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    <title>DSpace Collection: Monographica: the future of gene / II futuro del gene</title>
    <link>http://www.openstarts.units.it:80/dspace/handle/10077/5598</link>
    <description>Monographica: the future of gene / II futuro del gene</description>
    <pubDate>Sat, 25 May 2013 14:24:45 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-05-25T14:24:45Z</dc:date>
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      <title>DSpace Collection: Monographica: the future of gene / II futuro del gene</title>
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      <title>In defense of moral rights</title>
      <link>http://www.openstarts.units.it:80/dspace/handle/10077/5617</link>
      <description>Title: In defense of moral rights
Authors: de Mori, Barbara
Abstract: The Universal declaration of 1948 celebrated the belief in human rights as a great moral value. But what does this belief mean exactly? What are human rights precisely? Admitting the existence of human rights may cause difficulties for the moral theories involved and raise many problems. The problem of justification is particularly relevant: are human rights grounded on nature, that is on something unalterable and absolute, or are they the product of history and social life? Different moral theories of human rights give different answers. This paper, therefore, tries to investigate the controversial question of the justification of human rights by comparing the two main positions forwarded in proof of their existence, naturalization and denaturalization, which are developed inside the main moral theories of human rights. After showing the advantages and disadvantages of these rival arguments, some conclusions are drawn that could throw some light on the question of the justification of a concept, such as that of human rights, on which our present social life appears to be intrinsically based.
Type: Articolo</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2001-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Due concezioni della ragione pubblica a confronto. Dissezione analitica della nozione rawlsiana di ragione pubblica</title>
      <link>http://www.openstarts.units.it:80/dspace/handle/10077/5613</link>
      <description>Title: Due concezioni della ragione pubblica a confronto. Dissezione analitica della nozione rawlsiana di ragione pubblica
Authors: Schiavello, Aldo
Abstract: The idea of public reason — as well as the contraposition among public reason and private reasons — is strictly linked to the rise of pluralistic societies, societies in which the main problem is probably that of finding a lowest common denominator between different and often conflicting reasons. In a nutshell, the public reason is (or should be) just the core of principles and values shared by all the different philosophical and political doctrines. This paper is mainly focused on the very well-known conception of public reason developed by John Rawls as from the publishing of Political Liberalism.&#xD;
&#xD;
The aim of the first half of this paper is that of pointing out some serious difficulties connected with Rawls’ originary defence of public reason. In particular, in Political Liberalism Rawls assumes, without looking after to find some compelling evidence, that in pluralistic societies like ours the only way for understanding each other is that of constraining public debates and deliberations within the boundaries fixed by public reason, renouncing to deploy the whole truth. In this way, Rawls lays himself open to the critics of not taking seriously the freedom of speech. Furthermore, I argue that public reason is not able to ban comprehensive doctrines, either philosophical or religious, from public debates.&#xD;
&#xD;
In the second half of the paper, it will be argued for a "soft", more convincing, idea of public reason. In brief, the conception of public reason as "barrage" against all the reasons exceeding a political conception of justice will be replaced by the conception of public reason as "common denominator" or "translator" of these reasons.
Type: Articolo</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2001-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Moral Dilemmas in Greek Tragedies: a Discussion of Aeschylus’s Agamemnon and Sophokles’s Antigone</title>
      <link>http://www.openstarts.units.it:80/dspace/handle/10077/5612</link>
      <description>Title: Moral Dilemmas in Greek Tragedies: a Discussion of Aeschylus’s Agamemnon and Sophokles’s Antigone
Authors: Cowley, Christopher
Abstract: By looking at the situations faced by the protagonists of two classic plays (in purely philosophical terms rather than literary-critical or historical), I try to shed light on what it means to face an insoluble moral dilemma, what it might mean to deal with it, and how the dilemma can reveal certain crucial information about the decision-maker (i) to us readers-spectators, (ii) to other characters in the play who witness, or are implicated by, the incident, (iii) as well as, and perhaps most importantly, to the protagonist himself. In so doing, I distinguish the above dilemmas from moral-prudential dilemmas and from apparent dilemmas constituted by the mere lack of epistemological access. Indeed, I generally resist the various reductive approaches characteristic of much analytic moral philosophy, and challenge the notion of a uniquely right answer to which all rational moral agents can be held accountable.
Type: Articolo</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2001-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Trascendentalità e ragione argomentativa</title>
      <link>http://www.openstarts.units.it:80/dspace/handle/10077/5610</link>
      <description>Title: Trascendentalità e ragione argomentativa
Authors: Pieretti, Antonio
Abstract: This paper is a critical examination of Apel’s and Habermas’ models of human communication. Common to both philosophers is the stress on the relation between normative and empirical aspects of ethics. Although this relation is necessary in every ethical-oriented communication, the author shows that both in Apel and in Habermas it rests rather on a rational procedure stemming from relevant but limited fields - e.g. jurisprudence - than on an ethics of communication of our being in the world.
Type: Articolo</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2001 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2001-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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