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European Transport / Trasporti Europei (2010) 44/XV >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10077/6151
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| Title: | Rewarding instead of charging road users: a model case study investigating effects on traffic conditions |
| Authors: | Bliemer, Michiel C.J. van Amelsfort, Dirk H. |
| Keywords: | Pricing policies Rewarding Traffic conditions Peak avoidance |
| Issue Date: | 2010 |
| Publisher: | EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste |
| Citation: | Bliemer,M. C.J., van Amelsfort, D. H. (2010) Rewarding instead of charging road users: a model case study investigating effects on traffic conditions, European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, 44, pp. 23-40. |
| Series/Report no.: | European Transport / Trasporti Europei 44 |
| Abstract: | Instead of giving a negative incentive such as transport pricing, a positive incentive by rewarding
travelers for ‘good behavior’ may yield different responses. In a Dutch pilot project called Peak
Avoidance (in Dutch: “SpitsMijden”), a few hundred travelers participated in an experiment in which
they received 3 to 7 euros per day when they avoided traveling by car during the morning rush hours
(7h30–9h30). Mainly departure time shifts were observed, together with moderate mode shifts. Due to the
low number of participants in the experiment, no impact on traffic conditions could be expected. In order
to assess the potential of such a rewarding scheme on traffic conditions, a dynamic traffic assignment
model has been developed to forecast network wide effects in the long term by assuming higher
participation levels. This paper describes the mathematical model. Furthermore, the Peak Avoidance
project is taken as a case study and different rewarding strategies with varying participation levels and
reward levels are analyzed. First results show that indeed overall traffic conditions can be improved by
giving a reward, where low to moderate reward levels and participation levels of 50% or lower are
sufficient for a significant improvement. Higher participation and reward levels seem to become
increasingly counter-effective. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10077/6151 |
| ISSN: | 1825-3997 |
| Appears in Collections: | European Transport / Trasporti Europei (2010) 44/XV
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