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XXVII CICLO DEL DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN
SCIENCE DELL’INTERPRETAZIONE E DELLA TRADUZIONE

THE QUEST FOR ARGUMENTATIVE EQUIVALENCE
AN INTERPRETING-ORIENTED ARGUMENT ANALYSIS OF
POLITICAL SOURCE TEXTS ON THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Settore scientifico-disciplinare: L-LIN/12 LINGUA E TRADUZIONE - LINGUA INGLESE

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When I heard the learn’d astronomer,
When the proofs, the figures, were ranged in columns before me,
When I was shown the charts and diagrams, to add, divide, and measure them,
When I sitting heard the astronomer where he lectured with much applause in the lecture-room,

How soon unaccountable I became tired and sick,
Till rising and gliding out I wander’d off by myself,
In the mystical moist night-air, and from time to time,
Look’d up in perfect silence at the stars.

Walt Whitman, *When I Heard the Learn’d Astronomer*
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECB European Central Bank
ESM European Stability Mechanisms
EU European Union
IT Interpreted Text
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRT Interpretation Research and Theory
L1 First language / Mother tongue / Native language
L2 Second language
PSI Private Sector Involvement
SL Source Language
ST Source Text
TL Target Language
UMP Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO World Trade Organisation
**TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYMBOL</th>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>()</td>
<td>Brief pause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TOT sec)</td>
<td>Longer pause: the number in brackets indicates the duration of the pause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wor-</td>
<td>False start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Unintelligible syllable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>Unintelligible word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wo(rd)</td>
<td>Unintelligible phonemes or syllables which do not, however, prevent word comprehension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eh, ehm, ah, mh</td>
<td>Vocalised hesitations and disfluencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HESITATION</td>
<td>Non-vocalised hesitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a:</td>
<td>Vowel stretch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b:</td>
<td>Consonant stretch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/word 1, word 2/</td>
<td>Decoding uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wodr (!)</td>
<td>To dispel doubts about typing errors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>word.word.word</td>
<td>Syncopated rhythm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→word←</td>
<td>Accelerated pace of delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>←word→</td>
<td>Decelerated pace of delivery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Abstract

ABSTRACT

Interpreting activity is frequently performed in argumentative situations, i.e. communicative events whose purpose is the discursive “solution” of a conflict between different standpoints regarding one specific question. In their attempts at defending and attacking standpoints, speakers generally resort to argumentative techniques which determine the pragmatic force of speeches. In this respect, argumentation is essentially relative, as it depends on cultural conventions, contextual constraints and subjective factors. The relativity of argumentation compounds the interpreting task, as the quality of the interpreter’s performance within argumentative situations is determined by his/her ability to convey the argumentative purpose of the source text by reproducing the speaker’s convictions. Failure to do so is bound to lead to the production of pragmatically inequivalent interpreted texts.

Guided also by the intention partially to cater for the marked neglect of argumentation theories in interpreting research, the present research project focuses on political argumentation and pursues two main objectives: streamlining a suitable analytical methodology for the descriptive study of source-text argumentation in interpreting research and empirically assessing the relative nature of argumentation techniques with a view to providing suggestions for the interpretation of political speeches.

The study is based on a multilingual comparable corpus named ARGO. It is composed of three hundred and thirteen political speeches on the current financial and economic crisis, delivered by Barack Obama, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. The analysis focuses on the identification and description of content-related argumentation schemes, i.e. stereotypical patterns of reasoning recurrently exploited by politicians to legitimise or delegitimise given courses of action. In the light of the relative nature of argumentation, the presence in the corpus of significantly different argumentation schemes was hypothesised at the outset.

The findings of the contrastive analysis corroborate the initial hypothesis, as Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy and Hollande generally resort to extremely different argumentation schemes, which call for the adoption of specific interpreting strategies according to the speaker in question, the communicative context of speech delivery and the relevant audience. The results, thus, find useful application in interpreter training, in that, together with ARGO, they provide material and theoretical indications to sensitize students to relevant argumentation concepts with a view gradually to enhance their argumentative competence, understood as the ability to anticipate speakers’ arguments. More broadly, the results shed light on the predictability of political speeches and, consequently, foster the systematic adoption of argumentation analysis as a source-text research methodology, which could yield increasingly substantial findings paving the way for argumentative equivalence in interpreted argumentative situations.

Keywords: interpreting, political communication, economic crisis, argumentation, argumentation analysis, argument schemes, descriptivity, interpreting strategies.
L’interpretazione ha spesso luogo in situazioni argomentative, vale a dire eventi comunicativi miranti alla “soluzione” di una divergenza di opinioni in merito a una specifica questione. Nel tentativo di difendere o delegittimare determinate posizioni, gli oratori fanno solitamente ricorso a tecniche argomentative che determinano la forza pragmatica del discorso. In questo senso, l’argomentazione è essenzialmente relativa, poiché dipende da convenzioni culturali, vincoli contestuali e fattori soggettivi. La relatività delle tecniche argomentative complica il compito interpretativo, soprattutto considerando che, nelle situazioni argomentative, la qualità dell’interpretazione è determinata dall’abilità dell’interprete di trasmettere lo scopo argomentativo del testo di partenza. L’equivalenza passa, cioè, per il rispetto delle convinzioni dell’oratore, senza il quale l’interpretazione è destinata a produrre un testo non equivalente all’originale a livello pragmatico.

Guidato anche dall’intenzione di sopperire, seppur in misura minima, alla scarsa considerazione che le teorie dell’argomentazione godono nella ricerca in interpretazione, il presente progetto di ricerca circoscrive lo studio delle situazioni argomentative all’analisi dell’argomentazione in ambito politico, persegendo due obiettivi principali: la definizione di una metodologia appropriata per l’analisi descrittiva dell’argomentazione nei testi di partenza e la valutazione empirica della relatività delle tecniche argomentative, mirante alla formulazione di indicazioni per l’interpretazione di discorsi politici.

Lo studio si basa su un corpus comparabile multilingue denominato ARGO. Il corpus contiene trecentotredici discorsi politici sull’attuale crisi economico-finanziaria, pronunciati da Barack Obama, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy e François Hollande. L’analisi di ARGO è mirata all’individuazione e alla descrizione di schemi argomentativi, “ragionamenti” stereotipati che vengono spesso usati in ambito politico per legittimare o screditare determinate posizioni. Alla luce della natura relativa dell’argomentazione, la presenza di schemi argomentativi estremamente eterogenei è stata ipotizzata sin dall’inizio del progetto.

I risultati dell’analisi contrastiva confermano l’ipotesi iniziale, poiché Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy e Hollande fanno ricorso a diversi schemi argomentativi che richiedono l’utilizzo di diverse strategie interpretative a seconda dell’oratore in questione, del destinatario del discorso e del contesto in cui il discorso viene pronunciato. I risultati trovano pertanto utile applicazione in ambito didattico, poiché, insieme ad ARGO, forniscono materiale e indicazioni teoriche per sensibilizzare gli studenti a concetti argomentativi pertinenti all’interpretazione nella prospettiva di un graduale sviluppo della competenza argomentativa, intesa come l’abilità di anticipare le argomentazioni degli oratori. In maniera più generale, i risultati confermano la natura relativamente prevedibile dei discorsi politici; di conseguenza, avvalorano le implicazioni positive dell’analisi argomentativa dei testi di partenza in ambito interpretativo, il cui utilizzo sistematico è destinato a fornire risultati sempre più consistenti, affidabili e utili per promuovere la ricerca dell’equivalenza argomentativa nei testi interpretati.

Parole chiave: interpretazione, comunicazione politica, crisi economica, argomentazione, analisi argomentativa, schemi argomentativi, descrittività, strategie interpretative.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 On Convictions, Cooperation and Conflict in Monologue Interpreting

What is conference interpreting?
Conference interpreting deals exclusively with oral communication: rendering a message from one language into another, naturally and fluently, adopting the delivery, tone and convictions of the speaker and speaking in the first person (Directorate-General for Interpretation of the European Commission). (my emphasis)

The definition of conference interpreting provided by the Directorate-General for Interpretation of the European Commission (SCIC) might attract the attention of outsiders, but interpreters are unlikely to feel at ease with it. It is true that rendering messages fluently is not unusual to experienced interpreters, but hardly ever is it done naturally, as interpreting is, by definition, an unnatural activity (Riccardi 2005: 756). Moreover, the tasks of adopting the delivery, tone and convictions of the speaker are presented in an excessively simplistic way toning down the ever-present difficulty in conveying source language (SL) speakers’ messages without depriving them of all their nuances. Particularly, the stress on adopting the convictions of the speaker sounds decidedly normative, as it reckons without frequent interpreters’ failure in reproducing the intentionality and intensity of source texts (Palazzi 2007: 263). In other words, the definition sounds fairly idealistic, because interpreting in conference settings is described as if the speaker and the interpreter started the communicative process under the auspices of some sort of tacit “deal” ensuring smooth interlinguistic communication.

Interpreters’ definitions of interpreting are substantially different. First of all, the label “conference interpreting” merely refers to an interpreting setting (Viezzi 2013: 378), in which both the simultaneous and consecutive modes are adopted. No specific mention of interaction formats is provided in the above definition, despite their instrumental role in framing “interpreted situations”. The definition arguably refers mainly to monologue interpreting, which is characterised by the absence of mutual interaction between speakers and listeners (Viezzi 2013: 377).

As regards what interpreters are required to do, the definitions produced within interpreting scholarly settings are, again, substantially different from the SCIC definition, in that they generally focus on the actual operational challenges of the activity rather than on the remarkable albeit elusive results of some idealised interpreting performance.

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The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

Interpreting is a form of Translation in which a first and final rendition in another language is produced on the basis of a one-time presentation of an utterance in a source language (Pöchhacker 2004: 11). (my emphasis)

Pöchhacker’s definition, for instance, stresses the inevitable ephemeral presentation of the source text (ST) and the binding need for immediate production of the interpreted text (IT). It focuses on difficulties rather than ease, on weaknesses rather than strengths, thereby sounding more descriptive and less prescriptive than the SCIC definition; which comes as no surprise, as the DG Interpretation is an employer promoting its services, while interpreting scholars generally highlight the obstacles to quality for training and research purposes.

However simplistic, the comparison captures the rationale and the aim of this PhD project. The focus on problematic aspects of monologue interpreting is an essential introductory remark to the present dissertation. The research project addresses political communication and hinges precisely on challenges, focusing especially on the arduous task of reproducing the convictions of politicians, expressed by means of argumentation techniques.

In this approach, the following pages do not stem from a view of monologue conference interpreting as an activity naturally governed by the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975); which is by no means a denial of Grice’s communication theory, but the simple observation that a key principle underlying ordinary human communication does not apply to an unnatural form of communication like interpreting, in which speakers and interpreters, despite being engaged in a shared communicative process, do not actually abide by the φύσις of communication. Indeed, speakers “make assumptions about the listeners’ knowledge in line with the Gricean cooperative principle” but “do not, on the other hand, make any such assumptions about the interpreters’ knowledge” (Garwood 2002: 267-268). Hence,

interpreters find themselves in a rather anomalous position in the communication process in that they are not the intended addressees of the SL text, although it is the interpreters who must understand this text and then produce the TL text (Garwood 2002: 267-268).

It is precisely this anomalous position that reduces the scope for cooperation between the speaker and the interpreter: in monologue conference contexts, interpreting does not entail a communicative exchange between speaker and interpreter, as the flow of words and ideas is strictly unidirectional. In this respect, the interpreters’ most arduous task might be said to lie in grasping what speakers mean without having the possibility to interact with them; which does not hold true for dialogue interpreting: the cooperative principle might be said to operate fairly “naturally” in triadic exchanges, as the continuous negotiation of turns, content and roles (Straniero Sergio 2007) between participants entails cooperation at the micro- and macro-levels of discourse alike\(^2\).

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\(^2\) Acknowledging the interactional nature of dialogue interpreting is not tantamount to claiming that communication takes place on a level playing field. For instance, television interpreting is often characterised
Yet, things change in the monologue conference setting, where the alignment process (Straniero Sergio 2007: 37) is stifled irrespective of the modality adopted. On the one hand, consecutive interpreting might leave room for a limited degree of cooperation between the speaker and the interpreter who share the stage; the latter is allowed to ask the former for minor clarifications or repetitions of key concepts, but always running the risk of committing a face-threatening act (FTA) against him/herself, in Politeness terms. Cooperation is therefore limited to the micro-level of discourse and will only result in occasional requests for clarifications, if the interpreter does not wish to tarnish his professional reputation; in others words, no substantial negotiation is allowed between the speaker and the interpreter as regards turns, roles or content. On the other hand, no alignment process takes place in simultaneous interpreting, where the absence of direct contact between the speaker and the interpreter forces the latter to perform his/her communicative tasks on his/her own, in almost complete isolation. This also prevents cooperation at the micro-level of discourse from taking place, dooming the interpreter to a solitary communicative experience in the face of the cooperative exchange between the speaker and the audience (Garwood 2002: 267-268).

The most problematic aspect of the cooperation “ban” in monologue contexts lies particularly in the impossibility of content negotiation, also regarding the linguistic form through which the content is expressed.

Accessing speakers’ knowledge is, moreover, a demanding task and frequently results in dispersive and fruitless endeavours on the part of interpreters.

However well interpreters prepare for a conference, they will rarely share the same background knowledge as the other participants: there tends to be very little specialisation among free-lance interpreters. When given an assignment, interpreters obviously find out as much as they can about the topic, the participants, study any material given to them, and prepare a specific glossary. In this way the referential meaning of most of the utterances should be clear, but as they are not experts in the given field, the connotative meanings will not (Garwood 2002: 268).

These are the reasons why the Cooperative Principle has always found little scope in the literature on conference interpreting: simply, it is not a viable postulate, even though it

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by the “communicative monopoly” of one of the participants in the interaction, i.e. the presenter and mediator (Straniero Sergio 2007: 281). However, debate over the asymmetry of roles and varying types of alignment in dialogue interpreting contexts is not relevant to the present research and is thus best left to dialogue interpreting studies.

3 “Drawing on classical rhetoric, the interpreter can be said to be denied all opportunities for inventio, namely to decide what to say (invenire quid dicas), as the quest for res (content) to express through verba (arguments) is a prerogative of the speaker, the only author of the speech” (my translation).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

offers insights as a principle of ordinary communication. Incidentally, it has proved a useful framework for assessing the usability of the IT (Viezzi 1999: 150); yet, it has not much to do with the “relation” between the speaker and the interpreter and, thus, does not provide a reliable theoretical base for devising faithful models of interpreting activity.

In this respect, Chilton’s (2004: 20) minimalist view of communicative cooperation is the starting point of the present study, since it fosters the relativisation of Grice’s key notion, moving research away from idealistic models of interpreting activity. This methodological slant stems from the observation that conference interpreting has been extensively described in substantially different terms with respect to those adopted by the DG Interpretation, mainly drawing on semantic fields clashing with the concept of cooperation: interpreters are regularly faced with constraints (Riccardi 1998: 173-174) and problems (Gambier 2008: 65; Gile 1995a: 191), often leading to mistakes (Falbo 1998; 2002) or failures in reproducing the sociocultural value and communicative function of the ST (Palazzi 2007: 263). Interpreting efforts (Gile 1995a: 160) and the constant risk of shifts (Colucci 2011; Shlesinger 1995) in the ST-IT passage thus compel interpreters to adopt strategies and tactics (Gambier 2008: 72-74; Gile 1995a: 144), making interpreting a chiefly “problem-solving activity where the source-text is the problem and the target-text the solution” (Riccardi 1998: 172).

Seen from this angle, the interpreting process looks less like cooperation and rather like war between the speaker and the interpreter. The two can actually be regarded as enemies facing each other; the communicative event is the battlefield, in which words are hurled and ideas attacked or defended. The concomitant attacks coming from the ST lexical, syntactic and pragmatic features compel interpreters to adopt dynamic strategic behaviour (Riccardi 2005: 764-765) to avoid defeat, i.e. a poor quality IT flawed with a high number of casualties, namely mistakes and pragmatic shifts.

Despite not being explicitly stated, the comparison is latent in the literature, as attested by Gambier (2008) in his introductory remarks to the concept of strategy in translation and interpreting. Building on the assumption that translation and interpreting studies have always borrowed concepts and denominations from neighbouring disciplines (Gambier 2008: 63), Gambier specifies that strategy is a military term.

Le concept de stratégie a d’abord été utilisé pour la chose militaire (ce qui révèle son étymologie : stratos ‘armée’, àgein ‘commander’). Il dénote un plan général et un commandement, en vue d’atteindre un certain objectif explicite (Gambier 2008 : 64).

Through the interpreting is war metaphor, the Translator⁴ is regarded as a strategist, who devises a plan prior to Translation in order to attain a specific goal, which can be broadly identified with the production of a quality Translated text. The attainment of the goal is hampered by a variety of obstacles: besides language-independent and language-specific constraints (Riccardi 1998: 173), i.e. the intrinsic cognitive and operational

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⁴ As in Gile (1995a: 5), the terms Translation and Translator with an upper-case T are used as hypernyms for, respectively, translation and/or interpreting and translator and/or interpreter.
challenges of interpreting, knowledge about the topic, the speaker, the spatio-temporal setting and the type of text are further factors determining the success or failure of an interpreting performance, which is determined to a great extent by the absence of cooperation between speaker and interpreter. Therefore, a number of attacks, i.e. mistake triggers, are directly “launched” by the ST, its author and the context in which it is delivered. Riccardi (1998: 173) describes these factors in terms of the schemata that need to be activated before and during the interpreting process, meaning that preparation regarding the content, ethotic and contextual features of the communicative event is “essential to text comprehension and anticipation and to drive the information flow in the right direction” (Riccardi 1998: 173). Similarly, Kopczyński (1994: 190) describes the textual and contextual features requiring thorough preparation in terms of the “situational variables that might call for different priorities in different situations of translation”, and lists them as follows:

- the speaker, his status and the status of his receptors,
- the speaker’s intention in issuing the message,
- the speaker’s attitude toward the message and the receptors,
- the receptors’ attitude toward the message and the speaker,
- the interpreter, his/her competence, judgments, attitudes and strategies,
- the form of the message,
- the illocutionary force of the message,
- the existing norms of interaction and interpretation of a speech community,
- the setting.

The study of textual and contextual variables is, therefore, a prerequisite of a quality interpretation. It can be viewed as a pre-emptive attack the interpreter needs to launch prior to interpretation; it is part of a broader defensive plan ensuring victory, or at least an IT with no serious injuries.

The subject obviously raises the major dilemmas of the interpreter’s individual knowledge, advance preparation, interpreter training and exhaustive interpreter curricula. Indeed, unlike intrinsic constraints, the management of textual and contextual variables has a more pronounced individual dimension and is directly linked to interpreter training, particularly to the need gradually to develop the “textual and discoursal competence” (Garzone 2000: 73) enabling interpreters to tackle the speeches with a reasonable degree of confidence.

L’interprete ha dalla sua o dovrebbe avere dalla sua una certa conoscenza delle cose del mondo, del tema trattato, delle modalità comunicative proprie dei testi scambiati in certi eventi e in certe situazioni, un’aspettativa di ordine generale su quanto un particolare oratore potrà dire in un dato contesto e in un dato momento (Viezzi 2001: 193). 5

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5 “The interpreter masters or ought to master a certain knowledge of ‘the things of the world’, of the topic addressed, of the communicative modalities typical of texts uttered in given events and situations, and a general expectation regarding what a given speaker is likely to say in a given context and at a given moment” (my translation).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

The need to activate different schemata based on the variables of communicative events fits perfectly into the interpreting is war metaphor, as attested again by Gambier (2008: 64):

Le stratège se doit d’anticiper tous les facteurs qui pourraient avoir un impact sur cet objectif visé.

Even though Gambier refers to translation and interpreting alike, the deliberate mention of anticipation renders the comparison particularly suitable to interpreting activity. In this case, anticipation must not be understood in the narrow sense of “linguistic anticipation” (Gile 1995a: 173) but rather as prediction regarding the prospective unfolding of the ST and the communicative strategies through which SL speakers convey the informational content; this type of anticipation, i.e. anticipation acting “at the level of discourse plan” and “at the extra-linguistic level” (Garzone 2000: 74), is instrumental in helping the interpreter cater for the disadvantages brought about by his/her initial anomalous position in the confrontation with the speaker.

Whether linguistic or extralinguistic (Gile 1995a: 173-174), anticipation is a skill professional interpreters are (supposed to be) equipped with; thus, the present research project is primarily concerned with interpreter training and is mainly addressed to interpreting scholars, rather than to professional interpreters. In this respect, the comments will hold true for simultaneous and consecutive interpreting alike, even though the latter has been progressively ousted by the former, especially in political communication.

This is, in general terms, the area of investigation of the present research project. In the interpretation of political speeches, the thorough study of the textual and contextual variables of communicative events is particularly significant, because the ethotic and persuasive dimensions of discourse also become prominent, which are less salient in other communicative events such as specialist conferences. This implies that, with respect to other types of interpreting taking place in different communicative contexts, interpreting political speeches is subject to a higher number of attacks. The politician is often a professional rabble-rouser, who has received a rhetorical training, leverages his/her reputation and resorts to communicative strategies of all sorts. In “military” terms, in the political context, the interpreter’s enemy is generally armed to the teeth. The confrontation is thus decidedly uneven as regards knowledge of the subject matter and communicative competence alike. Without a defensive plan, the interpreter is bound to face defeat.

However, despite the interpreter’s disadvantageous position in the political interpreting battlefield offers an advantage: political communication is predictable (Zarefsky 2009: 115) and recurrent (Reisigl 2010: 243); therefore, a considerable amount of information on the enemy can potentially be extracted with respect to non-political communicative events. This is, in sum, the aim of the present project: promoting the study of enemies and helping interpreters face their “private” battles by mainstreaming one of the most famous war maxims into interpreting research and training.

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6 The training-oriented rationale of the project will be thoroughly addressed throughout the thesis.
If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles;
if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one;
if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle.⁷

1.2 The Role of Research on ST Argumentation in Interpreting Studies

The literature taken into account in section 1.1 shows that a substantial number of interpreting constraints are directly linked to the textual and contextual variables of communicative events; regarding which, the present study draws on Reisigl & Wodak (2009: 94) and builds on the assumption that politicians resort to discursive strategies that can be seen as weapons threatening ST comprehension.

By ‘strategy’, we generally mean a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 94).

Consequently, an effective defensive plan requires at least an intuitive knowledge of the communicative strategies adopted by the interpreter’s enemy, enabling the preparation of a suitable counter-attack strategy.

L’interpretazione si basa su strategie comunicative deliberatamente adottate – basate, a loro volta, su comportamenti comunicativi tipici e sul riconoscimento degli stessi – e su strategie di produzione linguistica che sono specifiche per coppie di lingue (Viezzi 2001: 133-134).⁸

Since interpreting strategies depend on speakers’ strategies and their language, quality in interpreting is determined to a great extent by the study of STs, shedding light on the communicative routines of SL speakers. Even though interpreting is an interlinguistic and intercultural activity, research can benefit from a chiefly monolingual ST analysis, aiming at studying implications for the prospective interpretation of the speeches analysed. After all, the interpreting-oriented text analytical approach to STs is no new insight in interpreting studies, despite the shared assumption that empirical research is “une recherche menée directement à partir de phénomènes d’interprétation observés sur le terrain” (Gile 1995b: 201). Garzone (2000: 69) claims that models based on textual analysis are likely to shed light on the nature of texts for which interpretation is required and complains that scarce “attention has been devoted to texts involved in interpreting activity, and in particular to the source text”. The reason for the marked neglect of original speeches has to be sought primarily in the fleeting nature of oral language that has always prevented the ST from becoming a fully-fledged object of inquiry (Garzone 2000: 69-70), despite its pivotal

⁸ “Interpreting is based on deliberately-adopted communicative strategies – which are based, in turn, on typical communication patterns and their recognition – and on discourse-production strategies specific for language-pairs” (my translation).
role of input and determiner of the interpreting process. Though the importance of practice and the need for solid procedural competence cannot be overlooked, reflection on STs is, indeed, equally instrumental:

Ma l’interpretazione non è, né può essere, mera esecuzione: richiede profonda riflessione, riconoscimento e capacità di utilizzazione di meccanismi comunicativi, capacità di attuazione di strategie interpretative adeguate. La natura stessa dell’interpretazione, con i suoi vincoli temporali estremamente rigidi e la sua complessità cognitiva, limita o addirittura esclude la possibilità di analisi approfondite durante lo svolgimento di compiti di interpretazione simultanea o consecutiva; di qui la necessità di acquisire preliminarmente le conoscenze e le competenze comunicative e interpretative che costituiscono il fondamento di ogni scelta operata e consentano di adottare comportamenti strategici durate lo svolgimento dell’attività interpretativa (Viezzi 2001: 133).

Hence, the present project picks up the gauntlet thrown down by Garzone and Viezzi by turning to descriptive and comparative linguistics in order to study political STs and draw meaningful insights for the interpreter’s sake.

Given the variety of research opportunities offered by text analysis, choosing a specific research focus is essential to achieve reliable results, even more so in a multilingual perspective, as excessively “philosophical” and critical studies on the one hand, or analyses exclusively focusing on specific categories of lexico-syntagmatic elements on the other, would turn out to be pointless or dispersive for interpreting purposes. Take the example of figures of speech. However insightful for descriptive purposes raising interpreters’ awareness of ST specificities, a detailed study of figures of speech in a set of mutually relevant texts is unlikely to yield meaningful data shedding light on how to reproduce ST rhetoric, the reason for which is simple:

Le discours rhétorique n’est jamais tout à fait paraphrasable; autrement dit, on ne peut le traduire, même dans sa propre langue, par un discours ayant tout à fait le même sens (Reboul 1991: 110).

Even though Reboul broadly refers to the uniqueness of any rhetorical speeches, more specific interpreting insights can be drawn. In simple interpreting terms, rhetoric is “partially untranslatable” and, consequently, the applicability of the study of ST rhetoric to interpreting is limited or “partially relevant”. For instance, the absence of anaphora in the IT would not prevent the audience from grasping the speaker’s intended meaning. Or, think of alliteration that is often bound to perish against the intrinsic differences between languages.

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9 “Yet, interpreting is not and could not be mere performing: it requires deep reflection, the recognition of communicative strategies, the ability to use them appropriately and the implementation of appropriate interpreting strategies. The nature of interpreting itself, with its severe time constraints and cognitive complexity, limits or even prevents the opportunity for deep analyses during simultaneous or consecutive interpreting; hence the need preliminarly to acquire the communicative and interpretative knowledge and skills underlying any decision and enabling the adoption of strategies during interpretation” (my translation).
Chapter 1 | Introduction

So we must harness new ideas and technology to *remake* our government, *revamp* our tax code, *reform* our schools (Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, 21st January 2013). (my emphasis)

The alliteration undoubtedly determines the pragmatic force of the speech passage but its reproduction is not demanded despite the rhetorical mitigation in the IT, as interpreters are generally dispensed from the task of “translating the untranslatable”. A translation sounding like “*to reform our government, our tax code and our schools*” would not overturn the speaker’s illocution.

Yet, the remarks do not hold true for *figures of thought* such as allusions, rhetorical questions or *storytelling*, concerning illocution and perlocution rather than the creation of specific rhythmic and prosodic effects; their reproduction is paramount in order to guarantee equivalence of the communicative function (Viezzi 1999: 147) between the ST and the IT.

Rhetoric is, therefore, not the focus of the present project. Rather, the research focus might be simplistically identified with the analysis of the *convictions* of speakers, to use the terms of the idealistic SCIC definition. Indeed, rather than on rhetoric, the project focuses on *argumentation*, the study of which also encompasses the analysis of *figures of thought*. Broadly, an *argument* is nothing other than a sentence presupposing the acceptance of another (Reboul 1991: 100; 2004: 56) and aims at resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint (van Eemeren 2010: 1); which is partly explained by the polysemous meaning of the term, relating to the notion of *confrontation*. Arguments rest upon *schemes*, i.e. more or less conventionalised logical reasoning patterns which will be the focus of the present research project. They reflect speakers’ reasoning and, consequently, their alleged *convictions*.

The study of argumentation is encompassed in the broader study of text pragmatics (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 12), because argumentation depends on cultural conventions (Marzocchi 1998: 6), the communicative context of speech delivery (Marzocchi 1997: 182), the topic addressed (Reisigl 2014: 77) and the speaker (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 3). Therefore, the relevance of the argumentative approach to STs lies in the aforementioned need for reckoning with situational variables and is again well explained drawing on the military semantic field.

*toute stratégie tient compte des conditions [...] dans lesquelles elle cherche à se réaliser* (Gambier 2008: 64).

While monologue research on argumentation is a chiefly hermeneutical practice broadly pertaining to the philosophy of language, in interpreting research it aims at gaining insights into *what* speakers say, *how* they say it and *what they mean* by saying it. Indeed, the effectiveness of arguments in persuading audiences is determined by their informational content and *packaging* alike (van Eemeren 2010: 93), to use Gile’s terms (1995a: 35).

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Thus, like all studies on political communication in interpreting research, the argumentative approach to STs aims at highlighting problematic aspects of political speeches and suggesting solutions (Viezzi 2001: 192). In this respect, the project is primarily training-oriented, in that it aims at yielding findings that are likely to enhance the interpreter’s *argumentative competence*, understood as the ability to anticipate and reproduce speakers’ arguments and guarantee *argumentative equivalence* between the ST and the IT. The notions of *argumentative competence* and *argumentative equivalence* will be formulated and further addressed in chapter 3, by drawing on the most influential argumentative contributions.

1.3 Research Purposes and Research Questions

The project is primarily concerned with the argumentation analysis of a set of political speeches. The corpus of reference, which was named *ARGO*, is composed of three hundred and thirteen speeches on the economic crisis. It is divided into three sub-corpora, each containing speeches delivered by Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy/François Hollande. The corpus will be described in detail in chapter 4.

The project has two main objectives. The first is chiefly theoretical and concerns the streamlining of a ST research methodology that can prove “a powerful key to text structure and text meaning” (Marzocchi 1997: 182), which is done building on Marzocchi’s seminal comments regarding the scope for argumentation theory in interpreting studies (1994, 1997, 1998). Despite Marzocchi’s contributions, however, the significance of argumentation theories for interpreting research has yet to be determined (Crevatin 1998: xiv), especially considering that the field of argumentation is constantly and rapidly expanding.

The second aim is more “practical” and revolves around the empirical assessment of the relative nature of argumentation. The analysis is clearly not conducted as a mere hermeneutical practice but considering the implications for the prospective interpretation of the corpus speeches and, especially, the implications for the prospective interpretation of speeches like the corpus speeches.

Basically, the study of argumentative features in the *ARGO* corpus aims at answering a simple research question: *do different speakers deal with the same topic differently?* Or, more specifically, *do they resort to different argument schemes when faced with the same topic?* Given the cultural nature of argumentation, the various contexts of situations in which the speeches were delivered and the different national implications of the economic crisis, the hypothesis is *Yes, they do*. A positive answer would raise other interpreting-related questions such as *Is there a need for specific argumentation-driven preparation? What do interpreters need to know about this specific type of speech before interpreting it?*

The analysis makes up the most substantial part of the project. Even though Marzocchi proposed an argumentation analysis of the *Troonrede 1990*\(^{11}\) (1998: 71-113), his studies

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\(^{11}\) The *Troonrede* is the “Speech from the Throne” delivered by the Queen of the Netherlands.
were mainly directed at laying down exhaustive guidelines for the application of argumentation concepts and methods to interpreting studies. In other words, no substantial and extensive argumentation analyses are present in the literature, and the analysis of ARGO is a first attempt at assessing the benefits of argument analysis on a vast corpus scale.

1.4 Possible Misunderstandings

Even though the project primarily concerns the analysis of a corpus of texts, the present research is neither a corpus-based nor a corpus-driven study. Rather, it is a corpus-based study only insofar as “it is empirical, analyzing the actual patterns of use in natural texts” and “it utilizes a large and principled collection of natural texts, known as ‘corpus’, as the basis for analysis” (Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1998: 4). However, it cannot be considered a corpus-based study in that it does not make “extensive use of computers for analysis, using both automatic and interactive techniques” and it does not depend “on both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques” (Biber, Conrad & Reppen 1998: 4).

Argumentation analysis is a largely qualitative research for specific reasons: argumentation is field-dependent (Toulmin 1958: 14-15), meaning that it depends on contextual shared assumptions, and enthymemic, in that it is shortened on the linguistic surface structure, i.e. partially implicit (Reisigl 2012: 2-4; 2014: 72). A thorough analysis of contextual and implicit features is, therefore, essential.

Corpus linguistics would not be particularly helpful anyhow, because specific categories for argument detection by means of corpus linguistics tools have yet to be determined. In simpler terms, if a researcher wanted to find arguments through corpus linguistics tools, s/he would not know exactly which headword or phrase to look for and type, because arguments do not rely on given lexico-syntagmatic elements. Similarly, the frequent occurrence of a given word or phrase would not be indicative of the recurrence of a given argument. The speeches have to be thoroughly read through in order to detect “hidden” or “compacted” arguments hinging on presuppositions and political implicatures (van Dijk 2005b), i.e. features of communication eluding corpus linguistic tools. Moreover, chapter 3, proposing a sifting of argumentation theories, will show that the most influential argumentation frameworks do not rely on corpus linguistics, even though the discipline is rapidly gaining ground in argumentation scholarly spheres as well. However, by building on the analytical findings and hinging on Garzone & Santulli’s (2004) comments regarding the compatibility of text analysis and corpus linguistics, the prospective scope for corpus linguistics in argument analysis will be discussed in chapter 9.

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12 Corpus-based investigations use corpora as sources of examples, to check research intuition or to examine the frequency and/or plausibility of the language contained within a smaller data set. Corpus-driven analyses proceed in a more inductive way - the corpus itself is the data and the patterns in it are noted as a way of expressing regularities and exceptions in language (Baker 2006: 16).
1.5 Limitations of the Study

The analysis of argumentation is quintessentially a hermeneutical practice (Marzocchi 1997: 182; Marzocchi 1998: 8). It is therefore no surprise that argumentation theories often place themselves within the theoretical boundaries of the philosophy of language, which explains why their relevance has to be carefully assessed before applying them to a profession-oriented domain like interpreting research.

The hermeneutical nature of argument analysis renders the study vulnerable to criticism levelled against lack of objectivity. This is the first and main limitation of the present study that, like all argumentation analysis, is characterised by subjective interpretation of textual data (Marzocchi 1998: 28). However, the limitation is not exclusive to argumentation analysis, as it is also shared by more “objective” research methodologies such as corpus linguistics.

Our findings are interpretations, which is why we can only talk about restricting bias, not removing it completely. A potential problem with researcher interpretation is that it is open to contestation (Baker 2006: 18).

As to the “duty” to restrict bias, the description of the arguments adopted by the corpus speakers will be systematically motivated and reference will be made to theoretical rationales and textual evidence alike.

A second limitation of the study might be identified in the lack of “translational evidence”: even though evidence of professional interpreters’ difficulty in reproducing SL speakers’ arguments will be provided throughout the thesis by means of selected examples drawn from CorIT\textsuperscript{13}, the extent to which previous knowledge of speakers’ argument schemes by the interpreter actually benefits the overall comprehension of the ST and favours the production of the respective IT will not be tested, even though this kind of research is certainly promising (Crevatin 1998: xiv). The reason for the lack of translational evidence in the present study mainly lies in the fact that experimentation is the final step of the lasting process regarding the mainstreaming of argumentation concepts and methods to interpreting research. The present project focuses on the first steps of the process, namely the theoretical assessment of the relevance of argumentation theories and the empirical analysis of a corpus of STs by means of a specific methodology. At the end of the dissertation, an intuitive model will be proposed for the presentation of analytical findings, with a view to sensitising interpreter trainees to significant argumentation concepts. Its testing in interpreting classrooms, however, is future work and will depend on future resources and research possibilities.

\textsuperscript{13} CorIT is the television interpreting corpus developed at the University of Trieste.
1.6 Outline of the Thesis

In chapter 2, introductory remarks on political speeches will be outlined to frame the area of investigation of the research project. Particular attention will be paid to the manifold pragmatic variables of political speeches. Moreover, evidence of professional interpreters’ difficulty in reproducing ST argumentation will be provided to serve as a rationale for the argumentation analysis; in this respect, the pragmatic foundation of the present work will be expounded.

Chapter 3 will first outline the scope of ST argumentation analysis in interpreting research and then provide an overview of the most influential argumentation theories; their relevance to interpreting studies will be assessed based on the yardstick of descriptivity; subsequently, the analytical methodology adopted for corpus analysis will be thoroughly addressed.

The reference corpus, named ARGO, will be described in chapter 4, where the text selection procedure and the corpus details will similarly be presented.

Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 make up the most substantial part of the thesis in that they present the results of the argumentation analysis of ARGO. The argumentative specificities of the speeches delivered by Barack Obama, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande will be addressed in turn.

Finally, chapter 9 will include the conclusions of the three-year project. Particularly, building on interpreter trainees’ need for limited and streamlined theoretical indications (Gile 1995a: 18-20), a model will be proposed to be used in classrooms, aiming at fostering student internalisation of relevant argumentation concepts. Furthermore, the implications of the findings for interpreting research and interpreter training will be addressed together with the presentation of future work on the analysis of the corpus.
Chapter 2

THE INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL SPEECHES

The interpretation of political speeches is no new topic in interpreting studies, as the interpreting profession was actually “born” within politics (Kellett 1999: 11-19). However, only over the last couple of decades have the specificities of political speeches been addressed with an eye to the interpreting process, as research was initially concerned with model-devising and the formulation of norms and principles for interpreting activity. From the first anecdotal publications (Herbert 1952; Rozan 1956) to the formulation of the théorie du sens (Seleskovitch 1968) and research on the cognitive implications of interpreting (Gran 1992, 1999; Gran & Fabbro 1987, 1988), the situatedness and ensuing relativity of political speeches have been substantially neglected, as a consequence of a widespread reluctance in addressing the relations between interpreting and its specific fields of application (Viezzi 2001: 132).

Only with the advent of the socio-cultural turn (Pöchhacker 2006; 2008: 38) of interpreting studies has political communication begun to be analysed with a view to finding appropriate strategies of interpretation. With the rising interests in the situationality and pragmatics of interpreting in the 1990s, case studies began to be conducted and methodological suggestions were formulated. Seminal works include Munday’s (2012: 42-79) empirical study of the strategies adopted to interpret Barack Obama’s 2009 Inaugural Address; Baker’s (1997) analysis of non-cognitive constraints in political interviews; and Schöffner’s (1997a) empirical research on the specificities of different types of political texts, resulting in the analyses of Helmut Kohl and Richard von Weizsäcker’s speeches delivered in the context of German reunification (1997b). More relevant works to the present project include Viezzi’s (2001: 195) analysis of Blair’s 1999 speech at the XXI Congress of the Socialist International and Marzocchi’s (1998: 71) argumentative analysis of the Troonrede 1990.

However, Viezzi’s (2001: 131) complaint about the notable scarcity of studies devoted to the interpretation of political discourse still holds true after more than a decade; despite being a promising research domain, the study of “la comunicazione politica in quanto oggetto di interpretazione”1 (Viezzi 2001: 134) seems more thriving in training than scholarly settings, as attested by the large number of BA and MA theses building on the aforementioned literature to venture into targeted surveys, especially as far as monologue analyses are concerned (Milan 2005; Gatto 2006; Brambilla 2011). Analyses of parallel texts are not neglected either; the theoretical framework of Error Analysis (EA) (Falbo 2002) is often adopted to analyse interpreters’ performances in rendering political speeches (Vitolo 2014). Yet the scarce number of available and reliable parallel corpora prevents extensive analyses from being carried out, with evident limitations concerning result reliability. In this respect, CorIT offers a useful albeit neglected research tool in Trieste, as

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1 “political communication as the object of interpreting” (my translation).
attested by the limited number of related studies (Colucci 2011; Dal Fovo 2011, 2012, 2014).

In the light of the above, streamlined and non-exhaustive overview, the interpretation of political speeches is still a promising field of research, also considering the constant changes involved in politics (Reisigl 2010: 244), “la cui specificità determina necessariamente una specificità dell’interpretazione quando applicata alla comunicazione politica stessa”² (Viezzi 2001: 132). Despite having been substantially neglected, the subject does not need to be given a fresh start, as the aforementioned literature provides reliable groundwork for conducting targeted analyses. The present chapter will therefore not dwell on pointless re-theorisation; rather, seminal tenets will be reaffirmed to serve as introductory comments framing the area of investigation of the present research. To this end, further relevant contributions will be examined and supplemented with recent insights drawn from discourse studies. In this respect, the present chapter is meant to provide a contribution to the systematisation of the topic by highlighting the manifold variables of political communication and sketching promising lines of research.

2.1 Variables and Features of Political Communication

Attempts to define the concept of political speech lie at the heart of discourse and interpreting studies alike. The adoption of an exhaustive and sufficiently versatile definition is also the prerequisite of the present research project, aiming first and foremost at framing the research object by taking into account all the textual and contextual variables of political speeches. After all, research into the interpretation of political speeches might be said broadly to address heterogeneity and variation.

By taking into consideration both interpreting and translation, Schäffner (1997a: 119) clarifies that political text itself is a vague term.

It is an umbrella term covering a variety of text types, or genres. Political discourse includes both inner-state and inter-state discourse, and it may take various forms.

As regards interpreting, Viezzi (2001: 136-137) specifies that the various forms a speech can take are determined by thematic, functional and situational criteria. These three central criteria can be said to derive from classical rhetoric, according to which speeches were distinguished based on “the social function, the occasion and - related to that - the place of delivery” (Reisigl 2010: 244). However, both discourse and interpreting studies have partially moved away from the classical foundation of the study of political communication, as the ancient rhetorical distinction between judicial, deliberative and epideictic genre has now become abstract and ideal (Reisigl 2010: 244).

² “whose specificity determines the specificity of interpreting when required in political communication contexts” (my translation).
Since the first rhetorical genre theory was outlined by Aristotle, political situations, systems, conditions and circumstances have changed and become increasingly complex, and, with these transformations, the forms, types and functions of political speeches have also altered remarkably. [...] Thus, the ancient rhetorical view of speeches alone cannot do analytical justice to the many complex political changes (Reisigl 2010: 244).

Faced with the obsolescence of classical rhetoric, Reisigl proposes a “transdisciplinary politolinguistic approach” (2010: 244) to political speeches thoroughly to assess the features of modern political communication. The situational, thematic and functional aspects of political speeches are addressed starting from the notions of polity, policy and politics.

Politolinguistics theoretically relies on actual concepts in political science, as well as on rhetorical and discourse analytical categories. [...] Politolinguistics builds on a differentiated concept of “the political” that, amongst others, distinguishes among the three dimensions of polity, policy and politics, and tried to grasp the specific political functions of speeches with respect to these dimensions more accurately than the traditional rhetorical approach did. According to this theoretical distinction, political speeches can be “political” in a threefold sense.

**Polity** broadly refers to the organisational structure of government and particularly relates to the constraints of cultural and institutional contexts:

**Polity** concerns the political frame for political actors, i.e. the formal or structural prerequisites and basic political principles of political action. [...] The constitution, the political system, the political culture, political norms and values as well as legal and institutional rules are associated with this dimension (Reisigl 2010: 244-246).

**Policy** concerns content:

**Policy** concerns the content-related dimension of political action. It regards the formulation of political tasks, aims and programmes in the different fields of policy, such as foreign policy, domestic affairs, social policy, cultural and educational policy, economic policy, family policy etc. (Reisigl 2010: 246).

**Politics** basically refers to the functions of political speeches:

**Politics** concerns political processes, i.e. the question of how and with whose help politics are [sic!] performed. Politics revolves around the formulation of political interests, the dissensual positioning against others, the conflict between political actors (be they single politicians or “collective actors” like parties, nations etc.), political advertising and fighting for followers and the acquisition of power. Its main purpose is to assert oneself against political opponents, in order to make a specific policy possible (ibid.).

In the light of Reisigl’s comments, the variables of political speeches and the resulting criteria for categorisation can be summarised in the following table.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

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<th>CRITERIA FOR POLITICAL SPEECH CATEGORISATION</th>
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Table 2.1 Variables of Political Speeches and Criteria for Categorisation

Even though the three dimensions of politics always intertwine, political speeches can be concerned to varying degrees with one of the three. For example, amongst the speeches which primarily focus on polity are commemorative speeches, anniversary speeches and ceremonial addresses (Reisigl 2010: 246); ministerial speeches, opening speeches on the occasion of commercial fairs and parliamentary debates focus, instead, on policy; finally, election speeches are the prototypical politics speeches (ibid.).

Therefore, thematic, situational and functional criteria are instrumental in framing political speeches, whatever the purpose of discourse analysis. In interpreting research, the focus on the three aspects is aimed at furthering reflection on how the interpreter is required to behave in carrying out his/her translational task.

In the following sections, recent insights drawn from discourse studies will again be used to supplement the tenets of interpreting literature regarding the variables and features of political communication, in the attempt to help diversify and streamline interpreter preparation. The three aspects of political speeches will be addressed separately for the sake of clarity but the topicality of a speech, its function and the setting in which it is delivered are mutually dependent and all contribute to determining the specific configuration of a speech.

2.1.1 WHAT: Topics

A political speech is, first and foremost, a speech addressing political issues (Viezzi 2001: 136; Schäffner 1997a: 119) and in this respect, the categorisation of a speech as political is also based on thematic criteria (Schäffner 1997a: 119).

Political discourse will be primarily about politics […]. That is, we may typically expect overall meanings related to political systems, ideologies, institutions, the political process, political actors, and political events. In other words, much political discourse is reflexive (van Dijk 1997: 25). (my emphasis)

Topical reflexivity is not simply a feature but a distinctive feature of political speeches:
This is not quite trivial, because this reflexivity is not typical for educational, scholarly, or legal discourse. Thus, campaigning politicians will speak about themselves as candidates, about the elections, about voting for them, and the policies they promise to support when elected. They speak about opponents and political enemies and about the bad politics and policies of previous presidents, governments or parliaments. [...] In sum, topically, political discourse is at least partly topically about politics itself. (van Dijk 1997: 25).

The focus on political processes does not mean that political communication is denotative and/or static, i.e. exclusively concerned with the verbalisation of current legislative processes.

The macropropositions (topics) of political discourse may typically be modalized [...] events and actions may be necessarily, probably or possibly the case in the past, present or future; actions may be permitted or obligatory, wished or regretted, and so on. [...] Political topics will be mainly about political actors (politicians, elites, public figures and social institutions and organizations) and their typical actions, in past, present and especially future (van Dijk 1997: 27-28). (my emphasis)

The extensive use of the future tense, stemming from politicians’ need to project discourse on future (and therefore vague) achievements thereby diverting attention from current needs, has already been proved a cornerstone of war rhetoric. For instance, Dunmire’s (2007) analysis of the discourse on the war on terror deals primarily with politicians’ habit to focus on emerging threats and coming dangers. In this respect, empirical analyses assessing the relevant prominence of given tenses in other domains of political communication could have significant implications for interpreting too, considering interpreters’ difficulties in translating verb tenses (Hale 2004: 131). As to modalisation, furthering research on politicians’ modalising routines with a view to interpretation might be similarly fruitful, especially in the light of interpreters’ tendency to arbitrary modalisation through the recurrent use of connective fillers (Colucci 2011: 77). However, the mere study of verb tenses and/or modalisation makes up a limited and non-independent research area, providing useful indications which are, though, unlikely to prove instrumental in enhancing the overall quality of ITs.

If the comments on the reflexivity of political communication might be considered to indicate a certain topical “simplicity”, it is vital to clarify that “in principle political discourse may be about virtually any topic” even though “we may assume that political discourse also exhibits preferred topics” (van Dijk 1997: 25) as a consequence of the strong ritualisation of politics (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 17-18).

To try and understand what a speech is or might be about, the distinction between discourse and text as described by Reisigl & Wodak (2009: 89) provides an insightful conceptual base: a discourse is always related to a macro-topic and “texts are parts of discourses”. For instance, a text by Barack Obama on the Payroll Tax Cut is “embedded” in the discourse on the economic crisis. The management of the macro-topic by the American President might be said basically to concern the legitimisation of policies aiming at ending the recession in the United States; the specific speech, however, will mainly focus on the
speaker’s discursive attempts to gain consensus for the implementation of the specific act in question, in a continuous integration of general and shared information regarding the crisis with “new”, continuously developing updates.

We may thus expect political actors to topicalize especially what is now the case and what should be done about it (van Dijk 1997: 27).

Yet, a political speech must not be regarded exclusively as a macro-topic-related text regarding one specific issue but as something more complex, as “political discourse usually combines its topics with those from other societal domains” (van Dijk 1997: 25):

Thus a debate about immigration policies is not only about government policies, but also about immigration or minorities, and the same is true for political meetings, discussions, debates, speeches or propaganda about education, health care, drugs, crime, the economy, (un)employment, or foreign affairs. This seems to open up a Pandora-box of possible topics and to suggest that formulating topical constraints in political discourse seems pointless (van Dijk 1997: 25-26).

In substance, political discourse is substantially reflexive and related to a macro-topic (a speech on $x$); it naturally topicalises current situations but also draws on other topics, which are often borrowed from other societal domains; hence, every single speech is likely to be made up of diverse subjects. The choice of topics by politicians is, however, not arbitrary and depends on communication settings and the juncture at which speeches are delivered.

However, even with this broad scope of topics, there are such constraints. [...] Incidentally, one of the major fields lacking in discourse analysis is a sub-discipline of Topics [...] or ‘topology’ which studies, among other things, what various types of discourses in what situations may be about (van Dijk 1997: 26).

In this regard, corpus analysis will outline the discourse web built up by the speakers in their dealing with the macro-topic of the economic crisis. For instance, the findings will show that Obama’s discourse is systematically combined with, among others, the macro-topic of education, especially in national addresses. The combination of political topics with topics of other domains is a feature of political communication that is usually referred to as interdiscursivity.

Interdiscursivity signifies that discourses are linked to each other in various ways. If we conceive of ‘discourse’ as primarily topic-related (as ‘discourse on $x$’), we will observe that a discourse on climate change frequently refers to topics or subtopics of other discourses, such as finances or health. Discourses are open and often hybrid; new sub-topics can be created at many points (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 90)

Moreover, texts themselves are linked to other texts in various ways. This feature is referred to as intertextuality:


**Intertextuality** means that texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present. Such connections are established in different ways: through explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through reference to the same events; by allusions or evocations; by the transfer of main arguments from one text to the next, and so on. The process of transferring given elements to new contexts is labelled *recontextualisation* (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 90).

Political speeches can, therefore, be said to encompass different topics, which can be arranged from the more general to the more specific, according to their *kinship* to others.

![Figure 2.1 The Topical Family Tree of Political Communication](image)

Any political speech could be a case in point. Take David Cameron’s *Speech on Wellbeing*, delivered on November 25th, 2010. Political processes are addressed to outline what the government is doing to improve the well-being of British citizens. Well-being is, indeed, the macro-topic of the speech. It is addressed as a composite concept, as it actually is. Interdiscursive references including natural catastrophes (*earthquake*), immigration, red tape and Cameron’s recurrent focus on the *Big Society* ideology occur to “shore up” the main arguments; intertextual references to Robert Kennedy and economists and social scientists Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen further validate the main standpoint, i.e. “government’s” instrumental “role in improving people’s lives in the broadest sense”. However, the topical theme of the economic crisis was bound to be addressed, as it directly affects well-being. Dealing with the crisis is instrumental in dispelling fear that focus on

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3 The speech is included in the reference corpus, where it is referred to as UK_12, being the twelfth speech of the British sub-corpus.
4 Cameron’s discursive routines will be outlined in chapter 6.
well-being could be “a distraction from the major, urgent economic tasks at hand”. In this regard, “economic growth” is considered “a means to an end”. As shown in the family tree of political topics (see figure 2.1), the economic crisis “generates” its own interdiscursive and intertextual references, respectively a comparison with the previous crisis in times of war (“At a time when we are recovering from the longest and deepest recession since the war”) and reference to the Regional Growth Fund. Another telling example is provided by Cameron’s speech at the World Economic Forum, delivered on January 24th, 20135: despite the general focus on economic issues, the British Prime Minister addressed the burning issue of the threat of terrorism, following the French-led intervention in the Northern Mali conflict. In this case, the branch of the “current topic” in the topical family tree of political communication stems from the trunk, i.e. from topical reflexivity, rather than from the general macro-topic.

Discourse studies are increasingly moving towards analyses of interdiscursive and intertextual relations in political discourse. For instance, Foxlee’s (2009) study of Obama’s first presidential campaign identifies the President’s intertextual routines in the discursive tradition of Abraham Lincoln and the Founding Fathers on the one hand, and that of Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights movement on the other. In his more extensive analysis of Presidential rhetoric in the United States, Austermühl (2014) goes further by highlighting intertextual links that “survive” throughout American history, which has led the author to talk of The Great American Scaffold.

Interdiscursivity and intertextuality, understood as fundamental features determining the recurrent topicality of political speeches, will be taken into account in the analysis of the corpus in that they have specific implications for the interpreter: in simple terms, interpreting is a hic et nunc activity (Viezzi 2001: 160) but the object of the interpreter’s performance, i.e. the political text, is only delivered hic et nunc, as it has been produced alibi et antehac (in another place at a moment in the past). Moreover, it refers to alibi et utcumque elements, i.e. “places” and “moments” other than those entailed by the interpreted communicative event. To meet the challenge and sustain the confrontation with experienced politicians, interpreters, too, have to rely on alibi et utcumque data, i.e. the activation of relevant encyclopaedic knowledge enabling relatively effortless recognition and reproduction of topical specificities, including interdiscursive and intertextual references; failure in recognising which has a huge impact on the quality of the political IT, as shown in table 2.2. It displays an excerpt of Obama’s first Victory Speech and the respective IT; in this speech passage, the American President tells the story of Ann Nixon Cooper, a hundred-and-six-year-old American voter, whose life story was harnessed to expound American values and retrace the most important events of American twentieth-century history.

5 Referred to as UK_62 in the British sub-corpus.
And tonight, I think about all that she [Ann Nixon Cooper] has seen throughout her century in America - the heartache and the hope; the struggle and the progress; the times we were told that we can’t, and the people who pressed on with that American creed: Yes we can.

At a time when women’s voices were silenced and their hopes dismissed, she lived to see them stand up and speak out and reach for the ballot. Yes we can.

When there was despair in the dust bowl and depression across the land, she saw a nation conquer fear itself with a New Deal, new jobs, a new sense of common purpose. Yes we can.

When the bombs fell on our harbor and tyranny threatened the world, she was there for democracy. Yes we can.

She was there for the buses in Montgomery, the hoses in Birmingham, a bridge in Selma, and a preacher from Atlanta who told a people that "We Shall Overcome." Yes we can.

A man touched down on the moon, a wall came down in Berlin, a world was connected by our own science and imagination.

Finally, the instrumental allusion to Martin Luther King is left out by turning the famous "We Shall Overcome." Yes we can.

Table 2.2 Omission and/or Misinterpretation of Intertextual and Interdiscursive References in the ST-IT Passage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST - Obama Victory Speech, 4th November 2008</th>
<th>IT - CorIT transcription</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>And tonight, I think about all that she [Ann Nixon Cooper] has seen throughout her century in America - the heartache and the hope; the struggle and the progress; the times we were told that we can’t, and the people who pressed on with that American creed: Yes we can. <strong>At a time when women’s voices were silenced and their hopes dismissed,</strong> she lived to see them stand up and speak out and reach for the ballot. Yes we can.</td>
<td>e stasera (...) io p:enson (...) a tutto quello che ha visto durante quel secolo passato in America (1,5 sec) l- le speranze le battaglie i passi avanti i progressi (2 sec) i i periodi in cui ci dicevano che non p- p: che non: n: non ce l’avremmo fatta che non potevamo invece yes we can si che possiamo (2 sec) <strong>quando le don- le voci delle donne:: rimanevano in silenzio l:ei è rimasta lì per parlare per andare a votare sì che possiamo (.) quando c’era disperazione d:epressione</strong> in tutto il Paese lei ha visto u::na nazione riprendersi con un New Deal nuovi posti di lavoro un nuovo s:enso di (.) fine comune finalità comune yes we can si che possiamo quando sono cadute sul suo porto delle bombe e la tirannia ha minacciato il mondo lei era lì a a testimoniare una generazione (.) che combatteva per la democrazia sì che possiamo (4 sec) era lì per le:: case di Birmingham (.) per un predicatore: <em><strong>XXX HESITATION</strong></em> che diceva ce la faremo (.) sì che possiamo (.) un uomo che ha m: ha messo i piedi sulla nu- sulla Luna un muro che è caduto a Berlino (2 sec) un mondo completamente interconnesso</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The right-hand column of table 2.2 shows that only the references to the New Deal, the first man on the Moon and the fall of the Berlin Wall survived the interpreting process. More specific culture-bound elements are omitted or misinterpreted: general references to gender discrimination are mitigated, as the coercive action described by the transitive verb to silence (“when women’s voices were silenced and their hopes dismissed”) is transformed into the intransitive action of women apparently choosing to remain silent (“quando le don- le voci delle donne:: rimanevano in silenzio”). The reference to the Dust Bowl is omitted, while the literal translation of depression at least preserves the allusion to the economic recession in the Thirties. Yet, reference to Pearl Harbour is misinterpreted, and one of the symbols of American history becomes Ann Nixon Cooper’s personal ship shelter (“quando sono cadute sul suo porto delle bombe”). Of the seminal events of the Civil Rights Movement (the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Birmingham campaign - stopped by the power of fire hoses - and the marches from Selma to Montgomery), two are omitted and one misinterpreted, probably owing to the interpreter’s unawareness of the event compounded by the almost homophonous terms hose and house (“le:: case di Birmingham”). Finally, the instrumental allusion to Martin Luther King is left out by turning the famous “preacher from Atlanta” into a preacher like many others (“un predicatore:”).

23
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

The speech passage is certainly demanding, also considering the peculiarity of TV interpreting\(^6\); however, analysis of the whole interpretation bears witness to the ability of the interpreter and the quality of his product, which is not devoid of appropriate solutions. Knowledge of recurrent interdiscursive and intertextual references of Obama’s discourse may have helped the interpreter produce a richer and more connotative IT. In this regard, the systematic study of STs can yield useful information by uncovering the idiosyncratic recourse to extra-textual references, as attested by Foxlee (2009).

2.1.1.1 Political Terminology and the Issue of Knowledge

The passage displayed in table 2.2 shows that grasping and reproducing the topicality of political speeches often boils down to reckoning with more or less specific and recurrent referents, in their double sense of terms and concepts. Political terminology (Chilton 2010) is, indeed, considered a crucial research domain in discourse studies.

What I understand as “political terms” is lexical items that would be recognised by native speakers as typically used to refer to entities and processes in that domain of social life concerned with politics, where politics is understood to be primarily activities associated with the public institutions of the state (Chilton 2010: 226).

According to Chilton (2010: 226), political terminology has to be distinguished from political discourse:

Political discourse […] is the use of language to do the business of politics and includes persuasive rhetoric, the use of implied meanings, the use of euphemisms, the exclusion of references to undesirable realities, the use of language to rouse political emotions, and the like. Political discourse thus includes political terminology but is not coterminous with it (Chilton 2010: 226)

The study of political discourse basically concerns the function of political speeches, while political terminology has to do mainly with topics. As in discourse studies, in Translation the study of content is always related to its packaging (Gile 1995a: 35-36), as Translators need first to understand what the ST is about and second translate it with equivalents in the target language.

In spoken speeches, the ‘packaging’ is made up of the words and linguistic structures of the speech (Gile 1995a: 35)\(^7\).

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\(^6\) Whereas in conference settings interpreters are generally given the texts of the speeches and therefore have at least a few minutes to prepare, in televised interpreted events they hardly ever have the opportunity to see the text (Straniero Sergio 2003: 169-170).

\(^7\) By packaging, Gile (1995a: 35-36) also means “features of the voice and of delivery […] plus non-verbal signals and information, including body language, diagrams on paper or on screen etc”, which are, though, not relevant to the present research project.
As regards political interpreting, respect for politicians’ lexical choices and recurrent syntagms is paramount, given the crucial role performed by language in politics (Viezzi 2001: 145). The interpreting-oriented study of political terminology is, obviously, not the mere study of political terms and their equivalents in the target language but, as in discourse studies, research into “political terms and their associated concepts” (Chilton 2010: 225) enriched by the interlinguistic and intercultural dimension. In this respect, interpreters’ interest in political terminology is justified by the fact that political terms are “lexical items that would be recognised by native speakers” (Chilton 2010: 226); which shows that political terms are culturally-bound and scarce topical-lexical preparation is liable to lead to communication breakdowns in interpreting, as shown in table 2.2. In other words, knowledge of political terms and concepts is a prerequisite ensuring topical coherence between the ST and the IT.

Apart from culture-bound (and, therefore, neither innately acquired nor easily accessible) referents, another problematic aspect of political terminology has to be sought in the fact that a number of political terms are generally not plainly denotative but usually associated with “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1956) lying at the core of political argumentation. Chilton (2010: 227) defines essentially contested concept in relation to political communication.

Essentially contested concepts […] can endlessly be both supported and contested by rational arguments of different kinds, all of which are valid.

Seen from this angle, political communication is nothing but the never-ending struggle to defend a specific stance against the equally valid attempts of opponents. In other words, a considerable number of political terms and concepts elude scientificity, thereby providing fertile ground for argumentation, whether rational or irrational. The special category of essentially contested concepts relates to “a number of organized or semi-organized human activities” which “in academic terms […] belong to aesthetics, to political philosophy, to the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion” (Gallie 1956: 168). A glaring example is the term democracy.

We find groups of people disagreeing about the proper use of the concepts, e.g., of art, of democracy, of the Christian tradition. When we examine the different uses of these terms and the characteristic arguments in which they figure we soon see that there is no one clearly definable general use of any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard use. Different uses of the term “work of art” or “democracy” or “Christian doctrine” subserve different though of course not altogether unrelated functions for different schools or movements of artists and critics, for different political groups or parties, for different religious communities and sects. Now once this variety of functions is disclosed it might well be expected that the disputes in which the above mentioned concepts figure would at once come to an end. But in fact this does not happen. Each party continues to maintain that the special functions which the term “work of art” or “democracy” or “Christian doctrine” fulfils on its behalf or on its interpretation, is the correct or proper or primary, or the only important, function which the term in question can plainly be said to fulfil. Moreover, each
party continues to defend its case with what it claims to be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justification (Gallie 1956: 168)

As regards the Christian religion, family is another term that has been increasingly used in politics over the last few decades. It is not a mere word but a label under which specific ideas are attacked or defended, as essentially contested concepts can be used both aggressively and defensively (Chilton 2010: 228). It is precisely the argumentative role of political terms and concepts that enables political speeches to be substantially about anything, including the “the defense of the indefensible” (Orwell 1946).

As regards interpreting, essentially contested concepts do not pose merely translational problems. When faced with them, interpreters are required to keep up the argumentative interaction that naturally arises when contested concepts are addressed. Their study in context is instrumental to grasp speakers’ illocution and perlocution in issuing messages, consequently helping interpreters “let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way around” (Orwell 1946). In this respect, Viezzi’s (2001) analysis of political terms in Blair’s speech is a case in point. Stress is laid not only on the propositional content but also on what it stands for, in the spirit of anticipating prospective comprehension problems triggered by culture-bound or political terms. The contextualisation of problematic terminology including, among others, the terms vision, people, business, welfare, social democracy/democratic socialism, partnership, empowerment, government and enablers (Viezzi 2001: 197-210) has the double aim to propose translational solutions and (especially) to further comprehension of Blair’s illocutionary and perlocutionary routines.

Broadly, the topical perspective on political communication can be said to show that interpreters are faced with the task to handle different thematic nuances. On the one hand, reference to events outside the text (e.g. the Selma to Montgomery marches) challenge their knowledge of the source culture. On the other hand, the argumentative nature of politics demands deep understanding of ideological stances lying behind specific words. In this respect, the topical perspective on political communication raises the dilemma of the interpreter’s knowledge.

If it is true that “interpreters are made not born” (Mackintosh 1999), it is, however, also true that interpreter training cannot do much when faced with the task of “filling up with knowledge” interpreter trainees’ brains. Exposure to relevant texts and suggestions regarding the recurrent topicality of a given genre are all students can be provided with in classrooms, as “ad hoc knowledge acquisition” (Gile 1995a: 144-145) is ultimately an individual practice, which is probably why the contributions on the subject are mainly anecdotal. Herbert’s suggestions to “connaître le sujet traité” and “avoir une vaste culture générale” (1952: 10) are not particularly stimulating for interpreting students. Remarkable efforts have been made by Gile (1995a: 81), for instance, whose comprehension equation highlighted the equally crucial roles played in text comprehension by linguistic knowledge, extra-linguistic knowledge and deliberate analysis. In her insightful studies (1998, 1999), Riccardi addresses the issue of knowledge while describing the phases of simultaneous interpreting. Specific schemata, i.e. knowledge about the topic, the speaker, the spatio-
temporal setting and the type of text (Riccardi 1998: 173) need to be already stored in long-term memory to be activated at any relevant moment, enabling ST decoding at all levels and its recoding in the TL, in a continuous dynamic integration of new information with contextual and encyclopaedic knowledge (Riccardi 1999: 162). Top-down approaches to knowledge of this kind have been (and still are) instrumental in describing the cognitive implications of knowledge management during the interpreting process. To this end, interpreting research has always turned to discourse studies to satisfy interest in the cognitive implications of the activity (Riccardi 2003: 144). Van Dijk’s overarching contributions, for instance, have always proved useful, as attested by Mackintosh’s (1985) application of the Kintsch and van Dijk model of discourse comprehension and production to the interpreting process.

However, despite their pivotal role in describing the cognitive implications of interpreting, no significant operational or methodological suggestions regarding access to relevant encyclopaedic knowledge can be gleaned, also owing to the “little explicit theorizing” (van Dijk 2005a: 73) on the issue. In fact, discourse studies too often appear to be anecdotal in addressing knowledge. Particularly, van Dijk (2005a: 73) complains about the deleterious habit, “both in discourse studies and in the psychology of text processing” to “deal with one type of more or less abstract and general ‘knowledge of the world’, e.g., the kind of knowledge represented in scripts or similar knowledge structures, and usually assumed to be stored in ‘semantic’ memory”. In an attempt to fill the gap, van Dijk (2005a: 77-80) puts forward a “list” of types of knowledge. As regards interpreting, institutional or organisational knowledge is essential in mastering the “code” of political communication in different political settings.

Institutional or organizational knowledge is social knowledge shared by the members of an institution or organisation, generally satisfying the strategic criteria of group knowledge and discourse (van Dijk 2005a: 78-79).

National knowledge and cultural knowledge have a more marked interlinguistic and intercultural character, as far as interpreting is concerned, and they probably make up the most challenging task for interpreter training and preparation.

National knowledge is knowledge shared by the citizens of a country. It is typically acquired at school and through the mass media, and presupposed by all public discourse in the country. Since most everyday communication for most people is with members of the same country, most national knowledge will be presupposed in most conversations as well as in most public discourse. […] Cultural knowledge is the general knowledge shared by the members of the same “culture”, that is based on language, religion, history, habits, origin or appearance (van Dijk 2005a: 79).

Like anyone else, interpreters handle national and cultural knowledge, i.e. the knowledge shared by the citizens of their own native country and cultural “peers”;

8 Van Dijk (2005a: 77-80) distinguishes among personal knowledge, interpersonal knowledge, group knowledge, institutional or organizational knowledge, national knowledge and cultural knowledge.
however, their profession compels them to cope with the task of familiarising with the source culture, and particularly with recurrent terms and themes cropping up in speeches. To this end, the apparently unwieldy issue of knowledge is probably best “broken into pieces” rather than addressed as an overall concept. In this regard, Viezzi’s analysis of Blair’s speech is a case in point, as it deals exclusively with Blair’s “knowledge”, understood as the topical potential of Blair’s discourse. In other words, the study is primarily concerned with access to a specific portion of knowledge rather than with theorising or cognitive-model devising. It is a bottom-up approach to knowledge, aiming at the enhancement of student relevant topical competence. The comment also applies to Marzocchi’s (1998) analysis of the Troonrede. This kind of studies are aimed at studying one enemy in the event of prospective battles, which, besides, yields findings that can also be applied to the interpretation of other speeches like the speeches analysed. For instance, reflection on the term vision (Viezzi 2001: 197) is relevant to all political speeches delivered in English.

Here lies the potential of studying political topics. The systematic and targeted analysis of topicality (Viezzi 2001: 194) could progressively build up “repositories” of data-driven clues to the relative nature of political STs, thereby gradually enhancing the relevant topical competence of trainees. In this respect, the analysis will shed light on recurrent topical features of speeches, including recurrent intertextual and interdiscursive argumentative practices, in the spirit of reconstructing the scaffold (Austermühl 2014) holding up the delicate structure of a specific “class” of political speeches. To this end, the settings in which speeches are “planned” and “built” cannot be overlooked.

2.1.2 WHEN and WHERE: Broader and Narrow Contexts

The focus on the topical potential of political speeches, together with evidence of the consequences of scarce knowledge of ST topical links provided in table 2.2, warns of the “dangers” of tackling speeches as if they were hic-et-nunc-produced flows of words. In this respect, not only the topical potential but also the production conditions and places of delivery of political speeches have implications for the formulation of interpreting strategies (Gambier 2008: 64).

However simplistic this might sound, considering that speeches are not uttered in a vacuum is the first instrumental task of the interpreter. For instance, assumed consistency in every politician’s rhetorical style is easily confuted by the following example.
And I would not be standing here tonight without the unyielding support of my best friend for the last 16 years the rock of our family, the love of my life, the nation’s next first lady Michelle Obama. Sasha and Malia I love you both more than you can imagine. And you have earned the new puppy that’s coming with us to the new White House.

My fellow citizens: I stand here today humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors. [...] Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential oath. The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace. Yet, every so often the oath is taken amidst gathering clouds and raging storms. At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forebears, and true to our founding documents.

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Table 2.3 Effects of Settings on Topicality and Rhetorical Style

The two passages are fundamentally different: the first is informal and vivid, the second contains highly formal and institutionalised language. The difference is determined by the contexts of speech delivery, respectively the public gathering to celebrate Obama’s victory and the formal inauguration marking the beginning of the newly-elected President’s term of office. The speeches both belong to the category of national speeches which, in addition, differ considerably from speeches delivered within international contexts such as the World Economic Forum or a G20 meeting. Incidentally, analysis will show that speakers’ argumentative strategies frequently change depending on the national or international character of the occasion. Therefore, settings affect and determine topicality. The convictions of speakers, are, thus, adapted to the context and the relevant audience. In this regard, settings must not be intended merely as the communicative events in which speeches are delivered. Basic cultural factors and conditions of text production must not be neglected, either. In this regard, Wodak’s (2007b: 206) distinction between broader and narrow contexts provides a useful conceptual base for understanding the variables of interpreted political events. The broader context is the sociopolitical and historical context of the juncture at which and the country in which the communicative event takes place, “which discursive practices are embedded in and related to” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 93); the narrow context is the communicative setting or context of situation itself (Wodak 2007b: 206), whose “extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 93) influence and determine speech configuration and pragmatic force.

From an interpreting point of view, while the study of broader contexts is primarily a matter of familiarity with the source political and historical culture, analysis of narrow contexts concerns the acknowledgment of the institutional and situational constraints of communicative events. Particular attention needs to be paid to the conditions of text production and reception in modern political communication, especially since media development has changed the structure of the public sphere fundamentally (Holly 2010: 317).
The conditions of political oratory have changed remarkably since antiquity, not least because of the transformation of political systems and the development of new means of mass communication that have led to new forms of public spheres (Reisigl 2010: 254).

Particularly, the mediatisation of politics (Norén 2013: 49) has bred political settings and compounded the conditions of speech production and reception, basically turning political interventions into *staged events* (Wodak 2007a: 204).

Over recent decades and across (at least) ‘the West’, we are witnessing the development of ‘media democracies’ in which media-savvy performances seem to become more important than traditional politics. [...] the media have contributed to the transformation of politics related to an emphasis on ‘front-stage performances’ (Forchtner, Krzyżanowski & Wodak 2013: 205-206).

*Soundbites* for TV consumption and “the snapshots provided by media which condense complex political processes into iconic images” (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 17-18) are indicative of the upheavals underway. However, politics “tabloidisation” (Holly 2010: 321) has not resulted in a loss of quality, simplification or de-politicisation (Holly 2010: 318). In fact, political communication has turned out compounded or at least more diversified. Even though interpreting became a profession in the midst of the process of politics mediatisation, comparison between the constitutive conditions of political oratory in past and contemporary public spheres sheds light on the demanding and heterogeneous landscape interpreters work in.

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<tr>
<th>dimension</th>
<th>classical rhetorical type</th>
<th>modern political communication</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>time</strong></td>
<td>momentariness / singularity:&lt;br&gt;● primarily future (deliberative genre) or&lt;br&gt;● primarily present (epideictic genre)</td>
<td>processuality / sequentiality:&lt;br&gt;● reference to past, present and future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>linguistic context</strong></td>
<td>simple linguistic context&lt;br&gt;● monotextuality (speech without intertextual relations)&lt;br&gt;● duotextuality (reference to the counterspeech of the opponent)&lt;br&gt;● intertextual relation of imitation (celebration speech)</td>
<td>complex linguistic context:&lt;br&gt;● multi- and intertextuality&lt;br&gt;● multi- and interdiscursivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>speaker / author</strong></td>
<td>individuality:&lt;br&gt;● speaker = author</td>
<td>representation:&lt;br&gt;● team of authors consisting of ghost writers, political advisers and the speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>addressee</strong></td>
<td>general homogeneity of addressees</td>
<td>plurality of audiences / multiple addressing:&lt;br&gt;● primary audience (face to face)&lt;br&gt;● secondary audience (audience listening to a live transmission via mass media)&lt;br&gt;● tertiary audience (audience listening to a later transmission via mass media, or recipients reading the press)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>medium</strong></td>
<td>direct acoustic and visual contact</td>
<td>direct acoustic and visual contact (co-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.4 Constitutive Conditions of Political Oratory in Past and Present
Public Spheres (Reisigl 2010: 258)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type of speech</th>
<th>aims / functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>two genres:</td>
<td>variety of aims/functions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deliberative genre and</td>
<td>● positive self- and other-presentation (recognition, emphasis on the exemplariness) and negative self- and other-presentation (including admonition, warning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>epideictic genre (laudatory speech or vituperation speech)</td>
<td>● political advertising aiming to acquire or maintain power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● influence on the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will (identity construction, manufacturing of consent and solidarity, ratification / justification of political norms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● law-making procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● party-internal formation of attitude, opinions and will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● inter-party formation of attitudes, opinions and will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● organisation of international / interstate relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● political administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● political control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The processuality and sequentiality of “political time” has already been mentioned in the previous section; despite interpreters’ difficulties in reproducing verb tenses (Hale 2004: 131), the alternation of verb tenses is a feature of all oral communication, whether spontaneous or prepared; consequently, ability to grasp and reproduce time nuances is part of interpreters’ competence in following the logical unfolding of STs, which is gradually acquired through the development of procedural skills and the management of cognitive strain. The horizontal lines of the table concerning the type of speech and its aims/functions will be addressed in the following sections. As regards the features of modern linguistic contexts, intertextuality and interdiscursivity have already been addressed in the previous section as topic-related features. As to the other horizontal lines, the representative nature of speech authorship stands out first; however, uncertain authorship is not a problematic factor for interpreters: the stylistic features of politicians’ messages are always consistent over time, showing that ghostwriters and advisers work in close collaboration with politicians, who presumably instruct their assistants and always reserve the right to modify speeches during the revision and/or delivery phases.

---

9 Political genres and subgenres are addressed by Reisigl in a separate section (2010: 247-253).
Regarding settings, the most striking changes concern the medium and the addressee. Changes in the medium through which political communication is expressed have diversified the “cooperative exchange” between politicians and audiences, which in the past only resulted in interactive co-presence. More specifically, different “types” of audiences have been mainstreamed in the political communication process, with significant implications for interpreting, mainly pertaining to speech reception, i.e. the adaptation of the output to the target audience. Indeed, the relevant audience determines whether the interpretation of a political speech is an instance of instrumental or documentary interpreting (Viezzi 2013: 384). By applying Nord’s (1997) distinction between instrumental and documentary translation to interpreting, Viezzi (2013: 384) describes television interpreted events in terms of “split” events. The author provides the example of simultaneously interpreted press conferences broadcast live by Italian television after each Formula One Grand Prix race.

The communicative situation may be described as being constituted by two events – the ‘primary’ event, where the only language used is English, with journalists asking questions of the drivers and drivers answering; and the ‘secondary’ event with the interpreters providing simultaneous interpreting of questions and answers for the benefit of the Italian TV audience. The two events are of course closely related. However, while the interpreter-mediated secondary event depends totally on the primary event, the non-interpreter-mediated primary event is absolutely autonomous and independent of the secondary event. […] Participants in the secondary event are therefore not among the addressees of the participants in the primary event – they might be regarded as ‘overhearers’ who are totally ignored by the speakers. In fact they are just informed of what is happening at the press conference – what goes on in the secondary event might be called documentary interpreting as opposed to instrumental interpreting (Viezzi 2013: 384).

The same holds true for all mass-mediated interpreted events - including political speeches -, which differ from interpreted conference events in that they separate speakers, audiences and interpreters in both time and space.

Unlike what happens in conference interpreting, media interpreting is often characterized by displaced situationality (Viezzi 2013: 384).

Table 2.5 shows the required types of interpreting according to settings and the type of interaction between speakers and audiences. Given the training-oriented rationale of the study, interpreting exams are taken into account as well.
Chapter 2  |  The Interpretation of Political Speeches

### Table 2.5 Types of Political Communication Settings and Related Types of Interpreting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Type of Interpreting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-presence of speakers, audience and interpreter(s)</td>
<td>Conference (e.g. conference, Parliamentary session)</td>
<td>Politician(s)</td>
<td>Participants in the conference/parliamentary session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreting exam</td>
<td>Politician (through recording) / Professor (reading the politician’s speech)</td>
<td>Professors in charge of assessing student’s performance</td>
<td>Documentary interpreting to the benefit of professors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Spatio-temporal dissociation | Media interpreting (e.g. interpretation of Obama’s Victory Speech, George W. Bush’s Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, Presidential Debate, International Press Conference) | Politician(s) | - participants in the event (primary audience)  
- TV spectators sharing the speaker’s language and culture (secondary and tertiary audience)  
- TV spectators in the target culture (foreign audience) | Documentary interpreting to the benefit of TV spectators in the target culture |

The situational perspective on political speeches highlights the utmost importance of taking the audience into consideration, with particular reference to its interactive relation to the speaker and, consequently, to the interpreter. The paramount role of audiences in the political communication process is not unknown either to discourse and interpreting studies, as the latter have always drawn on the tenets of the former to describe interpreters’ tasks. In this respect, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1958: 31-34) seminal focus on audiences as active participants in the communicative process has opened the floodgates to increasingly detailed analyses, in discourse (Amossy 2000: 33-36) and interpreting (Viezzi 1999, 2013) studies alike.

However, despite the cornerstones of research, it is not uncommon to see interpreters and interpreter trainees tackling political speeches as if they were “monological linguistic events” (Reisigl 2010: 254), or flows of words “occupying” a certain lapse of time during which interpreters must try and reproduce rapidly-delivered propositional content irrespective of the relevant audience. Against the risks of this “short-sighted, non pragmatic view” (Reisigl 2010: 254), Reisigl calls for a functional pragmatic approach to political speeches.

A functional pragmatic view immediately reveals that spoken political speeches are complex realisations of conventionalised linguistic action patterns with a clear interaction structure, even though they [...] are [...] not endowed with turn taking (Reisigl 2010: 254).

In other words, irrespective of the communication settings involved in monologue political communication, political speeches are only apparently monologic: given the
influence of audiences on speakers’ (and interpreters’) tasks, Reisigl (2010: 254) suggests addressing political speeches as *dialogic* communicative events. Seen from this angle, monologue conference interpreting does not differ much from dialogue interpreting, in which case the interpreter of political speeches should probably feel involved in a “communicative *pas de trois*” (Wadensjö 1998: 12).

### 2.1.3 *HOW* and *WHY*: the Functional Devices of Political Communication

In delivering their speeches, politicians resort to a variety of *discursive strategies* (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 94), which has already been hinted at in section 1.2. Like interpreting strategies (and strategies in general), politicians’ strategies pursue a “certain objectif explicite” (Gambier 2008: 64), namely gaining consensus (Viezzi 2001: 136). This is why *functional* features cannot be overlooked when analysing and/or interpreting a political speech (Viezzi 2001: 137).

Despite the utmost importance of content, the supremacy of function in political communication must be the beacon guiding interpreters in their preparation.

> Al centro del discorso politico non sembrano esserci le idee, ma la lingua; non le “cose” ma le parole. […] nella comunicazione politica il *come* è più importante del *cosa*, il modo in cui si parla di una certa realtà è più importante della realtà di cui si parla e la stessa veridicità di ciò che si dice appare di secondaria importanza (Viezzi 2001: 145).

Topics (il *cosa*), which are partially determined by broader and narrow contextual factors, are not the drive of political communication. Rather, the discursive strategies (il *come*) *selected* to address topics are the heart of political communication and, consequently, of research on political speeches. The choice of the verb *select* in the previous sentence is deliberate, in that politicians’ *choice* of specific thematic and functional strategies is the hinge of political argumentation (Zarefsky 2009: 121).

Analysis of strategies of persuasion in politics is a never-ending process. The present section will only outline the major objectives of political communication and general strategies adopted to achieve them. Analysis of *specific* strategies, i.e. argumentation strategies, will be the focus of chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Broadly, political speeches are traditionally divided into *functional* stages (Reisigl 2010: 253).

Following the rhetorical rules of disposition, the different speech acts are grouped together in the three macro-structural units of introduction, main part and conclusion, as well as in their respective subsections. The ideal typical rhetorical macro-structure of speeches is formed by the succession of the speech parts of (1) introduction (*exordium*), (2) narration

---

10 “At the heart of political discourse lie not ideas, but language; not ‘things’ but words. […] In political communication how is more important than what, the way in which a matter is addressed is more important than the matter itself and the truthfulness of what is said is not of primary importance” (my translation).
(narratio) and argumentation (argumentatio), and (3) conclusion (peroratio) (Reisigl 2010: 253).

However, as regards the functions of political communication, ancient rhetoric is, again, obsolete and unreliable for modern research and interpreting purposes.

In their composition, political speeches are often more freely organised than other speeches [...]. They seldom contain clearly separate sections of argumentation and narration. This deviation from the antique rhetorical ideal is due to the fact that political orators – especially nowadays – are concerned with many new demands in addition to deliberative advising and epideictic demonstration (Reisigl 2010: 253-254).

Modern political communication therefore imposes overarching functional analyses because all speech stages and sections are indiscriminately strewn with various functional devices. In this respect, the following sections will hint at the implications of the alternation between argumentation and narration, which will be addressed more extensively during the analysis of anecdotal arguments (Govier & Jansen 2011) in the American sub-corpus.

As to specific discursive functions, effective political communication can be said broadly to rely upon a number of “pragmatic devices” (Wodak 2007b: 203), namely allusions, insinuations, presuppositions, implicatures and wordplay. These “cognitively and emotionally effective” strategies (Wodak 2007b: 218) all share a characteristic: they are partially implicit, i.e. not visible on text surface. Consequently, effective speech comprehension requires acknowledgment not only of what is said but also of what is left untold, or, in Sbisà’s terms, is conveyed silently (2007: 3).

Addressing implicitness in interpreting research might seem irrelevant at first glance, considering the impossibility for interpreters to take their distance from what speakers say (Giambagli 1999: 232). However, the duty of adopting the convictions, rather than the words, of SL speakers must not be underestimated, however idealistic it might sound. After all, quality in interpreting is not achieved through literal equivalence but depends on the interpreter’s ability to attain equivalence of the communicative effect (Viezzi 1999: 147) by reproducing the communicative function of the ST (Palazzi 2007: 263).

Leaving implicit information in the ST also implicit or possibly vague in the TT [target text] may mean risking miscomprehension of the TT or preventing comprehension altogether (Schäffner 1997a: 129).

As to political interpreting, the above quotation does not mean that vague or implicit information in the ST always has to be rendered explicit in the IT, also considering that respect for speakers’ formal choices is more prominent than in other communicative events such as specialist conferences, in which interpreters are freer to make ST content explicit for the sake of clarity. Yet, informing is not the aim of politics (Viezzi 2001: 136). Rather, focusing on implicitness in political interpreting means highlighting given sentences concealing others which politicians deliberately choose to leave unsaid. Take the following example.
we are taking tough steps to deal with the massive deficits that we have inherited (David
Cameron Press Conference at Seoul G20, 12th November 2010)\textsuperscript{11}.

It might appear weak from both an informative and persuasive point of view, as it
looks like a passage dealing exclusively with the denotative description of political
processes, i.e. a passage focusing on topical reflexivity. An interpreter holding this view
could feel entitled to overlook and omit the passage. Yet the sentence actually implies
another utterance, not visible on text surface:

\textit{The deficit is not my/our fault. The fault lies with the previous government, namely Labour.}

Inference of this second utterance is triggered by the verb \textit{to inherit}. It is an externally
caused change of state verb (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995: 92; McKoon & Macfarland
2000), as the very act of inheritance is triggered by a third party in the first place.
Consequently, the verb in question serves the purpose of blaming opposition parties
“without actually doing it”. Here lies the “power” of the implicit: it enables the speaker to
“dire certaines choses, et de pouvoir faire comme si on ne les avait pas dites” (Ducrot 1972:
5), thereby benefiting “à la fois de l’efficacité de la parole et de l’innocence du silence”
(Amossy 2000 : 152).

What are interpreters supposed to do? Paradoxically, in this case a literal translation is
enough to ensure “pragmatic quality” (Kopczyński 1994: 190) in the IT. Omitting the
sentence or making it explicit in the IT would seriously alter the meaning of the speech and,
therefore, its reception by the audience.

Certaines valeurs et positions ont d’autant plus d’impact qu’elles sont avancées sur le mode
du cela-va-de-soi, et glissées dans le discours de façon à ne pas constituer l’objet déclaré du
dire. Elles échappent ainsi à la contestation, s’imposant d’autant mieux à l’auditoire qu’elles
se donnent comme des évidences qui n’ont pas besoin d’être formulées en toutes lettres
(Amossy 2000 : 152).

In Wodak’s words (2007b: 214), “presupposed content is […] accepted without (much)
critical attention”. Only one example has been provided, but it shows that also the study of
implicit meaning is part of the quest for the overall function of the speech (Brutian 2005:
115), as it is a strategy politicians use to achieve their specific aims. “Hidden” albeit crucial
political passages such as Cameron’s allusion to Labour are described by van Dijk (2005b)
in terms of political implicatures. Unlike implications, political implicatures are not
semantic, but pragmatic or contextual (van Dijk 2005b: 69). They are “the specific political
inferences that participants in the communicative situation […] may make on the basis of
(their understanding of) this speech and its context” (van Dijk 2005b: 66). They are thus
“inferred from a combined general knowledge of politics and a more contextual
understanding of the current political situation” (van Dijk 2005b: 75), i.e. knowledge of
broader and narrow contextual features. Notably, they “explain that and why political

\textsuperscript{11} Referred to as \textit{UK\_10} in the reference corpus.
participants say the things they do. They define the fundamental political point” (van Dijk 2005b: 70) of the speech in the political process. In this regard, van Dijk’s comments incontrovertibly show the mutual dependence of topical, situational and functional factors.

The massive presence of implicatures in political discourse is ascribable to the general orientation of political communication towards vagueness, enabling speakers to present persuasive speech acts “in the guise of conveying information” (Gruber 1993: 22). Vagueness is neither the mere synonym for non-transparency nor a fleeting excuse for not understanding political speeches, but rather a pragmalinguistic and interactional concept that “has to be described in terms of components of communicative situations, speakers’ intentions, and the expectations of listeners” (Gruber 1993: 1). More precisely, it is a “communicative strategy which enables one to perform linguistic actions in a specific way” (Gruber 1993: 1), a device used for intensification and mitigation purposes (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 94), “exploiting formal, content-specific and situational cues to guide the recipients’ understanding” (Gruber 1993: 2).

As “every politician has a public positive face (PPF)” (Gruber 1993: 3) and that his/her aim is to gain consensus by simultaneously “attacking” opponents, vagueness strategies substantially revolve around three communicative aims (Gruber 1993: 3-5):

- addressing different audiences at the same time;
- avoiding face-threatening acts (FTAs) against other politicians while simultaneously threatening their PPFs;
- avoiding FTAs against oneself (when, for instance, communicating tabooed topics).

The second and third objectives are attained through recourse to allusions and political implicatures. The need to pursue the first objective has arisen with the advent of mediatised political communication, which imposes the need for Doppelung or “split illocution” (Gruber 1993: 3) on politicians. Indeed, especially in the twentieth century, vagueness is largely determined by the fact that “l’art du discours politique est l’art de s’adresser au plus grand nombre pour le faire adhérer à des valeurs communes” (Charaudeau 2005: 187). In this regard, political discourse is the discourse of compromise, aiming at “construire une opinion moyenne” through the “conjontion d’imaginaires opposés”(Charaudeau 2005: 187).

C’est pourquoi le discours politique balance souvent entre deux positions contradictoires : s’il défend une position ultratechniciste, il entrera en contradiction avec l’imaginaire de la tradition, s’il défend une position antitechniciste, il entrera en contradiction avec l’imaginaire de la modernité (ibid.).

It is precisely this “coward” character of political communication which requires continuous recourse to allusions, presuppositions and implicatures compounding the comprehension of the deep meaning of texts. This specific feature of political discourse did not pass unnoticed in interpreting studies. Particularly, with reference to Blair’s rhetorical style, Viezzi (2001: 197) highlights the recurring oppositions between tradition and innovation, past and future, conservatism and change, showing that the speaker aims at the
reconciliation of opposites. This kind of speaker-related research into the strategic functional devices of political speeches plays a crucial role during interpretation, in that it “makes it possible to make explicit the implicit assumptions […] that underlie text production” (Wodak 2007b: 213).

To this end, implicit meaning will be taken into account during the analysis, in that it helps better “know the enemy” and his assumptions in “battles”. In this respect, the study of topical, situational and functional variables always needs to be related to a given politician’s ethos, because “il n’y a pas d’acte de langage qui ne passe par la construction d’une image de soi” (Charaudeau 2005: 66).

2.2 Interpreting Political Speeches: a Matter of Pragmatics

The theoretical focuses on topicality, situationality and functions of political speeches were meant to show the extent to which political texts are sensitive texts (Schäffner 1997b: 131). The conditions and determiners of sensitivity are summarised in table 2.6, drawn from Reisigl (2010: 249-251). It suggests political speech categorisation based on ten instrumental questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Criterion for speech name</th>
<th>Examples of speech names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 who?</td>
<td>the speaker or the political function of the speaker as political representative</td>
<td>presidential speech, chancellor’s speech, ministerial speech, speech of mps, mayor’s speech; King’s/Queen’s speech at the opening of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 on what occasion?</td>
<td>the occasion</td>
<td>“occasional speech”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>performative/illocutionary quality</td>
<td>inaugural address, speech of resignation, speech of appointment, speech of award, welcoming speech, farewell address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cyclical recurrence of the occasion</td>
<td>anniversary speech, jubilee speech, commemorative speech, birthday speech, speech on national holiday or New Year, ceremonial address, memorial speech, Aschermittwochsrede (“Ash Wednesday speech”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>relative time of speech</td>
<td>after-dinner speech, postprandial speech, opening speech, closing speech/address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intertextual or interdiscursive embedding in a greater communicative event</td>
<td>speech at party convention, speech in an election campaign, debate speech, counterspeech, funeral oration/eulogy, King’s/Queen’s speech at the opening of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organisation of inter-state relations / relations to</td>
<td>speech on the occasion of a state visit, victory speech, war speech, peace speech</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 “L’importance attribuée à la personne de l’orateur dans l’argumentation est un point essentiel des rhétoriques antiques, qui appellent *ethos* l’image de soi que l’orateur construit dans son discours pour contribuer à l’efficacité de son dire” (Amossy 2000: 60). Notably, “c’est bien l’image que le locuteur construit […] *dans son discours*, qui constitue un composant de la force illocutoire” (Amossy 2000: 69).
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political opponents/enemies</td>
<td>funeral eulogy, speech of consolation, speech of award, victory speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one-off occasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 where? the place (or place name)</td>
<td>speech in parliament, King’s/Queen’s speech at the opening of parliament (German: “Thronrede”, i.e. speech from the throne), “soap-box speech”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 when? the time</td>
<td>after-dinner speech, inaugural address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative time of speech</td>
<td>anniversary speech, jubilee speech, commemorative speech, birthday speech, speech on national holiday or New Year, “Aschermittwochsrede” (“Ash Wednesday speech”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cyclical recurrence of the occasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to whom? the addressees/ hearers</td>
<td>“address to the nation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>laudatory speech, admonitory speech, blaming speech/vituperation speech, counterspeech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 via what media? (mass) media of transmission</td>
<td>TV speech, radio speech, orally delivered speech, written speech, live speech, recorded speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 for what purpose? communicative main function, often naming the performative / illocutionary quality of the speech (closely related to the first of group 2)</td>
<td>speech of thanks, pleading speech, welcoming speech, farewell speech or address, valediction, laudatory speech/eulogy, admonitory speech, blaming speech/vituperation speech, speech of consolation, speech of appointment, speech of award, speech of protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 in what form? form of speech, form of preparation, form of presentation</td>
<td>free speech, read out speech, long speech, short speech, abridged speech, unabridged speech, fighting speech (i.e. an aggressive, loud and often offensive speech), polemical speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 about what? content, topic</td>
<td>speeches of principle, victory speech, war speech, state of the union address, “Europarede” (“speech on Europe”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 belonging to which rhetorical genre?</td>
<td>deliberative speech, epideictic speech</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6 Types of Political Speeches – adapted from Reisigl (2010: 249-251)

Table 2.6, summarising and furthering the theoretical overview of section 2.1, depicts political speeches as extremely composite, whose varying features are liable to affect interpretation if not appropriately taken into account.

A speech is a structured verbal chain of coherent speech acts uttered on a special social occasion for a specific purpose by a single person, and addressed to a more or less specific audience (Schmitz 2005: 698, cit. in Reisigl 2010: 243).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

The “problem” with thematic, situational, functional and, related to them, ethotic variables is that they substantially diversify political communication, thereby imposing diversification on interpreting tasks as well. In other words, the heterogeneity of speech production conditions determines the heterogeneity of speech interpretation demands. Which is why Kopczyński (1994: 190) claims that quality in interpreting has to be understood in terms of “pragmatic quality”.

In its pragmatic sense quality is not an absolute value, but it is contextually determined. In other words, context “complicates” the problems of quality in that it introduces situational variables that might call for different priorities in different situations of translation (ibid.).

As a consequence, the title of the present chapter should probably be modified into “ways of interpreting political speeches”. The study of political communication in interpreting is, thus, best left to pragmatics. Since “pragmatics does not deal with language as such but with language use” (Cap & Nijakowska 2007: viii), its relevance to interpreting activity is unmistakable, as attested by the considerable number of studies on the pragmatic aspects of conference interpreting (Kopczyński 1994; Marzocchi 1998; Setton 1999; Viaggio 2002; Palazzi 2007; Straniero Sergio 2007). Particularly, given its unnaturally constrained and demanding character, interpreting makes up an area of pragmatic research on its own, in which the tenets of traditional pragmatics do not always hold true. As regards the interpretation of political speeches, the notions of pragmatic failure and pragmatic competence need to be adapted to the monologue conference settings.

2.2.1 Interpreting in the Pragmatic Dark: a Dark Truth

The literature (Kopczyński 1994; Riccardi 1998; Schäffner 1997a, 1997b; Viezzi 1999, 2001, 2013) thoroughly expounds the relative nature of quality in interpretation and equivalence between the ST and the IT. Yet, what happens in practice?

Despite the cornerstones of research, it is not uncommon to see interpreters and interpreter trainees produce texts which “appear suspended in thin air, come from nowhere and no one in particular and going nowhere and to no one in particular” (Viaggio 2002: 229). This happens when interpreters perform their activity in the “pragmatic dark” (Viaggio 2002: 229). Darkness falls precisely as interpreters underrate the pragmatic variables of political speeches. As a result, they find themselves struggling to follow the string of words and trying to keep pace with the unfolding ST “topic or theme”, but losing sight of its “point or purpose or function”, respectively the aims of semantics and pragmatics (van Dijk 1977: 246). This is why, despite the strides made by the socio-cultural turn of interpreting studies (Pöchhacker 2006; 2008: 38), Viaggio (2002: 229) complains about the rife “underrating of the pragmatic aspect of communication in conference interpreting”. The criticism is indeed not levelled against the academia but against professionals and students, who often “just, well, translate!” (Viaggio 2002: 229) the propositional content overlooking its ad hoc relevance, namely why, how and for/against
Chapter 2 | The Interpretation of Political Speeches

whom it is expressed. In traditional pragmatic terms, *pragmatic failure* frequently occurs in interpreting and, as in L2 acquisition contexts, it stems from “the inability to understand what is meant by what is said” (Thomas 1983: 91). Failures in reproducing the pragmatic force of STs are exacerbated in the training setting, where the difficulty in respecting the intentionality and intensity of the ST is even more visible than among professionals (Palazzi 2007: 263), especially because students are still coming to terms with the acquisition of cognitively demanding interpreting skills. However, the kind of pragmatic competence demanded in the interpreting booth has little to do with its counterpart in L2 acquisition.

First of all, directionality plays a major role in defining failure. Unlike interpreters working in community settings, conference interpreters of political speeches are mainly called upon to translate only from the foreign language into their own native language. Therefore, whereas pragmalinguistic failure is generally understood as “the inappropriate transference of speech act strategies from L1 to L2” (Thomas 1983: 102), pragmatic failure in conference interpreting results in mistakes and disfluencies in the interpreter’s mother tongue. In other words, interpreters often seem to “lose” their L1 communicative competence during their work; consequently, pragmalinguistic competence cannot be taught “quite straightforwardly” (Thomas 1983: 109) and the obstacles leading to pragmatic failure are not “fairly easy to overcome” (Thomas 1983: 91), also considering that interpreters are not supposed to be language learners but language experts. A specific type of pragma-linguistic competence is, therefore, required to elude failure, one which depends on the interpreter’s ability to sustain his/her own L1 pragmatic competence against the challenging conditions of the activity and enables preservation of the intentionality and intensity of STs (Palazzi 2007: 263) by *pre-emptively* frustrating the looming appearance of the pragmatic dark.

This kind of competence relies on solid preparation of topical, situational and functional aspects of political speeches. The lack of which is bound to have serious repercussions on IT quality, if interpreting is like a chemical experiment in which *matter* and *energy* remain unchanged before and after the operation, despite the likely alteration in their distribution (Snelling 1999: 203). Evidence of interpreters working in the pragmatic dark is provided in the following tables. Table 2.7 shows the interpretation of an excerpt of Obama’s 2009 Inaugural Address, broadcast live on Italian television and performed by a professional interpreter.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST - Obama Inauguration Speech, 20th January 2009</th>
<th>IT - CorIT transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions, who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short, for they have forgotten what this country has already done, what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose and necessity to courage. What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them, that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long, no longer apply.</td>
<td>ora ci sono alcune domande che si frappongono davanti a queste ambizioni (1 sec) HESITATION il nostro sistema non può tollerare grandi programmi (2 sec) molti hanno dimenticato quello che il nostro paese ha già fatto quello che gli uomini e le donne liberi possono fare (2.5 sec) quando r-l la loro volontà per fare delle cose buone (2 sec) e eh spesso la terra trema sotto i nostri piedi (2 sec) adesso ci sono eh (1 sec) problemi legati alle capacità di consumo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.7 Interpreting in the Pragmatic Dark: Obama’s 2009 Inauguration Speech

Rather than an experiment, Table 2.7 looks more like a chemical disaster. Despite the partially conjectural nature of mistake aetiology in Error Analysis (Falbo 2002: 115), the origin of a mistake can generally be identified with a certain degree of precision during the comparison between the ST and the IT. All the more so when, as in the above passage, neither culture-bound extra-textual references nor particular difficulties stand out, unlike the passage displayed in table 2.2. In this particular case, the ST delivery speed was at times considerable and the pressure deriving from interpreting the first formal message of the newly-elected President of the United States live cannot be overlooked. Neither can the demanding constraints of TV interpreting (Straniero Sergio 2003: 169-170). However, despite being unquestionable compounding factors, information density, the challenges of media interpreting and excessive delivery speed are not excuses for poor translation, because their potentially detrimental consequences can be partially obviated by attentive and selective listening, with the problem lying instead in ST clarity (Palazzi 2007: 264). Palazzi’s comments, though, refer to interpreting in the private sector, and only partially hold true for political interpreting. Political speeches can be vague (Gruber 1993) and manipulative (Orwell 1946), but certainly not unclear, at least as far as denotation and delivery are concerned (also in the light of the increasing mediatisation of politics rendering speech fruition suitable for a wide and diverse audience). Taking a look at the transcription, it is evident that the interpreter is not a member of the circle of the most skilled. However, this excerpt seems particularly problematic: the professional misinterpreted the whole passage and probably lost track of the unfolding message, thereby interrupting selective listening and turning to “parallel formulations” (Straniero Sergio 2003: 159-160), an indicator of the pragmatic dark. Therefore, supposing that failure has not been caused by one of the above-mentioned factors, the problem trigger must lie somewhere else among the variables of the communicative event.

Pragmatic failure is triggered by the fact that the interpreter “misses” or omits the beginning of the sentence, containing the subject, and confuses the verb to question with the noun question. Research cannot clarify whether the interpreter was unable to hear the
The Interpretation of Political Speeches

beginning of the sentence or he neglected it. However, “there are some who” lies at the heart of Obama’s move, as it triggers subsequent references to a class of barely identifiable they, a further indicator of an argumentative strategy that is not uncommon among politicians: the straw man argument. It is “the tactic of distorting or exaggerating an opponent’s position, in order to make it look implausible, and then attacking this implausible position” (Walton 2004: 17). It is an allusive fallacious argument that can plausibly lead interpreters to lose their bearings, as it raises fundamental doubts and dilemmas: who is the speaker alluding to? Will specific names come up? Reference to “the cynics” could have rung a bell, but grasping who the speaker is referring to while interpreting may not be as straightforward, even less so given that the argument initially only refers to “some who” and “they”, becoming slightly clearer only later when they are labelled cynics. Obama probably alludes to the Republican opposition, which is, however, of secondary importance, because the aim of the argument is exaggerating the position contrary to the speaker’s for persuasive purposes, to make it easier to attack and further the speaker’s cause.

Moreover, the processing difficulty is also likely to be due to the fact that, in the passage, the point of the message seems to have temporarily faded.

When an opponent’s position is distorted or exaggerated in a straw man argument, the effect is often to divert the line of argument to irrelevant issues. So the straw man argument, as typically used, involves an aspect of irrelevance (Walton 2004: 22). (my emphasis)

In interpreting terms, the sudden shift towards irrelevance may have compounded comprehension and challenged relevant translation, or “optimal relevant identity between meaning as meant and meaning as understood” (Viaggio 2002: 229). In simpler terms, an interpreter, uninformed of the exaggerating implications of the straw man, has difficulties in grasping the argumentative move and may reasonably dread an impending launch of a personal attack by the speaker or, in Politeness terms, a face-threatening act (FTA) against another politician. Its translation would require enhanced attention to proper names, politeness strategies and the careful reproduction of the pragmatic force of the message, exposing the interpreter to the risk of committing an FTA against him/herself, i.e. staining his/her interpreter reputation.

Previous knowledge of this argumentative strategy, to which Obama frequently resorts13, could have helped the interpreter grasp the aim of the argumentative move. Further evidence of the problematic implications of the straw man argument can be found in table 2.8, showing the performance of another interpreter.

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The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST – Obama Victory Speech, 4th November 2008</th>
<th>IT - CorIT transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To those - to those who would tear the world down: we will defeat you. To those who seek peace and security: we support you. And to all those who have wondered if America’s beacon still burns as bright</td>
<td>a coloro (2 sec) che vuogliono (!) abbattere il mondo noi: (.) vi sconfiggeremo (. ) a coloro (. ) che cercano pace e sicurezza noi vi appoggeremo (1 sec) e a tutti coloro che si chiedono (4 sec) (e)h::: se l’America è ancora luminosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And where we are met with cynicism and doubts and those who tell us that we can’t, we will respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a nation: yes. We can.</td>
<td>dobbiamo combattere coloro (. ) che non- che ci dicono che non ce la faremo (4 sec) yes we can si che possiamo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.8 Interpreting in the Pragmatic Dark: Obama’s 2008 Victory Speech

Despite a few omissions (“beacon”, “that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a nation”), the interpreter managed to preserve ST illocution, but his delivery is flawed with pauses (even two four-second ones), disfluencies and false starts, suggesting a certain translation uneasiness and the likely implementation of a knowledge-based strategy (Riccardi 2005: 762). Moreover, reference to cynicism, favouring ST comprehension by the target audience, is, again, omitted. It might not be a coincidence that both interpreters found it hard to process and render the passages, apparently simple to translate but actually inaccurately translated in both cases, though with different results.

Not only the straw man argument but also other crucial arguments are often “dissolved” by the pragmatic dark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST - Obama Inauguration Speech, 21st January 2013</th>
<th>IT - CorIT transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The commitments we make to each other through Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security, these things do not sap our initiative, they strengthen us. (Applause) They do not make us a nation of takers; they free us to take the risks that make this country great. (Applause) We, the people, still believe that our obligations as Americans are not just to ourselves, but to all posterity.</td>
<td>gli impegni che facciamo l’uno con l’altro attraverso: Medicare e Medicaid ed- e la sicurezza sociale (. ) ci rafforzano (. ) sono iniziative che ci rafforzano co(m)e paese (. ) non ci rendono una nazione (. ) ma ci permettono di: assumere dei rischi che rendono questo paese grande (. ) noi (. ) il popolo (. ) crediamo ancora che i nostri obblighi come americani non siano solo: verso noi stessi ma verso: (. ) gli altri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.9 Argument “Dissolution” in the ST-IT Passage

Appeals to solidarity and responsibility for the sake of posterity are recurrent in political discourse in general and in discourse on the economic crisis in particular, as the recession has been triggered by reckless speculation.14 Yet, the arguments are misinterpreted and omitted in the IT, arguably owing to scarce familiarity with the American President’s discursive routines.

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14 The topic will be dealt with extensively in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Evidence of the obstacles posed by the argumentative specificities of STs is also provided in table 2.10, where the difficulty in managing the unexpected modern “intrusion” of narrative into argumentative passages stands out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST – Obama Second McCain-Obama Presidential Debate, 7th October 2008</th>
<th>IT - CorIT transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>But here’s what I do know. I know that I wouldn’t be standing here if it weren’t for the fact that this country gave me opportunity. I came from very modest means. I had a single mom and my grandparents raised me and it was because of the help of scholarships and my grandmother scrimping on things that she might have wanted to purchase and my mom, at one point, getting food stamps in order for us to put food on the table. Despite all that, I was able to go to the best schools on earth and I was able to succeed in a way that I could not have succeeded anywhere else in this country.</td>
<td>Ma qui (.) una cosa che invece s:o (2.5 sec) è che io non mi troverei qui: se non fosse per il fatto che questo paese (. ) m:i ha dato un’opportunità (1 sec) io vengo: d:a un retroterra molto povero ho avuto una ragazza madre e i miei nonni mi hanno: cresciuto (.) ed è stato grazie all: ’aiuto delle borse di studio (1 sec) e-e:- del duro lavoro di mia nonna (5 sec) ah: ah: ah: a un certo punto: (.) mamma faticava a mettere: il cibo da mangiare:: SOSPIRO a tavola però sono andato eh sulle migliori scu:: delle migliore scuole del paese sono: (.) riuscito in modo: (.) che n::: n::: non avrei mai potuto fare in nessun altro paese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.10 Translational Difficulties in Narrative Passages**

Apart from hesitations, pauses, false starts and inaccuracies (“mamma faticava a mettere: il cibo da mangiare:: [...] a tavola”), the interpreter’s sigh is indicative of a cognitive strain. The same holds true for table 2.11, in which the narration/argumentation blend is not appropriately managed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ST - Obama Victory Speech, 4th November 2008</th>
<th>IT - CorIT transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Even as we stand here tonight, we know there are brave Americans waking up in the deserts of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan to risk their lives for us. <strong>There are mothers and fathers</strong> who will lie awake after the children fall asleep and wonder how they’ll make the mortgage or pay their doctors’ bills or save enough for their child’s college education.</td>
<td>pur stando qui stasera sappiamo che ci sono coraggiosi Americani che si svegliano nel deserto dell’Iraq nelle montagne dell’Afghanistan e mettono a rischio la loro vita per noi (.) i loro genitori (2 sec) eh mm van::: vanno a dormire: e non sanno come: (.) come poi si potranno pagare (.) i mutui la mattina dopo come arrivare alla fine del mese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.11 Pragmatic Failure during the Interpretation of Narrative Passages**

The argumentative passages displayed in tables 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 are somehow problematic, in that they stand in the way of the attainment of “pragmatic quality” (Kopczyński 1994: 190) and “intertextual coherence” (Straniero Sergio 2003: 147). The contamination of the argumentative and narrative functional sections in modern political communication (Reisigl 2010: 253) will be further addressed throughout the thesis, with a view to detecting recurrent formal features and proposing suggestions for
interpretation. As to the allusive and vague *straw man argument* and the appeals to solidarity for the sake of posterity, their non-isolated presence suggests politicians’ deliberate recourse to strategic “argumentative devices” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 114) interpreters had better be aware of, in the light of the crucial need to “recognise elliptical cues to logical/pragmatic scope” (Setton 1999: 259). In this respect, an enhanced focus on argumentation is likely to shed light on the nature and pragmatic force of politicians’ discursive strategies, thereby providing “l’opportunità, in sede di preparazione, di lavorare per ampliare la gamma delle soluzioni possibili rendendole di fatto più facilmente accessibili nel momento della produzione”\(^ {15}\) (Viezzi 2001: 197).

This is basically what the next chapters will be about.

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\(^{15}\) “the opportunity, in the preparation phase, to reflect on problems and widen the range of prospective solutions, with a view to resorting to them in the production phase” (my translation).
Chapter 3

ARGUMENTATION AND INTERPRETING

The examples provided in tables 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 suggest that a substantial part of interpreting problems are posed by the frequent argumentative passages making up political texts. Yet, argumentation is not merely a functional section of political speeches, as it was in ancient times (Reisigl 2010: 253).

The complexity of the notion of argumentation is testified by the renewed and still growing attention the concept has received since the mid-twentieth century. Since the publications of Le Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) and The Uses of Argument by Toulmin (1958), there has been a remarkable spate of interest in the subject, initially building on classical rhetoric and subsequently treading autonomous paths. In fifty years, argumentation theory has grown to such an extent that it has now become an “international phenomenon” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: ix), a well-established area of study offering invaluable theoretical and methodological insights to neighbouring disciplines like philosophy, logic, linguistics, discourse analysis, rhetoric, speech communication, education, psychology, sociology, political science and law (van Eemeren et al. 1996: ix).

The study of argumentation is not only well-established but also thriving and extremely diversified, as it is constantly developing and rapidly expanding in scholarly settings.

Les différentes théories de l’argumentation développées à la fin du XXe siècle sont fondées sur des visions et des définitions différentes de leur objet, de leurs méthodes et de leurs objectifs. Les problématiques bi-millénaires de la rhétorique, de la dialectique et de la logique ont été reprises et réélaborées, dans le cadre intellectuel nouveau de la logique contemporaine post-frégéenne et des sciences du langage marquées par les développement de la pragmatique, des théories du discours et de l’interaction (Plantin 2014: 56).

Coupled with the various argumentation theories developing worldwide, there are, first of all, different definitions of argumentation. Examining the most influential among them is the first crucial step towards understanding the implications of argumentative discourse for interpreting activity.

3.1 Argumentation: some Definitions

Before venturing into the theoretical implications of argumentation in interpreting, certain clarifications will help frame the research object, the understanding of which is hampered by “the variety of terms used today” which “reflects an unprecedentedly wide variety of approaches, methods and indeed of definitions of the object of enquiry” (Marzocchi 1997: 179).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

Confusion around the term *argumentation* (Crevatin 1998: xv) partly stems from the fact that the very notion of argumentation is *ambiguous* (Marzocchi 1997: 180). Ambiguity is first of all determined by linguistic and cultural factors.

Le mot *argumentation*, utilisé, avec quelques variantes graphiques dans les langues romanes comme en anglais ou en allemand, est un excellent candidat à l’internationalisation. Mais le sens du mot dans ces différentes langues comporte des différences essentielles, comme on peut le voir en comparant *argument* et *argumer* avec les mots anglais *to argue, an argument* (Plantin 2014: 50).

In Duff’s (1981: 10) terms, “the words of all languages overlap and leave gaps of meaning”, and argumentation is not an exception. However, irrespective of language, the concept itself is polysemous and misleading.

“Argumentation” is a word from ordinary language that has been given a more precise and technical meaning in the study of argumentation (van Eemeren 2009: 109).

However simplistic it might sound, van Eemeren’s remark suggests that the concept be treated carefully. A series of questions, providing titles for the following sub-sections, will help outline its features.

3.1.1 What is an Argument? And What is Argumentation?

A sufficiently simple, concise and general definition, not easy to find in the tangle of argumentation theories, is provided by Hitchcock & Wagemans (2011: 185).

In its simplest form, argumentation consists of a statement (the *argument*) put forward by a speaker or writer (the *arguer*) in support of another statement (the *standpoint*).

An insightful, albeit less formalistic, definition is provided by Reboul (1991 : 100):

On peut dé finir l’argument comme une proposition destinée à en faire admettre une autre. Un théorème déjà démontré sert d’argument pour en démontrer un autre. Un indice sert d’argument à un policier ou à un avocat, etc.

Yet the temptation to define *argumentation as a series of arguments* is categorically rejected by the author (Reboul 1991: 100).

Comment définir l’argumentation ? Certainement pas comme un ensemble, ou une suite d’arguments ! […] Certains arguments sont démonstratifs, d’autres argumentatifs, et ce n’est donc pas à partir de l’argument qu’on peut définir l’argumentation. Elle est une totalité qu’on ne peut comprendre qu’en l’opposant à une autre totalité : la démonstration.
Reboul’s definition derives from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 17), who first defined the concept in opposition to demonstration:

Pour bien exposer les caractères particuliers de l’argumentation et les problèmes inhérents à l’étude de celle-ci, rien de tel que de l’opposer à conception classique de la démonstration et plus spécialement à la logique formelle qui se limite à l’examen des moyens de preuve démonstratifs.

In describing argumentation as opposed to demonstration, Reboul (1991: 100) claims that it is characterised by five distinctive features:

Nous dirons que l’argumentation se distingue de la démonstration par cinq traits essentiels : 1 / elle s’adresse à un auditoire ; 2 / elle s’exprime en langue naturelle ; 3 / ses prémisses sont vraisemblables ; 4 / sa progression dépend de l’orateur ; 5 / ses conclusions sont toujours contestables.

Broadly speaking, argumentation has, thus, a markedly subjective character with respect to the “scientific” practice of demonstration. Reboul (1991: 101-107) further expounds the five distinctive features of argumentation.


Une démonstration a tout intérêt à user d’une langue artificielle, par exemple celle de l’algèbre ou de la chimie. L’argumentation, elle, se déroule toujours en langue naturelle (ex. le français courant). Ce qui signifie qu’elle utilise bien souvent des termes polysémiques et fortement connotés. (Reboul 1991 : 102).

3. The premises of argumentation are always plausible:

Quand il s’agit de questions judiciaires, économiques, politiques, pédagogiques, peut-être aussi éthiques et philosophiques, on n’a pas affaire à un vrai ou faux, mais au plus ou moins vraisemblable. Inversement, dans un monde où tout serait scientifiquement certain, il ne serait plus possible d’argumenter, ni…d’agir. […] Qu’est-ce donc que le vraisemblable? Pour faire court : tout ce en quoi la confiance est présumée (Reboul 1991 : 103).

4. The structure and unfolding of argumentation are up to the speaker:

Si les prémisses ne sont que vraisemblables, la progression des arguments n’est en rien celle d’une démonstration. […] L’ordre des arguments est donc relativement libre et dépend de l’orateur (Reboul 1991 : 104).

5. The conclusions of the act of arguing are always contestable :

La conclusion est revendiquée par l’orateur comme devant s’imposer, clore le débat. Mais enfin l’auditoire, lui, n’est pas tenu de l’accepter ; il reste actif et responsable de son oui comme de son non ; c’est en ce sens surtout qu’une conclusion est controversable. (Reboul 1991 : 105).
Further approaches have built on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s distinction between argumentation and demonstration. Reisigl, for instance, defines argumentation in opposition to “other elementary patterns of text formation such as explanation, narration, description and instruction” (2014: 72-73).

we can state that truth and normative rightness relate to argumentation in various theoretical and practical contexts of social life, whereas comprehensibility primarily relates to explanation.[…]

That is to say: explanation can be conceived of as a primarily proposition-related linguistic and cognitive action pattern that aims at making something comprehensible, and consists in making something clear, clarifying something, rendering something more precisely or specifying something. Differently from argumentation, explanation is not produced by a controversial claim (Reisigl 2014: 73). (my emphasis)

The presence of a controversial claim, thus, appears to be a prerequisite of argumentation.

3.1.2 When and Why Does Argumentation Occur?

Argumentation does not occur by chance. It always takes place in argumentative situations (Plantin 2005: 53), i.e. communicative events whose purpose is the discursive “solution” of a conflict between different standpoints regarding one specific question.

la situation argumentative typique se caractérise interactionnellement par le développement et la confrontation de points de vue en contradiction à propos d’une même question. Cette vision est à la base de l’argumentation rhétorique ancienne, où l’on trouve, avec la théorie des questions ou “états de cause” la première théorisation des discours se développant sur la base d’un différend (Plantin 2014: 61).

When an arguer changes from an interlocutor to an opposer, s/he automatically gives rise to an argumentative situation, “où deux discours sont en concurrence explicite sur un même thème” (Plantin 2014: 179). Argumentative situations are, therefore, characterised by a difference of opinion, a conflict between different standpoints.

Le scepticisme caractérise la situation argumentative par la confrontation de deux discours de force égale (isosthéniques) et antiorientés, ce qui impose une suspension de l’assentiment (Plantin 2014 : 81).

Agreement on debating in a specific community might be said to trigger argumentation:

Pour qu’il y ait argumentation, il faut que, à un moment donné, une communauté des esprits effectue se réalise. Il faut que l’on soit d’accord, tout d’abord et en principe, sur la formation de cette communauté intellectuelle et, ensuite, sur le fait de débattre ensemble une question déterminée : or, cela ne va nullement de soi (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 18).
All argumentative situations revolve around one specific issue and are, therefore, governed by an argumentative question:

La question argumentative matérialise la confrontation discursive autour de laquelle se configure une situation argumentative. […] D’une façon générale, une question argumentative est produite au point où les discours (écrits ou oraux) se développant sur un même thème, divergent du point de vue même des locuteurs, qui sortent du procès collaboratif de co-construction du discours et de la réalité. Cette divergence produit une question, un problème, un point controversé. Cette mise en question ou problématisation d’un thème discursif est une condition nécessaire au développement d’une argumentation (Plantin 2014: 388).

Controversy as the trigger of argumentation is highlighted by van Eemeren et al. (1996: 2) as well.

In the discourse, argumentation always relates to a particular opinion, or standpoint, about a specific subject. The need for argumentation arises when opinions concerning this subject differ or are supposed to differ. […] Argumentation starts from the presumption, rightly or wrongly, that the standpoint of the arguer is not immediately accepted, but is controversial.

Plantin’s definitions of argumentative situation, backed by van Eemeren’s, might lead to think of argumentation as chiefly dialogic communication. Yet, it is “une forme du discours monologal” and “une forme de dialogue” (Plantin 2014: 60-61) alike. The frequent monologic character of argumentation is acknowledged in all argumentation theories and is often related to political communication:

Nous verrons que tous ces traits incluent tous la composante oratoire de la rhétorique (Reboul 1991: 100).

Argumentation is almost ubiquitous in political communication, whose purpose is “the overcoming of a (latent) conflict between different lines of action” (Marzocchi 1997: 182). In this respect, most political speeches are only apparently monologic, in that they address an audience and are aimed at legitimising given stances to the detriment of political opponents, who play the role of interlocutors and counter-arguers in the communication process, be they present or not.

### 3.1.3 What is the Aim of Argumentation?

Once argumentative situations have been defined, grasping what argumentation is about is an easy task.

More precisely, it is “the practice of justifying decisions under conditions of uncertainty” (Zarefsky 1995: 43). Justification has to be understood in broad terms:

Argumentation is intended to justify one’s standpoint, or to refute someone else’s. […] In an attempt to justify a standpoint, the constellation of propositions consists of one or more pro-arguments (“reasons for”); in an attempt to refute a standpoint, it consists of one or more contra-arguments (“reasons against”). […] In principle, however, these two activities [pro-argumentation and contra-argumentation] are interdependent: pro-arguments often presuppose certain contra-arguments, and vice versa. They are, in fact, complementary tools for testing the acceptability of a standpoint (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 3-4).

In other words, the aim of argumentation is the reduction of uncertainty in front of an audience by means of pro-arguments and contra-arguments.

L’argumentation est un discours propositionnel, qui permet de stabiliser un énoncé contesté en le connectant à un énoncé soustrait à la contestation ; cet effet de réduction de l’incertitude est de type persuasif, elle combine les approches structurelles et fonctionnelles (Plantin 2014 : 60). (my emphasis)

The relevance of argumentation to political communication is evident, given its relation to persuasion:

Argumentation can be conceived of as the linguistic and cognitive action pattern which follows the aim of justifying or questioning validity claims that have become problematic or have been questioned. In other words: argumentation has the pragmatic purpose of persuasion (Reisigl 2014: 73).

Here lies another crucial aspect of argumentation: it is quintessentially a social activity.

Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 5). (my emphasis)

Van Eemeren’s (1996: 5) is probably the most influential and quoted definition in argumentation studies, as it brings the social and pragmatic features of the study of argumentation to the forefront. As regards more formal issues, argumentation actually results neither in a statement nor in a series of statements, as put forward by Reboul (1991: 100), but rather in a constellation of propositions; which is in line with Plantin’s view of argumentation as “discours propositionnel” (2014: 60)\(^1\).

The role of the audience as a rational (and emotional) judge is taken into consideration in all argumentation theories:

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\(^{1}\) Reisigl (2014: 70) talks of speech acts rather than propositions. The issue will be addressed in detail in section 3.5.8.
Argumentation is an activity of reason, which indicates that the arguer has given some thought to the subject. Putting forward an argument means that the arguer attempts to show that a rational account can be given of his or her position on the matter. This is not to say that emotions cannot play a part in adopting a position, but that these internal motives, which have been assimilated in the discourse, are not directly relevant as such. When people put forward their arguments in argumentation they place their considerations within the realm of reason (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 2).

The emotional character of the act of arguing is highlighted by Reboul (1991: 106):

Concluons que l’argumentation rejette l’alternative : ou c’est rationnel, ou c’est émotif. Puisque les prémisses sont des croyances et que les croyances ont toujours un contenu affectif, il ne peut qu’en être de même pur la conclusion, même si en cours de route le discours a réussi à modifier l’affectivité ; si l’orateur change la crainte en confiance, la tristesse en joie, il aura délivré l’auditoire des sentiments négatifs, non des sentiments.

However paradoxical this might sound, argumentation aims at being both rational and emotional, especially in political communication, which resorts to split illocution (Gruber 1993: 3) to please the heterogeneous audience of modern addresses (see sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3).

3.2 Analysis of Argumentation

Since the act of arguing is determined by the situations in which it is carried out, analysis of argumentation pertains to the broader study of text pragmatics, through which it aims at analysing the conditions of argument production and reception, or simply relevance in persuasive communication (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 12).

Argumentation theorists are, broadly speaking, interested in the problems involved in the production, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. In studying these problems, they view argumentative discourse in the light of the actual circumstances in which it takes place. In examining argumentative discourse, many argumentation theorists therefore start from a unifying perspective on reasoned discourse which is to provide a general framework for studying the interplay of pragmatic factors (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 12).

The social and pragmatic character of argumentation is highlighted by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 18) as well:

Mais quand il s’agit d’argumenter, d’influer au moyen du discours sur l’intensité d’adhésion d’un auditoire à certaines thèses, il n’est plus possible de négliger complètement, en les considérant comme irrélevantes, les conditions psychiques et sociales à défaut desquelles l’argumentation serait sans objet ou sans effet. Car toute argumentation vise à l’adhésion des esprits et, par le fait même, suppose l’existence d’un contact intellectuel.

More broadly, argumentation analysis is an overarching text analytical practice having rhetorical, logical and pragmatic foundations alike (Amossy 2000: 2-15). The different
focuses on these three aspects are marked to a greater or lesser extent in each argumentation theory, depending on the researcher’s stance and the specific research object; which has partially determined the heterogeneity and (sometimes) incompatibility (Crevatin 1998: xv) of argumentation theories.

As to the more practical issue of text analysis, a fundamental comment that is not so often specified in the literature should be stated at the outset. Repetition of the noun phrase argumentative discourse in several argumentation theories might suggest the existence of argumentative texts. However, Reisigl (2014: 72) claims that argumentation is neither exclusive to certain text types nor the only pattern of discourse formation in texts that are object of argumentation analysis.

Argumentation is an abstract pattern of text formation […] or discourse formation […]. However, no argumentative text types or genres exist as such. Rather, we are faced with text types or genres (such as discussions, debates, reviews, forensic or judicial pleadings, scientific articles) that contain many elements of argumentation (Reisigl 2014: 72).

In simple terms, argumentation can be found within texts. Yet how does it manifest itself? How is it detected?

Argumentation is always composed of three elements.

![Figure 3.1 Model of Argumentation - adapted from Reisigl (2014: 75)](image)

Figure 3.1, which is drawn from Reisigl (2014: 75), has been adapted to account for different terms that might crop up in studying argumentation theories; which, incidentally, bears witness to the non-homogeneous and often ambiguous metalanguage of the domain in question (Crevatin 1998: xv). The argument or data gives the reason for or against a controversial claim, standpoint or thesis\(^2\), the conclusion rule guarantees the connection of the argument to the claim, and the claim represents the disputed, contested statement that has to be justified or confuted (Reisigl 2014: 75).

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\(^2\) In this case, Reisigl and Kienpointner opt for the term claim, while Pragma-dialecticians prefer to use standpoint. In adopting standpoint, Pragma-dialecticians acknowledge its manifold synonyms: “Other virtual synonyms of the term standpoint, used by various authors, are view, viewpoint, point of view, claim, thesis, etc.” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 2).
Certain approaches draw attention to the fact that the presence of argumentation is signalled by *indicators of argumentation* (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007).


The issue of *argumentative indicators* is paid particular attention to in van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2007), where specific grammatical elements are viewed as constituting a *map* showing the analyst the way to solid argument detection and evaluation.

Some words and expressions used in argumentative discussions and texts often indicate that a particular argumentative move is being made. The use of ‘in my opinion’, ‘to my mind’, ‘the way I see it’ or ‘thus’ or ‘therefore’ may, for example, introduce a standpoint, and the use of ‘because’ or ‘given that’ argumentation. We call words and expressions that may refer to argumentative moves such as putting forward a standpoint or argumentation *argumentative indicators* (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 1).

However, these elements are frequently concealed in discourse.

A standpoint may be marked as such by the use of phrases like “in my opinion”, “I think” and “if you ask me”. In ordinary discourse, however, such indicators are frequently absent. Thus, it is perfectly usual to present a standpoint by a statement consisting simply of the utterance of an unmarked (impersonal) indicative sentence, or even by a question. For an utterance to count as the expression of a standpoint, it is crucial that the person involved may be considered to have taken position for or against a certain proposition about the subject of discourse (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 3).

Moreover, indicators may be misleading.

The use of these argumentative indicators is a sign that a particular argumentative move might be in progress, but it does not constitute a decisive pointer. The word ‘therefore’, for instance, can also be used as filler, and, next to an argumentation, the word ‘because’ may introduce an explanation (van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 1).

In simple terms, no “shortcuts” are allowed in detecting and analysing argumentation, as attested by Marzocchi (1998: 73) with reference to his analysis of the *Troonrede*.

Una caratteristica evidente del testo è la mancanza di strutture dichiaratamente argomentative: gli indicatori di argomentazione sono rari e solo ricostruendo numerose

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3 The “Speech from the Throne” delivered by the Queen of the Netherlands, in this case in 1990.
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premesse è possibile riformulare il testo in una struttura costituita da premesse e conclusioni.⁴

Reconstruction of a speaker’s intended meaning thus entails the acknowledgment of implicit elements in discourse.

The pivotal points of an argument are often constituted by unexpressed elements, which are only implicitly present in the discourse (van Eemeren et al. 1996:14).

Unexpressed elements are one of the main research objects in argumentation theory:

We shall first identify four problem areas in the study of argumentation that can be adequately dealt with only if pragmatic factors are duly taken into account. These problem areas are the following: “unexpressed elements in argumentative discourse”, “argumentation structures”, “argumentation schemes”, and “fallacies” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 12).

In van Eemeren (2001: 27), points of view are added to the list of the crucial concepts in argumentation theory, together with investigations into argument interpretation and reconstruction (van Eemeren 2001: 165) and argumentation in the field of law (van Eemeren 2001: 201) which are not, however, so much concepts as research areas (van Eemeren 2001: 22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRUCIAL CONCEPTS IN ARGUMENTATION THEORY (van Eemeren 2001)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Points of view</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Unexpressed premises</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Argument schemes</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Argumentation structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Fallacies</td>
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</table>

Table 3.1 Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory

The study of implicit meaning, as outlined in chapter 2, is therefore a crucial domain in the study of argumentation. Implicitness concerns not only the premises of argumentation but all its components.

A difference of opinion may be completely overt and explicit […] but in practice the controversy will often remain covert and implicit. The standpoint itself may also remain obscure (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 3).

⁴“The lack of clear argumentative structures stands out from the text: the indicators of argumentation are infrequent and only by reconstructing a number of premises can the text be reformulated into a structure composed of premises and conclusions” (my translation).
Even though implicit meanings might be thought to have a low impact on the effectiveness of argumentation, they play a major dialogic role in all communication spheres (Macagno & Damele 2013), and in particular in political discourse (see section 2.1.3).

Argumentation is frequently enthymemetic, i.e. shortened on the linguistic surface structure. Each of its basic functional elements (argument, conclusion rule, claim) can potentially have been omitted and thus have to be completed ‘en thymò’, i.e. in the mind, by inferences (Reisigl 2014: 72).

Major points of arguments are, thus, not neglected but presupposed or presented in the form of allusions, having substantial perlocutionary effect (Amossy 2000: 152). Notably, the enthymemetic character of argumentation poses major challenges to the argumentation analyst:

This complicates argumentation analysis (Reisigl 2014: 72).

More precisely, it is what renders argumentation analysis a largely hermeneutical practice (Marzocchi 1997: 182; 1998: 8) pertaining to qualitative, pragmatic research, in which the topicality of a speech, the setting in which it takes place and its function must equally be taken into account in order to “reconstruct” speakers’ reasoning.

The specific focus of the PhD study will be addressed in section 3.4, where the choice of analysing argument schemes instead of other crucial concepts in argumentation theory will be explained. Having broadly defined the scope of argumentation, its relation to texts and the nature of argumentation analysis, the focus is now best shifted towards the broad research object of the PhD project, namely the relevance of argumentation theories to interpreting research and practice.

### 3.3 Interpreting and Argumentation, or Rationale of the PhD project

Sections 3.1 and 3.2 outline the complex study of argumentation and “place” it within the blurred boundaries of hermeneutics. A prospective merger between argumentation theory (an interdisciplinary and overarching research field) and interpreting studies (i.e. specific profession-oriented research) might seem pointless at first glance. However, the idea of applying concepts and methods drawn from argumentation theory to interpreting research is not arbitrary, but rooted in objective motivations that have been thoroughly expounded by Marzocchi in his seminal studies (1994, 1997, 1998) calling for a systematic mainstreaming of argumentation theory into Interpretation Research and Theory (IRT). The main points of the rationale of this disciplinary “merger” will now be addressed in turn, building on Marzocchi and supplementing his conclusions with further relevant insights drawn from argumentation studies.
3.3.1 Working within Argumentative Situations

The main reason in favour of an argumentative contribution to interpreting studies lies in the fact that argumentation is “the dominant mode of discourse in many interpreted situations” (Marzocchi 1997: 182). In simple terms, interpreters are often called upon to work within *argumentative situations* (Plantin 2005: 53): their task is to interpret the addresses of speakers whose priority is to try and convince audiences of the validity of their standpoints to the detriment of other speakers who do not share their views. Take specialist conferences and imagine a scientist having to persuade the scientific community of his/her ideas; or, think of the demanding interpreting tasks required by the legal practice, “the argumentative practice *par excellence*” (van Eemeren 2001: 22); and political speeches of all sorts, from presidential debates to (apparently) monologic epideictic speeches verbalising political values (Reisigl 2010: 244).

All these kinds of interpreted situations are systematically governed by an argumentative question, to which speakers try and provide a reasoned answer before strict *judges*, be they scientists, actual judges or voters and political opponents. In this respect, the study of argumentation in interpreting research “merely” appears as a theoretical framework for analysing “a mode of discourse that is so often the input of an interpreting process” (Marzocchi 1997: 182).

3.3.2 Argumentative Competence

*Why does the universe exist? Why do we only see one side of the Moon? Why has the world population increased so dramatically over the last century? Did the defendant kill his wife? Should we invade Iraq? Why should you vote for me instead of him?*

Are interpreters able to answer these argumentative questions, i.e. to keep up the argumentative interaction that naturally arises in controversial situations?

L’interpretazione implica una interazione argomentativa continua (Crevatin 1998: xiv).5

When the predominant focus of a communicative situation is on the discursive attempt to resolve a difference of opinion, the quality of the interpreter’s performance is assessed on the basis of his/her ability to convey the argumentative purpose of the ST, “possibly to the detriment of other kinds of equivalence or of received ideas concerning fidelity” (Marzocchi 1997: 183); which implies that interpreters’ quest for equivalence of the communicative effect (Viezzi 1999: 147; Palazzi 2007: 263) compels them to the recognition and reproduction of the argumentative techniques adopted by SL speakers.

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5 “Interpreting implies continuous argumentative interaction” (my translation).
La ricerca dell’equivalenza dell’effetto comunicativo impone all’interprete di riconoscere le tecniche argomentative usate dall’oratore (Marzocchi 1994: 65).  

In other words, the continuous argumentative interaction implied in argumentative situations requires at least an intuitive knowledge of the appropriate contextual use of arguments on the part of interpreters (Marzocchi 1997: 184). In this regard, when required in argumentative situations, interpreting is arguing. In this respect, Marzocchi’s insights suggest that interpreters are required some kind of argumentative competence. Also in the light of the complex mechanisms underlying the act of arguing, argumentative competence in interpreting can be defined as the ability to grasp SL speakers’ arguments and produce a logical and “argumentatively faithful” interpreted text preserving ST illocution and perlocution; it can be considered part of the broader pragma-linguistic competence (Palazzi 2007: 257) or “textual and discoursal competence” (Garzone 2000: 73) that is a prerequisite of the interpreting profession, a skill interpreter trainees need to develop from the very inception of their learning process. In similar but more vivid terms, argumentative competence can be considered a pivotal component of the “pragmatic compass” (Viaggio 2002) all interpreters need to be equipped with.

### 3.3.3 The Theoretical Gap

In spite of its significant development and interdisciplinary nature, argumentation theory has gone mostly unnoticed in scholarly interpreting settings, partly owing to the fact that interpreting research is still a fairly young and largely unexplored discipline (Garzone & Viezzi 2002: 2), in which a marked neglect of ST pragmatics stands out (Garzone 2000: 69). The theoretical gap is all the more alarming considering, first of all, the implications of pragmatic dark (Viaggio 2002: 229), which lead to the production of unfaithful and pragmatically inequivalent ITs; second and particularly, tables 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11, providing evidence of interpreters’ difficulties in coping with argumentative passages in political speeches, suggest that misrepresentation of speakers’ intended meaning is likely to be determined by neglect of ST argumentative specificities.

### 3.3.4 Argumentation Analysis as a Training-oriented Research Practice

Considering interpreters’ chronic difficulty in “seeing the context” (Garzone 2000: 71) and reproducing the intentionality and intensity of STs (Palazzi 2007: 263; Viaggio 2002), the study of ST argumentation is likely to yield findings raising text expectations in the interpreters’ minds during the training and/or preparation phases, thereby facilitating the inferential and translation processes during the interpretation.

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6 “The quest for equivalence of the communicative effect compels the interpreter to recognise the argumentative techniques adopted by the speaker” (my translation).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

Nel caso dell’interpretazione […], pratiche di analisi testuale fondate sul concetto di argomentazione, come chiave per il significato complessivo del testo, possono essere proposte semmai come componente della formazione, piuttosto che della prestazione vera e propria (Marzocchi 1998: 5).7

Marzocchi (1998: 7) actually claims that there are at least two training implications of the study of argumentation:

- può permettere di spiegare, ‘a valle’ della prestazione, casi intuitivamente palesi di traduzione inadeguata, riconducendoli alla scarsa familiarità del traduttore con le convenzioni argomentative della lingua e cultura di partenza;
- ‘a monte’ della prestazione, la conoscenza delle convenzioni argomentative proprie della lingua e cultura di partenza come pure del contesto in cui si svolge la prestazione può permettere inferenze e anticipazioni ragionevoli riguardo allo sviluppo di un singolo testo o di una intera situazione comunicativa, con un’evidente pertinenza nel caso dell’interpretazione simultanea. (my emphasis)8

The second implications is reiterated in Marzocchi (1994: 64):

Questa […] funzione si trova per così dire a monte della prestazione dell’interprete: l’analisi argomentativa dei testi può intervenire nella sua formazione, accanto ad altri metodi di analisi testuale.9

The first approach has already proved fruitful in translation studies (Williams 2001, 2004) and has been adopted in analysing ITs transcribed with WinPitch software (see section 2.2.1). However, the present project is concerned with the second aspect, i.e. the empirical observation of argumentation in a set of relevant texts with a view to promoting anticipation:

successful anticipation requires at least an intuitive knowledge of adequate argument schemes in the SL and TL culture (Marzocchi 1997: 184). (my emphasis)

As pointed out by Marzocchi (1998: 7), anticipation must not be understood here in the narrow sense of “linguistic anticipation” (Gile 1995a: 173) but rather as prediction regarding the prospective unfolding of the ST and the communicative strategies through which SL speakers convey the informative content. In this respect, argumentation analysis

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7 “In interpreting […], text analytical practices based on the concept of argumentation, understood as a key to the overall meaning of the text, can be proposed as a component of training rather than of the interpreting performance” (my translation).
8 “It enables explanation, after the interpreting performance, of glaring cases of inappropriate translation, by relating them to the scarce familiarity of the interpreter with the argumentative conventions of the source language and culture; before the interpreting performance, knowledge of the argumentative conventions of the source language and culture, together with knowledge of the context in which the interpreting service is provided, enables reasoned inferences and anticipation concerning the unfolding of an individual text or an entire communicative situation, with significant implications for simultaneous interpreting” (my translation).
9 “This […] function has to be sought upstream of the interpreter’s performance: the argumentation analysis of source texts can play a beneficial role during his/her training, together with other text analytical methods” (my translation).
is a largely training-oriented research practice (Marzocchi 1994: 64; 1998: 5), focusing primarily on text analysis in the attempt to promote anticipation acting “at the level of discourse plan” and “at the extra-linguistic level” (Garzone 2000: 74).

3.3.5 The Contrastive Potential of ST Argumentation Analysis

Since the application of argumentation theory to interpreting research is a barely charted sea, this approach has itself, in broad terms, two objectives:

L’obiettivo è duplice: verificare il potenziale esplicativo di un’analisi incentrata sull’argomentazione, e individuare preliminarmente il tipo di problemi che un testo analogo può porre […] all’interprete (Marzocchi 1998: 9).10

More specifically, though, analysis of argumentation is particularly promising in a multilingual perspective because, over and above performing a general hermeneutical function, it performs a second and more specific contrastive function (Marzocchi 1998: 8) highlighting the culture-bound nature of arguments.

Concetti e metodi tratti dagli studi di argomentazione possono quindi svolgere, se applicati alle prestazioni traduttive, una generale funzione ermeneutica e una più specifica funzione contrastiva (Marzocchi 1998: 8).11

Argumentation is cultural in that every linguistic community shows a predilection for specific ways of arguing, as attested by Hatim and Mason’s research into the specificities of cultural conventions with a view to the translation process (1997: 106-107). However, the contrastive potential of argumentation analysis does not only concern cultural aspects of communication.

Un’ulteriore possibile applicazione consiste nel ricorso a concetti sviluppati in questo settore per giungere a una descrizione più sistematica dei contesti nei quali la prestazione traduttiva si realizza (Marzocchi 1998: 8).12

Argumentation analysis is, therefore, context-related and basically aims at warning interpreters of specific problems arising in given argumentative situations. However, analysis of one or two texts related to a single context of speech delivery and reception yields extremely limited results, providing interpreters with relevant indications only when working in a contextually-compatible communicative event. In this respect, the more

10 “The aim is twofold: assessing the explanatory potential of argumentation-centred analysis and detecting the types of problems that a similar text can pose to the interpreter beforehand” (my translation).
11 “If applied to translation quality, concepts and methods drawn from argumentation studies can play a general hermeneutical function and a more specific contrastive function” (my translation).
12 “Another prospective application consists in resorting to concepts developed in this field with a view more systematically to describing the contexts in which the translation service is required” (my translation).
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overarching the analysis, the more substantial the results. It is precisely through systematicity that the potential of argumentation analysis of STs is fully harnessed.

3.3.6 The Quest for Patterns

Irrespective of the research focus, the potential of the argumentative approach to interpreting lies in the identification of patterns (Marzocchi 1997: 181), providing information on recurrent lexico-syntagmatic choices determining the pragmatic force and argumentative orientation of a given discourse. In a nutshell, the aim of argumentative analysis in interpreting is to yield reliable problem-solving indications related to a given type of communicative situations. These indications can be conceived as having the following form: “When speaker a delivers messages in situation b, he generally resorts to the argumentative strategy c, which is generally signalled by term d and/or sentence e, whose appropriate translations requires strategy f”.

In this respect, the study of political argumentation is particularly suitable, because it is recurrent

Speeches are […] compositions based on speech patterns and set pieces that have entered the linguistic and episodic memory of the speaker (Reisigl 2010: 243).

and, therefore, predictable.

Yet political argumentation is neither random nor unpredictable. Across situations and even eras, one can find recurrences that help to define the genre and to establish its conventions (Zarefsky 2009: 115).

The which has not eluded interpreting studies.

In fact, the very act of argumentation is predictable (Marzocchi 1997: 184).

The systematic study of political STs could, therefore, yield increasingly substantial findings to be harnessed in interpreter training gradually to sensitise students to relevant argumentation-driven problems and their related solutions. In this respect, although “advance preparation” is an intrinsic part of the interpreting profession (Gile 1995a: 144-145), interpreters are not researchers and cannot carry out massive corpus-based analyses before the conference or the exam. The task is up to interpreting research, which has the potential to embark on targeted inquiries.
3.3.7 *Descriptive Argumentation Analysis and the Rejection of the Formal Approach*

Despite its theoretically beneficial contribution, the application of argumentation theory to interpreting research raises serious relevance issues (Marzocchi 1998: 3). Basically, argumentation studies might be said to include two approaches, the *normative* or formal and the *descriptive* or content-related.

The various contributions to the study of argumentation [...] differ because their specific aims are different; some are entirely *descriptive*, others have an orientation that is primarily *normative* (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 24).

While normative studies aim at defining rules for effective argumentation and investigate the most effective ways to argue in a rational, sound way, descriptive frameworks investigate “how discourse is used” and mainly relate to discourse analysis practices (Marzocchi 1997: 181).

The formal approach to argumentation analyses the structure of argumentation as syllogism (Reisigl 2014: 75). Examples of the type

- All men are mortal (major premise)
- Socrates is a man (minor premise)
- Therefore Socrates is mortal (conclusion)

mushroom in formal contributions to the study of argumentation. The formal approach is, thus, governed by a normative dimension, also considering that both ordinary and institutionalised communication of any type result in linguistic formulations which differ considerably from the classical syllogism. As a consequence, no attempt at *describing* argumentation can rely heavily on the formal structure of arguments.

Regarding the specific purposes of the project, the relevance of the formal approach is further limited. Given that interpreters are not required to argue in a specific way, as their task is to reproduce the argumentation of others, interpreting research can only benefit from studies seeking descriptivity rather than normativity (Crevatin 1998: xv-xvi). The need for descriptivity stems from the language-based nature of all interpreting studies.

l’identificazione di [...] argomenti con schemi formali è possibile solo astraendo dall’ambiguità della lingua naturale, dunque attraverso una riduzione forzata (*effort de réduction*) a sua volta discutibile (Marzocchi 1998: 58).\(^\text{13}\)

\[^{13}\text{“Arguments can only be related to formal schemes by abstracting them from the ambiguity of natural language, therefore, by means of a similarly questionable coerced reduction (*effort de réduction*)” (my translation).} \]
More specifically, interest in argumentation in interpreting research is directed towards the findings of applied studies\(^{14}\) (Crevatin 1998: ix), focusing on the discursive practices of “professional” arguers to draw meaningful data for interpreter training. In other words, the rejection of the formal approach is the prerequisite of ST argumentation analysis in IRT (Marzocchi 1994: 70; 1998: 43).

Despite the instrumental methodological guidelines laid out by Marzocchi, however, the quest for a suitable descriptive framework is no easy task, as the realm of argumentation theories is vast and heterogeneous. In an attempt to dispel the inevitable methodological confusion (Crevatin 1998: xv) engendered by the study of argumentation, a theoretical selection is proposed in section 3.5.

The study of argumentation theories with a view to streamlining a suitable text analytical methodology has occupied a great deal of the PhD research, as the quest for descriptivity is the prerequisite of argumentation analysis in interpreting studies. However, before providing the theoretical overview, the specific research object of the PhD study is presented in the following section.

3.4 The Study of Argument Schemes and Its Relevance to Interpreting Research and Theory

As all argumentation analysis, since its inception the project has been faced with the wide variety of research possibilities offered by the study of argumentation (Marzocchi 1998: 4; van Eemeren 2001). In this regard, the adoption of a descriptive approach rejects the study of at least one among the crucial concepts in argumentation theory in the first place, i.e. fallacies.

The normative reconstruction of arguments of pragmatic exchange is also instrumental in studying those patterns of argumentation traditionally perceived as incorrect, dishonest, unsound, i.e. those known as fallacies. [...] since the normative study of argumentation is of less direct relevance to the interpreting scholar, an illustration of issues in descriptive argumentation analysis will be deemed sufficient here (Marzocchi 1997: 181).

Given the strictly descriptive character of interpreting-oriented argumentation analysis, the PhD study focuses on the detection and description of argument schemes.

Argument schemes are defined and categorized in various ways. The differences between the categorizations made in the literature on argumentation are connected with the goals each approach is aiming to achieve (Garssen 2001: 81).

A set of definitions drawn from influential theoretical frameworks will shed light on what argument schemes are and why their study is relevant in interpreting settings.

\(^{14}\) Crevatin (1998: ix) distinguishes between historical studies (pertaining to the research field of classical rhetoric), sectorial studies (including research in the domains of legal and philosophical argumentation) and applied studies (focusing on text analysis and the didactics of argumentation).
The term *argument schemes*, “probably first used by Perelman” (Garssen 2001: 81), refers to “general schemes for defending standpoints” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 106). Schemes are technically and formally defined as

Principles or rules underlying arguments that legitimize the step from premises to standpoints (Garssen 1999: 225).

In Hitchcock & Wagemans’ (2011: 185) terms, hinging on Garssen (1999: 225), argument schemes are abstract frameworks that express *the way* in which the transfer of acceptability from the premise to the standpoint takes place. Unlike *argumentation structures*, which are determined by the way in which arguments are arranged within the text, *argument schemes* concern the nature of the relations between the arguments and the standpoints to be defended or confuted (Marzocchi 1998: 39).

Many definitions, thus, focus on the formal features of argumentation, understood as the discursive practice aiming at persuasion. In this respect, argument schemes are “general and abstract patterns” that “correspond to logical reasoning patterns” (Garssen 2001: 96). Certain logic-driven definitions, however, might be misleading, or at least incomplete. In this respect, Amossy (2005: 88), building on Anscombe (1995a), specifies that argument schemes are:

> general principles on which reasoning relies but which are themselves not reasoning […], almost always presented as being an object of consensus in a more or less large community.

In simple terms, the study of argument schemes pertains to the broader “théorie des stéréotypes, ou du moins une théorie linguistique de la stéréotypicité” (Anscombe 1995b: 185). Walton’s definition (2013: 182), viewing argument schemes as “forms of argument that capture stereotypical patterns of human reasoning”, or Walton, Reed & Macagno’s (2008: 1), defining schemes as “forms of argument (structures of inference) that represent structures of common types of arguments used in everyday discourse”, are in line with Anscombe, as is van Eemeren’s (2001: 19-20):

> Argument schemes are *conventionalized* ways of displaying a relation between that which is stated in the explicit premise and that which is stated in the standpoint. (my emphasis)

In this sense, argument schemes might be seen as “easy ways out of reasoning”:

Arguers who put forward an argument are not automatically involved in an attempt to logically derive the conclusion from the premises but, in some way or other, they must be aiming at achieving a transfer of acceptance from the explicit premise to the standpoint. Hence, they attempt to design the argument in such a fashion that it will convince the listener. In this endeavor, they rely on more or less readymade *argument schemes* (van Eemeren 2009: 110-111).
Owing to their stereotypical character, argument schemes in modern approaches to argumentation broadly correspond to the classical concept of *topos* (Garssen 2001: 82). The ambiguous terminology of argumentation studies (Crevatin 1998: xv) is, thus, partly determined by the alternation of the terms *argument scheme* and *topos*. Also the term *conclusion rule* is alternatively employed, as has already been outlined in Figure 3.1. In search of clarity, the definition provided by Reisigl & Wodak (2009: 110), building on Kienpointner (1992: 194), will be taken into account here (see Figure 3.1):

The conclusion rule is seen as the central element, since it connects the argument with the conclusion, the claim. The conclusion rule is an argumentation scheme also known as *topos* (Greek for ‘place’) or *locus* (Latin for ‘place’). *Topoi* can be described as parts of argumentation which belong to the required premises. They [...] connect the argument(s) with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument(s) to the conclusion.

The stance is shared by van Eemeren (2001: 20), whose excerpt clarifies a crucial aspect of argument scheme analysis:

In most cases, some interpretative effort is required to identify the argument scheme that is being employed, i.e., to discover the *topos* on which the argumentation rests. In this endeavour, again, pragmatic knowledge must be brought to bear.

Certain elements of argument schemes can be left unsaid in argumentation. Even though argument scheme detection is hampered by the enthymemic nature of argumentation and is, thus, a demanding activity, argument schemes are “the most useful and widely used tool so far developed in argumentation theory” (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 1). Their usefulness is significant for specific reasons in interpreting studies as well.

In studying argument schemes, the object is not the formal structure of the argument, but its generalized *content*. In other words, some arguments are about causal relations, while others rely on resemblances, and so on (Gerritsen 2001: 72). (my emphasis)

By focusing on content, the study of argument schemes provides textual and contextual information, shedding light on what speakers mean by putting forward specific argumentative moves:

Because an argument scheme characterizes the type of justification or refutation provided for the standpoint in a single argument by the explicit premise for the standpoint, an analysis of the argument schemes used in a discourse produces information regarding the principles, standards, criteria, or assumptions involved in a particular attempt at justification or refutation (van Eemeren 2001: 20).

Even though not all elements of argument schemes are always expressed explicitly, they can always be made explicit as conditional or causal paraphrases such as “if x, then y” or “y, because x” (Reisigl 2012: 3; Reisigl 2014: 75), thereby enabling a discursive and
non-formalised descriptive account of the argumentative features of the speech analysed (Marzocchi 1998: 73). Take the straw man argument, which is likely to pose comprehension problems to interpreters, as suggested by the examples in tables 2.7 and 2.8. It might be said to rely on the following scheme:

*Premise 1 (Conclusion rule):* They say $x$, but $x$ is implausible.
*Premise 2 (Argument):* I oppose $x$.
*Conclusion (Claim):* Therefore, they are wrong and I am right.

This is the reduction to the formal structure of the argument, which, however normative, provides information regarding the speaker’s intended meaning. The pragmatic aim of the argumentative move is exploiting strategies of vagueness (Gruber 1993); in more practical terms, the argument boils down to attacking political opponents by threatening their public positive faces (PPFs) while simultaneously avoiding direct face-threatening acts (FTAs) against them and gaining consensus by means of a self-face-flattering act (FFA) (Gruber 1993: 3-5). The focus on argument schemes, as the study of all other crucial concepts in argumentation theory, can be more formal or content-related; highlighting reference to cynics and cynicism further helps interpreters grasp what the argument is actually about.

Or, take the appeals to solidarity and responsibility for the sake of posterity, as outlined in table 2.9 (see section 2.2.1). Given that the economic crisis has been triggered by reckless speculation and irresponsibility, Obama’s excerpt can be said to hinge upon a specific scheme.

*Premise 1 (Conclusion rule):* All we have comes from our fathers’ sacrifice.
*Premise 2 (Argument):* Speculation and selfishness constituted betrayal to our fathers and our values, and will prevent future generations from enjoying what we have received.
*Conclusion (Claim):* Therefore, sacrifices have to be made to restore our integrity and bring benefits to our children.

Starting from these schemes and referring to Obama’s recurrent intertextual relations regarding the origin of the crisis, the Great Depression, the Founding Fathers, the life of the ordinary American family, the Christian values of solidarity and love of one’s neighbours, give an overview of the American President’s argumentative patterns regarding the topic of the economic crisis and its related sub-topics. It helps understand the ways in which the transfer of the acceptability from the main argument (e.g. The nation’s economy must thrive or we must come out of the crisis) to the main standpoint (e.g. you should vote for me) takes place.

This is basically what the PhD analysis is about. Interpreting, whether simultaneously or consecutively, entails the ability to “compact” speakers’ messages into manageable chunks, or, precisely, “schemes” (Palazzi 2007: 266). However simplistic it might sound, schemes are frequently already there in STs. Hence, their systematic study might spare interpreters a considerable deal of decoding effort. In this respect, ability in recognising and reproducing SL speakers’ argument schemes can be considered a crucial component of
argumentative competence and, therefore, of an interpreter’s competence (Marzocchi 1997: 183).

Furthermore, the study of argument schemes is particularly promising in interpreting, because it is a contrastive analysis, in that “the choice of argument schemes is context-specific and culturally bound” (Marzocchi 1997: 182). Since recognition and reproduction of argument schemes are prerequisites of successful anticipation (Marzocchi 1997: 184), the potential benefits of the systematic account of argument schemes harnessed by given speakers in given communicative contexts is evident:

The correlation of argument structures15 to specific social groups or cultures is a potential aid to translation in that it makes some aspects of discourse comparatively predictable (Marzocchi 1997: 184).

In a nutshell, the decision to look for argument schemes has been taken in the light of their potential to provide textual and contextual information, catering for the descriptive and content-related need of interpreting research.

The description of recurrent argument schemes will be conducted by systematically relating them to their linguistic content, to provide interpreters with a cognitive and lexical support reducing decoding and recoding efforts in the event of contextually-compatible texts. Rather than detecting schemes by looking for argumentative indicators (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007), attention will be drawn to the recurrent lexico-syntagmatic indicators of specific argument schemes determining the topicality and pragmatic force of the speeches analysed.

In detecting and describing recurrent and significant content-related argument schemes, a well-defined, largely descriptive methodology must be adopted; which is subject to the thorough preliminary assessment of the relevance of the various argumentation theories to the specific and binding needs of interpreting studies.

3.5 Sifting Argumentation Theories in the Search for a Suitable Descriptive Text-analytical Methodology

In the present section, the main argumentation theories are briefly presented and sifted, meaning that their relevance to interpreting is assessed based on the yardstick of descriptivity. In an attempt to streamline a suitable methodology, particular attention is paid to how different theories address, conceptualise and categorise argument schemes.

The following theoretical overview has nevertheless no claims to be exhaustive, especially considering that new argumentation theories and revisions of old ones are continually mushrooming in university departments, and are often confined within language barriers. However, all major trends are taken into account. Since Marzocchi

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15 The term argument structures is here used by Marzocchi in general terms meaning “argument patterns” or “argument features”, rather than with reference to the specific notion of argumentation structure understood as one of the crucial concepts in argumentation theory (van Eemeren 2001).
already proposed a literature review (1998), his conclusions are supplemented with an analysis of recent influential trends.

### 3.5.1 The New Rhetoric

Whether adopting a chronological categorisation or starting from the most influential framework, any review of argumentation theories cannot but begin with *La nouvelle Rhétorique*, because the study of arguments in the modern age was launched by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s seminal work. Focusing on *discursive techniques* and “l’adhésion des esprits” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 5), the treatise provides modern theories with a revision of the cornerstones of classical rhetoric, “les topoi et la persuasion” (Plantin 2014: 57).


However, *The New Rhetoric* marks a decisive shift from classical theories in that “*topoi* are not seen as general formal or universal principles [...] but as dependent on culture and society” (Walton, Macagno & Reed 2008: 300). The study of argumentation in the twentieth century is, thus, revived under the auspices of a new, crucial tenet: argumentation is cultural. It is from this cornerstone that the pivotal notions of *auditoire universel* Vs *auditoire particulier* (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 40-41) and *accord* (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 87) have been constructed.

Despite having frequently been the target of criticism, the notions expounded in *The New Rhetoric* are the bedrock of modern argumentation theories, which continually quote Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and build on their theory further to develop new insights into the study of argumentation. The empirical relevance of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric (Kienpointner 1993) holds true for interpreting studies too, as attested by Marzocchi (1998: 118):

Dato un testo di partenza, l’analisi dell’argomentazione può infatti contribuire a precisare quali sono i testi d’arrivo accettabili, e ciò non in assoluto, ma *per un determinato uditorio, con il quale vige un determinato accordo preliminare*, e quali testi d’arrivo invece comportano una eccessiva distorsione del messaggio. Il contributo dell’analisi dell’argomentazione alla riflessione teorica sulla traduzione e l’interpretazione si riassume in definitiva parafrasando l’antico precetto retorico: così come chi argomenta lo fa sempre di fronte a un uditorio, anche chi traduce e chi interpreta lo fa sempre di fronte e a beneficio di un uditorio; la valutazione delle prestazioni traduttive non può prescindere da questo dato contestuale, e deve invece comprendere un’adeguata considerazione dell’uditorio e dell’accordo preliminare che questo condivide con l’oratore.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^\text{16}\) The argumentation analysis of a given source text can shed light on the acceptable target texts, not in an absolute sense, but considering a specific audience and its prior agreement with the speaker; it can also shed
Regarding the specific focus of the PhD project and the quest for descriptivity, the treatise comprises a typology of argumentation schemes that can be used to make standpoints more acceptable (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 105), together with some real-life examples. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory is generally not considered normative, but contains a normative dimension in that it “provides a survey of possible techniques of argumentation” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 106). It is more concerned with “les schèmes de pensée qui sous-tendent l’argumentation” (Amossy 2000: 8) rather than with linguistic analyses of argumentative discourse. In this respect, it can also be viewed as a philosophical treatise rather than a work on language. A seminal classification of argument schemes is provided, which makes up most of the The New Rhetoric (1958: 251-609).

Argument schemes are classified into two main categories, liaison and dissociation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 255-256).

Nous entendons par procédés de liaison des schèmes qui rapprochent des éléments distincts et permettent d’établir entre ces derniers une solidarité visant soit à les structurer, soit à les valoriser positivement ou négativement l’un par l’autre. Nous entendons par procédés de dissociation des techniques de rupture ayant pour but de dissocier, de séparer, de désolidariser, des éléments considérés comme formant un tout ou du moins un ensemble solidaire un sein d’un même système de pensée : la dissociation aura pour effet de modifier pareil système en modifiant certaines des notions qui en constituent des pièces maîtresses. C’est par là que ces procédés de dissociation sont caractéristiques de toute pensée philosophique originale.

The former encompasses three types of arguments:
1. “les arguments quasi-logiques” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 259), “those based on forms of inference” (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 300);
2. “les arguments basés sur la structure du réel” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 350) which, unlike quasi-logical arguments, having a rational aspect, “se servent de celle-ci [la structure du réel] pour établir une solidarité entre des jugements admis et d’autres que l’on cherche à promouvoir” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 350);

The second category (dissociation) includes various argumentation techniques which entail “the introduction of a division into a concept the audience previously regarded as constituting a single entity” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 117).

L’opposition à l’établissement d’une […] solidarité se marquera par le refus de reconnaître l’existence d’une liaison. On montrera, notamment, qu’une liaison que l’on avait considérée...
como admise, que l’on avait présumée ou souhaitée, n’existe pas, parce que rien ne permet de constater ou de justifier l’influence que certains phénomènes envisagés auraient sur ceux qui sont en cause, et que, par conséquent, la prise en considération des premiers est irrelevante (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 550).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PERELMAN &amp; OLBRECHTS-TYTECA’S CATEGORISATION OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Argumentation by association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quasi-logical arguments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arguments based on the structure of reality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arguments establishing the structure of reality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argumentation by dissociation</td>
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Table 3.2 Categorisation of Argument Schemes in The New Rhetoric

Manifold real-life examples are provided in the treatise which, however, do not pertain to the discursive practices of interpreted situations. Moreover, however influential and insightful for argumentation studies, the New Rhetoric categorisation of argument schemes is not particularly relevant to interpreters’ needs, which would rather benefit from the results of “l’analyse du discours argumentatif dans ses aspects langagiers” (Amossy 2000: 8). Debate over the descriptive or normative nature of The New Rhetoric seems pointless, however, as “rather than a normative argumentation theory, the new rhetoric is a descriptive catalog of types of argumentation that can be successful in practice” (Lunsford, Wilson & Eberly 2009: 114). In this sense, it can be considered a first attempt at describing argumentation techniques, having no claims to be either descriptive or normative and, consequently, lacking a fully-fledged methodology for discourse analysis.

3.5.2 Stephen Toulmin

Despite having rapidly become one of the most influential books among argumentation scholars, Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument does not actually put forward a theory of argumentation, as it is rather a work on logic (Marzocchi 1998: 33) and a philosophical treatise. Which is evident in the introductory lines as the author specifies that “the purpose of these studies is to raise problems, not to solve them; to draw attention to a field of inquiry, rather than to survey it fully; and to provoke discussion rather than to serve as a systematic treatise” (Toulmin 1958: 1). The success of The Uses of Argument in the field of argumentation is, in fact, ascribable to Toulmin’s “model of argument”, a schematic model for the analysis of argumentation, that has subsequently been adopted and adapted by a variety of scholars for conducting their targeted argumentation inquiries.

Toulmin proposes a model of argumentation in which three elements can be distinguished: claim, data, warrant. The following example is then provided (1958: 92): “A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject (warrant). Harry was born in Bermuda (data), so Harry is a British subject (claim)”. The model becomes more sophisticated and complicated as rebuttals (“unless both his parents were aliens”), backings (“on account of
the following statutes and other legal provisions”) and modalities (indicating the strength of the claim) are taken into account.

![Figure 3.2: Toulmin’s Model of Argument](image)

The example of Harry bears witness to the low degree of descriptivity of Toulmin’s approach to argumentation, lacking sound discourse analysis and real-life examples. The low descriptivity of the model mainly lies in the fact that “Toulmin’s book *The Uses of Argument* describes argumentation as a process and not as a product of the communicative event” (Walton, Reed, Macagno 2008: 301). In this respect, Toulmin’s contribution shifts more towards normativity than descriptivity: therefore, its relevance to interpreting-oriented analyses is limited, or, rather, not particularly intuitive. In other words, however insightful and influential, the model is fairly technical and formal, requiring systematic schematisation of the propositional content, with evident problems regarding the presentation of results for interpreting purposes:

Un’analisi fondata per esempio sul modello di Toulmin imporrebbe una sistematica ‘messa in forma’ ed explicitazione del testo, con evidenti problemi di presentazione dei risultati del lavoro (Marzocchi 1998: 73).\(^{17}\)

It is, thus, unsuitable, also considering that, after all, an argument can be faithfully reproduced by the interpreter without being mentally “broken” into its explicit and implicit components. Even though the formal and rationality-driven nature of Toulmin’s work clashes with the need for descriptivity of interpreting studies (Marzocchi 1998: 34), useful theoretical insights might nevertheless be drawn (Crevatin 1998: xv). For instance, the seminal notion of field-dependency (Toulmin 1958: 14), enables acknowledgment of the fact that arguments vary according to the specific “fields of social action” (Reisigl 2014:

\(^{17}\)“An analysis based, for instance, of Toulmin’s model would entail systematic formalisation and explicitation of textual features, with evident problems regarding the presentation of analytical findings” (my translation).
69) in which they are put forward. Even though a precise definition of field is not provided\(^{18}\), Toulmin brings the concept home by raising questions, in line with the philosophical stance of the treatise as set out at the outset (Toulmin 1958: 1).

The first problem we have set ourselves can be re-stated in the question, ‘What things about the form and merits of our arguments are field-invariant and what things about them are field-dependent?’ What things about the modes in which we assess arguments, the standards by reference to which we assess them and the manner in which we qualify our conclusions about them, are the same regardless of field (field-invariant), and which of them vary as we move from arguments in one field to arguments in another (field-dependent)? How far, for instance, can one compare the standards of argument relevant in a court of law with those relevant when judging a paper in the Proceedings of the Royal Society, or those relevant to a mathematical proof or a prediction about the composition of a tennis team? (Toulmin 1958: 14-15).

In line with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the notion of field has contributed to “move” the study of argumentation in the twentieth century towards the broader study of pragmatics.

“discourse” is considered to be [...] a complex of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action (in political contexts: the fields of law making procedure, of the formation of public opinion, attitude and will, of political administration, of political advertising, of political control or protest, etc.) (Reisigl 2014: 69). (my emphasis)

As to argument schemes, Toulmin “does not mention topics in his work, but he refers to them with his notion of field” (Walton, Reed, Macagno 2008: 301). In this respect, despite being formal and philosophical, his work has contributed significantly to the content-related study of argument schemes.

Following the observation that argumentation is always topic-related and field-dependent (i.e. depending on the configuration of social domains, disciplines, theories etc.), topoi are also formalized as a recurring content-related conclusion rules that are typical for specific fields of social action, disciplines, theories etc. (Reisigl 2014: 77).

However, a descriptive argumentation analysis can hardly hinge solely on Toulmin’s work.

3.5.3 Pragma-dialectics

Pragma-dialectics is probably the most influential argumentation theory. Developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst at the University of Amsterdam since the 1980s,

\(^{18}\) The notion of field is explained formally starting from the basic elements of argumentation: “Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type: they will be said to come from different fields when the backing or the conclusions in each of the two arguments are not of the same logical type” (Toulmin 1958: 14).
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the theory builds on the assumption that argumentation is “basically aimed at resolving a
difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint” (van Eemeren 2010: 1).
Pragma-dialectics, significantly influencing any study of argumentation and attracting
scholars from every corner of the world, draws mainly on normative pragmatics (van
Eemeren 2010: 4) and formal dialectics, with a view to providing a comprehensive
framework enabling normative and descriptive studies alike. In van Eemeren’s words,
argumentation is studied against the normative standards of reasonableness, in the attempt
to “clarify how the gap between the normative dimension and the descriptive dimension of
argumentation can be bridged to integrate critical and empirical insights systematically”
(van Eemeren 2010: 5)

The theory is overarching to such an extent that a thorough description of the pragma-
dialectical principles and the studies carried out within its theoretical framework is too
unwieldy an issue for any literature review. The present section will, therefore, limit itself
to a brief outlining of the “pros” and “cons” of Pragma-dialectics for interpreting purposes,
in general, and for the purposes of the PhD project in particular.

First of all, the theory has the unquestionable merit of highlighting the pragmatic and
social character of argumentation (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 5), thereby enabling
comprehensive analyses. Moreover, over and above the merit of turning the spotlight on the
study of argumentation, Pragma-dialectics provides a seminal, insightful and intuitive
theory of argumentation, i.e. *strategic manoeuvring* (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2007: 240;
van Eemeren 2010: 93). By adopting a comprehensive view of the practice of arguing and
taking into account logic, rhetoric and formal dialectics, the theory builds on the
assumption that parties involved in a critical discussion *manoeuvre strategically*
simultaneously to pursue their dialectical and rhetorical aims.

In their efforts to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of these two different aims, which may
at times even seem to go against each other, the arguers make use of what we have termed
*strategic maneuvering*. This strategic maneuvering is directed at diminishing the potential
tension between pursuing at the same time a ‘dialectical’ as well as a ‘rhetorical aim’ (van

The authors claim that in analysing argumentation, the analyst ought “to take a
differentiated view of the maneuvering rather than viewing it as a monolithic whole” (van
Eemeren 2010: 93). In other words, strategic manoeuvring is “made up” of different but
inseparable aspects or components, which are outlined in the “strategic maneuvering
triangle” (van Eemeren 2010: 93-95).
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Three elements make up strategic manoeuvring.

All three aspects are associated with distinct types of choices that are made in the maneuvering. [...] First, there is the choice made from the available “topical potential”, the (not always clearly delineated) repertoire of options for making an argumentative move that are at the arguer’s disposal in a certain case and at a particular point in the discourse. [...] Second, there is the choice of how to adapt the argumentative move made in the strategic maneuvering to meet “audience demand”, the requirements pertinent to the audience that has to be reached. [...] Third, there is the exploitation of “presentational devices”, which involves a choice as to how the argumentative moves are to be presented in the way that is strategically best (van Eemeren 2010: 93-94).

In this respect, in analysing strategic manoeuvring, all the major features of political communication are taken into account, namely what it is about, where it takes place, who it is addressed to and what functions it performs.

The theoretical focus on strategic manoeuvring also suggests that argumentation is not only context-dependent but also has a personal or idiosyncratic dimension, in that choices are continuously made which, in the end, determine argumentation.

It is important to emphasize that in argumentative practice making an opportune selection from the available topical potential, responding appropriately to perceived audience demand, and exploiting presentational devices as well as one can always go together and are represented in every argumentative move. No strategic maneuvering can occur without making simultaneous choices regarding how to use the topical potential, how to meet audience demand and how to employ presentational devices (van Eemeren 2010: 94). (my emphasis)

The quotation shows that the study of argumentation is in line with the imperative of acknowledging ethos in political discourse analysis (Amossy 2000: 69).

Strategic manoeuvring has proved an insightful and intuitive framework opening the floodgates to overarching multidisciplinary studies. Here lies another crucial advantage of Pragma-dialectics: despite building on the assumption that arguers engage in a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2007: 239) with the aim of resolving a difference of opinion, (apparently) monologic discursive contexts are not overlooked, either.
Argumentation presupposes two distinguishable participant roles, that of a “protagonist” of a standpoint and that of a – real or projected – “antagonist” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 277). (my emphasis)

As a consequence, Pragma-dialectics has generated heterogeneous and comprehensive studies, among which the analysis of political argumentation plays a major role. Incidentally, David Zarefsky’s studies on political speeches (2009, 2014) provide an invaluable source of theoretical and methodological insights for the interpreting scholar as well. Building on the notion of strategic manoeuvring, Zarefsky (2009) applies it to the specific field of political communication, integrating van Eemeren & Houtlosser’s (2007) and van Eemeren’s (2010) comments. Apart from the three basic aspects of manoeuvring, Zarefsky (2009: 121) identifies further and more specific types of strategic manoeuvring which occur in political argumentation. These features, which might fall under one or more of the three categories, are listed as follows (Zarefsky 2009: 121-125):

- changing the subject
- modifying the relevant audience
- appealing to liberal and conservative presumptions
- reframing the argument
- using condensation symbols
- employing the locus of the irreparable
- using figures and tropes argumentatively

All these features, or at least those relevant to the PhD analysis, will be further addressed and expounded in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. Further relevant and insightful pragma-dialectical works on political argumentation include Govier & Jansen’s (2011) analysis of anecdotal arguments, whose contribution will be examined in chapter 5 when analysing Barack Obama’s speeches.

Regarding argument schemes, Pragma-dialectics puts forward an original classification dividing schemes into three main categories: symptomatic argumentation, comparison argumentation and instrumental argumentation.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF ARGUMENT SCHEMES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Symptomatic Arguments</td>
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<td>Comparison Arguments</td>
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<td>Instrumental Arguments</td>
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Table 3.3 Pragma-dialectical Classification of Argument Schemes

These three types of argument schemes are categorised according to the specific relation which links the premise to the standpoint. Each type of scheme is associated with a specific critical question (Garssen 2001: 91) enabling the analyst to evaluate schemes.

In argumentation that is based on symptomatic relation, the standpoint is defended by mentioning in the premise a specific characteristic of what is mentioned in the standpoint.
and by presenting this characteristic as a typical quality of what is mentioned in the standpoint. The central critical question that accompanies symptomatic argumentation is whether the quality that is mentioned in the premise is really typical for what is mentioned in the standpoint. [...] In argumentation based on a relation of comparison, the standpoint is defended by presenting the controversial as something that has similarities with something that is not controversial in order to show that what applies to what is already accepted also applies to what is not yet accepted. The key critical question accompanying comparison argumentation is whether there are enough relevant similarities. [...] In argumentation based on a causal relation, an event that is mentioned in the argument is presented as the cause of what is mentioned in the standpoint – or the other way around – while the standpoint is defended by showing that the latter is the result of the former – or the other way around. [...] The key critical question that has to be answered in the evaluation of causal argumentation is whether the event that is presented as the cause really leads to the event that is presented as a result (Garssen 2001: 92).

However insightful, Garssen’s comments bear witness to the chiefly formal and theoretical stance of Pragma-dialectics as regards argument schemes. Particularly, the fact that different critical questions are associated with each type of scheme suggests that topoi are mainly addressed adopting a formal approach, that is to say that they are evaluated in terms of soundness rather than described. In this respect, the relevance of Pragma-dialectics to interpreting studies lies in the fact that, rather than the logic-driven categorisation of types of argument schemes, only relating specific schemes to the specific contexts in which argumentation occurs can play a crucial role in promoting anticipation. Hitchcock & Wagemans (2011: 185) claim, however, the equally descriptive and normative approach to argument schemes in Pragma-dialectics.

The notion [of argument scheme] plays a pivotal role in the pragma-dialectical analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. In the analysis, argument schemes are used to reconstruct the elements of the argumentation that remained implicit. In the evaluation, argument schemes and the critical questions associated with these schemes are used to assess the appropriateness and correctness of the arguer’s attempt to transfer the acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint. (my emphasis)

However, despite its overtly normative and descriptive approach, Pragma-Dialectics seems to be primarily concerned with perpetual discursive theorising having a “therapeutic” and normative aim (Crevatin 1998: ix), which marginalises empirical analyses. Even though analysis of argumentation is said to be taken into consideration, the theory turns out to propose an excessively ideal model for text analysis (Crevatin 1998: xi), entailing highly formalised argument reconstruction. In other words, albeit insightful, Pragma-dialectics offers more of a theory of argumentation than a text analytical methodology, and this slant is often stated deliberately.

In real-life contexts, it has to be taken into account that human interaction is not always automatically “naturally” and fully oriented toward the ideal of dialectical reasonableness. [...] The ideal of critical discussion is by definition not a description of any kind of reality
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*but sets a theoretical standard* that can be used for heuristic, analytic and evaluative purposes (van Eemeren 2010: 4). (my emphasis)

In this regard, Pragma-dialectics can be fairly dispersive and “misleading”, in the sense that it hides relevant descriptive insights and suggestions for text analysis under a conspicuous and repetitive amount of theoretical and normative indications.

3.5.4 Douglas Walton

A very influential contemporary development is Walton’s approach to argumentation, hinging primarily on formal logic (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 243). It is a philosophical, theoretical (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 242) and formal system that is “rather difficult to characterize briefly” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 236). Broadly, Walton’s research mainly pertains to the domain of *critically thinking* or *informal logic*¹⁹, and adopts a pedagogical approach (Marzocchi 1998: 2).

Despite its openly formalistic character, however, it deserves attention in interpreting settings, as it offers insightful theoretical indications regarding the nature of arguments and, especially, a matchless compendium of argument schemes (Walton, Macagno & Reed 2008). However exhaustive, though, this listing of schemes is backed by no specific methodology for argument detection and no substantial text analyses. Thus, the schemes provided only offer useful theoretical principles for interpreting purposes and have, therefore, to be thoroughly studied before being applied to specific discourse analyses. In this respect, Walton’s literature (2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2013) has proved essential in the initial phase of the PhD project in grasping the nature of argument schemes and will prove equally instrumental in providing intuitive theoretical definitions for describing the argument schemes which will stand out in analysing the corpus.

3.5.5 The Francophone “Landscape”

Despite its overarching and interdisciplinary nature, argumentation theory is decidedly monolingual, showing a stark preference for English, which is of course also a consequence of the advent of English as the lingua franca of academia. In this respect, despite rooting on English ground, the intricate “wood” of argumentation studies is best regarded as a multiethnic land, that has been shaped by Dutch, French, German and English-speaking scholars alike. After the first publications in Dutch, Pragma-dialecticians became aware of the prospective linguistic internment of the discipline and turned to English, rapidly gaining

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¹⁹ *Informal logic* is a theory developed in the 1970s by the American scholars J. Anthony Blair, Charles Willard, John Woods and Douglas Walton. Primarily inspired by Toulmin and triggered by the willingness to “counter” formal, *mathematical logic*, informal logic is primarily concerned with the normative study of logical reasoning in ordinary language. In this respect, it includes research on the nature and structure of argument schemes, with a particular focus on the difference between *sound* and *fallacious* argumentation.
a reputation in the field. The same did not happen in France, where the thorough and wide study of argumentation has always found crossing borders difficult.

Providing a thorough overview of the francophone contributions to argumentation theory is too unwieldy a task for the present thesis, especially because the relevance of francophone theories to interpreting is rather limited. Only the major contributions will, thus, be briefly outlined with an eye to descriptivity. In general terms, the francophone contribution to the study of argumentation can be said to be philosophical, theoretical and definitional, mainly aiming at framing argumentation studies in relation to the study of rhetoric.

The study of argumentation in France did not start before the mid 1970s, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric did not arouse immediate interest and failed to stimulate further research in the field (Plantin 2007: 284). It was the works of Anscombe & Ducrot and Grize that re-introduced the concept of argumentation into the field of human sciences (Plantin 2007: 285).

Anscombe & Ducrot (1983) developed the semantic-pragmatic theory of argumentation (Crevatin 1998: xii), challenging the “classical” rhetorical approach by putting forward a “weak or loose […] and extensive” (Amossy 2005: 87-88) definition of argumentation, which is considered inherent in human language rather than discourse-specific. Anscombe & Ducrot, thus, developed a theory of argumentative meaning rather than an argumentation theory (Crevatin 1998: xii). In other words, rather than outlining a methodology for argumentation analysis, the authors have developed a theory concerning the “scope” and “role” of argumentation in language, or rather “la fonction linguistique de l’argumentation” (Anscombe & Ducrot 1983: 5); which is rendered evident by the title of their seminal work L’argumentation dans la langue (1983). Moreover, their works mainly focus on the argumentative “role” of connectives, thus having limited applicability to interpreting-oriented analyses.

Despite rejecting the formal approach to argumentation, Grize (1982) developed a theory of natural logic rather than a theory of argumentation, and, like those of Anscombe & Ducrot, his studies are primarily concerned with the philosophical theorisation of the study of argumentative discourse rather than with specific text analyses. These are the reasons that have led Plantin (2014: 56) to refer to the theories of Anscombe & Ducrot and Grize in terms of “théories généralisées de l’argumentation”.

The works of the Belgian scholar Michel Meyer (1982, 1986), instead, adopt a marked normative and instructional approach (Marzocchi 1998: 26), placing themselves within the theoretical boundaries of the philosophy of language as well.

Plantin’s research has a more pronounced interdisciplinary and pedagogical character (Crevatin 1998: xiii); in this sense, it shifts towards normativity and, like the former

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20 For a more detailed insight into the argumentation theories developed in francophone settings, see Plantin (2007).
21 van Eemeren et al. (1996: 322) acknowledge that “Ducrot and Anscombe’s polyphonic and topical analyses of connectives such as ‘but’ and concessive expressions such as ‘although’, have established the ground for more detailed analyses of counterarguments, refutations, and concessions”.
22 For more detailed insights into Grize’s theory of Natural Logic see van Eemeren et al. (1996: 322-329).
studies, has a marked theoretical dimension. As witnessed by his attempts to dispel the definitional confusion revolving around the term argumentation in different languages (Crevatin 1998: xiii; Plantin 2007: 278), Plantin’s main interest appears to lie in framing the study of argumentation, with particular reference to the differences between French- and English-writing scholars. In this respect, his approach is particularly significant for interpreting researchers starting to study argumentation, since it provides clear and exhaustive theoretical explanations, of which the seminal notion of situation argumentative (Plantin 2005: 53; 2014: 59; 2014: 179) is a case in point. Incidentally, Plantin’s Dictionnaire de l’argumentation (2014) provides an invaluable theoretical source for interpreting researchers as well.

Unlike other French scholars, Plantin also opposes the “post-modern drift” or “flight from theory” (Plantin 2007: 289-291) the study of argumentation has undergone by moving away from its rhetorical foundation. Building on the assumption that “arguing is a rhetorical activity” (2007: 289), Plantin complains that too few studies venture into the genuine revival of rhetoric, with the single exception of Reboul, whose Introduction à la rhétorique (1991) propagated the study of rhetoric in France. Indeed, like Plantin, Reboul is an instrumental source for understanding what argumentation is about, why and how it occurs. However, despite their extreme clarity, which often seems greater than that of English-written literature, too few indications regarding how to carry out specific analyses can be gleaned from their works.

The same holds true for Charaudeau (2005), whose thorough theorising of the contextual variables of political speeches and the strategies of persuasion adopted by politicians limits the scope for analyses focusing on argument detection. Generally, since Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the study of argument schemes has, indeed, withered in francophone scholarly settings.

Similar comments apply to the more recent works of Amossy (2005, 2009). Even though they reveal a certain willingness to mainstream French research into the “global”, “English” study of argumentation by also relying on Pragma-dialectics, they nevertheless betray a typical French predilection for the theoretical framing of the study of argumentation. In other words, despite their attempt to move away from the philosophical foundation of the francophone approach, no genuine extensive discourse analyses are carried out; however, like Plantin, Reboul and Charaudeau, Amossy (2000) provides insightful theoretical sources which interpreting scholars are advised to consult at the beginning of their study of argumentation.

3.5.6 Manfred Kienpointner

Among recent studies on argumentation, the work of the Austrian Manfred Kienpointner is undoubtedly one of the most prominent. The author first of all concentrated on theoretical and formal issues in the study of argumentation by proposing a simplified version of Toulmin’s model of argument (1996: 75).
According to this simplified model, “the argument gives the reason for or against a controversial claim/thesis, the conclusion rule guarantees the connection of the argument to the claim, and the claim represents the disputed, contested statement that has to be justified or refuted” (Reisigl 2014: 75). By focusing most of his research on conclusion rules and following in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s footsteps, Kienpointner (1992, 1996) has contributed to the analysis of argumentation at micro-level in offering a comprehensive typology of argument schemes (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 348). The scholar (1996: 83-184) distinguishes between nine classes of formal argument schemes which are listed in Reisigl (2014: 76).

(1) scheme or topos of definition
(2) scheme or topos of the species and the genus
(3) scheme or topos of comparison (scheme/topos of similarity, scheme/topos of difference)
(4) scheme or topos of the part and the whole
(5) causal scheme or causal topos (scheme or topos of cause/consequence and of intention)
(6) scheme or topos of contradiction
(7) scheme or topos of authority
(8) scheme or topos of example
(9) scheme or topos of analogy

Kienpointner, thus, makes the schemes explicit through paraphrases: for instance, the argument from authority, as translated from German and adapted from Reisigl (2014: 76) has the following scheme:

**Conclusion Rule:** If authority X says that A is true/that A has to be done, A is true/A has to be done.

**Argument:** X says that A is true/that A has to be done.

**Claim:** Thus, A is true/A has to be done.

However, Kienpointner’s approach is not exclusively formal but comprehensive, linking the formal (normative) and content-related (descriptive) aspects of argumentation. His studies range across a variety of subjects, including theoretical issues (1993), fallacies (2009), figurative analogy in political argumentation (Garssen & Kienpointner 2011) and racist manipulation in right-wing populism (2005). The success of Kienpointner’s approach has been partially hampered by the fact that most of his papers and monographs, especially the less recent ones, are only published in German. However, the author is increasingly adopting English and moving towards descriptive analyses, showing a marked interest in streamlining the theoretical features of the content-related study of argumentation. In this
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respect, Kienpointner recently presented his latest work on the argument schemes of Louise Michel’s political rhetoric at the 8th ISSA Conference for the study of argumentation; the analysis, inserted in a broader research on freedom speeches, is a largely descriptive account of the schemes adopted by the French heroine. In this sense, Kienpointner’s contribution is likely to become increasingly useful for interpreting purposes.

3.5.7 Fairclough & Fairclough

Over the last few years, Fairclough & Fairclough have developed a branch of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with a more pronounced focus on argumentation, which is viewed as “a complex speech act whose intended perlocutionary effect is convincing an interlocutor to accept a standpoint” (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 23). Their studies mainly address political communication and their theory revolves around the concept of practical argumentation, understood as “means-end” argumentation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 4):

Practical argumentation can be seen as ‘means–ends’ argumentation, where the claim or conclusion (‘we should do A’) is a judgment about what means should be pursued to attain the end (goal).

In their recent work Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students (2012a), the authors put forward an original proposal for the structure of practical arguments (2012a: 45).

![Diagram of Practical Argument Structure](image)

Figure 3.5 The Structure of Practical Arguments (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 45)
After extensive theorisation of the model, Fairclough & Fairclough lay down specific guidelines for discourse analysis before presenting the findings of their research on the discursive political response to the economic crisis in Great Britain.

However insightful and descriptive, the method appears to rely heavily on Toulmin’s formal and logical reconstruction of arguments, which inevitably involves a reduction of the actual linguistic implementation of the argument to a schematic, logical standard form, “requiring more often than not the reordering of elements in the text, the addition of implicit elements, or many other transformations” (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 323). In other words, insistence on argument reconstruction, albeit descriptive, reduces the method’s potential applicability to interpreting research, basically owing to the lack of an intuitive methodology for content-related presentation of results. In this respect, the Fairclough & Fairclough approach is in line with pragma-dialectical descriptive analyses of argumentation, which is also attested by the authors’ active participation in the research group of the Amsterdam School (Fairclough 2009; Fairclough & Fairclough 2012b).

Moreover, the stress on practical argumentation does not do justice to the heterogeneity of arguments that can be found in political communication; despite the authors’ claim that “we are not suggesting that political discourse contains only practical arguments” (2012a: 1), only a few other schemes are taken into account (2012a: 128), such as the argument from authority (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 411) and the argument from negative consequences (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 332). However, a number of insights can be drawn especially regarding political communication. For instance, insistence on the subjective and ethotic character of political communication (2012a: 3) and the focus on values as premises of argumentation (2012a: 177) help better frame the speeches prior to the analysis. In this respect, analysis of the corpus speeches will show that argumentation regarding the economic crisis, however pragmatic, is frequently related to allegedly cultural values or “values that can potentially obtain universal acceptance – like freedom, democracy, justice, etc.” (Garzone & Santulli 2004: 362).

3.5.8 The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)

Besides Fairclough & Fairclough’s theory, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) is the other branch of CDA with a clear focus on argumentation. It was developed by Reisigl & Wodak, two German-speaking scholars who, among others, have the merit of building their research mainly on Kopperschmidt and Kienpointner’s works (whose contributions are hardly known by the English readership) and then developing and mainstreaming them into the more visible field of English-written scholarly papers and monographs.

As regards theoretical issues, unlike in Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984) and in Fairclough & Fairclough’s theory (2012a: 23), argumentation is not regarded as a “macro-speech act”.
In contrast to Pragma-Dialectics [...] as well as Fairclough and Fairclough [...], I do not regard argumentation to be a speech act, macro-speech act or complex speech act, but consider argumentation as an abstract pattern of text formation or discourse formation [...]. There are at least two reasons for this terminological decision: (1) In contrast to ‘speech act’, the concept of ‘macro-speech act’ or ‘complex speech act’ is theoretically underdeveloped. We have a pragmatically rather well-defined typology of speech acts (more or less at sentence level), but no elaborate theory of macro-speech acts or complex speech acts that makes a clear distinction between different types of macro-speech acts or complex speech acts. On the other hand, textlinguistics and discourse analysis offer a rather clear-cut distinction between basic patterns of text formation or discourse formation. They are narration, argumentation, explanation, description and instruction. (2) The indistinct use of the term ‘speech act’ for units of various order, functions, complexity and size levels conceptual differences that can be explicated by distinct terms. Thus, I prefer to use dissimilar terms for the metalinguistic description of different pragmatic units such as assertion and argumentation (Reisigl 2014: 72).

Argumentation results in speech acts but is not, itself, a speech act.

Argumentation is a non-violent linguistic as well as cognitive pattern of problem-solving that manifests itself in a more or less regulated sequence of speech acts which, altogether, form a complex and more or less coherent network of statements or utterances (Reisigl 2014: 70).

In this sense, there are no argumentative text types, genres or discourses; rather, most texts and discourses contain elements of argumentation (Reisigl 2014: 72).

Regarding the more practical question of argumentation analysis, the DHA connects formal, functional and content-related aspects of argumentation in an integrative framework, but is particularly interested in the analysis of the content of argumentation schemes (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 75), because “a content-related analysis of topoi says more about the specific character of discourses [...] than a purely functional or formal analysis” (Reisigl 2012: 4). Indeed, unlike most of the previously presented frameworks, DHA contributions are more concerned with practice than theorising, meaning that priority is given to targeted discourse analyses, backed by exhaustive methodological suggestions, also concerning the definition of an intuitive framework for the presentation of analytical findings. Apart from the distinction between sound and fallacious argumentation, which is not particularly relevant to interpreters’ needs (Marzocchi 1997: 181), the DHA is, therefore, one of the most relevant approaches. Among its merits there is undoubtedly the “relativisation” of the omnipresence of argumentation, in that arguments, in line with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, are systematically situated in context and deemed to be topic-related (Reisigl 2014: 77) or discourse-specific (Reisigl 2014: 78; Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 114), given that argumentation does not happen in a vacuum but is first and foremost a social activity. In this respect, the DHA does not limit itself to harnessing previously described topoi, but builds on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s contribution enriching it with further content-related argument schemes (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 114) which progressively occur in textual data as various topic-related analyses are carried out. For

23 The issue of result presentation and the DHA method will be further addressed in the following section.
instance, building on previous extensive research on populist and racist rhetoric in Austria (Reisigl & Wodak 2001), Reisigl (2014: 78-79) lists the most recurrent content-related topoi and fallacies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos of people</th>
<th>Argumentum ad populum (ad verecundiam, hasty generalisation)</th>
<th>Version 1 (negative version):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If the people refuse a political action or decision, then the action should not be performed / the decision should not be taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Version 2 (positive version):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If the people favour a specific political action or decision, then the action should be performed / the decision should be taken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos of democratic participation</th>
<th>Fallacy of democratic participation</th>
<th>Version 1:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If a specific political decision, action or non-action concerns all citizens / the people, then the citizens / the people should be asked for the opinion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Version 2:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If I or we have the power, the people will participate in political decisions democratically.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Topos of anger (of “the man on the street” [sic!]/ “the ordinary people”) | Fallacy of anger | If the man on the street” / the “ordinary people” become(s) angry and displeased, then a political action has (not) to be performed in order to resolve anger and displeasure. |
| Topos of burdening (“the man on the street” [sic!]/ “the ordinary people”) | Fallacy of burdening or weighting down | If a person, “the man on the street”, the “ordinary people”), “the Austrian” is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens. |
| Topos of exonerating (“the man on the street” [sic!]/ the ordinary people”) | Fallacy of exonerating | If a person, “the man on the street” / “the ordinary people” is (over)burdened or overloaded by political measures, one should do something in order to exonerate the person, “the man on the street” / “the ordinary people”. |
| Topos of liberty / of liberating (“the man on the street” [sic!] / “the ordinary people”) | Fallacy of liberty or liberating | Version 1: |
|                                 |                                      | If you support us (our petition), we guarantee freedom. |
|                                 |                                      | Version 2: |
|                                 |                                      | If I or we will have the power, we will guarantee the freedom and liberate or save the “man on the street” / the “ordinary
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topos of repaying the diligent and good workers / nationals</th>
<th>Fallacy of repaying the diligent and good workers / nationals</th>
<th>If you support / vote my populist movement / if I or we will have the power, then the diligent and good workers / nationals will be repaid.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topos of decency or respectability</td>
<td>Fallacy of decency or respectability</td>
<td>Version 1: If somebody is not decent and respectable, she or he should not be / become politician. Version 2: If I or we have the power, we will perform a decent or respectable policy and work for the decent and respectable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of dirty politics and of the necessity of clearing up and cleansing</td>
<td>Fallacy of dirty politics and of the necessity of clearing up and cleansing</td>
<td>Since politics is a dirty business, one / we must clear up, must have a clean-out, must muck out the stable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topos of law and order</td>
<td>Fallacy of law and order</td>
<td>If I or we have the power, we will provide for / guarantee law and order.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4 Frequent Content-related Populist Topoi and Fallacies in Austria (Reisigl 2014: 78-79)

Reisigl & Wodak do not insist on argument schemes as “ways of connecting premises to conclusions”, but harness their practical potential in providing an overview of the most salient pragmatic features of the speeches analysed. The authors’ studies on the rhetoric of racism and antisemitism in Austria (2001) and on discourse on climate change (2009), whose tables for the presentation of findings are displayed and examined (2009: 102-109), provide interpreting scholars with evidence of how argumentation analysis of “a specific discourse and related texts” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 93) is instrumental in identifying patterns and recurrences in speakers’ choice of schemes.

A further and slightly different example of the DHA method for presenting analytical findings is shown and discussed in the following section (Table 3.6).

3.6 Methodology for Interpreting-oriented ST Argumentation Analysis

The study of the most influential argumentation theories, carried out under the auspices of the seminal methodological guidelines laid out by Marzocchi (1994, 1997, 1998), provides specific indications regarding the suitable contributions to interpreting research on political STs. The findings are summarised in Table 3.5, showing the descriptive and/or normative focuses of the main theories. The plus (+) and minus (-) symbols respectively indicate whether there is or not emphasis on normativity and/or descriptivity. The plus/minus symbol (+/-) shows that the related focus is limited, while consecutive symbols (++) appear to indicate marked descriptive or normative stances.
The main contributions all provide instrumental theoretical frameworks to understand the complex notion of argumentation and its manifold interdisciplinary applications. Yet, as to the interpreting scholar’s practical aim to conduct discourse analyses for interpreting purposes, Pragm-a-dialectics, the Fairclough & Fairclough Approach and the DHA (hinging on Kienpointner) are the only theories showing a marked bent towards descriptivity. All the theories have been taken into account in the present PhD study, but only descriptive frameworks have been adopted for text analysis.

However, Pragm-a-dialectics betrays a normative dimension in argumentation analysis as well, as the few descriptive studies aim at evaluating argumentation according to normative standards of reasonableness. Therefore, a limited number of concepts and models for text analysis (Zarefsky 2009; Govier & Jansen 2011) have been used to study the corpus speeches. Pragm-a-dialectics offers, though, instrumental theoretical contributions that support both text analysis and the assessment of the relevance of argumentation concepts to interpretation research and theory, as shown in the following paragraph (3.7).

The same also holds true for the Fairclough & Fairclough approach, whose model for argumentation analysis, however descriptive, relies heavily on Toulmin’s formal reconstruction, which poses serious problems regarding intuitive presentation of results for training purposes.

In the light of the limitations of the two theories, the Discourse-Historical Approach to argumentation appears to be the most suitable framework for analysing STs with a view to the interpretation of similar speeches. With respect to other descriptive frameworks, it enables a further and more decisive shift towards descriptivity, particularly a shift from the study of the generalised content of arguments (Gerritsen 2001: 72) to a comprehensive and multidisciplinary analysis enabling an explicit content-related account of the schemes, which are always related to the speaker in question, the topic of the speech and the relevant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENTATION THEORIES</th>
<th>NORMATIVITY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perelman &amp; Olbrechts-Tyteca</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulmin</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragm-a-Dialectics</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walton</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Francophone “landscape”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anscombe &amp; Ducrot</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grize</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyer</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantin</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reboul</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charaudeau</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amossy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kienpointner</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairclough &amp; Fairclough</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse-Historical Approach</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5 Relevance of Argumentation Theories to Interpreting Research based on the Criteria of Normativity and Descriptivity
broader and narrow contexts (Wodak 2007b: 206). Moreover, the DHA is an intuitive theory and methodology, which must not be neglected, since interpreting scholars and interpreters are generally not argumentation experts; over and above offering a pre-established account of argument schemes to be found in political communication, it outlines a clear and sufficiently “free” methodology for detecting the ones that are specifically bound to the macro-topic of economic discourse and the various communicative contexts in which the corpus speeches were delivered.

In the present context, we refer to several topoi which are mentioned in the literature, but we also coin new names for topoi [...] which occur in our specific data (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 114).

Therefore, as in the DHA, reference will be made to several topoi described in the literature to provide a descriptive account of the speeches analysed, but new names will be coined for argument schemes which occur exclusively in the specific data collected for PhD analysis.

Another crucial advantage rendering the DHA more suitable than Pragma-dialectics and the Fairclough & Fairclough approach has to be sought in the description of an intuitive methodology for the presentation of analytical findings rejecting extensive argument reconstruction. Table 3.6 shows the model for presenting the results of the analysis of a specific text, which might be said to be propaedeutic to the one displayed in Table 3.4, in which argumentative patterns occurring in a set of compatible texts are summarily shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Klaus’s answers to questions from the House of Representatives of the US Congress (text, macrostructure/topics and argumentation)</th>
<th>Macro- and mesostructure: Turn-taking and discourse topics</th>
<th>Argumentation: Claims, topoi and fallacies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Václav Klaus, 19 March 2007</strong></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answers to questions from the House of Representatives of the US Congress, Committee on Energy and Commerce, on the issue of mankind’s contribution to global warming and climate change</strong></td>
<td>Parliamentary (sub)genre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concerning mankind’s contribution to climate change and in keeping with obligations towards the welfare of our citizens: what, in your view, should policymakers consider when addressing climate change?</strong></td>
<td>Question 1: Topic: anthropogenic climate change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T: policymakers ‘obligations towards citizens’ welfare</td>
<td>Answer 1 by Klaus: T: anthropogenic climate change</td>
<td>Claim 1: Anthropogenic climate change as dangerous argument (topos or fallacies of threat of freedom)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My ambition is not to bring additional arguments to the scientific climatological debate about this phenomenon. I am convinced, however, that up to now this scientific debate has not been deep and serious enough and has not provided sufficient basis for the policymakers’ reaction.

What I am really concerned about is the way environmental topics have been misused by certain political pressure groups to attack fundamental principles underlying free society. It becomes evident that while discussing climate we are not witnessing a clash of views about the environment but a clash of views about human freedom.

A someone who lived under communism for most of my life I feel obliged to say that the biggest threat to freedom, democracy, the market economy and prosperity at the beginning of the 21st century is not communism or its various variants. Communism was replaced by the threat of ambitious environmentalism. This ideology preaches earth and nature and under the slogans of their protection – similarly to the old Marxists – wants to replace the free and spontaneous evolution of mankind by a sort of central (now global) planning of the whole world.

| T: scientific climatological debate | Fallacy of superficiality and lack of scientific seriousness |
| T: policymakers’ reaction | Topos or fallacy of abuse |
| T: misuse of environmental topics by political pressure groups | Topos or fallacy of danger for threat of freedom and free society |
| T: attack on freedom and free society |

| T: victim of communism |
| T: threat of freedom, democracy, market economy and prosperity by environmentalism |
| T: environmentalist centralism similar to old Marxism |

| Fallacy of threat of freedom, democracy and market economy (formally: fallacy of comparison of communism and environmentalism [threat of centralism]) |

Table 3.6 DHA Table for the Presentation of Analytical Findings

In the DHA model for argumentation analysis, displayed in Table 3.6, speech passages are systematically shown together with the related *topics* and the more specific *themes* (*T*) addressed by Czech politician Václav Klaus in answering questions regarding climate change during a debate on global warming at the US Congress. In the right-hand column of Table 3.6, features of his argumentation (*claims, topoi and fallacies*) are displayed. If the model might seem to fail in explaining in detail the underlying argument schemes, mention must be made of the fact that the findings presented in Reisigl & Wodak (2009: 102-109) are backed by exhaustive discursive description of the argument schemes found in analysing Klaus’s intervention. In this sense, Table 3.6 is only meant to provide a schematic insight into the potential of DHA analyses.

This model has been adopted and adapted to the specific needs of interpreting research, meaning that the argument schemes have been shown next to the related speech passage without specifying whether the scheme is a plausible or fallacious one. The model has been

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24 Only the first passages of Klaus’s intervention have been provided in Table 3.6, but the DHA table actually occupies eight pages in Reisigl & Wodak (2009: 102-109) and accounts for the whole of the politician’s speech.
used throughout the second part of the PhD project to analyse the corpus speeches and will be further addressed in the following chapters, as the results of the analysis will be gradually expounded. However, even though some of these tables will be shown in chapters 5 and 6, they have only been used in the analytical phase; given that the relevance of the argumentative approach to STs lies in the identification and highlighting of patterns (see section 3.3.6) and considering interpreter trainees’ need for intuitive and streamlined theoretical indications (Gile 1995a: 18-20), the tables will, in the end, be further “condensed” based on the model of Table 3.4, in the sense that only the most frequently recurring and meaningful argument schemes adopted by the corpus speakers will be highlighted. The model, possibly to be used in training settings, will, however, be tailored to the specific needs of interpreting research, as the schemes will be highlighted together with their related lexico-syntagmatic indicators and concise indications regarding the communicative functions and specific contexts of use of the arguments. Further details and indications, mainly concerning possible argumentative strategies to be adopted when faced with specific arguments, will be addressed in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, and included in speaker- and topic-related tables drafted on the model of table 3.7 and included in chapter 9. A template of this theoretical tool is now shown in Table 3.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEAKER</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>MUST RECURRENT ARGUMENTS</th>
<th>ARGUMENT SCHEME / EXPLANATION</th>
<th>CRUCIAL COMMENTS AND LEXICO-SYNTAGMATIC INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM DEFICIT INHERITANCE</td>
<td>P.1: The present coalition government has inherited a massive budget deficit. P.2: Cutting the deficit is a priority for restoring the economy. C.: Therefore, the task is not easy and will require time and sacrifice.</td>
<td>POLITICAL IMPLICATURE → allusion to the previous government - to inherit - legacy - massive deficit - mess - problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STRAW MAN ARGUMENT</td>
<td>P.1: They say x, but x is implausible. P.2: I oppose x. C.: Therefore, they are wrong and I am right.</td>
<td>- PRAGMATIC PURPOSE: exaggerating an opponent’s position to make it look implausible - they - those who - the pessimists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7 Template for the Presentation of Analytical Findings

The aim of the present chapter was to expound the rationale of the PhD project and propose an overview of the most influential argumentation theories, which is a crucial step towards adopting a suitable methodology for ST argumentation analysis.

The overview has, however, no claim to be exhaustive, as it is not and will never be concluded; since the field of argumentation is rapidly expanding, a constant updating is
necessary for interpreting research to keep up with recent trends in order to define and streamline the most suitable methodology to be adopted in interpreting studies. Only by keeping track of further developments will the theory of interpreting-oriented argumentation analysis act as a “map”, guiding the interpreting scholar into the intricate “wood” of argumentation studies.

In chapter 4, the technical details of the corpus will be outlined to provide an overview of the speeches analysed before the presentation of analytical findings. Yet, before moving to the next chapter, the following section will provide evidence of the theoretical benefits of applying argumentation concepts, however formal, to interpreting studies.

### 3.7 Argumentative Equivalence Defined

In addition to finding instrumental scope in interpreting research and training by providing insightful text analytical methodologies, argumentation theory also provides theoretical, “operational” and definitional contributions which can help better frame the role of interpreters within argumentative situations.

*Argumentative competence* has been easily defined in section 3.3.2 by building on Marzocchi’s insights regarding interpreters’ ability in recognising and reproducing crucial features of ST argumentation. However, *argumentative equivalence* is a more controversial and hardly-definable concept, as interpretation is hampered by the cultural and conventional specificity of all acts of arguing (Marzocchi 1998: 6-7) and by problems regarding the “relevant audience shift” engendered by interpreting activity (see section 2.1.2). Yet, a definition can be provided by drawing on Pragma-dialectics, which suggests a particular interpreter approach to ST argumentation. Just as the argumentation analyst takes a differentiated view of manoeuvering rather than viewing it as a monolithic whole (van Eemeren 2010: 93), the interpreter who is plunged into argumentative situations ought to see his/her activity in relation to what could be named the Strategic Manoeuvring Equivalence Triangle.

![Figure 3.6 The Strategic Manoeuvring Equivalence Triangle](image-url)
In order to recognise and reproduce the speaker’s illocution and perlocution, thereby guaranteeing the correct transfer of argumentation patterns, three aspects have to be taken into account:

- **topical coherence**, respect for the topical choice made by the source language speaker;

- **respect for audience demands**, even though the relevant audience may change from the ST to the IT. For example, in the European Parliament the ST audience corresponds to the target audience, as all the participants share the same context of situation and the same communicative interests. Yet, during an interpreting exam, for instance, the IT audience is composed of interpreting professors who are in charge of assessing the quality of the student’s performance. Or, in television interpreting, the audience shifts from the actual participants in the original event and the TV audience sharing the language and culture of the speaker to the TV spectators in the target culture. However, irrespective of whether the activity is an instance of instrumental or documentary interpreting (Viezzi 2013: 384), respect for audience demands is paramount under any circumstances, because the interpreter’s task is to show the speaker’s attitude towards his/her audience.

- **presentational coherence**, or the preservation of ST presentational devices. This third category is controversial, because the pragma-dialectical notion of “presentational devices” encompasses a variety of features that cannot be always reproduced in the IT. Think of alliteration, often bound to perish against the intrinsic differences between languages. However, its reproduction is not demanded despite the rhetorical mitigation in the IT, as interpreters are generally dispensed from the task of “translating the untranslatable”, to paraphrase Reboul’s assertion on the untranslatability of rhetoric (1991: 110). Yet the systematic study of ST argumentation highlights a number of presentational devices that can be more easily reproduced, such as Cameron’s habit of “appealing to liberal and conservative presumptions” (Zarefsky 2009: 122).

Against this background, **argumentative equivalence** may be viewed as the faithful reproduction of the features of strategic manoeuvring into the IT. The focus on words and their contextual meaning, inherent in the analysis of strategic manoeuvring, is certainly not unknown to interpreting studies. For instance, Gile (1995a: 35-36) addresses the interpreter’s need to pay attention to both form and function in terms of dealing with **content** and **packaging**, while the need to adapt argumentation to audience demands may be inferred from Kopczyński’s (1994: 190) thorough analysis of the situational variables of interpreted events and the considerable number of studies on the pragmatic aspects of conference interpreting (e.g. Schäffner 1997a; Schäffner 1997b; Setton 1999). However, the literature on interpreting lacks a specific focus on argumentation, whose distinctive features are only tangentially addressed and whose scattered, incomplete and non-harmonised study stands in the way of its internalisation by interpreters and further shapes the heterogeneous and often ambiguous metalanguage of interpreting studies (Gambier 2008: 64). The focus on strategic manoeuvring, instead, provides a comprehensive and intuitive framework for understanding the threefold notion of argumentation and, by
implication, the importance and nature of *argumentative equivalence* between the source and the interpreted text.

This does not mean that the swift internalisation of the notion of strategic manoeuvring and the superficial study of ST argumentation are destined to solve the ever-present problems of performing demanding interpreting activity. Rather, the *theoretical* relevance of the argumentative approach to STs in interpreting research has to be sought in its explanatory potential, highlighting the salient features of all acts of argumentation, and in its resulting methodological and operational guidance, shedding light on the best way to transfer the pragmatic and argumentative nuances of STs.

Yet, as repeatedly claimed in the present chapter, attainment of *argumentative equivalence* between the ST and the IT depends on *argumentative competence*, i.e. ability in recognising and reproducing ST arguments by relying upon previously-acquired knowledge of *relevant* argumentation patterns, which can only be catered for through the extensive study of argumentation in a vast set of relevant texts.
As they were thus talking, a dog that had been lying asleep raised his head and pricked up his ears. This was Argo, whom Ulysses had bred before setting out for Troy. […] As soon as he saw Ulysses standing there, he dropped his ears and wagged his tail.¹

The theoretical underpinnings expounded in chapter 2 depict political discourse as a highly sophisticated form of communication posing pragmatic challenges to speech comprehension and reproduction alike. The focuses on strategic manoeuvring and its implications in interpreting, as outlined in chapter 3, further validate the idea that political texts are sensitive and, therefore, demanding texts, especially for the purposes of interlinguistic transposition.

Against this background, an exclusive and enhanced focus on source texts is essential to promote the attainment of pragmatic and argumentative equivalence in interpreting; in this regard, the empirical assessment of the cultural and contextual nature of argumentation makes up the most significant objective of this PhD research. Since the inception of the PhD course, the achievement of the objective has been subject to the imperative of gathering a large amount of homogeneous data enabling meaningful analysis.

The study is based on a multilingual comparable corpus² of political source texts which was assembled throughout the first two years of the PhD course. It is composed of three hundred and thirteen speeches on the current financial and economic crisis, almost equally divided into American, British and French speeches. Barack Obama, David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande are the corpus speakers.

The reference corpus is nothing but the solid foundation of the analytical mission. Corpus building, therefore, made up a crucial part of the broader PhD project, which aims at enhancing the study of ST argumentation by detecting recurrent problematic patterns and suggesting solutions, thereby yielding meaningful findings for interpreter preparation. In this spirit, the corpus has been named ARGO, for its reference to argumentation and after Ulysses’ dog: just as the dog recognised his owner when he returned to Ithaca twenty years after leaving, the corpus is meant to promote the internalisation of recurrent argumentative

² Multilingual comparable corpora are sets of original texts (written) in two or more languages, having similar characteristics as far as content, genre, communicative function, dimensions, collection, selection and composition are concerned (Zanettin 1998: 617; Delisle, Lee-Jahnke and Cormier 2002: 64). They differ from monolingual comparable corpora, which consist of two sets of texts, one originally written in language A and one of similar texts translated into language A from a variety of different languages (Baker 1995; Zanettin 1998: 616).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

strategies in the training and preparation phases, thereby favouring their recognition during interpretation.

4.1 Data Homogeneity and Representativity

Together with the study of the most influential argumentation theories, the initial part of the project consisted in assembling a representative multilingual corpus of political source texts in order to conduct a relevant and reliable study.

La questione della rappresentatività potrebbe essere riassunta nelle seguenti domande: di che cosa ci vogliamo occupare? Quale comunità linguistica e quale varietà linguistica ci interessa studiare? Che tipo di situazioni comunicative intendiamo circoscrivere e analizzare? (Bendazzoli 2010: 36).³

Bendazzoli’s questions provide an intuitive framework for describing ARGO.

- What do we want to address?

The genre focus of the present research has been expounded in chapter 2. Only political speeches make up the corpus, even though politics is not the only communicative “sphere” in which argumentation occurs (Zarefsky 2014: 1). Political communication, though, is made up of a variety of possible topics. Consequently, sound analysis cannot shirk some sort of content “restriction”. In the light of the topic-related nature of argumentation (Reisigl 2012: 4; Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 114), selective analysis is required, i.e. analysis of one single topic at a time or at least sound contrastive analysis of topic-related argumentation.

Faced with diverse political topics that are all object of interpretation, the decision was taken to analyse the most topical issue, namely the financial and economic crisis. Ongoing deliberation surrounding the economic recession and recovery has dominated the political landscape for the last half-decade or so. It has monopolised political communication since 2008, probably outranking the discourse on the War on Terror, at least in the United States. As a consequence, speeches on the crisis and, more generally, on the economy, are probably the most numerous and, therefore, the most easily accessible nowadays. Moreover, the topic immediately appeared to be sufficiently complex and controversial, that is to say a topic requiring sophisticated argumentation on the part of consensus-seeking politicians.

All these factors have influenced the choice, which was, however, primarily guided by the imperative of gathering a sufficiently large and homogeneous amount of textual data ensuring ecologically-valid and reliable results.

³ “The issue of representativeness could be summarised by the following questions: what do we want to address? Which language community and which language variety are we interested in studying? What communicative situations do we want to deal with and analyse?” (my translation).
- Which language community and which language variety are we interested in studying?

The project aims at studying argumentation in a contrastive perspective, i.e. in more than one language community. The corpus is composed of three hundred and thirteen American, British and French political speeches; a hundred and nine were delivered by Barack Obama, a hundred and one by David Cameron, a hundred and three by Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande (respectively fifty-three and fifty).

The initial idea to include Italian speeches was soon abandoned for their relatively low availability on the internet and to keep research relevant to passive interpretation. Analysis of argumentation in Italian political communication could, however, further the contrastive aspect of the project and yield suggestions for interpretation from Italian.

As regards the analysed language variety, the study focuses on political communication and, therefore, on a formal register of institutional language which is, however, subject to variation depending on the context of speech delivery (see section 2.1.2).

- What communicative situations do we want to deal with and analyse?

Unlike the genre, content, linguistic and cultural focuses of the study, specific and univalent, the contextual focus of the corpus is much more diversified. In simple terms, ARGO speeches were delivered in different types of communication settings.

The choice to take different settings into consideration is partly justified by the training-oriented rationale of the study. On the one hand, for the sake of relevance, speeches have been selected for their being delivered within international settings requiring the interpreting service. On the other hand, speeches delivered in national contexts have not been neglected either; even though they are rarely interpreted, they are often chosen for exam sessions in translation and interpreting faculties. To put it differently, the actual presence of interpreters in the original communicative events was not the sole yardstick for speech selection, for which there are two reasons. First, interpreter trainees often find themselves facing speeches which have not actually been interpreted. Second, considering the low availability of parallel interpreting corpora (Cencini & Aston 2002: 47) and the relatively scarce number of actually-interpreted STs, the study of texts similar to those to be interpreted is a fruitful, albeit neglected, activity, as claimed by Garzone (2000: 69) and attested by Marzocchi’s (1998: 71-118) analysis of the Troonrede.

Analizzando da un punto di vista retorico-argomentativo testi analoghi a quelli sui quali lavorerà, l’interprete ne identifica la funzione complessiva e delimita il quadro ideologico nel quale l’oratore si muove (Marzocchi 1994: 64).4

Therefore, actually-interpreted speeches and speeches like them have similarly been included in the corpus. Yet, not only is the choice motivated by training and data-gathering

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4 “Analysing rhetoric and argumentation in texts similar to those that will be interpreted, the interpreter identifies the overall textual function and outlines the ideological framework in which the speaker ‘situates’ his/her speech” (my translation).
issues. In fact, even though the presence of speeches delivered in heterogeneous communicative contexts is liable to arouse doubts on the ecological validity of the study, the analytical choice is deliberate and aimed at assessing the contextual variation of arguments and the prospective interpreter need for a context-specific study of ST argumentation. After all, the theoretical stress on politicians’ need to adapt argumentation to the relevant audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 31-34; Amossy 2000: 33-36) suggests that politicians’ arsenals include various and adaptable strategies or ways of arguing.

Therefore, both national and international speeches have been included in the corpus. Speeches delivered in national contexts have been selected in the light of their crucial argumentative role in “shaping” national consensus with a view to elections. In this regard, politicians might be thought to care more about the perlocutionary effects of their national speeches, which undergo a more significant, albeit less far-reaching, media-resonance process with respect to speeches delivered beyond national borders. National speeches are “discours phares” (Mayaffre 2012: 22) of a speaker’s argumentation. For instance, Sarkozy’s speeches in Toulon at the beginning of every December were a cornerstone of his Presidential career and have, consequently, become part of ARGO. National speeches in the corpus also include campaign speeches, providing the stage for marked argumentation, addresses delivered in schools and universities and interventions during visits to the headquarters of leading companies in the energy industry sector. These settings all provide fertile ground for dealing with the economy and its related topics, such as education, enterprise and innovation.

Even though the crisis struck locally, having different effects in different countries, it is a global predicament. As such, it has been (and still is) thoroughly and continually addressed in international meetings of heads of state and/or government. Speeches delivered at G8 and G20 conferences and at the World Economic Forum (WEF) have been included in the corpus, given their pivotal role in shaping international discourse on the crisis over the last few years. Speeches delivered during bilateral meetings between heads of state and/or government have also been selected; despite being mainly about the polite economic relations between the countries in question, this kind of interventions always provides speakers with the opportunity to “advertise” national policies and argue in favour or against given lines of action which give rise to controversy in the international community. In analysing bilateral meetings, only the passages delivered by the corpus speakers have been taken into account.

4.2 Text Selection Procedure and Technical Details of the Corpus

ARGO texts were collected on a daily basis during the first two years of the PhD course. All the speeches, making up a sample of the discourse on the financial and economic crisis, were delivered between 2008 and the beginning of 2014, the moment at which the text-selection and data-gathering activities were brought to an end. With a few exceptions, the
texts were downloaded from the official websites of the American, British and French heads of state and/or government. The specific internet sources from which the speeches were extracted will be specified in turn in the following sections, addressing the three sub-corpora of ARGO.

Yet, a methodological premise regarding data collection should be stated from the outset. ARGO texts are transcripts, i.e. written texts, rather than transcriptions, that is to say representations of the oral recording, which is itself already a representation of the original speech (Zanettin 2009: 333); which does not mean that the need to provide interpreting studies with interchangeable (Cencini & Aston 2002) and machine-readable (Shlesinger 1998: 486; Bendazzoli & Sandrelli 2009: 3) corpora has been totally disregarded. Rather, the choice to analyse transcripts instead of transcribing audio-visual data stems from the intrinsic difference between political source texts and interpreted texts, which basically boils down to the Latin maxim verba volant, scripta manent.

Interpreted texts are oral texts which, like all speech, “die in the air” (Cencini & Aston 2002: 47). In order to be thoroughly “observed”, they need to undergo a transcription process, whereby the oral is made written. In this regard, corpus-based interpreting studies mainly concern the creation, analysis and sharing of parallel corpora, which have long been awaited in scholarly interpreting settings to analyse the performances of interpreters and “validate existing theories and models” (Monti et al. 2005). Transcription is therefore the core of corpus-based interpreting studies; it is the process whereby ITs become “observable”.

Incidentally, the interpretations of Obama’s Victory and Inauguration Speeches provided in chapter 2 are, indeed, transcriptions. During the PhD course, a considerable amount of time was dedicated to the PhD stage, which consisted in the transcription of a number of ITs drawn from CorIT, the television interpreting corpus developed at the University of Trieste. Interpreted texts have been transcribed with WinPitch software (Martin 2005; Dal Fovo 2014: 87), enabling careful transcription and constant intratextual alignment (Bendazzoli 2010: 93), i.e. text-sound-video alignment. In addition, WinPitch has enabled fully digital elaboration of data (Dal Fovo 2014: 88), catering for the crucial academic needs of replicability and data-sharing (Dal Fovo 2014: 53). Moreover, apart from interchangeability (Cencini & Aston 2002: 47-48), another crucial advantage of transcribing with WinPitch lies in the fact that IT transcriptions highlight discursive peculiarities which are not visible in speech transcripts, i.e. strategic pauses, hesitations and hedges (Krouglov 1999); these features can turn out to be essential in analysing interpreting performances. As to the specific purposes of PhD research, transcription of political ITs played a major role in corroborating the rationale of the study: despite being “a labour-intensive and arduous process, which poses a major methodological hurdle” (Shlesinger 1998: 487), it has enabled empirical analysis of interpreters’ at work, with particular reference to observation of interpreters’ recurrent failures in coping with argumentative passages.

Yet, unlike interpreted texts, political source texts are fundamentally written texts.
Speeches are normally “texts” – in the sense of materially durable products of linguistic actions [...]. Usually, they are prepared in writing, although the wording of their verbal presentation may sometimes differ considerably from the written version. They are rarely produced ad hoc or spontaneously, and even the sporadic ex tempore speeches are never improvisations out of nothing (Reisigl 2010: 243).

The fundamentally written nature of certain types of source texts, like political speeches, has not passed unnoticed in interpreting studies either.

The term interpreting refers to the production of oral output based on other-language input which may be either written (to be read) or unwritten (impromptu) (Shlesinger 1998: 487).

The transcripts of most political addresses can be found on the internet shortly after speech delivery, which shows that, unlike interpreted texts, political texts are first written and then uttered. Corpus construction thus built on the written foundation of political communication, that caters for the need for tangible data and solves the corpus-based dilemma between reader-friendly and machine-friendly transcription (Cencini & Aston 2002: 50). Even though analysis of politicians’ prosody is a promising research area for interpreting studies as well, investigation into strategic pauses, possible overlaps and hedges in politicians’ delivery styles is not relevant to the present project; transcription of prosodic features was, thus, deemed irrelevant.

As regards the more practical issue of text selection and collection, the official websites of the White House, 10 Downing Street and L’Élysée have been accessed daily in the search for freshly-delivered speeches on the economy. Yet, the prospective discrepancy between the transcripts and the actually-delivered speeches has not been neglected.

La seule difficulté réside ailleurs, dans la distorsion qui peut exister entre la vidéo (c’est-à-dire le « prononcé » et le « visuel » des discours) et le texte officiel que les sites diffusent pourtant simultanément (Mayaffre 2012: 21).

Even though the websites provide, with certain exceptions, both the videos and the related transcripts, only the latter were paid attention to in the first place. Relevant speech transcripts were initially chosen on the basis of the presence in the texts and/or text titles of the words economic crisis, financial crisis, economy, economic, finance, financial. After this first sifting, each speech was read through to assess topicality, based on which transcripts were selected or rejected. Once topicality was assessed, transcript accuracy was cross-checked with the related video. Finally, the transcripts were downloaded, corrected where necessary, and definitively inserted in the corpus folder.

Despite the focus on the economic crisis, some speeches not addressing exclusively economic issues have been read and, if necessary, included in the corpus. For instance, Cameron’s speech entitled Afghanistan and European Council: Prime Minister’s statement has been chosen in the light of its multiple and unrelated topics, including the

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5 Referred to as UK_75 in the corpus.
economic crisis. The specific topical web has been taken into account, but analysis of argumentation has focused primarily on the passages dealing with the economy.

Transcripts have not been inserted randomly in the corpus folder. From the beginning of the text selection process, ARGO was divided into three sub-corpora based on the nationality of speakers. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the corpus details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY / SUB-CORPUS</th>
<th>SPEAKER(S)</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SPEECHES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WORDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>Financial and Economic Crisis</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>292,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Financial and Economic Crisis</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>180,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>Financial and Economic Crisis</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>194,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>François Hollande</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>Financial and Economic Crisis</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>129,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>313</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>797,360</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Overview of the Corpus

Taking a look at the table, the lower number of words in the British sub-corpus stands out. Even though it might look like lack of data homogeneity, consistency in the number of speeches rather than in the number of words has been sought. After all, homogeneity must not be understood as “approximately equal number of words”; it is a much more complex concept regarding, among other things, topicality and the contexts of speech production and reception (Bendazzoli & Sandrelli 2009: 3). The considerable variation in word number among the sub-corpora is, in fact, determined by “external” causes, taking which into account is essential in analysis of argumentation. The American and French Presidents’ habits of delivering dense and lengthy speeches before national audiences has led the respective sub-corpora to “outnumber” the British text collection, as far as the number of words is concerned; which must not be seen as a shortcoming hampering the ecological validity of the study, but rather as an indicator of the fact that political argumentation takes various forms depending on cultural and contextual constraints. In other words, the number of words itself already suggests that Cameron’s argumentation is more pragmatic than those of his American and French counterparts, which will be further substantiated by the argumentative analysis of the corpus. Furthermore, Cameron’s frequent constrained interventions at the European Council and the House of Commons, together with the relative brevitas of British national speeches, determines the uniqueness of the British sub.corpus.

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6 The issue will be dealt with in greater detail in chapters 5 and 7.
In considering speech length, another factor must be taken into account. Transcripts were downloaded in their entirety; at the end of speech delivery, questions and answers were sometimes envisaged depending on the communicative context (e.g. press conferences). Yet, analysis has only regarded *monologue* argumentation. Prospective question/answer groups (Dal Fovo 2014: 59) were “removed” from word-counting and analysis, as they pertain to a specific form of communication, i.e. “talk-in-interaction” (Schegloff 1990: 51), which might be seen as *induced* argumentation not entirely reflecting the *convictions* of politicians, especially as far as topical selection is concerned. In other words, analysis was kept consistent to monologue argumentation to guarantee reliable research on strategic manoeuvring patterns.

Once they were downloaded, the speech transcripts were directly inserted in the relevant sub-corpus folder. Speeches in all sub-corpora are numbered chronologically and labelled with the respective sub-corpus initials or indicators, namely *US_*, *UK_* and *FR_*.

The complete speech titles, which are listed in the following sections, were copied from the respective reference websites and left unchanged.

### 4.3 The American Sub-corpus

The American sub-corpus is made up of a hundred and nine speeches, all drawn from the official website of the White House, [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov). It offers invaluable resources for the sake of research, as each Obama’s address is made available in written and audiovisual form alike.

The text collection begins with a landmark speech at the beginning of Obama’s presidential career, which launched a long series of speeches on the macro-topic of the economy. All the American sub-corpus speeches are speeches on the economy, even though several sub-topics ranging from business, climate change, innovation and education always crop up and contribute to shaping Obama’s discourse on the crisis. In this respect, State of the Union Addresses might be seen as exceptions in that they are generally not *speeches on the economy* but programmatic speeches primarily dealing with the general “health” of the USA and the ensuing legislative agenda; however, since the macro-topic of the economic crisis has monopolised recent State of the Union Addresses, they have been included in the corpus (*US_8, US_14, US_33, US_68, US_102*).

A limited number of speeches is delivered jointly with another speaker, for instance, former President Bill Clinton (*US_24*), Vice President Joe Biden (*US_70*) or the First Lady (*US_101*). In these cases, only Obama’s words have been counted and his discourse analysed.

The American sub-corpus is characterised by a marked majority of national speeches with respect to addresses delivered in international contexts, partly owing to the American Presidency habit to organise frequent news conferences at the White House. Moreover, over the last few years Obama has delivered several speeches in national schools, universities and companies. In this regard, analysis will show that the economy appears to
be dealt with as a *private* American matter, especially if compared to the British and French sub-corpora. In table 4.2, providing an overview of the US_ sub-corpus, the national (N), bilateral-meeting (BM) or international (I) context of speech delivery is indicated in the right-hand column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Name and Number</th>
<th>Speech Title</th>
<th>Date of delivery</th>
<th>Context of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US_1</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on the Mortgage Crisis</td>
<td>18 February 2009</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_2</td>
<td>The President Addresses Joint Session of Congress</td>
<td>24 February 2009</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_3</td>
<td>Obama at the G20 London Summit 2009</td>
<td>2 April 2009</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_4</td>
<td>Remarks by the President at G20 Closing Press Conference, Pittsburgh</td>
<td>25 September 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_5</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on Job Creation and Economic Growth</td>
<td>8 December 2009</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_6</td>
<td>Remarks by The President on the Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee</td>
<td>14 January 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_7</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on Financial Reform</td>
<td>21 January 2010</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_8</td>
<td>State of the Union Address 2010</td>
<td>27 January 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_9</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform</td>
<td>22 April 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_10</td>
<td>Remarks by President Obama at G20 Press Conference in Toronto, Canada</td>
<td>27 June 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_11</td>
<td>Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act</td>
<td>21 July 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_12</td>
<td>Press Conference by the President After G20 Meetings in Seoul, Korea</td>
<td>12 November 2010</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_13</td>
<td>Press Conference by the President</td>
<td>7 December 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_14</td>
<td>State of the Union Address 2011</td>
<td>25 January 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_15</td>
<td>President Obama’s News Conference on Deficit Reduction</td>
<td>15 July 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_16</td>
<td>President Obama Addresses the Nation on Dangers of Default</td>
<td>25 July 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_17</td>
<td>Address by the President to a Joint Session of Congress</td>
<td>8 September 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_18</td>
<td>President Obama at Clinton Global Initiative 2011</td>
<td>21 September 2011</td>
<td>I</td>
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<td>US_19</td>
<td>Press Conference by President Obama After G20 Summit, Cannes</td>
<td>4 November 2011</td>
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<td>US_20</td>
<td>President Obama at the APEC Business Summit 2011</td>
<td>12 November</td>
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<td>US_21</td>
<td>President Obama Holds a Press Conference at the APEC Summit</td>
<td>13 November 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_22</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on US-EU Summit with Herman Van Rompuy and President José Manuel Barroso</td>
<td>28 November 2011</td>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_23</td>
<td>President Obama on the American Jobs Act in Scranton, Pennsylvania</td>
<td>30 November 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_24</td>
<td>President Obama and President Clinton Speak on Better Building Initiative Investments</td>
<td>2 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_25</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Middle Class Tax Cuts</td>
<td>5 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_26</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Economy</td>
<td>6 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_27</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Payroll Tax Cut Extension</td>
<td>17 December 2011</td>
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<td>US_28</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Payroll Tax Cut</td>
<td>20 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_29</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Importance of Extending the Payroll Tax Cut</td>
<td>22 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>US_30</td>
<td>President Obama on the Payroll Tax Cut Extension</td>
<td>23 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_31</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks About Insourcing American Jobs</td>
<td>11 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_32</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Consolidating Government Departments to Encourage Business</td>
<td>13 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>US_33</td>
<td>State of the Union Address 2012</td>
<td>24 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_34</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on an Economy Built to Last in Iowa</td>
<td>25 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_35</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on an Economy Built to Last in Arizona</td>
<td>25 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_36</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Helping Homeowners</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_37</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Landmark Housing Settlement with Banks</td>
<td>9 February 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_38</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the 2013 Budget</td>
<td>13 February 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_39</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Promoting American Manufacturing and Exports</td>
<td>17 February 2012</td>
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<td>US_40</td>
<td>President Obama on the Payroll Tax Cut Extension</td>
<td>21 February 2012</td>
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<td>US_41</td>
<td>President Obama at the University of Miami</td>
<td>23 February 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_42</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at National Governors Association Meeting</td>
<td>27 February 2012</td>
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<td>Title</td>
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<td>US_43</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Resurgence of the American Auto Industry</td>
<td>28 February 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_44</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at Conference on Conservation</td>
<td>2 March 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_45</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks to Business Roundtable</td>
<td>6 March 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_46</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Expanding Our Energy Portfolio</td>
<td>21 March 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_47</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at the Associated Press Luncheon</td>
<td>3 April 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_48</td>
<td>President Obama Signs the Jobs Act</td>
<td>5 April 2012</td>
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<td>US_49</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at the White House Forum on Women and the Economy</td>
<td>6 April 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_50</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Tax Fairness and the Economy</td>
<td>10 April 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_51</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Buffett Rule</td>
<td>11 April 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_52</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Trade and the Economy</td>
<td>13 April 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_53</td>
<td>President Obama Delivers Remarks at CEO Summit Of The Americas</td>
<td>14 April 2012</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_54</td>
<td>President Obama and President Santos Hold a Press Conference</td>
<td>15 April 2012</td>
<td>BM</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_55</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at the Close of the G8 Summit, Camp David</td>
<td>19 May 2012</td>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_56</td>
<td>President Obama Holds a Press Conference on the Economy</td>
<td>8 June 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_57</td>
<td>President Obama Holds a Press Conference at the G20 Summit, Los Cabos</td>
<td>19 June 2012</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_58</td>
<td>President Obama on Extending Middle-Class Tax Breaks</td>
<td>3 August 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_59</td>
<td>President Obama Discusses Growing the Economy and Reducing the Deficit</td>
<td>9 November 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_60</td>
<td>President Obama Holds a Press Conference</td>
<td>14 November 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_61</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks to the Business Roundtable</td>
<td>5 December 2012</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_62</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Economy and Middle-Class Tax Cuts</td>
<td>10 December 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_63</td>
<td>President Obama Makes a Statement on the Fiscal Cliff</td>
<td>21 December 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_64</td>
<td>President Obama Makes a Statement on Averting Tax Hikes for Middle Class Families</td>
<td>28 December 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_65</td>
<td>Statement by the President on the Tax Agreement</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
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<td>US_66</td>
<td>News Conference by the President</td>
<td>14 January 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_67</td>
<td>President Obama on the Need for a Balanced Approach to Deficit Reduction</td>
<td>5 February 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_68</td>
<td>The 2013 State of the Union Address</td>
<td>13 February 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_69</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Building Ladders of Opportunity into the Middle Class</td>
<td>15 February 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_70</td>
<td>Remarks by the President and Vice President at Meeting of the National Governors Association</td>
<td>25 February 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_71</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Impact of the Sequester</td>
<td>26 February 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_72</td>
<td>Remarks by the President at Business Council Dinner</td>
<td>27 February 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_73</td>
<td>President Obama Makes a Statement on the Sequester</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_74</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on American Energy</td>
<td>15 March 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_75</td>
<td>President Obama Announces the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget</td>
<td>10 April 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_76</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at Manor New Technology High School</td>
<td>9 May 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_77</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Innovation and Manufacturing</td>
<td>9 May 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_78</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Technology in Schools</td>
<td>6 June 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_79</td>
<td>Remarks by President Obama at Business Leaders Forum</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_80</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks at Ubungo Symbion Power Plant</td>
<td>2 July 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_81</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Economy</td>
<td>24 July 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_82</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Infrastructure and the Economy</td>
<td>25 July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_83</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Jumpstarting Job Growth</td>
<td>30 July 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_84</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on Responsible Homeownership</td>
<td>6 August 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_85</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on College Affordability (Buffalo, New York)</td>
<td>22 August 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_86</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on College Affordability (Syracuse, New York)</td>
<td>22 August 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_87</td>
<td>Remarks by President Obama in a Press Conference at the G20, St. Petersburg</td>
<td>6 September 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_88</td>
<td>President Obama Marks the Five-Year Anniversary of the Financial Crisis</td>
<td>16 September 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_89</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks to the Business Roundtable</td>
<td>18 September 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_90</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Economy</td>
<td>20 September 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_91</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Education and the Economy</td>
<td>25 October 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_92</td>
<td>Remarks by the President at SelectUSA Investment Summit</td>
<td>31 October 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_93</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Economy and Exports</td>
<td>8 November 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_94</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on the Economy in Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>14 November 2013</td>
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</table>
Table 4.2 The American Sub-corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US_95</th>
<th>President Obama Speaks on the Economy</th>
<th>26 November 2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US_96</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility</td>
<td>4 December 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_97</td>
<td>Press Conference by the President</td>
<td>20 December 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_98</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Extending Emergency Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>7 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_99</td>
<td>President Obama Announces the First Five Promise Zones</td>
<td>9 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_100</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation</td>
<td>15 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_101</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Expanding College Opportunity</td>
<td>16 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_102</td>
<td>2014 State of the Union Address</td>
<td>28 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_103</td>
<td>Remarks by the President on Minimum Wage</td>
<td>29 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_104</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Helping the Long-Term Unemployed</td>
<td>31 January 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_105</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on the Farm Bill and the Economy</td>
<td>7 February 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_106</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Raising the Minimum Wage</td>
<td>12 February 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_107</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Investing in Infrastructure</td>
<td>26 February 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>US_108</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Raising the Minimum Wage</td>
<td>5 March 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US_109</td>
<td>President Obama Speaks on Expanding Economic Opportunity for Women</td>
<td>20 March 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.4 The British Sub-corpus

A hundred and one speeches delivered by David Cameron and downloaded from the official website of the UK government (www.gov.uk) make up the British sub-corpus. As regards the speaker, UK_47 and UK_60 are exceptions, as they are delivered jointly by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of the coalition government. However, Nick Clegg’s words have not been analysed for the sake of consistency.

A variety of national speeches have been drawn from the official website of 10 Downing Street. As to international speeches, all Cameron’s addresses at the World Economic Forum from 2011 to 2014 are included in the British sub-corpus (UK_17, UK_38, UK_62, UK_95). Press conferences and interventions at G8 and G20 meetings have not been neglected either. Moreover, a considerable part of the British sub-corpus is composed of speeches delivered at the European Council. They are extremely sensitive
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

texts, as they see Cameron trying to assert his stance on the economy within a “hostile” European environment, which the British Prime Minister does not want to be completely part of. In this respect, House of Commons statements regarding EU Council meetings provide invaluable sources for assessing the context-related and audience-related character of argumentation. As in table 4.2, the context of speech delivery is specified in the right-hand column of table 4.3, where European speeches \((EU)\) are also indicated. House of Commons statements are signalled with the letters \(N\) \((HC)\).

Unlike www.whitehouse.gov, the British Prime Minister’s website does not always show transcripts with the related video. In the cases in which the audiovisual recording was not provided, transcript accuracy was cross-checked with the related video on youtube (www.youtube.com).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Name and Number</th>
<th>Speech Title</th>
<th>Date of delivery</th>
<th>Context of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK_1</td>
<td>Transforming the British economy: Coalition strategy for economic growth</td>
<td>28 May 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_2</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s speech on the economy</td>
<td>7 June 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_3</td>
<td>Speech to UKTI (UK Trade and Investment) business summit</td>
<td>14 July 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_4</td>
<td>Big Society Speech</td>
<td>19 July 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_5</td>
<td>PM’s podcast on the Spending Review</td>
<td>23 October 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_6</td>
<td>PM’s speech on creating a “new economic dynamism”</td>
<td>25 October 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_7</td>
<td>PM statement at European Council</td>
<td>29 October 2010</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_8</td>
<td>Statement on European Council meeting</td>
<td>1 November 2010</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_9</td>
<td>PM’s Speech at the G20, Seoul</td>
<td>11 November 2010</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_10</td>
<td>PM Press Conference at G20, Seoul</td>
<td>12 November 2010</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_11</td>
<td>Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet</td>
<td>15 November 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_12</td>
<td>PM speech on wellbeing</td>
<td>25 November 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_13</td>
<td>EU Summit Press Conference</td>
<td>17 December 2010</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_14</td>
<td>New Year podcast</td>
<td>31 December 2010</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_15</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Speech on Economic Growth in Manchester</td>
<td>6 January 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_16</td>
<td>Press conference with the French Prime Minister</td>
<td>13 January 2011</td>
<td>BM</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_17</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Speech at the World Economic Forum</td>
<td>28 January 2011</td>
<td>I</td>
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<td>UK_18</td>
<td>Prime Minister's speech at the UK-India CEO Forum</td>
<td>3 February 2011</td>
<td>I/BM</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_19</td>
<td>PM’s speech on Big Society</td>
<td>15 February 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_20</td>
<td>PM’s speech on Welfare Reform Bill</td>
<td>17 February 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK_21</td>
<td>Press conference at European Council</td>
<td>25 March 2011</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<td>UK_22</td>
<td>Speech on the Big Society</td>
<td>23 May 2011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_23</td>
<td>PM and President Obama’s press conference</td>
<td>25 May 2011</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_24</td>
<td>European Council press conference</td>
<td>24 June 2011</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_25</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s press conference in London</td>
<td>25 July 2011</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_26</td>
<td>PM’s speech in Moscow</td>
<td>12 September 2011</td>
<td>I/BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_27</td>
<td>PM’s statement on the European Council</td>
<td>24 October 2011</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_28</td>
<td>PM Press Conference in Cannes, G20</td>
<td>4 November 2011</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_29</td>
<td>PM Statement on G20</td>
<td>7 November 2011</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_30</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s speech on exporting and growth</td>
<td>10 November 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_31</td>
<td>“We Need to Go for Growth”</td>
<td>21 November 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_32</td>
<td>PM speech at Toyota</td>
<td>24 November 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_33</td>
<td>PM’s statement on the European Council</td>
<td>12 December 2011</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_34</td>
<td>Troubled families speech</td>
<td>15 December 2011</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_35</td>
<td>2012 New Year message from David Cameron</td>
<td>2 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_36</td>
<td>PM and Italian PM Monti Press Conference</td>
<td>18 January 2012</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_37</td>
<td>Start-up Britain speech in Leeds</td>
<td>23 January 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_38</td>
<td>PM Davos Speech</td>
<td>26 January 2012</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_39</td>
<td>PM at European Council</td>
<td>31 January 2012</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_40</td>
<td>Commons Statement on EU Council</td>
<td>31 January 2012</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_41</td>
<td>UK-France Summit press conference</td>
<td>17 February 2012</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_42</td>
<td>PM’s press conference at European Council</td>
<td>2 March 2012</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_43</td>
<td>Commons Statement on European Council</td>
<td>5 March 2012</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_44</td>
<td>PM speech on infrastructure</td>
<td>19 March 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_45</td>
<td>Press conference by David Cameron and Barack Obama</td>
<td>15 March 2012</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_46</td>
<td>Press conference launching Big Society Capital at the London Stock Exchange</td>
<td>4 April 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_47</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister economy speech</td>
<td>8 May 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_48</td>
<td>Prime Minister: A Speech on the Economy</td>
<td>17 May 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_49</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Speech at Mexico G20</td>
<td>18 June 2012</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_50</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s press conference at Mexico G20</td>
<td>19 June 2012</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_51</td>
<td>Welfare speech</td>
<td>25 June 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_52</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s speech in Brussels</td>
<td>29 June 2012</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_53</td>
<td>PM David Cameron and President Hollande press conference</td>
<td>11 July 2012</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_54</td>
<td>PM’s speech at Global Investment Conference</td>
<td>26 July 2012</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_55</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Statement on European Council</td>
<td>22 October 2012</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_56</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s speech to CBI (Confederation of British Industry)</td>
<td>19 November 2012</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_57</td>
<td>Prime Minister press conference at end of European Council</td>
<td>23 November 2012</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_58</td>
<td>David Cameron’s European Council statement</td>
<td>26 November 2012</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_59</td>
<td>European Council press conference</td>
<td>14 December 2012</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_60</td>
<td>David Cameron and Nick Clegg press conference: launch of the Mid-Term Review</td>
<td>7 January 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_61</td>
<td>EU speech at Bloomberg</td>
<td>23 January 2013</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_62</td>
<td>Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos</td>
<td>24 January 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_63</td>
<td>European Council press conference on EU budget agreement</td>
<td>8 February 2013</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_64</td>
<td>Prime Minister David Cameron statement on the EU budget</td>
<td>11 February 2013</td>
<td>N (HC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_65</td>
<td>David Cameron's speech at business event in Mumbai</td>
<td>18 February 2013</td>
<td>I/BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_66</td>
<td>Economy speech delivered by David Cameron</td>
<td>7 March 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_67</td>
<td>Brussels press conference</td>
<td>15 March 2013</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_68</td>
<td>PM's speech at the Global Investment Conference</td>
<td>9 May 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_69</td>
<td>Press conference: PM and President Obama</td>
<td>13 May 2013</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_70</td>
<td>Prime Minister's speech at the small business reception</td>
<td>5 June 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_71</td>
<td>Plan for Britain's success: speech by the Prime Minister</td>
<td>10 June 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_72</td>
<td>Prime Minister's speech at G8 Open for Growth</td>
<td>15 June 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_73</td>
<td>Press conference: Prime Minister at end of G8 Summit</td>
<td>18 June 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_74</td>
<td>Prime Minister's statement on G8 Summit</td>
<td>19 June 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_75</td>
<td>Afghanistan and European Council: Prime Minister's statement</td>
<td>2 July 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_76</td>
<td>Business in the Community Awards: Prime Minister's speech</td>
<td>2 July 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_77</td>
<td>Prime Minister visits Siemens</td>
<td>16 July 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_78</td>
<td>PM and Prime Minister Letta press conference</td>
<td>17 July 2013</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_79</td>
<td>G20 Summit: Prime Minister news conference</td>
<td>6 September 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_80</td>
<td>G20 Summit: Prime Minister statement to the House of Commons</td>
<td>9 September 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_81</td>
<td>Celebrating British enterprise: speech by the Prime Minister</td>
<td>12 September 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_82</td>
<td>PM Direct in York</td>
<td>10 October 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_83</td>
<td>David Cameron's speech at the Northern Ireland Investment Conference</td>
<td>11 October 2013</td>
<td>N/I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_85</td>
<td>PM Direct in Oxford</td>
<td>28 October 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_86</td>
<td>World Islamic Economic Forum: Prime Minister's speech</td>
<td>29 October 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_87</td>
<td>PM Direct in Wolverhampton</td>
<td>31 October 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_88</td>
<td>PM speech at Open Government Partnership 2013</td>
<td>31 October 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_89</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s CBI speech 2013</td>
<td>4 November 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_90</td>
<td>Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2013: Prime Minister’s speech</td>
<td>11 November 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_91</td>
<td>PM's speech at Dubai Airshow</td>
<td>16 November 2013</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_92</td>
<td>UK and China's long-term relationship: Prime Minister’s speech</td>
<td>2 December 2013</td>
<td>I/BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_93</td>
<td>PM Direct in Stockton-on-Tees</td>
<td>13 December 2013</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_94</td>
<td>European Council December 2013: David Cameron’s press conference</td>
<td>20 December 2013</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_95</td>
<td>World Economic Forum (Davos) 2014: speech by David Cameron</td>
<td>24 January 2014</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The double symbol indicates that the speech was uttered in the United Kingdom and addressed the topic of investment opportunities in Northern Ireland (N); however, the speech was delivered in front of an international audience during an international exhibition (I).
4.5 The French Sub-corpus

The French sub-corpus is the only one containing speeches delivered by two speakers: Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, the reason for which is twofold. First, France is the only country among the three in question in which a presidential handover took place in the midst of the period analysed, i.e. from the beginning of the crisis to the beginning of 2014; which has not been felt has a hindrance but an advantage, leading to the second cause. The study of two speakers who share the same culture and communicative contexts is likely to shed light on the personal or idiosyncratic nature of argumentation.

Hollande’s speeches (from FR_54 to FR_103) were all drawn from the official website of the French Presidency (www.élysée.fr), always displaying the videos and the related transcripts like the website of the American President. When Hollande became President in 2012, Sarkozy’s videos and transcripts were removed from the official website. The former President’s speeches were, therefore, downloaded from another website: Vie publique : au coeur du débat public (www.vie-publique.fr). Vie publique is a vital resource created in 2002 by the Direction de l’information légale et administrative (DILA) of the French government. Even though videos are not made available, the website contains, among other documents, over a hundred thousand speeches delivered by French government officials. As in the British sub-corpus, transcript accuracy was cross-checked with the related videos on youtube. A couple of speeches (FR_46 and FR_47), which are unavailable on either aforementioned sites, were downloaded from the official website of the UMP party (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), www.u-m-p.org.

As in the British sub-corpus, speeches delivered at the European Council have been included, given their crucial role in showing speakers’ argumentation beyond national borders but within the constrained and controversial European context. Bilateral meetings and speeches delivered at the G8, the G20 and the WEF also make up the French sub-corpus. Incidentally, since the French Presidents’ bilateral meetings often take place with other European heads of state and/or government, topicality is chiefly determined by speakers’ shared Europeanness and consequently monopolised by European issues, even though the context of speech delivery is not a EU institutional setting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supporting small businesses: David Cameron’s speech to the Federation of Small Businesses</th>
<th>27 January 2014</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK_97</td>
<td>David Cameron and Angela Merkel press conference</td>
<td>27 February 2014</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_98</td>
<td>The values that underpin our long-term economic plan</td>
<td>4 March 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_99</td>
<td>European Council March 2014: David Cameron’s press conference</td>
<td>21 March 2014</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_100</td>
<td>PM Direct in Peacehaven on pensions and savings plans</td>
<td>24 March 2014</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK_101</td>
<td>David Cameron and Matteo Renzi press conference</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
<td>BM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 The British Sub-corpus
Since the sub-corpus provides evidence of the 2012 presidential handover, campaign speeches (from \( FR_48 \) to \( FR_53 \)) giving rise to heated argumentation are highlighted with the symbol \( N \ (C) \) in the “Context of Delivery” column. Table 4.4 provides an overview of the French text collection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech Name and Number</th>
<th>Speech Title</th>
<th>Date of delivery</th>
<th>Context of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR_1</td>
<td>Discours de M. le Président au Zénith de Toulon</td>
<td>25 September 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_2</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, à l’issue du Conseil des ministres, sur les mesures décidées par le gouvernement français dans le cadre du plan d’action européen pour faire face à la crise financière internationale</td>
<td>13 October 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_3</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les mesures de soutien à l’économie face à la crise économique internationale, à Argonay</td>
<td>23 October 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_4</td>
<td>Discours de M. le Président Sarkozy à Rethel</td>
<td>28 October 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_5</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les mesures en faveur des entreprises et de l’emploi face à la crise économique, à Paris</td>
<td>30 October 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_6</td>
<td>Conférence de presse conjointe de MM. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, et José Manuel Barroso, Président de la Commission européenne, sur les décisions envisagées face à la crise économique et financière lors du Sommet sur les marchés financiers et l’économie mondiale, à Washington</td>
<td>15 November 2008</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_7</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur la nécessité de l’aide publique au développement dans le contexte de la crise économique et financière internationale, à Doha</td>
<td>29 November 2008</td>
<td>I(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_8</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur le plan de relance de l’économie française, à Douai</td>
<td>4 December 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_9</td>
<td>Vœux du Président de la République aux Français pour l’année 2009</td>
<td>31 December 2008</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_10</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur la refondation du capitalisme face à la crise économique, à Paris</td>
<td>8 January 2009</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_11</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les priorités de la politique économique face à la crise, à Vesoul</td>
<td>15 January 2009</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_12</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la</td>
<td>9 February</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) \( FR_7 \) is the only speech in \textit{ARGO} which was delivered in a United Nations context, namely at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Doha.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>République, sur le soutien à la filière automobile face à la crise, à Paris</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur la politique du gouvernement face à la crise économique et sociale, à Saint-Quentin</td>
<td>24 March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conférence de presse après le G20 de Londres</td>
<td>2 April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les engagements pris par les banques dans le cadre du plan de financement de l'économie et sur la rémunération des traders, à Paris</td>
<td>25 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur le respect par les banques de leurs engagements de financement de l'économie et sur le versement des bonus des traders en fonction des résultats, à Paris</td>
<td>25 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discours du président Nicolas Sarkozy à l’occasion de la XVIIème conférence des ambassadeurs</td>
<td>26 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conférence de presse de Nicolas Sarkozy au G20 de Pittsburgh</td>
<td>25 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discours de M. le Président au Zénith de Toulon</td>
<td>1 December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vœux du Président de la République aux Français pour l’année 2010</td>
<td>31 December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur la politique mise en œuvre face à la crise et sur les réformes engagées en 2009, à Cholet</td>
<td>6 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur l'action du gouvernement face à la crise économique et financière et sur les réformes engagées en 2009, à Paris</td>
<td>13 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation de M. le Président de la République devant le Forum Économique Mondial de Davos 2010</td>
<td>27 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les politiques à mettre en œuvre pour rétablir les finances publiques, à Paris</td>
<td>28 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conférence de presse de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, à l’occasion du Conseil Européen</td>
<td>25 March 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les efforts en faveur des PME et sur la politique menée par le gouvernement face à la crise économique, à Paris</td>
<td>15 June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation du Président Sarkozy au 13ème Forum économique international à Saint-Pétersbourg</td>
<td>19 June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vœux du Président de la République aux Français pour l’année 2011</td>
<td>31 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum Économique Mondial de Davos : discours de M. le Président</td>
<td>27 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_30</td>
<td>Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy devant les ministres des finances du G20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_31</td>
<td>Conférence de la présidence française du G20 sur le développement. Discours du président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_32</td>
<td>Conférence de presse de Nicolas Sarkozy au G20 de Cannes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_33</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les efforts gouvernementaux en faveur de l'industrie, notamment sur le rôle du Fonds stratégique d'investissement, à Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_34</td>
<td>Discours de M. le Président au Zénith de Toulon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_35</td>
<td>Conférence de presse à l’occasion du Conseil Européen de Bruxelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_36</td>
<td>Vœux du Président de la République aux Français pour l’année 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_37</td>
<td>Clôture de la 4ème édition du colloque « Nouveau Monde »</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_38</td>
<td>Conférence de presse de Nicolas Sarkozy et Angela Merkel, à Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_39</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les réformes engagées dans la fonction publique, à Lille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR_40</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur les mesures à mettre en œuvre pour lutter contre le chômage, à Paris</td>
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<td>FR_41</td>
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<td>FR_49</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, candidat à l'élection présidentielle, notamment sur la crise financière, la réforme des retraites, l'énergie nucléaire, le terrorisme, l'immigration et sur l'Ecole, à Nîmes</td>
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<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, candidat à l'élection présidentielle, sur la politique du gouvernement face à la crise économique, les réformes du quinquennat, l'immigration et sur les questions de sécurité, à Saint-Brice-Sous-Forêt</td>
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<td>FR_51</td>
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<td>FR_53</td>
<td>Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, candidat à l'élection présidentielle, sur la crise économique, l'immigration, le travail, l'Ecole, l'Union européenne et sur la Nation, à Nice</td>
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<td>FR_55</td>
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### Table 4.4 The French Sub-corpus

Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 bear witness to the written productivity of political communication. The following chapters will outline which argumentative patterns pertaining to “the linguistic and episodic memory” (Reisigl 2010: 243) of speakers have stood out in analysing *ARGO*.

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9 The double symbol indicates that the speech was delivered in France and addressed the topic of French competitiveness and attractivity (N), but the audience was composed, among other participants, of entrepreneurs of thirty companies coming from twenty different countries around the world (I).
Chapter 5

THE AMERICAN SUB-CORPUS ANALYSED

Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen and six, result happiness.
Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.
(Mr Micawber)¹

5.1 The Financial and Economic Crisis and the Great Recession. A Brief Contextualisation and Introductory Remarks on Crisis-Related Argumentation

However simple, the Micawber Principle is an influential and evocative economic theory; it has become part of English-national and international language heritage to such an extent that it is “included” in the vast but vague amount of knowledge all interpreters working from English are recommended to internalise (Snelling 2009: 92). Despite being a “law” of personal finance rather than a fully-fledged economic theory, it can easily be applied to State affairs to favour explanation and comprehension of modern economic systems. An example can be found in the second 2008 Obama-McCain presidential debate; the communicative event followed a town hall format, with a group of non-committed voters asking the candidates questions, after which the moderator would ask follow-up questions. When Barack Obama was asked a question by audience member Teresa Finch, he answered by comparing the State budget to a family budget and the Congress to a family that has become famous for its persistently inaccurate management of financial resources.

Finch: How can we trust either of you with our money when both parties got us into this global economic crisis?
Obama: Well, look, I understand your frustration and your cynicism, because while you’ve been carrying out your responsibilities - most of the people here, you’ve got a family budget. If less money is coming in, you end up making cuts. Maybe you don’t go out to dinner as much. Maybe you put off buying a new car. That’s not what happens in Washington. And you’re right. There is a lot of blame to go around.²

After all, economy literally means “management of a household”³. It is and always

will be about *balance* between income and expenditure, be it at personal “wallet” level or regarding more complex interactive systems of production and trade of resources.

Any imbalance in the economy is bound to lead to a crisis. If an individual spends more than s/he earns, s/he will inevitably meet not only poverty but also misery. Similarly, if there is an imbalance in State economy, the ensuing crisis will lead to “national misery”, resulting in failure in catering for people’s needs.

However, Obama’s *Micawberian* answer to Teresa Finch is an occasional example, probably resulting from the speaker’s need to answer a direct question during a “town-hall” debate. Actually, when it comes to economic issues in political communication, interpreters are generally denied the privilege of interpreting a speaker who shares the *brevitas* and rhetorical effectiveness of David Copperfield’s friend; which is clearly not only a question of political language vagueness as compared to the spontaneity of ordinary language, but is also determined by the fact that the laws of personal finance are much simpler than modern economic systems. The production, distribution and trade of goods and services by different agents (individuals, businesses, organisations, governments) in a given geographical space have greater implications than mere personal or family business.

The recent financial and economic crisis is a case in point, which incidentally shows that topicality actually affects the relative complexity and resulting comprehensibility of political speeches. Mortgage refinancing, the feelings of the middle class, social struggles, the stock exchange, education, technological progress, cultural values and national history all find their way into crisis discourse. In this regard, a brief contextualisation of the crisis will help frame the topic of the speeches analysed, thereby providing the necessary background for studying the discursive and argumentative choices of the corpus speakers.

The 2007-2008 financial and economic crisis is considered by many economists the worst crisis since the Great Depression and the worst downturn since World War II, especially because it subsequently led to a broader and sustained global recession, which is generally referred to as the *Great Recession*. The general economic decline in world markets, which is still underway in most countries, actually started around the end of the first decade of the 21st century with the subprime mortgage crisis. It was triggered by the bursting of the United States housing bubble, i.e. the steep decline in home prices following their unjustified increase over time which reached its peak around 2006–2007 (Deflem 2011: ix). During the American housing boom of the mid-2000s, financial institutions began marketing *mortgage-backed securities* (MBS), *collateralised debt obligations* (CDO) and other sophisticated derivative products at unprecedented levels. The increase in loan incentives encouraged borrowers to assume risky mortgages with an eye to quick refinancing at easier terms. However, once interest rates began to rise and housing prices started to drop in 2006–2007 in many parts of the United States, borrowers found themselves unable to refinance. In a nutshell, the US housing market went from boom to bust and large quantities of mortgage-backed securities suddenly lost value; massive defaults followed, leading millions of borrowers to contribute to the dramatic and widespread expansion of household debt.
The subprime mortgage crisis, thus, fuelled a major financial crisis (Deflem 2011: ix) spreading all across the globe: the devaluation of housing-related securities jeopardised the solvency of over-leveraged banks and financial institutions in the US and Europe. The predicament became public a year later, in 2008, with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest investment bank in the United States. Several other major financial institutions followed in the footsteps of Lehman Brothers, triggering a significant disruption in the flow of credit to businesses and consumers and marking the onset of the Great Recession.

The total collapse of large financial institutions was prevented by the bailout of banks by national governments. However, stock markets still dropped worldwide. The housing market was heavily affected by the financial crisis, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. Businesses started to fail, consumer wealth declined significantly and world economic activity underwent an unprecedented and historic downturn.

This brief overview has no claims to be exhaustive but merely aims at framing the topic of the speeches analysed. In this endeavour, a premise should be specified at the outset. Broadly speaking, there is widespread acceptance that the current recession has been triggered by finance. In particular, politics and the media have increasingly appeared to target financial speculation as the basic trigger of the 2008 financial and economic crisis and ensuing Great Recession.

US_7: For while the financial system is far stronger today than it was one year ago, it’s still operating under the same rules that led to its near collapse. These are rules that allowed firms to act contrary to the interests of customers; to conceal their exposure to debt through complex financial dealings; to benefit from taxpayer-insured deposits while making speculative investments; and to take on risks so vast that they posed threats to the entire system.

Yet, the fact that the global recession was triggered by a few unscrupulous traders and bankers is far too simplistic. Political responsibility in the lead-up to the crisis cannot be neglected either. In this respect, the causes of the Great Recession are much deeper and must be traced back to the beginning of the 1990s. At that time, growth was already declining considerably in the United States as a consequence of the gradual “collapse” of the middle class (Ferry 2009)\(^4\): American society had already started bipolarising, seeing a few well-educated and well-paid people on the one hand and a mass of underpaid workers on the other. As a consequence of bipolarisation, the middle class gradually shrunk and fewer and fewer people were able to buy houses, cars, etc., which significantly affected growth.

\(^4\) The information is drawn from philosopher Luc Ferry’s speech entitled “Face à la crise : développement durable et mondialisation”, to be found at [Canal U – Université de Tous les Savoirs (UTLS)](http://www.canal-u.tv/video/universite_de_tous_les_savoirs/face_a_la_crise_developpement_durable_et_mondialisation_luc_ferry.4865) (last accessed on 21\(^{st}\) January 2015).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

The bipolarisation of American society resulting in the collapse of the middle class lies at the heart of today’s crisis: as growth gradually weakened, a set of mortgage policies were implemented to encourage banks to “lend money to the poor”, in a short-sighted attempt to keep the economy growing. These policies were partially devised and implemented by former American President Bill Clinton and Alan Greenspan, the then President of the Federal Reserve, through major revisions of the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (Ferry 2009). In other words, growth started to be knowingly fuelled with consumer debt rather than with the actual wealth of the middle class (Ferry 2009). Most home-buyers thus actually received their mortgages through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) securitising mortgages in the form of mortgage-backed securities and selling them to investors on the open market. As a consequence of political intervention in the mortgage industry, the percentage of lower-quality subprime mortgages increased dramatically in the first decade of the 21st century, which eventually led to the bursting of the US housing bubble: when the market became saturated as borrowers were not able to refinance their mortgages, banks got rid of “dangerous” credit by means of securitisation, perpetrated under the “approval” of credit rating agencies. Therefore, despite aiming at addressing racial and economic inequalities, the Community Reinvestment Act, promoting “financial deregulation and the growth of the subprime mortgage industry”, actually “ended up completely subverting these goals” (Nguyen & Pontell 2011: 3-4).

Seen from this angle, the present recession appears to have been triggered by an economic crisis coinciding with the collapse of the middle class which subsequently led to a financial crisis, and not the other way around (Ferry 2009). In other words, the Great Recession does not only have financial causes but is the result of a complex interplay of policies that encouraged homeownership by providing easier access to loans. Rather than mere reckless speculation and unscrupulousness, the crisis was, therefore, fuelled by speculation coupled with misjudged political regulation.

However, analysis of ARGO will show that blaming bankers and speculators is a frequent strategy in political discourse on the crisis. Quite unsurprisingly, political responsibility in leading to the crisis is systematically omitted in political speeches. After all, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, politicians found themselves striving to preserve their public positive faces in the midst of a looming and long-lasting crisis. More particularly, they have thenceforth been confronted with the twofold task of solving the crisis in their respective countries and skilfully verbalising their endeavours without irritating taxpayers.

Not only economic crises but crises of all sorts expose leaders to public scrutiny and criticism. Yet public opinion, which naturally flows to the “negative pole” of crises, can easily be diverted (at least verbally) towards a “positive pole” enabling the speaker to

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5 “The Community Reinvestment Act is intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operations. It was enacted by the Congress in 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901) and is implemented by Regulation BB (12 CFR 228). The regulation was substantially revised in May 1995 and updated again in August 2005.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/communitydev/cra_about.htm, last accessed on 14th January 2015.
attract audience attention by bragging about a brighter future and presenting him/herself as a valiant leader during the predicament.

Crisis provides political leaders with an opportunity to [...] present themselves as leaders, to dramatically define the situation as tragic but hopeful, and to bring out the ‘resolve’ of national character (Sandaran & De Rycker 2013: 199-200).

The syntagm tragic but hopeful testifies the pervasiveness of compromise and the habit of resorting to the “conjonction d’imaginaires opposés”(Charaudeau 2005: 187) in political communication.

In more specific terms, crises, irrespective of their nature, are generally dealt with as moments of ferment whose negative character is neutralised by showing their alleged positive implications; the topoi of crisis as a challenge or crisis as an opportunity are strategies through which speakers discursively show the silver lining of difficult junctures. When a crisis upsets the foundations of a given system, it is generally said to have shown the weaknesses of that system, thereby providing the challenging opportunity to restore and possibly improve the previous order or state of affairs.

In this way, any crisis, no matter of what kind, is an opportunity to either reinforce or challenge the social equilibrium (Lean, Mohd Don & Fernandez 2013: 436). (my emphasis)

In their analysis of Bush’s discourse on the terrorism crisis after September 11, Sandaran & De Rycker (2013: 209) provide, among others, an example of the former President’s resorting to the crisis as an opportunity topos.

This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity – a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good. And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace. (my emphasis)

The pervasiveness of the topos of challenge and opportunity in crisis discourse is partly determined by the widespread habit, not only in political communication, of referring to the Chinese word for crisis, composed of two characters standing for “danger” and “opportunity”. John F. Kennedy’s early reference to the Chinese pictogram, during a speech in Indianapolis in 1959⁶, acted as an imprinting for political rhetoric: for instance, Al Gore resorted to the trope in question in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance lecture⁷.

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⁶ Kennedy’s speech, entitled “Remarks at the Convocation of the United Negro College Fund” and delivered on 12th April 1959, can be found in the website John F. Kennedy – Presidential Library and Museum, at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Indianapolis-IN_19590412.aspx (last accessed on 5th March 2015).

More broadly, crises involve change (De Rycker & Mohd Don 2013: 7), as attested by the relevant definition provided by the *Oxford English Dictionary*:

CRISIS: A vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a *turning-point*; also, a state of affairs in which a *decisive change* for better or worse is imminent; now applied esp. to times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense in politics or commerce8. (my emphasis)

The concept of change is inherent in human metaphorical thinking (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 3) and particularly thrives in politics, as leaders try and assert themselves through landmark decisions. Change is, by definition, not static, as it involves *movement* from one state of affairs to another; moreover, change can also be viewed as *making*.

Even a simple change of state, like the change from water to ice, can be viewed as an instance of making, since ice has a different form and function than water (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 73).

Crises can thus be viewed as externally-caused negative changes, whose effects can be neutralised by voluntary attempts at restoring positive situations or bringing about new positive outcomes. In this respect, crises are entirely negative even though they provide the opportunity for a change for the better.

Despite the realization and empirical evidence that *crises may bring progressive and even emancipator change* [...], there is widespread agreement that *avoiding, containing and/or resolving crisis are desirable goals*. Indecision, inaction or inertia, and generally, letting the crisis ‘run its course’ are seen as economically or politically costly, socially unjust, etc. Put simply, crisis is a problem (De Rycker & Mohd Don 2013: 3). (my emphasis)

Crisis is a problem which is compounded by *inertia* and stagnation. In this regard, movement towards change is the only way out of crises. Here, in this simple and to a certain extent simplistic observation, lies the essence of argumentation regarding crises in general and the current economic recession in particular. When crisis monopolises topicality, argumentation basically aims at persuading audiences of the validity of the speaker’s efforts in *containing and/or resolving* the crisis, with particular reference to the political *means* by which the economy will be restored. Preventing the crisis from *running its course* is a political priority, which is generally conveyed by resorting to a simple argument:

**ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE)**

*Premise*: If the crisis is not opposed, it will plunge the country/the world into a deep recession.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, political intervention is needed.

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The argument from negative consequences (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 332) always entails its counterpart.

**ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTION**

*Premise*: If action $x$ is brought about, it will contribute to containing the crisis.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, action $x$ must be brought about.

Once the crisis has been contained, political attention is shifted to the second imperative, i.e. *coming out of the crisis*. In this respect, a considerable number of a speaker’s argumentative moves is bound to result in strategies of *practical argumentation*, i.e. “means-end” argumentation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 4). Even though Fairclough & Fairclough’s insistence on practical arguments does not do justice to the heterogeneity of arguments to be found in political speeches (see section 3.5.7), it is a reliable framework for outlining the macro-argument underlying political discourse on the financial and economic crisis.

**PROTOTYPICAL CRISIS-RELATED ARGUMENT (MEANS-END)**

*Premise 1*: We must solve/come out of the crisis.

*Premise 2*: I claim that act $x$ will help us solve/come out of the crisis.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, we should implement act $x$.

Since reckless financial speculation (*US_4, US_5, UK_29*) and irresponsibility (*US_6, UK_66, FR_1*) are said to be the main triggers of the current crisis, more regulation can be expected to be one of the means through which the goal of solving the crisis will be achieved. Whether it aims at containing or resolving crises, any political response is generally presented as being *bold/tough* and *urgent*. However, the *topoi* of *bold action* and *urgency* are not exclusive to crisis discourse but can be said to be intrinsic to political communication.

Even though the above-described schemes are recurrent in crisis discourse, any attempt at generalising argumentation regarding a specific predicament is bound to yield limited findings. Despite being global plights, the housing crisis, the financial crisis and the economic crisis have given rise to an extremely articulated downturn, which has had different implications in different nations. In this regard, the economy is far too often misunderstood and thought to be a formal discipline, while, in fact, it pertains to the realm of social sciences.

As such, the idea or category of crisis is necessarily historically and socially contingent, and is bound to mean different things to different people (De Rycker & Mohd Don 2013: 5).

The macro-topic of the crisis is thus addressed in specific and particular ways depending on the country and the speaker in question.
5.2 Barack Obama and the Crisis

By taking a cursory glance at table 4.2 (see section 4.3), which displays the speeches included in the American sub-corpus, the vast majority of national speeches with respect to speeches delivered during bilateral and international meetings stand out. Only sixteen out of a hundred and nine speeches on the economy were delivered outside national borders.

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**Percentage of National Vs International Speeches in the American Sub-corpus**

![Percentage of National Vs International Speeches in the American Sub-corpus](image)

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Figure 5.1 Percentage of National Vs International Speeches in the American Sub-corpus

Since all relevant speeches on the economy delivered between February 2009 and March 2014 have been downloaded and included in the sub-corpus, the President’s “preference” for addressing the economy within the United States is a fact. The reason has to be sought in the nature of American rhetoric and, broadly, in the nature of American society.

Toute société qui tient à ses valeurs propres ne peut donc que favoriser les occasions qui permettent aux discours épidictiques de se reproduire à un rythme régulier : cérémonies commémorant des faits intéressant le pays, offices religieux, éloges des disparus et autres manifestations servant la communion des esprits. Dans la mesure où les dirigeants du groupe cherchent à augmenter leur emprise sur la pensée de ses membres, ils multiplieront les réunions de caractère éducatif (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 72) (my emphasis)

The markedly uneven distribution of texts in the sub-corpus is, therefore, not fortuitous. It is a peculiarity of the American text collection, a distinctive feature of American speeches on the economic crisis. Moreover, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s view already provides a useful indication regarding the argumentative orientation of Obama’s discourse on the crisis: it is a discourse focusing on values.
5.2.1 Argumentation from Values

Section 5.1, contextualising the macro-topic of the corpus speeches, has made clear that the crisis began precisely in the United States. The bursting of the housing bubble and the resulting total collapse of the middle class has dramatically influenced American discourse on the economy.

Homeownership has long been considered the cornerstone of the proverbial “American dream”. Owning a home comes with great pride and is viewed by most persons as a symbol of success and wealth (Nguyen & Pontell 2011: 4).

Before the crisis struck, homeownership was not only a symbol of success but also a safe and relatively accessible investment, especially considering the implications of government policies providing easier access to loans.

Moreover, homes are seen as among the most solid investments. Prior to the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, most Americans believed that residential real estate would always appreciate in value. There were two major prevailing logics that were part of the American psyche: (1) the value of real estate would never depreciate and (2) people would always make their mortgage payments (Nguyen & Pontell 2011: 4).

The crisis, thus, brought about not only an economic downturn but also the collapse of national certainties. Since the beginning of his mandate, the President has proved to be aware of the human implications of the recession. In this respect, Obama’s speeches immediately appear to be extremely vivid and “less specialist” if compared, for instance, to David Cameron’s.

US_1: Our housing crisis was born of eroding home values, but it was also an erosion of our common values, and in some case, common sense.

The focus on values is a further feature distinguishing argumentation from demonstration. Dealing with core values in political argumentation might sound trivial but it actually plays a significant persuasive role. Values are pivotal concepts concealing a specific argument scheme, the argument from values (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 321), which is generally left implicit. Obama generally addresses positive values deemed to be essentially American.

ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE VALUES

Premise 1: Value V is positive as judged by agent A (judgment value).
Premise 2: The fact that value V is positive affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (if value V is good, it supports commitment to goal G).
Conclusion: V is a reason for retaining commitment to goal G.

Knowledge of the formal scheme of the argument from values is not particularly suitable to interpreting activity, given that interpreters are not required to reconstruct the
logic of the argument. Yet the scheme draws attention to the implied presence of a goal in any discourse focusing on values, meaning that the verbalisation of values is not an end in itself. In the speeches on the economic crisis, “goal G” is the solution of the crisis.

Looking at the texts by keeping the formal scheme in mind, the illocution of Obama’s discourse becomes clearer: the crisis can be solved by means of values. In this respect, Fairclough & Fairclough’s theoretical stress on values as premises of argumentation (2012a: 177) finds empirical evidence in Obama’s texts, where values are presented as “what the Agent is actually concerned with or ought to be concerned with” (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 45). In other words, by dealing with values, the American President implicitly reiterates his commitment towards lifting the American people out of the recession.

What are the implications for interpreting? Given that the argument is almost completely left implicit in discourse, attention has to be paid to those words that identify values and carry a great deal of the argumentative core of Obama’s illocution and perlocution. To grasp what these values are, considering the negative version of the argument from values is in order.

ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE VALUES
Premise 1: Value V is negative as judged by agent A (judgment value).
Premise 2: The fact that value V is negative affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (if value V is bad, it goes against commitment to goal G).
Conclusion: V is a reason for retracting commitment to goal G.

Bad values have led to the economic crisis, namely “reckless financial speculation” (US_5) and irresponsibility (among others, US_6, US_7, US_23, US_26).

US_31: I don’t want America to be a nation that’s primarily known for financial speculation and racking up debt buying stuff from other nations.

US_6: As we all know, our country has endured the deepest recession we’ve faced in generations. And much of the turmoil was caused by irresponsibility on the part of banks and financial institutions.

The speculation “demon” is not only blamed in the follow-up to the mortgage crisis, but is also reiterated in more recent speeches, such as US_84:

US_84: So in that earlier generation, houses weren’t for flipping around, they weren’t for speculation - houses were to live in, and to build a life with.

By blaming speculation and irresponsibility, Obama asserts his commitment to not pursuing them and, by implication, the need to seek for their positive counterparts. To restore the economy, a step back to the genuine values of common sense and responsibility is needed. In particular, responsibility is deemed to be the way out of the crisis. The term is recurrent in the American sub-corpus, cropping up a hundred and forty-six times, i.e. more
than once per speech on average. Responsibility, implying thrift, hard work and selflessness, has always been part of American culture; it is a prerequisite for the American Dream, which is itself a national value.

**US_1**: So solving this crisis will require more than resources; it will require all of us to step back and take responsibility. [...] Those core values of common sense and responsibility, those are the values that have defined this nation. Those are the values that have given substance to our faith in the American Dream. Those are the values we have to restore now at this defining moment.

Restoring lost values is essential. In the light of which, Obama’s (vague and general) plan for solving the crisis might be said to rely on the following argument scheme:

**Obama’s Argument from Values**

*Premise 1*: Speculation and irresponsibility have led to the crisis, which is not only an economic crisis but also a crisis of our common values.

*Premise 2*: Coming out of the crisis is an imperative.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, we all have to give up speculation and irresponsibility and restore our values by acting with common sense and taking responsibility.

This can be viewed as the practical macro-argument from values underlying all discourse on the crisis. Values are the *means* for solving the crisis. More particularly, overcoming the crisis entails renewal or at least restoring of pivotal American values attached to the American Dream.

The stress on values as a solution to the crisis does not pose particular problems to interpreters, also considering the absence of difficulties in translating the terms involved in the discursive implementation of the scheme by the American President. Highlighting the value-driven nature of Obama’s argumentation is, however, in order for descriptive purposes and to expound the reasoning underlying the President’s discursive attempts at gaining consensus for implementing economic policies.

### 5.2.2. Obama’s Main Arguments

Reference to American values is pervasive in the American sub-corpus, but Obama’s argumentation does not solely hinge on the oppositions between speculation / common sense and irresponsibility / responsibility. Several recurrent arguments already appear together with the argument from values in **US_1**, a landmark speech on the mortgage crisis with which the American text collection begins. **US_1** was delivered at Dobson High School in Mesa, Arizona, at the beginning of the President’s first mandate. The aftermath of the financial and economic crisis had already started to materialise, demanding a firm political response. An excerpt of the analysis of **US_1** is shown in table 5.1, because the speech contains some of the specific argument schemes the President was to adopt in the
subsequent years. In this regard, *US_1* is indicative of the general argumentative orientation of Obama’s discourse on the crisis, at least as far as national addresses are concerned.

**US_1**: Remarks by the President on the Mortgage Crisis, 18th February 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEECH PASSAGE</th>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>ARGUMENT SCHEMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I’m here today to talk about a crisis unlike we’ve ever known - but one that you know very well here in Mesa, and throughout the Valley. In Phoenix and its surrounding suburbs, the American Dream is being tested by a home mortgage crisis that not only threatens the stability of our economy, but also the stability of families and neighborhoods. It’s a crisis that strikes at the heart of the middle class: the homes in which we invest our savings and build our lives, raise our families and plant roots in our communities.</td>
<td>Scope of the economic crisis</td>
<td>LINCOLNIAN ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY + PRIMARY AUDIENCE-ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So many Americans have shared with me their personal experiences of this crisis. Many have written letters or emails or shared their stories with me at rallies and along rope lines. Their hardship and heartbreak are a reminder that while this crisis is vast, it begins just one house - and one family - at a time. It begins with a young family - maybe in Mesa, or Glendale, or Tempe - or just as likely in a suburban area of Las Vegas, or Cleveland, or Miami. They save up. They search. They choose a home that feels like the perfect place to start a life. They secure a fixed-rate mortgage at a reasonable rate, and they make a down payment, and they make their mortgage payments each month. They are as responsible as anyone could ask them to be. But then they learn that acting responsibly often isn’t enough to escape this crisis. Perhaps somebody loses a job in the latest round of layoffs, one of more than 3.5 million jobs lost since this recession began - or maybe a child gets sick, or a spouse has his or her hours cut. In the past, if you found yourself in a situation like this, you could have sold your home and bought a smaller one with</td>
<td>Repercussions on the middle class</td>
<td>TOPOS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENTHYMEMIC ANECDOTAL ARGUMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>PRIMARY AUDIENCE-ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS + ANECDOTAL ARGUMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FROM VALUES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOPOS OF THE IRREPARABLE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FROM VALUES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
more affordable payments, or you could have refinanced your home at a lower rate. **But today**, home values have fallen so sharply that even if you make a large down payment, the current value of your mortgage may still be higher than the current value of your house. So **no** bank will return your calls, and **no** sale will return your investment. You **can’t** afford to leave, you **can’t** afford to stay. So you start cutting back on luxuries. **Then** you start cutting back on necessities. You spend down your savings to keep up with your payments. **Then** you open the retirement fund. **Then** you use the credit cards. And **when** you’ve gone through everything you have, **and** done everything you can, you have **no choice** but to default on your loan. **And so** your home joins the nearly 6 million others in foreclosure or at risk of foreclosure across the country, including roughly 150,000 right **here in Arizona**.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Arguments and Effect on House Prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irresponsibility of the banking system</td>
<td><strong>TOPOS OF THE IRREPARABLE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impoverishment compels families to thrift</td>
<td><strong>OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FROM VALUES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devaluation of house prices</td>
<td><strong>SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreclosures</td>
<td><strong>PRIMARY AUDIENCE-ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreams endangered</td>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation of house value</td>
<td><strong>ENTHYMEMIC ANECDOTAL ARGUMENT</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the foreclosures which are uprooting families and upending lives across America are only part of the housing crisis. For while there are **millions of families** who face foreclosure, there are millions more who are in no danger of losing their homes, but who have still seen their **dreams endangered**. They’re the **families** who see the "For Sale" signs lining the streets; who see neighbors leave, and homes standing vacant, and lawns slowly turning brown. They see their own **homes** - their single largest asset - **plummeting in value**.

**One study in Chicago** found that a foreclosed home reduces the price of nearby homes by as much as **9 percent**. Home prices in cities across the country have fallen by more than **25 percent** since **2006**. And in Phoenix, they’ve fallen by **43 percent**.

Even if your neighborhood hasn’t been hit by foreclosures, you’re likely feeling the effects of this crisis in other ways. Companies **in your community** that depend on the housing market - construction companies and home furnishing stores and painters and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Arguments and Effect on Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of the crisis</td>
<td><strong>PRIMARY AUDIENCE-ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td><strong>PRIMARY AUDIENCE-ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>landscapers - they’re all cutting back and laying people off.</th>
<th>Figures confirm the effects of the crisis</th>
<th>SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As businesses lose revenue and people lose income, the tax base shrinks, which means less money for schools and police and fire departments. And on top of this, the costs to local government associated with a single foreclosure can be as high as 20,000 dollars. So the effects of this crisis have also reverberated across the financial markets.</td>
<td>General economic crisis</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM CONTAGION OF SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the housing market collapsed, so did the availability of credit on which our economy depends. And as that credit has dried up, it’s been harder for families to find affordable loans to purchase a car or pay tuition, and harder for businesses to secure the capital they need to expand and create jobs.</td>
<td>General economic crisis</td>
<td>SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the end, all of us are paying a price for this home mortgage crisis.</td>
<td>Crisis scapegoating the innocent</td>
<td>PRIMARY AUDIENCE-ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS + ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And all of us will pay an even steeper price if we allow this crisis to continue to deepen - - a crisis which is unraveling homeownership, the middle class, and the American Dream itself.</td>
<td>Need to contain the crisis</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But if we act boldly and swiftly to arrest this downward spiral, then every American will benefit.</td>
<td>Political response to the crisis</td>
<td>TOPOS OF BOLD ACTION + TOPOS OF URGENCY + ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES (OF POLITICAL ACTION)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The plan I’m announcing focuses on rescuing families who’ve played by the rules and acted responsibly, by refinancing loans for millions of families in traditional mortgages who are underwater or close to it, by modifying</td>
<td>Political restoration of responsibility</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR REWARD TO THE RESPONSIBLE AND HARDWORKING + ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
loans for families stuck in sub-prime mortgages they can’t afford as a result of skyrocketing interest rates or personal misfortune, and by taking broader steps to keep mortgage rates low so that families can secure loans with affordable monthly payments.

At the same time, this plan must be viewed in a larger context. A lost home often begins with a lost job. Many businesses have laid off workers for a lack of revenue and available capital. Credit has become scarce as markets have been overwhelmed by the collapse of security backed - securities backed by failing mortgages. In the end, the home mortgage crisis, the financial crisis, and this broader economic crisis are all interconnected, and we can’t successfully address any one of them without addressing them all.

So yesterday, in Denver, I signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The act will create or save 3.5 million jobs over the next two years - including 70,000 right here in Arizona, right here - doing the work America needs done. And we’re also going to work to stabilize, repair and reform our financial system to get credit flowing again to families and businesses. And we will pursue the housing plan I’m outlining today. And through this plan, we will help families restructure or refinance their mortgages so they can afford - avoid foreclosure. And we’re not just helping homeowners at risk of falling over the edge; we’re preventing their neighbors from being pulled over that edge, too - as defaults and foreclosures contribute to sinking home values, and failing local businesses, and lost jobs.

But I want to be very clear about what this plan will not do: it will not rescue the unscrupulous or irresponsible by throwing good taxpayer money after bad loans. It will not help speculators who took risky bets on a rising market and bought homes not to live in but to sell. It will not help dishonest lenders who acted irresponsibly, distorting the

| Loans for families stuck in sub-prime mortgages they can’t afford as a result of skyrocketing interest rates or personal misfortune, and by taking broader steps to keep mortgage rates low so that families can secure loans with affordable monthly payments. | PROTOTYPICAL CRISIS-RELATED ARGUMENT |
| At the same time, this plan must be viewed in a larger context. A lost home often begins with a lost job. Many businesses have laid off workers for a lack of revenue and available capital. Credit has become scarce as markets have been overwhelmed by the collapse of security backed - securities backed by failing mortgages. In the end, the home mortgage crisis, the financial crisis, and this broader economic crisis are all interconnected, and we can’t successfully address any one of them without addressing them all. | Unemployment |
| So yesterday, in Denver, I signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The act will create or save 3.5 million jobs over the next two years - including 70,000 right here in Arizona, right here - doing the work America needs done. And we’re also going to work to stabilize, repair and reform our financial system to get credit flowing again to families and businesses. And we will pursue the housing plan I’m outlining today. And through this plan, we will help families restructure or refinance their mortgages so they can afford - avoid foreclosure. And we’re not just helping homeowners at risk of falling over the edge; we’re preventing their neighbors from being pulled over that edge, too - as defaults and foreclosures contribute to sinking home values, and failing local businesses, and lost jobs. | PROTOTYPICAL CRISIS-RELATED ARGUMENT |
| But I want to be very clear about what this plan will not do: it will not rescue the unscrupulous or irresponsible by throwing good taxpayer money after bad loans. It will not help speculators who took risky bets on a rising market and bought homes not to live in but to sell. It will not help dishonest lenders who acted irresponsibly, distorting the | Struggle against speculation and irresponsibility |

| Unemployment | ARGUMENT FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT + ARGUMENT FOR JOB CREATION SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT ARGUMENT FROM CONTAGION OF SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY (COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS) |
| General economic crisis | |
| Political response to the crisis | PROTOTYPICAL CRISIS-RELATED ARGUMENT + ARGUMENT JOB CREATION |
| Political restoration of responsibility | OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FROM VALUES + ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE) |
| Struggle against speculation and irresponsibility | ARGUMENT FROM THREAT + OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FROM VALUES + ARGUMENT FROM REWARD TO THE RESPONSIBLE AND |
facts - distorting the facts and dismissing the fine print at the expense of buyers who didn’t know better. And it will not reward folks who bought homes they knew from the beginning they would never be able to afford. So I just want to make this clear: This plan will not save every home.

But it will give millions of families resigned to financial ruin a chance to rebuild.

It will prevent the worst consequences of this crisis from wreaking even greater havoc on the economy. And by bringing down the foreclosure rate, it will help to shore up housing prices for everybody.

According to estimates by the Treasury Department, this plan could stop the slide in home prices due to neighboring foreclosures by up to $6,000 per home.

So here’s how my plan works. First, we will make it possible for an estimated 4 to 5 million currently ineligible homeowners who receive their mortgages through Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to refinance their mortgages at a lower rate.

Today, as a result of declining home values, millions of families are what’s called "underwater", which simply means that they owe more on their mortgages than their homes are currently worth. These families are unable to sell their homes, but they’re also unable to refinance them. So in the event of a job loss or another emergency, their options are limited.

Also right now, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - the institutions that guarantee home loans for millions of middle-class families - are generally not permitted to guarantee refinancing for mortgages valued at more than 80 percent of the home’s worth. So families who are underwater or close to being underwater can’t turn to these lending institutions for help.

My plan changes that by removing this restriction on Fannie and Freddie so that they can refinance mortgages they already own or guarantee. And what this

| Political response to the crisis | ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS |
| Opinion of leading institutions | ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY + ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES |
| Aftermath of the crisis and repercussions on the middle class | TOPOS OF THE IRREPARABLE ("UNDERWATER" FAMILIES) |
| Current middle-class impotence in getting out of economic troubles | ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS |
will do is it will allow millions of families stuck with loans at a higher rate to refinance.

### Table 5.1 Excerpt of Analysis of US_1

Topicality naturally “evolves” from 2009 to 2014, with the gradual emergence of new sub-topics and current issues mainly related to the succession of acts implemented by the President. However, apart from the specific focus on the mortgage crisis and the launch of the *American Recovery and Investment Act*, *US_1* is a prototypical Obama speech on the economic crisis.

The first argument shown in Table 5.1, with which the speech begins, might be named *argument from crisis exceptionality*. The current downturn is exceptional, unprecedented. The world has been shocked by an economic and financial upheaval for which solutions are not immediately at hand. The argumentative strategy is, in this case, a strategy of *justification* enabling the speaker to anticipate the persistence of economic hard times by claiming the lack of short-term solutions. This specific argument triggers another, namely the general *topos of crisis as a challenge*, according to which the unprecedented predicament challenges the search for new solutions. In this regard, the argument from crisis exceptionality can be said to be Lincolnian, as it implicitly makes intertextual reference to a famous passage of Abraham Lincoln’s second State of the Union Address:

> The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. *As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.* (my emphasis)

The political ability to adapt to changing times has become mainstream in American politics, especially among the Democrats, which is evident in Obama’s speeches (Foxlee 2009). Indeed, Lincoln’s passage echoes throughout the American sub-corpus of *ARGO*.

**US_32**: We live in a 21st century economy, but we’ve still got a government organized for the 20th century. Our economy has fundamentally changed - as has the world - but our government, our agencies, have not. The needs of our citizens have fundamentally changed but their government has not.

**US_78**: And in an age when the world’s information is a just click away, it demands that we bring our schools and libraries into the 21st century. We can’t be stuck in the 19th century when we’re living in a 21st century economy.

**US_96**: Progressives should be open to reforms that actually strengthen these programs and make them more responsive to a 21st century economy.

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9 A transcript of Lincoln’s speech is provided by Wikisource digital library at [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Abraham_Lincoln%27s_Second_State_of_the_Union_Address](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Abraham_Lincoln%27s_Second_State_of_the_Union_Address) (last accessed on 16th January 2015).
The 21\textsuperscript{st} century is fundamentally different from any other, and here lies the challenge of living up to the historic test. The \textit{Lincolnian argument from crisis exceptionality} thus rests upon the following scheme:

\textbf{LINCOLNIAN ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY}

\textit{Premise 1:} The economic crisis is an unprecedented downturn testing our ability to solve a dramatic problem.

\textit{Premise 2:} No ready-made solutions are available.

\textit{Conclusion:} Therefore, new means have to be sought and adopted.

The argument is not particularly problematic from an interpreting point of view, as it is generally related to the noun \textit{change}, the adjective \textit{new} and the syntags \textit{nineteenth century}, \textit{twentieth century} and \textit{twenty-first century}. However, highlighting its recurrent character and pivotal intertextual reference paves the way for more accurate and pragmatically-equivalent translation.

Despite its declared exceptionality, however, the crisis is actually systematically compared to another crisis in the rest of the sub-corpus, namely the \textit{Great Depression}.

\textbf{US\_11:} Over the past two years, we have faced the worst recession since the \textit{Great Depression}.

\textbf{US\_26:} After all that’s happened, after the worst economic crisis, the worst financial crisis since the \textit{Great Depression}, they want to return to the same practices that got us into this mess.

\textbf{US\_43:} More than one million Americans across the country would have lost their jobs in the middle of the worst economic crisis since the \textit{Great Depression}.

In most cases, the Great Depression is referred to as a “national ghost”, whose resuscitation continually threatens the United States. In this respect, the expression is often qualified by the ordinal number \textit{second} and, alternatively, by the adjective \textit{another}.

\textbf{US\_4:} It’s worth recalling the situation we faced six months ago - a contracting economy, skyrocketing unemployment, stagnant trade, and a financial system that was nearly frozen. Some were warning of a \textit{second Great Depression}.

\textbf{US\_5:} The fear among economists across the political spectrum that was - was that we were rapidly plummeting towards a \textit{second Great Depression}.

\textbf{US\_7:} Markets plummeted, credit dried up, and jobs were vanishing by the hundreds of thousands each month. We were on the precipice of a \textit{second Great Depression}.

\textbf{US\_9:} And that crisis was born of a failure of responsibility - from Wall Street all the way to Washington - that brought down many of the world’s largest financial firms and nearly dragged our economy into a \textit{second Great Depression}.
US_43: In communities across the Midwest, it would have been another Great Depression.

US_90: Now, some of you remember, five years ago a financial crisis hit Wall Street. It then turned into a devastating recession on Main Street and it came close to being another Great Depression.

The argument is linked to the argument from negative consequences of inaction, as a prospective comeback of a Great Depression must be prevented at all costs. In this regard, the argument is frequently signalled by the adverbial phrase never again or, more generally, by a structure composed of a negation (a negative verb such as to prevent or the negative adverb never), the noun crisis, the verb to happen and the adverb again, which could be summarised into “NEGATION + crisis + happen again”.

US_3: We have agreed on a series of unprecedented steps to restore growth and prevent a crisis like this from happening again.

US_4: We agreed to take concrete steps to move forward with tough, new financial regulations so that crises like this can never happen again. Never again should we let the schemes of a reckless few put the world’s financial system - and our people’s well-being - at risk.

US_33: And we’ve put in place new rules to hold Wall Street accountable, so a crisis like this never happens again.

US_84: And that’s why I want to lay a rock-solid foundation to make sure the kind of crisis we went through never happens again. We’ve got to make sure it doesn’t happen again.

The topos of the Great Depression actually triggers, by inference, an argument by analogy (Mazzi 2011; Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 315)10, having the following scheme (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 315):

- Similarity Premise: Generally, case $C_1$ is similar to case $C_2$.
- Base Premise: $A$ is true (false) in case $C_1$.
- Conclusion: $A$ is true (false) in case $C_2$.

However simple, the argument by analogy is one of the most widely adopted schemes in argumentation (Mazzi 2011).

By relying on this logic, Obama claims that the present crisis is like the Great Depression. The 2007-2008 crisis, an unprecedented and unfathomable predicament, is thus described by means of comparison, more precisely by relation to a notorious event in

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10 Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008: 315) actually name the argument “argument from analogy”.
American history. Even though it initially appears to cast a gloomy shadow on the present state of affairs, the adoption of this simple argumentative strategy actually enables the speaker to transfer all the characteristics of case C₁ to case C₂, including the positive ones. Attention is therefore automatically drawn to the successful containment of the crisis, corroborated by the (often implicit) reference to the successful, albeit belated, launch of the New Deal in the Thirties.

**US_12**: Third, we took further steps to implement financial regulatory reform. At home, we are implementing the toughest financial reform since the Great Depression.¹¹

**US_19**: That’s how we confronted our financial crisis in the United States - having our banks submit to stress tests that were rigorous, increasing capital buffers, and passing the strongest financial reforms since the Great Depression.

**US_96**: Together, we forged a New Deal, declared a War on Poverty in a great society.

Reference to the New Deal is made by claiming that current reforms are the strongest/toughest/most ambitious financial reforms since the Great Depression. The clause recurs like a refrain in the sub-corpus.

The argument by analogy making reference to the Great Depression can thus be reduced to this basic scheme:

ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY (TOPOS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION)

Premise 1: The 1929 economic crisis subsequently led to the Great Depression.

Premise 2: Today’s crisis is like the 1929 crisis.

Conclusion: Therefore, we must contain the crisis to prevent our economy from being dragged into a second Great Depression.

The argumentative strategy enables Obama to start his speeches describing gloomy atmospheres that evoke the idea of an apparently endless crisis and then suddenly steering discourse towards brighter and more hopeful prospects. In this respect, Table 5.1 displays the President’s recourse to a pivotal argument, often used in political communication: the topos of the irreparable.

The Great Depression was, indeed, perceived as *infinie*: it plunged the country into misery, to use Mr Micawber’s term, for more than a decade and the simple allusion attaches

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¹¹ *US_12* is the only international speech in which reference is made to the Great Depression, that appears to be treated primarily as a national matter.
to the present crisis all the significance it deserves by conjuring up prospective irreparability. The most skillful and foudroyant strategy, though, lies in suddenly denying or, rather, repairing the irreparable after claiming it. The irreparable is said to have been prevented already in the first speech of the sub-corpus. The crisis has not been prevented, but it has been contained and “stopped [...] from spreading further” (US_4). Indeed, in Obama’s speeches, the downturn is continuously described as acting like a virus infecting all sectors of the economy and rapidly spreading throughout the United States and the rest of the world. Another crucial argument of Obama’s rhetoric is, precisely, the argument from crisis contagion, of which two versions are adopted by the American President.

VERSION 1: ARGUMENT FROM CONTAGION OF SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY
Premise 1: The housing crisis has infected the financial sector.
Premise 2: The financial crisis then turned into a major economic crisis affecting the middle class.
Conclusion: Therefore, the current crisis is widespread and complex, and requires a comprehensive response to the crisis.

The first version of the argument is adopted to examine the origin of the crisis and to corroborate the thesis of its exceptionality and the resulting need for taking urgent and comprehensive action. In this respect, it might also be referred to as argument for comprehensive response to the crisis.

US_1: So the effects of this crisis have also reverberated across the financial markets. When the housing market collapsed, so did the availability of credit on which our economy depends. And as that credit has dried up, it’s been harder for families to find affordable loans to purchase a car or pay tuition, and harder for businesses to secure the capital they need to expand and create jobs. [...] In the end, the home mortgage crisis, the financial crisis, and this broader economic crisis are all interconnected, and we can’t successfully address any one of them without addressing them all.

Explanation of the crisis to the audience is also sometimes carried out by relying on the slippery slope argument (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 114), which will be addressed in detail in the analysis of Cameron’s speeches, as will the argument from authority (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 411), because these arguments are not that recurrent in the American sub-corpus. Similarly, the first version of the argument from crisis contagion is not as recurrent as the second, which can indeed be considered distinctive of Obama’s discourse on the crisis.

VERSION 2: PRIMARY-AUDIENCE ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION
Premise 1: You see the effects of the crisis in your neighbourhood.
Premise 2: The same is happening in every American State, city and neighbourhood.
Conclusion: Therefore, the crisis has spread all over the country and everybody has been hit.

The second version of the argument from contagion, concerning the geographical scope of the crisis, is systematically used in all Obama’s speeches. It is generally adopted at
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the gloomy outset of the address, when implementing the topos of the irreparable. It serves a specific argumentative purpose: establishing direct contact with the primary audience and "reassuring" participants by relying on the Ciceronian maxim non tibi hoc soli, i.e. a problem shared is a problem halved.

US_1: I’m here today to talk about a crisis unlike we’ve ever known - but one that you know very well here in Mesa, and throughout the Valley. In Phoenix and its surrounding suburbs, the American Dream is being tested by a home mortgage crisis that not only threatens the stability of our economy, but also the stability of families and neighborhoods. [...] It begins with a young family - maybe in Mesa, or Glendale, or Tempe - or just as likely in a suburban area of Las Vegas, or Cleveland, or Miami.

The argument not only crops up in national speeches but also in addresses delivered at international conferences:

US_3: The challenge is clear. The global economy is contracting. Trade is shrinking. Unemployment is rising. The international finance system is nearly frozen. Even these facts can’t fully capture the crisis that we’re confronting, because behind them is the pain and uncertainty that so many people are facing. We see it back in the United States. We see it here in London. We see it around the world: families losing their homes, workers losing their jobs and their savings, students who are deferring their dreams. So many have lost so much.

The argument conveys the idea of contagion, which justifies prospective political failure in “lifting ourselves out of this predicament” (US_2) or “digging ourselves out of the economic hole” (US_109).

US_20: Obviously we have just gone through the worst financial crisis and the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. And one of the differences between now and the ‘30s is that the global economy is more integrated than ever, and so what happens in Asia has an impact here in the United States; what happens in Europe has an impact on Asia and the United States.


As to the argument from geographical contagion, from an interpreter’s point of view the main problem is posed by geographical names which might either be well-known (Phoenix, London, Asia) or more specific and unknown (Mesa, Glendale, Tempe). Only the latter might be problematic in interpreting.

US_23: And Scranton, we’ve taken some punches these last few years. But there’s one thing I know about people here in Scranton, people in Pennsylvania, and people all across America. We are tougher than the times.
US_26: But, Osawatomie, this is not just another political debate. This is the defining issue of our time. [...] And in 1910, Teddy Roosevelt came here to Osawatomie and he laid out his vision for what he called a New Nationalism.

US_36: Here in Falls Church, home values have fallen by about a quarter from their peak.

Interpreters cannot be blamed for not being familiar with the cities of Scranton, Osawatomie or Falls Church; yet Obama’s systematic references to the narrow context serve the pivotal pragmatic functions of establishing contact with the audience and conveying the idea of contagion. In this respect, the President’s appeals to participants should not be omitted; references to unfamiliar cities can easily be reproduced by paraphrases like “Here in your city”. In interpreting terms, recognition and reproduction of this introductory argument is easily turned into a skill-based strategy (Riccardi 2005: 762).

5.2.3 The Argument from Middle-Class Distress

Even though a deep recession has been prevented, the crisis had major repercussions on the American economic system. Values have been lost, but the worst consequence of the crisis lies in the fact that millions of Americans have lost their jobs and houses, which is reiterated throughout the text collection.

US_7: Over the past two years, more than seven million Americans have lost their jobs in the deepest recession our country has known in generations.

US_9: Now, since I last spoke here two years ago, our country has been through a terrible trial. More than eight million people have lost their jobs. Countless small businesses have had to shut their doors.

US_84: Hundreds of thousands of construction workers had lost their jobs. A record number of people were behind on their mortgage payments. And a lot of people here in Phoenix, they saw that devastation.

US_86: And we all understand that for the past four and a half years, we had to fight our way back from a brutal recession, and millions of Americans lost their jobs and their homes and their savings.

As to real estate assets, the crisis has turned homeownership from a certainty into a dream.

US_102: And since the most important investment many families make is their home, send me legislation that protects taxpayers from footing the bill for a housing crisis ever again, and keeps the dream of homeownership alive for future generations of Americans.

In other words, despite its major financial implications, the crisis is only rarely addressed in its meaning of “crisis of the casino economy”. On the contrary, it is
systematically described in terms of “crise de l’économie réelle” (Ferry 2009), with particular reference to its repercussions on the “pockets” of the American middle class.

**US_1:** the American Dream is being tested by a home mortgage crisis that not only threatens the stability of our economy, but also the stability of families and neighborhoods. It’s a crisis that strikes at the heart of the middle class: the homes in which we invest our savings and build our lives, raise our families and plant roots in our communities.

Looking at occurrences helps understand the pervasiveness of the reference to the middle class in the American sub-corpus: the noun *middle class* occurs two hundred and seventy-eight times and there are exactly two hundred occurrences of the adjective *middle-class*. The American middle class is not only the target of the crisis but also the target of Obama’s policies.

**US_1:** But it [the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act] will give millions of families resigned to financial ruin the chance to rebuild.

**US_13:** My number one priority is to do what’s right for the American people, for jobs, and for economic growth. [...] And because of this agreement, middle-class Americans won’t see their taxes go up on January 1st, which is what I promised - a promise I made during the campaign, a promise I made as President.

**US_43:** I got my start standing with working folks who’d lost their jobs, folks who had lost their hope because the steel plants had closed down. I didn’t like the idea that they didn’t have anybody fighting for them.

Hundreds of examples could be provided but only a few passages have been selected. Even though formally they differ from each other, they share a common theme, i.e. Obama’s political effort in helping the middle class overcome its economic troubles. Innumerable speech passages in the American sub-corpus of *ARGO* rely upon this argument which can be named *argument from middle-class distress*. It is a topic-related sub-type of the *argument from distress* (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 334), which has this formal scheme:

| Individual x is in distress. |
| If y brings about A, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress. |
| Therefore, y ought to bring about A. |

The formal scheme does not provide interpreters with a particular advantage during the interpreting process. Yet, the content-related *argument from middle-class distress* schematically outlines the recurrent illocution underlying all Obama’s speeches on the economy.

**ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS**

*Premise 1:* The Middle Class is in distress.
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Premise 2: If the government implements act $x$, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the government ought to implement act $x$.

Like most arguments, the argument from middle-class distress is frequently enthymemic; in particular, the conclusion is frequently left implicit. What is not left implicit is the declared priority of Obama’s administration, i.e. rescuing the middle class.

**US_74**: Now, I’m here today to talk about what should be our top priority as a nation, and that’s reigniting the true engine of America’s economic growth - a rising, thriving middle class and an economy built on innovation.

Rescuing the middle class is an imperative, because working Americans are the guardians of American values.

**US_62**: Our economic success has never come from the top down; it comes from the middle out. It comes from the bottom up. It comes from folks like you working hard, and if you’re working hard and you’re successful, then you become customers and everybody does well.

The “middle-class argument” is linked to the prototypical crisis-related argument, as every single act promoted or implemented by the President is described as contributing dramatically to the solution of the problems of Americans. The specific act by which Obama claims to be lifting the middle class out of the crisis is deliberately left vague in the scheme (act $x$), as the “evolution” of discourse over time engenders a sequence of alternating acts which, in turn, “enter” speeches as topical issues. Constant updating is therefore required on the part of interpreters as the specific topical issue to be addressed always evolves. Yet, the scheme remains consistent throughout the text collection.

For the sake of descriptivity, a brief account of the main policies addressed in the sub-corpus is in order. The first broad plan launched by the President, addressed throughout the whole corpus, is the **American Jobs Act**.

**US_17**: The purpose of the American Jobs Act is simple: to put more people back to work and more money in the pockets of those who are working. It will create more jobs for construction workers, more jobs for teachers, more jobs for veterans, and more jobs for long-term unemployed. It will provide a tax break for companies who hire new workers, and it will cut payroll taxes in half for every working American and every small business.

Its aim is, again, to rescue the middle class by putting Americans back to work (sixty occurrences in the sub-corpus) and gradually re-enabling homeownership.

**US_21**: And so I will continue to fight for the American Jobs Act so that we can put our people back to work.

**US_56**: Last September, I sent Congress a detailed jobs plan full of the kind of bipartisan ideas that would have put more Americans back to work. It had broad support from the American people. It was fully paid for. If Congress had passed it in full, we’d be on track to have a million more Americans working this year.
The American Jobs Act is an ambitious economic plan partially passed by Congress, which is often blamed by the President. Among the policies envisaged, the Payroll Tax Cut Extension is undoubtedly the most frequently addressed. Debate over the implementation of the tax cut for middle-class families monopolised discourse from mid-2011 (US_16) to mid-2012 (US_56). The act, formally named Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act, was passed by Congress in 2012. Despite being fairly complex, it is always described in a simple fashion by relying on the argument from middle-class distress.

**US_25**: Not only is extending the payroll tax cut important for the economy as a whole, it’s obviously important for individual families. It’s important insurance for them against the unexpected. It will help families pay their bills. It will spur spending. It will spur hiring. And it’s the right thing to do.

Problems are, therefore, not posed by the description of the act. Neither is the translation of the name of the policy particularly demanding; it could easily be left unchanged in its English original form or an appropriate equivalent can be found in advance.

Further topical issues include the Buffett Rule, a part of a tax plan proposed by Obama which consists in applying a minimum tax rate of thirty percent on individuals making more than one million dollars a year. It is named after businessman Warren Buffett, who in 2011 publicly sided against the fact that rich people could pay less in federal taxes than the middle class. The plan is systematically explained in elementary terms, not posing particular translation problems. It is, moreover, always related to the imperative of rescuing the middle class, for which a tax cut is envisaged.

**US_33**: Tax reform should follow the Buffett Rule. If you make more than one million dollars a year, you should not pay less than thirty percent in taxes.

**US_51**: Now, next week, members of Congress are going to have a chance to vote on what we call the Buffett Rule. And it’s simple: if you make more money - more than one million dollars a year, not if you have one million dollars, but if you make more than one million dollars a year, you should pay at least the same percentage of your income in taxes as middle-class families do. If on the other hand, you make less than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year - like ninety-eight percent of American families do - your taxes shouldn’t go up.

**US_58**: And keep in mind […] we’re saying nobody’s income taxes go up on the first two hundred and fifty thousand dollars of their income. So even somebody who makes more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars is still getting a tax break on their first two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. You understand?

The Payroll Tax Cut and the Buffett Rule are the most frequently addressed policies, because they directly concern the President’s declared aim to help “families get into the middle class and stay in the middle class” (US_39). The theme is related to the American *topos of opportunity* and the positive value of *responsibility*, which Obama conveys by resorting to a recurrent formulation.
**Chapter 5 | The American Sub-corpus Analysed**

**US_38:** We can settle for a country where a few people do really, really well, and everybody else struggles to get by. Or we can restore an economy where everybody gets a fair shot, everybody does their fair share, everybody plays by the same set of rules - from Washington to Wall Street to Main Street.

**US_47:** What, if anything, can we do to restore a sense of security for people who are willing to work hard and act responsibly in this country? Can we succeed as a country where a shrinking number of people do exceedingly well, while a growing number struggle to get by? Or are we better off when everyone gets a fair shot, and everyone does their fair share, and everyone plays by the same rules?

**US_52:** We can either settle for a country where a shrinking number of people do really, really well, while a growing number are struggling to get by, or we can build an economy where everybody gets a fair shot, and everybody is doing their fair share, and everybody is playing by the same set of rules.

The expression occurs several times in the sub-corpus and conjures up a crucial atmosphere of equality that ends up surrounding any act promoted by the American President. Moreover, it relies upon another crucial argument of Obama’s discourse, according to which the President’s act will only rescue the hardworking and the responsible.

**ARGUMENT FOR REWARD TO THE RESPONSIBLE AND HARDWORKING**

**Premise 1:** The crisis has been brought about by irresponsible and reckless speculators.

**Premise 2:** Irresponsibility is a negative value.

**Premise 3:** I am not committed to negative-value driven goals.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, only the hardworking and the responsible will benefit from my policies.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will show that this argument is absent in the British and French sub-corpora. As a consequence, the argument for reward to the responsible and hardworking appears to be exclusively American. In particular, its recurrence in Obama’s speeches is likely to be determined by the Protestant work ethic, rife in American culture and society for historical reasons. Regarding the purpose of the present research, the argument in question, thus, confirms the cultural nature of argumentation and calls for lexical equivalence with a view to attaining pragmatic quality and argumentative equivalence in interpreted texts: even though the other corpus speakers also refer to employment and speculation, appeals to hard work and the pledge exclusively to reward responsible and hardworking Americans are the distinctive pragmatic devices of Obama’s speeches on the economic crisis. Incidentally, the verb to earn is another lexical indicator of the argument, showing that reward must not be taken for granted.

As regards the policies aiming at rewarding those who act responsibly and work hard, apart from the Payroll Tax Cut and the Buffett Rule, other policies are mentioned by Obama. Yet their presence in the sub-corpus is not as significant as references to the two most frequently addressed bills. Insisting on the chronological succession of newsworthy acts is, however, pointless. Handling specific topics is any interpreter’s job, which consists,
among other activities, in advance content preparation. In the case of Obama’s speeches, however, the task is simplified by the extremely informal and simplified dissertation about economic issues, which spares interpreters detailed descriptions of the policies envisaged by the Obama administration.

Emphasis is laid on the needs of working Americans, instead. The main value associated with the middle class is hard work, which denotes responsibility and can, thus, counter the causes of the crisis. As a consequence, it will be rewarded.

**US_23:** So there’s a sense of deep frustration among people who’ve done the right thing, but don’t see that hard work and that responsibility pay off. And that’s not the way things are supposed to be, not here in America. [...] We want an America where hard work is valued and responsibility is rewarded. We’re fighting to rebuild an economy that restores security for the middle class and renews opportunity for folks that are trying to get into the middle class. We’re fighting to build an economy that’s not based on outsourcing and tax loopholes and risky financial schemes, but one that’s built to last - one where we invest in things like education and small businesses - an economy that’s built on manufacturing and building things again and selling them all around the world.

**US_31:** And that’s my central goal and focus as President. That should be our central goal as a country - how we rebuild an economy where hard work pays off, responsibility is rewarded - a nation where those values continue for generations to come.

**US_52:** Now, part of building that economy is making sure that we’re not a country that’s known just for what we buy and what we consume. After all, our middle class was built by workers who invented products and made products and sold products - the best in the world - all around the world.

**US_83:** So I’ve come here today to talk a little more about something I was discussing last week, and that’s what we need to do as a country to secure a better bargain for the middle class - a national strategy to make sure that every single person who’s willing to work hard in this country has a chance to succeed in the 21st century economy.

**US_96:** But we know that people’s frustrations run deeper than these most recent political battles. Their frustration is rooted in their own daily battles - to make ends meet, to pay for college, buy a home, save for retirement. [...] And that is a dangerous and growing inequality and lack of upward mobility that has jeopardized middle-class America’s basic bargain - that if you work hard, you have a chance to get ahead. I believe this is the defining challenge of our time: making sure our economy works for every working American.

The value of hard work has not been lost but has been threatened by the crisis which has generated unemployment. In this regard, job creation is an imperative.

**ARGUMENT FOR JOB CREATION**

*Premise 1:* A thriving, hardworking middle class is the engine of growth.

*Premise 2:* Growth has been put at risk by the crisis.

*Conclusion:* Therefore, job creation is the key to the solution of the crisis and the creation of a sustainable economy.
Yet unemployment needs to be tackled comprehensively.

5.2.4 Recurrent Interdiscursive Relations and Related Arguments

Focusing on the destiny of the middle-class entails addressing two sub-topics which make up two major interdiscursive relations in Obama’s discourse: *education* and *innovation*; which comes as no surprise considering that speeches delivered in schools, universities, plants, firms and ports actually make up exactly thirty percent of the sub-corpus speeches.

![Narrow Contexts of Speech Delivery in the American Sub-corpus](image)

**Figure 5.2: Contexts of Speech Delivery in the American Sub-corpus**

The sub-topics of education and innovation are, however, addressed throughout the whole sub-corpus, also in speeches that are not delivered in education (e.g. *US_100* and *US_101*) or industrial (e.g. *US_107*) settings.

Spreading education opportunities among middle-class families and helping unemployed or redundant workers go back to work are not considered ancillary activities to economic recovery: they are the cornerstones of Obama’s plan to overcome the crisis and restore the economic “supremacy” of the United States.

**US_36:** Last week, in my State of the Union, I laid out my blueprint for an economy that’s built to last. […] That was a long speech. I’m not going to repeat the whole thing. […] But I do want to talk about some of the issues that I discussed last week because the blueprint we put forward was one that focuses on restoring what have always been this country’s greatest strengths - *American manufacturing, American energy, skills and education for American workers* so that we can compete with anybody around the world in this 21st
Appeals to a lasting solution to the crisis, the Lincolnian argument from crisis exceptionality (*in this 21st century economy*) and the focus on values (*fairness and responsibility*) are deeply related to the sub-topics of education and innovation. The former is expressed by relying on the following argument scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR EDUCATION**

Premise 1: The crisis has hit major sectors of the economy and reduced the middle class.
Premise 2: America cannot compete in 21st century economy by means of an obsolete economic system.
Conclusion: Therefore, education is a prerequisite to prepare our children for jobs of the future.

When calling for enhanced education, Obama generally insists on the insufficient number of high-school and college graduates in America. If nothing is done to improve the average education of middle-class Americans, the United States will end up losing its economic supremacy.

**US_2**: In a global economy where the most valuable skill you can sell is your *knowledge*, a good *education* is no longer just a pathway to opportunity – it is a pre-requisite. Right now, three-quarters of the fastest-growing occupations require more than a high school diploma. And yet, just over half of our citizens have that level of education. We have one of the highest high school dropout rates of any industrialized nation. And half of the students who begin college never finish. This is a prescription for economic decline, because we know the countries that out-teach us today will out-compete us tomorrow.

**US_8**: We need to invest in the *skills and education* of our people. [...] And the idea here is simple: instead of rewarding failure, we only reward success. Instead of funding the status quo, we only invest in reform - reform that raises student achievement; inspires students to excel in math and science; and turns around failing schools that steal the future of too many young Americans, from rural communities to the inner city. *In the 21st century, the best anti-poverty program around is a world-class education.*

A quality education system helps the country compete in the 21st century economy. In this respect, the President’s program foresees appropriate rating of national schools and universities, the revitalisation of community colleges and the promotion of college education by means of increased access to safe student loans and Pell Grants.\(^\text{12}\)

**US_8**: To make college more affordable, this bill will finally end the unwarranted taxpayer subsidies that go to banks for student loans. Instead, let’s take that money and give families a ten thousand dollar tax credit for four years of college and increase *Pell Grants*.

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\(^\text{12}\) The Federal Pell Grant Program provides grants to low-income undergraduate students to promote access to college education.
US_42: So my administration has tried to do our part by making sure that the student loan program puts students before banks, by increasing aid like the Pell grants for millions of students and their families, and by allowing students to cap their monthly loan payments at ten percent of their income, which means that their repayment schedule is manageable.

If children and young people need education, American industry must rapidly turn to innovation to guarantee jobs to future graduates and, in the short-term, jobs to the millions of unemployed workers.

ARGUMENT FOR INNOVATION
Premise 1: The crisis has hit major sectors of the economy and shown America’s unpreparedness in competing in 21st century economy.
Premise 2: America is lagging behind and is gradually losing its economic supremacy.
Conclusion: Therefore, innovation is a prerequisite for overcoming the crisis, getting the jobs of the future and building a lasting economy.

Coupled with hard work, ingenuity will help meet the demands of the 21st century and guide the country out of the recession. Just like hard work, ingenuity is not something needing to be sought: it is intrinsic in American society, it is a distinctive value which has been temporarily lost.

US_26: The world is shifting to an innovation economy and nobody does innovation better than America. Nobody does it better. No one has better colleges. Nobody has better universities. Nobody has a greater diversity of talent and ingenuity. No one’s workers or entrepreneurs are more driven or more daring. The things that have always been our strengths match up perfectly with the demands of the moment.

The President is sure of Americans’ bent for hard work and ingenuity to such an extent that he bets on them. And it is a winning bet.

US_62: I placed my bet on American workers. We bet on American ingenuity. I’d make that same bet any day of the week.

US_94: We bet on American ingenuity and American workers. And assembly lines started humming again, and automakers started to make cars again. And just a few months after this plant shut down, your plant manager got the call: fire those furnaces back up, get those workers back on the job.

The American auto industry is a frequent target of Obama’s discourse on innovation, promoting the swift development of more fuel-efficient cars. In this respect, focus on the auto industry is included in the broader discourse fostering the country’s “conversion” to clean energy and commitment to environmental reforms.

US_41: We need to keep developing the technology that allows us to use less oil in our cars and trucks, less energy for our buildings and our plants and our factories - that’s the strategy we’re pursuing. And that’s the only real solution to this challenge.
We can support scientists who are designing new engines that are more energy efficient; support scientists that are developing cheaper batteries that can go farther on a single charge; support scientists and engineers that are devising new ways to fuel our cars and trucks with new sources of clean energy -- like advanced biofuels and natural gas -- so drivers can one day go coast to coast without using a drop of oil.

This transition towards clean energy is enabled, again, by hard work and ingenuity, but is driven and supported by political action.

And to support that innovation, we will invest fifteen billion dollars a year to develop technologies like wind power and solar power; advanced biofuels, clean coal, and more fuel-efficient cars and trucks built right here in America.

After all, small business tax relief is not a substitute for ingenuity and industriousness by our entrepreneurs - but it can help those with good ideas to grow and expand. Incentives to promote energy efficiency and clean energy manufacturing don’t automatically create jobs or lower carbon emissions - but these steps provide a framework in which companies can compete and innovate to create those jobs and reduce energy consumption.

Obama’s focus on education and innovation shows his commitment to a different, speculation-free economy, one that is tailored to the demands of the 21st century. In this regard, economic recovery must not be a flash in the pan; never again should Americans have to face a second Great Depression. Hence, recovery will have to be strong and durable, and the government must commit to “an economy that’s built to last” (US_36). This is an argument with which the topics of education and innovation are inextricably linked.

ARGUMENT FOR STRONG AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Premise 1: The crisis has shown the weaknesses of our economic system.
Premise 2: Never again should we let a similar crisis occur.
Conclusion: Therefore, we need to commit to an innovative, strong and lasting economy.

Here lies the opportunity offered by the economic crisis: not only will America get out of “this mess” (e.g. US_7, US_26, US_39), it will also “emerge stronger than before” (US_2). Obama’s argument for crisis as an opportunity occurs ninety-four times in the sub-corpus, thereby presenting itself as one of the most distinctive features of the President’s argumentation.

OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FOR CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY (COMING OUT STRONGER)
Premise 1: America has always been the world’s largest economy.
Premise 2: The crisis has shown the weaknesses of our economy and endangered our supremacy.
Premise 3: Yet, it has also provided the opportunity to renew our economy.
Conclusion: If we take this challenge, we will emerge from the crisis stronger than before.
Despite their pervasiveness, education and innovation are not the only recurrent interdiscursive relations established by Obama’s speeches on the crisis. Health care reform is equally viewed as an imperative inextricably bound to the economic destiny of the country and, in particular, to the desired resurgence of the middle class. The topic is recurrently addressed as it has been a burning issue since the 2008 presidential campaign.

Argumentation regarding health care reform revolves around the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which is generally known as Affordable Care Act or “Obamacare”. The reform basically aims at expanding coverage for the uninsured unemployed Americans by guaranteeing that they don’t “go broke when they get sick” (US_96). The objective also is achieved through reform of Medicare and Medicaid, which compound the deficit predicament.

**US_14**: This means further reducing health care costs, including programs like Medicare and Medicaid, which are the single biggest contributor to our long-term deficit.

Obamacare thus entails lowering health care costs by enhanced control on insurance companies, which are required to cover all applicants within new minimum standards and offer the same rates regardless of pre-existing conditions or gender. This is said to be one of the keys to middle-class relief and overall economic recovery alike. The reform fosters deficit reduction and helps American businesses that “are saddled with rapidly increasing health care costs” (US_5), thereby creating jobs.

**US_82**: Now, I’ve got to tell you our businesses created jobs at nearly twice the pace of the last recovery, when there was no Obamacare, so it’s kind of hard to figure how Obamacare is actually the problem, giving people health insurance.

The reform was signed into law in March 2010. Yet it is continually criticised and constantly risks repealing (US_14, US_81). As a consequence, argumentation regarding Obamacare permeates the whole sub-corpus by relying on a specific and articulated argument scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR OBAMACARE (HEALTH CARE REFORM)**

*Premise 1*: Most working Americans receive health care insurance through their employers.

*Premise 2*: Unemployed Americans are, instead, generally uninsured.

*Premise 3*: Rising health care costs (Medicare and Medicaid) contribute to worsening the deficit predicament.

*Premise 4*: The crisis breeds unemployment and thus raises health care costs by leaving a lot of Americans uninsured.

*Premise 5*: Even though it constantly risks repeal, Obamacare expands coverage for the uninsured and reduces health care costs.

**Conclusion**: Therefore, Obamacare must be implemented for the sake of American families and the country’s economy.

Argumentation regarding health care reform often provides Obama with the opportunity to deal with the deficit crisis, as Medicare and Medicaid lie at the heart of
America’s budget crisis. However the deficit is only occasionally addressed. The following chapters will outline that the topic gives rise to specific and complex arguments in the speeches delivered by Cameron, Sarkozy and Hollande; yet, argumentation regarding the deficit crisis in Obama’s speeches basically revolves around the claim that, despite criticism, government policies are not compounding the deficit predicament. Even though they actually have a negative impact on the budget situation in the short-term, they are part of a broader government plan to solve the deficit predicament by cutting health care costs and promoting education and innovation. The passages dealing with the deficit do not pose comprehension or translation problems: the argument for deficit reduction implies the straw man argument, by means of which Obama asserts his stance to the detriment of political opponents; broadly, the topic is systematically addressed in a simple fashion, which sometimes provides the President with the opportunity to argue in Micawberian terms, as attested by the excerpt drawn from US_8:

US_5: Despite what some have claimed, the cost of the Recovery Act is only a very small part of our current budget imbalance. In reality, the deficit had been building dramatically over the previous eight years. We have a structural gap between the money going out and the money coming in.

US_8: Now – just stating the facts. Now, if we had taken office in ordinary times, I would have liked nothing more than to start bringing down the deficit. But we took office amid a crisis. And our efforts to prevent a second depression have added another one trillion dollars to our national debt. That, too, is a fact. I’m absolutely convinced that was the right thing to do. But families across the country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government should do the same. So tonight, I’m proposing specific steps to pay for the trillion dollars that it took to rescue the economy last year. […] Like any cash-strapped family, we will work within a budget to invest in what we need and sacrifice what we don’t. And if I have to enforce this discipline by veto, I will.

US_55: Our deficits are still too high. But after shrinking by nearly nine percent the quarter before I took office, America’s economy has now grown for almost three consecutive years. After losing hundreds of thousands of jobs a month, our businesses have created more than four million jobs over the past twenty-six months. Exports have surged and manufacturers are investing in America again.

Obama’s argument for deficit reduction, thus, rests on a simple content-related scheme:

ARGUMENT FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION
Premise 1: Some say that my policies compound the deficit predicament.
Premise 2: They are wrong, as the deficit predicament is serious irrespective of the impact of government policies.
Premise 3: However substantial, the impact of government policies on the deficit is negligible, as they are part of a broader plan to solve the crisis.
Premise 4: Obamacare reduces health care costs, thereby contributing to solving the deficit crisis; moreover, the economy is growing again owing to government commitment to business and innovation.
Conclusion: This is why I pledge to cut the deficit but I am not giving up my core policies.
The argumentative references to education, innovation, environmental and health care reforms are pivotal concepts of Obama’s rhetoric on the economy; they are, thus, harnessed in both national and international addresses, even though the former give rise to dwelling on the needs of the American middle class and consequently show a more marked presence of the topics of education and health care reform. On the other hand, the need for innovation and environmental change are similarly addressed in front of international audiences. In this respect, the differences between national and international speeches will be further outlined in section 5.2.6.

This section and the previous ones have described the main arguments Obama’s discourse on the crisis hinges on, regarding which, a comment is in order: once topicality and the recurrent lexico-syntagmatic indicators of the arguments have been highlighted, the President’s argumentative routines do not pose particular challenges to translation. The content-related account of argument schemes essentially serves descriptive purposes and aims at showing the argumentative orientation of Obama’s speeches on the economy. Yet the speeches included in the American sub-corpus are characterised by another and substantially different class of arguments, which do, on the contrary, pose major translation challenges.

### 5.2.5 Anecdotal Arguments

Probably the most distinctive feature of the American sub-corpus is the recurrent presence of narratives of varying length breaking the flow of argumentation, which in modern approaches to political argumentation are referred to as *anecdotal arguments* (Govier & Jansen 2011). In this regard, the sub-corpus provides a glaring example of the fact that modern political speeches do not contain clearly separate sections of argumentation and narration (Reisigl 2010: 253) but are, instead, freely organised.

As a consequence of the President’s focus on the middle class, the anecdotes generally concern the resilience of the American people in the face of the crisis. The stories of Stakhanovite workers, determined families in desperate need of coverage, brave and innovative businessmen are unexpectedly told to provide speeches with riveting details. Figure 5.3 gives an overview of the pervasiveness of narration amidst Obama’s arguments.
From an interpreting point of view, the unexpected “appearance” of stories in argumentative discourse is extremely demanding.

The idea that narratives pose challenges to accurate interpretation of argumentative discourse was corroborated during a seminar on simultaneous interpreting held at the University of Trieste in spring 2013. Three first-year MA students were challenged with Obama’s first Victory Speech, delivered in November 2008. It is one of the President’s most famous speeches, at the end of which he tells the story of Ann Nixon Cooper, a hundred-and-six year-old American voter. The recounting of her life story enables the speaker to retrace the cornerstones of America’s twentieth-century history and expound American values.

In general, the students performed extremely well and were able successfully to interpret a very dense and emotional speech. However, when Ann Nixon Cooper “showed up” during the final passages of the address, the students stopped interpreting and none of them grasped either the name of the woman, or her age, or the sense of the story. The audiovisual recording was stopped and the students were asked four questions in turn. The questions are shown together with the students’ answers in Table 5.2:

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13 The interpretation of an excerpt of this story, performed by a professional interpreter, is shown in chapter 2 (see table 2.2).
The interpretation of narratives appears to be problematic. In more general terms and without relying completely on students’ performances, which are, by definition, products of inexperienced interpreters, it is not uncommon to hear professionals confronted with serious difficulties in coping with stories, as is suggested by tables 2.10 and 2.11 (see section 2.2.1 in chapter 2). Stories, also referred to as narratives or anecdotes in discourse studies, thus appear to mark cognitively demanding passages within texts, especially in simultaneous interpreting. However, the subject seems to be completely overlooked by interpreting research, even though storytelling has received considerable attention in monologic discourse analysis (Abbott 2002; Longacre 1974; Schiffrin 2007). The gap in the literature is all the more alarming considering that narrative passages are pervasive in discourse (Abbott 2002: 1; Schiffrin 2007: 406) and, therefore, in interpreting too.

The occasional presence of stories is not exclusive to political communication. In specialist conferences for example, speakers often tell short anecdotes at the beginning of their speeches to break the ice, establish some sort of emotional and attentive contact with the audience and assess the scope for mutual understanding right at the outset of the communicative exchange.

Despite the pervasiveness of storytelling in discourse, the gap in interpreting literature is unsurprising and the reason is probably twofold. First, interpreters are hardly ever (or never) required to translate entirely narrative texts and are trained accordingly. The second reason is content-related and best explained by taking the example of the interpretation of political speeches. Despite the relative predictability of political speeches, the stories told in political communication are not recurrent and, therefore, unpredictable; rather, they can be recurrent but their content is not, because “political stories” are told only once, as their repetition would partly deprive them of their perlocutionary effect and frustrate the “storylistening trance experience” (Sturm 2000). The same partially holds true for all anecdotes breaking the linguistic routines of conference addresses. In other words, unlike arguments, each story is different from others and the subject eludes systematisation.

Yet, narration is taken into high consideration in the study of argumentation and often assigned a specific argumentative role in discourse (Renkema 2004: 59). As to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
<th>STUDENT 1</th>
<th>STUDENT 2</th>
<th>STUDENT 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question 1</strong>: In this passage, Obama is telling a story. Did you acknowledge it?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question 2</strong>: What’s the woman’s name?</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question 3</strong>: What peculiarities does the character have?</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question 4</strong>: How old is she?</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>Sixty-one</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 Students’ Failure to Grasp Obama’s Anecdote
argumentation theories, Pragma-dialectics is the only framework that systematically engages in the study of narratives in argumentative discourse, with particular attention to the discursive function of narratives. A seminal contribution is provided by Govier & Jansen’s pragma-dialectical analysis of narrative passages in one of George W. Bush’s addresses during the 2004 presidential debates and in Hilary Clinton’s speech at the 2008 Democratic National Convention (2011). In this regard, Pragma-dialectics provides useful groundwork for analysing Obama’s narratives in the American sub-corpus and their implications for interpreting.

In the framework adopted by Govier & Jansen, narratives are not simply viewed as “stories”, but are called anecdotal arguments, a definition suggesting that stories perform an argumentative role within a non-narrative speech.

First, Govier & Jansen (2011: 75) attest that anecdotes are often viewed as “rhetorical synecdoches”, devices through which a part is said to represent a whole; or, they are simply thought to be evidence supporting a generalisation, examples of something that has already been told in general terms. The widespread perception of stories as “examples” or “synecdoches” gives rise to a major interpreting dilemma: if stories were mere examples, ethotic arguments14 lending credibility to the conclusions drawn, interpreters would be somehow exempted from the duty to transfer them, or they would be forgiven in the event of anecdote omission in the interpreted text, because, however colourful an example may be, its absence would neither hamper recognition of the speaker’s illocution nor substantially modify the perlocutionary effect of the ST. Simply, an example would be missing, but the general sense of the ST and the intention of the speaker would be conveyed and preserved.

The pragma-dialectical approach detaches itself from the notion of “story as example or rhetorical synecdoche” and adopts a multidisciplinary approach taking both logic and rhetoric into account (Govier & Jansen 2011). The aim is logically to evaluate the prospective soundness of anecdotal arguments to assess their role in argumentation, starting from “the central notion of credibility”, in its double persuasive or epistemic interpretation (Govier & Jansen 2011: 78-79). After analysing an anecdote told by George W. Bush during the 2004 presidential debates, in which the mysterious character of Missy Johnson is said to endorse the war on terror despite the killing of her husband PJ in Iraq15, Govier & Jansen (2011: 77) reject both the definitions of anecdote as rhetorical synecdoche and as example, because Missy Johnson’s acceptance of her husband’s death in the name of the fight against Al Qaeda is unacceptable logically, and the story can’t therefore be understood as representative of the population. Therefore, given its evasive, unsound and controversial nature, the anecdote could only be accepted from a rhetorical point of view: as Govier & Jansen clarify, it is obviously possible for an anecdote to make a conclusion “more believable, persuasively, without making it more worthy of belief, logically” (2011: 79).

14 Arguments “from ethos, based on the credibility of the person” (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 140)
15 The whole anecdote can be found in Govier & Jansen (2011: 76).
Despite being an extreme example, the story of Missy Johnson is analysed to clarify the frequent role of stories in politics. Anecdotal arguments have nothing to do with logic and rationality, but are instances of strategic manoeuvring (Govier & Jansen 2011: 82). Hence, anecdotes are first and foremost an option: they are chosen deliberately within a range of different argumentative possibilities and conveyed for a specific purpose through specific lexical means. As to the specific purpose, Govier & Jansen conclude that the aim of anecdotal arguments is to draw interest, to focus the listeners’ attention (2011: 86); they are particularly used for “softening” purposes and to divert the attention of the audience from other poor argumentation (2011: 81-83). In simple words, when a speaker does not know how to explain the logical cogency of an action, when s/he has run out of sound arguments, s/he turn to stories, because telling stories is easier than adopting logic to convince an audience of the validity of a standpoint.

The implication for interpreting is all too clear: stories are not accessory examples, but discursive resources replacing logical argumentation; storytelling is an option that is selected and adapted deliberately; and recognition and reproduction of this host of choices is paramount if the aim of interpretation is the equivalence of the communicative function (Viezzi 1999: 147).

Before analysing Obama’s anecdotes, looking at Longacre’s table of discourse genres (1974: 358) helps frame the interpreting implications engendered by anecdotal arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOME DISCOURSE GENRES</th>
<th>- prescriptive</th>
<th>+ prescriptive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ chronological</td>
<td><strong>Narrative</strong></td>
<td><strong>Procedural</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First or third person</td>
<td>Non-specific person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor oriented</td>
<td>Goal oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accomplished time (encoded as past or present)</td>
<td>Projected time (encoded as past, present or future)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chronological linkage</td>
<td>Chronological linkage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- chronological</td>
<td><strong>Expository</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hortatory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any person (usually third)</td>
<td>Second person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject matter oriented</td>
<td>Addressee oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time not focal</td>
<td>Commands, suggestions (encoded as imperatives or ‘soft’ commands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logical linkage</td>
<td>Logical linkage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 Discourse genres – adapted from Longacre (1974 : 358) and van Leeuwen (2010: 347)

Political speeches are mainly hortatory texts. Table 5.3, showing four different discourse genres with their distinctive grammatical features, raises a question: what happens when narratives find their way into hortatory texts? The result is a contamination of discourse-specific features.

The following sections show some anecdotal arguments drawn from the corpus, with a view to highlighting the major shifts occurring during the sudden passage from the argumentative to the narrative mode; these linguistic shifts, significantly altering the
surface structure of the speech, are likely to act as difficulty triggers in both the reception and production phases of the interpreting process.

5.2.5.1 Shift towards the Third Person and towards Indirect and Direct Speech

First of all, when anecdotes break the flow of argumentation, the first person (whether singular or plural) is always replaced by the third person (generally singular). Moreover, the change clearly entails a transition towards indirect and direct speech to report the contingent words and thoughts of the character(s).

US_33: Now, what’s true for natural gas is just as true for clean energy. In three years, our partnership with the private sector has already positioned America to be the world’s leading manufacturer of high-tech batteries. [...] Because of federal investments, renewable energy use has nearly doubled, and thousands of Americans have jobs because of it. When Bryan Ritterby was laid off from his job making furniture, he said he worried that at fifty-five, no one would give him a second chance. But he found work at Energetx, a wind turbine manufacturer in Michigan. Before the recession, the factory only made luxury yachts. Today, it’s hiring workers like Bryan, who said, “I’m proud to be working in the industry of the future”.

These sudden shifts in the subject and in the point of view may be difficult to grasp while interpreting, especially simultaneously, and could arguably be a destabilising factor for interpreters.

5.2.5.2 Shift from Logical to Chronological Linkage

Secondly and particularly, anecdotal arguments give rise to a shift from logical to chronological linkage, as shown by the following example:

US_102: I’m also convinced we can help Americans return to the workforce faster by reforming unemployment insurance so that it’s more effective in today’s economy. But first, this Congress needs to restore the unemployment insurance you just let expire for 1.6 million people.

Let me tell you why.

Misty DeMars is a mother of two young boys. She’d been steadily employed since she was a teenager. She put herself through college. She’d never collected unemployment benefits. In May, she and her husband used their life savings to buy their first home. A week later, budget cuts claimed the job she loved. Last month, when their unemployment insurance was cut off, she sat down and wrote me a letter – the kind I get every day. “We are the face of the unemployment crisis,” she wrote. “I am not dependent on the government...Our country depends on people like us who build careers, contribute to society...care about our neighbors...I am confident that in time I will find a job...I will pay my taxes, and we will raise our children in their own home in the community we love. Please give us this chance.” Congress, give these hardworking, responsible Americans that chance. They need our help, but more important, this country needs them in the game. That’s why I’ve been asking
CEOs to give more long-term unemployed workers a fair shot at that new job and new chance to support their families.

In the first lines, *so that, but* and *why* act as argumentative indicators (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007: 1), when, suddenly, logical linkage is replaced by adverbs of time (*when*) and adverbial phrases of time (*In May, A week later, Last month*). When the narrative ends, logical linkage is restored (*That’s why*). Particularly, the use of the conjunctions *and* (Gimenez 2010: 200) and *then* (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 377) as temporal junctures stands out in narratives.

**US_43:** I was telling you I visited Chrysler’s Jefferson North Plant in Detroit about a year and a half ago. Now, the day I visited, some of the employees had won the lottery. Not kidding. They had won the lottery. Now, you might think that after that they’d all be kicking back and retiring. And no one would fault them for that. Building cars is tough work. But that’s not what they did.

The guy who bought the winning ticket, he was a proud UAW member who worked on the line. So he used some of his winnings to buy his wife the car that he builds because he’s really proud of his work. *Then* he bought brand new American flags for his hometown because he’s proud of his country. *And* he and the other winners are still clocking in at that plant today, because they’re proud of the part they and their coworkers play in America’s comeback.

See, that’s what America is about. America is not just looking out for yourself. It’s not just about greed.

Interpreters’ difficulties in respecting ST connectives is a fact (Colucci 2011: 77); regarding which, the presence of anecdotal arguments further compounds the interpreters’ task faithfully to reproduce logical and chronological links.

### 5.2.5.3 Shift in Verb Tense

The sudden appearance of narratives also engenders a shift in verb tense, in most cases from the present to the past. This happens because narratives are the “recounting of things spatiotemporally distant” (Gimenez 2010: 198) and are governed by codified grammar “rules”, especially including the following:

the principle forms are simple past and simple present. As a rule, no modals appear (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 375).

Sudden shifts in verb tense engendered by anecdotes are recurrent in the American sub-corpus:

**US_31:** Today, for the first time in fifteen years, Master Lock’s Milwaukee complex is running at full capacity. But *you don’t have to be* a big manufacturer to insource jobs. Bruce Cochrane’s family *had manufactured* furniture in North Carolina for five generations. But in 1966 - 1996, rather, as jobs *began* shifting to Asia, the family *sold* their
business and Bruce spent time in China and Vietnam as a consultant for American furniture makers who had shifted their production. While he was there, though, he noticed something he didn’t expect: their customers actually wanted to buy things made in America. So he came home and started a new company, Lincolnton Furniture, which operates out of the old family factories that had been shut down. He’s even re-hired many of the former workers from his family business.

At the end of the story, the present tense is restored (operates). Though the remark sounds obvious, interpreters’ difficulty in translating verb tenses (Hale 2004: 131) is certainly not to be overlooked. In this respect, anecdotal arguments are highly demanding, as they require recognition of unexpected temporal “leaps”. Moreover, Labov & Waletzky’s remark on the absence of modal verbs in narrative further corroborates the hypothesis that stories give rise to potentially destabilising linguistic difficulties when cropping up in argumentative texts, which, instead, provide fertile ground for modals (Rocci 2009).

5.2.5.4 Shift towards Vividness

Probably the most evident feature of narrative texts is vividness (Longacre 1974: 362), mainly resulting from lexical choices. The feature is not always shared by argumentation, that is deemed to be an activity of reason (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2007: 240), and the transition from the latter to the former discourse genre is bound to entail a sudden increase in language vividness and a resulting register shift towards informality. An interpreter could hardly process and translate the following passage without being bewildered by the suddenly-changing tone of the speech:

**US.68**: Each of these proposals deserves a vote in Congress. Now, if you want to vote no, that’s your choice. But these proposals deserve a vote. Because in the two months since Newtown, more than a thousand birthdays, graduations, anniversaries have been stolen from our lives by a bullet from a gun - more than a thousand.

One of those we lost was a young girl named Hadiya Pendleton. She was fifteen years old. She loved Fig Newtons and lip gloss. She was a majorette. She was so good to her friends they all thought they were her best friend. Just three weeks ago, she was here, in Washington, with her classmates, performing for her country at my inauguration. And a week later, she was shot and killed in a Chicago park after school, just a mile away from my house.

Hadiya’s parents, Nate and Cleo, are in this chamber tonight, along with more than two dozen Americans whose lives have been torn apart by gun violence. […] the families of Oak Creek and Tucson and Blacksburg, and the countless other communities ripped open by gun violence - they deserve a simple vote.

The main problem posed by the register shift lies in the transition from denotation to connotation, which arguably adds a compounding factor, because connotation entails the adoption of evocative, non-casual, rarely occurring words and expressions whose signifiers,
in addition, often differ considerably from one language to another and, therefore, require an enhanced translation effort.

The topic is closely linked to unpredictability, which is what actually turns the above-mentioned shifts into cognitive threats. Unpredictability is unusual in political communication; it is, moreover, a scourge for interpreters, who are forced to resort to knowledge-based strategies (Riccardi 2005: 762), venture into conscious cognitive efforts, tap into extra-linguistic knowledge and weigh up the plausibility of a range of prospective outputs.

US_78: Imagine a young girl growing up on a farm in a rural area who can now take an AP biology or AP physics class, even if her school is too small to offer it. Imagine a young boy with a chronic illness that means he can’t go to school, but now he can join his classmates via Skype or FaceTime and fully participate in what’s going on. Imagine educators spending fewer hours teaching to a test, more time helping kids learn in new and innovative ways.

How could interpreters expect the speaker to trot out a young girl growing up on a farm who wants to take Advanced Placement classes? Or a bedridden boy who attends lessons via Skype? Or “Pretty Willie”, who has worked for sixty years at Detroit Diesel plant (US_66)? How can they foresee that the life story of the hundred-and-six-year-old Ann Nixon Cooper will be told?

5.2.5.5 How to Foresee the Impending Appearance of Stories?

The massive presence of anecdotal arguments in Obama’s speeches shows the scope of the problems posed by argumentation in interpreting settings. Yet, even though the content of anecdotal arguments is completely unpredictable, the impending recounting of an anecdote is often announced by recurrent lexical indicators, at least in the analysed speeches. For example, it is frequently signalled by the word *story*:

US_14: And that dream is the *story* of a small business owner named Brandon Fisher.

US_34: They told me the *story* of how Conveyor started. Like so many other wonderful American companies, it started in a garage. Couldn’t make that up. Today, they employ sixty-five people - from engineers and welders to assembly line workers and salespeople.

Another frequently occurring lexical indicator of narratives is the verb *to see*, generally found in the first person, sometimes singular (*I see, I saw, I’ve seen*), sometimes plural (*we see*)\(^\text{16}\).

\(^{16}\)The plural form “*we see*” does not occur in *ARGO*, but can be found announcing anecdotal arguments in other Obama speeches such as “A Commitment to Restoring New Orleans”, delivered on 29th August 2010. A transcript is provided by the website of the *White House* at \[http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2010/08/29/a-commitment-restoring-new-orleans#transcript\], last accessed on 18th January 2015.
**US_43:** I’ve seen it myself. I’ve seen it at Chrysler’s Jefferson North Plant in Detroit, where a new shift of more than a thousand workers came on two years ago, another thousand slated to come on next year. I’ve seen it in my hometown at Ford’s Chicago Assembly, where workers are building a new Explorer and selling it to dozens of countries around the world.

**US_99:** And I’ve seen this personally even before I got into politics. In fact, this is what drove me into politics. I was just two years out of college when I first moved to the South Side of Chicago. I was hired by a group of churches to help organize a community that had been devastated when the local steel plants closed their doors. And I’d walk through neighborhoods filled up with boarded-up houses and crumbling schools, and single parents and dads who had nothing to do with their kids, and kids who were hanging out on the street corners without any hope or prospects for the future.

Alternatively, Obama introduces stories using the word *example*:

**US_68:** We should follow their example. We should follow the example of a New York City nurse named Menchu Sanchez. When Hurricane Sandy plunged her hospital into darkness, she wasn’t thinking about how her own home was faring. Her mind was on the twenty precious newborns in her care and the rescue plan she devised that kept them all safe. […] We should follow the example of a North Miami woman named Desiline Victor. […] We should follow the example of a police officer named Brian Murphy.

*Story*, the verb *to see* and *example* are the most recurrent lexical indicators. Less frequently, the forthcoming appearance of a story can be inferred from the presence of adverbial phrases of time suspending logical links, the numeral pronoun *one*, indicating a shift towards an individual referent, or the clause *I think about*:

**US_35:** Now, last year, I had the chance to tour one of Intel’s plants in Oregon. And basically, the engineers explained what happens inside these factories, and I pretended that I understood what they were talking about. It’s true. We were on this tour and we were looking through these microscopes and you’d look at some little spots in the microscope and you’d say, well what’s that? And they’d say, well, that’s atoms. Really? And it was so remarkable that my trip director who was with me - he said, this stuff is like magic. How do they do this?

**US_68:** One of those we lost was a young girl named Hadiya Pendleton. She was fifteen years old. She loved Fig Newtons and lip gloss. She was a majorette.

**US_26:** *I think about* a company based in Warroad, Minnesota. It’s called Marvin Windows and Doors. During the recession, Marvin’s competitors closed dozens of plants, let hundreds of workers go. But Marvin’s did not lay off a single one of their four thousand or so employees.

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5.2.5.6 Anecdotal Arguments: a Hindrance to Reformulation

The descriptive account of discursive shifts engendered by anecdotal arguments suggests that the transition from the argumentative to the narrative mode of discourse is likely to destabilise the attentive resources of the interpreter, which may have “fossilised” on the translation of the features of argumentative discourse.

Yet, the major translation problem engendered by anecdotal arguments seems to be posed by the reduced scope for reformulation. In this respect, traditional narrative analysis offers useful insights into the structure of stories and, therefore, of anecdotal arguments which need to be interpreted. By focusing on the formal features of narration, it incidentally provides the opportunity to detect prospective stumbling blocks for interpreting activity.

Within the traditional framework of narrative analysis, the most influential and frequently quoted definition of narrative is Labov & Waletzky’s (2007: 374):

Any sequence of clauses that contains at least one temporal juncture is a narrative. (my emphasis)

Temporal junctures are described as follows:

Two clauses that are temporally ordered with respect to each other are said to be separated by temporal juncture (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 373).

The notion of temporal juncture is pivotal in that it is a defining property of narratives “that creates a link between the sequence of events and the clauses that describe them” (Gimenez 2010: 200). In simpler terms, the presentation of events in chronological order is the prerequisite of narration, forcing it to be a highly-structured discourse genre, arguably limiting the scope of the interpreter by compelling him/her to the acknowledgment and respect of specific formal features. Building on the tenet of sequentiality, Labov & Waletzky (2007: 360) clarify that, traditionally, narratives can be analysed either by a formal or a by functional approach, with the two methods actually intertwining and depending on one another.

The formal approach mainly operates at the clause level and aims at identifying the different types of clauses and their sequence within the narrative (Gimenez 2010: 202).

Labov & Waletzky (2007: 369-370) identify the four types of clauses that make up each narrative text: there are free, narrative, coordinate and restricted clauses. The relevance to interpreting mainly lies in the significant difference between free and narrative clauses: while the former could be moved anywhere without disrupting the event sequence, the latter are strictly ordered by temporal sequence and univocally connected by temporal junctures, often taking the form of the conjunctions and or then. To put it simply, free clauses are literally free, narrative clauses are fixed, with coordinate and restricted clauses sharing features of both: the former could be freely interchanged without any disruption in the temporal sequence, while the latter could be placed at any point after one given clause. The temporal presentation of events is therefore in the hands of narrative clauses, whose
rearrangement would jeopardise the faithful account of events. For instance, if the narrative clauses in “[I caught cramps] and [I started yelling]” were changed to “[I started yelling] and [I caught cramps],” “they would be implying a different sequence of events and thus a different narrative” (Gimenez 2010: 199).

Another peculiarity of narration is that the different kinds of clauses are evenly distributed, organised one after the other, determining the basic sequential structure of narrative. The following formal analysis of one of the anecdotes drawn from the American sub-corpus shows the distribution of the clauses within the narrative passage:

**US_14**:  
*a.* And that dream is the story of a small business owner named Brandon Fisher.  
*b.* Brandon started a company in Berlin, Pennsylvania, that specializes in a new kind of drilling technology.  
*c.* And one day last summer, he saw the news that halfway across the world, thirty-three men were trapped in a Chilean mine,  
*d.* and no one knew how to save them.  
*e.* But Brandon thought his company could help.  
*f.* And so he designed a rescue that would come to be known as Plan B.  
*g.* His employees worked around the clock to manufacture the necessary drilling equipment.  
*h.* And Brandon left for Chile.  
*i.* Along with others, he began drilling a two thousand-foot hole into the ground, working three or four hour - three or four days at a time without any sleep.  
*l.* Thirty-seven days later, *Plan B succeeded, and the miners were rescued.*  
*m.* But because he didn’t want all of the attention, *Brandon wasn’t there when the miners emerged.*  
*n.* He’d already gone back home, back to work on his next project.  
*o.* And later, one of his employees said of the rescue, ‘We proved that Center Rock is a little company, but we do big things.’ We do big things.  
*p.* From the earliest days of our founding, America has been the story of ordinary people who dare to dream. That’s how we win the future. (my emphasis)

The narrative starts with two free clauses, *a.* and *b.*, which, at least in theory, could range over the entire narrative without disrupting the event sequence. Then, a significant portion of text made up of narrative clauses starts with *c.* and ends with *i.* All the clauses are of the narrative type, independent clauses determining the event sequence and univocally connected by more or less evident temporal junctures. Their substantial rearrangement would disrupt the event sequence, thereby determining a potential comprehension problem in the storylisteners’ minds. Evidently, fidelity to the temporal sequence of events would be of considerable help for the target audience of an interpreted event, too. *l.* is made up of two coordinate clauses (in italics). They may be interchanged without any disruption in the temporal sequence and they could not be placed before “Thirty-seven days later”, an adverbial temporal juncture separating *l.* from all the previously occurring clauses. Finally, *m.* is an example of restricted clause, defined by Gimenez (2010: 202) as clauses that “are less fixed to the sequence than a narrative clause, but less free to be displaced than a free clause”. In practical terms, *m.* could have been

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17 The example is drawn from Labov & Waletzky (2007: 373).
placed at any point after “and the miners were rescued”. n. and o. see a disruption of the temporal sequence (whose function will be specified shortly) and precede p., the last clause bringing the narrative to an end.

Regarding functional analysis, each story performs two general functions:

- a *referential function*, as narratives are “one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events that actually occurred” (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 366);
- an *evaluative function*, “an additional function of personal interest, determined by the stimulus in the social context in which the narrative occurs” (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 360).

In addition to the general referential and evaluative functions of narrative, the different types of clauses can perform six specific functions (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 378-387; Gimenez 2010: 203), or rather make up six specific and inescapable sections of narrative:

1. *abstract*, providing a brief summary or indication of the topic, to attract the listener’s attention and interest;
2. *orientation*, introducing the setting and “orienting” the listener as to person, place, time and behavioural situation;
3. *complication*, the main body of narrative clauses describing a series of events leading to a result;
4. *resolution*, the results of the complication, providing the listener with *meaning*;
5. *evaluation*, the “point” of the narrative, revealing the attitude of the narrator towards the narrative;
6. *coda*, an optional functional device for returning the verbal perspective to the present moment.

The functional stages can be easily identified in the story of Brandon Fisher: \(a\). is the abstract, presenting the protagonist, while \(b\). performs the orientation function by “telling” the listener where the story unfolds and providing further details on the main character. The complication is comprised from \(c\). to \(i\)., where the tragic story of the Chilean miners trapped underground is vividly evoked adopting the point of view of the protagonist. In \(l\), the resolution placates the anxieties aroused by the complicating factors. \(m\., \(n\). and \(o\). make up the evaluation, a vital phase of narrative, answering “to some stimulus from outside” and establishing “some point of personal interest” (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 381); notably, the section sees a disruption in “the a-then-b relation of narrative” (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 383), namely a significant deviation from the primary temporal sequence. Over and above establishing personal interest, especially in political speeches the evaluation serves “the function of self-aggrandizement, showing the narrator in a favorable position” (Labov & Waletzky 2007: 385). Finally, \(p\). is the coda, restoring the present tense.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

Most anecdotes told by Obama in the sub-corpus speeches follow the narrative macrostructure described by Labov & Waletzky: the events are presented in chronological order, with the exception of the evaluation phase in which the temporal sequence is provisionally disrupted to guide the listeners to the meaningful conclusion of the story. Interestingly, the different kinds of clauses are evenly distributed: while the abstract and orientation phases are made up of free clauses, the complication starts off a substantial portion of text composed of independent narrative clauses.

5.2.5.7 Possible Strategies to Interpret Anecdotal Arguments

Obama’s anecdotal arguments appear to be extremely demanding in interpreting contexts. First of all, they do not perform a representative but a strategic function in argumentative texts; they are instances of strategic manoeuvring enabling the speaker to steer the speech towards specific corners; therefore, their presence must not be overlooked and misunderstood as the speaker’s opportunity to provide examples. Storytelling is, instead, a strategic choice, demanding respect in interpretation for the sake of illocutionary and perlocutionary force retention.

Unlike the other recurring arguments, anecdotal arguments do not rely on a specific content-related scheme. In this respect, they elude the usual predictability of political arguments. Despite their content-unrelatedness, though, Obama’s narratives always aim at focusing argumentation on the American values of hard work and responsibility. To this end, they all rely on a formal scheme aiming at transferring qualities or values from the particular to the universal, i.e. the argument from the group and its members (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 322).

ARGUMENT FROM THE GROUP AND ITS MEMBERS
Premise 1: Member M of the group G has the quality Q.
Premise 2: If M has Q, G will have Q as well.
Conclusion: G has Q.

In this regard, anecdotal arguments are a form of inductive reasoning bestowing novel details and enhanced vividness on generally repetitive speeches.

Despite content unpredictability, formal regularities might assist interpreters in their translational tasks. In this respect, the combined traditional and pragma-dialectical approach to anecdotal arguments enables the formulation of potentially useful, albeit preliminary and limited, suggestions for the management of storytelling in interpreting.

Narratives bind interpreters to a fairly strict observance of the order of clauses; the possibility to operate radical lexico-syntactic reformulations is stifled by the structure of narratives, in which the events are presented in temporal sequence and most sentences are univocally linked by a relation of sequentiality and linear dependence. In Labov & Waletzky’s terms, reformulation is curbed by the varying “displacement sets” (2007: 368) of the different types of clauses.
According to the tenets of narrative analysis, syntactic reformulation is only possible at the beginning, during the abstract and orientation stages, which are made up of free, therefore displaceable, clauses. At least, this is what theory claims. As regards the purposes of interlinguistic transposition under time constraints, the clauses making up the abstract and orientation stages appear decidedly “less free”, as they are placed at the beginning to serve as introduction of the main character. Take the example of Brandon Fisher: in the first lines of the anecdote, the character is presented and the background outlined. Yet, an attempt at reformulating the story can be made.

This is the dream of a businessman.
One day last summer he heard the news of the Chilean miners trapped underground.
He thought he might help, because he owns a business specialising in drilling technology.
So he designed a rescue.
He left for Chile with his employees, who helped him by working hard and giving up sleep.
After a few days, they managed to rescue the miners.
But the businessman left before the miners emerged, because he had to work on another project.
This is the proof that through hard work and selflessness great things can be done.
This is what America has always been about.

a. has been simplified by replacing the name of the protagonist with a more vague a businessman, which has subsequently been replaced by the pronoun he in the rest of the anecdote. b., coinciding with the detailed orientation stage, has been displaced later within the narrative (because he owns a business specialising in drilling technology).

Even though it has not been carried out under interpreting constraints, the reformulation “experiment” shows that the abstract and orientation stages could be exploited to increase the décalage in order to focus attention and grasp the necessary background information that could be summarised, condensed into the sole presentation of the main character(s) or retrieved and displaced later to any part of the narrative. Moreover, the strategy could help save working memory for the incoming vital, generally rapid and dense body of narrative clauses making up the complication and the resolution, the stages in which the sequential details of the story crowd in, and therefore those from which the interpreter’s output ought closely to follow the speaker’s to avoid missing important details and chronological links. Though characterised by strict temporal sequence, the complication and resolution stages have been simplified as well by giving up non-necessary elements such as Plan B or the whole g. clause. The evaluation phase has equally been summarised, especially by giving up direct speech (But the businessman left before the miners emerged, because he had to work on another project. This is the proof that through hard work and selflessness great things can be done). In particular, lexical reformulation can enable interpreters to detach themselves from the surface structure of the speech by focusing on ready-made solutions provided by the focus on hard work and selflessness, which are recurrent in Obama’s speeches.

As regards the formal implications of the contamination of the argumentative and narrative modes, the discursive shifts deriving therefrom challenge the attentive resources
of interpreters and their ability to recognise and reproduce the unexpectedly-appearing features of narratives. Daunting as they may be, the shifts are, however, announced by recurrent lexical indicators, namely *story*, the verb *to see*, *example*, *I think about*, adverbial phrases of time and the numeral *one*. When occurring, their prompt identification ought to trigger a switch to the “narrative mode of interpreting”, “tuning” interpreters in to the recognition of indirect and direct speech, and the use of the third person, chronological linkage, the past tense and, especially, evocative, non-casual, vivid language.

However, although most anecdotes in the American sub-corpus follow the narrative macro-structure described by Labov & Waletzky, there is a class of anecdotal arguments which do not respect the basic structure of narrative.

**US_42**: You had a young woman who was from Long Island, had been studying mussels and wanted to be an oceanographer, and won the Intel Science Award while she was homeless. Her family had lost their home and she was living out of a car and on her family’s couch, and yet still was able to stay focused and achieve what was just remarkable.

**US_97**: Keep in mind unemployment insurance only goes to folks who are actively looking for work - a mom who needs help feeding her kids when she sends out her resumes, or a dad who needs help paying the rent while working part-time and still earning the skills he needs for that new job.

Even though these are not examples of typical anecdotal arguments, they can be viewed as “compressed” stories or *enthymemic* anecdotal arguments, i.e. arguments which are partially left implicit or shortened on the linguistic surface structure. Unlike all the other stories, which are told sparing no details, short anecdotal arguments are generally characterised by high speed of delivery, which further challenges interpretation. However, the scarcer presence of temporal junctures, the absence of clear-cut narrative stages and the neglect of proper names spares interpreters a considerable deal of cognitive effort. Moreover, they are less frequent and less strategic than traditional anecdotes, as they do not “divert attention from […] other poor argumentation” (Govier & Jansen 2011: 83) but “merely” enrich speech passages with vivid and general real-life (or made-up?) examples. It is precisely their general content that enables a higher degree of reformulation as compared to the other class of anecdotal arguments. Taking, for instance, the example drawn from **US_97**, it could easily be translated as “non-working Americans also need unemployment insurance for the sake of their families”.

Table 5.4 provides an overview of possible interpreting strategies to be adopted in the event of storytelling.
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### Anecdotal Arguments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical Indicators</th>
<th>Reformulation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- story</td>
<td>Décalage increase in the <em>abstract</em> and <em>orientation</em> stages to grasp background information and save working memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to see</td>
<td>Décalage reduction from the <em>complication</em> stage onwards and prospective retrieval of background information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- example</td>
<td>Lexical reformulation and omission of non-necessary clauses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shift to the “narrative mode” of interpreting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3rd person + in-/direct speech</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chronological linkage</td>
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<td>Past verb tense</td>
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<td>Vividness</td>
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### Entymemic Anecdotal Arguments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpreting strategies</th>
<th>Reformulation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shift to the “narrative mode” of interpreting</td>
<td>3rd person + in-/direct speech</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chronological linkage</td>
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<td>Past verb tense</td>
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<td>Vividness</td>
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Table 5.4 Lexical Indicators of Anecdotal Arguments and Possible Interpreting Strategies

The provided indications are mere suggestions which do not claim to be either exhaustive or decisive in theorising the “management” of anecdotal arguments. The subject deserves further investigation and more attention in scholarly settings and in classrooms alike, as coping with storytelling seems to be primarily a matter of dealing with unpredictability. Like all other interpreting abilities, depending both on practice and the internalisation of relevant and streamlined theoretical guidelines (Gile 1995a: 18-20), the interpretation of narratives requires practice that has to go hand in hand with the study of a streamlined description of the features of anecdotal arguments. Only thus can the interpretation of stories turn from a knowledge-based into a skill-based activity (Riccardi 2005: 762), one that is closely linked to the ability to come up with creative solutions in the face of unpredictability. Which is, after all, the prerequisite of good interpretation (Riccardi 1998: 171-3).

#### 5.2.6 Differences between National and International Speeches

A telling feature of the American sub-corpus lies in the absence of anecdotal arguments in the speeches delivered within international settings. In this respect, anecdotal arguments are more likely to challenge students than professional interpreters when it comes to Obama’s
speeches. Yet enthralling narratives were told, for instance, during the 2008 presidential debates\(^\text{18}\), which have international resonance and require interpretation. Moreover, the President does not give up anecdotal arguments even during the highly-formal occasion of State of the Union Addresses (US_8, US_14, US_33, US_68, US_102), whose interpretation is generally broadcast live on television, at least as far as Italy is concerned. ARGO texts thus provide useful training material, as getting used to interpreting the President’s anecdotes can be a crucial step towards developing the ability to interpret narratives in general, including those recurrently told in specialist conferences.

Not only anecdotal arguments but the general persistent focus on the middle class is generally relinquished outside US borders. In this respect, during bilateral and international addresses, Obama’s topicality “naturally” shifts towards “less American” and more internationally-relevant issues. In doing so, the President puts forward different arguments, displayed in table 5.5, showing an excerpt of the analysis of US_10.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|p{0.3\textwidth}|p{0.3\textwidth}|p{0.4\textwidth}|}
\hline
\textbf{Speech Passage} & \textbf{Themes} & \textbf{Argument Schemes} \\
\hline
The G20 is now the premier forum for international economic cooperation. We represent East and West, North and South, advanced economies and those still emerging. Our challenges are as diverse as our nations. But together we represent some eighty-five percent of the global economy, and \textit{we have forged a coordinated response to the worst global economic crisis in our time}. & Scope of G20 action & \textit{Argument for comprehensive and coordinated response to the crisis} \\
& G20 response to the economic crisis & \\
& Scope of the economic crisis & \\
\hline
In \textit{London} last year, we took unprecedented action to prevent an even larger economic catastrophe, to put our economies on the path to recovery and to begin reforming our financial system so that a crisis like the one we were emerging from never happened again. & Success of London summit & \textit{Argument for international summit as milestone in the path towards global economic recovery} & \textit{Argument from negative consequences of inaction (preventing the crisis from getting worse)} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^{18}\) For example, during the third debate, the President told the story of two women who had just been laid off of their plant, lost their insurance and were “desperate for some way of getting coverage”. A transcript of the third debate is provided by the website of The \textit{New York Times}, at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/debates/transcripts/third-presidential-debate.html (last accessed on 18th January 2015).
In **Pittsburgh** we went further - moving beyond the old economic cycles of boom and bust by committing our nations to a new framework for **growth that’s balanced and sustained**, as well as specific financial reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>In Pittsburgh</strong> we went further - moving beyond the old economic cycles of boom and bust by committing our nations to a new framework for <strong>growth that’s balanced and sustained</strong>, as well as specific financial reforms.</th>
<th><strong>Success of Pittsburgh summit</strong></th>
<th><strong>ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT AS MILESTONE IN THE PATH TOWARDS GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Our bold action has succeeded.</strong> In the United States, we are committed, above all, to leading by example, and because of the steps that we’ve taken to get our economy moving, we are growing again, and this growth is beginning to translate into job creation. <strong>And we’re now poised to pass the toughest financial reform since the aftermath of the Great Depression.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political response to the crisis</strong></td>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT FOR STRONG AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC RECOVERY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globally, economic contraction has given way to economic growth. Trade that had plummeted is rebounding. Emerging economies in particular are seeing impressive growth. So we have pulled ourselves back from the brink, and begun to move forward with economic recovery. But as we all know, that’s not good enough. In the United States and around the world, too many people are still out of work. In too many economies, demand for goods and services is still too weak. As we’ve been reminded in recent months, a financial crisis in one country can have consequences far beyond its borders. And history teaches us that growth and prosperity is never guaranteed. It requires constant effort and it requires continued leadership.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES (OF POLITICAL REFORMS)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES (OF POLITICAL REFORMS)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION OF THE CRISIS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM HISTORY</strong></td>
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<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION</strong></td>
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So we came to Toronto with three specific goals: *to make sure the global recovery is strong and durable;* to continue *reforming the financial system;* and to address the range of global issues that affect our prosperity and security. And we made progress in each of these areas.

First, to ensure the recovery is strong and durable, we agreed to continue coordinating our efforts so we’re *creating jobs.* That’s my highest economic priority as President. And that is why we are focused on increasing global demand. Every economy is unique, and every country will chart its own unique course, but make no mistake - we are moving in the same direction.

As I reiterated to my colleagues, after years of taking on too much debt, Americans cannot - and will not - borrow and buy the world’s way to lasting prosperity. No nation should assume its path to prosperity is simply paved with exports to the United States. Indeed, I’ve made it clear that the United States will *compete aggressively for the jobs and industries and markets of the future.*

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<tr>
<th>Argument for Strong and Durable Recovery</th>
<th>Argument for Need for Job Creation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Success of Toronto summit</td>
<td>Consistency of interests in the international community</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5 Excerpt of analysis of *US_10*

Probably the most striking feature of speeches delivered at international meetings is the absence of the *argument from middle-class distress.* Just like anecdotal arguments, another hinge of Obama’s “national” argumentation seems to “disappear” as the relevant audience changes. More precisely, the focus on the middle-class is implied by reiterating the imperative of achieving growth through job creation. The situation and destiny of the American middle class are only hinted at in *US_18,* delivered at a meeting of the Clinton Global Initiative, and during the Press Conference after the G20 meeting in Cannes (*US_19*). Generally, the American situation is only touched upon to corroborate the President’s commitment to the solution of internationally-shared problems.

In this respect, in international addresses powerful and vivid argumentation appears as if it has been diluted into more formalised discourse, with positive implications, as the
specific interpreting problems posed, for instance, by anecdotal arguments, leave room to enhanced denotation.

Though less evocative, other arguments characterise this class of speeches and deserve attention in the light of their recurrence. First of all, reference is always made to the summit or event in question. In particular, regarding G20 meetings, the subject relies on a simple ad specific scheme:

ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT AS MILESTONE IN THE PATH TOWARDS GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Premise 1: We are gathered here in another G20 meeting.
Premise 2: Progress has been made in the implementation of policies aimed at solving the global crisis.
Conclusion: Therefore, like previous G20 meetings, this summit marks another milestone in the path towards global economic recovery.

Every G20 summit is said to be a milestone in the quest for new economic stability.

US_87: This summit marks another milestone in the world’s recovery from the financial crisis that erupted five years ago this month.

The scheme is recurrent and elementary. Therefore, interpreters are “merely” required to acquire a preparation regarding the unfolding of the G20 political agenda, with particular attention to be paid to the cities in which summits take place. In particular, as shown in table 5.5, the achievements of previous meetings are systematically mentioned.

US_4: Six months ago, I said that the London Summit marked a turning point in the G20’s effort to prevent economic catastrophe. And here in Pittsburgh, we’ve taken several significant steps forward to secure our recovery, and transition to strong, sustainable, and balanced economic growth. We brought the global economy back from the brink. We laid the groundwork today for long-term prosperity, as well.

The argument is also recurrently linked to the argument for strong and sustainable economic recovery and also to the argument for comprehensive and coordinated response to the crisis. This argument replaces the speaker’s focus on his national duties and shifts attention to the need for a comprehensive and coordinated response to shared problems.

US_3: Ultimately, the challenges of the 21st century can’t be met without collective action. Agreement will almost never be easy, and results won’t always come quickly. But I am committed to respecting different points of view, and to forging a consensus instead of dictating our terms. That’s how we made progress in the last few days. And that’s how we will advance and uphold our ideals in the months and years to come.

Even though the need for comprehensive response is hailed in national speeches as well (see table 5.1), reference to coordination appears only in international meetings.

Furthermore, Obama often resorts to the topos of competition, whereby he confirms America’s willingness to compete aggressively for the jobs and the markets of the future.
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(e.g. *US_21*). By doing so, the President’s shows consistency regardless of the relevant audience, as America’s commitment to innovation with a view to restoring economic supremacy is a feature of national addresses.

In this regard, the other main arguments put forward in front of international audiences do not differ much from their “American” counterparts, with the exception of the argument from middle-class distress and anecdotal arguments. References to speculation and irresponsibility, the argument by analogy relating to the Great Depression, the topos of the irreparable, the argument from crisis contagion, the negative consequences of inaction and the need for bold and rapid political response all contribute to shaping mainstream discourse on the economic crisis.

Rather, the peculiarity of international speeches lies in interdiscursive relations. Despite the focus on the economy, the international stage often requires Obama to address totally-unrelated issues (see section 2.1.1).

**US_12**: Good afternoon, everybody. Before I discuss the G20, I want to briefly comment on the agreement in *Iraq* that’s taken place on the framework for a new government. There’s still challenges to overcome, but all indications are that the government will be representative, inclusive, and reflect the will of the Iraqi people who cast their ballots in the last election. This agreement marks another milestone in the history of modern *Iraq*. Once again, Iraqis are showing their determination to unify *Iraq* and build its future and that those impulses are far stronger than those who want Iraq to descend into sectarian *war and terror*.

Unrelated interdiscursive references, especially regarding war crises, sometimes show up in national addresses, too. Yet they are only hinted at, whereas they become fully-fledged objects of discussion in international settings.

As regards typically international arguments, even though they systematically show up in Obama’s international addresses, they cannot be said to be distinctive of the American President’s argumentation. Analysis of the British and French sub-corpora will show that they are, there, typical of political argumentation in international settings and aim at addressing national and international audiences at the same time.

As to national speeches, they are characterised by a high degree of informality that sometimes shifts the political speech towards *dialogicity*. Obama’s predilection for direct contact with the audience is suggested by the recurrence of the *primary-audience oriented argument from geographical contagion of the crisis*; yet speeches further shift towards dialogicity as Obama frequently poses direct questions to the audience, mentions prominent participants in the event or engages in brief communicative exchanges with audience members.

**US_50**:  
THE PRESIDENT: Financial institutions started making bets with other people’s money that were reckless. And then our entire financial system almost collapsed. *You remember that?*  
AUDIENCE: Yes!  
THE PRESIDENT: It wasn’t that long ago. I know *you guys* are young, but it was pretty recent.
US_62:
THE PRESIDENT: America is not going to compete based on low-skill, low-wage, no workers’ rights. That’s not our competitive advantage. There’s always going to be some other country that can treat its workers even worse. Right?
AUDIENCE: Right!
THE PRESIDENT: What’s going to make us succeed is we got the best workers - well trained, reliable, productive, low turnover, healthy. That’s what makes us strong.

US_85:
THE PRESIDENT: Your outstanding Mayor, Brian Higgins, is here. Give him a big round of applause.
AUDIENCE: Congressman!
THE PRESIDENT: What?
AUDIENCE: The Mayor is Byron Brown!
THE PRESIDENT: Byron Brown. That’s - I’m sorry, Byron. What I meant was - your Congressman, Brian Higgins, is here.

However, the dialogicity of several of Obama’s addresses, which has been highlighted for the sake of descriptivity, does not appear as a major interpreting problem. Yet, informal register, coupled with the specificity of the topics addressed, is likely to pose specific lexical challenges. The most glaring and recurrent are addressed in the following section.

5.2.7 Recurrent Expressions and Prospective Lexical Hindrances

Reference has already been made in the previous paragraphs to specific and recurrent lexical and expressive choices which determine the pragmatic force of Obama’s speeches on the economic crisis. In general, informal or finance-related vocabulary crops up in Obama’s speeches on the economy, challenging interpreters’ preparation in tackling non-conventional political language.

Despite its informal and apparently non-political character, the verb to rack up is recurrently used in Obama’s speeches, generally in association with bills or debt.

US_16: raising the debt ceiling does not allow Congress to spend more money. It simply gives our country the ability to pay the bills that Congress has already racked up.

US_26: Those at the very top grew wealthier from their incomes and their investments […] and too many families found themselves racking up more and more debt just to keep up. We shouldn’t be making it harder to afford college. We should be a country where everyone has a chance to go and doesn’t rack up 100,000 dollars of debt just because they went.

US_82: But right now, we’ve seen a group of Republicans in the House, in particular, who suggest they wouldn’t vote to pay the very bills that Congress has already racked up. That harmed our recovery back in 2011. It would severely harm it again. It could plunge us back into financial crisis.

US_96: When families have less to spend, that means businesses have fewer customers, and households rack up greater mortgage and credit card debt.
To rack up is generally used by Obama as a synonym for to accumulate. Notably, it is used negatively in relation to debt and bills, in such a way that the collocations to rack up debt and to rack up bills end up vividly describing some of the causes of the crisis. Given its informal character, the verb is likely to be unknown to some interpreters, who might be distracted by a colloquial expression for which an equivalent does not immediately come to mind. Since these collocations are recurrent and serve the purposes of blaming the bad value of irresponsibility as opposed to thrift and selflessness, interpreters had better find appropriate translation solutions in advance, before tackling any speech on the economy delivered by the American President.

The verb to revamp is recurrently used, generally in the expression to revamp the economy. After the collapse brought about by the unprecedented downturn, the American economic system needs to be overhauled, which is all the more often conveyed by the verb in question.

Reference to speculation and irresponsibility which have led to the crisis are frequently addressed by resorting to the finance-related expressions boom and bust and/or bubble and bust.

US_3: I believe that we must put an end to the bubble-and-bust economy that has stood in the way of sustained growth and enabled abusive risk-taking that endangers our prosperity.

US_5: We can’t go back to an economy that yielded cycle after cycle of speculative booms and painful busts.

US_10: In Pittsburgh we went further - moving beyond the old economic cycles of boom and bust by committing our nations to a new framework for growth that’s balanced and sustained, as well as specific financial reforms.

These expressions have, in general, become internationally known and do not require interpreters to find equivalents in their target languages.

The same holds true for bailout, which has come to indicate the financial rescue of banks by national governments and international organisations in the follow-up to the bursting of the American housing bubble. Even though the more general rescue is an acceptable equivalent, bailout has now become a borrowed term in most languages (Galimberti 2012: 18) and unequivocally refers to the current crisis.

Another problematic term pertaining to the realm of finance is underwater. It is a chiefly American term “relating to or denoting a loan with a balance that exceeds the current market value of the loan”19. In the American sub-corpus it is generally associated with families, who owe more on their mortgages than the actual market value of the latter.

US_36: But this time too many families haven’t been able to take advantage of the low rates, because falling prices lock them out of the market. They were underwater; made it more difficult for them to refinance.

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**US_81**: The good news is over the past four years, we’ve helped more responsible homeowners stay in their homes. And today, sales are up and prices are up, and fewer Americans see their homes underwater.

Other recurrent topic-related lexical items requiring attention and content preparation on the part of interpreters include *foreclosure, down payment, mortgage-backed securities* and *refinance*, meaning “to renew the terms of a loan”.

Over and above financial terminology, the sub-corpus is characterised by recurrent expressions and collocations which seem to have “entered the linguistic and episodic memory of the speaker” (Reisigl 2010: 243). For instance, the verb to *refinance* is generally found together with the noun *mortgage*.

**US_23**: For homeowners, I announced a new policy that will help families *refinance their mortgages* and save thousands of dollars.

**US_36**: If you’re ineligible for refinance just because you’re underwater on your mortgage, through no fault of your own, this plan changes that. You’ll be able to *refinance* at a lower rate. You’ll be able to save hundreds of dollars a month that you can put back in your pocket.

**US_81**: I’ve asked Congress to pass a really good, bipartisan idea […] and this is the idea to give every homeowner the chance to *refinance their mortgage* while rates are still low so they can save thousands of dollars a year.

*Mortgage refinancing* or simply *refinancing* is made possible by the President policies and is a way out of personal financial troubles. Commitment to the “mission” of middle-class rescue is also conveyed by another recurrent expression, namely *to create new jobs*. The expression is generally found together with numerals indicating the considerable number of jobs “created” either by political intervention or by American innovation and ingenuity.

**US_62**: Our businesses *have created* more than five point five million *new jobs* over the past thirty-three months. So we’re making progress.

**US_83**: Today, our businesses *have created* seven point two million *new jobs* over the last forty months. This year, we’re off to our best private-sector jobs growth since 1999.

**US_100**: For decades we’d been losing manufacturing jobs. But now our manufacturers have added over the last four years more than five hundred and fifty thousand *new jobs*, including almost eighty thousand manufacturing jobs in the last five months alone. So we want to keep that trend going.

The government is committed to the creation of *new jobs* (a hundred and twenty-six occurrences in the sub-corpus), but the restoration of core American values needs to be comprehensive and involve all actors; the concept is conjured up by means of the evocative opposition between *Wall Street* and *Main Street*, to which *Washington* is frequently added.
US_6: Ultimately, it is by taking responsibility - on Wall Street, here in Washington, all the way to Main Street - that we’re going to move past this period of turmoil.

US_26: A strong middle class can only exist in an economy where everyone plays by the same rules, from Wall Street to Main Street. [...] The fact is this crisis has left a huge deficit of trust between Main Street and Wall Street.

The focus on Main Street in relation to the issues of education and job creation gives rise to a further reiterated formulation:

US_1: As businesses lose revenue and people lose income, the tax base shrinks, which means less money for schools and police and fire departments.

US_16: To make matters worse, the recession meant that there was less money coming in, and it required us to spend even more [...] on aid to states so we could prevent more teachers and firefighters and police officers from being laid off.

US_56: But one of the biggest weaknesses has been state and local governments, which have laid off four hundred and fifty thousand Americans. These are teachers and cops and firefighters.

US_90: We made sure that people were rebuilding roads and bridges, keeping things going, helping to keep teachers and firefighters and cops on the job.

Teachers, firefighters and cops are the heralds of Obama’s mission, i.e. to “repopulate” the void created by the collapse of the middle class. The President’s commitment towards helping underwater families re-climb the social hierarchy is conveyed through the iterative expressions to get into the middle class (e.g. US_24, US_40, US_106), to lift people into the middle class (e.g. US_26), to work one’s way into the middle class (e.g. US_31, US_76), to step into the middle class (e.g. US_52), to earn one’s way into the middle class (e.g. US_82) to climb into the middle class (e.g. US_69, US_99) and to provide ladders or ladders of opportunity into the middle class (e.g. US_65, US_68, US_96, US_101, US_103).

Yet the “pathways into the middle class” (US_85) are not duty-free, as they demand a contribution in terms of hard work and responsibility.

US_83: And that’s why I’m visiting cities and towns like this - to lay out my ideas for how we can build on the cornerstone of what it means to be middle class in America. A good job with good wages. A good education. A home to call your own. Affordable health care that’s there for you when you get sick. A secure retirement even if you’re not rich. More chances for folks to earn their way into the middle class as long as they’re willing to work for it.

Only thus, by giving their fair share, by playing by the same rules, will Americans be given a fair shot.
Chapter 6

**THE BRITISH SUB-CORPUS ANALYSED**

### 6.1 David Cameron and the Crisis

The distribution of texts according to the context of speech delivery is decidedly more even in the British sub-corpus, as the speeches delivered in front of non-national audiences make up forty-seven percent of the text collection.

![Pie chart showing distribution of texts: National Speeches (53%), International and Bilateral Meeting Speeches (32%), EU Speeches (15%)](image)

**Figure 6.1 Types of Texts according to the Narrow Context of Speech Delivery**

Before venturing into the descriptive account of Cameron’s distinctive arguments regarding the economy, introductory remarks on the similarities and differences between the American and British leaders’ arguments are in order. Argument regularities among the sub-corpora are mainly topic-dependent. In this respect, the *prototypical crisis-related argument (means-end)* recurrently shows up in the British sub-corpus, too.

**UK_31:** *We acted to prevent crisis* while others who failed to do so are suffering emergency budgets, deeper austerity and political crisis. *And our actions* have helped to secure record low interest rates for businesses and consumers – the biggest possible stimulus to the economy.

**UK_75:** My business delegation *signed deals* worth over seven hundred million pounds - all of which *will help create and sustain jobs* here in the UK.
However, less emphasis is generally laid on the single acts and/or policies devised and implemented by the national government, as the general plan and vision of Cameron’s administration appears to dominate in discourse. Cameron’s prototypical argument can, thus, be said to rely on a slightly different scheme:

**Prototypical Crisis-Related Argument (Means-End)**

*Premise 1:* We must solve/come out of the crisis.

*Premise 2:* I claim that plan x (my plan) will help us solve/come out of the crisis.

*Conclusion:* Therefore, we should stick to plan x.

References to *crisis as change* and *crisis as opportunity* also appear in Cameron’s speeches, which suggests that they are chiefly *political* rather than speaker-related arguments.

**UK_6:** We’re in a world of unprecedented economic change. […] This is an incredible opportunity for Britain, for new start-ups to flourish, for innovations to drive growth and create jobs.

**UK_81:** Because everyone knows we’ve come out of a long and difficult recession, the downturn has taken time to get out of. Everybody knows that we have to do two things; we’ve got to give hope to young people that want to work and we’ve also got to make sure that Britain is a success in this modern, competitive, interconnected world.

The examples drawn from *UK_6* and *UK_81* show that the *topoi* of competition and innovation also appear in Cameron’s texts, but also suggest that Cameron’s discourse focuses more on the consequences of the crisis rather than on its origins. The difference seems to be due to cultural factors: even though the crisis is a global predicament, it actually broke out in the United States owing to the bursting of the American housing bubble. As a consequence, the housing crisis is not addressed, also considering that homeownership is certainly not a British *value*. Indeed, even though themes are shared by Obama and Cameron, the following sections will show that the arguments of the latter build on different, essentially British premises. The crisis has fundamentally changed the global economic landscape, turning the market into a thrilling competitive arena in which crucial choices have to be made, especially because the UK is getting to grips with national problems preventing genuine economic recovery. This idea pervades the whole sub-corpus and is conveyed by means of specific argument schemes. Some of them resemble Obama’s, but most of them reflect the Prime Minister’s specific *convictions* concerning the solution of the crisis.
6.2 Cameron’s Priorities: Cutting the Budget Deficit and Opening Up the Economy

David Cameron’s plan for the economy is fairly simple, as shown by the following quotation:

The Coalition’s strategy is to try and create the conditions for private-sector-led growth by taking rapid measures to cut the budget deficit, primarily through reducing public spending (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012a: 117).

Cutting the budget deficit by reducing public spending and unleashing growth by spurring enterprise are the basic means through which the United Kingdom will overcome the crisis. As regards the former, one of the major factors which have compounded and prolonged the crisis in Britain is said to be the critical situation of national debt, that the Coalition Government has been forced to tackle since the beginning of its mandate. The government’s unmistakable difficulties in addressing economic issues, for which it is not to blame, are recurrently conveyed by relying on a specific argument scheme:

ARGUMENT FROM DEFICIT INHERITANCE
Premise 1: The present coalition government has inherited a massive budget deficit.
Premise 2: Cutting the deficit is a priority for restoring the economy.
Conclusion: Therefore, the task is not easy and will require time and sacrifice.

The recurrence of the argument is signalled by the verb to inherit, an externally caused change of state verb (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1995: 92; McKoon & Macfarland 2000), whose crucial pragmatic effects have already been referred to in chapter 2 (see section 2.1.3).

UK_10: In Britain, we are taking the tough steps to deal with the massive deficit that we inherited.

UK_49: In Britain, cleaning up our banks and introducing a proper regulatory framework is a vital part of clearing up the mess we inherited. Britain has one of the largest financial sectors in the world - and we are making it one of the safest.

UK_56: Never forget - we inherited a deficit bigger than Spain’s. Bigger even than Greece. This has meant taking decisions no other government had dreamed of taking before.

The present Coalition Government is recurrently said to have inherited either a “massive deficit” (e.g. UK_2, UK_7) or a more vivid “mess” (e.g. UK_22, UK_31, UK_48). The conclusion of the argument is regularly left implicit, as the verbalisation of the two premises is enough to express the government’s lack of responsibility. By recurrently adopting the change of state verb to inherit, the speaker presupposes and conjures up a previous, extremely negative state of affairs that has restricted the leeway and
affected the actions of the present government. Cameron’s utterances, thus, trigger a political implicature by implying another utterance, not visible on text surface:

“the deficit is not my/our fault. The fault lies with the previous government, i.e. Labour”.

In the light of which, emphasis on the verb to inherit is pivotal in translation as well, as the verb lies at the heart of Cameron’s argumentation. It triggers allusion to the previous government, that is only rarely blamed directly.

UK_14: Eight months ago we inherited an economy in deep trouble. The previous government had racked up the biggest budget deficit in our peacetime history.

Sometimes the verb to inherit is not present, but the political implicature highlighting the responsibility of Labour is equally evident.

UK_2: So, while the cutbacks that are coming are unavoidable now, they could have been avoided if previously we had spent wisely instead of showering the public sector with cash at a time when everyone else in the country was tightening their belt.

In all cases, however, the argument scheme acts as a strategy of justification, enabling the speaker to assert the Conservative “innocence” regarding the persistence of tough economic times. In this regard, not only the deficit but also, in more general terms, problems have been inherited.

UK_33: We have problems in this country that this government inherited and needs to sort out.

UK_44: Now, of course, the most immediate example of our long-term thinking is our commitment to deal with the disastrous legacy of debt and deficit that we inherited. […] But this is the problem we inherited: we are powering our county through an out of date, inefficient grid and ageing, polluting power stations.

UK_48: First, we must continue to get to grips with the deficit and build recovery at home. Let’s be clear about what we inherited: an economy built on the worst deficit since the Second World War: the most leveraged banks; the most indebted households; one of the biggest housing booms; and unsustainable levels of public spending and immigration.

The argument from deficit inheritance is recurrently adopted irrespective of the narrow context of speech delivery. Reference to the national legacy inherited by the Tories also appears in international speeches, where the economic situation of the UK is regularly addressed.

UK_54: The coalition government that I lead in Britain inherited the worst deficit this country has had since the Second World War. But we have acted decisively to put in place a credible and steady plan to restore confidence in our public finances.
Labour responsibility is thus systematically expressed and used as an excuse for difficulties or delays in tackling the deficit crisis.

As regards the means adopted by the government to cut the deficit, Cameron’s main strategy lies in reducing public spending. In this respect, be it for the PM’s Britishness or not, Cameron’s convictions appear to be essentially Micawberian, as thrift and spending are deemed to be more important than income, at least as far as the initial task of containing the crisis is concerned. After all, the crisis has tested nations’ abilities to survive with more modest means.

**UK_6**: We’re in a world of unprecedented economic change, with millions of new consumers and countless innovations where companies are starting with less investment than ever before, yet still becoming global giants within a matter of years.

**UK_90**: We need to do more with less. Not just now, but permanently. It can be done.

Passages like those drawn from UK_6 and UK_90 are recurrent in the British sub-corpus, as they seem to serve the purpose of mitigating unpopular references to sacrifice, inevitably entailed by argumentation regarding the deficit crisis. Indeed, spending cuts are frequently addressed by flaunting the silver lining of the predicament, i.e. the challenging nature of the aftermath of the crisis. However, reducing spending is not only a challenge but a duty, as it is the prerequisite for growth.

**UK_9**: The most important thing was for us to show we’re going to get on top of that deficit, we’re going to live within our means, we’re going to cut our expenditure over the coming years and we’re going to get rid of our structural budget deficit. The alternative to that is not some wonderland of continuous growth.

**UK_17**: Those who argue that dealing with our deficit and promoting growth are somehow alternatives are wrong. You cannot put off the first in order to promote the second.

Deficit and growth are inextricably linked. Here lies the challenge launched by the crisis, which is actually a twofold challenge, as the solution of the crisis depends on the government’s success in reducing deficit and promoting growth. This stance, underlying all the speeches included in the British sub-corpus, is frequently conveyed by resorting to the following argument scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING**

*Premise 1*: Cutting the deficit is the government’s priority, as it is essential to contain and solve the crisis.

*Premise 2*: Even before the crisis, we were spending too much, which worsened our deficit crisis and jeopardised growth.

*Premise 3*: The crisis has challenged and reshaped our spending standards.

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1 The example drawn from UK_9 sees Cameron referring to the structural deficit, which suggests that the Prime Minister’s speeches are more specialist than Obama’s. In this respect, comments will be made in chapter 8 by referring to the lexical routines of all the corpus speakers (see section 8.2).
Conclusion: Therefore, cutting public spending is the key to deficit reduction and promotion of growth.

Though the reduction of public spending and the promotion of growth are interdependent policies, they are often emphasised in separate discursive stages. In this regard, the former “occupies” a great deal of Cameron’s speeches.

UK_2: Thankfully this is a warning that has now focused the attention of the international community. This is why we believe there is only one option in front of us: to take immediate and decisive action. That’s why we have already launched and completed an in-year Spending Review to save six billion pounds of public spending.

UK_5: The last government was borrowing almost twice as much as when this country nearly went bankrupt in the 1970s. We had to bring some responsibility back to public spending because if we didn’t, Britain was looking down the barrel of economic ruin.

UK_10: Just as countries with big budget deficits must cut public spending, which is right for them and right for the world economy, so countries with big trade deficits need to save more, consume less and export more.

UK_23: Barack and I did not come into politics to cut public spending but neither did we seek office to see our great economies decline, or to land our children with unsustainable debts.

UK_89: Now that doesn’t just mean cuts, although we have had to cut public spending and we’re going to have to go on making difficult decisions into 2015, into 2016.

The argument for cutting the budget deficit through reduction of public spending is formally an argument for thrift (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 105). However, as has already been specified in the previous page, the pragmatically detrimental consequences of evoking the idea of sacrifice are systematically pre-empted.

UK_96: That is good progress, but we have to be frank, we have still got one of the bigger deficits of developed countries. It is still too high. It needs to come down. We have to stick to the programme, stick to the plan of the difficult decisions about spending that will get that deficit down and we should do that not by endlessly increasing people’s taxes. It is spending that needs to bear the burden. And that is our plan.

The excerpt drawn from UK_96 is indicative of the intended perlocutionary effect of the argument: presenting the speaker as a responsible and thrifty leader who delivers in times of crisis by simultaneously taking taxpayers into consideration. In other words, the reduction of public spending is not an end in itself but is functional to something else, namely the protection of taxpayers’ money.

UK_22: Because spending cuts are not the ends; they’re not even the means to the ends...they’re just a symptom of the inescapable reality that you cannot get anything done if your country goes bankrupt.
Despite its pivotal role in restoring the economy and favouring growth, the reduction of public spending with a view to cutting the deficit is not a means for spurring growth. More broadly, spending cuts are indicative of a problem in British economy. This hindrance to economic recovery is, in Cameron’s opinion, posed by a major imbalance, which also lies at the origin of the huge British debt.

**UK_2:** Since 2007 public spending has actually gone up by over 15% – some extra £120 billion in just three years. And while private-sector employment fell in this period by 3.7%, public-sector employment actually rose. So it has been, if you like, a tale of two economies: a public-sector boom and a private-sector bust.

**UK_15:** For a long time we saw a dangerous imbalance in our economy, tilted too far towards unsustainable spending and borrowing and away from private sector investment and exports.

**UK_81:** Government got too big, the public sector got too big. Inevitably we had to lose some jobs from the public sector. That would have happened whoever was standing here as Prime Minister. And when that happens it’s vital that the private sector responds and grows and takes people on and brings the investments and jobs and the wealth our country needs.

There is a dangerous imbalance between the public and the private sectors. Over the last few years, the former has “boomed” while the latter has shrunk owing to ill-judged policies.

**UK_85:** We were spending too much, we were borrowing too much.

The fault of the “private-sector bust” lies, again, with the previous government.

**UK_2:** But there was a problem with this public-sector splurge. The previous government argued that more spending would support the economy, conveniently forgetting that if you start with a large structural deficit, you ramp up spending even further, which is actually going to undermine confidence and investment, rather than encourage it. So, while the people employed by the taxpayer were insulated from the harsh realities of the recession, everyone else in the economy was starting to pay the price. And now, today, we’re all paying the price because the size of the public sector has got way out of step with the size of the private sector. We’re going to have to try and get it back in line and that will be much more painful than if we had kept things properly in balance all along. […] The private sector has shrunk back to what it was over six years ago.

The imbalance between the public and the private sectors has favoured national debt and seriously affected growth. As a consequence, the economy needs rebalancing, a concept which runs through the whole British sub-corpus (e.g. UK_1, UK_15, UK_32, UK_54, UK_60, UK_83). Regarding the policies through which the British economy will be rebalanced, the reduction of public spending has been carried out “in the right way […] in a way that will help promote economic growth and new jobs” (UK_5). This is what Cameron’s plan for the economy is about: the creation of “a new economic dynamism”
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(e.g. UK_6, UK_12, UK_14, UK_40) resulting from a redistribution of resources from the public sector to the private.

**UK_5**: You’re going to see the most *pro-business, pro-growth, pro-jobs* agenda ever unleashed by a government.

**UK_17**: And we’re striking the right balance between tax and spending, with spending cuts taking three quarters of the strain and tax rises a quarter.

Like Obama, then, Cameron relies heavily on the *argument for job creation*, which rests, though, on significantly different and typically British premises.

**ARGUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR JOBS (“NEW ECONOMIC DYNAMISM”)**

*Premise 1*: Private-sector jobs are the engine of growth.
*Premise 2*: Growth has been put at risk by the crisis.
*Premise 3*: Moreover, private-sector jobs were overlooked by the previous government to the benefit of the public sector, which has further jeopardised growth.
*Premise 4*: As a consequence, the economy is characterised by a dangerous imbalance and growth is stagnating.

**Conclusion**: Therefore, balance between the private and the public sector has to be re-struck by spurring private-sector jobs.

Private-sector jobs are systematically described as the prerequisite of growth, the key to achieving the “new economic dynamism” craved for.

**UK_14**: Now ultimately it’s not government that creates jobs - it’s businesses, entrepreneurs, wealth creators.
And that is particularly true when governments are so deeply in debt that they have to cut back their own spending programmes.
So small and growing businesses will be our most important job creators. [...] I want us to create a new economic dynamism in our country.

Here lies another difference between Obama’s and Cameron’s argumentation regarding the crisis: balance is lacking in the UK and, therefore, it becomes a premise of argumentation in the British Prime Minister’s speeches. In other words, even though the two politicians share arguments, they actually implement them in different ways, by relying on different premises. In this regard, while Obama frequently resorts to the *argument for strong and sustainable economic recovery* (see section 5.2.4), Cameron generally uses the *argument for strong and balanced growth*:

**UK_1**: We have always been ambitious for the future of our economy. We have set out a series of clear, transparent benchmarks for our economy from ensuring macroeconomic stability to creating more balanced growth, getting Britain working and ensuring our whole country shares in rising prosperity. [...] We are determined along with our European partners, and our international partners in the G20 to ensure there is a return to more balanced growth and that we address the massive imbalances which played such a significant part in the recent economic crisis.
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**UK_15**: You’ve got to make sure that *growth is balanced* and spread *more fairly* across our country.

**UK_60**: In just two and a half years, we’ve cut the deficit by a quarter and set out a credible path towards our goal of a *balanced budget*. The economy is *rebalancing*. There are over a million new private-sector jobs.

**UK_66**: And my argument today is simple: if we stick to the plan and if we reject the false choices, we can come through this together with a *stronger, more resilient and more balanced economy*.

The passages indicate that Cameron’s *argument for strong and balanced growth* hinges on a specific scheme, closely related to the argument for the creation of private-sector jobs.

**ARGUMENT FOR STRONG AND BALANCED GROWTH**

*Premise 1*: The crisis has jeopardised growth worldwide.

*Premise 2*: The impact has been felt particularly in Britain, as growth was already been affected by a dangerous imbalance between the public and the private sectors.

*Premise 3*: The crisis has shown the weaknesses of Britain’s economy.

*Premise 4*: We must solve/come out of the crisis.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, we must spur a strong and balanced economic growth to lift Britain out of the crisis.

As the above examples show, Cameron’s plan to pursue a balanced growth basically hinges on private-sector investment:

**UK_31**: So, in short we are putting in the money, leveraging the power of the private sector and reshaping the rules to break decades of failure and build world-class infrastructure to support a world-beating economy.

As regards specific government policies, rebalancing the economy is effected primarily through the implementation of the *Regional Growth Fund*, in explaining which Cameron resorts to the prototypical crisis-related argument, claiming that act/policy *x* is instrumental in the leadup to economic recovery.

**UK_15**: And part of that step change is why we are here today - the *Regional Growth Fund*. We are saying to people - if you have got an idea to bring investment and wealth to your area, whether it is a local wasteland that needs decontaminating before it can be built on, whether it is a run-down dockside that could be transformed into a retail area with some start-up capital, there is £1.4 billion in there waiting in the *Regional Growth Fund* to help make those good ideas happen. So that is what you will get from us: a plan that brings some sense and some stability to the public finances; a plan that actively drives growth and gets behind enterprise; a plan that helps to rebalance our economy, empowering local communities to take charge and drive wealth creation.

**UK_30**: A year ago we created something called the *Regional Growth Fund*. Sounds like jargon I know. But let me tell you the difference it is really going to make.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

It’s getting private sector investment into parts of our country that are over-dependent on the public sector. So far £1.4 billion has been allocated to projects from Plymouth to Newcastle unlocking nearly £8.5 billion of new private sector investment and potentially creating or safeguarding 325,000 jobs. That’s great.

UK_48: We need to rebalance our economy so we are supporting the new enterprises that will spread jobs and growth right across the country with 24 enterprise zones and a £2.4 billion Regional Growth Fund that’s securing 328,000 jobs.

The focus on job creation leads Cameron’s discourse to share some arguments with Obama’s. High on the list is the argument for innovation, as Britain needs to “give a massive boost to enterprise, entrepreneurship and business creation” (UK_31). The argument hinges on a slightly different content-related scheme, but the focus on the “jobs of the future” is recurrent in the British sub-corpus too (e.g. UK_26, UK_61, UK_90, UK_95).

ARGUMENT FOR INNOVATION
Premise 1: Owing to the crisis and ill-judged policies implemented by the previous government, the private sector has shrunk to unsustainable levels.
Premise 2: Private-sector jobs are the engine of growth.
Premise 3: The world economy has become extremely competitive and creativity is required to get the jobs of the future.
Conclusion: Therefore, the government must spur innovative private-sector jobs and get the jobs of the future.

While the “jobs of the future” generally recur in Obama’s speeches, reference to “the economy of the future” (e.g. UK_17), “the sectors of the future” (e.g. UK_14, UK_86) and “the industries of the future” (e.g. UK_48, UK_66) also appear in the British sub-corpus. As in the American sub-corpus, though, innovation is not something to be invented or searched for. It has always been intrinsic in British history and culture.

UK_88: Now, in Britain we know this to be true from our own history. We weren’t the world’s first industrial power just because of the coal and the iron ore beneath our soil. It was because we had secure property rights, relatively open and flexible markets for labour and capital, and a system in which innovation, investment and enterprise could thrive.

British companies “just” need political drive, because innovation has been curbed for too long. Cameron’s strategy for the economy is already addressed in UK_1, where crucial questions are said to underlie the plan of the coalition government; they will be put to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Minister of State for Universities and Science.

UK_1: So a big part of our strategy for growth is getting out of the way of business. I’m going to be asking George Osborne, Vince Cable, David Willetts and their teams some simple questions week in, week out: what are you doing to make it easier to start a business? Easier to take people on? What are you doing to make regulation less complicated? To make locating a business here more attractive?
Chapter 6 | The British Sub-corpus Analysed

Already, just two weeks in, I’m hearing answers that I like – and that I know business will like.

In a nutshell, the aim of Cameron’s government is “to make Britain the best place in Europe to start, finance or grow a business” (UK_86); or, as anticipated by the above example drawn from UK_1, the government mission is to make it easier to start businesses in Britain:

**UK_17**: But that also means the power is in us to change to make it easier for businesses to start up and prosper to open new markets - within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world.

**UK_38**: And while we may be fiscal conservatives, we are monetary radicals injecting cash into the banking system and introducing credit easing measures to make it easier for small businesses to access finance.

**UK_48**: We need to make it easier to take on new workers so we are reforming employment law.

**UK_83**: Millions travel between the UK and Ireland every year and our two countries are working on joint visa arrangements to make it easier for people from around the world to visit and invest.

The need to make it easier for new businesses to start up is frequently accompanied by mention of Startup Britain (e.g. UK_30, UK_37), a national campaign funded by private-sector sponsors but launched by the Prime Minister in 2011. By supporting British companies, the country will simultaneously be rendered “more attractive” to foreign investors (e.g. UK_18, UK_22).

Another instrumental policy through which innovation will be promoted is the corporation tax cut, which will help unleash productivity in the private sector and, consequently, growth.

**UK_1**: We’ll cut corporation tax rates by simplifying reliefs and allowances and tackling avoidance, while protecting manufacturing industries.

The government cut is systematically vaunted as having made the British corporation tax amongst “the lowest in the developed world” or “in the G7”:

**UK_3**: We also made an incredibly important cut too, and that is a cut in the rate of corporation tax - not just this year, but next year and the year after - so that we end up with a 24 percent corporation tax, which will be amongst the lowest in the developed world. Because I think, in the modern world, the corporation tax rate that you set is like an advertisement for your country. It is saying, “Come and invest here, and we will tax you less than other countries”. So in spite of all the difficult decisions that we’ve had to make, I wanted that to be an absolutely key change.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

UK_31: That’s why we are cutting the time it takes to set up a business creating the most competitive corporate tax regime in the G20 and cutting corporation tax to 23 percent – the lowest in the G7.

UK_62: Now back in the UK we’ve been doing all of these things. Less than three years in and this government has cut the deficit by a quarter; our corporation tax rate is the lowest in the G7.

UK_86: So we are cutting corporation tax to 20 percent, the lowest in the G7. We’re cutting the time it takes to start a new business.

UK_95: In a time of austerity we have chosen to maintain our spending on science and innovation. And we have chosen to cut business taxes. Corporation tax will soon be as low as 20 percent, the lowest in the G7 and as low as 10 percent for companies that turn innovation into manufacturing.

Those companies who turn to innovative production will benefit from an increased tax cut. The Regional Growth Fund and the corporate tax cut are, thus, included in the broader plan to re-strike a balance between the public and the private sector.

UK_12: We’re trying to make it easier for people to start their own business, we’re cutting corporation tax, we’re getting behind entrepreneurs. It’s why we’re taking practical steps to try and rebalance the economy. We’ve got this Regional Growth Fund that’s going to help stimulate enterprise and help create jobs across our country.

In broader terms, state intervention to support the private sector is ascribable to Cameron’s political philosophy regarding the economy, which could be summarised in two words: deregulation and liberalisation. This is how the economy will be rebalanced. Entrepreneurship has been stifled by excessive regulation, which has compounded the economic predicament brought about by the global recession.

UK_1: First, we will liberalise keeping tax rates low, stopping the rise of red tape, so we free our economy and our businesses to compete.

UK_11: We are creating one of the most competitive corporate tax regimes in the G20, cutting the time it takes to set up a new business, and scrapping the needless red tape and excessive regulation that has held us back for too long.

UK_66: And, by stripping back the red tape that was smothering businesses, we’ve put Britain back in the World Economic Forum’s Top Ten for competitiveness.

Cameron’s plan for deregulation substantially revolves around the “new one-in, one-out rule for regulation”, whereby the government pledges to get rid of an existing regulation whenever a new one is enacted.

UK_3: You will see a government that will be deregulating; that for any new regulation ministers want to introduce, they have to scrap an existing regulation; and you’ll see a
government that, in every way, will do what it can to make Britain a great place to do business.

**UK_30**: We’ve dealt with the flow of regulation by instituting a “one-in-one-out” rule, so any Minister who wants to bring in a new regulation, has to get rid of an existing one first. And we’ve imposed a moratorium on all new regulations for microbusinesses.

Towards the end of 2013, the rule was replaced by a tougher “one-in, two-out” rule:

**UK_86**: And we have introduced a one-in, two-out rule for new regulation so, yes, if we need a new regulation that affects business, we’ll get rid of two others in return. All told, we’re saving businesses one billion pounds by slashing red tape. And it’s paying off.

**UK_96**: And that is why we had the red tape challenge where we put all of those regulations online and asked you to help us to get rid of it. That is why we introduced the one-in, one-out rule. None of my ministers could introduce a regulation unless they abolished one at the same time, which we’ve now changed to the one-in, two-out rule. You’ve got to get rid of two regulations if you want to introduce a new one. And that is why this is going to be the first government in modern history that at the end of its parliamentary term has less regulation in place than there was at the beginning.

The above passages show that the liability of excessive regulation in compounding the economic predicament in the UK is a crucial conviction cherished by the British Prime Minister, who, therefore, often flaunts his plan to lift Britain out of the recession by resorting to a specific argument scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR DEREGULATION**
*Premise 1*: Excessive regulation has stifled British businesses for too long.
*Premise 2*: My government has committed to the “red tape challenge” since the beginning of my mandate.
*Premise 3*: We have introduced the “one-in, one-out” rule for new regulation, which was then replaced by the “one-in, two-out” rule.
*Premise 4*: Our deregulation policies have set British businesses free. They have made it easier for companies to start up and prosper.
*Conclusion*: Therefore, we must keep deregulating.

Cameron’s commitment to deregulation is part of the broader plan to restore equilibrium to the UK economy. Furthermore, the need for deregulation is all the more urgent in times of crisis, in which protectionist trends are always rife.

**UK_28**: Second, we agreed we must halt the slide to protectionism. The danger of a worsening global economic situation is that it increases the pressures for people to put up trade barriers. You can see that happening in different countries around the world. The G20 responded to this in the first wave of the crisis in 2008 and it needed to do so again.

Protectionism is a constant threat; particularly, it was what has led to the economic crisis in the 1930s and is still threatening the world economy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
UK_10: Trade barriers, protectionism, beggar my neighbour policies, these are the things that wrecked the world economy in the 1930s, and the G20 and I are absolutely determined to stop this from happening again.

UK_49: Fourth, the risk that, faced with ever growing tensions in the global economy instead of progressively removing the imbalances in the world economy governments will put up protectionist barriers, just like the 1930s.

In this respect, Cameron’s discourse on the economy resembles Obama’s: the 2008 crisis is like the one which broke out in 1929, but it is not too late for preventing “a second Great Depression”, to use Obama’s terms. The argument actually entails another, the topos of history (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 80), through which the speaker claims (in this case implicitly) that lessons have been learnt from the past. However, comparison with the Thirties is not as recurrent as in the American sub-corpus and reference to the Great Depression is made only once (UK_62). The focus of Cameron’s discourse is, instead, the need to open up the economy and liberalise trade: only by preventing “any collapse back to protectionism” (UK_38) will the economy be restored.

UK_1: Another [part of achieving balanced and sustainable world growth] is promoting trade and fighting protectionism. One of the best things we could do for the British economy today is break down the barriers to trade. In the modern, global economy, our fortunes are entwined with the fortunes of others.

UK_29: The G20 reaffirmed its pledge not to take protectionist actions, committed again to roll back any new protectionist measures that may have arisen.

UK_79: One of the most significant and hard-fought achievements at previous G20 Summits has been the commitment to resist protectionist measures.

The rejection of protectionism obviously entails its opposite, i.e. commitment to free trade and liberalisation.

UK_10: Second, boosting trade. Increasing trade is the biggest boost and the biggest stimulus that we could give to the world economy, and it doesn’t cost any money. Britain is an open trading economy. We welcome overseas investment, so this agenda can really help us to create wealth and jobs. That is why I’m linking Britain to the fastest growing countries in the fastest growing parts of the world and why I’m backing so vigorously trade liberalisation. [...]Today, we committed to keeping markets open and liberalising trade and investment as a means to promote economic progress for all and we said that we would - and I quote – “roll back any new protectionist measures that may have arisen”.

UK_30: It’s why at the G20 last week I pushed for agreement on new and credible approaches to trade liberalisation. Breaking down trade barriers and opening up new markets.

UK_54: That is the power of trade to drive growth and it’s the same story the world over. That is why I have made advancing trade a personal priority. At the G20 in Mexico, I fought hard to advance a trade deal between the US and the EU, because when two
continents that account for more than half of the world’s total trade *liberalise their trade*, the *benefits to growth* could be felt all over the planet.

In this respect, Cameron’s discourse can be said to hinge on a pivotal strategy of political argumentation, i.e. appealing to liberal and conservative presumptions (Zarefsky 2009: 122). Indeed, Cameron’s view is not presented as a stance but as truth, something that must be taken for granted.

**UK_62**: Let me tell you why. It’s the oldest observation of the modern age […] push for more *openness on trade*.

The verb *to open up* and the noun *openness* are the recurrent lexical indicators of this argument, which can be named *argument for liberalisation and struggle against protectionism*.

ARGUMENT FOR LIBERALISATION AND STRUGGLE AGAINST PROTECTIONISM

*Premise 1*: In times of crisis, protectionism is a constant threat.

*Premise 2*: Protectionism is historically known to worsen economic recessions.

*Premise 3*: Rather, trade liberalisation would bring invaluable benefits to the economy by spurring growth at national and international levels alike.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, we must struggle against the slide towards protectionism and push for openness.

The importance of the *argument for liberalisation* and the *argument for deregulation* in Cameron’s rhetoric is also testified by recurrent reference to the *Single Market*.

**UK_21**: As a result, the European Council has agreed today that *the single market* has a key role to play in *delivering growth*, and that we should bring new impetus to our efforts to complete it.

The sustained predicament in which Britain and Europe have been plunged is partially determined by the incompleteness of the *Single Market*, which still stifles businesses with too much regulation and puts “*the brakes on growth*” (*UK_36*).

**UK_38**: For every Euro invested in venture capital in the EU, five times as much is being invested in the US.  
*The single market remains incomplete.* And there are still a colossal 4,700 professions across the EU to which access is regulated by government. 
And that’s not all. In spite of the economic challenge, we are still doing things to make life even harder.

This is why “*opening up*” or “*completing*” the single market is a prerequisite for growth, a vital step towards achieving a new economic dynamism.

**UK_17**: So let’s make the choice to do things differently, to fight for our prosperity. If we set our sights high if we take bold decisions in deregulation, on *opening up the single*
market, on innovation and on trade then together we can defy the pessimists and together, recover our dynamism.

UK_25: Britain and Spain also want to see quick, bold and practical action to get European economies growing and creating jobs, so we’ll work together in the EU to complete the single market in services, in energy and in the digital economy.

UK_61: At the core of the European Union must be, as it is now, the single market. Britain is at the heart of that Single Market, and must remain so. But when the Single Market remains incomplete in services, energy and digital - the very sectors that are the engines of a modern economy - it is only half the success it could be. It is nonsense that people shopping online in some parts of Europe are unable to access the best deals because of where they live. I want completing the single market to be our driving mission. I want us to be at the forefront of transformative trade deals with the US, Japan and India as part of the drive towards global free trade.

Even though reference to the Single Market entails addressing European and/or international trade issues, it is also recurrently made (even though to a lesser extent) in national speeches, where the “place” of Britain within Europe and the world is regularly assessed.

UK_55: In terms of action at the EU level, that means: lifting the burdens on businesses, completing the single market and taking forward trade deals with the biggest economies and the fastest growing countries in the world.

Given its recurrence, the argument for completion of the Single Market may be considered another cornerstone of Cameron’s argumentation:

ARGUMENT FOR COMPLETION OF THE SINGLE MARKET
Premise 1: The Single Market remains incomplete.
Premise 2: As a consequence, free trade is curbed and Britain and the EU find it harder to emerge from the crisis.
Conclusion: Therefore, we must complete/open up the Single Market with a view to boosting growth.

Only by heading for “an effective Single Market reaching its full potential” (UK_49) will “we boost growth across Europe” (UK_39) and “provide an enormous boost to growth across the world” (UK_50), with particular reference to “the biggest immediate boost to British growth” (UK_31). However essential, though, deregulation, trade liberalisation and the struggle against protectionism are not sufficient in the global economic arena.

6.3 The Big Society Argument

UK_4: There are the things you do because it’s your duty. Sometimes unpopular - but you do them because it is in the national interest.
And yes, cutting the deficit falls into that camp. 
But there are the things you do because it’s your passion. 
The things that fire you up in the morning, that drive you, that you truly believe will make a 
real difference to the country you love. 
And my great passion is building the Big Society.

David Cameron’s plan for the economy is systematically related to a broader macro-
topic: commitment to building the Big Society. The label was launched by Steve Hilton, the 
former director of strategy for David Cameron, and became the main slogan of the Prime 
Minister’s 2010 campaign.

Providing a definition of Big Society is not easy, as the notion is extremely vague. Yet 
the above excerpt drawn from UK_4 already suggests that the Big Society is some sort of 
passion-driven counterbalance of unpopular spending cuts. In the speech, dealing 
exclusively with the issue, Cameron continues to address the Big Society and defines it as 
follows:

**UK_4:** Let me briefly explain what the Big Society is and why it is such a powerful idea. 
You can call it liberalism. You can call it empowerment. You can call it freedom. You can 
call it responsibility. I call it the Big Society. 
The Big Society is about a huge culture change, where people, in their everyday lives, in 
their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace, don’t always turn to officials, 
local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face, but instead 
feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities. 
It’s about people setting up great new schools. Businesses helping people getting trained 
for work. Charities working to rehabilitate offenders. 
It’s about liberation - the biggest, most dramatic redistribution of power from elites in 
Whitehall to the man and woman on the street. 
And this is such a powerful idea for blindingly obvious reasons.

The crisis has provided the opportunity not only for economic change but also for 
cultural change; it has offered the opportunity to build the Big Society. In more specific 
terms, any reference to the Big Society in the British sub-corpus is basically an appeal to 
decentralisation that, like the argument for cutting the budget deficit through reduction of 
public spending, has a markedly populist character conjured up by the frequent allusion to 
the protection of taxpayers’ money.

In his speeches [David Cameron] calls for a return to a revival of civil society as a 
counterweight to not only a wasteful but an oppressive state (Scott 2011).

In a nutshell, the Big Society ideology can be said to hinge on the principle of 
subsidiarity, as Cameron promotes the search for local solutions to local problems rather 
than vaunting the government role in delivering economic recovery. In particular, arguing 
in favour if the Big Society is in line with the overall appeals to “do more with less” and 
cutting state-driven regulation. The consequences brought about by the economic crisis 
have been compounded by political decisions that have led the British economy to a
dangerous imbalance. Empowering civil society will, thus, help re-strike the right balance in the economy by *redistributing power*.

**UK_12**: Our instinct that most people have a real yearning to belong to something bigger than themselves - that is leading our plans to bring neighbourhoods together, to increase social action and to build what I call the *Big Society*. [...] Every day, ministers, officials, people working throughout the public sector make decisions that affect people’s lives, and this is about helping to make sure those government decisions on policy and spending are made in a *balanced* way, taking account of *what really matters*.

**UK_15**: So that is what you will get from us: [...] a plan that helps to *rebalance our economy*, *empowering local communities* to take charge and drive wealth creation.

*Balance*, thus, also plays a major role in this specific argument and, in broader terms, permeates the whole sub-corpus. The Big Society can, indeed, be said to be basically about active cooperation between “the government” and “the people” on a level playing field, at least in Cameron’s words.

**UK_1**: Just as our plans to build the *Big Society* aren’t simply about cutting back big government and hoping civic society will spring to life so our plans to revive our economy are not simply about cutting public spending and hoping the private sector will spring to action. Government cannot be a bystander.

**UK_35**: So we will tackle excess in the City just as we’re reforming welfare to make work pay and support families. I profoundly believe that we can turn these things around. That’s what I mean by the *Big Society*. The British people have got what it takes - and the government has got the ideas and policies we need.

Together with the empowerment of civil society, the priority of the Big Society plan is “*to bring transparency and accountability to our governments*” (*UK_23*) in particular, and to all sectors of the economy in general. Indeed, “*transparency*” is one of the keywords of Cameron’s argumentation.

**UK_67**: And I think the most important thing we can do there is greater *transparency*, greater *transparency* for governments, greater *transparency* for companies, greater *transparency* about laws and rules, and I think the G8 can give a lead there.

Therefore, the plan for the Big Society aims at rendering the government less powerful and more transparent, while simultaneously pursuing the long-term aim of “*building a bigger, stronger society*”, which is testified by the recurrence of the expression in the British sub-corpus (e.g. *UK_14, UK_19, UK_22, UK_34, UK_60, UK_76*); in the light of which, the Big Society does not only have to do with the economy.

**UK_19**: That is our duty, but if you like, what is my mission? What is it I am really passionate about? It is actually *social recovery* as well as *economic recovery*. I think we need a social recovery, because as I have said lots of times in the past, there are too many parts of our society that are broken, whether it is broken families or whether it is some
communities breaking down; whether it is the level of crime, the level of gang membership; whether it’s problems of people stuck on welfare, unable to work; whether it’s the sense that some of our public services don’t work for us – we do need a social recovery to mend the broken society. To me, that’s what the Big Society is all about.

In order to be stable and balanced, economic recovery cannot exclude a broader social recovery. This is “what the Big Society is all about”, this is “what really matters” (UK_12, UK_98).

UK_22: So, as our debts are paid off, this is what I want to endure as the lasting legacy of this administration: helping to build a society where families and communities are stronger, where our nation’s well-being is higher and where all these things are accepted as central, not peripheral aspects of what modern governments should hope to achieve. So the Big Society is not some fluffy add-on to more gritty and more important subjects. This is about as gritty and important as it gets: giving everyone the chance to get on in life and making our country a better place to live.

UK_35: And I will be bold about working to cure the problems of our society. While a few at the top get rewards that seem to have nothing to do with the risks they take or the effort they put in, many others are stuck on benefits, without hope or responsibility. So we will tackle excess in the City just as we’re reforming welfare to make work pay and support families. I profoundly believe that we can turn these things around. That’s what I mean by the Big Society.

When arguing in favour of the Big Society, Cameron’s discourse “gets closer” to Obama’s, as emphasis is laid on education, support to hardworking families and the government’s commitment to “the values that underpin our long-term economic plan” (UK_98).

UK_98: I want all our young people to have the skills and the opportunity to aspire to a great future. And that’s why delivering the best schools and skills are at the heart of our long-term economic plan. So yes, we are sorting out the economy and getting the numbers to add up. But we’re doing something much more than that. We are doing what’s right for our country. What’s right for our children. What’s right for our future. Because I want us to build a better Britain where we can look after future generations.

In this respect, the Big Society argument implies another argument, intrinsic to political communication, i.e. the topos of moral duty towards prosperity. Indeed, as regards education reform, Cameron’s plan boils down to introducing ‘free schools’ and expanding “academies/academy schools” (e.g. UK_47, UK_60, UK_89) in an attempt to spur innovation-driven growth in the long term.

UK_22: We’re not introducing free schools and expanding Academies because it’s a way of saving money from the schools budget. We’re doing it because it’s the best way to improve education. More choice for parents. More freedom for professionals to innovate. A greater ability for new providers to come forward. It is the Big Society way to improve education.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

Yet, the Big Society not only concerns education but also the “modernisation of our public services” (UK_14). Health is also addressed now and again, but certainly not as regularly as in the American sub-corpus and not by relying on a content-related argument scheme like the argument for Obamacare (see section 5.2.4).

**UK_22**: In our health service, we’re not giving patients more control and doctors more professional freedom because we want to save money. We’re doing it because it’s the best way to improve the NHS.

In a nutshell, the Big Society is about expanding “freedom” and opportunity to all sectors of UK society, as is being done for the economy. The goal is promoted through *Big Society Capital*, a UK independent social investment institution providing finance and support to organisations which commit to social issues.

**UK_46**: We are moving from the old stop-start hand-to-mouth way the social sector was funded, towards something new, and, I believe, very exciting. *Big Society Capital* is a critical part of that. If you look at the way this organisation is going to work, there are no handouts, there is no government pulling the strings behind the scenes; this is a self-sustaining, independent market, which is going to help build the Big Society.

The Big Society is about empowerment and decentralisation. However important civil society, though, the government’s role always lies at the core of the Big Society argument, which also rests on the prototypical crisis-related argument:

**UK_90**: *As a government we have invested* thirty-eight million pounds to double the membership of credit unions, *a shining example of the Big Society in action.*

Given the interdiscursive relations it establishes, the argument can thus be said to rely on a specific content-related scheme:

**THE BIG SOCIETY ARGUMENT**

*Premise 1*: The aftermath of the economic crisis has been compounded by centralisation.

*Premise 2*: The concentration of power in the public sector has produced an unsustainable debt.

*Premise 3*: The man and woman in the street have relied on the government for too much, which has further inhibited growth.

*Premise 4*: But the crisis has provided the opportunity for huge economic, social and cultural change.

*Premise 5*: If the government cuts the deficit by simultaneously committing to the empowerment of civil society, not only will we emerge from the crisis (*economic recovery*), but we will also build a bigger and stronger society (*social recovery*), which will lead to stable and balanced recovery.

*Conclusion*: This is why the government is committing to building the Big Society.

The above passages bear witness to the vagueness with which the concept is generally addressed; no detailed description is given regarding the specific policies promoted by the government in order to rebalance the economy, and the Big Society is systematically
addressed in extremely vague and simple terms. Indeed, Cameron’s commitment to the Big Society has been heavily criticised, especially by the opposition. Ed Miliband, for instance, accused the Conservative party of “cynically attempting to dignify its cuts agenda, by dressing up the withdrawal of support with the language of reinvigorating civic society” and suggested that the Big Society is nothing but “a cloak for the small state” (Miliband 2011). However, David Cameron has consistently denied that the Big Society is “simply a mask for government spending cuts”.

Irrespective of controversies between political parties, in the sub-corpus of ARGO the Big Society argument seems to serve the purpose of masking actual cuts to the welfare state.

**UK_20**: We face a choice - make cuts in welfare or cuts elsewhere in those services we rely on like education and health or those things which are so vital for our future, like science and infrastructure.

However vague, the Big Society argument deserves attention in interpreting, as its recurrence has profound implications. Seen from a pragmatic angle, reference to the Big Society is what actually enables Cameron to address the economy in a more comprehensive sense, by establishing interdiscursive relations which “embellish” speeches on the economy and put the speaker in a favourable light. In other words, the Big Society argument appears to serve the purpose of bringing balance back to a discourse that is far too focused on harsh “bookkeeping” and predictable appeals to liberalisation.

**UK_19**: But I would make this argument: whoever was standing here right now as Prime Minister would be having to make cuts in public spending, and isn’t it better if we are having to make cuts in public spending, to try and encourage a bigger and stronger society at the same time?

Over and above the importance of reproducing the argument for the purpose of pragmatic force retention, another crucial comment is in order concerning anticipation and the expectations of interpreters. Obama’s focus on unemployment and the middle class shows that commitment to social issues is not unrelated to discourse on the economy; moreover, the following chapters will further show that ARGO is strewn with references to society, social justice and plans aimed at solving the crisis once and for all by bringing about not only economic but also social recovery. In Hollande’s terms, “les crises ne se séparent pas” (FR_62, see section 8.3); hence, crisis discourse is also governed by a macro-argument in favour of a comprehensive solution to all the problems which prevent

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3 Cameron’s words are reported in the *BBC News* webpage entitled “Prime Minister David Cameron defends Big Society Policy” (13th February 2011), available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12441972](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12441972) (last accessed on 1st February 2015).
nations from thriving. However in line with the addresses of the other corpus speakers, Cameron’s speeches on the economy are less predictable as far as the appeal to social recovery is concerned, as they prove mainstream expectations regarding British Conservative rhetoric wrong. In the light of Margaret Thatcher’s motto “There is no such thing as society”, the prominent role of the Big Society argument marks a decisive shift in Conservative discourse and, thus, challenges interpreters to trust what they hear rather than what they know. In van Dijk’s words, “knowledge is by definition relative” (2004: 10) and resorting to knowledge-based strategies (Riccardi 2005: 762) when interpreting Cameron’s argumentation regarding the Big Society is bound to result in failure. In this respect, highlighting the crucial role of the argument in the Prime Minister’s speeches enables “recognition of a well-known stimulus within the communicative event” (Riccardi 2005: 760), turning the reproduction of the Big Society argument into a skill-based strategy (ibid.).

Given the prominent role of the Big Society argument, the fact that the economy is often addressed comprehensively by relating government policies to broader, societal commitments is undeniable. However, Cameron’s discourse focuses much more on other themes, namely deficit reduction, innovation, and trade liberalisation. Reference to education, for instance, is not as recurrent and pervasive as it is in the American sub-corpus; even though education reform is deemed to be essential for the resurgence of the British economy in the long run, it is not a means to solve the crisis in present circumstances. In other words, the focus on education is one of the distinctive features of Obama’s argumentation. As regards topicality, the focus of the Prime Minister’s speeches is the economy in its narrow, commercial sense.

6.4 The Global Race Argument

The Big Society is a long-term plan. As a consequence, social problems are not the major issues at stake, or at least they do not appear to be so in Cameron’s speeches on the economic crisis. They deserve to be addressed, but not like other, more pressing economic issues. The twenty-first century sees “a world of unprecedented economic change” (UK_6). The fundamentally “new” nature of today’s economy underlies Cameron’s speeches, as the concept of change is inherent in crisis discourse (De Rycker & Mohd Don 2013: 7). Moreover, in line with mainstream crisis discourse, the predicament has given rise to challenging economic opportunities, as it has for the social and cultural opportunities addressed in relation to the Big Society.

UK_11: Beijing and Seoul provide good vantage points to reflect on the huge changes sweeping our world: the rise of new great powers, the shifting balance of economic power

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and the tensions of globalisation. This interconnected world, the world of restless markets, so well represented here in this room tonight, is creating huge new opportunities for the countries that are able to seize them.

On November 19th, 2012 David Cameron delivered a speech at the Confederation of British Industry. As far as topicality is concerned, the speech (UK_56) is not particularly original if compared to others. Yet, it is singular in that it launched a crucial argument Cameron was to adopt systematically thereafter.

UK_56: Next year we’re planning more trips to India and China and I hope we’ll have a lot of you there too. Because frankly, we need this buccaneering, deal-making, hungry spirit now more than ever. Britain is in a global race to succeed today and you don’t need me to tell you that. Every day the people in this room are fighting to win contracts in Indonesia, India, Nigeria. Every week you step off aeroplanes in the South and East and feel the pace of change there. You know what the global race means because you’re living it. And I’m here today to tell you this Government gets it. We get that the world is breathing down our neck. And we get what British business needs. You need us to deal with our deficit. To cut business taxes so we can compete. To have a proper industrial strategy to get behind the growth engines of the future. To reform education so we turn out the brightest graduates and school leavers. To reform welfare so it pays to work. These are the key steps to Britain thriving in this global race. But it’s not just about policies, it’s about attitude. You need us to be tough. To be radical. To be fast.

If David Cameron’s discourse can be said to be more “specialist” than Obama’s, the Prime Minister nevertheless does not give up simple argumentation. In most speeches following UK_56, the world economy is compared to a global race in which every country runs alone and aims at winning the race. By conveying this view, the Prime Minister generally abides by a specific argument scheme:

GLOBAL RACE ARGUMENT
Premise 1: The twenty-first century sees a world of unprecedented economic change which is characterised by a highly-competitive economic environment.
Premise 2: The UK is running a global race for its economic future.
Premise 3: It risks being outpaced by other countries.
Conclusion: Therefore, it must run faster than others to compete for the jobs of the future.

The global race is no pastime, but “a race for the wealth and jobs of the future” (UK_61), a “race for our economic future” (UK_86), which has been launched by new powerful economies.

UK_61: The challenges come not from within this continent but outside it. From the surging economies in the East and South. Of course a growing world economy benefits us all, but we should be in no doubt that a new global race of nations is underway today. A race for the wealth and jobs of the future. The map of global influence is changing before
our eyes. And these changes are already being felt by the entrepreneur in the Netherlands, the worker in Germany, the family in Britain.

As shown by the example drawn from UK_56, the argument is generally accompanied by verbs, nouns and adjectives which pertain to the semantic field of speed.

**UK_56**: But there’s something else you desperately need from us, and that’s speed because in this global race you are quick or you’re dead.

**UK_66**: Now our economy has been beset by three fundamental problems: the biggest budget deficit in post-war history; a build-up of private debt, accompanied by a global banking crash; and third, an erosion of our competitiveness in an era when global competition and the global race for our economic future has rapidly accelerated.

**UK_71**: It is a world that would be barely recognisable to previous generations. We see competition that is more intense than ever before, involving more countries than ever before, who are more ambitious and determined than ever before. That is why I call it a global race.

Of course the world has always been competitive but the pace of the race has quickened, and more have joined.

Sometimes different semantic fields vividly contribute to shaping the linguistic implementation of the global race argument:

**UK_60**: At the heart of that commitment is one simple fact: Britain is in a global race. And that means an hour of reckoning for countries like ours. Some countries will sink; others will swim. And for Britain to be a success, we need to take the tough decisions that will enable us to compete and thrive. We need to fix the nation’s finances by dealing with our debts. We need to rebalance and rebuild our economy.

**UK_71**: The challenge before us is clear. We are in a battle for Britain’s future. And it is a battle we’ve got to fight on two fronts: at home, really ambitious about competing; and abroad, ambitious about pursuing our national interests.

Irrespective of the semantic fields involved, the global race is a competition, which is why the verbs to win and to lose occur frequently in the sub-corpus. An aggressive, competitive environment is what freedom and openness inexorably entail. In this respect, the global race argument might be viewed as a macro-argument entailing further crucial arguments of Cameron’s discourse, such as the argument for innovation and the topos of history:

**UK_90**: We have the scientists and technical expertise that is the envy of the world. This is Britain. Competitive, pioneering, creative, innovative. Our success in the global race hinges on playing to these strengths - on taking the country that led the agricultural revolution, the industrial revolution and the market-based revolution of the Eighties and equipping it to lead the economic revolution of today.
Moreover, it is generally accompanied by the *topos of bold action* and the *topos of urgency*, which basically aim at corroborating the idea that only by swiftly taking “bold decisions” (e.g. UK_17, UK_26, UK_49) will Britain outpace thriving economies and win the race. In this regard, unlike commitment to building the Big Society, running the global race is not about pondering about long-term, postponable actions.

The argument is also linked to more specific arguments such as the *argument for the creation of private-sector jobs*, because a thriving private sector plays a crucial role in helping Britain win the race.

**UK_70:** We are in the business of trying to turn our economy and our country round and give us the very best chance of succeeding in the *huge global race* that is taking place in our world. And if we are going to *compete and succeed and win* in that *global race*, it is *small businesses that are going to enable us to do that*. And that is why it is so important that you are here today.

**UK_96:** And it seems to me that we *should be trying to play to our strengths as a country*. That is the way we’re going to *win in the global race*. That is the way we’re going to turn this economy around. It’s the way we’re going to provide jobs and success for our people in the future. *And one of Britain’s strengths is its enterprise, is the small businesses that provide sixty percent of the private sector employment in our country.*

Despite the focus on innovation and competition, the peculiarity of the *global race argument* does not lie solely in its topicality. Over and above yielding notable descriptive insights into Cameron’s argumentation, analysis of this argument also provides fertile ground for studying the audience-dependent nature of argumentation. If it is true that the global race argument is amongst the most recurrent in the sub-corpus, it is also true that its presence is decidedly more remarkable in national speeches. In other words, David Cameron does not always make reference to the global race when dealing with the world economy, as the argument sometimes seems to be replaced by its opposite.

**UK_26:** But I want to make the case this morning for a new approach based on *cooperation*. Right now, we both face enormous challenges, from providing for our ageing populations and securing sustainable economic growth to protecting our countries against a global terrorist threat. The countries that will be successful in the 21st century will not be those that hunker down, that pull up the drawbridge, that fail to overcome their differences with others. *The successful countries will be those that work together.* [...]we can take another path that is open to us - to cooperate, to work together and therefore both win. Today, I want to make the case that *together we are stronger*.

**UK_41:** We both want to see a stable and successful Eurozone. When you look at the specific *collaboration and cooperation* we are talking about today on the economy, you can see the real benefits for both our countries.

**UK_97:** We also want to strengthen our *cooperation* in other areas, from research and science to high tech, and I’m delighted that in a couple of weeks we’ll be opening together one of the world’s largest digital trade fairs in Hanover.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

The fact that the above passages and those in which the global race argument is put forward are contradictory is undeniable, as Cameron’s convictions seem to waver: is Britain in favour of cooperation with other countries in all sectors of the economy or is it willing to compete alone in the global race for the jobs of the future?

Yet the choice of apparently incompatible arguments does not have to do with convictions but with the need to adapt argumentation to the relevant audience. Indeed, the appeals to cooperation are generally included in speeches delivered during bilateral meetings, in which the communicative event is generally governed by the rules of Politeness. In these settings, the global race argument would be perceived as highly impolite, as “addressing different audiences at the same time” and “avoiding face-threatening acts (FTAs) against other politicians” (Gruber 1993: 3-5) impose themselves as prerequisites of communication in bilateral meetings (see section 2.1.3). In other words, politeness is even more important than Britain’s competitiveness.

UK_16: We want to be promoting research and innovation, making sure there’s access to finance, reducing regulatory burdens and these are all areas where Britain and France will work together. We will also work together on the internal market and also promoting Doha and trade.

UK_65: And I hope one of the things we can have achieve on this visit, is for both the British side and the Indian side to look at any barriers there are to cooperation between us and work together to remove those barriers. That is certainly the spirit in which I come to India on this visit.

UK_97: That requires a more open, outward-looking, flexible and competitive European Union. We want to work together with our fellow leaders to deliver that change.

UK_101: That requires a more open, outward-looking, flexible and competitive European Union. We want to work together with our fellow leaders to deliver that change.

Therefore, unlike national speeches focusing on the need for Britain to outdo its competitors, the above passages rely on the Argument from Bilateral Economic Cooperation, that might be said to be intrinsic to political communication irrespective of the convictions of speakers:

ARGUMENT FROM BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Premise 1: We are living in an interconnected world.
Premise 2: Crisis in one country affects all other countries.
Premise 3: Moreover, trade barriers prevent cooperation between our countries and further jeopardise growth.
Conclusion: Therefore, solving the crisis by opening up trade and enhancing cooperation is essential for the sake of the world economy.

As regards international speeches, the global race argument generally serves the purposes of describing the riveting economic era inaugurated by the twenty-first century,
while appeals to cooperation mainly concern treaties and understanding regarding general orientations rather than actual economic cooperation.

**UK_49:** These five threats are very real. And let’s be clear, in a global economy they threaten us all. So by representing ninety percent of the world economy, the G20 is the right forum to work together to deal with these threats.

**UK_62:** But my argument today, the argument I want to make in front of you and the idea that the G8 will be driving forward this year, is that competing in the global race is not just about what we do at home, it is about the wider economy we’ll operate in, the rules that shape it, the fairness and the openness that characterise it. We need more free trade.

**UK_68:** Britain is engaged - as other countries are right now - in a global race. We see enormous shifts in wealth and power and influence in our world, as these fast-growing countries in the south and the east see huge changes and huge growth.

In other words, the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces of both arguments are “softened” in international settings, where a highly-diversified audience compels the speaker to care about Doppelung or “split illocution” (Gruber 1993: 3); regarding which, in international speeches the need for cooperation is hailed more frequently than the imperative of winning the global race, even though in relation to a different topic, namely the role of industrialised economies in helping developing countries. When the subject is addressed, Cameron often resorts to a specific form of argument from distress, that can be labelled argument from mutual interest in unilateral distress. It can be summarised by the following formal scheme, adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno’s argument from distress scheme (2008: 334):

ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS

Premise 1: Individual x is in distress.
Premise 2: If y brings about A, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress, simultaneously benefiting from providing help.
Conclusion: Therefore, y ought to bring about A.

In Cameron’s speeches, x is mostly African countries and generally the South of the World, while the role of y is played by industrialised countries. Cameron’s argument is slightly different from the general argument from distress, as the benefits of y’s intervention are mutual.

**UK_9:** One thing the British have been very active in trying to insert into this G20 is a free-trade area for Africa. Africa should be a growing part of the world economy, we should be lifting more people out of poverty in Africa, but we will not do it with all the trade barriers that exist between African countries.

**UK_49:** We also need to work towards a free trade area in Africa which […] could play such a vital role in helping Africa to lift itself out of poverty. […] I want you to campaign on trade on a similar case to the efforts of the NGOs on poverty. And for my part I pledge to make trade a core priority when Britain hosts the G8 next year. Because in the long term,
nothing could do more for jobs and growth, or for the alleviation of poverty across the world.

**UK_62**: So it is clear how devastating this can be for some developing countries. *But frankly all this matters, and should matter, to developed countries too.* When trade isn’t free, we all suffer. […] Trade between developing countries and within Africa is growing and we should work to encourage that further - and we must also continue to support the multilateral system.

**UK_71**: Last week I led an international effort to tackle hunger and under-nutrition – and yes, of course this is a moral issue, but it is an economic one too. Under-nutrition cuts Africa’s GDP by about eleven percent. Filling that gap, delivering on that goal – *of course that is good for Africans, of course that is good for Africa, but it’s good for us, too.*

In the light on the examples provided, Cameron’s “argument pro-Africa” can be said to rest on the following content-related scheme.

**ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS (‘ARGUMENT PRO-AFRICA’)**

Premise 1: Africa is in distress.
Premise 2: If Britain/Europe/international organisations expand free trade to Africa, they will relieve or help to relieve Africa’s distress, simultaneously benefiting from providing help.

Conclusion: Therefore, Britain/Europe/international organisations must expand free trade to Africa.

The argument basically aims at claiming that free trade must be extended to all developing countries, especially African countries, which will benefit the UK economy and help restore growth in the whole of Europe. However, it also seems to clash with the global race argument, that is put forward only in relation to the need to compete against the rise of new economies, i.e. China, Brazil, India. Therefore, rather than reflecting the speaker’s convictions, the argument seems to serve a specific pragmatic purpose: enabling the speaker to display his and his nation’s commitment towards a vague solution of the North-South divide, in an advertising move whose pragmatic effects should not be overlooked by any interpreter happening to process and translate a Prime Minister’s speech.

### 6.5 Britain and Europe. Argumentation at a Crossroads

The need to split illocution and produce vague and apparently incompatible arguments finds fertile ground in the speeches delivered by David Cameron within European settings. Regarding which, the subject requires framing. A useful starting point is the data drawn from Eurobarometer surveys. The following figures are drawn from Survey 415, entitled
“Europeans in 2014”\textsuperscript{5}. Figure 6.2 shows the results of a survey amongst the citizens of EU member states regarding their opinions about the future of the European Union.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{euroscepticism.png}
\caption{Euroscepticism in the UK}
\end{figure}

\textit{Euroscepticism} has always been a significant element in the politics of the United Kingdom, and figure 6.2 shows that it is still rife, as forty-seven percent of the British believe their nation “could better face the future outside the EU”. In this respect, Britain’s position within the EU is controversial, as it is a member of the European Union without having adopted the single currency. Data on UK scepticism regarding the Euro are displayed in figure 6.3.

\textsuperscript{5} The report can be downloaded from the website \textit{Eurobarometer – European Commission} and is available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_en.pdf (last accessed on 14\textsuperscript{th} January 2015).
Of all the members of the EU, the UK is the most disapproving towards a European economic and monetary union with one single currency. EU settings are, thus, delicate and potentially hostile communicative environment for the British Prime Minister, who produces highly vague, Doppelung-driven arguments. The passage drawn from UK_61 is a case in point.

**UK_61**: I know that the United Kingdom is sometimes seen as an argumentative and rather strong-minded member of the family of European nations. And it’s true that our geography has shaped our psychology. We have the character of an island nation - independent, forthright, passionate in defence of our sovereignty. We can no more change this British sensibility than we can drain the English Channel. And because of this sensibility, we come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional. For us, the European Union is a means to an end - prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within Europe and beyond her shores - not an end in itself. We insistently ask: How? Why? To what end? But all this doesn’t make us somehow un-European. The fact is that ours is not just an island story - it is also a continental story.

Cameron recognises that his country can be viewed as “an argumentative and rather strong-minded member of the EU”. This is because of its geography.

**UK_71**: This is how our country thrives: when we lead, when we strive to be more than the sum of our parts, the small island with the big footprint in the world.

**UK_80**: We may be a small island, but we are a great nation.

Yet the British are also European, given the “continental story” of their nation. Neither fact can be overlooked. However simple, this stance enables the Prime Minister to defend
conflicting interests at the same time, thereby pleasing the Eurosceptic British audience and the European audience alike.

Regarding the political role of the UK within the EU, Cameron’s “European” priority over the last few years has been dealing with the Eurozone crisis.

UK_38: Of course, the most urgent question of all facing Europe right now is how to deal with Eurozone crisis. And this is where I believe Europe needs to be boldest of all.

The label “Eurozone crisis” stands for the European sovereign debt crisis, the ongoing debt predicament which erupted in the wake of the Great Recession and involved several Eurozone member states. After the outbreak of the economic crisis, these states found themselves unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks without the support of supra-national institutions such as the ECB or the IMF; which has been the bone of contention of European debate since 2009.

Difficulties in dealing with the Eurozone crisis are dealt with exactly like difficulties in reducing the deficit in the UK, as the argument from deficit inheritance is systematically employed in EU settings as well.

UK_7: Britain has helped to put that vital issue on the agenda. Just as at home we inherited finances that were a complete mess, so too in Brussels we have inherited a budget deal completely out of touch with the economic situation we face across Europe.

Therefore, the non-culpability of Cameron’s government regarding the lasting debt crisis is similarly defended in EU contexts.

Also regarding the actions aiming at tackling the deficit predicament, David Cameron generally claims that the Eurozone crisis can be solved by the same means through which the British economic crisis is being solved, i.e. the reduction of public spending. In this respect, the argument for cutting the budget deficit through reduction of public spending is applied to the EU budget as well.

UK_7: First, Britain won backing from twelve other member states, including Germany and France, to put a stop to the six percent increase in the 2011 EU budget that was being senselessly proposed by the European Parliament. […] I believe that as a result of Britain’s intervention, the spotlight has now shifted to reining in the excesses of the EU budget.

The reason for arguing in favour of “reining in the excesses of the EU budget” mainly lies in the fact that the destinies of Europe and Britain are intertwined.

UK_52: This has been a long and painstaking summit, but it is important because we will not get the strong and lasting economic recovery we need back at home without strong action here in Europe.

UK_29: As the Chancellor has said, the single biggest boost to the British economy this autumn would be a lasting resolution to the Eurozone crisis.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

Europe is not blamed for the effects of the predicament in the UK. Yet what happens in Europe has an impact on Britain.

**UK_31**: So, first we must overcome the crisis of debt. The fact that the markets are not convinced that Eurozone countries are able to pay their debts is what lies behind the Eurozone crisis – and the biggest immediate boost to British growth would be a clear resolution of that crisis. […] But I don’t blame our ills only on the Eurozone crisis – of course not. Britain is outside the Euro. No one else is responsible for our own debts or our deficit.

In particular, even though the UK is not a member of the Eurozone, the Eurozone crisis significantly affects the UK. This is because Europe and Britain’s paths always intersect, giving rise to clashing and shared interests alike. The former concern the adoption of the single currency, while the latter revolve around the solution of the Eurozone crisis, which would benefit Britain as well, “not least because forty percent of our exports go to the Eurozone” (UK_24). In broader terms, the Euro has a huge impact on the countries which are not part of the Eurozone.

**UK_48**: Britain cannot cut itself off from what happens elsewhere. As our biggest trading partner, the problems in the Eurozone are affecting Britain too. As we prepare for the potential storms we should be both resolute and confident. Resolute because we will do what it takes to shelter the UK from the worst of the storms.

**UK_59**: Because the changes that the Euro is driving, of course are affecting the eurozone countries, but they also affect all of us. They affect the organisation that we are a member of, that we are a contributor to, that we are an important part of.

In this respect, the topos of the crisis as virus shows up in Cameron’s speeches, too.

**UK_49**: First, instability in the Eurozone - and the uncertainty and risk of contagion that brings.

Against the risk of contagion, Cameron’s priority lies, again, in the protection of British taxpayers.

**UK_7**: I am absolutely clear that Britain’s national interest, and our highest priority in Europe, must lie in protecting British taxpayers from reckless spending in Europe.

**UK_13**: We came into this European Council with a victory for commonsense on the 2011 EU budget. The European Parliament’s request for a 6% budget increase was decisively rejected and agreement on a much more limited increase of 2.91% was secured. This saves the British taxpayer several hundred million pounds compared with what could have happened if the normal processes were followed. […] and I believe it was our intervention that stopped that from happening.
UK_8: We prevented a crazy six percent rise in the EU Budget next year. We made sure that the budget reflects domestic spending cuts in all future years. And we protected the UK taxpayer from having to bail out Eurozone countries who get themselves into trouble.

In this respect, EU contexts of speech delivery systematically provide the British Prime Minister with the opportunity to put forward another Doppelung-driven argument regarding, broadly, the place of Britain in Europe and particularly the non-adoption of the single currency.

UK_1: Of course we are outsiders in one sense – we are not members of the euro and we will not join the euro. And that is absolutely right. But we have shared interests. We want the Eurozone to deal with its problems. We want it to be prosperous. We want it to be stable. That is not only in their own interests but in ours – about half of our exports go to the EU, overwhelmingly to the Eurozone.
And they want us to get our deficit down and restore Britain’s economic vitality – because we are the Eurozone’s largest export market; larger even than the US.

UK_16: We want a strong Eurozone. We want it to sort out its problems. We won’t stand in its way, but we are neither joining the Euro nor are we going to be drawn into fresh and new mechanisms within the Eurozone.

UK_21: Britain isn’t going to be joining the Euro, and so it is right that we shouldn’t be involved in the Euro area’s internal arrangements. That is why I secured in December a commitment which carves Britain out of future Eurozone bailout arrangements.

UK_33: We’re not in the Single Currency and while I am Prime Minister we will never join. We are not in the new Euro area bailout funds, even though we had to negotiate our way out it.

UK_94: So my priority at this council was to ensure that as part of these discussions it’s absolutely clear there can be no financial liability for Britain, whether in banking union or any future Euro area mechanism of loans or guarantees for Eurozone countries, just as we got Britain out of the EU Eurozone bailout mechanism. It is not our banking union, so we should not be paying for it.
That is what I’ve achieved. The conclusions make clear there will be no obligations on countries not participating in these areas. These conclusions also reiterate the importance of making the EU more competitive, completing the single market and cutting red tape for business.

These are pivotal reiterated convictions of the Prime Minister, which can be summarised by the following scheme:

**ARGUMENT AGAINST ADOPTION OF THE EURO**

*Premise 1:* Britain is not a member of the Eurozone and never will be.

*Premise 2:* However, stability in the Eurozone is in Britain’s interests, because it would enhance trade and benefit UK’s growth.

*Conclusion:* Therefore, we support EU efforts to solve the Eurozone crisis.
The strategy enables the speaker to assert his nation’s marked scepticism towards joining the Euro or, rather, its determination not to do so, while simultaneously displaying the willingness to implement reforms which will lift Europe out of the recession.

**UK_7**: There has been a discussion on Europe’s economic governance arrangements. *Britain is not a member of the Eurozone, and we will not be joining the euro, but stability in the Eurozone is in our national interest*, which is why we support Eurozone countries’ efforts to get their own house in order.

**UK_16**: Let me just say one word about the Eurozone and the importance of the Eurozone to Britain. About half of our trade goes to the European Union and about forty-four percent of it is with countries of the Eurozone. *Let me be absolutely clear: Britain is not a member of the Euro, we are not going to join the Euro*. As long as I’m Prime Minister there’s absolutely no chance of that happening. I believe we’re better off with our own currency and being able to have our own economic policy. *But let me be clear about something else: a strong and successful Eurozone is in Britain’s interests*. We want the countries of the Eurozone to sort out the difficulties and the problems that they have and we won’t stand in the way as they do that. Indeed, we will be a helpful partner in making sure that happens.

**UK_24**: On the euro, let me just repeat *Britain is not in the euro, Britain is not going to join the euro*, but we do want a successful Eurozone and a growing Eurozone, not least because forty percent of our exports go to the eurozone. So we want the eurozone to sort out its problems and its difficulties and we’ve been constructive in trying to help make that happen.

**UK_43**: *Britain is not in the euro. And it’s not going to join the euro*. So it’s right that we are not involved. *But it is important that we continue to ensure that vital issues such as the Single Market are discussed by all twenty-seven members.*

**UK_94**: There were also important discussions on the future of the Eurozone, and measures to strengthen economic and monetary union. As I’ve said many times before; *we’re not in the Eurozone, we’ll not be joining the euro*. *But it is in our interest to have a strong and stable single currency*. We support efforts to achieve that as long as Britain’s interests are protected.

As regards interpreting, comments are in order. First of all, the argument does not pose challenging passages for interpreters, at least as far as the propositional content is concerned. Yet it might sound controversial and lead interpreters to confusion. However vague from an illocutionary point of view, the argument lies at the heart of Cameron’s argumentation and accurate translation is required. It always gives rise to a recurrent formulation, a “split sentence”, in which the reluctance to join the Euro is “separated” from the assurance of Britain’s political will to solve the crisis by means of the adversative conjunction *but*. The sentence regularly sounds like “*We will not join the Euro but we struggle for stability in the Eurozone*”. Which could be translated into simple advice to interpreters: whenever you hear “*not join the euro*”, expect an adversative clause in which the pragmatic force of the first utterance is “softened” by reassuring the audience about Britain’s commitment to European problems.
The argument is generally not implicit. Only rarely is the argument expressed by stating solely the conclusion:

**UK_13**: Because it’s in Britain’s interest that we have a strong and stable eurozone, it was important to establish a permanent mechanism for bailing out eurozone countries who find themselves in financial difficulties.

**UK_16**: A strong and successful Eurozone is in Britain’s interests.

**UK_48**: As I have consistently said it is in Britain’s interest for the Eurozone to sort out its problems.

However, apart from the need to cut the EU budget and the alleged willingness to back Eurozone countries’ efforts, no specific proposals are put forward by the British Prime Minister. One of the few vague indications provided by Cameron to bring the crisis to an end lies, again, in liberalising trade and opening up the Single Market. Only thereby will growth start again in European member states.

**UK_36**: Today our discussions are focussed on the European economy, on the urgent need for a credible solution to the Eurozone crisis, and on how we can release the brakes on growth to generate wealth and jobs and enterprise. We both agree that the EU single market with five hundred million customers, eleven trillion of economic activity, this is a unique resource and we must make the most of its advantages.

More broadly, the imperative of balance occurs once again in EU settings, where “balance between the public and private sectors” is replaced by “balance between the EU and its members states”.

**UK_7**: When I arrived in Brussels yesterday, I made clear that getting a grip of EU spending was my top priority. I said at the time when many national governments around Europe, including ours at home, are taking tough steps to clamp down on dangerous deficits, it was completely unacceptable to be talking about large increases for the European budget. At this Council, we have indeed taken important steps to begin to bring the EU’s finances under control. […] Britain has secured an unprecedented and important new principle, one that, frankly, I think was long overdue: from now on, the EU budget will reflect the spending cuts being made by national governments.

**UK_8**: So from now on the EU budget must reflect what we are doing in our own countries. And it is quite apparent that almost every country in Europe is seeing very tough spending settlements.

**UK_16**: On the EU budget, you’ve seen very close relations between Britain and France and Britain and France and Germany and many of the other nations in Europe, where at European Council after European Council we’ve been coming together and saying how important it is that at a time when we are cutting spending in our own countries we should be doing the same thing in terms of European budgets. We are arguing for real restraint both over the next two years and also as we go into the European financial perspective.
UK_24: At a time when we’re having to make spending reductions at home I think our voters, our constituents, our publics want to see the European Union saving money, not spending money. We didn’t discuss the budget at this European Council, but I’m absolutely determined to keep making progress on the budget issue and winning allies and support for doing just that.

The above excerpts show that Cameron’s speeches on the EU budget convey a specific idea: it is governments controlling the EU, and not the other way around.

UK_7: At a time when we are making painful decisions at home to put our economy back on track, I will not allow Brussels to derail it.

UK_63: Now I have been determined to cut the spending limits, and so to cut the amount that Brussels can spend and, working with like-minded allies, I have achieved that today. Every previous time these multi-year deals have been agreed, spending has gone up. Not this time.

UK_58: And together we had a very clear message: we are not going to be tough on budgets at home and then sign up to big increases in European spending in Brussels. […] Mr Speaker, our objective for EU spending in the 7 years to 2020 is clear: we want to see spending reduced and will insist on at least a real terms freeze.

As shown by the above example, the argument is often signalled by the verb to freeze. Freezing the budget is described either as a propaedeutic activity or an alternative to actual cuts.

UK_57: So we’ve argued for a cut or, at the very least, a freeze in spending. […] Freezing the budget is not an extreme position, it is eminently reasonable. There is absolutely no reason why we shouldn’t be able to reduce the Presidency’s proposal down to the level needed. It is possible and it would not result, in my view, in hardship for any Member State. For instance, we could freeze in real terms the budgets for security and justice and external spending. That would make €7.5 billion of additional savings without actually cutting either of those budgets by a single euro. And there’s no excuse whatever for not taking a much tougher approach towards the EU’s administrative costs.

UK_63: As I’ve said repeatedly in parliament and elsewhere, I wanted to set the limit at a level that would deliver at best a cut in actual spending over the next seven years, and at worst a freeze.

The verb to freeze appears primarily in EU speeches and in speeches delivered at the House of Commons in the follow-up of a European Council meeting. Regarding which, the Prime Minister shows topical and argumentative consistency irrespective of the communicative contexts: British steadiness in controlling what happens in the EU is equally vaunted in national and EU settings.

In the light of the above examples, Cameron’s argumentation regarding the solution of the Eurozone crisis can be said to rely on a specific argument scheme:
ARGUMENT FOR SOLUTION OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS THROUGH REDUCTION OF THE EU BUDGET

Premise 1: Solving the Eurozone crisis is a priority for both Britain and Europe as a whole.
Premise 2: The Eurozone crisis has an impact on all member states, including those who have not adopted the Euro.
Premise 3: Any increase in the EU budget affects British taxpayers.
Premise 4: At a time when spending cuts are made by national governments, EU spending must similarly be curbed.
Conclusion: Therefore, we need to cut the EU budget to solve the Eurozone crisis and protect (British) taxpayers.

In this respect, together with the argument against adoption of the euro, the above scheme serves as a slogan which briefly verbalises the vague British contribution towards the solution of the Eurozone crisis. The protection of British taxpayers from potential damage brought about by the Eurozone crisis is the topical core of Cameron’s argumentation in EU settings, and commitment to the solution of the Eurozone crisis is systematically claimed.

Notably, the impact of the Eurozone crisis on Britain is addressed by relying on another argument typical of political communication, i.e. the argument from fear appeal (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 333):

Premise 1: If you do not bring about A, then D will occur.
Premise 2: D is very bad for you.
Premise 3: Therefore, you ought to prevent D if possible.
Premise 4: But the only way for you to prevent D is bring about A.
Conclusion: Therefore, you ought to bring about A.

In the British sub-corpus, D is generally the risk of increases in EU spending, burdening British taxpayers with further economic troubles, while A is the solution to D, i.e. cutting the EU budget. The implementation of the scheme by David Cameron can be inferred from the recurrent use of the noun fear:

UK_31: But fears about the immediate future are real. Paralysis in the Eurozone is causing alarm in the markets and having a chilling effect on economies in many countries – including our own.

Yet the fear appeal also depends upon other lexical choices, which serve the purpose of conjuring up the danger posed by the Eurozone crisis to national governments and, particularly, to British taxpayers.

UK_71: Now there will be those who succeed and those who fall behind. And let me state from the outset, I know how anxious people are. They wonder what all this means for us as a country. How will Britain compete? How will we cope? How will our children cope?

UK_48: We are living in perilous economic times. Turn on the TV news and you see the return of a crisis that never really went away. Greece on the brink; the survival of the Euro in question. Faced with this, I have a clear task: to keep Britain safe. Not to take the easy
course - but the right course. Not to dodge responsibility for dealing with a debt crisis - but to lead our country through this to better times.

The argument from fear appeal is closely related to the *topos of the irreparable*, which is recurrently used at the beginning of speeches to depict a threatening economic landscape:

**UK_38**: We meet today at a *perilous moment* for economies right across Europe. Growth has *stalled*. Unemployment is rising. *The prospect of Europe getting left behind is all too apparent.* While China grows at 8%, India at 7% and Africa at 5.5%, the European Commission forecasts the EU will grow by just 0.6 per cent in the whole of 2012 - and even that is assuming the problems in the Eurozone get better not worse. Yesterday in Britain we had the official figures for the final quarter of last year - and they were negative. Other large economies of Europe are forecast to have a similar outcome.

Just as Obama does, the strategy lies in proposing solutions to the allegedly irreparable situation:

**UK_38**: So this is not a moment to try and pretend there isn’t a problem. Nor is it a moment to allow the fear of failure to hold us back. This is a time to show the leadership our people are demanding. Tinkering here and there and hoping we’ll drift to a solution simply won’t cut it anymore. This is a *time for boldness* not caution.

Regarding the protection of British taxpayers from EU spending, an additional comment on the topicality of Cameron’s speeches in European settings is in order. Reference is frequently made to the *UK rebate* or *British rebate*, i.e. a system that provides the UK with a refund on a part of its contribution to the EU budget.

The rebate was negotiated by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984. The main reason was that a high proportion of the EU budget (more than seventy percent at the time) was spent on the *Common Agricultural Policy*. Yet, the UK had relatively few farms and, consequently, benefited much less than other countries from EU policy, because it received a small share of farm subsidies. The *CAP* now covers approximately forty percent of the EU budget, but the Prime Minister still defends the British rebate strenuously, because without it Britain would be the largest net contributor to the EU.

**UK_52**: The real negotiations are for later in the year but I wanted to put down a very clear marker about our priorities for the budget and I made it absolutely clear that the *British rebate is not up for renegotiation*; it is fully justified. Without it, we would have the largest net contribution in the EU. It would be double that of France or Italy and almost one and a half times bigger than Germany; so I will always defend that *rebate*.

**UK_58**: Mr Speaker, we have put a marker down at this Council. We stood up for the taxpayer.

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Together with like-minded allies we rejected unacceptable increases in European Spending. And we protected the UK’s rebate. We are fighting hard for the best deal for Britain. And that is what we will continue to do.

Government intervention is essential in safeguarding the rebate and, consequently, British taxpayers.

UK_63: Now of course I said I would also never in any way entertain any further changes to the British rebate. Attempts to undermine the rebate were made again and again at almost every meeting there’s been on this subject over the last few months. As ever it was attacked from every side, but I fought off these attempts. The British rebate is safe.

UK_75: However, in this process there was a further attempt to unpick the British rebate. In February, after repeated attempts to water down the rebate, we reached a clear deal that it would remain unchanged. This was reflected in the Council Conclusions that I reported back to this House. So this discussion was not necessary and it is frustrating and frankly unacceptable that we had to go through it. The proposal to remove our rebate on agricultural spending in new member states would have cost the British taxpayer over 1.5 billion pounds. It has now been categorically rejected. We will continue to get the rebate in the years ahead on the same basis that we do now. It is fair. It is right. And unlike the last government, this government will not agree to weaken it or give any part of it away.

The issue of the UK rebate is addressed during EU Council meetings and in subsequent discussions in the House of Commons, i.e. in European and national contexts alike. Cameron’s discourse on the Eurozone crisis can, thus, be said to hinge on another recurrent scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR DEFENCE OF THE UK REBATE**

*Premise 1:* Without the rebate on agricultural spending, the UK would make the largest net contribution to the EU.

*Premise 2:* The rebate is essential to ensure fairness in member states’ contributions to the EU.

*Premise 3:* The rebate has been regularly questioned in EU settings.

*Conclusion:* I have defended it and will continue to do so for the sake of British taxpayers.

In the light of the proposed excerpts, the Prime Minister’s argumentation regarding the solution of the Eurozone crisis appears heavily to rely on “split illocution”, given the heterogeneous audience of the speeches in question. Here lies the vagueness of Cameron’s speeches delivered in EU contexts or concerning Britain’s relationship with the EU: trying to please all audiences without irritating any of them, by relying on a convenient concept of the European Union:

UK_33: But I believe in an EU with the flexibility of a network, not the rigidity of a bloc.
6.6 Cameron’s Pragmatic Arguments

Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 outline the main content-related schemes adopted by David Cameron in dealing with the economic crisis. The disastrous legacy of Labour, the need to cut the deficit at both national and EU levels, rebalancing the economy, supporting the private sector, opening up trade, winning the *global race*, building the Big Society are the topical cornerstones of the Prime Minister’s argumentation. However, the descriptive account outlined in the previous sections is not enough either to provide a faithful overview of Cameron’s argumentative devices or to yield comprehensive suggestions for interpreting. Table 6.1, showing an excerpt of the analysis of *UK_17*, suggests that further argument schemes contribute to shaping Cameron’s discourse on the crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SPEECH PASSAGE</strong></th>
<th><strong>THEMES</strong></th>
<th><strong>ARGUMENT SCHEMES</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>It’s been four decades since you first invited European business leaders up this mountain and gave them a stark message <em>modernise and adapt - or fall behind and fail</em>. Forty years on, here we are again. No one can deny what a difficult position Europe is in at the moment. Four years of annual growth have been wiped out. Unemployment has risen to the double digits.</td>
<td>Scope of the economic crisis</td>
<td>PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, <em>recovery has begun</em>. But while economies like India, Brazil and China are steaming ahead in Europe, the drag on growth has persisted.</td>
<td>Persistence of the economic crisis</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR JOBS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indeed, Europe’s share of world output is projected to fall by just under a third in the next two decades. <em>And no one is immune</em>. This week, we had disappointing growth <em>estimates</em> back home. Yes, they were partly driven by the terrible weather which shut down airports, factories and schools - but let’s be frank. They also brought home something we have said for months: given the traumas of recent years, the recovery was always going to be choppy.</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>GLOBAL RACE ARGUMENT + ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>So as we meet at Davos, the big questions are these: How can we get our economies going? How can we get Europe going? How do we go for growth?</td>
<td>Need to get the economy growing again</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM FEAR APPEAL</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Slow recovery</td>
<td>TOPOS OF THE IRREPARABLE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Need to get the economy growing again</td>
<td>TOPOS OF CRISIS AS A CHALLENGE</td>
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Now, **there are some who say** that slow-growth status for Europe is inevitable. **They are the pessimists** - and this is their charter.

One - we in Europe are incapable of solving our **debt and deficit problems**.

Two - we’re unable to compete with **dynamic economies** because we’ll always be over-burdened with **regulation and bureaucracy**.

Three - we’re hardwired to be consumers and not producers.

And four - we’re attached to **liberal values** that are leaving us far behind the juggernaut of authoritarian capitalism.

Today, I want to make the case for **optimism** - for confidence in our future. We can overcome these problems but we do need a change of direction. **Huge deficits don’t just fall out of the sky.**

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<tr>
<th>Complex rules which restrict labour markets are not some naturally occurring phenomenon. <strong>Crushing regulation</strong> is not some external plague that’s been visited on our businesses. All of these result from decisions we have taken - alone or together. In many ways, we in Europe have been our own worst enemy.</th>
<th>Pessimists standing in the way of politics</th>
<th>STRAW MAN ARGUMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe’s backwardness with respect to emerging economies</td>
<td>Europe’s backwardness with respect to emerging economies</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stifling red tape, at national and EU levels alike</td>
<td>Stifling red tape, at national and EU levels alike</td>
<td>GLOBAL RACE ARGUMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR DEREGULATION</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR DEREGULATION</td>
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<td>Prototypical crisis-related argument (means-end)</td>
<td>Prototypical crisis-related argument (means-end)</td>
<td>Prototypical crisis-related argument (means-end)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Need to reduce the deficit</td>
<td>Need to reduce the deficit</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>STRAW MAN ARGUMENT</td>
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government debt in the EU is almost eighty per cent of GDP. Some countries are again borrowing five, six or seven per cent of GDP again this year. The figure for the UK is more than ten per cent. This is clearly unsustainable and action cannot be put off.

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<th></th>
<th>government debt in the EU</th>
<th>government debt in the UK</th>
<th>ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING + TOPOS OF URGENCY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Let’s put this in context. Remember what we started with in the UK: an economy built on the worst deficit, the most leveraged banks, the most indebted households, the biggest housing boom and unsustainable levels of public spending and immigration. And now think of where we need to go: an economy based not on consumption and debt but on savings and investment, not on government spending but on entrepreneurial dynamism, not on one industry in one corner of the country but on all our businesses in all our regions, with a new emphasis on manufacturing, exports and trade.</td>
<td>Effects of the financial and economic crisis</td>
<td>Means to solve the crisis and achieve sustainable economic recovery</td>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING + ARGUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR JOBS (“NEW ECONOMIC DYNAMISM”) + ARGUMENT FOR INNOVATION ARGUMENT FOR LIBERALISATION AND STRUGGLE AGAINST PROTECTIONISM</td>
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<tr>
<td>To get there isn’t easy. We can’t just flick on the switch of government spending or pump the bubble back up. Making this transformation - and it is a transformation - requires painstaking work and it takes time. It involves paying down billions of pounds of debt. New plants and factories need to be built. New products designed. New innovations taken to market. New businesses nurtured. It’s going to be tough - but we must see it through. The scale of the task is immense, so we need to be bold in order to build this economy of the future. The British people know these things.</td>
<td>Need for radical transformation of economic systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM SACRIFICE ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING ARGUMENT FROM SACRIFICE TOPOS OF BOLD ACTION ARGUMENTUM AD POPULUM</td>
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<tr>
<td>They understand there are no short-cuts to a better future. And already we’re making progress. Not long ago we were heading towards the danger zone where markets start to question your credibility. Yet in the past eight months we’ve seen our credit rating - which was on the brink</td>
<td>Success of political response to the crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES</td>
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of being downgraded - affirmed at the triple A level.

We’ve seen market interest rates - which were in danger of spiralling - actually fall. All this has happened not in spite of our plan to cut the deficit, but because of it. That’s why we must stick to the course we have set out.

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<th>Table 6.1 Excerpt of Analysis of UK_17</th>
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By comparing Cameron’s discourse to Obama’s, significant differences stand out. First of all, in the British sub-corpus, no anecdotal arguments are deployed. The noun *middle class* occurs only once, as emphasis is rather laid on balance between the public and private sectors; the middle class is not the hinge of argumentation, even though the resurgence of manufacturing is deemed to be one of the keys to Britain’s economic success. Moreover, *values* are only hinted at, particularly in relation to the Big Society argument. Undoubtedly, the verbalisation of values is intrinsic in political communication, and reference to values sporadically shows up. They are sometimes included to conjure up national history and landmark achievements.

**UK_11**: And we have the *values - national values* that swept slavery from the seas, that stood up to both fascism and communism and that helped to spread democracy and human rights around the planet - that will drive us to do good around the world.

More frequently, though, the values addressed by Cameron do not differ from those hailed by Obama. They are the *positive values* which are called for in times of speculation and irresponsibility.

**UK_2**: Freedom, fairness, *responsibility*: those are the *values* that drive this government; they are the *values* that will drive our efforts to deal with our debts and to turn this country around.

**UK_20**: When the welfare system was born, there was what we might call a *collective culture of responsibility*. More than today, people’s self-image was not just about their personal status or success it was measured out by what sort of citizen they were; whether they did the decent thing. […] Now let’s be honest about where we’ve travelled to, from there to here. That *collective culture of responsibility* - taken for granted sixty years ago - has in many ways been lost.

**UK_51**: The system we inherited was not only unaffordable. It also trapped people in poverty and encouraged *irresponsibility*. […] We inherited, quite simply, a mess of perverse incentives, mind-numbing complexity and real *unfairness*.

However, values are not the harbingers of Cameron’s *convictions* and the presence of the argument from values in the British sub-corpus cannot be said to be significant. Rather, Cameron’s rhetoric seems to be driven by a radically different stance. However important
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in times of crisis, values are not means to solve the plight or, rather, the restoration of values is not a priority. The economic crisis has compounded already serious debt predicaments. It has challenged nations’ abilities to do more with less. It has inaugurated the era of innovation. It has fuelled competition by launching the global race. It has unlocked wit. Now is the time for pragmatism.

Reference has already been made in chapter 4 to the fact that Cameron’s speeches are less wordy than those of the other corpus speakers (see section 4.2). The relative brevitas of the Prime Minister’s addresses is precisely determined, at least in part, by the scarce emphasis laid on values, resulting in fewer epideictic speeches delivered in national addresses with respect to, for instance, the American sub-corpus (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 72 – see section 5.2). Moreover, the institutionalised nature of EU, House of Commons and international speeches contributes to the relative terseness of Cameron’s speeches together with the Prime Minister’s predilection for “pragmatic” issues such as deficit reduction. However, Cameron’s “pragmatism” is not only determined by the rejection of value-driven discourse and the impact of constrained narrow contexts on text production, but also and particularly by the recurrent recourse to a specific class of arguments named pragmatic arguments:

Nous appelons argument pragmatique celui qui permet d’apprécier un acte ou un événement en fonction de ses conséquences favorables ou défavorables. Cet argument joue un rôle à tel point essentiel dans l’argumentation, que certains ont voulu y voir le schème unique de la logique des jugements de valeur : pour apprécier un événement il faut se reporter à ses effets (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 358).

By relying on pragmatic arguments, Cameron’s discourse sounds highly normative and instructional, thereby presenting the speaker as an expert on the economic crisis, both at national and international levels.

6.6.1 The Argument from Negative Consequences

In analysing Obama’s texts, reference has been made to the argument from negative consequences, that is used by the American President in relation to the prospective aftermath of political inaction (see section 5.1). The argument, aiming at spurring action to prevent the economic predicament from getting worse, is recurrently used by David Cameron as well. Take this excerpt drawn from UK_2:

UK_2: I want to set out for the country the big arguments that form the background to the inevitably painful times that lie ahead of us. Why we need to do this, why the overall scale of the problem is even worse than we thought and why its potential consequences, and the consequences of inaction, are therefore more critical than we originally feared. […] And I

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7 Since shorter speeches are, at least in theory, less repetitive (Castello 2008: 44), and since redundancy is likely to help interpreters understand and reproduce texts (Chernov 2004), a promising line of research in political interpreting could lie in the study of redundancy in ARGO speeches.
want to be equally clear about *what the potential consequences are if we fail* to act decisively and quickly to cut spending, to bring our borrowing down and to reduce our deficit. [...] *If we fail* to confront our problems *we could suffer worse*, a steady, painful erosion of confidence in our economy, because today almost every major country in the world is focusing on the need to cut their deficits. And the G20 has called on those countries with the biggest deficits to accelerate their plans for reducing them.

However, it is not used exclusively when dealing with the consequences of inaction. In its simplest form, the argument from negative consequences relies on this scheme (Walton 2006: 106):

*Premise:* If $A$ is brought about, bad consequences will plausibly occur.  
*Conclusion:* $A$ should not be brought about.

It is a sub-type of the *argument from cause to effect* (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 328):

*Major Premise:* Generally, if $A$ occurs, then $B$ will (might) occur.  
*Major Premise:* In this case, $A$ occurs (might occur).  
*Conclusion:* Therefore, in this case, $B$ will (might) occur.

This more generic argument also occurs, but Cameron generally focuses on the negative implications of a given course of action.

**UK_61:** The Union is changing to help fix the currency - and that has *profound implications* for all of us, whether we are in the single currency or not.

Examples have already been provided addressing the Prime Minister’s stance regarding the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the UK (e.g. **UK_48:** “the problems of the Eurozone are affecting Britain too”; **UK_59:** “the changes that the Euro is driving […] also affect *all of us*”). Yet, the argument from negative consequences is used to address all the pivotal topics of Cameron’s argumentation. In this regard, *pragmatic arguments* do not only concern the *content* of speeches but also the *form* in which it is presented. The above examples have shown that the argument from negative consequences is often expressed by means of conditional sentences; or, alternatively, it is signalled by the noun *implications*. Yet, the most recurrent indicator of the argument is the verb *to affect*. The term *consequence* is, hardly surprisingly, frequently associated with the argument.

**UK_2:** How we deal with these things *will affect* our economy and our society, indeed our whole way of life. The decisions we make *will affect* every single person in the country and *the effects* of those decisions will stay with us for years, perhaps even decades, to come. And it is precisely because these decisions are so momentous, because they all have such *enormous implications* and because we cannot afford either to duck them or to get them wrong, that I want to make sure we go about the urgent task of cutting our deficit in a way that is open, responsible, and fair.
UK_99: We’ve also reiterated that if Russia takes any further steps to destabilise Ukraine, there will be far-reaching economic consequences.

The argument from consequences is sometimes also found in its positive version:

UK_44: Infrastructure matters because it is the magic ingredient in so much of modern life; it is not secondary to other more high-profile elements of economic strategy, it affects the competitiveness of every business in the country, it is the invisible thread that ties our prosperity together.

However, despite showing the way to emerge from the crisis, Cameron’s argumentation seems to be characterised by insistence on the consequences of past and/or prospective actions.

6.6.2 The Slippery Slope Argument

If arguments like the *global race argument* seem to suggest a certain simplicity in the rhetoric of Prime Minister, there is a specific type of pragmatic argument that renders Cameron’s discourse one of the more “specialist” in the whole of *ARGO*: the *slippery slope argument*. Walton (2006: 107) provides the formal scheme, that suggests what the content-related implementation of the argument can be like:

**SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT**

First step premise: \(A_0\) is up for consideration as a proposal that seems initially like something that should be brought about.

Recursive premise: Bringing up \(A_0\) would plausibly lead (in the given circumstances, as far as we know) to \(A_1\), which would in turn plausibly lead to \(A_2\), and so forth, through the consequence \(A_2, \ldots, A_n\).

Bad outcome premise: \(A_n\) is a horrible (disastrous, bad) outcome.

Conclusion: \(A_0\) should not be brought about.

In simple terms, by putting forward a slippery slope argument, a speaker states that a relatively small first step leads to a chain of related events culminating in some significant effect, much like an object given a small push over the edge of a slope sliding all the way to the bottom. It is the argument from negative consequences *par excellence*, and the Prime Minister does not shirk from harnessing its pragmatic force.

As regards predictability and, thus, interpreting, the main “problem” with Cameron’s slippery slope arguments is that they are not related to a specific propositional content. The argument is sometimes adopted to explain the unfolding of events which have led to the crisis.

UK_66: We had over-indebted households borrowing from over-indebted banks. Banks lent more than they could afford to, spurred on by an irresponsible banking culture that rewarded short-termism and unmanageable risk-taking. And households borrowed more
than they could afford to, spurred on by an assertion that we had, somehow, ended boom and bust. *So when* the crash came, we in Britain did not just have over-indebted banks, over-indebted households and a big budget deficit, we had the most over-indebted banks, the most over-indebted households as well as the biggest budget deficit of virtually any country anywhere in the world.

A further interpreting problem engendered by slippery slope arguments is that they are characterised by relatively brief sentences which are usually uttered quickly, one after the other, to create a tight rhythm conveying the idea of inexorability. In this regard, solid contextual preparation on the crisis could partially cater for inability to follow the speaker’s fast reasoning, as it offers the opportunity to turn to “parallel formulations” (Straniero Sergio 2003: 159-160), i.e. contextually plausible albeit unfaithful utterances.

However, the slippery slope argument is alternatively adopted to anticipate the prospective negative implications of an ill-judged (at least in Cameron’s opinion) course of action. In these cases, the propositional content cannot be anticipated.

**UK_12**: So, at this time I am absolutely clear that our most urgent priority is to get the economy moving, to create jobs, to spread opportunity for everyone. If we let our debts *spiral out* of control, interest rates would go up, mortgage rates would rise and people would be hurt.

**UK_27**: Legislating now for a referendum, including on whether Britain should leave the EU, could *cause* great uncertainty and could actually damage our prospects of growth.

**UK_72**: *When* some companies don’t play by the rules, that *drives* more regulation and makes it harder for other businesses to turn a profit.

Moreover, the examples show that slippery slope arguments are challenging for interpreters because they mark passages in which the speaker turns to logical reasoning in order to persuade audiences. More particularly, they establish successive causal relations between clauses, thereby carrying a great deal of the speaker’s *convictions*.

However, even though the content of slippery slope arguments is not always predictable, *formal* remarks might help interpreters in their tasks, as happens for Obama’s anecdotal arguments. Incidentally, slippery slope arguments actually give rise to a narration of events. Like anecdotal arguments, they are often characterised by the succession of sentences linked by the temporal junctures *and* and/or *then*, which frequently follow the adverb of time *when*, opening the argument.

**UK_56**: But the truth is, Whitehall has become too risk-averse, too willing to say ‘no’ instead of ‘yes’. There are understandable reasons for that. *When* you have lobby groups lined up to criticise every action you take and Parliamentary Select Committees ready to jump on every bump in the road, *then* the rational choice is to be cautious – even over-cautious.

Further lexical indicators include *to affect*, *to mean*, *consequence*, *implication*.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

**UK_31:** The shortage of credit and lack of confidence affects some parts of the economy more than others. One of the markets that is particularly blocked is the housing market. The consequence of the credit crunch is that the lenders won’t lend, the builders won’t build and the buyers won’t buy. Nobody wants another borrowing boom but when first time buyers on a good salary can’t get a reasonable mortgage the market grinds to a halt. And that ricochets round the economy hitting builders, retailers and plumbers alike.

**UK_62:** Just over half of the EU countries are in the single currency, in the Euro. When you have a single currency you move inexorably towards a banking union, towards forms of fiscal union and that has huge implications for countries like the UK who are not in the Euro and frankly are never likely to join.

But slippery slope arguments are characterised, in particular, by a chain of sentences inextricably linked by a series of recurrent causative verbs, including to cause, to lead to, to drive and also to mean, adopted in its meaning of to imply.

**UK_51:** What these examples show is that we have, in some ways, created a welfare gap in this country between those living long-term in the welfare system and those outside it. Those within it grow up with a series of expectations: you can have a home of your own, the state will support you whatever decisions you make, you will always be able to take out no matter what you put in. This has sent out some incredibly damaging signals. That it pays not to work. That you are owed something for nothing. It gave us millions of working-age people sitting at home on benefits even before the recession hit. It created a culture of entitlement. And it has led to huge resentment amongst those who pay into the system, because they feel that what they’re having to work hard for, others are getting without having to put in the effort.

**UK_62:** When some businesses aren’t seen to pay their taxes, that is corrosive to the public trust. When shadowy companies don’t play by the rules, that drives more box ticking, more regulation, more interference and that makes life harder for other businesses to turn a profit.

**UK_66:** And it is, I think, hard to overstate the fundamental importance of low interest rates for an economy as indebted as ours, and also hard to underestimate the unthinkable damage that a sharp rise in interest rates would cause. When you’ve got a mountain of private sector debt, built up during the boom, low interest rates mean indebted businesses and families don’t have to spend every spare pound just paying their interest bills. In this way, low interest rates mean more money to spare to invest for the future. A sharp rise in interest rates as has happened in other countries which have lost the world’s confidence would put all of this at risk, with more businesses going bust and more families losing their homes.

The above examples suggest that slippery slope arguments mark fairly dense and tangled passages. In tackling these arguments, some elements of the speaker’s reasoning might easily be lost, in which case, some sort of strategy ought to be taken into consideration.

If the linguistic formulation and fast pace of delivery are likely to prevent accurate interpretation of all the links of the negative chain of events, a possible strategy consists in adopting a minimalist approach to the translation of the passage by stating at the outset that “if x is done, it will have serious implications on all sectors of the economy” or “if x is done, it will trigger a vicious circle”. The noun phrases “serious implications” and
“vicious circle” enable interpreters not to misrepresent the speaker’s illocution and take precautions in the event of prospective inability to reproduce the incoming string of related clauses.

However, the application of this strategy does not exempt interpreters from the “duty” accurately to convey information regarding the implications of the first step triggering the “sequence of events that will lead to some horrible outcome” (Walton 2006: 107). The advisable strategy is clearly one entailing “shuffling of words” and reformulation of the propositional content. For instance, the following passage drawn from UK_71 could be interpreted as follows.

**UK_71:** This country depends for its living on international ties and global trade. They *in turn* depend on global stability and security, and on there being global rules to abide by. *When* a country like Somalia fractures and breaks, that affects us not just in the region, not just in the terrorism threatened on our streets or the flows of mass immigration, but in the piracy off the Horn of Africa that *affects* British trade.

↓

**STRATEGIC REFORMULATION OF SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS**

This country depends on international ties and global trade, which in turn depend on stability and security. If a crisis breaks out in Somalia, it has *serious implications* here, coming from terrorism threats, immigration and hindrances to trade caused by piracy.

The passage has been reduced from seventy-four to forty-one words. The addition of the noun phrase “*serious implications*” enables *décalage* increase and detachment from the chronological and/or causal description of events through the retrieval of the described negative outcomes at the end of the passage.

A couple of other examples of possible ways to reformulate slippery slope arguments are shown below:

**UK_9:** This imbalance of money, this massive surplus of cash seeking out places to invest, *led to* all the problems of new bonds and financial instruments being created and the asset bubbles in the West that, *when* they burst, *caused* so much damage.

↓

**STRATEGIC REFORMULATION OF SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS**

Speculation in the West *was caused by* this imbalance of money, which has triggered a *vicious circle:* speculative bubbles, their ensuing bursting and damage to all sectors of the economy.

**UK_10:** Also, trade imbalances *have led to* an imbalance of funds - a wall of money in the East, a wall of debt in the West - *and this is what helped to* create the tidal wave that *helped cause* the booms that *helped pump up* the bubbles that *led to* the crash that *affected* us all.

↓

**STRATEGIC REFORMULATION OF SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS**

Trade imbalances have had *significant implications:* an imbalance between East and West, a boom-and-bust cycle, the bursting of the housing bubble and a widespread and severe crisis.
The reformulation of *UK_9* shows that the “reversal” of the causal relation between the elements enables interpreters better to grasp the first, crucial step of the chain. The strategy is implemented by replacing the causative verb “led to” with “was caused by”, which enables shifting of the first clause to later in the sentence, that starts, instead, with the second clause. Moreover, the addition of “vicious circle” further increases décalage and eases comprehension of the following links of the event chain. In addition, lexical reformulation enables “reduction” of the propositional content and preservation of illocutionary force (e.g. “all the problems of new bonds and financial instruments being created” = “Speculation”).

The reformulation of *UK_10* further shows the potential of the strategy in question: the addition of a general sentence like “x had/would have/will have significant implications” enables enhanced selective listening and subsequent gradual “listing” of the negative implications triggered by “trade imbalances”. Even though it might not solve the problems posed by slippery slope arguments, this strategy seems to be a more suitable approach than the option of chasing the speaker’s output in the attempt to grasp and reproduce a rapidly-uttered sequence of related events.

### 6.6.3 The Pragmatic Argument from Alternatives

Another pivotal pragmatic argument of Cameron’s discourse is the pragmatic argument from alternatives (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 333).

**PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES** (adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 333)

Premise 1: Either we bring about A, or B will occur.
Premise 2: B is bad or undesirable.
Conclusion: Therefore, we should bring about A.

By relying on this scheme, Cameron sets out the economic and financial conditions that, in his view, either Britain or the European community should respect to overcome the crisis.

*UK_26*: So we face a choice: we can settle for the status quo where in too many areas we are in danger of working against each other and therefore both losing out, or we can take another path that is open to us - to cooperate, to work together and therefore both win.

*UK_48*: The Eurozone is at a cross-roads. It either has to make-up or it is looking at a potential break-up. Either Europe has a committed, stable, successful Eurozone with an effective firewall, well capitalised and regulated banks, a system of fiscal burden sharing, and supportive monetary policy across the Eurozone. Or we are in unchartered territory which carries huge risks for everybody. As I have consistently said it is in Britain’s interest for the Eurozone to sort out its problems.
**UK_99:** Our message to Russia is clear: choose the path of diplomacy and de-escalation, or face increasing isolation and tighter and tighter sanctions. We’ve already seen 10% wiped off the value of the Russian stock market this month, reports of capital flight and down rated credit ratings.

The pragmatic argument from alternatives is generally found in the form “either A or B can be done”, with the conclusion left implicit. The “concealment” of the conclusion says a lot about the aim of the argument: showing two incompatible options, one of which is blatantly out of the question and the other is heartily recommended.

The argument does not pose particular problems for interpreters, with the exception of the fact that the opposition between two incompatible options verbalised by means of concise clauses is a hinge of Cameron’s argumentation, the reproduction of which is paramount.

Hardly less frequently is the argument implemented by means of more articulated formulations.

**UK_9:** The most important thing was for us to show we’re going to get on top of that deficit, we’re going to live within our means, we’re going to cut our expenditure over the coming years and we’re going to get rid of our structural budget deficit. The alternative to that is not some wonderland of continuous growth; the alternative to that is the markets questioning your economy, is your interest rates rising, is confidence falling and you see your economy go into the danger zone that others are currently in.

**UK_49:** The alternatives to action that creates a more coherent Eurozone are either a perpetual stagnation from a Eurozone crisis that is never resolved or a break up caused by a failure to address underlying economic fundamentals that would have financial consequences that would badly damage the world economy, including Britain.

**UK_66:** Now, of course, there are plenty of people out there with different advice about how to fix our broken economy. Some say cut more and borrow less, others say cut less and borrow more; “go faster”, “go slower”, “cut taxes”, “put them up”. I think we need to cut through all of this and tell people some pretty plain truths.

Irrespective of the linguistic implementation of the argument, though, the aim of the pragmatic argument from alternatives is always pursued consistently: an implausible course of action is presented to corroborate the one promoted by the speaker.

### 6.6.4 The Straw Man Argument

Cameron’s predilection for “aut aut argumentation” also results in a significant presence of straw man arguments (see sections 2.2.1 and 3.4).

**UK_2:** There are some who say that our massive deficit is just because we have been in a recession, and that when growth comes back everything will somehow be okay. But there is a flaw in this argument and it is rather a major flaw: we had a significant deficit problem way before the recession.
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UK_11: Now, there are some who say that Britain is embarked on an inevitable path of decline, that the rise of new economic powers is the end of Britain’s influence in the world, that we are in some vast zero-sum game, in which we are bound to lose out. I want to take that argument head on. Britain remains a great economic power. Show me a city in the world with stronger credentials than the City of London.

UK_17: Now, there are some who say that slow-growth status for Europe is inevitable. They are the pessimists.

UK_31: Yes, there are some who seriously try to argue that additional spending and borrowing will actually lead to less debt in the end despite the fact that no evidence supports this assertion.

UK_62: Now some just say “well, let these events unfold naturally”. I say no.

UK_88: Now, there are those who say a nation’s prosperity is determined by its geography, or its climate, its religion. I say nonsense.

UK_95: There are still people who think that the key to success is ever greater social protections and more regulations.

More examples could be listed, as the straw man argument appears dozens of times in the sub-corpus. As regards interpreting, bearing its aim in mind is crucial, as the straw man argument basically serves the same purposes as the argument from alternatives: exaggerating the position contrary to the one that is actually promoted, in order to “make it less tenable” (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 73), “to make it look implausible” (Walton 2004: 17) and easier to harness to corroborate its opposite.

6.7 The Argument from Authority

Pragmatic arguments render Cameron’s discourse rather authoritarian. The slide towards excessively normative and subjective argumentation is, however, prevented by means of a crucial argument, the argument from authority.

Il existe une série d’arguments, dont toute la portée est conditionnée par le prestige. […] L’argument de prestige le plus nettement caractérisé est l’argument d’autorité, lequel utilise des actes ou des jugements d’une personne ou d’un groupe de personnes comme moyen de preuve en faveur d’une thèse (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 : 410-411). (my emphasis)

The formal scheme on which the argument from authority hinges is provided by Reisigl (2014: 76):

ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY (adapted from Reisigl - 2014: 76)
Premise 1: If authority x says that A is true/that A has to be done, A is true/A has to be done.
Premise 2: x says that A is true/that A has to be done.
Conclusion: Thus, A is true/ A has to be done.

In practical terms, this means that all Cameron’s arguments are frequently backed by the opinion of an expert in the field or matter in question, which corroborates the Prime Minister’s argument by bestowing credibility and objectivity upon it.

UK_6: And the IMF and OECD, you, the CBI, and the thirty-five business leaders who wrote to the Daily Telegraph last week have backed the approach we have taken in tackling the deficit.

UK_22: From Edmund Burke and Adam Smith in the 18th century, from Hegel and de Tocqueville in the 19th, to Hayek and Oakeshott in the 20th - all have been clear that individual freedom is only half the story. Tradition, community, family, faith, the space between the market and the state - this is the ground where our philosophy is planted.

UK_29: The greatest mistake the global economy could make is a slide towards protectionism. The WTO report sets out all the protectionist measures that have been taken in G20 countries over the last year. And these are a cause for concern. The G20 reaffirmed its pledge not to take protectionist actions.

UK_49: And over the next few years, the IMF predict faster growth in Britain than any other major European economy.

UK_62: This is the argument that’s been made brilliantly by the economist Paul Collier and I’m delighted that he’s been advising my government ahead of this G8.

UK_86: Ernst and Young now say Britain is the best place in the world for new entrepreneurs. Today the World Bank has recognised that we have improved access to credit, improved protection for investors, simplified the tax burden and made it easier and faster to register property.

UK_88: It was Amartya Sen who wrote of the remarkable empirical connection between political freedoms and economic prosperity.

Renowned philosophers, leading economists, prestigious institutions all contribute to render Cameron’s argument more acceptable. Therefore, their recurrent presence and pivotal function deserve attention during interpreting activity. Generalisations like “most economists” or “several organisations” might be used as a last resort strategy; however, whereas the quoted philosophers and economists might be unknown to some interpreters, the institutions to which Cameron makes reference are more easily recognisable. Apart from EU bodies, occurring consistently throughout the sub-corpus, the most frequently quoted organisations include the IMF (thirty-five occurrences) and the WTO (twelve occurrences).

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8 Several and varying philosophers and economists are mentioned in the premises of the argument from authority. Their names are, therefore, not recurrent, with the exceptions of Amartya Sen and Paul Collier.
However, interpreting problems engendered by the argument from authority lie, rather, in numbers and quotations.

Regarding the former, “authorities” are often “involved” to display numbers, i.e. reliable data supporting a thesis.

**UK_72:** According to Kofi Annan’s Africa Progress Panel, twelve of the twenty-five countries in the world with the highest child mortality rates are resource-rich African countries.

In this regard, when hearing proper names of economists, philosophers or institutions, interpreters ought to be prepared to write down figures accurately and possibly retrieve them later during interpretation.

As regards, however, quotations and direct speech, they can be anticipated by Cameron’s recurrent recourse to the clause “and I quote”:

**UK_7:** We have issued a joint letter, which makes clear that a 6% increase is, and I quote, “Especially unacceptable at a time when we are having to take difficult decisions at national level to control public expenditure”. More than that, the joint letter goes on to say, and I quote, “We are clear we cannot accept any more than the 2.9% increase being proposed by the Council”.

**UK_26:** President Medvedev has emphasised his focus on tackling corruption as being fundamental to Russia’s progress. Back in June he said that Russia’s focus needs to include, and I quote, “Real progress in fighting corruption, establishment of a modern police force and other law enforcement agencies, and efforts to make the judicial system more effective”.

If possible, the entire quotation should be translated. Alternatively, the passage could be translated as reported speech and, if necessary, generalised.

### 6.8 Comments on Lexical Peculiarities

Since deficit inheritance and deficit reduction are the topical core of Cameron’s speeches, a comment is in order. In February 2013, the British Prime Minister was formally reprimanded by the UK Statistics Authority for creating confusion between *debt* and *deficit*.

In these austere days, some of us have belatedly learnt how to tell a “debt” from a “deficit”. Debts are something we all run up; a deficit is not something we think about in everyday life, though perhaps we should: it is the measure of how much the money going out exceeds the money coming in. The latest person who has had to be given this basic lesson is David Cameron. The Prime Minister made a false claim – not in an unguarded moment but during a scripted political broadcast – that the government is “paying down Britain’s debts” (McSmith 2013).
While the United Kingdom national debt is the total amount of money owed by the British Government to its creditors at any given time, the Government budget deficit is the Public Sector Net Cash Requirement (PSNCR), i.e. the rate at which the Government borrows money. Therefore, despite Cameron’s claim that the government is “paying down Britain’s debts”, his administration has been attempting to reduce the deficit, not the overall debt. The latter will in fact continue to rise even if the deficit shrinks. In the article drawn from The Independent, no mention is made of the speech in which David Cameron pronounced the criticised expression “paying down Britain’s debts”. Yet evidence can also be found in the British sub-corpus of ARGO.

UK_15: Now, of course government has got to pay down its debts in a way that helps growth rather than hinders it.

UK_17: Making this transformation - and it is a transformation - requires painstaking work and it takes time. It involves paying down billions of pounds of debt.

Regarding innovation, instead, the recurrent appeal to attract foreign investors is often accompanied by the expression “Britain is back open for business” (e.g. UK_5, UK_17, UK_22, UK_54), after which the Prime Minister sometimes apologises for giving “a little/brief commercial” (e.g. UK_9, UK_49).

As far as Cameron’s brevitas and pragmatism are concerned, they give rise to a further significant difference between his argumentation and that of Obama’s. Unlike the American President’s speeches, Cameron’s discourse does not hinge on recurrent expressions but on recurrent ideas, convictions or arguments whose linguistic implementations vary, albeit slightly, from speech to speech. In this regard, discourse patterns concern keywords and recurrent phrases such as “building the Big Society” which seem to be a consequence of the reiteration of arguments rather than the “traces” of the “linguistic and episodic memory of the speaker” (Reisigl 2010: 243).

Some of these keywords and expressions should, however, be internalised by interpreters, as they are the lexical and expressive foundation of the Prime Minister’s argumentation. They include private-sector jobs, imbalance, deregulation, protectionism, reducing public spending, freezing the budget, building the Big Society, winning the global race, opening up the economy, completing the Single Market, There are some who say that.

A further, final comment regarding the “favourite” presentational devices of David Cameron is in order. In analysing the British sub-corpus, the massive recourse to modal expressions stands out. Particularly, parenthetical verbs (high among them I think, occurring two hundred and thirty-five times in the sub-corpus), modal verbs (should) and adverbs (absolutely, actually, frankly) proliferate in the texts. Take the following excerpts drawn from UK_9:

UK_9: I think we should just take a moment to think about the country we’re in […] We should try and remember that actually, in the life of an economy, anything is possible. [...]
So the first thing I think we should bear in mind […] The second point I want to make is, I think, how important it is that […] the three things that I think are absolutely essential […] I think we have a great story to tell. […] let me defend for a moment what I think is absolutely necessary for those countries like mine that have large fiscal deficits, we absolutely have to deal with them.

Even though their adoption may seem unwitting, modal expressions are chosen intentionally in political speeches for relativisation and “softening” purposes (Gruber 1993: 19) and significantly modify the pragmatic force of utterances. As regards David Cameron’s speeches, the significant presence of modal expressions appears to be ascribable to the Prime Minister’s need to mitigate the force of his normative arguments, especially that of pragmatic arguments. For instance, in EU settings, they seem to aim at adjusting the controversial character of a euroscepticism-oriented stance without depriving it of persuasive force.

Highlighting Cameron’s recourse to modal expressions might seem pointless at first glance. However, considering interpreters’ tendency to arbitrary modalisation through the recurrent use of connective fillers liable to mitigate or intensify the perlocutionary force of statements (Colucci 2011: 77), drawing attention to the speaker’s modalising routines is essential. Together with the described arguments, they perform a pivotal pragmatic function; respect for the speaker’s choices is, therefore, paramount, and even attention to apparently superfluous expressions like “I think” could contribute to the faithful “explicitness of argumentative links” (Marzocchi 1997: 183) and the preservation of the argumentative orientation of Cameron’s speeches.
Chapter 7

The French Sub-corpus Analysed - Sarkozy

The French text collection is the only one among the sub-corpora of ARGO which contains speeches delivered by two speakers: Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. The presidential handover took place in 2012, which provides this study with the opportunity to analyse even more diversified speeches with respect to the American and British sub-corpora. In particular, the study of two speakers sharing the same language, culture and communicative contexts of speech delivery is bound to shed light on the subjective nature of argumentation and the party-related adoption of argument schemes. Moreover, a few campaign speeches (from FR_48 to FR_53) are included in the collection of Sarkozy’s texts which, thus, provide the opportunity to analyse argumentation in “a particular case of ‘sub-genre’ characterised by a specific (though sometimes covert) perlocutionary intention, aimed at committing the receiver to a precise form of behaviour, i.e. casting a vote in favour of the party represented by the speaker” (Garzone & Santulli 2004: 361).

Therefore, the comments regarding the French texts differ from those in chapters 5 and 6. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are based on less substantial sets of data, as fifty-three speeches were delivered by Sarkozy and fifty by Hollande; however, they provide sufficient material for gleaning insight from the speakers’ argumentative patterns and furthering the study of the relative character of arguments.

Figure 7.1 offers an overview of the French speeches based on the context of speech delivery.
The proportion between national and non-national speeches is even in the collection of Hollande’s texts. Sarkozy’s addresses in front of French audiences, instead, outnumber those delivered beyond national borders, even though to a lesser extent than Obama’s texts (see section 5.2). As with the American sub-corpus, the disproportion is indicative of the significant presence of values as premises of argumentation. However, distinguishing between national and non-national speeches when it comes to Nicolas Sarkozy is a less relevant issue, as the speaker’s main arguments generally recur irrespective of text typology.

7.1 Nicolas Sarkozy and the Crisis

Though his mandate ended in 2012, Nicolas Sarkozy has already entered history as one of the world’s leading politicians associated with the 2008 financial and economic crisis. When the crisis broke out, he was already President of the French Republic, which partially explains the pervasiveness of the term “crise” in his speeches. It is, indeed, “un des termes favoris de Sarkozy” (Mayaffre 2012: 37), occurring six hundred and eighty-two times in his ARGO speeches, that is to say thirteen times per speech on average.

**FR_3:** Mais la crise n’est pas finie. Et elle aura des conséquences. Cette crise n’est pas une crise française. Ce n’est pas une crise européenne. C’est une crise mondiale. Cette crise, ce n’est pas une crise conjoncturelle. Ce n’est pas un accident. C’est une crise structurelle. Cette crise n’est pas une parenthèse qui sera bientôt refermée.

**FR_11:** Mais la crise nous appelle à multiplier les initiatives pas à les stopper. Ce qui compte, c’est que l’on ait des résultats devant une crise d’une ampleur jamais vue et, surtout ce qui est très frappant, c’est une crise dont les paramètres n’ont jamais été réunis de cette façon. Personne n’ayant vu une crise de cette nature, il faut se garder de toute idéologie, être extrêmement pragmatique, extrêmement réactif, ne pas faire d’erreurs, agir au bon moment.

**FR_19:** Il y a eu la crise, la violence de la crise, les souffrances de la crise.

**FR_34:** Ce que l’on appelle la crise de la dette souveraine qui frappe l’Europe de plein fouet, c’est la même crise qui se poursuit. C’est la crise de la dette privée qui se prolonge en crise de la dette publique. C’est la même crise, qui après avoir frappé les banques, frappe les États. Cette crise frappe tous les grands pays développés.

**FR_50:** Le monde sort de quatre années de crise d’une violence inouïe, crises multiples, financière, économique, qui ont été à deux doigts d’emporter les plus grands pays du monde.

However, the recession is not only addressed with the word “crisis” but also in more vivid terms.
FR_7: Le monde n’est pas passé loin de la catastrophe parce que le monde s’était habitué au profit dans n’importe quelle condition, à des banques qui prétaient n’importe comment à n’importe qui.

FR_29: On n’avait pas le choix, on n’avait pas le choix parce qu’on était au bord du précipice.

FR_36: Dans la tempête, vous avez souffert. Je sais que la vie de beaucoup d’entre vous déjà éprouvée par deux années difficiles a été une fois encore durement mise à l’épreuve.

FR_46: Mais je veux dire, pour que chacun le comprenne, que nous avons échappé à une catastrophe.

FR_51: L’Europe est passée au bord du gouffre.

The terms “précipice”, “gouffre”, “tempête” and “catastrophe” recur in Sarkozy’s text collection, thereby contributing to bestowing vividness on the President’s addresses. In this regard, the choice of equivalent or similarly vivid lexical items is the prerequisite for guaranteeing argumentative equivalence in the IT.

As with Obama’s speeches, the crisis is exceptional, which is in most cases signalled by the adjectival phrase “sans précédent”.

FR_1: Si j’ai voulu m’adresser ce soir aux Français, c’est parce que la situation de notre pays l’exige. Je mesure la responsabilité qui est la mienne dans les circonstances exceptionnelles où nous nous trouvons.

FR_7: Face à cette crise financière sans précédent, doublée d’une crise économique sans précédent, l’Europe a demandé la réunion des chefs d’Etats du G20 qui a eu lieu à Washington.

FR_10: Le système financier mondial a prospéré sur ces déséquilibres. En recyclant les excédents financiers pour financer les déficits, oui, Angela, il a permis, autorisé des déséquilibres sans précédent.

FR_48: Monsieur le Maire, cher Jean-Paul, vous tous, vous savez, mes chers amis, durant ces cinq années de ce quinquennat, j’ai connu quatre années où nous avons eu à faire face à des crises sans précédent, des crises immenses, des crises que le monde, que l’Europe et que la France n’avaient pas connues sans doute depuis bien longtemps. […] Quand ce cauchemar est passé, nous avons dû affronter une crise économique sans précédent.

The crisis is not only unprecedented, it was also unexpected.

FR_3: Le monde change : il n’a pas fallu plus de quelques semaines pour que cette idée s’impose alors qu’il y a un mois c’était encore impensable.

FR_50: Ce qu’on pensait impossible s’est avéré banal. On pensait impossible qu’une banque fasse faillite, une des plus grandes banques du monde aux Etats-Unis a fait faillite
en quelques semaines. *On pensait impossible* que de grands pays ne trouvent pas de prêteurs pour financer leur dette, *ce qui était impossible* est devenu banal.

**FR 52**: Peut-être vous souvenez-vous qu’aux confins de 2008 et de 2009, l’*impensable s’est produit*, le système bancaire mondial a implosé. Deux des cinq premières banques américaines ont fait faillite. Le monde entier s’est alors demandé : *Est-ce que ma banque va faire faillite ?*

**FR 53**: Lorsque la crise a frappé, dès 2008, et lorsque *nous avons vu l’impensable*, deux des plus grandes banques américaines disparaît d’un trait de plume, en quelques jours ! […] Je dois le dire : jamais, je n’aurais pu penser, imaginer que l’*impensable* se produise.

In presenting the crisis, generally at the beginning of speeches, Sarkozy’s discourse resembles Cameron’s and, particularly, Obama’s. The crisis is serious, *unprecedented*. Yet, it is systematically related to the financial and economic crisis of the Thirties.

**FR 3**: Et c’était indispensable pour éviter ce qui s’est passé dans les années 30 quand l’effondrement du système bancaire a plongé l’économie mondiale dans ce qui est resté dans l’histoire comme la plus grande crise économique du XXe siècle.

**FR 17**: Je n’accepterai pas que ceux qui nous ont plongés dans la *crise la plus grave depuis 1930* soient autorisés à recommencer comme avant.

**FR 26**: Nous avons traversé en 2009 *la pire crise que l’économie mondiale ait connue depuis les années 30*.

**FR 34**: Nous risquons de refaire pas à pas le chemin tragique qu’a emprunté le monde dans les années 30.

**FR 50**: Sans doute, depuis le début du 20ème siècle, *la fameuse crise de 1929*, jamais le monde n’avait été confronté à autant de difficultés financières et économiques. Ce qu’on pensait impossible s’est avéré banal.

The findings of the analysis of *ARGO* thus show that the argument by analogy, used to compare the present crisis to that of the Thirties, is topic-related. In other words, the argument is employed systematically by the speakers to define and describe the current predicament. However, certain differences stand out.

Firstly, as with Cameron’s texts, mention of the *Great Depression* appears only once (*FR 34*). Specific reference to the *Great Depression* is, thus, exclusively American.

Secondly, the “Lincolnian” advice to adopt *new means* to tackle a *new crisis* does not occur in Cameron’s texts, though it can be said to be implied in the *global race argument* and the *argument for innovation*; yet, it appears sporadically among Sarkozy’s speeches, more precisely, four times.

**FR 3**: Le XXIe siècle ne peut vivre avec les institutions du XXe.

**FR 23**: On ne peut pas gouverner le monde du XXIe siècle avec les règles du XXe.
FR_42: C’est qu’au XXIe siècle, les idéologies du XXe, cela ne marche pas.

FR_44: Je voudrais vous dire ma conviction absolue qu’on ne peut pas répondre à la problématique du XXIe siècle avec les idéologies du XXe.

Reference to the Lincolnian “solution” of the crisis is certainly not as significant as in the American sub-corpus. However, the occasional suggestion to adopt new, adapted means might be indicative of the fact that the former American President’s advice has become mainstream in political communication.

Thirdly, the comparison between the 2008 and 1929 crises hinges not only on the argument by analogy but can also be said to imply the topos of history.

The topos of history can be described as follows: because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to. A specific subtype of this argumentation scheme is the already Ciceronian topos of historia magistra vitae (Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 80).

Here lies the strategic function of referring to the past crisis: reassuring the audience by claiming that lessons have been learnt from the past. The topos of history can thus be said to rely upon the following formal scheme:

**TOPOS OF HISTORY**

Premise 1: Today’s situation is like situation x in the past.

Premise 2: Mistakes were made then, but we have learnt important lessons from those mistakes.

Conclusion: Therefore, we will not make the same mistakes.

However, the actual implementation of this argument in ARGO is far more complex and diversified. Chapter 5 and 6 have shown that reference to “learning lessons” is generally not made but left implicit in Obama and Cameron’s speeches. Unlike Obama and Cameron, Sarkozy frequently insists on the fact that lessons have to be learnt from crises. Yet, the lessons learnt from the 1929 crisis are only occasionally addressed, with emphasis being laid rather on the need to learn lessons from the current crisis “pour éviter justement qu’il y en ait d’autres” (FR_3).

FR_1: Il faut tirer les leçons de la crise pour qu’elle ne se reproduise pas. Nous venons de passer à deux doigts de la catastrophe, on ne peut pas prendre le risque de recommencer. […] Je redis donc, à quel point il me paraît nécessaire que les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement des principaux pays concernés se réunissent avant la fin de l’année pour tirer les leçons de la crise financière et coordonner leurs efforts pour rétablir la confiance. J’ai fait cette proposition en plein accord avec la chancelière allemande, Madame Merkel, avec qui je m’en suis entretenu et qui partage les mêmes préoccupations à propos de la crise financière et sur les leçons qu’il va falloir en tirer.

FR_23: Que les choses soient claires : je ne suis pas venu ici en tant que responsable politique pour donner des leçons à quiconque, mais pour vous dire que tous ensemble nous
devons tirer les leçons de la crise. Pourquoi on doit tirer les leçons tous ensemble ? Parce que nous en sommes tous responsables. Et parce que, surtout, nous sommes responsables du monde que nous allons laisser à nos enfants.

FR_34: À la fin des années 70, par une sorte de retour du balancier, l’idéologie du laisser-faire a triomphé au point de faire oublier au monde toutes les leçons qui avaient été tirées de la Grande Dépression des années 30. […] On défend mieux sa souveraineté avec des alliés, que tout seul. C’est la grande leçon de l’histoire du XXème siècle. […] L’Europe se refondera en tirant pragmatiquement les leçons de la crise.

Here lies the opportunity offered by the crisis according to Nicolas Sarkozy: it is the opportunity to learn lessons and change, because the current predicament is fundamentally different from the crisis of the Thirties. Regarding interpreting, the argument is not particularly challenging but calls for lexical equivalence and the reproduction of the pivotal expression “tirer les leçons”, whereby the conclusion of the argument is conveyed.

FR_7: Parce que nous sommes face, nous, le monde, à une crise financière sans précédent. Face à cette crise, il y a deux attitudes. La première consisterait à continuer comme avant, sans tirer aucune leçon des erreurs du passé. La seconde consiste à faire de cette crise sans précédent, une opportunité pour changer le monde.

FR_34: La crise est d’abord un révélateur de nos faiblesses. Mais pour peu que nous sachions en tirer les leçons, les crises nous indiquent aussi la voie à suivre pour reconstruire et elles donnent à la politique une responsabilité et un champ d’action au fond sans précédent depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale parce qu’il faut tout imaginer, tout réinventer.

Sarkozy’s argument from crisis exceptionality can thus be said to hinge on a specific content-related scheme, whereby the speaker describes the crisis by encompassing the argument by analogy, the topos of history and the topos of crisis as an opportunity.

SARKOZY’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY (OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN LESSONS AND CHANGE)
Premise 1: The present economic crisis is the worst economic crisis since the Thirties.
Premise 2: Lessons have been learnt from the past predicament, which is similar to the current crisis only as far as its scope is concerned.
Premise 3: Today’s crisis is, thus, fundamentally new.
Premise 4: It offers the opportunity to learn lessons from our mistakes and change our behaviour.
Conclusion: Therefore, we must learn the lessons of the current crisis and reshape our politics and our economy.

This crucial introductory argument already shows a peculiarity of Sarkozy’s argumentation. It is meticulous, comprehensive and takes nothing for granted.
7.2 Not only an Economic and Financial Crisis

Another peculiarity of the discourse on the crisis appears to be the topos of crisis contagion, which is, however, implemented with significantly different meanings by the corpus speakers. If Obama sees the crisis as a virus spreading all across the country and sparing nobody, and Cameron is afraid of the contagion of the Eurozone crisis to countries that are not part of the Eurozone, the infectious nature of the recession is addressed by Sarkozy in a substantially different, non-geographical sense. The economic crisis is a fact, yet it is not the primary concern of the former French President.

FR_2: La crise bancaire et financière qui a commencé à l’été 2007 s’est aggravée au cours des dernières semaines. Nous sommes désormais confrontés à une crise de confiance sans précédent qui menace de paralyser l’économie mondiale.

FR_27: Et le 18 septembre 2008, le monde stupéfait assiste à l’impensable : la faillite d’une des plus grandes banques du monde, américaine. La confiance s’évapore et tout s’écroule.

FR_34: L’effondrement de la confiance paralyserait tout. Les Français s’appauvriraient... Nous n’avons pas le droit de laisser se produire un tel désastre. Prenons la crise de l’Euro pour ce qu’elle est : une crise de crédibilité, une crise de confiance.


The real problem to be faced by politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century is a widespread, apparently uncontrollable crisis of confidence, which is the result of contagion from finance to emotions.

FR_42: Ce n’est pas une crise économique, c’est une crise financière qui a créé une crise de confiance, qui crée une crise économique.

It is an unshakable conviction of the former French President: it all started with the financial crisis, which then led to a confidence crisis that, in turn, has triggered the economic crisis. This view results from acknowledging that finance and the economy are not something enigmatic and unfathomable but merely human activities:

FR_34: Que sont les marchés ? Les marchés, ce sont des hommes, des femmes, des organismes qui prêtent de l’argent à ceux qui en ont besoin.

The current crisis is, thus, a human crisis, whose consequences affect not only wallets but also emotions, however simplistic this might sound. This situation faced by the
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economy is already described in clear terms in FR_1, Sarkozy’s speech on the economy in Toulon.1

**FR_1**: Une crise de confiance sans précédent ébranle l’économie mondiale. De grandes institutions financières sont menacées, des millions de petits épargnants dans le monde qui ont placé leurs économies à la Bourse voient jour après jour fondre leur patrimoine, des millions de retraités qui ont cotisé à des fonds de pension craignent pour leurs retraites, des millions de foyers modestes sont mis en difficulté par la hausse des prix. Comme partout dans le monde, les Français ont peur pour leurs économies, pour leur emploi, pour leur pouvoir d’achat. La peur est une souffrance. La peur empêche d’entreprendre, de s’engager. Quand on a peur, on n’a pas de rêve, on ne se projette pas dans l’avenir. La peur est la principale menace qui pèse aujourd’hui sur l’économie.

Arguing over confidence implies arguing over its opposite: fear is the major single threat to the world economy, the underlying cause of the widespread crisis of confidence.

**FR_5**: Depuis un mois et demi, les acteurs économiques sont désorientés, les marchés ne savent plus où ils vont, et le principal facteur de crise, la cause des faillites plus que leur conséquence, c’est l’anxiété. Une anxiété irrationnelle et généralisée. Les ménages et les entreprises ne sont pas surendettés, le prix du pétrole a baissé de moitié, le dollar est remonté de 25%, beaucoup d’entreprises sont rentables. Mais l’affolement peut conduire l’économie entière à sa perte.

**FR_19**: Quand on voit qu’on a peur pour son emploi, que l’État garantit une banque et que les quelques dirigeants de ladite banque se versent des bonus qui représentent une vie de salaire, on a la rage.

**FR_34**: Mais aujourd’hui, la peur est revenue. Cette peur qui détruit la confiance. Cette peur qui paralyse les consommateurs, qui empêche l’investisseur d’investir, l’entrepreneur d’entreprendre, le patron d’embaucher, le banquier de prêter.

Therefore, only by solving the crisis of confidence, by restoring confidence, will the economic crisis be solved.

**FR_2**: La confiance doit être rétablie au plus vite.

**FR_14**: Notre idée étant, pour en terminer, que pour tourner le dos à la crise économique, il faut que la confiance revienne.

**FR_34**: Elle [la crise de l’Euro] ne peut se résoudre qu’en restaurant la crédibilité, en restaurant la confiance.

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1 The speeches on the economy delivered in Toulon (FR_1, FR_19, FR_34) are among the “discours phares” (Mayaffre 2012: 22) of the former French President. They are frequently mentioned in other speeches, giving rise to recurrent intertextual references.
Chapter 7 | The French Sub-corpus Analysed - Sarkozy

FR_51: Moi, je suis pour la France forte, pas pour la France faible. Celui qui a peur, c’est celui qui est faible.

FR_53: Si tel ou tel choisit la peur ou l’intérêt, c’est leur droit. Qu’ils continuent leur route ! Nous, nous avons une autre route, celle de la France, celle de l’intérêt général et celle des Français.

Therefore, Sarkozy’s argumentation builds on fear, the fear spread by contagion, and on the need to restore confidence. More precisely, all the former President’s remarks regarding the crisis hinge upon a specific argument scheme:

SARKOZY’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS CONTAGION (FINANCIAL CRISIS → CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE → ECONOMIC CRISIS)
Premise 1: Reckless speculation has engendered the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Premise 2: As a consequence, people no longer trust banks and the financial sector.
Premise 3: We are witnessing a crisis of confidence which stifles economic activity.
Conclusion: Therefore, we must overcome fear and restore confidence in order to solve the economic crisis.

The argument is formally an argument from cause to effect (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 168) that could be summarised in the sentence “the financial crisis breeds fear, fear stifles the economy”.

Sarkozy has a clear plan to help the French and the European overcome fear, which starts from telling the truth.

FR_1: Il faut vaincre cette peur. C’est la tâche la plus urgente. On ne la vaincra pas, on ne rétablira pas la confiance en mentant mais en disant la vérité.
La vérité, les Français la veulent, ils sont prêts à l’entendre. S’ils ont le sentiment qu’on leur cache quelque chose, le doute grandira. S’ils ont la conviction qu’on ne leur cache rien, ils puiseront en eux-mêmes la force de surmonter la crise.

FR_3: Dans la crise de confiance qui frappe l’économie mondiale nous avons plus que jamais besoin de vérité.
Le doute est le principal ennemi que nous ayons à combattre et le doute grandira si les Français ont le sentiment qu’on leur cache quelque chose.

The leadup to the crisis has been characterised by silence or, rather, by a conspiracy of silence. The truth about financial speculation and the bursting of the American housing bubble appeared too late in newspapers, which led confidence to plummet. The French, like the citizens of all the other countries of the world, no longer trust governments and financial institutions; consequently, their trust has to be won back. Telling the truth might seem counterproductive, because it could further fuel fear.

FR_3: Dire la vérité, c’est peut-être risqué. Mais, à mes yeux, c’est moins risqué que le mensonge.
Dire la vérité, c’est nécessaire si l’on veut que les Français puissent avoir confiance, si l’on veut que la parole de l’État soit crédible. Dire la vérité, c’est la ligne de conduite que je me suis fixée.

FR_19: C’est dans ce contexte dramatique que j’ai voulu m’adresser aux Français pour leur dire la vérité alors que tant de voix m’appelaient à ne rien dire parce qu’en disant la vérité, me conseillait-on, j’aurais pris le risque d’aggraver l’inquiétude et donc de précipiter davantage la crise.

Yet lying is not allowed in times of crisis, as the priority is restoring confidence in order to get the economy moving again.

FR_22: On ne peut pas mentir. Et en période de crise, le mensonge se paye encore beaucoup plus cher parce qu’il y a de la souffrance.

Commitment to truth is, thus, Sarkozy’s pledge at the beginning of the crisis. However simple, the strategy enables him to present himself as an honest and bold leader in the predicament.


FR_53: J’ai donc choisi de ne pas évacuer les problèmes, de les traiter pour que chacun sache dans les cinq années qui viennent ce que l’on va faire et je conteste l’idée qu’on ne peut pas parler des sujets qui préoccupent les Français, qu’on ne devrait parler que des questions qui ne les préoccupent pas, dont on parle dans quelques cénacles où personne ne comprend rien quand on les écoute, où quand ils parlent, ils parlent entre eux, jamais à vous, toujours à eux, niant la réalité, faisant comme l’on expliquait, « vous n’avez pas peur, vous avez l’impression d’avoir peur. »

The argument is closely related to the topos of realism (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 106), presenting the speaker as a serious leader who refrains from hiding behind excuses and lies that will only end up damaging the French people in the long run.

FR_46: Si on refuse la réalité, on ne peut pas comprendre les efforts qu’il nous faut faire. Et si on ne les comprend pas, on ne les fera pas. Et si on ne les fait pas alors ce sont tous les Français qui souffriront.

Moreover, by focusing on the need to tell the truth about the scope of the crisis, Sarkozy harnesses the potential of the topos of the irreparable at the beginning of his speeches, just as Obama and Cameron do. In this regard, the argument for telling the truth to the French, recurrent in Sarkozy’s speeches, performs a crucial pragmatic function. As regards interpreting, the “transfer” of vividness from the ST to the IT by reproducing the speaker’s presentational devices plays, again, a major role in determining pragmatic quality. The iteration of réalité, the marked oppositions between peur/inquiétude and confiance, mensonge and vérité, mentir and dire la vérité show that Sarkozy’s discourse
hinges on “words that are emotionally charged or supercharged” (Viezzi 2013: 383). The preservation of their pragmatic force in the IT is, thus, essential to reproduce the argument scheme and guarantee argumentative equivalence.

Apart from bestowing vividness on discourse, the argument for telling the truth to the French appears to play another pivotal pragmatic role, namely establishing trust with the audience right at the outset of the communicative exchange and, especially, empowering the audience by stating that it is ready to know the truth.

**FR_1**: La vérité, les Français la veulent, ils sont prêts à l’entendre.

**FR_34**: Cette vérité, les Français étaient prêts à l’entendre.

In this regard, the argument has a markedly populist character, which is typical of Sarkozy’s rhetoric, as attested by the fact that “les Français” occurs a hundred and twenty-five times in his speeches. The world is witnessing “une situation de crise économique brutale” (FR_5); the crisis is real, and it is a crisis “d’une violence inouïe” (e.g. FR_11, FR_48, FR_50, FR_51), but everybody has the right to be told what has happened, what is happening and what will happen. The first truth to reveal is that the crisis is not over, indeed, it risks worsening.

**FR_1**: Dire la vérité aux Français, c’est leur dire que la crise n’est pas finie, que ses conséquences seront durables, que la France est trop engagée dans l’économie mondiale pour que l’on puisse penser un instant qu’elle pourrait être à l’abri des événements qui sont en train de bouleverser le monde. Dire la vérité aux Français, c’est leur dire que la crise actuelle aura des conséquences dans les mois qui viennent sur la croissance, sur le chômage, sur le pouvoir d’achat.

**FR_3**: Je ne crois pas du tout, bien au contraire, que l’on redonnera le moral aux Français, qu’on leur rendra confiance dans l’avenir, en leur dissimulant l’ampleur de la crise financière, en faisant semblant de croire qu’elle n’aura aucune conséquence sur l’activité, sur l’emploi et sur le pouvoir d’achat.

**FR_19**: Je vous ai dit combien cette crise était grave, qu’il s’agissait d’une crise mondiale et que la France ne serait pas à l’abri.

**FR_34**: Leur dire la vérité, c’était leur dire que la France ne pouvait pas rester à l’abri d’une crise planétaire. C’était leur dire que cette crise était grave, qu’elle allait durer, qu’elle aurait des conséquences sur la croissance, sur le chômage, sur le pouvoir d’achat.

Here lie the fear of the French and the exceptionality of the crisis. It is the very first global crisis from which no one is safe. The above excerpts show that Sarkozy’s argument relies on a recurrent formulation, that can be summarised by the structure ”France + NEGATION + à l’abri”; sentences like “La France n’est pas à l’abri” mushroom in Sarkozy’s texts to conjure up a threatening atmosphere, thereby demanding relatively easy reproduction in ITs. More broadly, the iteration of the expression indicates that the main
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source of fear for the French people is the fact that their country no longer depends entirely on itself in a “monde [qui] change” (e.g. FR_1, FR_3, FR_10, FR_27).

**FR_34:** Mais aujourd’hui, la peur est revenue. […] Cette peur porte un nom : c’est la peur pour la France de perdre la maîtrise de son destin. La seule façon de conjurer cette peur c’est de dire la vérité. La vérité, c’est que la crise n’est pas finie.

Sarkozy’s priority is to give France back the control of her destiny.

**FR_34:** Il faut rendre à la France la maîtrise de son destin. Et pour cela elle doit entrer de plain-pied dans le nouveau cycle économique. Elle doit s’y préparer.

**FR_47:** Cette France, je veux tout faire pour lui rendre la maîtrise de son destin.

This is the basic truth to be told to the French, and it is the first step to overcome fear. Sarkozy’s argument for telling the truth to the French can, thus, be said to rely on the following scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR TELLING THE TRUTH TO THE FRENCH**

*Premise 1:* The causes of the financial crisis have been concealed from the French / The French have been kept in the dark.

*Premise 2:* By relying on silence, the financial crisis has bred fear, leading to a widespread crisis of confidence.

*Premise 3:* Fear is stifling the economy, it is the main element underlying the economic crisis.

*Premise 4:* We must emerge from the crisis.

*Premise 5:* The crisis can only be solved by overcoming fear.

*Premise 6:* Lying about the origins and scope of the crisis will further fuel fear.

*Premise 7:* The French are ready to know the truth.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, we must tell the truth to the French in the first place: the crisis is not over, it will last long and France will not be spared. Yet, I pledge to give France back the control of her destiny.

There are, however, other things the French are entitled to know, because simply knowing that the crisis will have long-term consequences and that the twenty-first century world is closely interconnected is not enough to restore confidence. It is true that the French have economic problems and, therefore, need solutions but, especially, they are afraid, and they need remedies against fear. In this respect, they need not only ideas but also ideology.

### 7.3 The Main Crisis-related Arguments of Sarkozysme

The crisis provides the opportunity to learn lessons and change the path of France in the twenty-first century. However, seen from a broader angle, the crisis has provided Sarkozy with the opportunity to unleash all of his rhetorical potential and to mark a divide in French presidential discourse. Borrowing a French expression, Sarkozy’s discourse can be said to
be “un discours charnière”, marking the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century:


In his analysis of Sarkozy’s rhetoric, Mayaffre underlines that, though virtually all issues were addressed by the former French President from 2007 to 2012, his discourse is undeniably characterised by “le tropisme économique”2 (Mayaffre 2012: 37). In other words, owing to the economic crisis, Sarkozy’s discourse naturally heads towards economic issues, which are addressed in a comprehensive fashion. Indeed, both macroeconomic issues and microeconomic issues are systematically dealt with (Mayaffre 2012: 47).

FR_17: Le 15 septembre 2008, un an après le début de la crise des « subprimes », le monde entier a été projeté au bord du précipice par la décision des autorités américaines de laisser tomber la banque Lehman Brothers. Une décision, je le rappelle, prise alors sans aucune concertation avec les principaux partenaires des États-Unis. Ce jour-là, le monde a constaté qu’une dérégulation sans fin, aveuglément confiante dans l’esprit de responsabilité des acteurs financiers, avait conduit à une irresponsabilité généralisée devant l’appât irrésistible du gain rapide.

FR_23: En dérégulant à l’excès, qu’est-ce qui s’est passé ? Nous avons eu les dumpings, et une concurrence qui n’était plus loyale mais déloyale.

FR_37: Mais franchement, réfléchissons ensemble, qu’est-ce qui a conduit le monde dans la situation où il se trouve ? C’est la dérégulation sans limite. Qu’est ce qui a conduit à la catastrophe d’aujourd’hui ? C’est le fait que tout était possible, sans limite.

FR_44: On a vu où cela conduisait le pays, on a vu où la finance dérégulée conduisait les finances publiques.

FR_42: Mes chers compatriotes, j’aimerais que vous compreniez cela : c’est le dérèglement de la finance qui a mis le monde dans la situation où il se trouve aujourd’hui. Ce n’est pas une crise économique, c’est une crise financière qui a créé une crise de confiance, qui crée une crise économique. Le dérèglement de la finance, est-ce qu’il n’est pas normal économiquement, juste politiquement, moralement indispensable que ceux qui ont mis le monde dans la situation où il se trouve, participent à la résorption des déficits qu’ils ont contribués à créer ? Qui peut contester une idée pareille ?

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The reckless deregulation of finance lies at the heart of Sarkozy’s argumentation regarding the origins of the economic crisis, as the past few decades have permitted excessive deregulation, thereby imposing the law of the jungle on nation states.

**FR_31**: Cette espèce de loi de la jungle du secteur financier aboutit à la catastrophe.

**FR_37**: La loi de la jungle est inacceptable.

Excessive deregulation has proved unsuccessful, in that it lies at the basis of today’s crisis. In particular, by showing the aftermath of deregulation, the crisis has called for rules.

**FR_13**: Il faut rétablir la confiance et la confiance ne reviendra pas sans de nouvelles règles qui mettront fin aux dérives des vingt cinq dernières années. […] La crise nous renvoie à la nécessité de la règle. Elle signe l’échec du laisser faire absolu et de la dérégulation à tout va. Il n’appartient qu’à nous, à notre courage, à regarder en face les réalités que le monde nouveau qui va naître de cette crise devienne meilleur, plus humain, plus vivable.

**FR_14**: Pour que la confiance revienne il faut qu’il y ait de nouvelles règles pour mettre un terme à la crise financière.

Here lies the opportunity offered by the crisis, the opportunity to regulate.

**FR_1**: L’économie de marché c’est le marché régulé, le marché mis au service du développement, au service de la société, au service de tous. Ce n’est pas la loi de la jungle, ce n’est pas des profits exorbitants pour quelques-uns et des sacrifices pour tous les autres. L’économie de marché c’est la concurrence qui réduit les prix, qui élimine les rentes et qui profite à tous les consommateurs.

If the focus on rules might be expected to imply a restriction of personal freedom, Sarkozy recurrently outlines that rules are the prerequisite of freedom.

**FR_13**: Les mêmes qui ont soutenu la dérégulation financière soutiennent aujourd’hui que la règle empêche la liberté. C’est le contraire. C’est la règle qui permet la liberté.

**FR_27**: Un État de droit, c’est le respect de règles. Les règles doivent être aussi proches les unes des autres dans le monde. La liberté, ce n’est pas la loi de la jungle. Ce n’est pas l’absence de régulation.

**FR_31**: Il n’y a pas de liberté sans règle et cette espèce de loi de la jungle du secteur financier aboutit à la catastrophe. Dans son intérêt même, la régulation doit être un objectif.

**FR_37**: Ce que nous voulons c’est une mondialisation régulée, une concurrence loyale et que chacun comprenne qu’il n’y a pas de liberté sans règle.

In this regard, Sarkozy’s recourse to the topos of freedom (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 105) is recurrent and is likely to be a typically French topos considering the national motto
of France. Notably, unlike Cameron, Sarkozy claims that deregulation is not the solution to the crisis but its main cause. Against the desperate need for rules to solve the crisis, politics and the state acquire newly-found significance and resume their pivotal roles in the economy.

**FR_5**: Le seul acteur capable de redonner une visibilité, de montrer une direction, d’apaiser les craintes, c’est l’État.

The failure of economic deregulation has triggered the crisis and led to the resurgence of politics, which had been neglected for too long.

**FR_1**: L’idée de la toute puissance du marché qui ne devait être contrarié par aucune règle, par aucune intervention politique, était une idée folle. L’idée que les marchés ont toujours raison était une idée folle.

**FR_3**: S’il y a bien un fait majeur qui émerge de cette crise, c’est le retour de la politique. Cette crise dont il est clair désormais qu’elle ne peut se résoudre sans une intervention massive des États, cette crise qui appelle d’urgence un nouvel ordre économique, financier, monétaire, cette crise exprime au fond un besoin profond de politique. Le politique, on avait cru pouvoir s’en passer. On avait cru que tout allait pouvoir être résolu par l’autorégulation, par les experts, par la libre concurrence et par le marché. Désormais, il y aura plus de politique. Parce que l’idéologie de la dictature des marchés et de l’impuissance publique est morte avec la crise financière.

**FR_49**: Voilà la situation folle dans laquelle nous étions.

The complete deregulation of finance and the economy was a crazy idea, but the lesson has now been learnt. The pervasiveness of similar passages among Sarkozy’s speeches clarifies that the argument for state intervention in the economy is a cornerstone of the former President’s argumentation during the crisis.

**ARGUMENT FOR STATE INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY (“RESURGENCE OF POLITICS”)**

- **Premise 1**: The past few decades imposed the law of the jungle on the world economy.
- **Premise 2**: The excessive deregulation of finance was a crazy idea and underlies today’s crisis.
- **Premise 3**: Some people thought that the economy was self-sufficient and that politics/state intervention was dead.
- **Premise 4**: The crisis has proved them wrong by calling for rules.

**Conclusion**: Therefore, enhanced political intervention in the economy is needed to solve the crisis.

The argument is recurrent among Sarkozy’s speeches and relies upon the lexical and expressive choices which stand out in the above examples. “Dérégulation”, “la loi de la jungle”, “règles”, “politique” are the distinctive indicators of the argument. However, this basic tenet of Sarkozy’s rhetoric is also frequently presented in a different form which stems from broader ideological premises.
Excessive deregulation is the symptom of an ill-judged political, economic and social philosophy that has characterised the twentieth-century history of industrialised countries. Therefore, the crisis has deep roots and its origins have to be traced back to the mid- and late-twentieth century, when the first sparks of today’s crisis were generated.

The origin of the crisis lies in globalisation and capitalism. Therefore, the basic cause of the crisis does not have to be sought in the 1990s and 2010s, but earlier in history, in those years in which today’s political and economic system was built. In this regard, the crisis is a watershed, showing the weaknesses of a perverse system that needs to be changed.

In particular, the crisis has marked the end of a naïve dream, the dream of “la mondialisation heureuse”.

FR_1: Dire la vérité aux Français, c’est leur dire d’abord la vérité sur la crise financière. Parce que cette crise, sans équivalent depuis les années 30, marque la fin d’un monde qui s’était construit sur la chute du Mur de Berlin et la fin de la guerre froide.

FR_11: Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les Américains avaient gagné la guerre, avaient l’économie la plus puissante, c’était au fond la seule monnaie. On peut comprendre qu’après Bretton Woods, ils aient décidé d’organiser aussi le système financier international. Il y avait également le Plan Marshal. Il y avait des raisons à cela et ce n’était pas simplement idéologique. Mais aujourd’hui, le monde du XXIe siècle est multipolaire et ne s’organisera pas autour d’une seule puissance fût-elle notre alliée et notre amie car, naturellement, aucun Français n’oubliera que les Américains sont venus nous aider deux fois. Mais nous ne pouvons pas continuer à ce que le monde finance le déficit géant de la première puissance avec le résultat que l’on connaît aujourd’hui.

FR_34: C’est dans l’instauration, à partir de la fin des années 70, d’une mondialisation sans règle autre que celles qui garantissaient la liberté du commerce que se trouve l’origine des difficultés actuelles.

FR_3: Je vous le dis : cette crise marquera sans doute pour l’histoire le commencement véritable du XXIe siècle, le moment où tout le monde aura compris qu’il était temps de changer, temps de donner un nouveau visage à la mondialisation, temps de construire un nouvel ordre mondial, politique, économique, social, assis sur de nouveaux principes et de nouvelles règles.

FR_8: Le monde qui sortira demain de cette crise sera profondément différent de celui d’hier. La demande de régulation, de protection, de justice sera plus forte.

FR_23: C’est une folie. On ne peut pas regarder le monde d’après la crise comme celui d’avant la crise. Le monde de demain ne sera pas celui d’hier.

In particular, the crisis has marked the end of a naïve dream, the dream of “la mondialisation heureuse”.

FR_1: La génération qui avait vaincu le communisme avait rêvé d’un monde, où la Démocratie et le marché résoudraient tous les problèmes de l’humanité. Elle avait rêvé d’une mondialisation heureuse qui vaincrait la pauvreté et la guerre.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War nurtured this dream, “*un grand rêve de liberté et de prospérité*” (FR_1). But the dream was only an illusion.

**FR_1:** *Ce rêve a commencé à devenir réalité : les frontières se sont ouvertes, des millions d’hommes ont été arrachés à la misère, mais le rêve s’est brisé sur le retour des fondamentalismes religieux, des nationalismes, des revendications identitaires, sur le terrorisme, les dumpings, les délocalisations, les dérives de la finance globale, les risques écologiques, l’épuisement annoncé des ressources naturelles, les émeutes de la faim.*

**FR_10:** *La mondialisation heureuse annonçait la fin de l’Histoire. Ce grand rêve de paix s’est brisé. Il s’est brisé sur les passions humaines. Le mur est tombé, mais les revendications identitaires et les radicalismes religieux se sont engouffrés. Le revers de ce modèle où tout était voué à s’organiser, à se régler à l’échelle de la planète tout entière, cela a eu pour résultat que l’homme est demeuré de plus en plus seul face au monde.*

In Sarkozy’s opinion, the world was not ready to be self-sufficient and never will be. In other words, twentieth-century capitalism has proved fundamentally wrong, in that it has been unable to provide nations with peace and stability. The term “*capitalisme*” occurs eighty-one times in the speeches, which shows that Nicolas Sarkozy has soon got used to dealing with the economy in an overarching ideological perspective.

**FR_10:** *Moi, je pense que le rêve de la mondialisation heureuse est mort avec le 11 septembre 2001 et l’émergence d’un fanatisme qui semblaient venu du fond des âges.*

However, it is not capitalism itself that lies at the basis of the 2008 crisis but rather the “*dénaturation du capitalisme*”.

**FR_23:** *La crise que nous traversons n’est pas une crise du capitalisme. C’est une crise de la dénaturation du capitalisme.*

The noun phrase “*dénaturation du capitalisme*” occurs only in FR_23, as the nature of the recession is generally addressed in terms of “*crise structurelle*” and “*capitalisme financier*”.

**FR_3:** *Cette crise, ce n’est pas une crise conjoncturelle. Ce n’est pas un accident. C’est une crise structurelle.*

**FR_8:** *Cette crise, je persiste et je signe, est aussi structurelle. Elle va transformer pour longtemps l’économie, la société, la politique.*

**FR_16:** *Et par l’intermédiaire de Christine Lagarde nous allons sensibiliser l’ensemble des opinions publiques internationales pour dire qu’il est possible de changer les règles du capitalisme financier.*

**FR_19:** *Je veux pour le monde la victoire du modèle européen qui n’a rien à voir avec les excès d’un capitalisme financier.*
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

**FR_34:** Dire la vérité aux Français, c’était leur dire que la crise était une crise structurelle qui nécessitait des réponses structurelles.

Today’s crisis is, therefore, a crisis regarding the Western economic system which, over the last few decades, has relied consistently on financial capitalism, resulting in the subordination of processes of production to the accumulation of profits by the exchange of financial instruments. The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* defines the concept as follows.

FINANCE CAPITALISM: a stage of capitalism in which economic and political domination is exercised by financial institutions or financiers rather than by industrial capitalists.³

Therefore, the main problem does not lie in capitalism per se but rather in its drift.

**FR_10:** Il faut dire les choses telles qu’elles sont, je prends mes responsabilités, le capitalisme purement financier a perverti la logique du capitalisme. Si on n’est pas d’accord sur ce constat là, on est d’accord sur rien.

**FR_19:** La crise est venue de la dérive d’un modèle anglo-saxon.

**FR_23:** Si le capitalisme financier a connu une telle dérive, c’est parce que des banques ne faisaient plus leur métier. Pourquoi prendre le risque de prêter aux entrepreneurs quand il est si facile de gagner autant d’argent en jouant sur le niveau de la bourse sur les marchés ?

However, the most dangerous threat posed by the economic predicament is not financial capitalism, but “the opposite of capitalism”, always rife in times of crisis.

**FR_1:** Je veux le dire aux Français : l’anticapitalisme n’offre aucune solution à la crise actuelle. Renouer avec le collectivisme qui a provoqué dans le passé tant de désastres serait une erreur historique.

**FR_10:** Le remède à la crise que nous connaissons n’est pas l’anticapitalisme. L’anticapitalisme est une impasse. L’anticapitalisme c’est la politique de la table rase, c’est la négation de tout ce qui a permis d’asseoir notre identité du progrès.

The appeal against the threat of anticapitalism is typical of Sarkozy’s argumentation. However vague the notion might seem, it is broadly identifiable with protectionism and, to a lesser extent, with communism.

**FR_6:** Quatrième principe, le refus du protectionnisme, le choix d’un monde ouvert aux échanges.

**FR_32:** Enfin, s’agissant du commerce mondial, tous les pays ont indiqué - et ça ne vous étonnera pas - que le protectionnisme n’était en aucun cas la solution, qu’il fallait

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promouvoir la liberté des échanges, mais qu’il fallait changer de méthode, qu’on n’était pas obligés de rester dans la même stratégie qui aboutissait depuis des années au même échec.

**FR_34:** Ayons conscience que si nous échouons à changer ensemble les règles du jeu, le monde risque de sombrer dans le chacun pour soi et le protectionnisme et nous irons à la catastrophe, parce qu’alors nous risquons de refaire pas à pas le chemin tragique qu’a emprunté le monde dans les années 30.

In this sense, Sarkozy’s argumentation shares a pivotal element of Cameron’s. The threat of anticapitalism or, to use Cameron’s expression, “the slide to protectionism”, is reiterated, in that it provides the foundation for the description of Sarkozy’s plan to restore the economy. It serves the purpose of conveying the crucial information that financial capitalism, the cause of the crisis, is not the opposite of capitalism but simply its drift: it is “corrupt capitalism” or “value-free capitalism”.

**FR_10:** Le capitalisme purement financier c’est un système d’irresponsabilité, je vais utiliser un mot fort, c’est un système amoral où la logique des marchés excuse tout. C’est un système où l’argent va à l’argent, où le travail est déprécié, où la production est dépréciée, où l’esprit d’entreprise est déprécié.

**FR_23:** Le capitalisme purement financier est une dérive qui bafoue les valeurs du capitalisme. Mais l’anticapitalisme est une impasse pire encore. Il n’y a aucune solution dans l’anticapitalisme. Il n’y a aucun système autre que l’économie de marché.

Genuine capitalism is substantially different in that it cherishes values.

**FR_23:** Le capitalisme a toujours été inséparable d’un système de valeurs, d’un projet de civilisation, d’une certaine idée de l’homme.

It is values that promote long-term plans and, consequently, growth.

**FR_8:** Un nouvel équilibre s’établira entre l’Etat et le marché, entre la logique financière et la logique de la production, la logique industrielle, entre le capital et le travail, entre le court terme et le long terme.

**FR_13:** J’ajoute, mes chers amis, que l’idée que les marchés pouvaient s’autoréguler s’oppose à la conviction qui est la mienne que la dictature du marché, ce n’est pas la liberté. Que la dictature du profit à court terme, ce n’est pas la liberté.

**FR_17:** Alors nous devons également travailler à l’adaptation des normes comptables, autre sujet capital, pour qu’elles cessent de favoriser le court terme au détriment de l’investissement.

The difference between “good” capitalism and “bad” capitalism, thus, lies in values and foresight: while the former promotes long-term plans, the latter is concerned with short-term profit. The excerpt drawn from **FR_1** is indicative of Sarkozy’s stance.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

**FR_1:** Le capitalisme ce n’est pas le court terme, c’est la longue durée, l’accumulation du capital, la croissance à long terme.
Le capitalisme ce n’est pas la primauté donnée au spéculateur. C’est la primauté donnée à l’entrepreneur, la récompense du travail, de l’effort, de l’initiative.
Le capitalisme ce n’est pas la dilution de la propriété, l’irresponsabilité généralisée. Le capitalisme c’est la propriété privée, la responsabilité individuelle, l’engagement personnel, c’est une éthique, une morale, des institutions.
Le capitalisme c’est ce qui a permis l’essor extraordinaire de la civilisation occidentale depuis sept siècles.
La crise financière n’est pas la crise du capitalisme. C’est la crise d’un système qui s’est éloigné des valeurs les plus fondamentales du capitalisme, qui a trahi l’esprit du capitalisme.

Here lies the key of Sarkozy’s plan to “heal” the economy. Not all features of capitalism are negative. A substantially free economy is the prerequisite of trade and growth, which is why financial capitalism does not need to be replaced, it just needs to be “mended” and given back what it had lost throughout the twentieth century, namely values. This is the main objective of Nicolas Sarkozy, the moralisation of capitalism.

**FR_9:** La France a exigé des changements pour moraliser le capitalisme, promouvoir l’entrepreneur sur le spéculateur, sanctionner les excès inacceptables qui vous ont scandalisés à juste titre, pour redonner à la dimension humaine toute sa place dans l’économie.

**FR_10:** La crise du capitalisme financier n’appelle pas à la destruction du capitalisme qui serait une catastrophe mais à sa moralisation. C’est une deuxième chose sur laquelle je veux me battre. On doit moraliser le capitalisme, non pas le détruire. Voilà le défi, Angela, auquel nous sommes confrontés. Il ne faut pas rompre avec le capitalisme, il faut le refonder.

**FR_13:** Cette crise économique, cette crise sociale est également une crise intellectuelle et une crise morale. On ne sortira pas de la crise si on élitue les questions de principes et de valeurs. Ce soir je veux poser des valeurs. Je veux rappeler des repères. Ces repères, ces valeurs sont ceux d’un capitalisme moral. […] La France - en novembre - a proposé de réunir à Washington les chefs d’État et de gouvernement des vingt plus grandes puissances du monde pour discuter de la relance mondiale, de la moralisation du capitalisme financier.

**FR_23:** Mais nous sauverons le capitalisme et l’économie de marché, en le refondant, oserai-je le mot, en le moralisant. Je sais que ce terme peut susciter beaucoup d’interrogations.
Mais de quoi avons-nous besoin au fond, sinon de règles, de principes, d’une gouvernance qui reflètent des valeurs partagées ? Et si nous nous dotions d’une morale commune ?

**FR_34:** En 2008, j’ai dit que le capitalisme devait être refondé. J’ai dit qu’il fallait moraliser la finance.

The examples show that Sarkozy’s discourse on the economic crisis revolves around a major argument.
ARGUMENT FOR THE MORALISATION OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM

Premise 1: We must emerge from the crisis.
Premise 2: The twentieth-century dream of totally free and deregulated capitalism (financial capitalism) has proved to be an illusion that has led to the current economic crisis.
Premise 3: Financial capitalism is the value-free, corrupt version of capitalism.
Premise 4: Faced with the failure of the twentieth-century Western economic system, the tendency to turn to anticapitalism (protectionism) is rife.
Premise 5: Anticapitalism is not a solution to the economic crisis.
Premise 6: Financial capitalism can be “mended” by restoring the core values traditionally attached to capitalism.
Premise 7: Only by setting and imposing new value-driven rules will genuine capitalism be restored.

Conclusion: Therefore, financial capitalism has to be moralised to promote the solution of the crisis.

The verbalisation of the argument for the moralisation of financial capitalism does not hinge on specific or recurring expressions; however, given the logic underlying the argument and the argumentative structure in which it is regularly embedded, interpreters faced with Sarkozy’s speeches on the economy should be guided by a basic principle: remember that financial capitalism is not considered a scourge by Sarkozy; more particularly, whenever you hear “capitalisme financier”, expect contra-arguments regarding anticapitalism/protectionism and appeals to values and the moralisation of finance.

More broadly, the argument in question shows that Sarkozy’s argumentation resembles Obama’s, as the opposition between irresponsibility / responsibility is recurrent, though less prominent with respect to the speeches delivered by the American President. However, though Sarkozy shares with Obama the conviction to restore values in order to solve the crisis, his argumentation cannot be said to hinge primarily on values. It is true that values lie at the core of Sarkozy’s plan to moralise a corrupt economic system; nevertheless, the former French President does not indulge in the kind of preacher-like rhetoric typical of Barack Obama⁴.

La caractéristique historique de Sarkozy est à nos yeux d’avoir réussi à (ré)imposer un discours sur les « valeurs » […]. Mais, force est de constater que le discours de Sarkozy est aussi un discours d’expert : l’expert économique (Mayaffre 2012: 37).

Here lie the essence and the pragmatic force of sarkozyste discourse: it is neither just a discourse on values nor just a technical discourse, it is both of them by being an ideological discourse. It is true that, with respect to Obama and Cameron, the need to convey a specific ideology results in a less significant presence of prototypical crisis-related arguments and a marked insistence on the speaker’s vision; however, claims that a specific policy has contributed to solving the crisis are not neglected:

⁴ In his analysis of Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign speeches, Foxlee (2009) shows that the American President’s rhetoric draws primarily on Martin Luther King’s.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

**FR_26:** Pour la France, la crise aurait été bien pire sans les mesures prises par le gouvernement et sans la politique de réformes lancée dès 2007.

In other words, ideology discourse does not exclude pragmatism, and the *argument for the moralisation of financial capitalism* is the most blatant example of Sarkozy’s rhetorical effectiveness.

Il paraît difficile de qualifier le discours sarkozyste de discours libéral quant à son contenu affirmé : le président, sous la pression de la crise, notamment à partir du discours de Toulon (25 septembre 2008), en appelle souvent à la régulation du capitalisme et prône si nécessaire à l’interventionnisme. Cependant, le discours de Sarkozy reste libéral dans la caractérisation profonde […] : un discours d’expertise gestionnaire qui met la démocratie et le politique en dépendance d’un système économique non négociable – amendable peut-être, mais non négociable – et transforme le chef de l’État en chef d’entreprise ou en directeur des ressources humaines (Mayaffre 2012 : 37-40).

Incidentally, the following sections will show that the speaker also shares features of Cameron’s more pragmatic argumentation. In this respect, Sarkozy’s discourse can be said to encompass a mixture of all the most “powerful” argumentative strategies of the American President and the British Prime Minister. Values are translated into practical plans for the economy, and highly technical or harsh precepts are motivated by commitment to values. Sarkozy is not only a populist rhetorician but also a “gestionnaire du système économique” (Mayaffre 2012: 37), he is not only on the side of free trade but also on the side of French and European citizens.

### 7.4 Sarkozy’s Interventionist Arguments

Since the economic crisis is a structural crisis, its solution requires “réformes structurelles” (e.g. *FR_6, FR_36, FR_40*), which is why rescue plans have to be devised and implemented in the first place. In this regard, Nicolas Sarkozy was one of the most convinced advocates of the bailout of banks by national governments.

**FR_2:** L’autre problème à résoudre pour surmonter la crise de confiance concerne la difficulté pour les banques à se procurer les fonds propres qui leur sont nécessaires. Sans fonds propres suffisants, *pas de confiance* dans les banques et pas de capacité des banques à consentir de nouveaux prêts. Le manque de fonds propres bancaires provoquerait un rationnement du crédit qui aurait de graves répercussions sur l’économie réelle.

By arguing in favour of the bailout, Sarkozy implies the *argument from crisis contagion*: not saving the banking system would further compound the widespread crisis of confidence, with major repercussions on the economy. In the speeches drawn from *ARGO*, the argument refers to the past, as the bailout of banks by national governments and supranational bodies was among the immediate reactions to the threat of collapse of the banking system.
FR_3: Alors que les marchés financiers ne fonctionnaient plus, que l’argent ne circulait plus, que la confiance entre les banques n’existait plus, il a fallu que l’État intervienne, il était le seul à être crédible pour le faire. Il a fallu que l’État apporte sa garantie et son crédit à hauteur de 320 milliards d’euros pour la liquidité des banques et de 40 milliards d’euros pour leurs fonds propres. […] À situation exceptionnelle, il a fallu un engagement exceptionnel. C’est ce que l’État a fait. C’est ce que les banques centrales ont fait. C’était indispensable pour sauver les économies des Français parce que les banques reçoivent, partagent et utilisent l’argent des épargnants.

The argument is systematically associated with the syntagms “sauver les banques”, “sauver le système bancaire”.

FR_5: Que les choses soient claires, avec le Premier ministre et le gouvernement, nous avons pris nos responsabilités et nous avons mis tout le crédit de l’État pour sauver les banques, pour protéger l’épargne. J’entends que cet argent soit utilisé comme vous vous êtes engagés à ce qu’il le soit et pas simplement au niveau du président d’un grand groupe, au niveau de chaque directeur de banque centrale.

FR_8: Si l’on n’avait rien fait pour sauver nos banques, les Français auraient perdu presque toutes leurs économies parce que le système bancaire tout entier se serait retrouvé en faillite.

The verb sauver in all its forms appears ninety times in Sarkozy’s speeches, which is indicative of a major feature of the argument. It is used as a strategy of justification against the harsh criticism levelled against the decision to bail out the banking system.

FR_4: Je voudrais vous dire, mes chers compatriotes, qu’il n’y aurait pas eu de plus grande erreur que de laisser le système financier s’effondrer. Parce que l’argent des banques, c’est le vôtre. Ce sont les prêts pour vos maisons, ce sont les prêts pour vos voitures, ce sont les prêts pour vos fonds de commerce. C’est l’argent de votre épargne. La paralysie du système bancaire cela signifiait la paralysie instantanée de l’économie, les faillites d’entreprises et les disparitions massives d’emplois. Nous ne pouvions pas attendre passivement que la finance entraîne le reste de l’économie au fond du gouffre.

By saving banks, politics has protected the savings of “the middle class”, to borrow a noun phrase from the American sub-corpus. This is the objective underlying the decision to save banks. The claim is signalled by the nouns “épargne” and “épargnants”.

FR_4: Il y en a peut-être parmi vous qui se disent : mais pourquoi aider les banques ? Pourquoi ne pas soutenir directement les PME, qui créent de l’emploi, et ont leurs problèmes de financement, bien plus durs que ceux des banques ? Ou bien, pourquoi ne pas distribuer cet argent aux salariés eux-mêmes ? A ceux là je réponds que le plan voté par le Parlement à la demande du gouvernement est fait pour les PME, est fait pour les salariés, est fait pour la croissance et est fait pour l’emploi. Il n’est pas pour les banques. Les banques paieront, en intérêts, le juste prix de la garantie que l’État a mis à leur disposition. Les seuls bénéficiaires de ce plan, ce sont les entreprises et les ménages, auxquels les banques prêteront à nouveau. […] Je voudrais dire aussi à ceux qui me reprochent d’avoir fait ce plan pour les banques, qu’au moment de la crise de 1929, il n’y a pas eu de plan et
les gens sont alors venus en masse retirer leur l’argent, parce qu’ils n’avaient plus confiance.

FR_5: A ceux qui nous font le reproche d’avoir mobilisé cet argent pour sauver le système bancaire de la faillite, je veux dire que si nous ne l’avions pas fait, ce sont les épargnants qui auraient été spoliés.

FR_11: A tous ceux qui, pour des mauvaises raisons, ont voulu polémiquer avec l’argent que nous avons mis à la disposition des banques, je dis que nous avons évité le désastre financier pour vos économies, pour les épargnants.

FR_19: En sauvant les banques, ce sont les économies et les emplois de tous les Français qui ont été sauvés. En apportant aux banques françaises des fonds propres et en garantissant leur refinancement, l’intervention de l’État a permis que le secteur bancaire puisse continuer à fonctionner. Les sommes engagées par l’État, et j’en ai pris la responsabilité, ont été énormes. Je me souviens parfaitement de la polémique, on disait que le Président faisait valser les milliards pour les banques et qu’est-ce qu’il y avait pour nous ? Aujourd’hui, on peut faire le bilan, le plan bancaire français, qui a sauvé les banques et vos économies, n’a pas coûté un centime d’euro au contribuable français, pas un seul.

FR_47: Dois-je ajouter pour rétablir la vérité qu’en sauvant nos banques au plus fort de la crise financière, ce ne sont pas les banquiers que nous avons sauvés mais c’est l’épargne des Français que nous avons préservée.

FR_48: Mais j’avais pris un autre engagement, qu’on sauverait notre système bancaire, parce que sauver notre système bancaire, c’était sauver vos économies et sauver votre épargne.

Here lies the difference with the Thirties: State intervention, the crucial role of politics in restoring confidence by “saving” the access to credit, which lies at the heart of Sarkozy’s argument for defence of bailout.

ARGUMENT FOR DEFENCE OF BAILOUT
Premise 1: The banking system has significant responsibilities in the leadup to the crisis.
Premise 2: Politics had the power to bailout banks and did so.
Premise 3: The decision to bailout banks was heavily criticised, because irresponsibility of the banking system lies at the heart of the current crisis.
Premise 4: The bailout of banks is part of the broader plan to moralise financial capitalism.
Premise 5: Refusing to bailout banks would have meant sinking the economy, because confidence would not have been restored.
Premise 6: The money of banks is your money, your savings, and the bailout was not for banks but for you.
Conclusion: That is why we saved banks.

The bailout of banks is not a French policy, and the argument is related to the measures devised and implemented by the European Union. However, the argument not only appears in EU and international speeches; it is also pervasive in national speeches, which reveals that Sarkozy’s argumentation regarding the EU is consistent in all his speeches.
The bailout of banks is a rescue, a desperate attempt at preventing the collapse of the banking system and, consequently, the collapse of the economy. Since it is a controversial topic, it is systematically addressed by Sarkozy for purposes of justification, irrespective of the communicative context.

As regards more proactive argumentation, Sarkozy’s plan for the economic recovery is also evoked by means of a crucial concept of Sarkozysme: voluntarism.

Voluntarism is a central notion of Sarkozysme (Giacometti 2007). It is quite a vague notion that, however, is easily identifiable with action, as reference to voluntarism is also signaled by the noun “action” and the adjective “active”.

The excerpts drawn from FR_6, FR_11 and FR_13 show that, despite being a cornerstone of Sarkozysme, the appeal to voluntarism is typical of political communication in general. Particularly, it is nothing but the argument from positive consequences of political action and the related argument from negative consequences of political inaction, which are also distinctive of Obama’s and Cameron’s discourse (see, respectively, section 5.1 and 6.6.1).
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

**FR_39**: *Le mouvement* permet d’épouser ce monde nouveau, *l’immobilisme* conduit à prendre des décisions plus douloureuses parce qu’on a fait le choix plus tard.

However, goading to action seems to serve a crucial pragmatic function in Sarkozy’s speeches, namely mitigating the force of a substantially *centralist* discourse by conveying the idea of *shared* action.

**FR_3**: Dans le monde qui vient, Elle [Europe] aura besoin d’un plus grand *volontarisme* que par le passé. […] Je veux le dire à nos partenaires, nous devons, dans les circonstances actuelles, continuer d’être *volontaristes*. C’est le *volontarisme* qui sera le meilleur antidote à la dangereuse tentation du protectionnisme, de l’anticapitalisme, du dirigisme bureaucratique que les désordres actuels vont immanquablement nourrir. *Le volontarisme d’un État investisseur, entrepreneur, protecteur*, voilà ce que je propose comme modèle à l’Europe pour empêcher que demain l’étatisme ne revienne en force, que la liberté d’entreprendre, la propriété privée, l’ouverture au monde ne soient les victimes du rejet d’un système où toutes les valeurs fondamentales du capitalisme se trouvent pervertis et où les citoyens ne supporteront plus longtemps d’entendre les responsables politiques qu’ils ont élus leur répéter : « nous n’y pouvons rien ». Si vous n’y pouvez rien, ce n’était pas la peine de se présenter aux élections !

The need for regulation has re-bestowed a crucial role on politics, but everybody must be involved in the endeavour to overcome the crisis. Indeed, empowerment lies at the heart of Sarkozy’s argumentation, as *Sarkozysme* is basically “un *volontarisme de droite*” (Mayaffre 2012: 15), which shows through all speeches; in the light of which, the *argument for voluntarism* can be said to be a further crucial argument of the former President’s rhetoric.

**ARGUMENT FOR VOLUNTARISM**

*Premise 1*: The failure of financial capitalism has shown that both governments and civil society have been too passive faced with the unfolding of financial and economic processes.

*Premise 2*: Inaction would significantly worsen the effects of the current crisis.

*Premise 3*: The crisis has provided the opportunity to change by restoring the role of politics.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, both the government and all actors of the economy should opt for *voluntarism* and be active in solving the crisis.

As a philosophical notion rather than a plan, voluntarism lies at the heart of Sarkozy’s discursive endeavour to commit to a lasting recovery. In this respect, he shares with Obama the *argument for strong and sustainable economic recovery* (see section 5.2.4). Yet, Sarkozy’s argument for a lasting solution of the crisis not only revolves around innovation and education, but around a broader conception of political and social commitment.

**FR_1**: Je crois à la croissance *durable*. Ce que nous avons décidé de faire est très ambitieux. L’effort qui va être engagé en matière de fiscalité incitative, de règles nouvelles et d’investissement est gigantesque. C’est une *véritable transformation de notre modèle économique et social* et de notre cadre de vie qui va s’accomplir dans les années qui viennent.
**FR_4**: Les investissements seront à la base du rebond, de la sortie de crise, d’une *restauration durable* de la compétitivité de l’économie française, de son adaptation à un monde de ressources rares.

**FR_21**: Je crois également que rien de grand et de durable ne se fait sans *cohésion sociale*.

**FR_23**: Il ne peut y avoir de *développement durable* quand le profit immédiat et la valeur pour l’actionnaire sont les seuls critères.

**FR_34**: En septembre 2008, ici, à Toulon, au cœur de la tourmente, j’avais tracé une perspective : celle d’un capitalisme de production, d’une mondialisation régulée, d’une finance encadrée, d’un *développement durable*, d’un nouveau rôle pour l’État dans l’économie, d’une nouvelle gouvernance européenne et mondiale.

His argument thus builds on different premises:

**ARGUMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC RECOVERY**

*Premise 1*: The previous finance-based, de-humanised economic model has proved unsustainable.

*Premise 2*: Both politics and civil society were denied the power to act and influence the course of the economy.

*Premise 3*: The economic crisis has called for rules and politics on the one hand, and for genuine *value-driven* capitalism on the other. It has called for action.

*Premise 4*: Choosing inaction would have major repercussions on the economy.

*Premise 5*: Action/voluntarism would, instead, enable politics to implement structural reforms empowering all actors of the economy, thereby bringing about a *value-driven*, comprehensive *social and environmental reform* rather than mere economic reform.

**Conclusion**: Therefore, voluntarism is instrumental in bringing about a lasting, sustainable recovery.

The appeal to voluntarism might appear to indicate a certain vagueness in Sarkozy’s discursive attempts at paving the way for a solution of the crisis. However, the argument for voluntarism is simply a macro-argument encompassing other, more specific schemes catering for the need for *structural reforms*. In other words, even though Sarkozy’s discourse is substantially ideological, references to specific measures to tackle the crisis are not overlooked, as the government’s plan is comprehensive.

**FR_24**: Au lendemain de la plus grave crise financière de l’après-guerre, tous les pays développés sont confrontés à *deux défis majeurs*: la lutte contre le chômage, bien sûr, et la réduction des déficits.

**FR_26**: Pour que notre économie connaisse une *reprise durable*, nous devons concilier le soutien à la croissance et le rétablissement des comptes publics. C’est à ce seul résultat, le soutien à la croissance et le rétablissement des comptes, que nous pourrons relever les défis de l’avenir.

The excerpts show that regarding the *means* to solve the crisis too, Sarkozy skillfully harnesses the topical potential of Obama’s and Cameron’s speeches alike.
7.4.1 The Deficit Crisis, Business and Innovation

Another similarity between Sarkozy and Cameron lies in the systematic dealing with the deficit crisis. However, the topic is addressed in greater detail and also with more clarity by the French President, which comes as no surprise.

Les discours de Sarkozy rassemblent parfois à un cours magistral où le professeur en tribune s’adresse à ses élèves (Mayaffre 2012 : 243).

This feature is, hardly surprisingly, highly beneficial when it comes to interpreting. Take the example drawn from FR_8: it is characterised by incessant repetition of lexical items, reducing decoding efforts (Chernov 2004) and favouring reformulation5:

**FR_8:** Le déficit est une conséquence. Une conséquence du manque d’investissement, du manque de productivité, du manque de compétitivité, du manque de travail. Une conséquence du manque de rigueur dans la gestion de la dépense. Ce qui est crucial, c’est la dépense et la nature de la dépense. Quand la dépense est de l’investissement on peut la financer en partie par l’emprunt. Nos enfants hériteront certes du passif mais aussi des actifs. Ce que nos parents ont investi dans le nucléaire, dans le TGV, dans l’aéronautique, les ponts, les autoroutes, les hôpitaux, c’est nous qui en profitons. Mais quand nous finançons les dépenses courantes par le déficit, alors nous ne laissons à nos enfants que des dettes. Accroître les dépenses d’investissement n’est pas contradictoire avec la volonté de réduire les dépenses courantes. Au contraire c’est complémentaire.

The clarity of Sarkozy’s texts is also determined, as shown in the example, by the speaker’s recourse to the topos of moral duty towards posterity, shaping an extremely simple discourse regarding the deficit, as Sarkozy merely claims that investment will benefit future generations. Furthermore, comprehension of Sarkozy’s argumentation regarding the deficit is also favoured by the fact that the former president clarifies that there is a “bon déficit” and a “mauvais déficit” (FR_22). Basically, Sarkozy’s plan to reduce the deficit is not different from Cameron’s: cutting spending and investing in private-sector growth. However, less emphasis is laid on spending cuts, which are likely to be perceived as unpopular by a considerable “portion” of the national audience.

**FR_19:** J’appellerai donc à une grande conférence où les collectivités territoriales, la sécurité sociale et l’Etat, nous devrons prendre ensemble, vis-à-vis des Français, un même engagement de maîtrise de nos dépenses, de maîtrise dans la création de postes de fonctionnaires pour ne pas peser sur l’économie, sur les entreprises et donc sur vos emplois, des charges que plus personne ne voudra ou ne pourra financer. C’est un enjeu absolument considérable.


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5 Interpreting strategies possibly to be adopted when interpreting Sarkozy’s texts, characterised by the presence of anaphora, will be addressed in section 7.9.
FR_44: Il faut cesser de croire que l’emploi public est l’alpha et l’oméga de la réponse au chômage. C’est une erreur, c’est un mensonge, c’est une impasse. Parce que naturellement, les postes de fonctionnaires, qui, par ailleurs, sont nécessaires, augmentent les dépenses publiques, qui donc doivent être financées, et pour les financer, on doit accroître les charges. En augmentant les charges, on pénalise l’emploi, on pénalise les entreprises, on pénalise votre compétitivité.
Cela pose la question du rôle de l’Etat. Le rôle de l’Etat, c’est de créer un environnement favorable au développement de vos projets. Le rôle de l’Etat, c’est de diriger l’investissement vers vos entreprises, le moins que l’on puisse dire, c’est que vous en avez besoin.

FR_51: Quels sont les problèmes de la France aujourd’hui ? Trop de dépenses publiques, j’ai pris un engagement et je le tiendrai, nous serons à 0 % de déficit en 2016.

Moreover, even though the competitive nature of the twentieth-century economy is acknowledged, insistence on competitions and “global races” is replaced by comprehensive proposals for reducing the deficit. In other words, innovation is never addressed as a topic apart but always in relation to its being the key to deficit reduction.


In more general terms, Sarkozy’s speeches are similar to those of Obama and Cameron. The fact that the world has changed, the topos of competition and the need for a successful economy to build on innovation and education are systematically addressed in Sarkozy’s speeches, too.

FR_1: Dire la vérité aux Français, c’est leur dire que pour entrer dans l’économie de la connaissance qui sera l’économie du XXIème siècle. Nous ne pouvons plus attendre pour investir dans la formation, dans la recherche, dans l’innovation. Nous ne pouvons plus attendre pour accomplir la révolution numérique.

FR_3: À côté de l’université, de la recherche et du Grenelle de l’Environnement, on va investir […] puissamment dans l’économie numérique qui sera le moteur de la croissance future.

FR_11: Je crois à l’industrie. Je n’ai pas l’intention de changer de conviction mais il faut voir comment évoluent les choses, le faire de la façon la plus intelligente en faisant que chaque euro utilisé soit un euro utilisé efficacement. Mais la crise nous appelle à multiplier les initiatives pas à les stopper.

FR_5: Nous avons décidé de relancer par l’investissement, par l’innovation, par la connaissance, par la recherche.

FR_33: Nous avons mis en place les instruments nécessaires d’une politique ambitieuse, autour de la compétitivité, de l’innovation, du financement et de la structuration des filières.
FR_40: L’innovation, la formation et la mobilité de la main d’œuvre, la qualité des produits et la productivité participent tout autant à la compétitivité. Nous avons donc ce sujet de la compétitivité globale.

Several policies are included in the plan to contribute to the enlargement of the “good deficit”. The most recurrent include the reform regarding the crédit impôt-recherche, “le système fiscal [...] le plus favorable au monde pour l’innovation” (FR_33). It is a tax cut on companies on the basis of their commitment to Research & Development programmes, which has been tripled by Nicolas Sarkozy.

FR_19: L’économie de la connaissance, c’est pour cela que nous avons fait le triplement du crédit impôt-recherche, l’autonomie des universités. Je souhaite pour la France les meilleures universités du monde.

FR_21: Il était donc urgent de rétablir la compétitivité de nos entreprises. C’est la raison pour laquelle nous avons triplé le crédit impôt-recherche qui est aujourd’hui le dispositif de ce type le plus puissant dans le monde.

FR_22: Je pense que les quelques deux milliards et demi d’euros que nous investissons dans le crédit impôt-recherche sont une dépense qui est bien utilisée et sur laquelle d’ailleurs personne ne reviendra. Cela nous coûte de l’argent, oserais-je dire, mais c’est du bon déficit, pas du mauvais déficit.

FR_26: Le crédit impôt recherche, nous l’avons triplé. Parmi les nouveaux adhérents au dispositif, les 2/3 sont des PME indépendantes.

Another crucial measure implemented by Sarkozy’s government is the reform or, rather, the abolition of the business tax with a view to spurring innovation.

FR_1: La France ne s’en sortira pas en investissant moins mais en investissant plus. C’est la raison pour laquelle désormais de nouveaux investissements seront exonérés de la taxe professionnelle qui les pénalise.

FR_13: Je prends donc mes responsabilités jusqu’au bout, je suis opposé à une énième réforme de la taxe professionnelle. C’est amusant, plus on réforme la taxe professionnelle, plus elle coûte chère. Franchement, il vaut mieux ne pas faire de réformes. […] Je le dis, je propose de supprimer la taxe professionnelle qui n’existe nulle part ailleurs en Europe.

FR_19: La taxe professionnelle n’existe nulle part ailleurs en Europe.

As with Obama’s speeches, reference is also frequently made to the need to support the automobile industry, particularly hit by the crisis.

FR_4: Depuis quelques semaines, le nombre d’entreprises en difficultés et de procédures collectives augmente sensiblement. Certains secteurs sont particulièrement exposés, notamment l’automobile où la chute de la production des donneurs d’ordres impose à leurs sous-traitants une baisse de régime souvent fatale.
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**FR_8:** L’autre secteur prioritaire, c’est l’automobile qui emploie directement ou indirectement 10% de la population active et qui est aujourd’hui aux prises, comme la plupart des grands constructeurs mondiaux, avec des difficultés considérables. […] Un fonds de *restructuration de la filière automobile* va donc être créé. Il sera alimenté à la fois par les constructeurs et par l’État à travers le fonds d’investissement stratégique.

However, the rescue of the automobile sector is subordinate to the commitment by entrepreneurs to refrain from outsourcing jobs.

**FR_8:** Je veux le dire ici, l’État est prêt à tout faire pour sauver l’industrie automobile. Mais je ne suis pas d’accord pour aider des entreprises qui continueraient de *déléguer* leurs activités à l’étranger ou qui pousseraient leurs fournisseurs à se *déléguer*. Je ne laisserai pas *démanteler* l’outil industriel français.

*Il n’y aura pas sauvetage ni dans l’automobile, ni ailleurs, sans contrepartie.*

**FR_9:** Des mesures ont été arrêtées pour sauver notre industrie automobile, en contrepartie de l’engagement des constructeurs de ne plus *déléguer* leur production.

The topic is not only addressed in relation to the auto industry but to the destiny of French entrepreneurship and the future of Europe in general.

**FR_44:** Je veux que les *déléguations* s’arrêtent. Je veux qu’on reste une terre de production. Mon projet économique, c’est qu’on garde nos usines, qu’on continue à fabriquer en France, non pas à fabriquer français comme je l’ai entendu, peu m’importe.

**FR_48:** Le jour où les *déléguations* ont ravagé nos industries et notre potentiel productif, où est-ce qu’on va trouver un travail ? Le jour où on est obsédé uniquement par le prix le plus bas et la qualité la plus basse, où il se trouve alors l’idéal humaniste de l’Europe ?

It is so recurrent and pivotal in Sarkozy’s speeches because it is related to unemployment.

**FR_26:** Et s’il y a davantage de *déléguations*, il y aura davantage de chômeurs.

In this regard, commitment to education reform is not only seen as a long-term plan but as a resource yielding immediate results helping overcome the scourge of unemployment. This is what Sarkozy refers to as the “*sécurité sociale professionnelle*”, entailing the enhancement of both vocational training and unemployment benefits.

**FR_3:** Je souhaite également que pour les salariés soit créée une véritable *sécurité sociale professionnelle* en sécurisant mieux les parcours professionnels. […] Si je parle de *sécurité sociale*, c’est que nous avons le devoir de donner à chacun l’assurance qu’il peut *construire*, *préserver* et *améliorer* ses compétences, son savoir-faire, ses perspectives de carrière. Ce qui est intolérable, ce n’est pas la perte d’un emploi, c’est le sentiment que si cet emploi est perdu, on n’a aucune chance d’en retrouver un. Ce qui est intolérable, ce n’est pas de commencer sa carrière en bas de l’échelle, c’est d’être condamné à y rester toute sa vie, quels que soient ses mérites et son travail.
FR_4: Tout le monde sait bien qu’il faut profondément réformer le système de formation professionnelle dans notre pays. C’est difficile, c’est pour cela que cela n’a pas été fait. Nous le ferons. Parce que c’est de votre avenir qu’il s’agit. C’est cela votre sécurité sociale professionnelle. Parce que si l’un d’entre vous se trouve confronté au chômage, à un licenciement économique, à une difficulté, il doit être certain qu’avec le système qui est le nôtre, on lui offrira une formation de qualité, qui lui permettra de retrouver un métier. La sécurité sociale professionnelle, c’est aussi une indemnisation du chômage plus juste et plus incitative au retour à l’emploi.

Incidently, social security is also frequently dealt with by the former French President, as it has racked up debt during the crisis, to use Obama’s expression.

FR_24: Par ailleurs, nous allons mettre en place - le Premier ministre le fera dans les jours qui viennent - la commission réunissant le gouvernement et le Parlement pour trouver des solutions pour rembourser la dette exceptionnelle que la sécurité sociale a accumulée pendant la crise.

FR_33: Il y a une méthode qui ne marche pas et qui consiste à faire toujours plus de dépenses publiques, et à combler le déficit de la Sécurité Sociale à coup d’augmentation des charges et des cotisations. Ce qui favorise un mouvement de délocalisation qui n’a vraiment pas besoin d’être favorisé.

The economic crisis has further endangered the debt crisis of French social security, especially as far as pensions are concerned.

FR_49: Mes chers compatriotes, je veux vous le dire parce que c’est la vérité : j’ai été surpris moi-même ; lorsque je suis devenu Président de la République, j’ai constaté que sur quinze millions de retraités, la Sécurité sociale allait chercher à la banque un argent qu’elle n’avait pas pour un million et demi d’entre vous, vous m’entendez ? Un million et demi de retraités percevaient une pension que la Sécurité sociale n’avait pas, qu’elle devait aller à la banque emprunter.

FR_50: Il y a 15,5 millions de retraités en France, pour 1,5 million d’entre vous, les retraites n’étaient pas payées. Je veux dire la Sécurité sociale allait à la banque chercher un argent qu’elle n’avait pas. On peut continuer comme cela ? Moi, je ne suis pas venu dans cette campagne électorale pour nier la réalité.

The topic is, thus, closely related to the pension reform first hailed and then implemented by Sarkozy. The reform basically revolves around raising the normal retirement age for public pensions from sixty-five to sixty-seven and early reduced pensions from age sixty to sixty-two, in an attempt to revise the 1983 socialist act. It is deemed essential by the French President, because a considerable portion of pensions were being paid by means of loans from banks to the social security system. The reform was heavily criticised and gave rise to a series of general strikes and demonstration in autumn 2010. However, Sarkozy strenuously defends it in that it plays a crucial role in deficit reduction.
FR_36: Je pense notamment à la réforme des retraites et à toutes les mesures visant à diminuer nos dépenses publiques qui ont permis à la France de garder la confiance de ceux qui lui prêtent leur épargne pour financer son économie.

FR_42: Il a fallu affronter la réforme des retraites, sujet ô combien sensible ! On m’a dit : « mon dieu, c’est difficile, ce n’est pas populaire, il ne faut pas le faire. » […] Notre régime de retraite était en quasi faillite. 15 millions de retraités, pour 1,5 million d’entre eux, les retraites n’étaient payées que par un emprunt contracté par la Sécurité Sociale auprès des banques. […] Nous n’avons pas reculé, nous n’avons pas cédé, parce que l’essentiel était en jeu. […] Personne ne reviendra sur cette réforme parce qu’elle était incontournable, parce qu’elle était indispensable. Cette réforme n’était pas de gauche, elle n’était pas de droite, elle n’était pas de l’opposition, elle n’était pas du gouvernement : c’est une réforme de bon sens et je préfère avoir eu à affronter la mauvaise humeur des Français plutôt que leur colère lorsqu’ils s’apercevraient qu’après une vie de travail, la Sécurité Sociale n’avait pas les moyens de leur servir des retraites pour lesquelles ils auraient cotisé toute leur vie.

FR_44: La réforme des retraites, c’est vingt-deux milliards d’euros de recettes en plus par le travail des Français. En 2017, les retraites seront payées et, avec cela, on peut faire des allègements de charges sur vous.

FR_51: Imaginez la France sans la réforme des retraites qui apporte vingt-deux milliards d’euros au régime de retraite par solidarité et qui équilibre nos retraites, nos régimes de retraite en 2017, si nous ne l’avions pas fait, aujourd’hui, nous serions dans la situation de l’Espagne, dans la situation des pays qui ont la crainte de ne pas voir leur dette financée.

The example drawn from FR_44 is indicative of Sarkozy’s predilection for personal pronouns, as the speaker directly addresses the audience composed of French businessmen. The use of “vous” is not occasional but stands out in the former president’s speeches, as the pronoun occurs one thousand three hundred and thirty-five times, i.e. twenty-five times per speech on average. The figure is only comparable to Obama’s use of “you”, occurring two thousand seven hundred and forty-nine times, which suggests that the two speakers favour direct contact with the audience, also owing to their predilection for epideictic speeches delivered in national contexts. Therefore, Sarkozy’s and Obama’s discourses can be said to shift towards dialogicity (see section 5.2.6). The pronouns “I”/“je” and “we”/“nous” occur more consistently throughout the corpus, suggesting that the feature can be deemed intrinsic to politics rather than speaker-related. However, differences also stand out, though to a lesser extent if compared to the marked presence of “vous” and “you” in the speeches delivered, respectively, by Sarkozy and Obama. Broadly, Sarkozy and Hollande alternately use “je” and “nous”, while Obama and Cameron show a predilection for “we”. Given the differences in the use of personal pronouns, deepening the study of politicians’ recourse to “I”/“je”, “we”/“nous” and “you”/“vous” is a promising line of research: even though the translation of personal pronouns is not problematic, gaining an insight into their contextual use to assess who they actually refer to is bound to foster comprehension of speakers’ ways of adapting argumentation to the relevant audience; incidentally, the present study has shown (and further will) the crucial argumentative role played by the personal pronoun “they” in the straw man argument.
As regards the above-listed examples and the specific purposes of the present thesis, Sarkozy’s discourse regarding deficit reduction appears to be more “complete” and exhaustive than Cameron’s. Unlike Obama’s, Sarkozy’s argumentation does not depend upon “ready-made” lexical and expressive solutions, which results in a relatively high degree of lexical variation. However, the most glaring patterns and discursive features have been taken into account in the present section. In the light of which, Sarkozy’s discourse on deficit reduction can be said to hinge upon the following argument scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION**

*Premise 1:* The solution of the deficit crisis cannot but take spending cuts into account.

*Premise 2:* However, there is a “bad deficit”, determined by public spending, and a “good deficit”, determined by investment in research, education, innovation and enterprise.

*Premise 3:* They both entail spending, but spending for the “good deficit” will be repaid in terms of productivity and quality, thereby increasing incomes, spurring growth and benefit posterity.

*Conclusion:* This is why the government has retaken control of the management of spending: it is investing in research (*crédit impôt-recherche*), promoting vocational training, cutting business taxes (*crédit impôt-recherche, supprimer la taxe professionnelle*), opposing outsourcing and reforming the social security (pension reform).

The scheme shows that a variety of political measures are said to contribute to the main economic objective of deficit reduction. Among them, the *crédit impôt-recherche*, the repeal of the business tax and the pension reform deserve particular attention not only for their recurrence but also because they are typical of several among Sarkozy’s political proposals, focusing on the revision of recent, ill-judged policies rather than on genuinely new and innovative measures. Which is what Mayaffre has labelled the “révolution conservatrice” of Nicolas Sarkozy (2012: 97).

Sarkozy, par tempérament naturel peut-être ou pour répondre à la psychologie collective majoritaire d’une France vieillissante au début du XXI® siècle, propose, au-delà des hymnes superficiels à la modernité, un retour en arrière. C’est le plus souvent la recherche d’un passé perdu idéalisé qui sous-tend ses discours efficaces électoralement ; passé perdu dont on renonce pour l’heure à identifier les origines quelque part dans les années d’après guerre. De manière significative, les « réformes » que Nicolas Sarkozy promeut sans cesse […] visent le plus souvent à revenir sur des mesures coupables récentes afin de restaurer un ordre ancien présenté comme plus performant (Mayaffre 2012 : 53-54).

This strategy results in a plethora of nouns and verbs with the prefix *re-* (Mayaffre 2012: 147).

**FR_13:** Je me suis donné pour objectif de restaurer la compétitivité de la France, c’est mon devoir.

**FR_10:** Et je dis à mes propr es amis en France qui ne sont pas d’accord avec cette expression *refonder*, s’ils n’adoptent pas la *refondation* du capitalisme, alors ils font le lit de ceux qui veulent détruire le capitalisme. Soit on *refonde* le capitalisme, soit on le détruit.
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FR_20: Mes chers compatriotes, même si les épreuves ne sont pas terminées, 2010 sera une année de renouveau.

Nouns and verbs with the prefix re- also characterise another crucial and recurrent argument of Sarkozy’s speeches.

7.4.2 The Restoration of the Value of Work

The efforts made by the French government to reduce the deficit all share a common underlying theme, namely unemployment, because the economic crisis is primarily a job crisis.

FR_8: C’est autour du chômage que se noue la crise de confiance qui précipite la crise économique. Il faut donc encourager les entreprises à embaucher alors que leurs débouchés se réduisent et que leurs marges diminuent. On ne peut y parvenir qu’en diminuant le coût du travail.

FR_47: La crise sans précédent que nous vivons, c’est d’abord une crise du travail.

Solving the job crisis is the means not only to solve the economic crisis but also the key to restoring genuine capitalism, one in which the primacy is given to workers and entrepreneurs.

FR_3: Nous avons une tâche immense à accomplir : refonder le capitalisme mondial en redonnant le premier rôle à l’entrepreneur et au travailleur et non plus au spéculateur, nous devons faire en sorte que la finance soit mise au service des entreprises, de la production, de l’innovation, du développement économique et non plus seulement au service d’elle-même.

By the term “travail” Sarkozy entails entrepreneurship and manpower alike, two concepts Obama addresses in terms of “ingenuity” and “hardworking families”. Notably, the noun “travail” and the verb “travailler” are overused; they are the only words comparable, in terms of occurrences, with “crise”. “Travail” occurs four hundred and seventeen times, and “travailler” (in all its forms) two hundred and twenty-one times. This does not happen by chance, as the terms are used for persuasive purposes as they aim at “marteler pour imposer” (Mayaffre 2012: 49). In this regard, le travail is not only a pivotal topic but an inescapable value of sarkozyste discourse.


Here lies a tenet of Sarkozy’s discourse on the economy. The moralisation of capitalism cannot exclude the value of work or, in other words, a capitalism revolving
around workers and entrepreneurs is the solution to or rather the cure for financial capitalism.

**FR_1:** Ne pas donner tous les bénéfices aux dirigeants et aux actionnaires, en destiner une part plus grande à ceux qui par leur travail créent la richesse, redonner du pouvoir d’achat aux travailleurs sans alourdir les charges fixes de l’entreprise et ainsi remettre le capitalisme à l’endroit. […] L’autre figure du capitalisme qu’il faut réhabiliter c’est celle de l’entrepreneur. Au capitalisme financier il faut opposer le capitalisme des entrepreneurs. A côté de la valeur travail, il faut remettre l’esprit d’entreprise au cœur du système de valeur de l’économie. C’est toute la philosophie de la loi de modernisation de l’économie et ce sera l’autre priorité de la politique économique dans l’avenir.

**FR_5:** Et je le dis aux Français, en faisant cela, je reste attaché à la valeur travail. Je préfère que des gens travaillent en se formant et en prenant un autre métier plutôt que de les mettre au chômage.

**FR_10:** Il faut voir la crise actuelle comme la conséquence d’un dégonflement rapide de la bulle de la dette, comme le passage d’un modèle de croissance par l’endettement à un modèle de croissance par le travail. Plus que jamais, je crois à la valeur travail.

**FR_34:** La croissance extravagante du secteur financier qui a disséminé d’invraisemblables quantités de dettes a eu pour conséquence la financiarisation de l’économie. Elle l’a mise sous la domination exclusive de la logique spéculative et l’obsession du court-terme. On en connait les conséquences dramatiques sur l’industrie, sur l’environnement, sur les inégalités et sur la dégradation de la valeur du travail.

In line with his predilection for words prefixed with re-, Sarkozy claims that the solution of the crisis is the “réhabilitation de la valeur travail”.

**FR_4:** Parce que depuis mai 2007, nous avons encouragé les créations d’emploi et réhabilité le travail. […] J’ai été élu pour réhabiliter le travail.

**FR_19:** Le maintien d’une base industrielle, un capitalisme de production, la réhabilitation du travail. Voilà ce que nous allons faire et voilà pourquoi nous nous lançons dans cela.

**FR_21:** Depuis deux ans et demi nous avons voulu réhabiliter le travail pour avoir plus de croissance, rétablir la compétitivité de nos entreprises pour créer davantage de richesses, encourager l’innovation et le progrès technique qui sont à la source de la croissance, relever le défi du vieillissement, préserver notre système de retraite, consolider nos finances publiques, préparer notre économie à la croissance verte pour préserver l’avenir de la planète. Le rôle de l’Etat c’est de protéger les Français, mais les protéger en leur faisant comprendre que notre pays doit évoluer, doit se moderniser. […] Quelle est ma priorité ? Réhabiliter le travail. Je continuerai à porter cette politique de réhabilitation du travail.

**FR_47:** En engageant le combat que nous avons engagé pour la moralisation du capitalisme financier contre la spéculation, contre les bonus, contre les paradis fiscaux, nous n’avons rien fait d’autre que d’engager le combat pour la réhabilitation du travail. […] Je me dis qu’il faut redonner la parole à la France qui travaille. Au fond, c’est la seule façon de
surmonter les blocages, que c’est la seule façon de vaincre les conservatismes, que c’est la seule façon de réhabiliter complètement le travail.

Regarding the value-driven nature of Sarkozy’s argument, a crucial comment is in order. Though it might seem tantamount to the Protestant argument for reward to the responsible and hardworking recurrently put forward by Obama, Sarkozy’s stance is substantially different in that values are not personal values requiring some sort of divine reward but rather national values nurtured by targeted political measures. Even though merit is sometimes addressed, it is associated with other core, typically French values the state needs to restore in order to promote genuine capitalism, and no reward is promised to anybody. Here lies a crucial difference between Obama and Sarkozy: even though they both focus on work, the speeches of the latter do not rely on religious assumptions and preacher-like rhetoric for cultural and historical reasons.

**FR 9:** Et en même temps, nous préserverons les valeurs qui font notre spécificité : le travail, l’effort, le mérite, la laïcité et la solidarité, sans laquelle aucun effort n’est acceptable.

The secular nature of the state is another frequently addressed value as, after all, “la République est laïque, et c’est mis dans l’article premier” (FR_48). In other words, unlike in American speeches, the value of work is not a personal virtue shared by most citizens but a priority for the political agenda, a value that has always characterised French political vision and that has only been provisionally wiped out by financial capitalism and the “mondialisation sans règle” (FR_34). This is what renders Sarkozy’s discourse an ideological discourse rather than a discourse on values.

Le discours de Sarkozy n’est pas seulement un discours gestionnaire, un discours technique, un discours comptable ; il se présente comme un discours sur les valeurs – valeurs polémiques si possible susceptibles de marquer le clivage gauche-droite. En ce sens, c’est un discours idéologique, le plus souvent dissensuel, qui rompt avec la prose vide et consensuelle d’un Jacques Chirac par exemple (Mayaffre 2012 : 53).

In this respect, calling for the restoration of the value of work serves the specifically ideological and pragmatic purpose of promoting the President’s “révolution conservatrice”. Indeed, the decline of the value of work in France is, in Sarkozy’s opinion, primarily ascribable to the thirty-five-hour working week reform implemented by Lionel Jospin in 2000, which is frequently described as acting like fetters (“carcan”) on the economy of France.

**FR 3:** Nous sommes le seul pays au monde à nous être dotés du carcan des 35 heures.

**FR 11:** Qu’est-ce qui s’est passé en 2000 ? Les 35 heures. Comment voulez-vous que notre pays soit compétitif si on explique aux gens qu’ils travailleront moins et gagneront autant ?
The government has revised the reform by reducing the tax on overtime, because “les trente-cinq heures” promoted a culture of idleness.

The opposition between “working more” and “working less” is recurrent, because it is basically what the restoration of work is about: working more to nurture the “good deficit”, thereby overcoming the economic crisis. The excerpt drawn from FR_47 shows that the pension reform is also ascribable to the need to restore the primacy of workers and entrepreneurs.
Here lies another crucial argument of Sarkozy’s rhetoric.

**ARGUMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE VALUE OF WORK**

*Premise 1:* The economic crisis is primarily a job crisis.

*Premise 2:* Financial capitalism has promoted the model of growth nurtured by debt, thereby depriving capitalism of the core value of work.

*Premise 3:* Left parties have contributed to promoting the culture of idleness by implementing the thirty-five-hour working week reform.

*Premise 4:* We must solve the crisis.

*Premise 5:* Only by working more will we overcome the crisis / Only by solving the job crisis will the economic crisis be overcome.

*Premise 6:* Moreover, investing more in businesses and work will nurture the “good deficit”.

**Conclusion:** This is why the government is promoting the restoration of the value of work by reducing the tax on overtime and by implementing the pension reform.

### 7.5 Sarkozy’s European and International Arguments

Compared with the other corpus speakers, Sarkozy displays argumentative consistency irrespective of the audience and the context of speech delivery. In other words, national speeches are not that different from the speeches delivered in EU and international settings. The topical focus of Sarkozy’s speeches is comprehensive to such an extent that it enables him to “please” all audiences at all times. It is true that essentially “national topics” such as allusions to the mistakes of opposition parties and the reforms aiming at promoting businesses are more pervasive in the speeches delivered in front of French audiences. However, the value of work and all the other crucial convictions of the speaker regarding the nature of the crisis are addressed systematically, and European issues are similarly dealt with in national contexts. Take the *argument for defence of bailout*: it is quintessentially an international argument in that it concerns international measures to solve the international economic crisis. However, Sarkozy adopts it in most speeches, especially in national speeches, and it is thus a recurrent argument of Sarkozy’s discourse on the economic crisis, primarily because, unlike Cameron, Sarkozy appears to see himself as a French and European leader alike:

**FR_7:** Monsieur le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, la France et l’Europe apprécient votre travail.

**FR_44:** Alors que la France et l’Europe sont touchées par l’une des crises sans doute les plus graves de ces soixante dernières années, alors que les équilibres du monde ont été si profondément bouleversés, il nous faut faire preuve de courage, de lucidité, et inventer les nouvelles réponses à une crise telle que nous n’en avons jamais connue dans son ampleur et dans ses contours.

Particularly, Sarkozy’s argumentation differs considerably from Cameron’s because France and her President feel completely “part” of the European project.

Le plan européen a été ensuite adopté en France en trois jours. La représentation nationale a montré une réactivité et je le dis aux parlementaires qui sont ici, elle a montré une réactivité et un esprit de décision à la hauteur des circonstances exceptionnelles.

Ma deuxième conviction, c’est que l’Europe doit s’affirmer comme un pôle de stabilité de ce monde nouveau, l’Europe doit régler les problèmes de la zone euro et porter dans le monde entier les convictions qui sont les siennes. L’Europe ne doit pas subir, l’Europe a des choses à dire, l’Europe est irremplaçable dans le monde.

Therefore, the labels “European arguments” and “international arguments” do not regard the context of speech delivery but topicality. In this respect, only a few additional comments on Sarkozy’s argumentation regarding Europe are in order.

Sarkozy and his country enjoy an advantageous position in the European context, which is not concealed.

Notre pays a connu une récession de 2,6%, c’est un choc énorme, mais tous nos voisins de la zone euro ont connu une baisse de leur PIB de près de 5%, le double de la France. Le chômage a augmenté de 20% par rapport à mai 2007, mais il a augmenté de 33% dans la zone euro, et a plus que doublé aux États-Unis et en Espagne. La France a donc mieux résisté que les autres pays.

Depuis 2008, dans la tempête économique et financière, sans doute la plus grave et la plus dangereuse que le monde ait connu depuis les années 30, la France a résisté, la France a tenu. Et les Français ont fait face.

Undoubtedly, European discourse shifts towards denotation. Argumentation regarding the solution of the Eurozone crisis revolves around enhanced control of the financial sector, appeals to cooperation and commitment to implement measures to contain the crisis and prevent similar predicaments from happening again.

Les agences de notation seront désormais enregistrées, mises sous surveillance.

Troisièmement, la zone euro prend son destin en main. Nous nous sommes mis d’accord pour mettre en place un mécanisme pour gérer les crises dans la zone euro. C’est un pas majeur qui nous oblige aussi à repenser nos mécanismes de surveillance économique et budgétaire, pour que de telles crises ne se reproduisent plus […] Enfin, nous avons décidé de demander au président Van Rompuy de constituer un groupe de travail avec les États membres, la Commission, la BCE, pour présenter avant la fin de l’année les mesures nécessaires pour renforcer les instruments de prévention et de surveillance des risques économiques et budgétaires.

Among the European measures to solve the Eurozone crisis, reference is often made to the Greek debt crisis. Argumentation regarding the bailout of Greece basically revolves around European efforts to back Greek recovery. In this respect, reference is sometimes
made to the IFM and the PSI (“Private Sector Involvement”), together with which the contributions of member states prevented a major recession by keeping Greece in the Eurozone. However, the topic does not give rise to extensive discussions, as the speaker generally states that “the Greeks, in return, must respect their commitments”.

**FR_38**: Et enfin notre analyse sur la Grèce est la même : nous avons négocié à l’époque un PSI. Nous avons dit que le PSI ne s’appliquerait qu’à la Grèce. Il faut maintenant que nos amis grecs tiennent leurs engagements et qu’avec le FMI nous mettions en œuvre ce qui a été prévu par l’accord de Bruxelles.

**FR_45**: Avec la Chancelière, nous disons d’ailleurs que la situation de la Grèce doit être réglée une bonne fois pour toute. Les paramètres du règlement sont sur la table et nos amis grecs doivent prendre leurs responsabilités en votant les réformes sur lesquelles ils se sont engagés.

Rather, Greece is often mentioned in relation to other “weak” members of the Eurozone and quoted to shed light on the more encouraging situation of the economy in France.


**FR_42**: Y en a-t-il un seul d’entre vous qui aimerait que la France soit dans la situation de la Grèce, qui aimerait que la France soit dans la situation du Portugal, de l’Espagne, même de l’Italie? Qu’est-ce qui s’est donc passé dans ces pays ? Ils n’ont pas fait les choix difficiles qu’il fallait faire au moment où ils devaient les faire. Quand on diffère une décision difficile, on doit la prendre plus tard, trop tard, et alors il y a davantage de souffrance.

**FR_50**: Je ne veux pas pour mon pays, la France, de la situation de la Grèce ou de la situation de l’Espagne, voilà la vérité que je suis venu défendre dans cette campagne.

**FR_52**: Nous avons soutenu les banques, pas pour elles, pour vous, parce que dans les banques, c’est l’argent de votre travail, c’est l’argent de votre vie, c’est votre épargne. Si nous ne l’avions pas fait, que se serait-il passé ? Là encore, est-ce que vous avez envie de vivre ce que vivent les Grecs, ce que vivent les Espagnols, ce qu’ont vécu les Irlandais ? Mieux que ça, le seul pays au monde où le plan de sauvetage des banques a rapporté de l’argent au Trésor public, c’est la France. Bien sûr qu’on n’a pas tout réussi. Mais ma fierté, c’est de vous avoir protégés et d’avoir évité que la France qui travaille et qui épargne soit ruinée par une crise qui a ruiné tant d’ épargnants dans le monde. La France n’a pas connu ce drame.

This topic thus rests on a simple justification scheme:
ARGUMENT FOR DEFENCE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES BY COMPARISON TO “WEAK” EUROZONE MEMBERS

Premise 1: There are some who oppose or criticise the government’s policies.
Premise 2: Though these policies seem drastic, they have been instrumental in preventing a major recession in France.
Premise 3: Similar policies have not been implemented in weaker Eurozone countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy).
Conclusion: This is why France has avoided a major recession.

Apart from reference to the crisis in other Eurozone countries and discourse regarding the unfolding of the European agenda (which is more informative than argumentative), the passages focusing on European issues seem to be characterised by one major argument, aiming at the “resserrement sur le pilier franco-allemand” (Mayaffre 2012: 55). Chancellor Angela Merkel “shows up” in most of Sarkozy’s speeches, which comes as no surprise as the two emerged as the leaders of Europe during the crisis.

FR_1: J’ai fait cette proposition en plein accord avec la Chancellerie allemande, Madame Merkel, avec qui je m’en suis entretenu et qui partage les mêmes préoccupations à propos de la crise financière et sur les leçons qu’il va falloir en tirer.

FR_6: Ce sujet, à la demande d’ailleurs de la Chancellerie Mme Merkel, sera un point important du Sommet franco-allemand du mois de novembre. Tout le monde est d’accord sur la nécessité d’une relance économique forte.

FR_10: Je remercie bien sûr Angela Merkel. Nous devons travailler ensemble, nous travaillons ensemble parce que c’est l’intérêt de l’Europe et parce que l’on partage les mêmes convictions, Angela et moi.

FR_18: C’était un point incontournable, nous en avions d’ailleurs fait, avec Mme Merkel, un élément fort de nos priorités.

Not only Angela Merkel but also and particularly the alliance between Germany and France is recurrently addressed, in that it has been instrumental in dealing with the consequences of the Eurozone crisis. After all, the two countries boast the most powerful economies in Europe.

FR_14: Mesdames et Messieurs, c’est sans précédent qu’on ait pu trouver un accord de cette nature. Je dois dire que l’axe franco-allemand a bien fonctionné.

FR_25: L’accord que nous avons trouvé en Europe sur un mécanisme de soutien en cas de crise est un succès des États de la zone euro. Il a été rendu possible par la mobilisation de la France et de l’Allemagne qui ont conclu dans le courant de cet après-midi un accord, que nous avons présenté au président Van Rompuy et autres Etats de la zone euro qui l’ont accepté lors d’une réunion exceptionnelle de l’Eurogroupe au niveau des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement.

FR_34: L’Allemagne et la France unies, c’est l’Europe toute entière qui est unie et forte. La France et l’Allemagne désunies, c’est l’Europe toute entière qui est désunie et qui est
affaiblie. Je recevrai lundi prochain à Paris la chancelière Merkel et ensemble nous ferons des propositions pour garantir l’avenir de l’Europe. […] La France et l’Allemagne ont fait le choix de la convergence. Je ne reviendrai jamais sur ce choix. Cela ne veut pas dire que l’une veut se mettre à la remorque de l’autre, ni que les deux veulent renoncer à leur identité jusqu’à se confondre. Le choix de la convergence, ce n’est pas celui de l’imitation mais celui des leçons tirées en commun de l’expérience de chacun.

Le choix de la convergence c’est celui du travail en commun, de l’effort partagé pour construire au cœur de l’économie européenne une zone de stabilité et de confiance qui sera le moteur de la compétitivité européenne. Je ferai tout pour qu’il en soit ainsi. L’Europe n’est plus un choix. Elle est une nécessité.

FR_38: Il ne peut pas y avoir d’avenir pour l’Europe sur des divergences franco-allemandes. J’ai grande confiance en Mme Merkel, nous travaillons souvent ensemble, nous échangeons sur tous les sujets et cette année 2012 où la crise est si forte, où la situation est si préoccupante, imposait que dès le début de l’année nous échangions. […] Je voudrais remercier la Chancelière Merkel pour le travail en commun que nous faisons. La grande confiance qu’il y a entre l’Allemagne et la France. Et l’idée que nous nous faisons, c’est que nos deux pays doivent s’entraider pour sortir la zone euro de la crise dans laquelle elle se trouve.

FR_45: Avec Mme Merkel, nous avons évoqué tous les sujets du jour et puis tous les sujets structuraux. Vous savez - d’ailleurs ce n’est pas une nouveauté -, nous nous parlons extrêmement régulièrement, nous nous parlons en confiance, nous nous parlons comme des amis et comme des alliés. Je veux redire l’importance que la France attache à son entente et à sa collaboration avec l’Allemagne. Nous sommes les deux premières économies d’Europe. Notre alliance est stratégique, et, à un moment où le monde connaît tant de bouleversements, tant de difficultés, tant de changements, à un moment où l’Europe s’est trouvée confrontée à tant de crises financières et économiques, l’alliance sans faille déterminée entre l’Allemagne et la France a permis d’éviter que l’Europe en général, et l’euro en particulier, tombe dans le gouffre de la crise financière. Nous n’en sommes pas complètement sortis - nous en sommes parfaitement conscients -, mais pendant ces longs mois, pendant ces trois années de crise, c’est l’alliance entre l’Allemagne et la France qui a permis à l’Europe de surmonter les défis immenses qui se présentaient à elle.

FR_48: Mais la France est le pays d’Europe, avec l’Allemagne, qui a le mieux résisté à la crise.

Over and above providing a crucial contribution to the solution of Eurozone problems, cooperation between Germany and France has historic significance.

FR_34: L’histoire et la géographie ont fait l’Allemagne et la France rivales ou partenaires. En faisant le choix de l’amitié le Chancelier Adenauer et le Général de Gaulle ont fait un choix historique.

The excerpts show that Sarkozy’s rhetoric builds on another crucial, recurrent argument scheme:
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

ARGUMENT FROM FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION

Premise 1: The Eurozone crisis is a historic predicament, a structural crisis demanding structural reforms.
Premise 2: We must solve the Eurozone crisis.
Premise 3: Germany and France are the most powerful among European economies.
Premise 4: After a history of conflict, Germany and France have chosen cooperation.
Conclusion: Therefore, Franco-German cooperation is contributing significantly to the solution of the Eurozone crisis.

Despite the major differences between Cameron and Sarkozy as regards the topic of the relation between their respective countries and the European Union, the two speakers share a crucial argument when it comes to international issues, i.e. the argument from mutual interest in unilateral distress (see section 6.4).


FR_13: La France - en novembre - a proposé de réunir à Washington les chefs d’État et de gouvernement des vingt plus grandes puissances du monde pour discuter de la relance mondiale, de la moralisation du capitalisme financier, en y associant les grands pays émergents que l’on tenait jusqu’à présent à l’écart de toutes les décisions.

FR_17: Si on ne s’occupe pas de l’Afrique, on est irresponsible car on ne prépare pas l’avenir et on est accusé à ce moment là de nous désintéresser. Si on s’en occupe, on est très facilement accusé d’ingérence. Mais ce n’est pas parce que c’est difficile qu’il ne faut pas le faire, il faut le faire. L’avenir de l’Europe se joue en partie aussi en Afrique.

FR_23: On ne peut pas gouverner la mondialisation en tenant à l’écart la moitié de l’Humanité.

FR_31: Il ne faut pas croire que le monde a besoin d’un tiers monde, que les pays développés auraient intérêt à maintenir les pays pauvres en état de dépendance, que le
développement des uns empièterait sur la croissance des autres. Il n’y aura pas de croissance future et durable pour l’économie mondiale sans un développement partagé.

There can be no genuine economic recovery without shared prosperity; in the light of which, the argument from mutual interest in unilateral distress might be said to be a quintessentially political argument, irrespective of the speaker in question, as it aims at showing the commitment of developed countries towards a solution of the problems of the Third World. However mainstream, Sarkozy’s version of the argument builds on specific premises and puts forward a specific conclusion.

ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS (“ARGUMENT PRO-AFRICA”)
Premise 1: Half of the world’s population (and especially Africa) is in distress and has been overlooked and/or kept at a distance by industrialised countries for too long.
Premise 2: In the 21st century, economic problems are globally-shared problems.
Premise 3: There can be no genuine economic recovery without shared prosperity.
Premise 4: We will not solve the economic crisis if we do not strive to lift Africa (and developing countries) out of poverty.
Conclusion: This is why France and Europe commit to promoting economic development in Africa.

7.6 Pragmatic Arguments

Since Sarkozysme is also about pragmatism (Mayaffre 2012: 93), the analysed speeches share with Cameron’s addresses the significant presence of pragmatic arguments, which is also a consequence of the French President’s bent for the production of a “discours d’expert” (Mayaffre 2012: 37).

The argument from alternatives is frequently used by Sarkozy to present two incompatible options, a wise one and a senseless one.

FR_7: Face à cette crise, il y a deux attitudes. La première consisterait à continuer comme avant, sans tirer aucune leçon des erreurs du passé. La seconde consiste à faire de cette crise sans précédent, une opportunité pour changer le monde.

FR_13: Le sommet de Londres ne doit pas être un sommet technique mais un sommet politique où se joiera la question de savoir si l’on réforme le capitalisme ou si l’on laisse le champ libre à ceux qui veulent le détruire et qui en même temps, ne nous y trompons pas, détruiront la liberté. […] Si la France est active, si la France est présente, elle a une chance de prendre toute sa place. Si on n’est pas actif, si on n’est pas présent, si on se plaint, si on se plaint, si on ne fait rien, personne ne nous attendra.

Reference has already been made to the presence of the argument from negative consequences of inaction in Sarkozy’s speeches (see section 7.4). More generally, the argument from consequences is systematically used, and thus appears to be a pivotal argumentative strategy of political argumentation.
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**FR_46**: Si on refuse la réalité, on ne peut pas comprendre les efforts qu’il nous faut faire. Et *si on* ne les comprend pas, on ne les fera pas. *Et si on* ne les fait pas alors ce sont tous les Français qui souffriront.

**FR_52**: Si vous avez cinquante-sept ans, que vous êtes dans le textile et que vous êtes en province et que vous voulez changer de métier, il n’y a pas de formation pour vous. *Donc* il faut changer notre système parce que les fonds de la formation professionnelle vont d’abord à ceux qui en ont, en fait, le moins besoin.

The excerpts show that the argument from consequences is generally put forward in the form of conditional sentences and signalled by the conjunction *si*.

**FR_21**: Parce que *si on* ne fait reposer notre fiscalité que sur le travail, *on* ne s’en sortira pas.

**FR_26**: Face à un problème démographique, la réponse démographique relève du bon sens : *si on* vit plus longtemps, *on* doit travailler plus longtemps.

**FR_52**: Ça rentrera en vigueur en octobre parce que *si on* ne fait pas ça, *on est* complice des délocalisations.

The examples show that, unlike in the British sub-corpus, in Sarkozy’s speeches the argument from consequences is less dependent on lexical items like *consequences* or *to affect*. Rather, it takes the form of impersonal conditional sentences in which the subject is generally identified with the pronoun *on*. *On* is a “resource” of the French language which is extensively used by Sarkozy; however, not all languages enjoy the benefits of a ubiquitous impersonal pronoun. In interpreting, *on* can frequently be replaced by *we*, as Sarkozy generally uses the pronoun to indicate France, the French government or Europe. For instance, the passage drawn from FR_21 could be translated as “*If we do not reduce business taxes we won’t come out of the crisis*”, and the passage drawn from FR_52 as “*It will enter into force in October, otherwise we will be contributing to business outsourcing*”. Alternatively, the argument can be turned into a passive sentence. The last sentence of the excerpt drawn from FR_26 can thus be translated as follows: “*a longer life requires more work*”.

### 7.7 The Straw Man Argument

The comments regarding Cameron’s predilection for “*aut aut* argumentation” also apply to Sarkozy, as his preference for pragmatic argumentation results in the pervasive presence of *straw man* arguments.

**FR_13**: Une société de liberté, c’est d’abord une société de respect. Si *certains* ne comprennent pas spontanément ce que veut dire le mot respect, nous allons les aider à comprendre ce que signifie le mot respect.
FR_46: Je veux le dire calmement mais aussi fermement : ceux qui font comme si rien de grave ne s’était passé depuis trois ans dans le monde, ceux qui font comme si les risques auxquels la France s’était trouvé confrontée n’avaient pas été dramatiques, ceux-là mentent aux Français, ceux-là ne rendent pas service à la France.

FR_48: Honte, honte à ceux qui ont essayé de défendre des sentiments de germanophobie. […] À ceux qui viennent vous dire qu’il suffisait de sortir de l’euro, des choses absurdes dans ma vie, j’en ai entendu, mais comme celle-là, jamais. Et je vais vous le démontrer d’une phrase.

FR_52: Il y a ceux qui disent : « Le monde n’existe pas, nous sommes seuls au monde. » Il y a ceux qui disent : « La crise, ça n’a pas existé. On peut faire, après la crise, comme on faisait avant la crise. » C’est leur droit de penser cela mais c’est mon devoir de chef de l’État qui a conduit la France pendant quatre ans au milieu des pires difficultés et des crises d’une violence inouïe que de dire aux Français : le monde existe, nous ne pouvons pas faire comme s’il n’existe pas. Nous sommes en compétition avec les autres. C’est notre devoir de préparer l’avenir et nous ne pouvons pas faire, après les crises que nous avons connues, comme on faisait avant.

More examples could be provided, as the straw man argument in Sarkozy’s speeches is even more recurrent than in Cameron’s. What is important from an interpreting point of view is to bear in mind its pragmatic function, which does not differ from that of the argument from alternatives.

In Sarkozy’s speeches, straw man arguments are often associated with the demonstrative pronoun “ceux” that, together with the other demonstrative pronouns, make up a distinctive feature of the President’s rhetoric (Mayaffre 2012: 266). Indeed, “ceux”, “ce”, “cela” and “ça” “réduisent la complexité des choses” (Mayaffre 2012 : 273), allude to the opposition, imply meanings, show the audience what has to be taken for granted and contribute to providing Sarkozy’s speeches with pragmatic force.

7.8 Questions Used as Rhetorical Devices

The previous sections have highlighted that the discourse of Sarkozysme revolves around several crucial arguments. However, when reading, interpreting or simply listening to Sarkozy’s addresses, the major discursive feature that stands out is the massive recourse to questions for rhetorical purposes.

FR_7: Pourquoi l’Europe a-t-elle voulu ce sommet ? Parce que nous sommes face, nous, le monde, à une crise financière sans précédent.

FR_26: Quelle est la situation aujourd’hui ? Nous avons traversé en 2009 la pire crise que l’économie mondiale ait connue depuis les années 30.

FR_31: Car l’enjeu est là : quelle mondialisation voulons-nous ? Nous voulons une mondialisation qui s’éloigne des choix à courte vue, une mondialisation qui ne vise plus la
From a pragmatic point of view, the recourse to questions is the discursive feature “qui fonde en grande partie l’efficacité oratoire de Sarkozy” (Mayaffre 2012: 236).

Par interrogation rhétorique, il faut entendre les innombrables questions que Sarkozy se pose à lui-même, donnant à son discours une allure vivante, dialoguée, interactive (Mayaffre 2012: 236).

More precisely, in Sarkozy’s ARGO speeches, questions are the speaker’s rhetorical strategy to show his commitment in explaining to the audience the plan to solve the crisis, thereby empowering listeners by getting them to feel involved in political debate. Incidentally, this rhetorical device is in line with the speaker’s discursive tendency to dialogicity (see section 7.4.1). Regarding interpreting, questions contribute significantly to the pragmatic force of speeches; therefore, they cannot be overlooked for the purposes of achieving pragmatic equivalence between the source and the interpreted text, though their presence is superfluous from an informative point of view.

Questions are used for different purposes. In the above examples drawn from FR_7, FR_26 and FR_31, they serve the purpose of “imposer l’évidence ou le triomphe du bon sens” (Mayaffre 2012: 243). In these cases, the question has an obvious answer, by which the speaker strategically “transforme […] l’évidence en chevaux de bataille” (Mayaffre 2012: 243-244).

Another example is provided by the following passage drawn from FR_52:

FR_52: Il y a plusieurs manières de réussir, il n’y a pas qu’une seule voie de réussite. Ce jeune qui n’est pas fait pour passer des longues études ou passer des concours, ce jeune, par exemple, passionné d’ordinateur et moins passionné par le bac, est-ce qu’on ne peut pas valoriser ses qualités devant l’ordinateur en créant un bac numérique dans des académies qui prépareront à ce bac numérique pour que ce que parents considèrent comme un défaut devienne, pour la société, une qualité parce qu’on en aura besoin ? Est-ce qu’on doit l’obliger, ce jeune, à passer par l’algèbre, par la géométrie et par tout un tas de matières qu’il ne maîtrisera pas et qui, de toute manière, ne l’intéressent pas ? Est-ce qu’il n’y a pas, là aussi, une chance à lui donner ? Bref, la question de la formation professionnelle.

Questions sometimes serve as an introduction to the speaker’s argumentation. In these cases, they generally aim at “mettre l’auditoire devant son incapacité à répondre” (Mayaffre 2012: 241), thereby providing the speaker with the opportunity to display his ability in answering an extremely serious question. The example drawn from FR_31 and shown in the previous page, seeing Sarkozy asking “Quelle mondialisation voulons-nous ?”, is a case in point. Take another example drawn from FR_27:

FR_27: Deuxièmement, la crise. Qu’est-ce qui s’est passé ? Pourquoi ça s’est passé ainsi ? Et quelles leçons en tirer ?
Alternatively, questions are used polemically. In this respect, they act like straw man arguments.

**FR_4**: Il y en a peut-être parmi vous qui se disent : mais pourquoi aider les banques ? Pourquoi ne pas soutenir directement les PME, qui créent de l’emploi, et ont leurs problèmes de financement, bien plus durs que ceux des banques ? Ou bien, pourquoi ne pas distribuer cet argent aux salariés eux-mêmes ? À ceux là je réponds que le plan voté par le Parlement à la demande du gouvernement est fait pour les PME, est fait pour les salariés, est fait pour la croissance et est fait pour l’emploi. Il n’est pas pour les banques.

**FR_48**: Avec le recul, qui ici pourrait me dire que vous enviez le sort de la Grèce, que vous enviez le sort de l’Espagne ou le sort de l’Italie ? Et qui peut me reprocher d’avoir tout fait pour que dans cette crise inouïe de violence, l’Allemagne et la France continuent côté à côté, solidaires, à tenir l’Europe ?

In other words, by means of questions Sarkozy summarises and exaggerates the opinions and stances of his opponents, thereby turning the spotlight on his answers.

As regards interpreting, the translation of Sarkozy’s questions is a matter of pragmatic force retention, but it does not pose formal challenges. Their presence is easily identifiable, as it is announced either by unmistakable lexical items (“Pourquoi?” , “Comment?” , “Est-ce que?”) or by the excellent prosodic skills of the speaker. Moreover, questions are generally “laissées un instant sans réponse” to shape “l’image de l’homme providentiel qui détient, seul, les solutions” (Mayaffre 2012 : 241). In interpreting terms, the opportunity is provided to lengthen the décalage and produce a careful translation before the answer is given.

### 7.9 Interpreting Problems

Despite being also a specialist discourse characterised by a high degree of lexical variation, Sarkozy’s discourse on the economic crisis remains fundamentally clear. His speeches resemble those of an educator (Mayaffre 2012 : 243), also owing to the persistent recourse to questions used as rhetorical devices. Sarkozy’s clarity undoubtedly plays a beneficial role in interpreting. However, challenges can be detected. Probably the major difficulty in interpreting Sarkozy’s speeches lies in the presence of intense and rapidly-delivered passages made up of short, juxtaposed sentences. Take this excerpt drawn from **FR_4**:

**FR_4**: En effet, le meilleur moyen pour une entreprise et ses salariés de prévenir les ajustements brutaux, c’est d’anticiper les besoins en emplois et en compétences, de développer ces dernières, de se préparer aux changements technologiques et économiques et de gérer les carrières non pas au jour le jour mais dans une logique de long terme.

The difficulty of interpreting this kind of passages is comparable with the challenges posed by slippery slope arguments in Cameron’s speeches. However, the two discursive routines in question are substantially different: whereas Cameron’s arguments result in
clauses linked by temporal junctures, logical linkage or causative verbs, Sarkozy’s are characterised by coordination and asyndeton. The absence of both logical and chronological links contributes to accelerating the rhythm of delivery that enhances the rhetorical effectiveness of speeches.

Since some elements of the chain might be lost in the interpreting process, a general strategy lies in keeping décalage at a minimum to grasp the speaker’s simple albeit rapid sentences. However, a frequent feature of these fast asyndetic passages can assist interpreters in their tasks: Sarkozy’s massive recourse to anaphora.

**FR_3:** Il faut que l’Europe se prépare. Il ne faut pas qu’elle soit la variable d’ajustement du nouvel ordre mondial. Il ne faut pas qu’elle soit naïve, il ne faut pas qu’elle laisse ses entreprises à la merci de tous les prédateurs, il ne faut pas qu’elle soit la seule au monde à ne pas défendre ses intérêts, à ne pas protéger ses citoyens.

**FR_7:** Changer les institutions du monde, changer le système financier du monde, changer l’opportunité pour des régions comme l’Afrique notamment, de se développer.

A useful strategy helping interpreters “reduce” the propositional content thereby lengthening décalage and focusing attention lies giving up anaphora. Examples of how to implement the strategy are provided below:

**FR_8:** La crise va changer les équilibres du monde. Elle va changer les comportements, les idées, les valeurs. Cette crise, nous ne devons pas la subir. Cette crise, nous devons l’affronter de face, sans mentir. Cette crise, elle ne doit pas nous inciter à attendre, elle doit nous inciter à agir, à agir vite, à agir fort. Notre réponse doit être à la hauteur. Parce que la crise est très forte, notre réponse doit être très forte. Parce que la crise va tout changer, notre réponse doit préparer le changement. Elle doit préparer l’avenir. Nous ne devons pas nous contenter d’essayer de passer tant bien que mal une période difficile. Nous ne devons pas nous contenter de limiter les dégâts. Nous devons au contraire être ambitieux, nous devons faire preuve d’imagination, d’audace. Notre réponse à la crise, c’est l’investissement.

**REFORMULATION BY ELIMINATION OF ANAPHORA**

The crisis will change the world order, our behaviour patterns, ideas and values, but we must not be affected by it. We must tackle it without lying. This crisis must not lead us to inaction but spur us to action, rapidity and boldness. Our response must live up to the test. Since the crisis is tough and will bring change, we must be tough and be ready to change. It must prepare our future. We must not be satisfied with a half-hearted response aimed at limiting the damage. Rather, we must be ambitious, imaginative and bold. Investment is our response to the crisis.

The “elimination” of anaphora, however inelegant for rhetorical purposes enables interpreters to focus attention on crucial topical features of Sarkozy’s rhetoric such as values, the importance of truth, the negative consequences of inaction, boldness and private-sector investment.
Over and above the mere elimination of anaphora and repetition, a considerable reformulative effort is required to keep pace with Sarkozy’s fast asyndetic passages.

**FR_13**: Voilà pourquoi, là aussi, *il faut changer* nos habitudes et ne pas *les changer* dans les mots, mais *les changer* dans les faits, et la crise nous donne l’opportunité de le faire.

**REFORMULATION BY ELIMINATION OF ANAPHORA**
Which is why *we must change* our habits, not with words but with facts. The crisis is an opportunity to do so.

**FR_21**: *Si nous voulons* être parmi les économies qui comptent dans vingt ans, *si nous voulons* que nos universités soient classées parmi les meilleures du monde, *si nous voulons* gagner la bataille de la connaissance, *si nous voulons* rester à la pointe de la recherche, *si nous voulons* entrer de plein pied dans la société numérique, *si nous voulons* participer à la croissance verte, mes chers compatriotes nous n’avons pas le choix, nous devons investir.

**REFORMULATION BY ELIMINATION OF ANAPHORA**
*If we want* in the future a thriving economy, excellent universities and research centres, groundbreaking digital technology programs and green policies, we have no choice, my fellow citizens: we must invest.

Obviously, relinquishing anaphora is just a possible strategy, as it is up to individual interpreters to recognise when repetition can be “sacrificed” and when not.

**FR_12**: C’est clair, *nous voulons* une industrie française, *nous voulons* une industrie automobile française et *nous voulons* garder des capacités de production sur le territoire français.

**REFORMULATION BY ELIMINATION OF ANAPHORA**
It is clear, we want French businesses, French cars and French productivity on French ground.

### 7.10 A Further Argumentative peculiarity

Among all the speeches included in *ARGO*, those delivered by Nicolas Sarkozy are the only ones containing examples of *ad hominem arguments*.

The fallacy of the *argumentum ad hominem* is said to be committed when one person criticizes an argument by attacking the arguer personally instead of considering his argument on its real merits (Walton 2008: 19).

In simple words, *ad hominem arguments* are gratuitous attacks on an opponent and, actually, they are not arguments but criticism levelled against an arguer rather than against an argument (Walton 2008: 170).
Since “l’argument *ad hominem* est l’une des armes privilégiées du discours polémique” (Amossy 2000: 129), Sarkozy’s recourse to the *ad hominem argument* might appear to be ascribable to his ideological, partisan and polemic argumentation aiming at corroborating stances by attacking opponents in the first place. However, this type of argument is directed only towards François Hollande.

**FR_48**: Monsieur Hollande, qui parle tellement des retraites qu’on n’arrive pas à comprendre ce qu’il veut faire, a dit solennellement aux Français qu’il reviendrait à la retraite à soixante ans. Mensonge, mensonge et encore mensonge.

**FR_50**: Je comprends pourquoi Monsieur Hollande a proposé un programme pour un an. J’ai compris. Bon, je ne suis pas très rapide, il m’a fallu un peu de temps mais j’ai compris. On raconte d’abord le commencement de l’histoire, puis comme elle se termine mal, on s’abstient de parler de la fin. Bon, mais la fin, c’est nous qui devons l’écrire

**FR_51**: Je comprends que monsieur Hollande veuille gagner des voix mais je lui demande de ne pas gagner des voix sur l’intérêt général de la France parce que la France est plus importante que nous, parce que la France c’est plus fort que la campagne, parce que la France elle se respecte !

Notably, attacks on François Hollande only appear in *FR_47, FR_48, FR_49, FR_50, FR_51* and *FR_53*, namely the speeches delivered in the middle of the presidential campaign. In the rest of the sub-corpus, attacks on parties of the left are only found in the form of allusions targeting “bad policies” such as “*les trente-cinq heures*” and the socialist pension policy. Therefore, the findings suggest that *ad hominem arguments* are typical of campaign speeches rather than crucial strategies implemented in discourse on the economy or in political communication in general.

More insightful conclusions can be stated by drawing on speeches not contained in *ARGO*. The rhetorical analysis of Margaret Thatcher’s speeches delivered during the Falklands War, carried out to draft the present author’s MA thesis (Brambilla 2011), has shown the recurrent presence of direct attacks on the Argentine General Leopoldo Galtieri.

If *this dictator* [Leopoldo Galtieri] succeeds in unprovoked aggression, other dictators will succeed elsewhere.  

We believe in self determination, a dictatorship of course doesn’t. And then sometimes you get speeches made in Argentina of the kind that President Galtieri made this weekend when he said that he was prepared to sacrifice some forty thousand lives for the Falkland Islands, to keep them. I just thought how dreadful. It made one sick at heart, so many. Whereas *he* [Leopoldo Galtieri] could avoid all the loss of life by withdrawing from the Islands and carrying on the kind of talks we had before.

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In the light of the specific contexts in which *ad hominem arguments* have been detected, they are arguably a cornerstone of war rhetoric and campaign speeches alike. In other words, *ad hominem arguments* seem to be dependent on highly polemic contexts or war situations, which corroborates the relative nature of argumentation: it depends on culture, the context of speech delivery, the *broader* context of situation, the topic and the speaker. Therefore, the systematic analysis of political argumentation in interpreting research is bound to yield increasingly substantial results by corroborating previous findings and gradually helping interpreters diversify their preparation and enhance their anticipatory skills.
Analysis of François Hollande’s argumentation cannot but start from comparison with his predecessor, because the current President of the French Republic has been accused of imitating Nicolas Sarkozy since the 2012 campaign, as regards rhetoric and political programmes alike. One of the most constructive “attacks” in this sense comes from Damon Mayaffre, historian, linguist and, especially, expert in the language-based study of Sarkozysme.

Hollande se sarkozyse de manière tellement spectaculaire que l’on peut imaginer qu’il s’agit d’une stratégie de communication. D’une manière surprenante, lors de ses vœux, Hollande s’est amusé à répéter plusieurs fois « la France sera forte », le slogan de campagne du candidat Sarkozy. Et de la même façon que le « moi, président de la République… » qu’il a utilisé durant son duel télévisé avec Sarkozy. Ce dernier a été ébahi et probablement déstabilisé de voir son adversaire prendre sa propre figure rhétorique (Mayaffre 2014). (my emphasis)

In his interview to Nice-Matin, Mayaffre (2014) refers to the “Vœux du Président de la République aux Français pour l’année 2014” and the rhetorical figure that is supposed to have been “stolen” from Sarkozy is anaphora. The address for the 2014 New Year’s Greetings is included in ARGO (FR_97) and the passage in question is shown below:

**FR_97:** Alors la France sera forte si nous savons nous réunir sur l’essentiel, c’est-à-dire le destin économique, industriel, productif de notre pays dans les dix prochaines années.

La France sera forte si elle reste solidaire. Si elle bâtit plus de logements, réduit la pauvreté, accueille mieux les personnes en situation de handicap ou de dépendance.

La France sera forte si elle est intraitable dans le respect de ses règles : la sécurité, qui est la garantie de la liberté ; l’indépendance de la justice, c’est l’impartialité ; la laïcité, c’est la condition pour vivre ensemble.

By mentioning the expression “moi, président de la République”, reiterated during the 2012 presidential debate, Mayaffre outlines that the recourse to anaphora is not sporadic, as it has proved to be typical of Hollande’s speeches since the campaign. The president’s predilection for the discursive strategy in question is also highlighted in the article “Les anaphores de Hollande, une figure de style inspirée de Sarkozy” (Joseph 2014), published by Le Figaro in 2014. The recurrence of anaphora is also confirmed by the analysis of ARGO speeches.

**FR_54:** La France du travail d’abord qui veut concilier justice sociale et performance économique.

La France des salariés dont je sais la grande qualification et en même temps dont je mesure les attentes et parfois les inquiétudes.
La France des entreprises dont je connais les performances mais aussi les difficultés face aux défis de l’économie mondialisée.

La France des agriculteurs, des commerçants, des artisans, des professions libérales, des acteurs de l’économie sociale et solidaire, vous tous devant moi.

La France de l’engagement, celle du mouvement associatif, du mouvement familial, des bénévoles.


As regards anaphora, then, the comments on Sarkozy’s speeches also apply to Hollande’s: anaphora can play a crucial role in interpreting by providing time and, consequently, more scope for reformulation, however inelegant its elimination can be.

In his interview to Nice-Matin, Mayaffre (2014) continues to expound the sarkozyste nature of Hollande’s speeches by highlighting the President’s recurrent use of the pronouns je, a feature introduced by Sarkozy, and on, that together with demonstratives contribute to establishing complicity with the audience.


From an interpreting point of view, the recurrence of je is not problematic and the same holds true for demonstratives. As regards on, the possibility either to replace it with we or to see it as the chance to produce passive sentences has been addressed in the previous chapter (see section 7.6).

The sarkozyste character of Hollande’s discourse is ascribable, in Mayaffre’s opinion, to the fact that the current president has been recurrently blamed by both left and right parties for lacking authority since the beginning of the presidential campaign1. In response to criticism, Hollande is, thus, thought to have adopted the most glaring rhetorical traits of his opponent.

Et, aujourd’hui, on entend beaucoup le « je », lequel a la vertu d’asseoir l’autorité de la personne. Mitterrand disait un « je » tous les 26 mots, preuve d’un certain égotisme. Sarkozy, avec beaucoup de « j’ai eu » par exemple, exhibe sa propre ambition qu’il assume. Et chez Hollande, le « je » revient plus souvent à mesure qu’on lui reproche son manque d’autorité (Mayaffre 2014). (my emphasis)

The discursive similarities between Sarkozy and Hollande are undoubtedly noteworthy, and highlighting them can provide interpreters with useful albeit limited indications regarding Hollande’s rhetorical style. Seen through interpreters’ eyes, though, Mayaffre’s clear remarks could raise doubts about the relevance and necessity of devoting an entire chapter to the current president’s discourse on the crisis. However, analysing ARGO with a view to argumentation rather than rhetoric, significant differences between Sarkozy and Hollande also stand out.

8.1 The Crisis in Hollande’s Speeches

The first glaring difference between Sarkozy’s and Hollande’s speeches lies in the less frequent recourse to the term *crise* by the current president. The six-hundred and eighty-two occurrences in Sarkozy’s speeches stand out compared with the hundred and twenty-two in Hollande’s. More precisely, Hollande’s recourse to the term *crise* is in line with Obama’s (two hundred and sixty one occurrences in a hundred and nine speeches) and slightly more marked than Cameron’s (ninety-one occurrences), with the British Prime Minister appearing as the speaker less interested in exploiting the evocative power of the term. In other words, lexical insistence on the crisis seems to be topic-related in all speeches, with the exception of Sarkozy’s texts, in which the overuse of the term stands out for its serving as the lexical basis of the speaker’s fear-inducing rhetoric.

Furthermore, the data must be seen in a broader perspective, which further shows the differences between Sarkozy’s and Hollande’s texts. The fewer references to the crisis are in part ascribable to the fact that, unlike his predecessor, Hollande addresses economic issues four years after the crisis broke out; yet, a distinctive feature of Hollande’s texts is also the absence of terms like “tempête”, “catastrophe”, “précipice”, and “gouffre”, which were so dear to Sarkozy (see section 7.1). The feature is not accidental, as Hollande’s speeches see a significantly less marked recourse to the *topos of the irreparable*, which is a distinctive argumentative feature of all the three previously analysed speakers. In more general terms, the absence of vivid and connotative words related to the crisis and the choice not always to start speeches with gloomy atmospheres are symptoms of a less polemic, less intimidating and more “accommodating” argumentation.

Moreover, Hollande is the only one among the corpus speakers who never makes reference either to the 1929 crisis or to the ensuing Great Depression. In other words, Hollande is the only speaker who does not resort to the *topos of history*, which is also partially signalled by the fact that the speaker never claims that “lessons have to be learned”. In a nutshell, the crisis is only rarely said to be exceptional, it is not compared to any other crisis, learning lessons is not a priority and Hollande’s argumentation does not rest upon conveying fear in the first place in order to provide solutions later in texts.

Hollande’s stance is substantially different: the crisis is a fact, its origin is a fact, and the measures to be adopted are quite obvious. In other words, argumentation regarding the crisis seems to have lost vividness and perlocutionary force in Hollande’s speeches, which
is probably not something to reproach Hollande for, but a consequence of the unfolding of events; unlike in the other speakers’ texts, the crisis or, rather, the origin of the crisis is no longer a mystery and the topic is starting to lose its newsworthiness. Excessively vivid and prolonged description of the causes of the crisis would probably be perceived as redundant by any audience, no longer needing to be told what the crisis is about and why it happened. To put it differently, Hollande’s speeches in ARGO bear witness to the fact that topicality naturally evolves and argumentation evolves with it. However, the topic of the crisis is still and will long be newsworthy, because the consequences of the crisis have given rise to a severe recession. The following excerpts provide an overview of Hollande’s way of dealing with the crisis.

**FR_54:** Je tenais à m’exprimer devant vous au début d’un mandat, celui qui m’a été confié par le peuple français, dans un contexte particulièrement difficile au plan européen, avec une crise de l’euro qui n’en finit pas et qui peut menacer non seulement la cohésion entre nos pays mais aussi le pacte que nous avons noué au sein même de l’Union européenne.

**FR_61:** La crise dans laquelle la France comme l’Europe sont plongés est longue, trop longue et profonde. Elle nécessite pour être surmontée d’abord d’être comprise avec pertinence. Cette crise est pour partie mondiale mais elle est aussi et surtout européenne. Elle est exacerbée par nos faiblesses, une croissance faible quand elle n’est pas nulle, une financiarisation excessive de nos économies, une compétitivité dégradée et un endettement public très élevé, trop élevé.

**FR_63:** L’Europe traverse non plus une guerre, c’est fini, mais une crise, et elle dure. Une crise qui traduit les déséquilibres de la finance, l’ampleur des dettes, mais aussi la vulnérabilité des États.

**FR_66:** Or, nous vivons bien plus qu’une crise, nous vivons un changement du monde.

**FR_73:** En mai dernier, vous m’avez confié la tâche de conduire notre pays dans un moment particulièrement grave. Avec une crise historique, un chômage qui progresse implacablement depuis près de deux ans et une dette record.

The president has been called upon to guide France in a context very difficult, for the nation and Europe alike. The crisis burst years ago but it still feeds on structural weaknesses; hence, it will last for long. The excerpts show that Hollande does not generally dwell on the causes of the crisis but addresses the juncture without surveying its premises fully. The lasting nature of the crisis is, thus, the main focus of most introductory passages of Hollande’s argumentation.

**FR_81:** C’est la question que vous posez. Quand allons-nous sortir de la crise ? Je dois dire que je me la pose aussi parce que cette crise est longue. Elle a commencé en 2008 et elle a pris des formes multiples depuis cinq ans.

**FR_97:** Mais l’année 2013 a aussi été difficile pour beaucoup d’entre vous et pour le pays. Parce que la crise s’est révélée plus longue, plus profonde que nous l’avions nous-mêmes prévu.
In other words, the need is not felt to provide the audience with background information regarding the crisis. In the light of the analysis of Sarkozy’s argumentation, Hollande’s perspective on the crisis can thus be outlined as follows: the French have already been “told the truth” about the crisis by Sarkozy, but they are continuously reminded of it by Hollande, though with less vivid expressions and more concise passages. Particularly, the audience does not need to be provided with information regarding the financial and speculative origin of the crisis but is, rather, entitled to be told that the crisis is not over and will last for long. Incidentally, there is only one sentence among all the speeches suggesting that Hollande adopts Sarkozy’s argument for telling the truth to the French.

**FR_83:** Mais la bataille, elle ne sera gagnée dans la durée – *car je veux dire la vérité aux Français* – elle ne sera gagnée dans la durée que si la croissance revient, que si nous sortons de cette torpeur, de cette langueur et donc de cette peur.

In the light of which, the argument cannot be said to be typical of Hollande’s discourse. However, though the origins of the crisis are not addressed in detail, a crucial tenet of Sarkozy’s discourse “survives” in the speeches of his successor: the crisis is fundamentally about confidence.

**FR_54:** Mais je suis le chef de l’État et je viens vous dire ma conception de l’État dans la place qui est la sienne pour *permettre à notre Nation de retrouver confiance*.

**FR_60:** Voilà pourquoi je pense que nous devons faire des choix fondés sur la responsabilité, le sérieux et la crédibilité mais aussi sur la compréhension de ce que doit être une économie, une économie de croissance, une économie qui permet aux peuples d’avoir confiance.

**FR_65:** Je voudrais vous exprimer ma confiance – puisque c’est le mot que vous avez utilisé, Monsieur le Président [Drouin], en demandant que l’on vous fasse « confiance ». Oui, je vous fais confiance et ce que nous avons à faire, c’est de donner confiance à la France et vous y contribuez. C’est le sens de ma présence ici et de ma gratitude à l’égard des chefs d’entreprises.

**FR_96:** Nous devons alors avoir davantage de confiance en nous-mêmes.

The fact that the solution of the economic crisis is inextricably linked to the need to restore confidence is not only claimed in national settings in relation to the predicament in France but also in European settings, when dealing with the Eurozone crisis.

**FR_58:** Nous n’avons pas besoin simplement d’une forme de compassion à notre égard, nous avons besoin de confiance en nous et ce que nous devons, Européens, affirmer à la fois face aux pays émergents et aussi face aux plus grandes puissances que nous connaissons et qui sont aussi conscientes qu’elles ne pourront avoir de la croissance aux États-Unis et même en Chine que si il y a *une Europe qui a retrouvé à la fois confiance en elle-même et stabilité*. 
FR_61: L’Europe vit depuis quatre ans une crise de confiance et une crise de croissance, l’une entraînant l’autre.

FR_76: C’est la confiance qui permettra de restaurer la croissance. La confiance est maintenant rétablie dans la zone euro et les efforts des Grecs n’auront pas été inutiles à l’ensemble des Européens. La confiance doit être maintenant celle des investisseurs, pour qu’ils viennent partout où ils sont appelés, notamment en Grèce. La confiance doit être également chez les consommateurs, chez les citoyens européens. […] Voilà le message que j’étais venu délivrer ici, message d’amitié, message de soutien, message de confiance et message de croissance.

Though the noun phrase “crise de confiance” occurs only once in the speeches (FR_61), the crisis fundamentally remains a crisis of confidence. In other words, Hollande’s logic does not differ much from Sarkozy’s: widespread lack of confidence is the main hindrance to economic recovery; it is a dangerous feeling nurtured by the diffidence spread by the 2008 financial crisis. In particular, the lack of confidence hampers growth and only by restoring confidence will growth be boosted, but the “movement” is bidirectional, meaning that only by promoting growth will confidence be gradually restored. It is true that confidence is generally said to influence growth, as attested by the excerpt drawn from FR_61; yet, the reversible nature of the process is also claimed from time to time, as shown by the following passage, drawn from FR_83.

FR_83: Bien sûr que – quand nous aurons lancé ces programmes, qui sont déjà en cours pour certains – nous n’allons pas créer de la croissance tout de suite, même s’il y aura déjà un effet. Il y aura sûrement, encore, une patience à observer. Mais c’est aussi le moyen de donner confiance aux Français dans l’avenir car nous sommes un pays qui est capable d’innover, d’inventer, de trouver en lui-même des sources qu’il n’imagine pas pour la création et pour la production.

The more limited presence of the noun phrase “crise de confiance” in Hollande’s speeches is actually due to the fact that less emphasis is laid on the causal relations between the financial crisis, the crisis of confidence and the economic crisis. As a result, the atmosphere of contagion emerges considerably “softened” and the argument from crisis contagion (see section 7.2) can only be said to be implied in the president’s discourse, with the sole conclusion reiterated in the form of the expression “confidence has to be restored”. Regarding the less fear-inducing rhetoric of Hollande, another crucial difference between the speakers stands out: while fear lies at the basis of the crisis of confidence in Sarkozy’s speeches, the term “peur” occurs fourteen times in Hollande’s speeches, whereas fifty-eight occurrences are observed in Sarkozy’s texts. Fear is generally “replaced” by equally detrimental but less dreadful feelings, like doubt, diffidence and mistrust.

FR_60: Nous voulons qu’il n’y ait pas une réponse conjoncturelle aux difficultés de la zone euro. Nous voulons qu’il y ait des réponses aussi structurelles qui permettent d’en terminer avec cette période de douce, parfois d’atermoiement ou d’inquiétude. C’est d’autant plus important que finalement, c’est la croissance qui fait les frais de la perte de confiance.
FR_87: Et puis, il y a un mal beaucoup plus profond, celui sur lequel nous devons nous pencher dans cette conférence sociale, c’est celui de la défiance, du doute, du désarroi, chacun en connaît les raisons et chacun doit aussi en mesurer les conséquences. Les économies qui repartent, il y a des facteurs objectifs, mais il y a aussi des facteurs psychologiques. Si nous voulons redonner aux consommateurs et aux investisseurs capacité à décider pour l’avenir, nous devons retrouver la confiance, l’espérance.

FR_91: Qu’est-ce que nous voulons faire de notre pays ? Quelle est l’image que nous voulons donner de la France de demain, mais aussi de la France d’aujourd’hui ? Une France qui a peur, qui se recroqueville, qui se rabougrit, qui essaie de protéger ce qu’elle croit être l’intérêt d’aujourd’hui au détriment de l’intérêt de demain ? Ou au contraire une France qui est capable de prendre des risques, d’avancer, de brûler les étapes et de faire en sorte que nous puissions promouvoir une nation innovante, parce que sans innovation, sans progrès, il n’y a pas de développement possible ?

FR_98: Si on prend la France telle qu’elle est, à la fois traversée par le doute, par le scepticisme et en même temps par la fierté d’être elle-même, par la considération de son destin, nous devons agir.

However, even though the atmosphere of panic is attenuated in Hollande’s speeches, confidence continues to lie at the heart of the recession, because lack of confidence hampers growth. Yet, confidence is not only the key for spurring growth but “la clé de tout” (FR_82). Particularly, confidence is systematically described as being the bridge between deficit reduction and the promotion of growth. In this respect, Hollande’s plan to restore confidence remains consistent with Sarkozy’s, as innovation-led growth is deemed the key to deficit reduction (see section 7.4.1). However, as far as the linguistic formulation of the argument is concerned, Hollande’s discourse also resembles Cameron’s. Selected passages are shown below together with an excerpt drawn from the British sub-corpus (UK_17), showing the similarities between Hollande’s and Cameron’s arguments.

UK_17: Those who argue that dealing with our deficit and promoting growth are somehow alternatives are wrong. You cannot put off the first in order to promote the second.

FR_54: La volonté de croissance, elle n’empêche pas le sérieux budgétaire. Nous devrons réduire la dette publique, revenir à l’équilibre de nos finances publiques d’ici la fin du quinquennat, nous doter des disciplines nécessaires. Mais je vais vous faire cette confiance : aussi grandes seraient les disciplines, aussi lourdes seraient les sanctions, s’il n’y a pas de croissance, il n’y aura pas d’objectifs qui pourront être atteints en terme de réduction des finances publiques. À l’inverse, si nous ne mettons pas bon ordre à un certain nombre de dérives, il n’y aura pas de retour à la croissance. Les deux se tiennent et vont de pair.

FR_55: Celui de la croissance indispensable si nous voulons que nos économies retrouvent une dynamique et si nous voulons atteindre nos objectifs de réduction des déficits – même si je n’oppose pas le sérieux budgétaire et la croissance. Le sérieux budgétaire est nécessaire à la croissance et la croissance permet d’atteindre des objectifs en termes de financements. Cela c’est le premier principe, la croissance.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

FR_77: Je veux vous faire comprendre que nous pouvons faire les deux en même temps. Ce sont deux mouvements : le mouvement pour le rétablissement de nos comptes, le mouvement pour le retour de la croissance. Il n’y a pas de contradiction. Plus tôt on rétablira nos comptes, plus tôt la confiance reviendra. Et plus tôt nous aurons mis de la croissance en plus, plus tôt nous pourrons rétablir nos comptes. C’est en définitif le même processus.

FR_81: Ce que je veux, c’est le sérieux budgétaire, indispensable pour le désendettement à moyen terme. Mais c’est aussi la croissance, parce que sans la croissance, il n’y aura pas de réduction des déficits. S’il n’y a pas un engagement en termes de comptes publics, il n’y aura pas le retour de la confiance, donc à la croissance. Tout se tient.

The fact that deficit reduction is a forthcoming project (“à moyen terme”) while the longed-for comeback of growth is a long-term one is seldom specified. Generally, argumentation revolves around the claim that confidence, growth and deficit reduction are intertwined. This is a crucial conviction of François Hollande which, though tantamount to the plans of Sarkozy and Cameron, is verbalised by relying on slightly different premises.

HOLLANDE’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE (CONFIDENCE AS THE “BRIDGE” BETWEEN DEFICIT REDUCTION AND THE PROMOTION OF GROWTH)

Premise 1: The French have asked to me for guidance at a serious moment for our country and Europe.

Premise 2: The crisis is not over and will last long.

Premise 3: The crisis of confidence is hampering growth, and slow growth prevents confidence from being restored.

Premise 4: Cutting the deficit will lead confidence to rise, and restoring confidence would be beneficial to our public finances.

Premise 5: Cutting the deficit and promoting growth are not mutually exclusive activities.

Premise 6: Promoting growth will help us redress our public finances and vice-versa.

Conclusion: Therefore, on the one hand, we must cut the deficit in order to restore confidence and promote growth; on the other, we must promote growth in order to restore confidence and get our public finances in order.

The argument scheme helps grasp the two major topical areas of Hollande’s discourse: unsurprisingly, given the results of the analysis of the other corpus speakers, it is deficit reduction and growth.

8.2 Deficit Reduction, or the Chance for Displaying Expertise and Bookkeeping Skills

FR_83: La première [réforme], c’était tout simplement le sérieux budgétaire. Cela va de soi, et pourtant ! Que s’est-il passé ces dernières années ? Que de dérèglements, de dérives, de déséquilibres, de dettes ! Donc, le sérieux. Comment cela se prouve le sérieux ? Par un indicateur, le niveau de la dépense publique.

As with Cameron’s and Sarkozy’s speeches, Hollande’s texts dwell on the need for the government to deal with the deficit crisis by reducing public spending, which is in most
cases motivated by insisting on the “sérieux budgétaire” (e.g. FR_54, FR_55, FR_61, FR_77, FR_83). Particularly, the speaker seems to share Cameron’s conviction regarding the need to “do more with less”, as attested by the excerpt drawn from FR_97.


**FR_97**: D’abord, je veux réduire la dépense publique. Nous devons faire des économies partout où elles sont possibles. Et j’ai la certitude que nous pouvons faire mieux en dépensant moins.

In this respect, all speakers resort from time to time to the *argument for thrift* (Reisigl & Wodak 2009: 105), which can, therefore, be labelled a crisis-related argument.

However, Hollande’s discourse on the deficit crisis shows peculiarities with respect to the other corpus speakers. In broad terms, as with Sarkozy, the crisis in general and the need to deal with the deficit crisis in particular provide Hollande with the opportunity to produce a “discours comptable” (Mayaffre 2012: 53). However, whereas Sarkozy’s argumentation is primarily guided by the speaker’s attempt to flaunt his expertise in discussing macro-economic problems (Mayaffre 2012: 37), Hollande’s discourse is characterised by enhanced emphasis on bookkeeping, signalled by the considerable presence of numbers. Excerpts are shown below to highlight the pervasiveness of numbers and the “specialist” nature of Hollande’s speeches, thereby providing sufficient material for discussion. The following examples will be referred to throughout the present section, in which Hollande’s lexical choices and predilection for displaying numbers will be addressed in turn.

**FR_54**: Nous avons perdu des parts de marché, notre déficit commercial dépasse 70 milliards d’euros, quand les Allemands en dégagent 150 milliards- oui, mais d’excédent.

**FR_57**: D’abord le redressement de nos comptes publics. La dette a augmenté de 800 Milliards depuis 10 ans. Elle atteint désormais 90 % de la richesse nationale. Quant au déficit public, il a dépassé encore 100 Milliards d’euros en 2011 et ne pourra être contenu autour de 4,5 % de la richesse nationale en 2012 qu’au prix d’un ajustement fiscal dont le gouvernement a pris à juste raison la responsabilité. […] La France, les chiffres sont maintenant bien connus, est passée d’un excédent commercial de 3 Milliards et demi d’euros en 2002 à un déficit de 70 Milliards d’euros en 2011.

**FR_61**: La situation de nos finances publiques est préoccupante, pour ne pas dire grave. Quelques chiffres l’attestent : en 2001 notre déficit représentait 1,6 % du produit intérieur brut, 10 ans plus tard, ce même déficit atteignait 5,2 % du PIB, soit 100 milliards d’euros. La dette publique dépasse 1700 milliards d’euros, soit près de 90 % du PIB. Il y a 10 ans, c’était moins de 60 %. […] La crise n’explique pas tout. Certes, elle peut être tenue responsable d’un tiers de la dette par l’effondrement des recettes qu’elle a provoqué mais la
dégradation de nos comptes publics est en grande partie d’origine structurelle. La France avait un déficit structurel beaucoup plus fort avant la crise que les moyennes européennes et c’est encore vrai durant la crise. Le déficit structurel s’élève aujourd’hui à 4 % du PIB, contre 3,2 % en moyenne dans la zone euro et 0,8 en Allemagne, voilà la situation. […] Nous sommes donc confrontés à un impératif de rééquilibrage des comptes publics. Je confirme, ici l’engagement pris par la France de ramener le déficit public à 3 % à la fin de l’année 2013. Ce sera l’effort budgétaire le plus important depuis 30 ans. Pour prendre les calculs que la Cour a délivré il y a deux mois, cela représentera un effort structurel de 1,6 points de PIB, soit un peu plus de 30 milliards d’euros, en termes d’inflexion de dépenses et en termes de recettes supplémentaires.

FR_65: La lucidité, c’est de considérer que depuis 10 ans notre compétitivité, malgré des réussites sectorielles indéniables, a décroché. Le déficit commercial atteint 70 milliards d’euros à la fin de l’année dernière, à peu près autant cette année. Je rappelle que nous étions à l’équilibre en 2002, et que nos amis allemands ont dégagé un excédent de 160 milliards d’euros. La lucidité c’est de regarder les pertes de parts de marché : sur le monde entier où nous avons reculé de 5% à 3,3. Sur l’Europe, donc à conditions de concurrence équivalente, où nous avons, là encore, reculé de 12,7 à 9,3. La lucidité c’est de constater que les marges des entreprises dans l’industrie sont tombées à un point bas, 20%, au lieu de 30% chez nos voisins allemands. La lucidité c’est de constater aussi que la part de notre industrie dans la valeur ajoutée est aujourd’hui de 13% ; c’est le double en Allemagne.


FR_68: Notre crédibilité est aujourd’hui assurée, puisque les taux d’intérêt consentis sur notre dette souveraine sont parmi les plus bas de notre histoire. Ils ont diminué depuis le 6 mai : de 2,86 à 2,10%. Et l’écart avec l’Allemagne s’est lui-même réduit de 40% (124 points de base à 78). J’avais demandé au lendemain de mon élection un audit indépendant au premier président de la Cour des Comptes sur la perspective de nos finances publiques pour 2012 et 2013. Rendu public au début du mois de juillet, il faisait apparaître un besoin de financement de 30 milliards d’euros pour atteindre l’objectif de réduction du déficit public à 3% fin 2013. […] La dépense publique atteint aujourd’hui 57% de notre produit intérieur brut. C’est beaucoup. C’est un record. Elle n’atteignait que 52% il y a seulement 5 ans. Nous devons être capables de faire mieux en dépensant moins.

FR_81: Je rappelle quelques chiffres pour ce qui concerne la France. Il y a dix ans le déficit public, qui était déjà considéré comme trop important, représentait 1,6 % de la richesse nationale et la dette était autour de 57 % du PIB. Aujourd’hui, je devrais dire en 2012, le déficit était de près de 5,2 %, en 2011. Il sera de 4,8 % en 2012. La dette publique représente 1,8 milliard d’euros, plus de 90 %. Si rien n’est fait nous serons à 100 % dans les prochaines années. Je m’y refuse.

A significant difference from the other texts analysed shows through the passages: Hollande’s discourse is at times more specialist with respect to the other corpus speakers and the French President generally appears to be at ease with economic discourse. In particular, the deficit is not only “the deficit” but it is denoted and dealt with in greater detail, as different types of deficit are alternately addressed, such as the structural deficit.
and the *trade deficit*. Comments are therefore in order to put the analysis of *ARGO* speeches in perspective.

As is the case for the other speakers, Hollande frequently deals with the public deficit (“déficit public”) and the national debt (“dette”, “dette publique”, “dépense publique”, “comptes publics”) alike, as, in his opinion, the reduction of the former entails the reduction of the latter.

**FR_65**: L’État devra lui aussi monter l’exemple, et être plus compétitif, avec des réformes en profondeur de certaines de ses missions et la réduction de ses déficits et donc de la dette publique.

However, the president also deals with the *structural deficit* (“déficit structurel”). The topic is not addressed recurrently, as references have only been found in *FR_61* and *FR_88*. However, given the expert nature of Hollande’s discourse, clarifications are in order. An intuitive definition of *structural deficit* is provided by the *Cambridge Dictionary*.

**STRUCTURAL DEFICIT**: the amount by which a government’s spending is more than it receives in taxes *in a particular period*, whether the economy is performing well or not.² (my emphasis)

The structural deficit is generally defined in opposition to the *cyclical deficit*.

**CYCLICAL DEFICIT**: the amount by which a government’s spending is more than it receives in taxes *at a time when the economy is not performing well*.³ (my emphasis)

The difference between structural deficit and cyclical deficit thus lies in the time frame. A structural (permanent) deficit differs from a cyclical deficit in that it exists regardless of the stage in the business cycle owing to an underlying imbalance in government revenues and expenditures. The sum of the structural deficit and the cyclical deficit makes up the total budget deficit of a country.

Reference is never made to *cyclical deficits* in *ARGO*, whereas the structural deficit is also occasionally addressed in David Cameron’s speeches (*UK_2, UK_66, UK_80*).

**UK_2**: The previous government argued that more spending would support the economy, conveniently forgetting that if you start with a large structural deficit, you ramp up spending even further, which is actually going to undermine confidence and investment, rather than encourage it.

**UK_66**: By 2008, we already had a structural deficit of more than 7%, the biggest of any G7 country.

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UK_80: We’ve cut the deficit by a third and cut the structural deficit by more than any other G7 country.

Only one occurrence of structural deficit is observed in the American sub-corpus (US_89); Obama actually deals with the topic in another occasion (US_5), though by using the simple sentence “We have a structural gap between the money going out and the money coming in”. As regards Sarkozy, no references to structural deficits can be found in his texts. Therefore, the analysis indicates that the topic is generally considered too specialist for political communication. However, Cameron’s and Hollande’s texts show that references to the structural deficit can crop up in political speeches and can, thus, pose comprehension problems in interpreting. Even though interpreters are not required to master the difference between cyclical and structural deficit, since the topic is never addressed in detail, a basic knowledge of such financial tenets is likely to help them grasp what the speaker is referring to, especially when it comes to interpreting the current French President and British Prime Minister.

More serious problems in interpreting Hollande’s speeches can be posed by the recurrent references to the trade deficit (“déficit commercial”), a definition of which is provided below:

TRADE DEFICIT: An economic measure of a negative balance of trade in which a country’s imports exceeds its exports. A trade deficit represents an outflow of domestic currency to foreign markets.

The definition shows that trade deficit has to do with the balance of trade (BOT). In a nutshell, the balance of trade is the relationship or, rather, the difference between a country’s imports and its exports. The balance of trade is the largest component of a country’s balance of payments (BOP), i.e. a country’s record of all economic transactions between the residents of that country and the rest of the world in a particular period. Regarding the BOP, a country has a trade deficit when it imports more than it exports. Trade deficit is, therefore, a negative balance of trade, while a positive balance is known as trade surplus, occurring when exports outstrip imports. Notably, references to trade surplus (“excédent commercial”) also occur in Hollande’s speeches (e.g. FR_57, FR_58).

Along with Hollande, David Cameron is the only one among the corpus speakers who sometimes uses the terms trade deficit and trade surplus (respectively seven and five occurrences in the British sub-corpus).

UK_9: It does sound a bit as if countries are saying to each other that it is somehow a bad thing for one country to be successful in exporting and to have a trade surplus. That is not the issue.

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UK_28: Those [countries] with a trade deficit have to undertake structural reforms to restore competitiveness.

UK_30: First the challenge from those who say we don’t make enough, so we can’t export and we can’t deal with our trade deficit.

UK_66: Sectors like aerospace, where we are the number one manufacturing sector in Europe, or our automotive industry, which had a trade surplus in 2011 for the first time in nearly forty years.

UK_96: I think we need to encourage small business to export. Currently one in five of you export your goods and services around the world. If we could move that from one in five to one in four we’d effectively wipe out Britain’s trade deficit.

However, the fact that, unlike Obama and Sarkozy, Cameron and Hollande sometimes deal with trade deficits and trade surpluses does not mean that they are the only ones dealing with the major issue of a nation’s balance of trade during the period of crisis. Chapter 7 has highlighted Sarkozy’s insistence on the need to tackle outsourcing (see sections 7.3 and 7.4) in order to preserve French productivity and production quality, thereby increasing the chances for exporting. Similarly, Obama recurrently deals with the balance of trade without actually naming it; he does so by dealing with outsourcing and insourcing and, also, by calling for products “made in America”.

US_17: I want to see more products sold around the world stamped with the three proud words: “Made in America”. That’s what we need to get done.

US_31: You’ve heard of outsourcing. Well, these companies are insourcing. These companies are choosing to invest in the one country with the most productive workers, the best universities, and the most creative and innovative entrepreneurs in the world, and that is the United States of America.

US_39: First, if you’re a business that wants to outsource jobs, that’s your choice, but you shouldn’t get a tax deduction for doing it.

US_83: We now sell more products made in America to the rest of the world than ever before.

In other words, in Sarkozy’s and Obama’s speeches, commitment to the reduction of trade deficit is implied in claims in favour of insourcing innovative jobs; which shows the relevance of focusing on presentational devices, in Pragma-dialectical terms. Though some passages drawn from the different sub-corpora deal with exactly the same topic, this does not mean that they “sound” the same way or that they are similarly perceived by audiences. The fact that, at least regarding trade deficit, Hollande and Cameron are more lexically meticulous than Obama and Sarkozy cannot be neglected, especially when this type of speech needs to be fully understood and interpreted by pursuing pragmatic quality. In other words, Hollande’s statements dealing with the trade deficit cannot be interpreted in terms of
“we want more products made in France”, as the speaker’s lexical choices play a major role in determining the pragmatics of his speeches, and argumentative equivalence, thus, also depends on equivalence at lexical level.

The examples drawn from Hollande’s text collection have shown the president’s habit of displaying a certain expertise in dealing with the deficit crisis. Furthermore, they highlight that the topic provides the speaker with the opportunity to display bookkeeping skills through the use of numbers. The passages in which numbers generally crowd in are primarily but not exclusively those dealing with the deficit, as attested by the body of examples provided at the beginning of the present section (going from FR_54 to FR_91). More examples could be provided, as numbers are a permanent feature of Hollande’s speeches which significantly contribute to bestowing credibility on the president’s discourse. This type of passages can be problematic in interpreting, especially because they are generally uttered rather rapidly. Therefore, interpreters ought always to be ready to write down numbers when interpreting Hollande’s speeches, as it provides the opportunity to devote attention to the speaker’s message and retrieve numbers later during interpretation.

In the light of the body of examples provided at the beginning of the present section, Hollande’s argumentation regarding the deficit can be said to hinge on a few fundamental remarks and numbers, reiterated throughout the text collection and presented in table 8.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECURRENT FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF HOLLANDE’S BOOKKEEPING PASSAGES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In 2001 our public deficit equalled 1.6% of the GDP. Now it has reached 5.2%, namely 100 billion euros.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The public deficit will be cut to 3% of the GDP by 2013.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• In particular, the structural deficit makes up 4% of the GDP, as against 3.2% on average in the Eurozone and 0.8% in Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Our public debt exceeds 1700 billion euros, that is 90% of the GDP. It has increased dramatically over the last ten years, as in 2001/2002 it equalled 60%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Our trade deficit exceeds 70 billion euros, while ten years ago the balance of trade was in equilibrium, as it was characterised by a 3 billion surplus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Germany can boast a trade surplus of approximately 150 billion euros.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1 Recurrent Fundamental Points of Hollande’s Bookkeeping Passages in Relation to the Deficit Crisis

Since the crisis evolves and economic situations evolve, numbers are bound to change over time; as a consequence, providing solutions to this type of interpreting problem only results in limited indications, mainly regarding content. For instance, however recurrent, the claim that the public deficit will be cut to 3% of the GDP by 2013 “disappears” starting from FR_68, delivered in November 2012, possibly owing to the fact that the initially boasted objective has gradually proved to be unattainable. Therefore, focusing on content enables detection of more reliable regularities, which can be said to shape a content-related scheme. By showing the recurrent propositional content of the president’s statements, the scheme can assist interpreters translating Hollande’s speeches by reducing decoding efforts and saving working memory for the hard task of writing numbers.
ARGUMENT FROM DEFICIT AND DEBT PREDICAMENT

Premise 1: As regards the deficit crisis, Germany is the benchmark for analysing the situation in France.

Premise 2: We are lagging behind Germany.

Premise 3: In approximately ten years, our public deficit predicament has worsened, though there are signs of recovery/though recovery is underway.

Premise 4: The public debt has increased dramatically over the last ten years.

Premise 5: Particularly, our structural deficit is too high, especially compared to Germany’s.

Premise 6: Ten years ago the balance of trade was positive (trade surplus), but today our trade deficit is substantial, especially compared to Germany’s.

Premise 7: Like the economic crisis, the deficit and debt crises are not over and will last long.

Conclusion: This is why we have to take steps to cut the deficit comprehensively: we must reduce public spending to solve the debt crisis and reduce the structural deficit, and we must boost growth and increase exports to bring the balance of trade back to equilibrium.

Since numbers change over time, focusing on content might cater for interpreters’ inability to grasp numbers or retrieve them later in the text. For instance, claiming that Germany is the benchmark for assessing French achievements and commitments can be considered a faithful translation despite the absence of numbers in the interpreted text. In this respect, drawing attention to Hollande’s content-related scheme when dealing with deficit and debt could play a crucial role in interpreting.

A final remark related to argumentation regarding the deficit is in order before analysing the other crucial arguments put forward by François Hollande.

As regards the crucial need to “balance the books”, Hollande’s speeches share a crucial topic with Sarkozy’s, namely pension reform. Hollande’s 2013 pension reform has been heavily criticised in that it followed in the footsteps of Sarkozy’s. For instance, French left-wing politician Olivier Besancenot has labelled the reform “une réforme typiquement de droite”; moreover, economists Marc Touati and Marc Fiorentino have outlined that the reform is actually a non-reform (de Mareschal 2013). In other words, here lies another crucial and “suspicious” similarity between the former and the current president, despite their belonging to opposing political parties. As regards argumentation, the speeches of the two presidents seem to converge considerably when it comes to pension reform, not only because the measure is recurrently said to play a major role in deficit reduction but also because the passages dealing with the topic see one of the very few occurrences of “peur” in Hollande’s texts.

FR_87: La peur est là aujourd’hui. La peur, c’est celle des pensionnés de voir remises en cause leurs retraites. La peur, c’est celle des actifs qui arrivent en fin de carrière de ne pas pouvoir partir dans de bonnes conditions à la retraite. La peur, c’est celle des jeunes qui pensent – trop nombreux aujourd’hui – qu’ils ne pourront jamais accéder à une retraite

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convenable. La réforme que nous avons donc à faire n’est pas pour ajouter une peur à une autre, c’est au contraire pour donner une confiance et une espérance dans le système des retraites par répartition. […] Si nous voulons redonner de la confiance, si nous voulons lever les suspicions, les doutes, les inquiétudes, les angoisses par rapport à l’avenir, il convient d’avoir, non pas des réformes des retraites tous les trois ans ou tous les quatre ans […] mais d’avoir un pilotage, non pas automatique, parce que cela doit être justement fondé sur le dialogue et la responsabilité, mais que nous puissions disposer d’une visibilité à moyen et long termes.

This shows that pension reform is viewed as a highly sensitive issue, that can play a crucial role in deficit reduction. However, doubt and mistrust are generally preferred to fear as premises of argumentation. As with Sarkozy’s habit of harnessing fear as a premise of argumentation, references to doubt and mistrust are not accessory; they are functional to arguing in favour of the restoration of confidence, the bridge between deficit reduction and the promotion of growth.

8.3 Growth, Unemployment and the Solution of the Crisis

Emphasis on Hollande’s argument from crisis of confidence (section 8.1) shows that, in addition to deficit reduction, the restoration of growth is the other prerequisite for the solution of the economic crisis, in that it will help bring the balance of trade back to equilibrium. In this regard, Hollande’s discourse is not particularly original with respect to those of the other corpus speakers, especially Cameron and Sarkozy. However, Hollande’s speeches are characterised by enhanced focus on growth, which sometimes seems to be considered the single and major objective of the government’s policies.

FR_67: Il y a également la nécessité de retrouver de la croissance, parce que tous ces contrats que nous créons, toutes ces formules que nous inventons, tous ces compromis que nous trouvons, ne pourront avoir l’ampleur attendue et espérée, que s’il y a de la croissance, que s’il y a de l’activité économique.

FR_83: Car l’enjeu, je le répète, c’est la croissance, c’est la sortie de la crise, c’est la fin de la récession.

The longed-for comeback of growth by means of deficit reduction and the restoration of confidence permeates Hollande’s speeches. The term “croissance” occurs two hundred and fifty-eight times in fifty speeches, that is approximately five times per speech on average.

FR_77: En Chine, en Inde – j’y étais il y a encore quelques jours – les taux de croissance sont supérieurs à 7 - 8%. Même aux États-Unis, une des principales puissances économiques du monde – je rappelle que la première, c’est l’Europe – la croissance devrait être à 2 ou 3%.
FR_87: D’abord, il y a des signes de reprise économique, en France et en Europe parce que l’économie mondiale est en expansion, les pays émergents, un ghetto de croissance de 7 à 8%, les Etats-Unis, qui vont connaître une croissance de 2 à 3%, les pays d’Asie, et même les pays d’Afrique, qui connaissent des croissances aujourd’hui supérieures à 5%. Nous avons donc un problème en Europe, nous avons réglé les questions liées à la zone euro, à sa stabilité, à son intégrité, nous devons tout faire pour que la croissance reparte. Et elle va repartir.

Unlike Sarkozy, Obama and Cameron, Hollande also displays his economic expertise by dwelling on the fact that growth in France and Europe is “faible” or “molle”, which is the main problem lying at the heart of Europe’s lasting recession. Indeed, slow growth is nothing but the recession. There are encouraging signals showing that the major world economies are recovering, as growth has been rekindled, but it is still too weak, which prevents countries from coming out of the recession. The fact that growth is inextricably linked to confidence has already been mentioned in section 8.1: slow growth prevents doubts from being completely dispelled, while the enduring lack of confidence hampers the promotion of growth. It is by insisting on this vicious circle that Hollande conveys a feeling of urgency in implementing reforms.

FR_57: Il y a en Europe des pays où la croissance est très faible voire même des pays qui sont en récession mais il en est d’autres qui ont réussi à partir de réformes engagées depuis plusieurs années, à porter un niveau de croissance bien supérieur au nôtre.

FR_61: Cette crise est pour partie mondiale mais elle est aussi et surtout europénne. Elle est exacerbée par nos faiblesses, une croissance faible quand elle n’est pas nulle.

FR_66 : La France est devant un triple défi : un défi lié à une situation d’endettement qui pourrait devenir insupportable, un défi lié à une situation de faible croissance et de chômage élevé - c’est le 16ème mois de hausse consécutifs du chômage - et enfin un défi de compétitivité.

FR_79: Les causes de ce fléau, c’est d’abord la faible croissance, pour ne pas dire la récession à l’échelle de l’Europe.

FR_97: Et nous en avons payé le prix avec une croissance faible.

FR_98: Mais je préfère, je vous l’ai dit, regarder la réalité en face. En ce début d’année, la croissance est faible, trop faible pour créer durablement des emplois. Le chômage a été stabilisé même avec une croissance faible pour ne pas dire quasi nulle. […] C’est maintenant que tout se joue. Je vais poser la question simplement : ou la confiance revient et alors les investissements et les embauches repartiront plus vite et plus vigoureusement, ou le doute et l’incertitude s’installent et la croissance sera molle et le chômage deviendra incompressible.

Here lies a crucial difference between Hollande and the other corpus speakers, probably determined by the fact that the French president was elected when the effects of the crisis had already been felt completely: Hollande’s speeches are not strewn with
sentences like “we have prevented the crisis from spreading further” because the recession is underway. France, Europe, indeed the whole world all face a major problem at the moment, namely slow growth, which seems to be plunging world economies into “a second Great Depression”, to use Obama’s terms. However, this idea is not conveyed by means of the topos of the irreparable but in a more denotative way, by relying on a simple scheme:

**ARGUMENT FROM SLOW GROWTH**
*Premise 1*: World economies are seeing encouraging signals, as growth has been rekindled.
*Premise 2*: However, growth is still too slow and weak.
*Conclusion*: Therefore, we have to find new means to increase growth, restore confidence and solve the economic crisis.

The above examples indicate that the topic of growth is almost systematically linked to another crucial subject, i.e. unemployment. The two topics are closely related because rising unemployment jeopardises confidence, and confidence is the prerequisite of growth. More practically, there can be no growth without economic activity and productivity. The word “chômage” crops up a hundred and sixteen times, thereby becoming a lexical and topical cornerstone of Hollande’s rhetoric.

As with the deficit crisis, unemployment too provides the speaker with the opportunity to display numbers.

However, the topic is not only addressed by turning to bookkeeping. Since unemployment jeopardises confidence, it is a social scourge. In Hollande’s terms, in
dealing with the economy “il y a des facteurs objectifs, mais il y a aussi des facteurs psychologiques” (FR_87). Incidentally, compared to Sarkozy’s, Hollande’s texts see a significant increase in the use of the term “précarité”, which contributes to conveying the human and social implications of the unemployment crisis. The solution of which is not only a government priority but a mission, signalled by the recurrence of the syntagms “bataille contre le chômage” and “lutte contre le chômage”.

**FR_67:** Nous avons engagé depuis six mois la bataille contre le chômage. C’est la seule priorité qui vaille, celle que nous allons poursuivre tout au long du quinquennat. […] Parce que c’est une bataille nationale, la bataille contre le chômage. Parce qu’elle concerne en premier lieu l’État et celui qui en exerce la responsabilité. Mais elle doit également associer tous ceux qui ont à un moment la possibilité de créer une activité et un emploi.

**FR_79:** Il n’y a pas de préoccupation plus urgente. Il n’y a pas de cause plus importante pour la cohésion nationale ; il n’y a pas d’exigence plus forte pour le gouvernement que la lutte contre le chômage.

Admittedly, unemployment is primarily an economic and social problem but, more precisely, it is a symptom of the profound nature of the crisis, that is not a temporary downturn but a social, political and economic upheaval.

**FR_74:** Enfin, l’Europe est un continent où la croissance est trop faible, où un chômage de masse révèle la profondeur de la crise, qui n’est pas seulement, comme on l’a dit, une transition passagère, mais une mutation profonde.

Unemployment is the major cause of the recession and the major threat to economic recovery. It is a complex and daunting problem, requiring “un ensemble de réformes structurelles qui touche tous les domaines de l’action publique” (FR_66). In this respect, Sarkozy’s stance regarding the structural nature of the crisis and the resulting need for structural reforms remains unchanged in Hollande’s speeches. Though Sarkozy’s predilection for the expression “crise structurelle” is not found in Hollande’s speeches, by “mutation profonde” Hollande means just that: the crisis is a structural crisis. This can also be inferred from the fact that, as in Sarkozy’s speeches, the response to the crisis is recurrently said to require “réformes structurelles”.

**FR_65:** Il y a des réformes structurelles à engager.

**FR_66:** Je veux terminer sur ce qui entraîne une politique de compétitivité, un pacte de compétitivité. C’est un ensemble de réformes structurelles qui touche tous les domaines de l’action publique et que nous avons commencé à engager

**FR_67:** Pour gagner cette bataille [la bataille contre le chômage], nous devons la mener sur tous les fronts : au niveau mondial en coordonnant les politiques économiques pour soutenir la croissance ; au niveau européen pour stabiliser la zone Euro et donner confiance ; et au niveau national, ici dans notre pays, en utilisant tous les instruments possibles pour permettre de créer de l’emploi.
FR_74: L’intégration ce sont des réformes structurelles pour rendre nos économies plus fortes.

FR_98: Je pourrais également prétendre que jamais autant de réformes ont été menées en si peu de mois. Et des réformes structurelles. Mais je préfère, je vous l’ai dit, regarder la réalité en face. En ce début d’année, la croissance est faible, trop faible pour créer durablement des emplois. […] Il y a un intérêt supérieur, qui est celui du pays tout entier. […] Il appelleras des réformes structurelles, des changements de comportement, une gestion différente des deniers publics.

Argumentation regarding the struggle against unemployment revolves around two major policies: “le contrat de génération” (forty occurrences in Hollande’s speeches) and “la loi sur les emplois d’avenir” (twenty-five occurrences).

FR_100: Quand je suis arrivé aux responsabilités j’avais deux grandes idées : les emplois d’avenir et les contrats de génération dans le secteur privé.

Hollande’s “generation contract” boils down to “lutter d’un même mouvement contre le chômage des jeunes et contre la mise à l’écart des seniors de l’entreprise” (FR_54). In a nutshell, the plan aims at tackling unemployment in general, by helping both young and older workers get and keep their jobs respectively. Particular emphasis is laid on “CDI” or “contrat à durée indéterminée” and the transmission of know-how from older to younger workers, which would significantly contribute to reducing both unemployment and the cost of labour. Examples of argumentation regarding the “generation contract” are shown below:

FR_67: C’est quoi le contrat de génération ? C’est cette belle démarche qui consiste à soutenir un employeur qui embauche un jeune et qui garde un senior, le senior formant le jeune dans le cadre d’un tutorat. Cet employeur - qui répond à la double exigence d’insérer un jeune et de garder un senior dans l’emploi - recevra, si son entreprise fait moins de 300 salariés, une prime de 4 000 euros : 2 000 pour le jeune, 2 000 pour le senior. Pour les entreprises de plus de 300 salariés, les exonérations de cotisation sociale seront conditionnées à une signature de contrats de génération. Nous espérons 150 000 contrats dès la première année. C’est une mobilisation exceptionnelle.

FR_83: Soixante-quinze mille « contrats de génération ». Vous savez, le passage de témoin d’un senior pour un jeune, cette alliance des âges et qui commence depuis le mois de mars à être mise en place dans les entreprises. Là aussi, j’ai demandé que l’on puisse étendre le principe même du « contrat de génération » à la création d’entreprise, à l’installation, y compris des agriculteurs, parce que c’est la même idée : faire qu’une génération puisse servir de marchepied à une autre.

FR_87: Et le contrat de génération, qu’est-ce que c’est, si ce n’est de permettre à des jeunes de rentrer dans l’emploi avec un contrat à durée indéterminée, mais aussi de permettre à des salariés de plus de 57 ans, 58 ans, de pouvoir rester eux-mêmes dans l’entreprise pour avoir leur retraite à taux plein au moment où ils décideront de partir. C’est en fonction de ces principes de responsabilité que nous réussirons la réforme des retraites.
FR_100: C’est quoi un contrat de génération ? C’est lorsqu’un employeur embauche un jeune de moins de vingt-cinq ans et garde un senior pour servir de tuteur, il y a une baisse du coût du travail et donc une incitation forte pour les entreprises à faire confiance à un jeune et à garder un senior plus longtemps dans l’entreprise le temps que ce senior puisse se préparer à la retraite.

The examples (particularly the excerpt drawn from FR_87) show that the topic is closely related to pension reform, primarily because “en 2030, 30% des Français auront plus de 60 ans” (FR_94). Despite the focus on the generation contract, however, the struggle against unemployment is primarily related to youth unemployment, mainly because France is also the youngest country in Europe.

FR_57: Le premier est de répondre à la faiblesse d’activité des séniors et de réduire le chômage des jeunes, qui représente, je le rappelle le double de celui des adultes.

FR_67: La jeunesse, cela a été la grande ambition que j’ai portée tout au long de la campagne présidentielle. La jeunesse, cela doit être également la volonté du gouvernement et de l’ensemble des pouvoirs publics pour ce quinquennat.

FR_68: Aussi, ma priorité, la seule, c’est l’emploi. Et notamment celui des jeunes.

FR_80: Il y a eu également une grande convergence de vue, sur la nécessité, déjà rappelée dans le cadre financier européen, de tout faire pour lutter contre le chômage des jeunes. Contre le chômage en général, celui des jeunes notamment.

FR_83: Oui, la France a toutes les raisons de faire confiance à sa jeunesse parce qu’elle est le premier pays en Europe en termes de démographie, de jeunesse. C’est un atout considérable qui nous donne non seulement une place en Europe mais une confiance en nous-mêmes, à condition de donner à cette jeunesse toute sa place, de lui montrer que le progrès est possible et qu’il peut même être une perspective pour tous, y compris pour ceux qui sont dans les quartiers et qui s’interrogent également sur le lien qu’ils ont avec la Nation.

FR_100: Le pays doit savoir que c’est une chance d’avoir une jeunesse dynamique, c’est une chance d’avoir une démographie importante. On est le pays le plus jeune d’Europe, donc il faut regarder cette réalité avec espoir !

The second major commitment of the president, “la loi sur les emplois d’avenir”, aims precisely at tackling youth unemployment. Announced in 2012, the law promotes the integration of the young and disadvantaged in the place of work by means of subsidies and vocational training. It is addressed to young people aged between sixteen and twenty-five, with particular reference to those “qui sont sans qualification” (FR_67) and live in rural or suburban areas. Disabled people and the citizens of French Overseas Territories are also mentioned in the act. The law promotes employment in the public sector, as non-profit organisation and the state will be in charge of hiring; for those who apply, either an open-ended contract (“CDI”) or a fixed-term contract (“CDD”) is envisaged together with the guarantee of vocational training. In this regard, the recurrence of “formation
professionnelle” (forty-four occurrences) is comparable to that in Sarkozy’s speeches (forty-two occurrences), which marks another crucial topical similarity between the former and the current president. Regarding the jobs subsidised by the government, they are those pertaining to promising and innovative sectors or those having an undisputed social dimension. The jobs promoted by “les emplois d’avenir” are, thus, presented as being nothing other than the “jobs of the future” hailed by Obama, or the prize bestowed on those who win Cameron’s global race. The following examples provide an overview of Hollande’s discourse on the “emplois d’avenir”, in which the government’s “objectif de 150 000 emplois d’avenir créés en 2014, dont 100 000 dès 2013” is sometimes addressed. However, emphasis is generally laid on the law’s potential in restoring confidence. The first excerpt, drawn from FR_67, might be thought to indicate that Sarkozy’s predilection for voluntarism has been “borrowed” by Hollande, but reference to voluntarism is actually virtually absent; FR_67 is an exception and Hollande cannot be said to resort to Sarkozy’s argument for voluntarism (see section 7.4).

FR_67: Nous avons voulu imaginer une formule nouvelle : celle des emplois d’avenir. C’est une formule qui va permettre, à la fois, de créer de l’emploi mais aussi de créer de la confiance, et notamment dans les quartiers qui sont les plus exposés à tous les risques. Je pense aux quartiers populaires et à ces jeunes qui peuvent être à un moment dans le doute et dans l’interrogation sur la place qui leur est accordée dans notre société. L’idée des emplois d’avenir, elle est nouvelle parce que c’est une démarche volontariste et réaliste. Volontariste car nous allons offrir à des jeunes non seulement un emploi mais une formation, une qualification, qui leur permettra ensuite soit de garder l’emploi qui leur a été proposé, soit d’aller sur le marché du travail avec des conditions nouvelles pour obtenir un emploi, un bon emploi. C’est une démarche réaliste parce que nous donnons de la durée.

FR_68: C’est la priorité donnée à l’Éducation. Mais ce sera long. D’où l’urgence. C’est l’idée des emplois d’avenir pour les jeunes qui sont sortis du système scolaire sans qualification. Ils sont aujourd’hui 500 000. 100 000 seront créés en 2013, 150 000 ensuite chaque année.

FR_100: D’une certaine façon les emplois d’avenir, c’était une forme de pacte de responsabilité entre l’État et les employeurs du secteur non lucratif, pour que les ces derniers prennent un jeune et leur apportent une formation.

Reference to “les emplois d’avenir” is closely related to the “contrat de génération”, and the two measures are both inextricably linked to other crucial topics that appear to be addressed by all the corpus speakers in relation to the economic crisis: education and innovation.

FR_63: Mais nous avons aussi à faire davantage pour la recherche. Parce que l’Europe, la France, l’Allemagne détiennent une richesse incomparable avec leur nombre de savants et

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8 Ibid.
d’ingénieurs. Faisons travailler, encore davantage qu’aujourd’hui, nos étudiants, nos enseignants, nos chercheurs pour porter, là encore, de nouveaux projets.

**FR 81:** Entre 2015 et 2017, c’est par des réformes structurelles que le redressement s’opédera et non pas par des coups automatiques, dont on voit que si elles sont faites à l’aveugle, elles provoquent des dégâts sociaux considérables. Parce qu’à un moment, c’est sur l’éducation, la formation, l’investissement que se font les ajustements, c’est-à-dire sur la préparation de l’avenir, les conditions même de la croissance.

Investing in education and innovation is the key to long-term growth, the right choice to prepare the nation’s future. Incidentally, Hollande has revised Sarkozy’s reform on education and research without modifying it substantially, which has provided fertile ground for harsh criticism (Brafman 2013).

In broader terms, the analysis shows that Hollande’s plan to solve the unemployment crisis is nothing other than Sarkozy’s struggle for the restoration of the value of work (see section 7.4.2). However, the focus on argumentation highlights that, even though the two speakers share the same convictions, their arguments build on vastly different premises and conclusions, harness a different topical potential and are characterised by different lexical indicators. Therefore they are, simply, different. In other words, claiming that “Hollande se sarkozyse” is far too simplistic, as Hollande’s argumentation regarding unemployment can be summarised in a very specific content-related scheme.

**ARGUMENT FOR SOLUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS**

**Premise 1:** World economies are seeing encouraging signals, but growth is still too slow and weak.

**Premise 2:** One of the major threats to growth is unemployment, because it jeopardises confidence, and confidence is the prerequisite of growth.

**Premise 3:** Unemployment is the symptom of the profound and lasting nature of the crisis.

**Premise 4:** We must solve the unemployment crisis to restore confidence and spur growth at the same time.

**Premise 5:** My government has committed to the struggle against unemployment since the beginning of my mandate.

**Premise 6:** In particular, I am focusing on youth unemployment, because France is the youngest country in Europe.

**Premise 7:** The “generation contract” reduces the cost of labour by helping older workers keep their jobs and the young get into a place of work, thereby tackling unemployment comprehensively.

**Premise 8:** “Les emplois d’avenir” primarily tackles youth unemployment by focusing on helping the disadvantaged, which further contributes to solving the social implications of unemployment and, in general, the social implications of the economic crisis.

**Premise 9:** Together with “le contrat de génération” and “les emplois d’avenir”, investment in research and innovation will help us prepare for the jobs of the future, while simultaneously restoring confidence.

**Conclusion:** This is why we have launched the “generation contract” and “les emplois d’avenir”, and why we are investing in research and education.

Hollande’s focus on French youth gives rise to further argumentative peculiarities, especially including the recurrent use of the *topos* of moral duty towards posterity.
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

FR_57: ce que veulent comprendre les Français c’est si nous sommes capables de mobiliser nos forces pour permettre de nouveaux progrès, avec la perspective d’ouvrir pour la nouvelle génération pour, la jeunesse un avenir meilleur que le nôtre. Voilà l’enjeu. […] Nous n’avons qu’un objectif : permettre d’assurer à la génération qui vient un avenir meilleur que le nôtre, donner à notre pays confiance dans lui-même, réussir à redresser notre pays parce que c’est ce que nous avons eu comme mandat des Français et c’est parce que nous avons à cœur de leur donner un bel espoir dans leur avenir.

FR_63: Pour vaincre la crise, il nous faut voir plus loin qu’elle, être capable déjà d’être dans l’après.

FR_74: C’est en rappelant inlassablement cette ambition que nous serons à la hauteur de notre histoire et surtout de l’espérance des nouvelles générations.

Hollande recurrently claims that his policies target the young and future generations too, as they seek to reintroduce confidence in the job sector. In line with the moral aim to “bequeath a better world than the one in which we live”, the topos of moral duty towards posterity is frequently related to the imperative of striving for sustainable development. Particularly, the noun phrase “transition énergétique” occurs sixty-six times, revealing itself a lexical hinge of Hollande’s speeches.

FR_54: Nous mènerons également, toujours dans cet esprit de redressement et c’est un second grand enjeu, la transition énergétique. Cette transition énergétique, nous allons en débattre lors de la Conférence de Rio+20. Votre Assemblée, là encore, a adopté, le 22 mai dernier, un avis particulièrement intéressant qui souligne l’urgence des changements à conduire. Nous devons aller vers un bouquet énergétique bien plus diversifié, promouvoir un modèle de consommation plus sobre, plus efficace, plus durable. Face à la raréfaction des ressources, au renchérissement de leur prix, nous n’avons pas d’autre choix que de faire de la transition énergétique une nouvelle frontière.

FR_62: Les crises ne se séparent pas ; la crise écologique ce n’est pas une crise de plus, elle est dans la crise globale qui se décline sur tous les terrains, dans tous les domaines : économique, social, sanitaire. […] La transition énergétique et écologique ne doit pas être regardée comme une contrainte, une contrainte de plus qui s’abattrait sur notre pays, comme si nous devions à chaque fois demander effort et sacrifice, non, la transition énergétique et écologique, rendue nécessaire par la rareté des ressources naturelles et par la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique, est un axe prioritaire de développement de demain.

FR_81: Je pense au logement, au numérique, à la rénovation thermique, et plus largement, à la transition énergétique et aux nouvelles technologies, parce que c’est là que se joue la croissance de demain.

FR_91: La transition énergétique n’est pas un choix de circonstances, n’est pas un compromis, n’est pas une négociation. La transition énergétique, c’est une décision stratégique. Ce n’est pas un problème, c’est la solution. La seconde priorité, au-delà de la sobriété énergétique, c’est la diversification. Les énergies fossiles représentent encore plus de 70 % de notre consommation énergétique finale. Donc la diversification, c’est de chercher à limiter nos émissions de gaz à effet de serre, à réduire notre déficit commercial. Je propose donc de diminuer de 30 % la consommation des énergies fossiles en 2030.
The excerpt drawn from FR_91 shows that any topic provides Hollande with the opportunity to display numbers and statistical data. Energy transition is the shift to a sustainable economic system by means of renewable energy, energy efficiency and sustainable development. Climate change, the depletion of natural resources and their increased costs are not among the direct causes of the economic crisis; they pertain to another crisis, the energy crisis, but crises are always interconnected. The economic crisis provides the opportunity for a strategic and innovative “transition énergétique”, which would definitely contribute to rendering the solution of the economic crisis a permanent solution.

In broad terms, Hollande’s argumentation can be said to share Sarkozy’s argument for sustainable economic recovery (see section 7.4) and could be reduced to Sarkozy’s opposition between short-term and long-term policies. However, it relies on specific topical and lexical elements, thereby giving rise to another distinctive, speaker-related argument scheme:

**ARGUMENT FOR LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS**

*Premise 1:* The crisis will last long, as it is the symptom of a deep economic, political, social and environmental upheaval.

*Premise 2:* Crises are all interconnected.

*Premise 3:* Faced with the economic crisis, climate change and the depletion of natural resources must not be seen as constraints.

*Premise 4:* Rather, the economic crisis provides the opportunity to contemplate a strategic energy transition.

*Premise 5:* Energy transition would enable us to turn to new technologies, innovate, promote growth and reduce our energy dependency.

*Premise 6:* Though energy transition might appear expensive, tomorrow’s growth will depend upon energy efficiency and renewable energies.

*Premise 7:* Foresight is needed to solve the economic crisis.

*Premise 8:* Committing to energy transition and sustainable development will benefit future generations.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, we must bring about energy transition boldly and strive for sustainable development in order to restore growth, bring about a lasting and comprehensive solution to the crisis and bequeath a better world to future generations.

The argument schemes outlined in the present section show that, even though two speakers share the same language, culture, topics and audiences, they do not necessarily set out argumentation on the same premises. In pragma-dialectical terms, argumentation must always be studied in a triple perspective: the topical potential is always exploited in different ways, however slight differences might be; presentational devices are a speaker’s distinctive marks, and every speaker is likely to choose specific terms and expressions for addressing a topic; moreover, the expectations of the audience is bound to be perceived in different ways by any given speaker.
8.4 The Argument for the Social Conference, or the Rejection of Sarkozy’s Values and Ideology

Hollande undoubtedly shares some elements of Sarkozy’s discourse. The pivotal role of confidence in solving the crisis is a case in point. As to differences, some of them are ascribable to the different moments in which Sarkozy and Hollande deliver their speeches, after the bursting of the crisis and in the midst of the ensuing recession respectively. Reference has already been made in section 8.1 to the fact that in Hollande’s speeches the need is not felt to provide the audience with background information on the crisis. However, the financial and speculative nature of the crisis are occasionally addressed and, in this sense, Hollande’s convictions do not differ from Sarkozy’s.

FR_71: C’est un grand progrès parce que, si l’on songe à ce qui a provoqué la crise, c’est d’abord la défaillance des banques américaines puis des banques européennes. Quelles ont été les conséquences de cette dérive du système financier ? L’intervention des États, le déséquilibre des comptes publics puis le ralentissement de la croissance. Dès lors que nous réglons les questions qui sont à l’origine de la crise - les banques -, que nous avons également traité les déséquilibres budgétaires à travers le pacte budgétaire et que nous avons aussi déterminé un pacte de croissance, tout en permettant plus de stabilité avec le Mécanisme européen et l’intervention de la Banque centrale, je répète ce que j’ai déjà dit : je considère que les conditions de sortie de crise de la zone euro sont désormais réunies.

FR_72: Concrètement, c’est donc la protection des épargnants et aussi la protection des États puisque la crise bancaire avait nécessité une intervention des États.

FR_81: Sûrement faut-il la nommer pour ce qu’elle est, c’est-à-dire d’abord une crise de la finance dérégulée. Mais elle n’est déjà plus cela, elle est aussi une crise économique et donc une crise politique.

However, though the financial origin of the crisis is sometimes addressed and though all the corpus speakers agree with the fact that speculation and the financialisation of the economy lie at the basis of today’s recession, it is also true that Hollande refrains from focusing his discourse on values. Incidentally, taken all together, the nouns “spéculateurs”, the adjective “spéculatif” in all its derived forms, and the verb “spéculer”, only show up thirteen times, while they proliferate in Sarkozy’s texts, for instance. Moreover, the term “irresponsabilité” occurs once in Hollande’s speeches (FR_81) and not in relation to the leadup to the crisis, which might be simply interpreted as the consequence of the fact that the French “no longer need to be told the truth”. In other words, perception of audience demands changes as the president changes.

Regarding the fact that the crisis has demanded state intervention in the economy, the excerpts drawn from FR_71 and FR_72 show that a cornerstone of Sarkozy’s rhetoric has survived the presidential handover: excessive deregulation has called for regulation. However, less emphasis is laid on the “resurgence of politics”, as the intervention of
national governments for the sake of taxpayers is deemed to be a mere consequence of the “financialisation” of the economy rather than a political credo.

**FR_66:** Ma conclusion, sur ce point, c’est que si nous laissons les marchés seuls, si nous attendons des marchés et uniquement d’eux la résolution de la crise, il y a à craindre qu’elle se perpétue encore longtemps. Nous avons besoin de *mécanismes*, de régulation et d’action.

Here lies another major difference between Sarkozy and Hollande, partially ascribable to the speakers’ different views on audience demands: the latter does not resort to the main arguments of the former, i.e. the *argument for state intervention in the economy* and the *argument for moralisation of financial capitalism* (see section 7.3). In other words, the rejection of ideology discourse is the main clue to the “non-sarkozyisation” of Hollande’s discourse. The pervasiveness of numbers in Hollande’s speeches is a signal of the “death of Sarkozy’s ideology”, as Hollande’s discourse shifts more towards un “discours comptable” (Mayaffre 2012: 53) rather than polemically focusing on values. In this respect, highlighting that the word “capitalisme” only occurs once in Hollande’s speeches could be enough to explain the extent to which ideology is softened in the speeches of Sarkozy’s successor.

**FR_81:** Les inégalités se sont creusées, pas simplement d’ailleurs aux États-Unis, mais dans l’ensemble des pays développés et même au-delà. Inégalités dont nous n’avions jamais eu connaissance depuis l’histoire même du *capitalisme*.

Moreover, there are only nine occurrences of the term “mondialisation”, which further shows that Hollande’s argumentation focuses less on the macro-economic triggers of the crisis. The moralisation of capitalism and “*la mondialisation heureuse*” are Sarkozy’s distinctive presentational devices, the lexical foundation of his argumentation, not shared by his successor. In other words, though Hollande’s speeches present some similarities with Sarkozy’s, the previous sections have also highlighted that claiming that Hollande has “sarkozysed” his discourse since the 2012 campaign is far too simplistic, at least as far as the interpreting-oriented rationale of the present research is concerned. The pragmatic and argumentative forces of a text also depend on lexical choices. In this regard, Hollande’s rejection of polemical, value-based and ideological discourse results in peculiar lexical choices destined to be extremely different from those of Sarkozy. The difference is evident to such an extent that it has even been highlighted by the most convinced advocate of Hollande’s “sarkozyisation”.

**QUESTION :** Quelle différence alors entre les deux hommes ?
**RÉPONSE :** Dans la fibre de gauche de Hollande, avec les termes « solidarité », « fraternité » et l’évocation des « partenaires sociaux », là où Sarkozy avait tendance à dénoncer « les corps intermédiaires » (Mayaffre 2014).

In particular, the opposition between “*partenaires sociaux*” and “*corps intermédiaires*” has been observed in *ARGO* as well. It is true that Hollande generally uses
the former while Sarkozy tends to use the latter, but it is also true that the two terms appear in the texts of both speakers. The difference does not lie in the choice of the term but in the way in which speakers argue about the role of social partners. Take the following excerpts drawn, respectively, from Sarkozy’s FR_46 and Hollande’s FR_57:

**FR_46**: Pendant cinq ans j’ai pu mesurer la puissance des corps intermédiaires qui s’interposent parfois entre le peuple et le sommet de l’État, ces corps intermédiaires qui prétendent souvent parler au nom des Français et qui en vérité, souvent, confisquent la parole des Français. Que ce soit pour l’autonomie des universités, le service minimum, la réforme des ports ou les retraites, j’ai pu mesurer bien souvent la difficulté de réformer quand les Français n’ont pas leur mot à dire. Ce ne sont pas les Français qui sont rétifs aux réformes mais les corps intermédiaires qui n’aiment rien tant que l’Immobilisme.

**FR_57**: Cette conférence accueille le gouvernement et d’abord le Premier ministre, les ministres, des élus de nos territoires mais surtout les présidents, les Secrétaires généraux des grandes organisations professionnelles et associatives de notre pays. Ce qu’on appelle les corps intermédiaires, sans lesquels la France ne serait pas ce qu’elle est aujourd’hui. Et c’est parce que je voulais les rassembler autour d’une grande mission qui est celle d’ouvrir une perspective à notre pays que j’ai souhaité que cette Conférence sociale accueille largement tous ces participants.

In Sarkozy’s view, social partners hijack the possibility for the French to express their opinions, thereby hampering direct and frank contact between the government and its citizens. Notably, social partners are responsible for “l’immobilisme”; they are the determiners of inaction, which leads to extremely negative consequences on the economy and prevents the solution of the crisis.

Hollande’s view is diametrically opposed to Sarkozy’s, as social partners are “what has led France to be what it is today”, not in the sense of a country striving to emerge from the recession but in the sense of a democratic country that has endured the recession better than several other European countries. “Les partenaires sociaux” are the backbone of the French Republic and, particularly, they lie at the heart of the president’s plan to lift his country out of the recession:

**FR_57**: Mais la plus importante si nous voulons parvenir à nos fins, c’est la confiance. Les sociétés qui connaissent les performances les plus élevées en termes de croissance mais aussi en termes de progrès social sont celles qui ont su nouer des compromis durables. Entre l’État et les autres acteurs c’est-à-dire les partenaires sociaux, les collectivités locales, les forces vives, un compromis aussi entre le patronat et les syndicats. Un compromis entre les exigences de l’économie réelle et la préservation des ressources naturelles. Un compromis entre le financement de l’économie et la capacité d’investissement des entreprises.

**FR_58**: Mais au moment où nous appelons à l’effort de tous pour réduire nos déficits, maîtriser notre dette, améliorer notre compétitivité, en ce moment se tient une conférence sociale avec tous les partenaires sociaux qui participent justement de la vie de l’entreprise aussi bien les employeurs que les représentants des salariés, nous avons besoin d’appeler à une forme de patriotisme.
Economic recovery, the solution of the unemployment crisis, the restoration of confidence and growth are not exclusively dependent on government intervention, but will eventually stem from cooperation between all the actors of the social, economic and political life of France. Here lies a major difference between Hollande and Sarkozy, that sounds paradoxical considering the speakers’ affiliation to opposing political parties: though the present section will further show that Hollande resorts to typically socialist arguments and draws on ideology typical of the left, his argumentation can actually be said to promote government “dismantlement”, or rather reconsider the centralisation effort brought about by Sarkozy’s policies and hailed in Sarkozy’s speeches. Mainstream assumptions regarding “discourse of the left” or “discourse of the right” are, therefore, likely to prove wrong when interpreting the speeches of the former and the current French presidents, as the role of politics is more strenuously defended and vividly promoted in the speeches of the president of the UMP. The comments regarding Cameron’s Big Society argument, therefore, also apply to argumentation regarding the distribution of power in the French sub-corpus: heavily relying on general extra-linguistic knowledge rather than previously studying the variables of the speech to be interpreted is liable to result in a skewing of the speaker’s illocution. The following excerpts bear witness to Hollande’s stance regarding the role of the State in solving the crisis.

**FR_54:** Mais je suis le chef de l’État et je viens vous dire ma conception de l’État dans la place qui est la sienne pour permettre à notre Nation de retrouver confiance. L’État c’est l’instance qui oriente, qui arbitre et qui dans bien des domaines décide. L’État c’est une puissance, ce n’est pas la seule, protectrice, anticipatrice, redistributrice. Elle garantit l’idée même du bien commun par-delà la confrontation des égoïsmes ou des corporatismes ou l’exubérance des attentes parfois irraisonnées. L’État c’est la référence collective, l’incarnation de l’intérêt général même si l’État ne détient pas par lui-même le monopole de l’intérêt général. Car l’État est au service de la Nation, il n’est pas la Nation à lui seul. Et l’État ne peut pas prétendre tout faire tout seul s’il ignore la multiplicité des organes qui constituent le corps vivant, le corps social, alors il se condamne à l’inefficacité et parfois même à l’impuissance. L’État doit être respecté, à condition qu’il respecte les autres partenaires.

**FR_73:** Mais l’État n’est pas le seul acteur. C’est la raison pour laquelle le gouvernement a ouvert la négociation sur la sécurisation de l’emploi.

Here lies the core of Hollande’s argumentation: though the crisis has called for rules, the State is not the only actor and it is not entitled to set rules on its own. In this respect, Hollande restores balance between the state and social partners after Sarkozy’s presidency.

The excerpts drawn from **FR_57, FR_58** and **FR_73** show that certain crucial terms and concepts revolve around argumentation regarding the role of social partners in the solution of the social and economic crisis. Like all the other parties involved, social partners are called upon to participate in a historic “social conference” (“conférence sociale”). The expression occurs thirty-four times in Hollande’s speeches, while it is absent in Sarkozy’s. The “social conference” is Hollande’s ambitious plan for achieving a lasting solution of the crisis, and rests upon a simple precept: no bills will be approved and no laws
will be enacted without preliminary agreement between the government and social partners which stand for the will of workers, entrepreneurs and, in more general terms, citizens.

**FR_54:** Aucune loi, plus exactement aucune proposition ou aucun projet de loi modifiant le statut, les conditions de vie au travail, les salariés et leurs droits mais également les entreprises ne devra être établi ni adopté sans une étroite concertation préalable avec les organisations qui les représentent. C’est d’ailleurs tout l’esprit de la grande conférence sociale qui va se réunir ici, quel plus beau symbole, réunissant donc État et partenaires sociaux.

**FR_57:** Je l’ai dit, les pays qui sont capables d’assurer le mieux leur redressement dans la justice sociale, sont ceux qui sont prêts à nouer un contrat entre les différents acteurs. La conférence sociale n’est donc pas un aboutissement ou une promesse qui viendrait d’être tenue. La conférence sociale c’est un commencement.

**FR_87:** J’en arrive à notre conférence sociale. C’est un espace de concertation, de dialogue. Cette conférence nous permet de connaître ce que sont les chantiers sur lesquels l’État et l’ensemble des partenaires vont se mobiliser.

The social conference is a fresh start that, like all conferences, is about debate. Indeed, argumentation regarding the social conference is recurrently associated with the syntagm “dialogue social” and the term “négociation”. The former occurs twenty-four times, while in Sarkozy’s speeches only six occurrences can be observed. The latter occurs forty-eight times in Hollande’s speeches, as opposed to the seven occurrences in Sarkozy’s. “Concertation” also crops up frequently. In Hollande’s view, the social conference must not be understood as a temporary measure: social dialogue is a method that must be “internalised” by the French and become the foundation of decision-making. Turning to constant negotiation is not simply a choice but a strategic choice that will dispel doubts and diffidence, thereby restoring confidence and, consequently, growth. This is why the social conference (or social dialogue, negotiation, cooperation) will become a constitutional tenet.

**FR_54:** Les économies les plus robustes sont celles qui ont été capables de tisser cette confiance et d’organiser ce système de relations sociales fondé sur la négociation. Je m’y suis engagé devant les Français et donc le dialogue social ne sera pas réservé à des moments d’exception ou à des réponses à des manifestations - ça peut être le cas - ou à des sommets convoqués pour la circonstance, non, le dialogue doit être un processus constant et cohérent. Et c’est la raison pour laquelle j’ai proposé de l’inscrire dans la pratique, celle que mettra en ouvre le gouvernement, mais aussi dans la lettre de notre Constitution.

**FR_57:** C’est pourquoi, je confirme ici que je souhaite, si le Parlement y consent et si les partenaires sociaux y adhèrent, inscrire dans notre Constitution le rôle du dialogue social et la place des grandes organisations représentatives. Il conviendra de prévoir plus clairement les obligations de concertation préalables à la décision publique. Il n’y aura pas de loi dans le domaine de la vie économique et sociale qui pourrait être votée par le Parlement sans qu’il y ait eu une phase de dialogue et de concertation. L’affirmation de ce principe constitutionnel ne remet pas en cause la primauté de la loi et donc le rôle du législateur, mais il permet d’engager avec plus de confiance que par le passé les modes de concertation et de négociation indispensables.
FR_65: Mais la négociation la plus attendue, celle qui vient de s’ouvrir, qui est la plus importante, c’est celle qui porte sur la sécurisation de l’emploi. Elle est en fait le fondement de notre stratégie, si nous savons tous ensemble en prendre la mesure.

FR_78: Je veux donc saluer cette initiative qui a été prise d’organiser une concertation avec tous les acteurs, de faire en sorte que nous puissions évaluer ce qu’est notre politique de développement dans un moment où le monde change et où l’Europe et la France connaissent des difficultés économiques, qui pourraient nous faire renoncer à nos objectifs. […] Et c’était le sens de votre initiative, Monsieur le ministre, de faire en sorte que nous puissions à travers une consultation, une participation, une concertation, qu’importe les mots, savoir où nous voulons aller et comment.

FR_87: Je veux conclure sur le dialogue social. Nous l’avons engagé depuis un an, nous en avons éprouvé, je pense, les uns et les autres, la qualité, la pertinence, l’utilité, et, en même temps, nous ne devons pas rester simplement à des procédures. Le dialogue social, c’est un état d’esprit, c’est une conviction, c’est une méthode qui ne vaut pas pour un an, ou même pour un quinquennat, c’est une méthode qui doit profondément changer les habitudes dans notre pays. […] Ma conviction, c’est que nous devons avoir la foi dans le dialogue social, car la France n’avancera et ne réussira que si elle respecte les acteurs.

FR_98: Nous avons fait le choix aussi d’une méthode, celle du dialogue social. Elle a fait ses preuves puisque, en un an, quatre grands accords ont été signés, pas par tous mais avec toujours la participation des grandes confédérations et avec l’idée de faire avancer le progrès. Il y a d’abord eu l’accord sur la sécurisation de l’emploi. Ensuite, le contrat de génération, la qualité de vie au travail et, plus récemment, la formation professionnelle. […] Elles [les contreparties] devront donc être définies parallèlement aux trois autres chantiers, dans le cadre d’une concertation impliquant les partenaires sociaux et associant également le Parlement.

The group of pivotal terms used in relation to the need for the social conference also include “compromis”: the reiterated term always has a positive connotation, whereas in Sarkozy’s speeches it occurs only four times in a negative sense, for instance in FR_46. The excerpts below bear witness to the extent to which a single term can take on different meanings and revolve around clashing convictions:

FR_46: Je me souviens de ceux qui voulaient séparer les hommes et les femmes dans les piscines municipales parce qu’ils étaient prêts à tous les compromis avec les valeurs républicaines. Pas de compromis avec les valeurs républicaines !

FR_57: L’idée que je lance c’est celle du compromis positif. C’est l’idée qui permettra à notre pays de sortir par le haut des épreuves qu’il traverse. Ce compromis positif c’est cette conférence qui peut le nouer, en tout cas l’organiser, le permettre. Cela ne doit pas être une rencontre sans lendemain, ce doit être une dynamique qui sera elle-même un changement dans la méthode qui permettra un changement dans la réalité. Je ne demande à personne, ici, d’abandonner ses convictions, de renoncer à ses revendications, de ne céder à je ne sais quelle pression. Je fais confiance à des acteurs libres, indépendants pour prendre leur part de la tâche commune.

FR_65: Voilà le compromis que nous devons chercher, que les partenaires sociaux ont entre leurs mains. Je souhaite qu’ils le trouvent. C’est leur intérêt, c’est l’intérêt du pays.
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FR_67: C’est une négociation historique. Je souhaite qu’elle débouche sur un compromis. Il ne sera pas facile. Mais les employeurs doivent être également conscients que c’est par le dialogue qu’ils peuvent avoir cette souplesse qu’ils revendiquent. Les salariés peuvent aussi être sûrs que, par ce dialogue, ils obtiendront les protections qu’ils réclament à juste raison.


“Conférence sociale”, “dialogue social”, “négociation”, “concertation”, “compromis” are all functional to conveying the purpose of the government, that is the quest for “la justice sociale” (e.g. FR_54, FR_65, FR_73, FR_103), which has to go hand in hand with the achievement of economic recovery.

FR_54: La grande question à laquelle nous devons répondre, c’est : Quel modèle social pour la France de demain ? Depuis trop longtemps, justice sociale et performance économique ont été opposées, comme s’il fallait choisir entre l’une et l’autre.

FR_103: J’ai entendu votre message, il est clair. Pas assez de changements et donc trop de lenteur. Pas assez d’emplois et donc trop de chômage. Pas assez de justice sociale et trop d’impôts.

This “French social revolution” hailed by François Hollande is primarily pursued through a major government initiative, “le pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité”. The label refers to a set of measures announced by François Hollande during the New Years’ Greetings to the French (FR_97), which aim at promoting cooperation between the government and enterprises, with the intercession of social partners. In the president’s view, the “Responsibility and Solidarity Pact”9 supplements previous government’s acts, with particular reference to “les emplois d’avenir” and “le contrat de génération”, by achieving a comprehensive deal not only between the government and the public sector but also with French businesses:

FR_100: D’une certaine façon les emplois d’avenir, c’était une forme de pacte de responsabilité entre l’État et les employeurs du secteur non lucratif, pour que les ces derniers prennent un jeune et leur apportent une formation. L’idée maintenant c’est de lancer un pacte de responsabilité avec l’ensemble des entreprises privées et de leur dire : « on va vous baisser un certain nombre d’obligations, réduire le coût du travail, simplifier des formalités et, en contrepartie, vous allez faciliter l’embauche de jeunes, prendre en compte aussi les difficultés que rencontrent les seniors et améliorer la formation et le dialogue social ».

Therefore, though the reform is only addressed from FR_97 to FR_103, it actually revolves around all the major policies and plans that have been outlined in the previous sections: “le contrat de génération”, “les emplois d’avenir”, commitment to establishing the unshakable premises for durable social dialogue, the need for cooperation between all the actors of the economy, the reduced leeway of state power are all encompassed in the broader and comprehensive plan envisaged in the “Pact”. More particularly, “le pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité” (that is simply named “pacte de responsabilité” in Hollande’s ARGO speeches) is mutually beneficial for French businesses and French society: through the reform, the government pledges to reduce business taxes and businesses, in turn, commit themselves to innovating, hiring young people and taking the difficulties of older workers and retirees into consideration. The following examples provide an overview of Hollande’s argumentation regarding the “Responsibility Pact”.


FR_100: L’idée maintenant c’est de lancer un pacte de responsabilité avec l’ensemble des entreprises privées et de leur dire : « on va vous baisser un certain nombre d’obligations, réduire le coût du travail, simplifier des formalités et, en contrepartie, vous allez faciliter l’embauche de jeunes, prendre en compte aussi les difficultés que rencontrent les seniors et améliorer la formation et le dialogue social ». C’est ce que nous sommes en train de nouer comme contrat.

Focusing attention on the “Responsibility Pact” in analysing ARGO leads to a crucial conclusion. However recurrent in Hollande’s speeches, the term responsabilité has little to do with the meaning of responsabilité in Sarkozy’s: it is never opposed to the irresponsibility of banks and speculators but systematically related to the state, entrepreneurs and social partners, all required to take responsibility for helping the country solve the economic crisis, the social crisis of unemployment and the energy crisis simultaneously. Moreover, references to the “Responsibility Pact” and the other pivotal government policies mark a divide from Sarkozy’s ideology discourse in that they restore the pervasiveness of the prototypical crisis-related argument, whereby “law/act x helps...
overcome the crisis”. Indeed, the “Pact”, “les emplois d’avenir” and the “generation contract” are instrumental in restoring confidence and, consequently, growth.

FR_99: *La croissance, elle reviendra si la confiance est là, et vous êtes – investisseurs étrangers – un élément de cette confiance. Nous avons aussi à travers le pacte de responsabilité à pouvoir la créer sur le plan intérieur. C’est pourquoi j’ai lancé cet appel à l’ensemble des partenaires sociaux, pour qu’ils puissent se mobiliser autour de cet enjeu, la croissance, la confiance, la création d’emplois, la réussite de notre pays.*


Though the “Pact” is only addressed in the last speeches of the sub-corpus, the ideas lying behind it permeate the whole of Hollande’s speeches. In this respect, the current president’s speeches can also be said to hinge on a specific ideology, a typically left ideology of social justice which, apart from the above-mentioned lexical indicators, is also testified by the recurrence of the term “pacte”, occurring ninety-seven times in the fifty speeches delivered by Hollande.

FR_54: *C’est pourquoi je souhaite, au-delà de l’urgence, pour assurer la prochaine rentrée, un nouveau *pacte entre l’école et la nation. Ce pacte définira les priorités qui sont devant nous.*

FR_59: *Mais en même temps, que nous puissions définir une perspective, un projet mobilisateur, d’où le *pacte pour la croissance*, mais aussi l’union politique que nous devrons bâtir.*

FR_61: *Le temps est venu de clore cette phase des pays qui sont le plus en difficulté et d’en ouvrir une autre, celle de la croissance et du sérieux budgétaire. C’est ce *pacte global* qui sera soumis au Parlement dans les prochains jours.*

FR_65: *Nous avons à mettre en place, ensemble, un *pacte de compétitivité* qui ne laissera rien de côté, qui s’inscrira dans la durée et qui fera les réformes trop longtemps oubliées, même si elles ont été toujours annoncées et chaque fois différées.*

FR_68: *Un *pacte c’est donnant-donnant.*

Apart from showing the extent to which Hollande takes his distance from his predecessor, his commitment to social justice by means of social dialogue is characterised by another particularity which stands out among all the other speeches included in ARGO, i.e. the need for patience.

FR_54: *L’État doit également respecter les partenaires sociaux car la démocratie doit avoir à la fois le sens de l’urgence, répondre aux sollicitations des citoyens, mais aussi le sens de*
la patience pour agir bien et dans le long terme. L’enjeu est bien là et ce n’est un paradoxe que d’apparence : pour répondre à l’urgence, mieux vaut prendre son temps, celui de la concertation et de la réflexion. Le temps de transformer les idées en projets et les projets en actes, cela s’appelle le dialogue. Le dialogue n’est pas un problème, il n’est pas non plus la solution, il est le point de passage. Il n’est pas un obstacle sur le chemin des décisions, il permet de les prendre librement, de les assumer pleinement et surtout de les appliquer efficacement.

**FR_87**: Le dialogue social exige du temps, concertations, négociations, transpositions, et ce n’est pas toujours compatible avec l’impatience de nos concitoyens, ou l’urgence des situations. Certains nous disent, « mais, il conviendrait d’aller plus vite, l’État pourrait décider tout seul, et, au sein de l’État le chef de l’État, nous gagnerions du temps, cela serait fini de ces palabres, de ces pourparlers, de ces discussions. La crise est là, il faut aller vite. » Aller vite, c’est aller nulle part. Aller vite, c’est rester sur place. Aller vite, c’est mettre chacun en opposition avec l’autre. Donc, la méthode, ce n’est pas de perdre notre temps, c’est d’avoir nos rythmes, nos calendriers, nos chantiers. C’est le sens de la feuille de route de la conférence sociale. Et, en plus, c’est une fausse vision du dialogue social, parce que, dans les entreprises et dans les branches, si cela négocie, les accords permettent d’aller bien plus vite qu’une modification de la loi ou une procédure judiciaire qui peut prendre des mois pour ne pas dire des années.

Though the dramatic consequences of the crisis call for urgent responses, haste is a poor counsellor. The social conference enables the gathering of all the actors of the economy, but the government, companies and social partners are likely to defend clashing interests from time to time. Therefore, rapid solutions cannot be found or, rather, they could be found but they would lead to short-term, superficial and deceptive results. Social justice is a mission and requires time and patience. This is a cornerstone of Hollande’s accommodating discourse in that the speaker actually clashes with mainstream argumentation regarding the economic crisis in particular and political issues in general, for which rapid measures and bold action are generally encouraged. The *topos of urgency* also appears in Hollande’s speeches but, as shown in the above examples drawn from **FR_54** and **FR_87**, patience in tackling urgent problems is not viewed as a paradox. Only thus, by cooperating, debating, striving for social justice and embracing sustainable development will the crisis be overcome once and for all. This is one of the major components of Hollande’s argument for the social conference.

**ARGUMENT FOR THE SOCIAL CONFERENCE**

**Premise 1**: The State is not the only actor in the economy.

**Premise 2**: The social partners are the backbone of the French Republic.

**Premise 3**: The crisis is not only an economic but also a social scourge.

**Premise 4**: Slow growth, unemployment and the lack of confidence are urgent threats, but haste is a poor counsellor. Time and patience are needed for structural reforms to bear fruit.

**Premise 5**: The government has a mission, i.e. gathering all the actors of the economy (businesses and the social partners) in the “social conference”.

**Premise 6**: The social conference rests upon a basic principle: no bills will be approved and no laws will be enacted without preliminary agreement between the government and social partners which stand for the will of workers, entrepreneurs and, in more general terms, citizens.
Premise 7: The social conference is about dialogue, cooperation, negotiation, positive compromises and deals, which require all the participants in the conference to take responsibility for the sake of social justice.

Premise 8: The social conference is not a temporary reform.

Premise 9: Social dialogue between the parties is a new method, a strategic choice that will dispel doubts, thereby restoring confidence and, eventually, growth.

Premise 10: Social dialogue requires time and patience, but it is instrumental in bringing about lasting and effective solutions to the crisis.

Premise 11: The “generation contract”, “les emplois d’avenir” and the “Responsibility Pact” aim at promoting social dialogue.

Conclusion: Therefore, the social conference must become a permanent feature of the French economic, social and political agenda, a foundation of decision-making that will bring about a lasting solution to the crisis.

As regards interpreting, Hollande’s topos of patience is as problematic as Cameron’s Big Society argument, in that it challenges interpreters to translate what they hear rather than to resort to assumptions that can prove wrong in context. In this regard, a simple advice can be given to interpreters: whenever you hear Hollande describing the atmosphere of urgency spread by the current predicament, expect a turning point at which an appeal to patience is launched and used as a premise for arguing in favour of jointly-devised reforms.

8.5 Hollande’s European and International Arguments

Hollande’s predilection for dialogue as the prerequisite for sound and sustainable policies remains unchanged in European settings, as the meetings with other representatives of EU members states provides the opportunity for debating the crucial steps to be taken to solve the Eurozone crisis. However, hailing the stimulating environment of EU Council meetings can be considered intrinsic to all speakers’ argumentation for reasons of Politeness.

FR_74: L’Europe, parce que c’est son histoire, parce que c’est son destin, est avant tout une volonté politique, c’est-à-dire un engagement où chacun accepte l’équilibre des droits et des obligations, où les règles sont respectées, où la confiance crée la solidarité, c’est-à-dire un projet dont on ne peut pas discuter sans cesse des acquis et remettre tout en cause à chaque étape.

More broadly, Hollande’s convictions do not waver in Europe, as has already been mentioned in section 8.1 in relation to the interdependency between the crisis of confidence and slow growth. The speaker’s stances regarding the budget deficit and the social implications of the crisis are also consistent in all Hollande’s speeches. The deficit needs to be addressed comprehensively, by reducing spending and by promoting growth, which can only be done through the implementation of policies aimed at tackling unemployment, with particular reference to youth unemployment.

FR_61: Le redressement des comptes est un impératif pour la France, mais c’est aussi un engagement pour l’Europe. L’Europe vit depuis quatre ans une crise de confiance et une
crise de croissance, l’une entraînant l’autre. Des décisions importantes ont été prises ces derniers mois au Conseil européen, et encore plus récemment au niveau de la Banque Centrale. Mais ces décisions, aussi bien pour soutenir la croissance que pour stabiliser les marchés, ne nous dispensent pas de mettre de l’ordre dans la gestion de nos pays respectifs. L’Europe supporte le fardeau du déficit que certains pays ont laissé dériver et que l’Europe n’a pas su traiter au bon moment et avec l’intensité attendue.

FR_71: Est-ce que pour autant nous sommes maintenant sur une perspective de croissance ? C’est vrai que l’Europe s’est engagée pour la croissance, mais nous avons aussi une conjoncture qui reste difficile. Pour moi, la priorité restera en 2013, la croissance, le soutien à l’emploi. Je constate que, sur la question de la compétitivité et de l’emploi, le Conseil européen s’est mobilisé, y compris même sur l’emploi des jeunes.

Analysis of ARGO indicates that Hollande’s European speeches too differ from Sarkozy’s, especially at lexical level; in particular, despite the same topicality, the former French president addresses the EU Stability and Growth Pact only once (FR_8), while insistence on the word “pacte” is a typical feature of all Hollande’s addresses, including those delivered in EU settings.

FR_58: Nous avons aussi eu un Conseil Européen, il y a un peu plus d’une semaine au cours duquel, britanniques et français, avec nos partenaires, ont pu faire adopter un pacte de croissance qui s’ajoute au pacte budgétaire.

FR_80: La première décision, ce sera de mettre en œuvre, avec un rythme accéléré, le pacte de croissance qui a été adopté au mois de juin dernier.

FR_88: Premier intérêt, c’était d’évaluer l’application du pacte de croissance qui avait été décidé l’année dernière, à notre initiative mais porté par d’autres pays et accepté par le Conseil européen en juin 2012, dont on pouvait parfois douter de la mise en œuvre effective et rapide. Le président de la Banque européenne d’investissement et le président de la Commission européenne ont donc rendu compte de la mise en œuvre de ce pacte de croissance. Je rappelle que 120 milliards d’euros avaient été dégagés pour soutenir l’activité. Les chiffres qui nous ont été communiqués montrent que ce pacte de croissance est bien appliqué.

Growth is the prerequisite of France and Europe alike. Reference has already been made in section 8.1 to the crucial role played by doubt and mistrust (rather than fear) in determining lack of confidence. European citizens are not only worried about their jobs and their national economies, but they are also doubtful about the future of Europe and the Eurozone. In other words, Hollande is the only speaker, together with David Cameron, who addresses Euroscepticism systematically, although without ever naming it directly.

FR_63: L’Europe traverse non plus une guerre, c’est fini, mais une crise, et elle dure. Une crise qui traduit les déséquilibres de la finance, l’ampleur des dettes, mais aussi la vulnérabilité des États. Cette crise se paie cher : un chômage élevé, l’angoisse des jeunes pour leur avenir et une défiance à l’égard de la politique. C’est une crise morale que nous avons à relever.
Euroscepticism is the major threat posed to the European project, as it results in the comeback of populist movements and protectionism.

Euroscepticism is a fact. European citizens no longer have confidence in the European project. However, the European project was not only about building a monetary union but about devising and pursuing a social and political project. Like the “social conference”, the European project cannot be built in a day but requires time and patience; this is why struggling against Euroscepticism is the first step towards restoring confidence and growth in Europe. The passages dealing with this topic are not generally based on complex logic, as the answer to Euroscepticism and protectionism is usually said to lie in the relentless promotion of trust in the European project.

FR_74: S’il est vrai que la crise de la zone euro est désormais largement derrière nous, nous sommes loin d’en avoir tiré toutes les conséquences, et ce qui nous menace aujourd’hui n’est plus la défiance des marchés, c’est celle des peuples, et qui ne voit, à travers une suite de déclarations, que l’intérêt national est en train de prendre le pas sur l’intérêt européen.

FR_63: L’Europe, la première puissance économique du monde doute d’elle-même. Comment comprendre ? Elle hésite à s’unir davantage au risque que nos pays soient eux-mêmes ramenés, emportés par le scepticisme, l’égoïsme et le populisme.

FR_66: Dernier constat qui n’est pas le plus rassurant : c’est la monté de pratiques protectionnistes qui avait déjà été endiguée et dénoncée au sommet de Los Cabos au Mexique - pays qui vous est cher - lorsque nous nous sommes réunis au sein du G20.

FR_81: Nous devons lutter contre le protectionnisme, mais en même temps contre le libre-échange sans règles, sans normes. [...] Certains voudraient nous faire croire que la solution consisterait à réduire encore plus vite les déficits. Mais chacun connaît le risque, c’est qu’il n’y ait aucun résultat en termes de rétablissement des comptes publics parce qu’il y aura une récession qui se prolongera, et j’en connais les conséquences : le chômage et le désarroi des peuples et avec, la montée d’un certain nombre de populismes. Il n’y a pas besoin de les inventer, ils sont là, déjà là. [...] Les risques c’est que les cohésions nationales s’effritent pays par pays. Les risques c’est que les populismes grandissent, faute d’espoir. Les risques c’est que la construction européenne - cette grande aventure, cette grande idée – puisse être un jour discutée.

FR_90: Le commerce mondial peut être menacé par des mesures protectionnistes, par des entraves, par des décisions unilatérales alors qu’il y a eu l’échec – chacun s’en souvient – de Doha.
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pas forcément avec autant de pays qu’il y en a dans l’Europe, mais au moins avec un certain nombre d’entre eux, qui voulaient aller plus loin. Eh bien, nous avons à reprendre cette belle idée et à redonner du sens à la construction européenne.

**FR_63**: La réponse à la crise de l’Europe a un nom, un seul nom, c’est l’Europe elle-même, c’est l’Europe qui vaincra la crise qui la traverse !

All these passages rest upon a crucial European and International argument, the argument for tackling Euroscepticism and protectionism:

**ARGUMENT FOR TACKLING EUROSCEPTICISM AND PROTECTIONISM**

*Premise 1*: The Eurozone crisis is a confidence crisis that compounds the budget deficit and prevents growth from being boosted.

*Premise 2*: European citizens are in the grip of doubt, mistrust and helplessness.

*Premise 3*: The economic, social and political project of a European Union is questioned, as Euroscepticism is increasing among EU citizens.

*Premise 4*: Protectionism and populism are rife again in Europe and the rest of the world.

*Premise 5*: Protectionism and populism are not the answers to the Eurozone crisis.

*Premise 6*: The answer to the Eurozone crisis is the European project itself, though it requires time and patience.

*Conclusion*: Therefore, we have to believe in the European project and struggle against Euroscepticism and protectionism by cutting the deficit and promoting trade and innovation.

As regards the solution of the Eurozone crisis, solidarity is needed between members of the Eurozone, which is also the key to the restoration of confidence.

Regarding other European issues, unlike Sarkozy, Hollande does not exploit either the situation of Greece or those of other “weak” members to boast the “acceptable” economic performance of his country (see section 7.5). Argumentation regarding the situation in Greece resembles Sarkozy’s, as it generally boils down to underlining EU’s efforts in supporting Greece and the need for the Greeks to respect their commitments.

**FR_55**: Les Grecs sont souverains, ce sont eux qui doivent décider et nous devons les respecter. Ils ont fait des efforts considérables depuis plusieurs mois pour se mettre au niveau de ce qui était demandé, compte tenu de ce qui avait été hélas laissé par des gouvernements. Et aujourd’hui ils doivent réaffirmer leur attachement à l’euro et à des engagements. Mais je le dis aussi : l’Europe doit faire son devoir en termes de croissance par rapport à la Grèce. Et j’ai plaidé, je pense que là-dessus nous pouvons nous retrouver aussi, pour que des fonds structurels puissent être apportés rapidement à la Grèce, de façon à ce qu’elle puisse elle aussi avoir des retombées de croissance. Nous avons confiance dans le peuple grec, le peuple grec doit avoir confiance dans les Européens mais en même temps chacun doit respecter ses engagements.

**FR_56**: Des messages ont été envoyés de part et d’autre : volonté des Grecs de rester dans la zone euro et de respecter les engagements ; volonté des Européens, en tout cas la mienne, de pouvoir accompagner la Grèce.

**FR_76**: Mais je suis ici comme président d’un pays qui a voulu que la Grèce reste dans la zone euro. Depuis mon élection, je n’ai cessé de convaincre les partenaires européens que
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c’était l’intérêt de l’Europe que la Grèce reste dans la zone euro. C’était bien sûr l’intérêt de la Grèce, mais ça, c’était aux Grecs de se déterminer. Mais notre intérêt était de démontrer que nous avions besoin d’une zone euro stable et cohérente, qui puisse montrer sa capacité à réagir face aux marchés. La Grèce devait faire des efforts, elle devait prendre des engagements. Les efforts ont été considérables. Le Premier ministre rappelait que la Grèce vivait sa sixième année de récession, que le chômage dépassait 27 % de la population active, près de 60 % chez les jeunes. Aucun peuple en Europe n’a subi une telle épreuve. Alors, nous devions être aux côtés de la Grèce.

Sarkozy’s and Hollande’s arguments also “converge” when it comes to Germany. As in the speeches of the former president, Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle are frequently mentioned to retrace the twentieth-century history of France and Germany. Moreover, Angela Merkel is continuously referred to as the ideal supporter of the French government in the struggle for the solution of the Eurozone crisis.


FR_63: Ce traité, c’était la volonté de deux hommes, qui avaient connu, l’un et l’autre, la guerre et l’avaient faite et qui voulaient établir la paix, la paix non pas pour leur génération, la paix pour toujours entre nos deux Nations. Ces deux hommes s’appelaient Konrad Adenauer et Charles de Gaulle. […] L’urgence, aujourd’hui, c’est de créer les conditions de la croissance, de mieux contrôler la finance, de renforcer la zone euro, d’installer une nouvelle gouvernance de l’Europe. C’est ce à quoi nous travaillons ensemble, France et Allemagne. Et aujourd’hui, avec Angela Merkel, nous agissons pour le changement qui est attendu. Pour vaincre la crise, il nous faut voir plus loin qu’elle, être capable déjà d’être dans l’après. Et, le moment est venu, d’approfondir notre relation France-Allemagne, afin de permettre à l’Europe de disposer d’institutions et de processus de décision politique conformes aux exigences économiques et sociales. […] Vous, jeunes allemands, vous êtes les enfants d’un grand pays, plus grand encore que celui que visitait le général de Gaulle, il y a cinquante ans, puisque les murs sont tombés. Construisez donc l’Europe à votre image, jeunes allemands, jeunes français. Une Europe exigeante, une Europe morale, une Europe généreuse, une Europe ouverte ! Poursuivez le rêve européen, celui qui a été esquissé par les pères fondateurs, ce rêve que faisaient, ici même, il y a cinquante ans, ensemble, les yeux ouverts, le chancelier Adenauer et le général de Gaulle.

FR_83: L’idée européenne exige le mouvement. Si l’Europe n’avance pas, elle tombe ou plutôt elle s’efface ; elle s’efface de la carte du monde, elle s’efface même de l’imaginaire des peuples. Il est donc plus que temps de porter cette nouvelle ambition. L’Allemagne, plusieurs fois, a dit qu’elle était prête à une Union politique, à une nouvelle étape d’intégration. La France est également disposée à donner un contenu à cette Union politique.

FR_88: Ce qui d’ailleurs explique que nous aurons le 3 juillet à Berlin, à l’initiative de Mme Angela Merkel, nous en avions convenu lors de sa venue à Paris, une évaluation de toutes les pratiques en matière d’emploi, et notamment d’emploi des jeunes de façon à ce que les dispositifs nationaux puissent être d’abord inspirés de ce qui marche dans les pays
Européens et, deuxièmement, puissent être complétés par ce que l’on vient de décider, au plan européen, notamment la garantie jeunees.

**FR_99:** Et dès mercredi, j’aurai l’occasion d’en parler avec madame Merkel, puisque nous faisons une réunion commune de nos deux gouvernements.

France and Germany are the harbingers of the European dream, threatened by today’s scepticism. But France and Germany have an advantage with respect to other countries: history. After years of war, the two countries have been inextricably tied by a shared European project of peace and prosperity, that cannot be dissolved even by the recession. In other words, the above examples show that Hollande’s argumentation also aims at the “resserrement sur le pilier franco-allemand” (Mayaffre 2012: 55) by hinging on a slightly different version of the argument from Franco-German cooperation.

**ARGUMENT FROM FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION**

*Premise 1:* The Eurozone crisis is essentially a crisis of confidence.

*Premise 2:* Against the lasting nature of the Eurozone crisis, the diffidence brought about by unemployment has rapidly become Euroscepticism and nurtured protectionist stances.

*Premise 3:* Euroscepticism and protectionism jeopardise the EU project.

*Premise 4:* The European project requires time and patience, and the crisis does not mark the end of the European project.

*Premise 5:* Germany and France are the harbingers of the European project, which is a dream of peace and prosperity launched, among others, by Adenauer and de Gaulle.

*Premise 6:* Franco-German cooperation is constant, and contributes almost daily to the solution of Eurozone problems.

**Conclusion:** Therefore, France and Germany will keep cooperating to keep our shared European dream alive.

As regards more practical steps to tackle the Eurozone crisis, Hollande’s discourse is more detailed than Sarkozy’s, in that the speaker continuously deals with the “Union bancaire” (forty-seven occurrences in Hollande’s speeches against zero in Sarkozy’s). The gap comes as no surprise as discussions about the Banking Union started in 2012. However, the difference also bears witness to the fact that Hollande’s argumentation focuses more on measures than on values, whereas Sarkozy’s was primarily concerned with the explanation of the macro-economic causes of the Eurozone crisis.

The initiatives taken to pursue the Banking Union include “stronger prudential requirements for banks, improved depositor protection and rules for managing failing banks” and “form a single rulebook for all financial actors in the twenty-eight Member States of the European Union”10. Basically, the Banking union aims at tackling the financial causes of crisis by transferring responsibility for banking policy from the national to the EU level in several countries of the European Union. It promotes a deeper integration of the banking system for Eurozone countries by establishing a *Single Supervisory Mechanism* and a *Single Resolution Mechanism*, in the attempt “to create a safer and sounder financial

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sector for the single market."\(^\text{11}\) The Banking union is, thus, composed of two phases preventing national governments from the need to intervene when banks fail: the supervision of banks and their restructuring following funding arrangements, which include possible recapitalisation by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). In a nutshell, the verb to recapitalise denotes the act of providing a bank with more capital. However, recapitalisation is actually a complex concept, two definitions of which are provided below:

\[
\text{RECAPITALISE: provide (a business) with more capital, especially by replacing debt with stock.}\(^\text{12}\)
\]

\[
\text{RECAPITALISATION: Restructuring a company’s debt and equity mixture, most often with the aim of making a company’s capital structure more stable. Essentially, the process involves the exchange of one form of financing for another, such as removing preferred shares from the company’s capital structure and replacing them with bonds.}\(^\text{13}\)
\]

However complex, though, the concept is never expounded in detail by François Hollande. Supervision, restructuring and recapitalisation are “simply” said to be the keys to the lasting solution of the crisis and the prerequisites for building a stronger European Union. The supervision and resolution mechanisms are referred to as “mécénisme de supervision” and “mécénisme de résolution”\(^\text{14}\), with the former being the prerequisite of the latter.

\[
\text{FR}_\text{72}: \text{Avec ce qui est prévu aujourd’hui et qui va se structurer pour l’année qui vient, plus aucun État n’aura à intervenir dans une crise bancaire, dès lors que cette crise aura été prévenue à travers la supervision et même résolue sans qu’il soit fait appel à une contribution des États, c’est-à-dire du contribuable. C’est donc, je crois, pour beaucoup d’Européens un soulagement que de savoir que les crises peuvent être maintenant endiguées, empêchées et que même si elles devaient survenir au sein d’un établissement bancaire, il ne serait plus fait appel à la contribution des États.}
\]

\[
\text{FR}_\text{74}: \text{Enfin, les principes d’une Union bancaire, ont été définis pour prévenir les dérives d’un système financier, et là encore ce sera un enjeu considérable, la supervision bancaire, un mécanisme de résolutions et des épargnants mieux protégés par une garantie de dépôt.}
\]

\[
\text{FR}_\text{89}: \text{Quel est ce mécanisme ? C’est ce que l’on appelle les modalités de la supervision. Deux préalables doivent être posés. Le premier, c’est l’évaluation d’un bilan des banques. Et c’est la mise en place, dans chaque État, de filets de sécurité. Le Conseil européen vient de se prononcer là-dessus et tout sera donc prêt au milieu de l’année 2014 pour que rentre en vigueur ce mécanisme de supervision. La dernière étape, c’est la résolution. Une fois que l’on a surveillé, une fois que l’on a mis en place un mécanisme, le même partout sur la zone européenne considérée, faut-il encore qu’il y ait possibilité de régler les crises bancaires.}
\]

\(^{11}\) Ibid.


\(^{14}\) Only once is the Single Resolution Mechanism named “mécénisme de résolutment” (FR_101).
Reference to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is sometimes also made, as it is “the permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro area”\footnote{European Stability Mechanism, http://www.esm.europa.eu/, last accessed on 28\textsuperscript{th} February 2015.}, the intergovernmental organisation which actually recapitalises banks.

**FR_89:** Premier point, la recapitalisation des banques par le mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES) a été rendu possible, dès cette semaine, par l’accord des ministres de l’Économie et des Finances. Cela, c’est pour l’urgence. Mais la supervision unique – c’est-à-dire que sur le même ensemble, il y ait une autorité qui puisse surveiller et contrôler les banques autour de la Banque centrale européenne – cela, c’est maintenant engagé.

**FR_93:** Donc, nous voulons, la France et l’Espagne, que l’ensemble des procédures permettant la supervision, c’est fait, mais la résolution des crises puisse être adoptée au Conseil européen de décembre. Ce qui veut dire deux choses, un mécanisme européen de résolution des banques défaillantes et la recapitalisation directe des banques par le mécanisme européen de stabilité. […] Cela suppose qu’il y ait des actions au niveau de l’Europe. Nous y travaillons. Jamais il n’y aura eu autant de mécanismes de stabilité et donc de solidarité.

As regards interpreting, the examples show that specific names of EU mechanisms are likely to “show up” in Hollande’s speeches and thus require attention. Argumentation in favour of the Banking union is a cornerstone of Hollande’s European speeches which cannot be neglected. However, not all mechanisms are always mentioned; in particular, Hollande’s discourse often boils down to the claim that, thanks to the Banking union, European banks will undergo supervision, restructuring and recapitalisation. More often, the Banking union is merely said to provide the EU with the opportunities to supervise banks and intervene when necessary. In most cases, however, argumentation basically revolves around the claim that the Banking Union will make the EU more stable, will protect those who save their money in banks and will play an instrumental role in preventing a similar crisis from happening again.

**FR_59:** D’accord pour qu’il y ait une union bancaire à condition qu’il y ait une supervision et donc une capacité pour l’Europe de surveiller et d’intervenir pour protéger les épargnants.

**FR_68:** La deuxième étape s’est jouée le 18 octobre dernier où nous avons décidé l’Union bancaire, c’est-à-dire la supervision bancaire et le principe d’une recapitalisation directe des banques.

**FR_71:** La supervision bancaire, c’est d’abord la Banque centrale qui se voit confier cette responsabilité. Elle aura autorité sur l’ensemble des banques de la zone euro même si, pour ce qu’on appelle les banques de taille modeste, le superviseur national jouera le rôle de premier vérificateur, sous le contrôle de la banque centrale européenne. […] Le deuxième étage de l’union bancaire, c’est la recapitalisation directe des banques. C’était déjà prévu au sommet européen du mois de juin et c’est maintenant précisée, quant au calendrier, puisqu’au premier semestre 2013 la recapitalisation pourra, sous certaines conditions, intervenir.
**FR_89:** L’Union bancaire, cela peut paraître compliqué – cela l’est d’ailleurs – mais de quoi s’agit-il ? Il s’agit de prévenir les crises qui ont provoqué la récession que nous connaissons aujourd’hui. Il s’agit d’éviter des défaillances bancaires qui pourraient coûter cher aux épargnants et aux contribuables. Il s’agit d’avoir des instruments et des procédures qui permettent à l’Union européenne mais surtout dans la zone euro, d’avoir une surveillance – ce que l’on appelle la supervision – et la capacité d’intervention. Enfin, le dernier objectif, c’est d’éviter que des États puissent être emportés, comme cela l’a été dans un passé récent, par des défaillances bancaires.

**FR_92:** Le premier [objectif], c’est de poursuivre et d’achever l’Union bancaire. Je ne veux pas rentrer dans les détails, dans les procédures, dans les mécanismes qui, d’ailleurs, sont souvent incompréhensibles – je ne veux pas dire pour les gouvernants, je leur fais ce crédit - mais sont néanmoins des mécanismes essentiels. […] L’Union bancaire, ce n’est rien d’autre que la capacité sera donnée à la zone euro et à l’Union européenne d’éviter, de prévenir, d’empêcher et même de régler toute difficulté qui pourrait se poser sur la question des banques et du crédit. Si nous régions l’Union bancaire, nous en terminerions non seulement avec la crise qui vient de se produire, mais nous donnons des armes à la zone euro pour empêcher sa reproduction. C’est un acte majeur et nous devons aller jusqu’au bout. La position que nous prenons, la France et l’Italie, c’est d’aller jusqu’au bout de l’Union bancaire, bien sûr, avec nos partenaires.

**FR_96:** Dans quelques jours, il y aura un Conseil européen qui va parapher, sceller ce que l’on appelle l’Union bancaire, c’est-à-dire que ce qui a été la cause de la crise. Le comportement des banques et de certains établissements, va être prévu, guéri, traité, résolu, grâce à cette Union bancaire qui s’ajoutera d’ailleurs à l’Union monétaire, à l’Union budgétaire, pour permettre à la zone euro d’être plus solide.

**FR_101:** Pour l’Union bancaire, c’est souvenez-vous au mois de juin de l’année 2012 qu’avaient été posés les principes de cette Union bancaire. Deux ans après nous avons trouvé le compromis indispensable, pas simplement entre les chefs d’État et de gouvernement, pour le mécanisme de résolution, mais également avec le Parlement européen. C’est le signe le plus évident que non seulement nous sommes sortis de la crise de la zone euro, de ce qu’on avait appelé « la crise de la zone euro », mais que nous avons en plus introduit les dispositifs qui permettront de ne pas connaître – en tout cas pas avec la même ampleur – les turbulences qui ont frappé l’Europe ces dernières années.

By highlighting recurring lexical and expressive choices, the above excerpts provide an overview of the discursive implementation of a key argument of Hollande’s rhetoric, the argument for the Banking union.

**ARGUMENT FOR THE BANKING UNION**

*Premise 1:* The economic crisis was triggered by financial speculation.

*Premise 2:* The Eurozone crisis will last long and is severe also because it is fuelling Euroscepticism.

*Premise 3:* The causes of the crisis must be tackled to dispel doubts and diffidence about the EU project and to achieve stable and durable recovery.

*Premise 4:* The Banking union is a major EU response to the Eurozone crisis.

*Premise 5:* The Banking union promotes a deeper integration of the banking system for Eurozone countries by establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism, which enable supervision, restructuring and recapitalisation of
banks through the European Stability Mechanism. In simple terms, it provides the EU with the opportunities for supervision and intervention.

Premise 6: The Banking union will make the EU more stable, will protect EU citizens’ savings and will play an instrumental role in preventing a similar crisis from happening again.

Conclusion: This is why we are working relentlessly for the implementation of the Banking union.

Together with the argument from tackling Euroscepticism and protectionism and the argument from Franco-German cooperation, the argument for the Banking union is the pivotal European argument related to the topic of the economic crisis in Hollande’s speeches. As regards other European and, particularly, “international” arguments, some comments are in order.

As with the other speeches in ARGO, the argument from mutual interest in unilateral distress is not neglected.

FR_95: Trop souvent, nous avons le regard tourné vers le passé et parfois la compassion. Nous regardons l’Afrique comme si elle était le continent souffrant. Nous ne voyons pas encore que l’Afrique est le continent de demain, le continent d’avenir et qu’il y a là une opportunité : d’abord pour les Africains de marquer encore davantage leur affirmation, leur volonté, leurs capacités ; mais une opportunité aussi pour les grands pays industrialisés de venir investir en Afrique.

FR_102: Nous avons enfin abordé la question de l’Afrique, puisqu’il y a, les 2 et 3 avril, le Sommet entre l’Union européenne et l’Afrique à un moment important où les yeux s’ouvrent sur ce qu’est l’Afrique. Bien sûr, nous parlons beaucoup des questions de sécurité, de terrorisme, parfois sur des réalités humanitaires qui sont particulièrement bouleversantes. Chacun les a à l’esprit. Mais l’Afrique, c’est un continent d’avenir. L’Afrique, c’est un enjeu de développement économique pour elle-même mais aussi pour l’Europe. C’est pourquoi des pays qui jusqu’à présent n’avaient pas les yeux tournés vers l’Afrique commencent à regarder vers elle. La France veut montrer aussi qu’elle a une politique africaine qui n’est pas simplement pour elle-même, mais dans la volonté d’associer l’Europe à cet enjeu-là.

Hollande’s speeches, thus, corroborate the hypothesis that promotion of Africa as the land of opportunity for bilateral economic development is a permanent feature of political communication, irrespective of the policies actually implemented by speakers. In this respect, analysis of ARGO indicates that, in general, the striking differences in speakers’ argumentative choices tend to even out in international settings, which demand the adoption of “ready-made” and less distinctive arguments. Yet, differences with respect to Cameron’s and Sarkozy’s content-related arguments (see sections 6.4 and 7.5) can be detected anyhow, as Hollande’s argument rests on slightly different premises.

ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS (“ARGUMENT PRO-AFRICA”)

Premise 1: Africa is in distress.

Premise 2: However, Africa is the continent of the future and provides an opportunity to European countries.
Premise 3: If France/Europe cooperates with Africa and invests there, it will relieve or help to relieve Africa’s distress, simultaneously benefiting from providing help.

Conclusion: Therefore, France/Europe must invest in Africa.

Despite the relatively “codified” nature of international arguments throughout the whole corpus, a peculiarity stands out in Hollande’s texts. With respect to the addresses delivered by Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy, Hollande’s European and international speeches see a significant increase in the presence of interdiscursive relations which do not pertain to the topic of the crisis. In simple terms, Hollande seems to be accustomed to digressions. The most recurrent include references to the Northern Mali conflict, the Syrian Civil War and the Ukrainian Crisis.

FR_55: J’ai voulu, avec le ministre des affaires étrangères, également évoquer avec le Président Monti la grave question de la Syrie. La France est mobilisée et elle le restera, par rapport à une situation qui est inacceptable et qui s’aggrave de jour en jour.

FR_60: Sur la Syrie, nous sommes l’un et l’autre, mais heureusement que nous ne sommes pas que l’un et l’autre, convaincus de cette nécessité, nous sommes convaincus que Bachar el-Assad doit partir pour qu’il y ait une solution politique en Syrie et pour cela la formation d’un gouvernement alternatif, d’un gouvernement provisoire est la condition. Ce n’est pas la seule. Il faut qu’il y ait une bonne compréhension des pays, qui aujourd’hui n’en sont pas encore convaincus, je parle de la Russie et de la Chine.

FR_70: De la même manière sur la Syrie, sur la Somalie et le Mali, nous avons adopté des positions communes.

FR_74: C’est la raison pour laquelle j’ai décidé au nom de la France d’intervenir au Mali. J’ai pris cette décision dans le cadre du droit international. Il n’y avait pas de temps à perdre ou plus exactement si nous avions laissé le temps, c’était celui du terrorisme qui aurait à ce moment-là conquis l’ensemble du Mali. Je l’ai fait, ce choix, au nom de la France, parce que c’était notre responsabilité. […] J’assure ici, le Mali retrouvera son intégrité territoriale, le moment est proche. Viendra le temps politique, celui du dialogue, de la réconciliation, de la stabilité dans ce pays et dans cette région de l’Afrique de l’ouest, le temps du développement et ce temps-là doit être celui des organisations africaines, elles y sont prêtes, elles sont déjà présentes sur place.

FR_90: Et même, le G20 aura été utile pour rassembler des pays par rapport à la situation en Syrie et la France y aura contribué, à sa place, aussi bien pour les questions économiques que pour la question syrienne.

FR_97: Intense, parce que la France a pris ses responsabilités lors de graves crises internationales : le Mali, la Syrie, la Centrafrique encore tout récemment. Intense, parce que l’Europe a réussi, enfin, à surmonter la tourmente financière qu’elle traversait depuis 2008.

FR_102: L’Europe souhaite par ailleurs être utile et ouvrir une possibilité de dialogue, de discussion, de négociation pour qu’il puisse y avoir une désescalade en Ukraine.
On the one hand, these interdiscursive relations appear to be a “duty”, as they reflect the speaker’s willingness not to overlook major crisis-unrelated issues even in speeches whose topical focus is the economy. Indeed, digressions are not spurned by the other corpus speakers either, but they are pervasive in Hollande’s speeches. In this respect, their recurrence could also be interpreted as a symptom of the fact that the crisis is gradually becoming less newsworthy.

8.6 Interpreting Problems

The previous sections provide an overview of the most recurrent arguments put forward by François Hollande in relation to the economic crisis. As regards chiefly formal hindrances posed to interpretation, the president’s “Sarkozyist” recourse to anaphora has already been highlighted in section 8.1. However, the major formal problem appears to be determined by Hollande’s recurrent use of parenthetical clauses.

FR_54: Et dans tous les lycées de France, il y aura une partie des élèves – ceux qui auront fait l’effort d’être les meilleurs – qui pourront aller vers les établissements d’enseignement supérieur de grande qualité. […] J’étais très frappé – je sais qu’ici, il y a plusieurs représentants des outre-mer – par la gravité de la situation, notamment de la jeunesse, en outre-mer, du chômage, de la difficulté d’avoir là encore des investissements durables compte tenu de l’extrême volatilité des règles fiscales ou des règles administratives où, à chaque fois, les conditions changent.

FR_65: L’essentiel – et c’est pourquoi je tenais à m’adresser à vous – est que la fiscalité soit stabilisée durant les cinq prochaines années et que vous puissiez faire vos choix d’investissement en toute connaissance de cause et quelles que soient les difficultés conjoncturelles ou budgétaires que pourrait rencontrer l’État.

Running into parenthetical clauses is not problematic in itself, but becomes so when rush in translating the speaker’s message as soon as it is delivered significantly increases the risk of false starts. In the light of which, a useful strategy lies in refraining from “translation haste” when the speaker starts uttering a sentence. Increasing décalage and waiting for the speaker to produce “manageable chunks” before starting translation might turn out to be a strategic choice because, in most cases, the information conveyed by parenthetical clauses is more easily transferred to the beginning or to the end of the utterance. In this regard, examples of possible ways to deal with Hollande’s parenthetical clauses are shown below.
The Prime Minister will also be in charge of a policy that will prioritise housing and will require us to find financing tools such as saving funds.

In the light of the challenges posed by competitiveness, unemployment and the restoration of our public finances too, this period requires new and decisive responses.

Starting from which, we will have to think together about the best way to find alternative resources to streamline productivity and to reduce pollution. This is an issue for the social conference and the environmental conference alike.

I have dealt with costs, with financing, what this public bank has to be about, I have addressed taxation and competitiveness. But the competitiveness of the French economy is also about preparing our future, organising the industry sector, earmarking funds to the markets of the future.

Your report that will shortly be published shows that this situation is due to certain policies or, rather, to the absence of policies which has characterised the past decade.
FR_72: Enfin la dernière question qui devait être traitée à ce Conseil – et cela a été une bonne partie des débats de ce matin – c’est la Syrie.

STRATEGIC INTERPRETATION OF PARENTHETICAL CLAUSES

The last issue that had to be discussed in this Council is Syria, and the topic has absorbed a great deal of this morning’s debate.

The strategy would prove crucial especially when translating from a source language pertaining to the same group as the target language, e.g. from French into Italian, when the risk of chasing after the speaker is greater and might lead interpreters to produce irritating false starts and “waste” precious time in trying to reformulate the sentence.

Certainly, the adoption of this strategy does not pave the way for argumentative equivalence, as the previous sections have clarified that the production of argumentatively faithful versions of Hollande’s texts rests upon the interpreter’s ability to recognise and reproduce specific content-related arguments. However, since parenthetical clauses are recurrent in Hollande’s texts and frequently jeopardise the production of clear and concise sentences, getting used to applying this strategy could turn out to be instrumental in determining the overall usability (Viezzi 2013: 385) of interpreted texts.
Chapter 9

CONCLUSIONS

In chapter 1, the rationale of the PhD research project has been outlined. Particularly, the claim has been put forward that thorough recognition and reproduction of the speaker’s convictions do not stem from cooperation between the speaker and the interpreter, but depend on the targeted study of contextually-compatible source texts and the resulting internalisation of pivotal discourse patterns before the interpretation. Chapter 2, framing the PhD study, offers theoretical and empirical evidence of the detrimental consequences of interpreting in the “pragmatic dark” (Viaggio 2002: 229). In particular, chapter 3 addresses the fact that a number of pragmatic problems leading to the production of inadequate and inaccurate interpreted texts is ascribable to the marked neglect of argumentation concepts in interpreting studies. In the second part of chapter 3, the methodology adopted to analyse argumentation in political STs has been outlined, while the reference corpus has been described in chapter 4.

Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 make up the most substantial part of the thesis, in that they outline the findings of the argumentative analysis of the corpus. Analysis of ARGO shows that argumentation regarding the economic crisis is, first and foremost, governed by certain crucial arguments put forward throughout the whole corpus. High on the list is the prototypical crisis-related argument, by means of which speakers claim that their policies are instrumental in solving the crisis. Though the corpus speakers rely on it to differing extents, political argumentation aiming at gaining consensus for economic policies in times of crisis seems to revolve around this basic and simple scheme, irrespective of the speaker in question.

PROTOTYPICAL CRISIS-RELATED ARGUMENT (MEANS-END)
Premise 1: We must solve/come out of the crisis.
Premise 2: I claim that act x will help us solve/come out of the crisis.
Conclusion: Therefore, we should implement act x.

In this respect, the scheme appears to be topic-related and intrinsic to political communication alike, as all politicians’ attempts at solving “problems” can be expected to hinge on a simple overarching claim that can be summarised in the sentence “There is a problem, I am the only one who can solve it by means of specific policies”. Regarding which, the straw man argument, serving the purpose of discrediting political opponents without actually naming them, is also recurrent in the corpus and can thus be expected to be typical not only of crisis discourse but of political communication in general.

STRAW MAN ARGUMENT
Premise 1: They say x, but x is implausible.
Premise 2: I oppose x.
Conclusion: Therefore, they are wrong and I am right.
The topic of the economic crisis also proves to hinge on the *topos of the irreparable*. Most speeches in *ARGO* start with a gloomy atmosphere that speakers generally conjure up by elucidating, to the benefit of the audience, the daunting origins of the predicament. Shedding light on the detrimental causes of the crisis, thus, appears a duty, as the economic recession the world has witnessed over the last few years is *unprecedented* or, rather, *exceptional* to such an extent that it can only be compared to the Great Depression. The *argument by analogy*, enabling speakers to describe today’s unfathomable downturn by comparison with the notorious crisis of the Thirties, is another cornerstone of crisis discourse. More precisely, argumentation regarding the economic crisis also builds on the *topos of history*, enabling speakers to claim that lessons have been learnt or must be learnt from the past. Unlike more specific crisis-related arguments, the *topos of history* can be said to be intrinsic to political communication: rhetorical analysis of Margaret Thatcher’s speeches during the Falklands War, resulting in this author’s MA thesis (Brambilla 2011), has shown that the Iron Lady habitually made reference to Winston Churchill’s pro-war rhetoric to justify “a struggle so far from home for a leftover of empire” (Hastings & Jenkins 1983: 315).

We have *learned* something about ourselves - a lesson which we desperately needed to learn. [...] The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our *history*. [...] If the lessons of the South Atlantic are to be *learned*, then they have to be *learned* by us all. [...] Thirty-six years on, perhaps we are beginning to *relearn* the truth which Churchill so clearly taught us.¹

Other crucial arguments that can be expected to be put forward by any speaker in any communicative context in which any topic is discussed are the *argument from negative consequences of inaction* and the *argument from positive consequences of political action*. They are recurrently put forward in relation to the solution of crisis, which depends on action, as doing nothing would significantly worsen the effects of the predicament thereby leading to a severe recession.

ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE)
*Premise*: If the crisis is not opposed, it will plunge the country/the world into a deep recession.
*Conclusion*: Therefore, political intervention is needed.

ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTION
*Premise*: If action x is brought about, it will contribute to containing the crisis.
*Conclusion*: Therefore, action x must be brought about.

These two basic arguments also imply the *topos of bold action* and the *topos of urgency*, as politicians cannot promote *slow* action or inaction if they wish to present

themselves as valiant leaders at a severe moment for any country in the world. In other words, most participants in political communicative events, including secondary and tertiary audiences (see tables 2.4 and 2.5), have first-hand experience of the crisis and wait-and-see policies would be perceived as a lengthening of sufferings. The *topoi* of bold action and urgency cannot be said, though, to be exclusively crisis-related arguments. Drawing again on Margaret Thatcher’s speeches, they rather appear to be two cornerstones of political communication.

The battle of the Falklands was a remarkable military operation, *boldly* planned, *bravely* executed, and brilliantly accomplished.\(^2\)

It is the desire of everyone in the House that *the action* should be as *swift* and successful as possible.\(^3\)

Despite being a serious predicament, the crisis is, though, not only addressed *negatively*, i.e. by focusing on its negative implications. In this respect, the *topos of crisis as a challenge* and the *topos of crisis as an opportunity* are two recurring, comprehensive and pivotal arguments, which enable speakers to present themselves in a favourable position by proposing political solutions to what had been previously described as *irreparable*. The stimulating nature of the crisis, thus, constitutes the turning point of most speeches and gives rise to further recurrent arguments. Broadly, speakers claim that the crisis will be solved through deficit reduction and, especially, political reforms aiming at promoting education, research, innovation, private-sectors jobs and sustainable development, which will eventually enable the country in question to “perform well” in the highly competitive environment of the twenty-first century. The macro-topic of the economic crisis thus gives rise to a variety of related arguments, such as the *argument for education* and the *argument for innovation*, which establish fundamental interdiscursive relations that appear to lie at the heart of argumentation regarding the crisis.

The findings of the analysis show that these are the mainstream arguments put forward by speakers in relation to the topic in question. However, this general account does not raise substantial text expectations in interpreters’ minds, as it is not enough to provide a faithful and exhaustive overview of the argumentative specificities found in *ARGO* texts. Indeed, chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 have shown that, however pivotal and recurring, the above arguments are actually implemented in extremely different ways by the corpus speakers. For instance, the *prototypical crisis-related argument* is less pervasive in Sarkozy’s speeches, in which the need to claim the instrumental role of government policies is limited by the speaker’s willingness to promote a specific ideology, argue about values, deal with macro-economic issues and foster a specific *Weltanschauung*. However recurrent in Hollande’s speeches, the *topos of bold action* and the *topos of urgency* are “balanced” by


reiterated appeals to *patience*, i.e. the prerequisite of social dialogue and the “social conference”. The French President also distinguishes himself from other speakers in that he refrains from resorting to the *argument by analogy* and the *topos of history* to compare the present crisis to past predicaments. Moreover, though the *topos of history* shows through the speeches of Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy, the former French president is the only one who deals explicitly with the *lessons* that have been or need to be learnt, whereas the conclusion of the argument is systematically left implicit by the American President and the British Prime Minister. As regards the *straw man argument*, it is admittedly present in all sub-corpora, but it is also true that it is decisively more recurrent in Cameron’s and Sarkozy’s speeches, as the two speakers appear to “need it”, respectively, to blame Labour for bequeathing a disastrous deficit and to corroborate the need to embrace a specific interventionist ideology.

In other words, analysis of *ARGO* shows that Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy and Hollande deal with the topic of the economic crisis in extremely different ways, thereby calling for different priorities during interpretation. In other words, as argumentation changes in STs, different *schemata* (Riccardi 1998: 173) need to be activated according to the speaker, the topic and the communicative context in question. This conclusion not only stems from the above comments regarding the main crisis-related or primarily “political” arguments, but is corroborated by the fact that all speakers adopt other *specific* arguments which reflect their *specific convictions*. In the following sections, the most frequently recurring arguments put forward by the four politicians will be presented following the model of table 3.7 (see section 3.6), to provide an overview of the striking differences between the sub-corpora of *ARGO*.

### 9.1 Obama

Obama’s speeches appear to be the least specialist within the whole of *ARGO*. For instance, arguments concerning the deficit crisis are sporadically put forward and the topic is always addressed in a very simple fashion. Moreover, Obama’s discourse is not strewn with numbers and detailed plans to balance the books; rather, his argumentation appears to be governed by an overarching macro-argument, i.e. the *argument from middle class distress*. The major aim of Obama’s policies is to rescue “American families” from the financial troubles engendered by the crisis for which they cannot be blamed. The American middle class is the herald of the American values of responsibility, hard work, solidarity and compassion. These universally “good values” are opposed to the “bad values” of irresponsibility, speculation and selfishness that have led to today’s crisis. The American middle class is, thus, the target of Obama’s policies in that it is nothing but the solution of the crisis itself: by fostering education to nurture the ingenuity of future businessmen, by promoting innovative jobs for hard-working Americans and by exclusively rewarding the responsible, not only will America solve the crisis, but it will emerge from the recession “stronger than before”.
The main interpreting problem in Obama’s speeches seems to be posed by the fact that, in line with his focus on the middle class, the American President recurrently tells vivid stories of American people to shed light on their resilience in front of the crisis and, by implication, highlight core American values which serve as premises of argumentation. Anecdotal arguments are, thus, the hinge of the pragmatic force of Obama’s speeches. Since both formal and pragmatic challenges are posed, suggestions for anticipating and interpreting anecdotal arguments have been outlined in section 5.2.5.

The following table summarises the main arguments of Obama’s speeches on the crisis, thereby shedding light on the argumentative orientation and lexico-syntagmatic specificities of the American President’s discourse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEAKER</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>MOST RECURRENT ARGUMENTS</th>
<th>ARGUMENT SCHEME / EXPLANATION</th>
<th>CRUCIAL COMMENTS AND LEXICO-SYNTAGMATIC INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>OBAMA’S ARGUMENT FROM VALUES</td>
<td>P.1: Speculation and irresponsibility have led to the crisis, which is not only an economic crisis but also a crisis of our common values. P.2: Coming out of the crisis is an imperative. C.: Therefore, we all have to give up speculation and irresponsibility and restore our values by acting with common sense and taking responsibility.</td>
<td>- Obama’s MACRO-ARGUMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LINCOLNIAN ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY</td>
<td>P.1: The economic crisis is an unprecedented downturn testing our ability to solve a dramatic problem. P.2: No ready-made solutions are available. C.: Therefore, new means have to be sought and adopted.</td>
<td>- Intertextual reference to a famous passage of Lincoln’s second State of the Union Address - symptom of Obama’s predilection for intertextual references to Abraham Lincoln (Foxlee 2009) - unprecedented crisis - change - new - nineteenth century - twentieth century - twenty-first century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY (TOPOS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION)</td>
<td>P.1: The 1929 economic crisis subsequently led to the Great Depression. P.2: Today’s crisis is like the 1929 crisis. C.: Therefore, we must contain the crisis to prevent our economy from being dragged into a second Great Depression.</td>
<td>- implies the ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION - 1929 crisis - Thirties - Great Depression - to prevent a second/another Great Depression - “NEGATION + crisis + happen again”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM CONTAGION OF SECTORS</td>
<td>P.1: The housing crisis has infected the financial sector.</td>
<td>- housing crisis - financial crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

| **PRIMARY-AUDIENCE ORIENTED ARGUMENT FROM GEOGRAPHICAL CONTAGION** |
|---|---|---|
| *P.1:* You see the effects of the crisis in your neighbourhood. | *P.2:* The same is happening in every American State, city and neighbourhood. | *C.:* Therefore, the crisis has spread all over the country and everybody has been hit. |

- **PRAGMATIC PURPOSE:** establishing contact with the primary audience and claiming that a problem shared is a problem halved
- **NEIGHBOURHOOD**
- **GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES** → translatable with “*Here in your city*”

| **ARGUMENT FROM MIDDLE-CLASS DISTRESS** |
|---|---|---|
| *P.1:* The middle class is in distress. | *P.2:* If the government implements act *x*, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress. | *C.:* Therefore, the government ought to implement act *x*. |

- **MIDDLE CLASS** = herald of American values and target of Obama’s policies (American Jobs Act, the Payroll Tax Cut and the Buffett Rule)
- **MIDDLE CLASS/MIDDLE-CLASS**
- **HOMEOWNERSHIP**
- **AMERICAN DREAM (TOPOS OF AMERICA LAND OF OPPORTUNITY)**

| **ARGUMENT FOR REWARD TO THE RESPONSIBLE AND HARDWORKING** |
|---|---|---|
| *P.1:* The crisis has been brought about by irresponsible and reckless speculators. | *P.2:* Irresponsibility is a negative value. | *P.3:* I am not committed to negative-value driven goals. | *C.:* Therefore, only the hardworking and the responsible will benefit from my policies. |

- **“PROTESTANT ARGUMENT”**
- **HARD WORK AS A DISTINCTIVELY AMERICAN VALUE**
- **RESPONSIBILITY/IRRESPONSIBILITY**
- **SPECULATION, SPECULATORS**
- **HARD WORK, HARDWORKING**
- **REWARD, REWARDED**
- **TO EARN**
- **FAIR (“FAIR SHOT”, “FAIR SHARE”)**
- **TO PLAY BY THE SAME (SET OF) RULES**

| **ARGUMENT FOR JOB CREATION** |
|---|---|---|
| *P.1:* A thriving, hardworking middle class is the engine of growth. | *P.2:* Growth has been put at risk by the crisis. | *C.:* Therefore, job creation is the key to the solution of the crisis and the creation of a sustainable economy. |

- **MIDDLE CLASS, MIDDLE-CLASS**
- **GROWTH**
- **“TO CREATE NEW JOBS”**

| **ARGUMENT FOR EDUCATION** |
|---|---|---|
| *P.1:* The crisis has hit major sectors of the economy and reduced the middle class. | *P.2:* America cannot compete in 21st century economy by means of an obsolete economic system. | *C.:* Therefore, education is a prerequisite to prepare our children for jobs of the future. |

- **EDUCATION** = recurrent interdiscursive reference
- **IMPLIES THE LINCOLNIAN ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY**
- **EDUCATION, RESEARCH, SCHOOLS, UNIVERSITIES**
- **TO REFORM THE EDUCATION/ECONOMIC SYSTEM**
- **INNOVATION**
- **MIDDLE-CLASS**
- **JOBS OF THE FUTURE**

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ARGUMENT FOR INNOVATION

**P.1:** The crisis has hit major sectors of the economy and shown America’s unpreparedness in competing in 21st century economy.

**P.2:** America is lagging behind and is gradually losing its economic supremacy.

**C:** Therefore, innovation is a prerequisite for overcoming the crisis, getting the jobs of the future and building a lasting economy.

- **innovation** = recurrent interdiscursive reference
- **ingenuity** as a distinctively American value
- implies the LINCOLNIAN ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY
- **innovation,** **ingenuity**
- **hard work**
- **jobs of the future**
- **last/sustainable economic recovery**

ARGUMENT FOR STRONG AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC RECOVERY

**P.1:** The crisis has shown the weaknesses of our economic system.

**P.2:** Never again should we let a similar crisis occur.

**C:** Therefore, we need to commit to an innovative, strong and lasting economy.

- “strong and sustainable/lasting economic recovery”
- “NEGATION + crisis + happen again”

O BAMA’S ARGUMENT FOR CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY (COMING OUT STRONGER)

**P.1:** America has always been the world’s largest economy.

**P.2:** The crisis has shown the weaknesses of our economy and endangered our supremacy.

**P.3:** Yet, it has also provided the opportunity to renew our economy.

C.: If we take this challenge, we will emerge from the crisis stronger than before.

- implies the TOPOS OF CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY and the TOPOS OF CRISIS AS A CHALLENGE
- **opportunity**
- **challenge**
- “to renew/to reform/to rebuild our economy”

ARGUMENT FOR OBAMACARE (HEALTH CARE REFORM)

**P.1:** Most working Americans receive health care insurance through their employers.

**P.2:** Unemployed Americans are, instead, generally uninsured.

**P.3:** Rising health care costs (Medicare and Medicaid) contribute to worsening the deficit predicament.

**P.4:** The crisis breeds unemployment and thus raises health care costs by leaving a lot of Americans uninsured.

**P.5:** Even though it constantly risks repeal, Obamacare expands coverage for the uninsured and reduces health care costs.

C.: Therefore, Obamacare must be implemented for the sake of American families and the country’s economy.

- **Obamacare or Affordable Care Act**
- **Medicare and Medicaid**
- health care, health care costs
  - employers
  - insured/uninsured
  - repealing
- middle-class/American families
  - sick, get sick
  - deficit
  - expand coverage

ARGUMENT FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION

**P.1:** Some say that my policies compound the deficit predicament.

**P.2:** They are wrong, as the deficit predicament is serious irrespective of the impact of government policies.

**P.3:** However substantial, the impact of government policies on the deficit is negligible, as they are part of a broader plan to solve the crisis.

**P.4:** Obamacare reduces health care costs, thereby contributing to solving the deficit crisis; moreover, the economy is growing again owing to government commitment to

- implies the STRAW MAN ARGUMENT, the ARGUMENT FOR INNOVATION, the ARGUMENT FOR JOB CREATION and the ARGUMENT FOR OBAMACARE
### Anecdotal Argument

- It does not rest on a specific content-related scheme
- *Inductive* argument resting on the formal scheme of the *Argument from the Group and Its Members* (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 322):
  
  **P.1:** Member M of the group G has the quality Q.
  
  **P.2:** If M has Q, G will have Q as well.
  
  **C.** G has Q.

### Argument for International Summit as Milestone in the Path Towards Global Economic Recovery

**P.1:** We are gathered here in another G8/G20 meeting.

**P.2:** Progress has been made in the implementation of policies aimed at solving the global crisis.

**C.** Therefore, like previous G8/G20 meetings, this summit marks another milestone in the path towards global economic recovery.

### Recurrent Terms and Expressions

- to prevent a second/another Great Depression
- to dig ourselves out of the economic hole / to lift ourselves out of this predicament
- to help families get into the middle class and stay in the middle class
- to get into the middle class/to lift people into the middle class/to work one’s way into the middle class/to step into the middle class/to earn one’s way into the middle class/to climb into the middle class/to provide ladders (of opportunity) into the middle class
- when/an economy where everybody gets a fair shot, everybody does their fair share, everybody plays by the same (set of) rules
  - to rack up bills/debt
  - to revamp the economy
- to put our people/Americans back to work
  - boom and bust / bubble and bust
  - bailout / to bail out (banks)
- *underwater* (especially “underwater families”)
- foreclosures, down payment, mortgage-backed securities
  - to refinance one’s loan/mortgage
- Wall Street – Main Street – Washington
- “teachers and firefighters and police officers/cops”

### Table 9.1 Obama’s Main Arguments
9.2 Cameron

Cameron’s speeches are substantially different from Obama’s. More emphasis is laid on the need to cut the deficit, pursued primarily through the reduction of public spending. Regarding the deficit crisis, unlike Obama, Cameron stresses the major responsibility of the former government in bequeathing a disastrous debt legacy. Over and above cutting public spending, the key to the solution of the crisis is also said to lie in spurring growth led by the private sector. In this regard, even though all speakers claim that growth and innovation are instrumental in bringing about a lasting solution to the crisis, the British Prime Minister’s speeches are the only ones characterised by a recurrent focus on the need for private-sector jobs as the prerequisite for rebalancing the economy, as the government promoted public-sector jobs for too long, thereby significantly worsening the deficit crisis. The opposition between private-sector jobs / public-sector jobs and the resulting need for balancing the economy run through the whole of the British sub-corpus. Emphasis on businesses, private-sector jobs and competition, exalted by the global race argument, is, however, counterbalanced by the Big Society Argument, whereby the newly-found Conservative commitment to social issues is constantly flaunted.

Deregulation and the struggle against protectionism with a view to opening up the economy are further cornerstones of Cameron’s argumentation, which revolves around crucial Doppelung-driven arguments in European settings and when dealing with the role of the United Kingdom within the EU and, especially, in relation to Eurozone countries.

Another crucial feature of the Prime Minister’s speeches is the pervasive presence of pragmatic arguments. The most challenging when it comes to interpreting Cameron’s speeches is the slippery slope argument, giving rise to fast and extremely demanding passages for tackling which suggestions are provided in chapter 6.

Table 9.2 provides an overview of David Cameron’s core arguments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEAKER</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOST RECURRENT ARGUMENTS</th>
<th>ARGUMENT SCHEME / EXPLANATION</th>
<th>CRUCIAL COMMENTS AND LEXICO-SYNTAGMATIC INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARGUMENT FROM DEFICIT INHERITANCE</td>
<td>P.1: The present coalition government has inherited a massive budget deficit. P.2: Cutting the deficit is a priority for restoring the economy. C.: Therefore, the task is not easy and will require time and sacrifice.</td>
<td>POLITICAL IMPLICATURE → allusion to the previous government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- to inherit</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- legacy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- massive deficit</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- mess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR CUTTING THE BUDGET DEFICIT THROUGH REDUCTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING</td>
<td>P.1: Cutting the deficit is the government’s priority, as it is essential to contain and solve the crisis. P.2: Even before the crisis, we were spending too much, which worsened our deficit crisis</td>
<td>- cutting spending = prerequisite of the solution of the crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- implies the ARGUMENT FROM DEFICIT INHERITANCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments</th>
<th>Key Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private-sector jobs are the engine of growth.</strong></td>
<td>- deficit / debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.1:</em> Private-sector jobs are the engine of growth.</td>
<td>- to cut public spending / spending cuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.2:</em> Growth has been put at risk by the crisis.</td>
<td>- Spending Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.3:</em> Moreover, private-sector jobs were overlooked by the previous</td>
<td>- growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government to the benefit of the public sector, which has further</td>
<td>- responsibility in public spending</td>
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<tr>
<td>jeopardised growth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>C.:</em> Therefore, balance between the private and the public sector has</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to be re-struck by spurring private-sector jobs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The crisis has jeopardised growth worldwide.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.1:</em> The crisis has jeopardised growth worldwide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.2:</em> The impact has been felt particularly in Britain, as growth was</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>already been affected by a dangerous imbalance between the public and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the private sectors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.3:</em> The crisis has shown the weaknesses of Britain’s economy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.4:</em> We must solve/come out of the crisis.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C.: Therefore, we must spur a strong and balanced economic growth to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lift Britain out of the crisis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Owing to the crisis and ill-judged policies implemented by the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>previous government, the private sector has shrunk to unsustainable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>levels.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.1:</em> Owing to the crisis and ill-judged policies implemented by the</td>
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<tr>
<td>previous government, the private sector has shrunk to unsustainable</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>levels.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.2:</em> Private-sector jobs are the engine of growth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.3:</em> The world economy has become extremely competitive and creativity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is required to get the jobs of the future.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.: Therefore, the government must spur innovative private-sector jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and get the jobs of the future.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excessive regulation has stifled British businesses for too long.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.1:</em> Excessive regulation has stifled British businesses for too long.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>P.2:</em> My government has committed to the “red tape challenge” since</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the beginning of my mandate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Excessive regulation has stifled British businesses for too long.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Excessive regulation has stifled British businesses for too long.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Excessive regulation has stifled British businesses for too long.</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Chapter 9 | Conclusions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT FOR LIBERALISATION AND STRUGGLE AGAINST PROTECTIONISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **P.1:** In times of crisis, protectionism is a constant threat.  
**P.2:** Protectionism is historically known to worsen economic recessions.  
**P.3:** Rather, trade liberalisation would bring invaluable benefits to the economy by spurring growth at national and international levels alike.  
**C:** Therefore, we must struggle against the slide towards protectionism and push for openness. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT FOR COMPLETION OF THE SINGLE MARKET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **P.1:** The Single Market remains incomplete.  
**P.2:** As a consequence, free trade is curbed and Britain and the EU find it harder to emerge from the crisis.  
**C:** Therefore, we must complete/open up the Single Market with a view to boosting growth. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE BIG SOCIETY ARGUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **P.1:** The aftermath of the economic crisis has been compounded by centralisation.  
**P.2:** The concentration of power in the public sector has produced an unsustainable debt.  
**P.3:** The man and woman in the street have relied on the government for too much, which has further inhibited growth.  
**P.4:** But the crisis has provided the opportunity for huge economic, social and cultural change.  
**P.5:** If the government cuts the deficit by simultaneously committing to the empowerment of civil society, not only will we emerge from the crisis (*economic recovery*), but we will also build a bigger and stronger society (*social recovery*), which will lead to stable and balanced recovery.  
**C:** This is why the government is committing to building the Big Society. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLOBAL RACE ARGUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **P.1:** The twenty-first century sees a world of unprecedented economic change which is characterised by a highly-competitive economic environment.  
**P.2:** The UK is running a global race for its - primarily used in national settings  
- marks a fundamental shift in Conservative discourse (≠ Thatcher)  
- commitment to building the Big Society promotes empowerment of citizens and rests on the PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY  
- implies the TOPOS OF MORAL DUTY TOWARDS POSTERITY  
- the Big Society  
- to redistribute / redistribution of power  
- balance  
- to empower / empowerment  
- change  
- opportunity  
- transparency  
- to build a bigger and stronger society  
- to rebalance the economy  
- “what really matters”  
- to introduce free schools and to expand academies  
- to modernise our public services |

- excessive regulation  
- red tape / “red tape challenge”  
- deregulation  
- “one-in, one-out” / “one-in, two-out” rule  
- slide to protectionism  
- trade barriers  
- beggar my neighbour policies  
- to break down trade barriers  
- to liberalise trade / trade liberalisation  
- to boost trade  
- (to push for) openness (on trade)  
- implies the TOPOS OF HISTORY  
→ reference to protectionist measures in the Thirties  
- the Single Market is incomplete  
- to complete/to open up the Single Market  
- to boost/to provide a boost to British/European/world growth  
- primarily used in national settings  
- implies the TOPOS OF BOLD ACTION and the ARGUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF PRIVATE-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.1: We are living in an interconnected world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.2: Crisis in one country affects all other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.3: Moreover, trade barriers prevent cooperation between our countries and further jeopardise growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.: Therefore, solving the crisis by opening up trade and enhancing cooperation is essential for the sake of the world economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTOR JOBS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- race for our economic future / for the jobs of the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to compete (aggressively) / competition / competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ambition / ambitious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- change / twenty-first century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- creative / innovative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- battle / to fight for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- speed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- quick/fast/rapid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- win/lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- keep up with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS (“ARGUMENT PRO-AFRICA”)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.1: Africa is in distress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.2: If Britain/Europe/international organisations expand free trade to Africa, they will relieve or help to relieve Africa’s distress, simultaneously benefiting from providing help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.: Therefore, Britain/Europe/international organisations must expand free trade to Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT AGAINST ADOPTION OF THE EURO</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.1: Britain is not a member of the Eurozone and never will be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.2: However, stability in the Eurozone is in Britain’s interests, because it would enhance trade and benefit UK’s growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.: Therefore, we support EU efforts to solve the Eurozone crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARGUMENT FOR SOLUTION OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS THROUGH REDUCTION OF THE EU BUDGET</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.1: Solving the Eurozone crisis is a priority for both Britain and Europe as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.2: The Eurozone crisis has an impact on all member states, including those who have not adopted the Euro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.3: Any increase in the EU budget affects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter 9 | Conclusions

**ARGUMENT FOR DEFENCE OF THE UK REBATE**

| P.1: Without the rebate on agricultural spending, the UK would make the largest net contribution to the EU. |
| P.2: The rebate is essential to ensure fairness in member states’ contributions to the EU. |
| P.3: The rebate has been regularly questioned in EU settings. |
| C.: I have defended it and will continue to do so for the sake of British taxpayers. |

- EU budget deficit - to inherit - Eurozone crisis - reckless spending - spending cuts - to freeze the budget - to affect / to have an impact on - balance - (to protect) British taxpayers

**ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES**

- it rests on the following formal scheme (Walton 2006: 106):
  - P.: If A is brought about, bad consequences will plausibly occur.
  - C.: A should not be brought about.

- pragmatic and content-abstract argument
- conditional sentences
- consequences / implications / effects
- to affect

**SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT**

- it rests on the following formal scheme (Walton 2006: 107):
  - *First step premise:* $A_0$ is up for consideration as a proposal that seems initially like something that should be brought about.
  - *Recursive premise:* Bringing up $A_0$ would plausibly lead (in the given circumstances, as far as we know) to $A_1$, which would in turn plausibly lead to $A_2$, and so forth, through the consequence $A_2, \ldots, A_n$.
  - *Bad outcome premise:* $A_n$ is a horrible (disastrous, bad) outcome.
  - *Conclusion:* $A_0$ should not be brought about.

- pragmatic and content-abstract argument
- ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES *par excellence*
- INTERPRETING STRATEGY $\Rightarrow$ “$x$ will have serious implications / trigger a vicious circle” + reformulation and retrieval of negative outcomes at the end of the utterance
- consequences / implications / effects
- CAUSATIVE VERBS $\rightarrow$ to affect / to mean / to cause / to lead to / to drive
- ADVERBS OF TIME (when) + TEMPORAL JUNCTURES (and / then)

**PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES**

- it rests on the following formal scheme (adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 333)
  - P.1: Either we bring about A, or B will occur.
  - P.2: B is bad or undesirable.
  - C.: Therefore, we should bring about A.

- pragmatic and content-abstract argument
- PRAGMATIC PURPOSE: showing two incompatible options, one of which is blatantly out of the question and the other is welcome
- usually found in the form “Either A or B can be done”, with the conclusion being left implicit
- either...or...
- alternative(s)
**The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRAW MAN ARGUMENT</th>
<th>ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.1:</strong> They say $x$, but $x$ is implausible.</td>
<td><strong>P.1:</strong> If authority $x$ says that $A$ is true/that $A$ has to be done, $A$ is true/$A$ has to be done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.2:</strong> I oppose $x$.</td>
<td><strong>P.2:</strong> $x$ says that $A$ is true/that $A$ has to be done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C.:</strong> Therefore, <em>they</em> are wrong and I am right.</td>
<td><strong>C.:</strong> Thus, $A$ is true/$A$ has to be done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- pragmatic and content-abstract argument</td>
<td>- pragmatic and content-abstract argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- same pragmatic purpose as the PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES</td>
<td>- INTERPRETING STRATEGIES: generalisation as a last resort strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- they</td>
<td>- INTERPRETING PROBLEMS: presence of numbers and quotations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- those who</td>
<td>- most frequently quoted institutions $\rightarrow$ IMF, WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- the pessimists</td>
<td>- most frequently quoted economists and philosophers $\rightarrow$ Paul Collier, Amartya Sen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(adapted from Reisigl - 2014: 76)</td>
<td>- “and I quote”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LEXICAL PECULIARITIES AND RECURRENT TERMS AND EXPRESSIONS**

- Inappropriate use of the terms "debt" and "deficit" → "to pay down debt(s)"
- "Britain is back open for business"
- private-sector jobs, imbalance, deregulation, protectionism, reducing public spending, freezing the budget, building the Big Society, winning the global race, opening up the economy, completing the Single Market, “There are some who say that”
- MODAL EXPRESSIONS significantly modifying the pragmatic force of speeches $\rightarrow$ parenthetical verbs ("I think"), modal verbs (should), modal adverbs (absolutely, actually, frankly)

Table 9.2 Cameron’s Main Arguments

**9.3 Sarkozy**

Sarkozy’s argumentation can be said to combine Obama’s preferences for argumentation from values and detailed interdiscursive themes with Cameron’s predilection for pragmatism. In addition, the former French President focuses on macro-economic issues, with particular reference to the role of the financialisation of capitalism leading to the economic crisis. In a nutshell, even though the prototypical crisis-related argument is not absent in Sarkozy’s speeches, his argumentation aims at justifying and promoting a well-motivated interventionist ideology by means of populist arguments, rather than gathering consensus on specific government policies. In this respect, the core of Sarkozy’s argumentation particularly lies in the argument for the restoration of the value of work, the argument for state intervention in the economy, the argument for the moralisation of financial capitalism and on the less content-related straw man argument, often implemented by means of pragmatically crucial questions used as rhetorical devices. In this respect, despite the twofold dimension of expert discourse and ideology discourse, Sarkozy’s speeches remain fundamentally clear, as the President’s argumentation resembles
that of an educator (Mayaffre 2012: 243). Particularly, his speeches hinge on pivotal lexical choices which are reiterated throughout the text collection. Even though redundancy, partially determined by the frequent recourse to anaphora, assists interpreters in the decoding or comprehension phase, the production of a quality IT rests on the interpreter’s ability to reproduce crucial lexical, expressive and rhetorical choices that determine the pragmatic force of Sarkozy’s speeches. The specificities of Sarkozy’s discourse on the crisis are outlined in table 9.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEAKER</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy</td>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOST RECURRENT ARGUMENTS</th>
<th>ARGUMENT SCHEME / EXPLANATION</th>
<th>CRUCIAL COMMENTS AND LEXICO-SYNTAGMATICAL INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SARKOZY’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY (OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN LESSONS AND CHANGE)</td>
<td>P.1: The present economic crisis is the worst economic crisis since the Thirties. P.2: Lessons have been learnt from the past predicament, which is similar to the current crisis only as far as its scope is concerned. P.3: Today’s crisis is, thus, fundamentally new. P.4: It offers the opportunity to learn lessons from our mistakes and change our behaviour. C.: Therefore, we must learn the lessons of the current crisis and reshape our politics and our economy.</td>
<td>- implies the ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY, the TOPOS OF HISTORY AND THE TOPOS OF CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY - crise / catastrophe / tempête / au bord du précipice / au bord du gouffre - sans précédent - la pire crise / la crise la plus grave depuis les années Trente - crise d’une violence inouïe - impossible / impensable - tirer les leçons (de la crise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARKOZY’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS CONTAGION (FINANCIAL CRISIS → CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE → ECONOMIC CRISIS)</td>
<td>P.1: Reckless speculation has engendered the 2007-2008 financial crisis. P.2: As a consequence, people no longer trust banks and the financial sector. P.3: We are witnessing a crisis of confidence which stifles economic activity. C.: Therefore, we must overcome fear and restore confidence in order to solve the economic crisis.</td>
<td>- formally an ARGUMENT FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT / SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT - opposition peur / confiance - crise de confiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGUMENT FOR TELLING THE TRUTH TO THE FRENCH</td>
<td>P.1: The causes of the financial crisis have been concealed from the French / The French have been kept in the dark. P.2: By relying on silence, the financial crisis has bred fear, leading to a widespread confidence crisis. P.3: Fear is stifling the economy, it is the main element underlying the economic crisis. P.4: We must emerge from the crisis. P.5: The crisis can only be solved by overcoming fear. P.6: Lying about the origins and scope of the crisis will further fuel fear.</td>
<td>- argument with a marked populist character - implies the TOPOS OF REALISM - generally found at the beginning of speeches in relation to the TOPOS OF THE IRREPARABLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

**ARGUMENT FOR STATE INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY (“RESURGENCE OF POLITICS”)**

| P.1: The past few decades imposed the law of the jungle on the world economy. |
| P.2: The excessive deregulation of finance was a crazy idea and underlines today’s crisis. |
| P.3: Some people thought that the economy was self-sufficient and that politics/state intervention was dead. |
| P.4: The crisis has proved them wrong by calling for rules. |
| C.: Therefore, enhanced political intervention in the economy is needed to solve the crisis. |

- implies the STRAW MAN ARGUMENT and the TOPOS OF FREEDOM

- déréguler / dérégulation (à l’excès/sans limite)
- la finance dérégulée / dérèglement de la finance
- loi de la jungle
- confiance
- règle(s) / régler
- liberté (“il n’y a pas de liberté sans règle”)
- (intervention de) l’État / (besoin de/retour de la) politique

---

**ARGUMENT FOR THE MORALISATION OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM**

| P.1: We must emerge from the crisis. |
| P.2: The twentieth-century dream of totally free and deregulated capitalism (financial capitalism) has proved to be an illusion that has led to the current economic crisis. |
| P.3: Financial capitalism is the value-free, corrupt version of capitalism. |
| P.4: Faced with the failure of the twentieth-century Western economic system, the tendency to turn to anticapitalism (protectionism) is rife. |
| P.5: Anticapitalism is not a solution to the economic crisis. |
| P.6: Financial capitalism can be “mended” by restoring the core values traditionally attached to capitalism. |
| P.7: Only by setting and imposing new value-driven rules will genuine capitalism be restored. |
| C.: Therefore, financial capitalism has to be moralised to promote the solution of the crisis. |

- implies the ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS EXCEPTIONALITY

- crise structurelle
- opposition monde de hier / monde de demain
- opposition capitalisme / anticapitalisme / protectionnisme
- opposition capitalisme / capitalisme financier
- dénaturation/dérive du capitalisme
- mondialisation sans règle / mondialisation heureuse
- rêve
- différent
- valeurs
- opposition irresponsabilité / responsabilité
- opposition court terme / long terme
- moraliser le capitalisme (financier) / moralisation du capitalisme (financier)
- capitalisme moral
### Argument for Defence of Bailout

- **P. 1:** The banking system has significant responsibilities in the leadup to the crisis.
- **P. 2:** Politics had the power to bailout banks and did so.
- **P. 3:** The decision to bailout banks was heavily criticised, because irresponsibility of the banking system lies at the heart of the current crisis.
- **P. 4:** The bailout of banks is part of the broader plan to moralise financial capitalism.
- **P. 5:** Refusing to bailout banks would have meant sinking the economy, because confidence would not have been restored.
- **P. 6:** The money of banks is your money, your savings, and the bailout was not for banks but for you.

C.: That is why we saved banks.

- used in all national, European and international speeches
- implies the ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS CONTAGION, the ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE) and the ARGUMENT FOR STATE INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY

- sauver les banques / sauver le système bancaire
- l’État
- épargne / épargnants
- économies
- emplois

### Argument for Voluntarism

- **P. 1:** The failure of financial capitalism has shown that both governments and civil society have been too passive faced with the unfolding of financial and economic processes.
- **P. 2:** Inaction would significantly worsen the effects of the current crisis.
- **P. 3:** The crisis has provided the opportunity to change by restoring the role of politics.

C.: Therefore, both the government and all actors of the economy should opt for voluntarism and be active in solving the crisis.

- implies the ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE), the ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL ACTION, the TOPOS OF CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY and the ARGUMENT FOR STATE INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY

- volontarisme / volontariste(s)
- action / actif, active
- opposition mouvement / immobilisme
- changer / changement

### Argument for Sustainable Economic Recovery

- **P. 1:** The previous finance-based, de-humanised economic model has proved unsustainable.
- **P. 2:** Both politics and civil society were denied the power to act and influence the course of the economy.
- **P. 3:** The economic crisis has called for rules and politics on the one hand, and for genuine value-driven capitalism on the other. It has called for action.
- **P. 4:** Choosing inaction would have major repercussions on the economy.
- **P. 5:** Action/voluntarism would, instead, enable politics to implement structural reforms empowering all actors of the economy, thereby bringing about a value-driven, comprehensive social and environmental reform rather than mere economic reform.

C.: Therefore, voluntarism is instrumental in bringing about a lasting, sustainable recovery.

- crisis = not only economic but also social and environmental
- implies the ARGUMENT FROM NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION (PREVENTING THE CRISIS FROM GETTING WORSE), the ARGUMENT FOR THE MORALISATION OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM, the ARGUMENT FOR STATE INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY and the TOPOS OF BOLD ACTION

- durable (changement, restauration)
- développement durable
- valeurs
- crise structurelle
- réformes structurelles
|ARGUMENT FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION| - gives rise to manifold interdiscursive references  
- POLITICAL IMPLICATURE $\rightarrow$ revision of policies previously implemented by opposition parties  
- nouns and verbs with the prefix re-  
- opposition bon déficit / mauvais déficit - dette - (maîtrise de la/des) dépense(s) - crise structurelle - réformes structurelles - croissance - formation, éducation, recherche - crédit impôt-recherche - innovation, compétitivité - taxe professionnelle - secteur automobile - délocaliser / délocalisation(s) (d’entreprise) - chômage - sécurité sociale / sécurité sociale professionnelle - réforme des retraites|

|ARGUMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE VALUE OF WORK| - “secular argument” $\rightarrow$ ≠ Obama’s ARGUMENT FOR REWARD TO THE RESPONSIBLE AND HARDWORKING - implies the ARGUMENT FOR THE MORALISATION OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM and the ARGUMENT FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION  
- POLITICAL IMPLICATURE $\rightarrow$ revision of policies previously implemented by opposition parties  
- nouns and verbs with the prefix re-  
- crise de confiance - crise du travail - réhabiliter/rehabilitation de la valeur travail - mérite - la laïcité - opposition capitalisme financier / capitalisme des entrepreneurs - croissance, compétitivité, entreprise, chômage - réforme des trente-cinq heures (carcan) - opposition travailler moins / travailler plus|

---

**P.1:** The solution of the deficit crisis cannot but take spending cuts into account.

**P.2:** However, there is a “bad deficit”, determined by public spending, and a “good deficit”, determined by investment in research, education, innovation and enterprise.

**P.3:** They both entail spending, but spending for the “good deficit” will be repaid in terms of productivity and quality, thereby increasing incomes, spurring growth and benefit posterity.

**C.:** This is why the government has retaken control of the management of spending: it is investing in research (crédit impôt-recherche), promoting vocational training, cutting business taxes (crédit impôt-recherche, supprimer la taxe professionnelle), opposing outsourcing and reforming the social security (pension reform).

---

**P.1:** The economic crisis is primarily a job crisis.

**P.2:** Financial capitalism has promoted the model of growth nurtured by debt, thereby depriving capitalism of the core value of work.

**P.3:** Left parties have contributed to promoting the culture of idleness by implementing the thirty-five-hour working week reform.

**P.4:** We must solve the crisis.

**P.5:** Only by working more will we overcome the crisis / Only by solving the job crisis will the economic crisis be overcome.

**P.6:** Moreover, investing more in businesses and work will nurture the “good deficit”.

**C.:** This is why the government is promoting the restoration of the value of work by reducing the tax on overtime and by implementing the pension reform.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT FOR DEFENCE OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES BY COMPARISON TO “WEAK” EUROZONE MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **P.1:** There are some who oppose or criticise the government’s policies.  
**P.2:** Though these policies seem drastic, they have been instrumental in preventing a major recession in France.  
**P.3:** Similar policies have not been implemented in weaker Eurozone countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy).  
**C.:** This is why France has avoided a major recession. |
| - implies the STRAW MAN ARGUMENT  
- PRAGMATIC PURPOSE: shed light on the relatively positive situation of the economy in France and on the positive consequences brought about by government policies  
- opposition France / Grèce, Portugal, Irlande, Italie, Espagne |
| ARGUMENT FROM FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION |
| **P.1:** The Eurozone crisis is a historic predicament, a structural crisis demanding structural reforms.  
**P.2:** We must solve the Eurozone crisis.  
**P.3:** Germany and France are the most powerful among European economies.  
**P.4:** After a history of conflict, Germany and France have chosen cooperation.  
**C.:** Therefore, Franco-German cooperation is contributing significantly to the solution of the Eurozone crisis. |
| - implies the TOPOS OF HISTORY  
- crise de la zone euro  
- Europe  
- L’Allemagne et la France / franco-allemand  
- histoire  
- Angela Merkel  
- Konrad Adenauer / Charles De Gaulle  
- travailler ensemble |
| ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS (“ARGUMENT PRO-AFRICA”) |
| **P.1:** Half of the world’s population (and especially Africa) is in distress and has been overlooked and/or kept at a distance by industrialised countries for too long.  
**P.2:** In the 21st century, economic problems are globally-shared problems.  
**P.3:** There can be no genuine economic recovery without shared prosperity.  
**P.4:** We will not solve the economic crisis if we do not strive to lift Africa (and developing countries) out of poverty.  
**C.:** This is why France and Europe commit to promoting economic development in Africa. |
| - “codified”, typically political argument  
- primarily used in European and international settings  
- Afrique / Europe / France  
- tenir à l’écart  
- s’occuper de l’Afrique  
- l’avenir de l’Europe  
- il n’y a pas de croissance durable sans un développement partagé |
| PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES |
| - it rests on the following formal scheme (adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 333)  
**P.1:** Either we bring about A, or B will occur.  
**P.2:** B is bad or undesirable.  
**C.:** Therefore, we should bring about A. |
| - pragmatic and content-abstract argument  
- PRAGMATIC PURPOSE: showing two incompatible options, one of which is blatantly out of the question and the other is welcome  
- “si..., ... ” / “si on...on...” (conditional sentence) |
| ARGUMENT FROM POSITIVE/NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES |
| - it rests on the following formal scheme (Walton 2006: 106):  
**Premise:** If A is brought about, good/bad consequences will plausibly occur.  
**Conclusion:** A should (not) be brought about. |
| - pragmatic and content-abstract argument  
- “si..., ... ” / “si on...on...” (conditional sentence) |
| STRAW MAN ARGUMENT |
| **Premise 1:** They say x, but x is implausible.  
**Premise 2:** I oppose x.  
**Conclusion:** Therefore, they are wrong and I am right. |
| - same pragmatic purpose as the PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT FROM ALTERNATIVES  
- often implemented by means of QUESTIONS used as rhetorical devices  
- “(il y a) ceux qui”  
- certains |
The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD HOMINEM ARGUMENT</th>
<th>PERSONAL ATTACK: attacking the arguer rather than the argument (Walton 2008: 170).</th>
<th>- exclusively used in campaign speeches and directed towards François Hollande</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**FURTHER PECULIARITIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERPRETING**

- Presence of “words that are emotionally charged or supercharged” (Viezzi 2013: 383) → the choice of similarly vivid lexical items in ITs (LEXICAL EQUIVALENCE) is instrumental in guaranteeing ARGUMENTATIVE EQUIVALENCE between the ST and the IT

- QUESTIONS used as RHETORICAL DEVICES → significantly determine the pragmatic force of Sarkozy’s speeches (either used polemically – STRAW MAN ARGUMENT – or for perlocutionary purposes)

- ANAPHORA and ASYNDETON → the strategic elimination of anaphora provides the opportunity to increase décalage, save working memory for reformulation and focus attention on topicality and lexical accuracy

Table 9.3 Sarkozy’s Main Arguments

### 9.4 Hollande

Despite criticism levelled by linguists and journalists at Hollande’s “sarkozysation”, the speeches of the former and the current Presidents of the French Republic appear to be significantly different as far as argumentation is concerned. In more specific terms, if it is true that Hollande “borrows” the recourse to anaphora and the use of the pronouns je and on from his predecessor, it is also true that Hollande’s arguments have nothing to do with Sarkozy’s, with the exception of some European and international arguments. First of all, values and, especially, ideology give way to a specialist discourse governed by some arguments typical of the left, as the primacy of the prototypical crisis-related argument is restored by Hollande’s appeals to policies guided by the imperative of social dialogue. In this respect, the newly-found role of politics hailed by Sarkozy is reconsidered, however paradoxical it might sound. The need to change the course of French politics, economy and society pervades the whole of Hollande’s text collection and gives rise to comprehensive arguments in which the conclusion is defended by means of detailed sets of related premises. Therefore, previous knowledge of Hollande’s argumentative macro-structure is paramount to preserve illocutionary and perlocutionary patterns in interpreted texts.

One feature shared by Sarkozy and Hollande lies in the expert nature of their speeches. In particular, Hollande’s texts see a shift from macro-economic issues to increased lexical specificity in dealing, especially, with the deficit crisis. Indeed, of all ARGO speeches, Hollande’s are those in which occurrences of “structural deficit”, “trade deficit” and “trade surplus” are more frequently observed. Paraphrases would thus jeopardise the lexical specificity of Hollande’s texts, thereby significantly altering their pragmatic force.

More specific interpreting problems are posed by numbers and frequently-occurring parenthetical clauses. As to the former, they serve the purpose of bestowing credibility on the president’s discourse; they are recurrently exploited irrespective of the topic addressed but seem to be primarily used in relation to deficit reduction. Regarding which, focusing on the manifold premises and crucial conclusion of the argument from deficit and debt predicament is bound to assist the inferential process in interpreting, thereby helping
interpreters save time and working memory for the crucial task of writing down numbers and reproducing them or retrieving them later in the IT. As to the second interpreting problem, i.e. parenthetical clauses, décalage increase is highly recommended to enable shift of the propositional content to the beginning or to the end of utterances. Together with the reproduction of key lexical items and numbers, the strategy is bound to contribute significantly to the production of a clear, specialist and equivalent interpreted text.

An overview of the argumentative orientation of Hollande’s speeches is provided in table 9.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>François Hollande</td>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Recurrent Arguments</th>
<th>Argument Scheme / Explanation</th>
<th>Crucial Comments and Lexico-Syntagmatic Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**HOLLANDE’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE**

**P.1**: The French have asked to me for guidance at a serious moment for our country and Europe.  
**P.2**: The crisis is not over and will last long.  
**P.3**: The crisis of confidence is hampering growth, and slow growth prevents confidence from being restored.  
**P.4**: Cutting the deficit will lead confidence to rise, and restoring confidence would be beneficial to our public finances.  
**P.5**: Cutting the deficit and promoting growth are not mutually exclusive activities.  
**P.6**: Promoting growth will help us redress our public finances and vice-versa.  
**C.**: Therefore, on the one hand, we must cut the deficit in order to restore confidence and promote growth; on the other, we must promote growth in order to restore confidence and get our public finances in order.

**ARGUMENT FROM DEFICIT AND DEBT PREDICAMENT**

**P.1**: As regards the deficit crisis, Germany is the benchmark for analysing the situation in France.  
**P.2**: We are lagging behind Germany.  
**P.3**: In approximately ten years, our public deficit predicament has worsened, though there are signs of recovery/though recovery is underway.  
**P.4**: The public debt has increased dramatically over the last ten years.  
**P.5**: Particularly, our structural deficit is too high, especially compared to Germany’s.  
**P.6**: Ten years ago the balance of trade was positive (trade surplus), but today our trade deficit is substantial, especially compared to Germany’s.  
**P.7**: Like the economic crisis, the deficit and — implies HOLLANDE’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE and the ARGUMENT FROM THRIFT  
- characterised by the presence of numbers and relatively specialist language
### The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT FROM SLOW GROWTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.1:</strong> World economies are seeing encouraging signals, as growth has been rekindled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.2:</strong> However, growth is still too slow and weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C.:</strong> Therefore, we have to find new means to increase growth, restore confidence and solve the economic crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT FOR SOLUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.1:</strong> World economies are seeing encouraging signals, but growth is still too slow and weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.2:</strong> One of the major threats to growth is unemployment, because it jeopardises confidence, and confidence is the prerequisite of growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.3:</strong> Unemployment is the symptom of the profound and lasting nature of the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.4:</strong> We must solve the unemployment crisis to restore confidence and spur growth at the same time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.5:</strong> My government has committed to the struggle against unemployment since the beginning of my mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.6:</strong> In particular, I am focusing on youth unemployment, because France is the youngest country in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.7:</strong> The “generation contract” reduces the cost of labour by helping older workers keep their jobs and the young get into a place of work, thereby tackling unemployment comprehensively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.8:</strong> “Les emplois d’avenir” primarily tackles youth unemployment by focusing on helping the disadvantaged, which further contributes to solving the social implications of unemployment and, in general, the social implications of the economic crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P.9:</strong> Together with “le contrat de génération” and “les emplois d’avenir”, investment in research and innovation will help us prepare for the jobs of the future, while simultaneously...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- implies HOLLANDE’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE and the ARGUMENT FROM SLOW GROWTH
- interdiscursive references to research, education and innovation

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debt crises are not over and will last long.

C.: This is why we have to take steps to cut the deficit comprehensively: we must reduce public spending to solve the debt crisis and reduce the structural deficit, and we must boost growth and increase exports to bring the balance of trade back to equilibrium.

- sérieux budgétaire
- déficit public / dette publique / dépense(s) publique(s) / comptes publics
- déficit structurel
- déficit commercial
- excédent commercial
- produit intérieur brut (PIB)
- Allemagne / allemand
- réforme des retraites

- implies HOLLANDE’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
- closely related to unemployment

- croissance faible/molle
- taux de croissance
- confiance
- chômage

- implies HOLLANDE’S ARGUMENT FROM CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE and the ARGUMENT FROM SLOW GROWTH
- interdiscursive references to research, education and innovation
restoring confidence.

C.: This is why we have launched the “generation contract” and “les emplois d’avenir”, and why we are investing in research and education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT FOR LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( P.1: ) The crisis will last long, as it is the symptom of a deep economic, political, social and environmental upheaval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.2: ) Crises are all interconnected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.3: ) Faced with the economic crisis, climate change and the depletion of natural resources must not be seen as constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.4: ) Rather, the economic crisis provides the opportunity to contemplate a strategic energy transition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.5: ) Energy transition would enable us to turn to new technologies, innovate, promote growth and reduce our energy dependency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.6: ) Though energy transition might appear expensive, tomorrow’s growth will depend upon energy efficiency and renewable energies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.7: ) Foresight is needed to solve the economic crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P.8: ) Committing to energy transition and sustainable development will benefit future generations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.: Therefore, we must bring about energy transition boldly and strive for sustainable development in order to restore growth, bring about a lasting and comprehensive solution to the crisis and bequeath a better world to future generations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| - récession |
| - confiance |
| - croissance |
| - travail |
| - chômage / précarité |
| - bataille/lutte contre le chômage |
| - réformes structurelles |
| - “contrat de génération” |
| - loi sur les emplois d’avenir / “les emplois d’avenir” |
| - contrat à durée déterminée (CDD) / contrat à durée indéterminée (CDI) |
| - jeunesse |
| - jeune(s) / senior(s) |
| - génération |
| - réforme des retraites |
| - emploi des jeunes |
| - formation professionnelle |
| - formation / qualification |
| - éducation, formation, investissement |

- interdiscursive reference to the environmental and energy crisis and climate change
- implies the TOPOS OF CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY and the TOPOS OF MORAL DUTY TOWARDS POSTERITY
- often characterised by the presence of numbers

- jeunes / jeunesse
- nouvelles générations
- avenir
- transition énergétique
- énergétique / écologique
- développement durable
- restaurer/rétablir la croissance
- stratégique
- solution
### ARGUMENT FOR THE SOCIAL CONFERENCE

*P.1:* The State is not the only actor in the economy.

*P.2:* The social partners are the backbone of the French Republic.

*P.3:* The crisis is not only an economic but also a social scourge.

*P.4:* Slow growth, unemployment and the lack of confidence are urgent threats, but haste is a poor counsellor. Time and patience are needed for structural reforms to bear fruit.

*P.5:* The government has a mission, i.e. gathering all the actors of the economy (businesses and the social partners) in the “social conference”.

*P.6:* The social conference rests upon a basic principle: no bills will be approved and no laws will be enacted without preliminary agreement between the government and social partners which stand for the will of workers, entrepreneurs and, in more general terms, citizens.

*P.7:* The social conference is about dialogue, cooperation, negotiation, positive compromises and deals, which require all the participants in the conference to take responsibility for the sake of social justice.

*P.8:* The social conference is not a temporary reform.

*P.9:* Social dialogue between the parties is a new method, a strategic choice that will dispel doubts, thereby restoring confidence and, eventually, growth.

*P.10:* Social dialogue requires time and patience, but it is instrumental in bringing about lasting and effective solutions to the crisis.

*P.11:* The “generation contract”, “*les emplois d’avenir*” and the “Responsibility Pact” aim at promoting social dialogue.

*C.*: Therefore, the social conference must become a permanent feature of the French economic, social and political agenda, a foundation of decision-making that will bring about a lasting solution to the crisis.

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### ARGUMENT FOR TACKLING EUROSCEPTICISM AND PROTECTIONISM

*P.1:* The Eurozone crisis is a confidence crisis that compounds the budget deficit and prevents growth from being boosted.

*P.2:* European citizens are in the grip of doubt, mistrust and helplessness.

*P.3:* The economic, social and political project of a European Union is questioned, as Euroscepticism is increasing among EU citizens.

*P.4:* Protectionism and populism are rife again in Europe and the rest of the world.

*P.5:* Protectionism and populism are not the...
### ARGUMENT FROM FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION

**P.1:** The Eurozone crisis is essentially a crisis of confidence.

**P.2:** Against the lasting nature of the Eurozone crisis, the diffidence brought about by unemployment has rapidly become Euroscepticism and nurtured protectionist stances.

**P.3:** Euroscepticism and protectionism jeopardise the EU project.

**P.4:** The European project requires time and patience, and the crisis does not mark the end of the European project.

**P.5:** Germany and France are the harbingers of the European project, which is a dream of peace and prosperity launched, among others, by Adenauer and de Gaulle.

**P.6:** Franco-German cooperation is constant, and contributes almost daily to the solution of Eurozone problems.

**C.:** Therefore, France and Germany will keep cooperating to keep our shared European dream alive.

### ARGUMENT FOR THE BANKING UNION

**P.1:** The economic crisis was triggered by financial speculation.

**P.2:** The Eurozone crisis will last long and is severe also because it is fuelling Euroscepticism.

**P.3:** The causes of the crisis must be tackled to dispel doubts and diffidence about the EU project and to achieve stable and durable recovery.

**P.4:** The Banking union is a major EU response to the Eurozone crisis.

**P.5:** The Banking union promotes a deeper integration of the banking system for Eurozone countries by establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism, which enable supervision, restructuring and recapitalisation of banks through the European Stability Mechanism. In simple terms, it provides the EU with the opportunities for supervision and intervention.

**P.6:** The Banking union will make the EU more stable, will protect EU citizens’ savings and will play an instrumental role in preventing a similar crisis from happening again.

**C.:** This is why we are working relentlessly for the implementation of the Banking union.
**The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence**

ARGUMENT FROM MUTUAL INTEREST IN UNILATERAL DISTRESS ("ARGUMENT PRO-AFRICA")

| P.1: Africa is in distress. |
| P.2: However, Africa is the continent of the future and provides an opportunity to European countries. |
| P.3: If France/Europe cooperates with Africa and invests there, it will relieve or help to relieve Africa’s distress, simultaneously benefiting from providing help. |
| C.: Therefore, France/Europe must invest in Africa. |

- "codified", typically political argument
- primarily used in European and international settings
- Afrique / Europe / France
- continent d’avenir/déemain
- opportunité
- pays industrialisés
- investir en Afrique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FURTHER PECULIARITIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERPRETING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• recurrent INTERDISCURSIVE REFERENCES to unrelated topics (especially Northern Mali conflict, Syrian civil war and Ukrainian crisis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ANAPHORA → the strategic elimination of anaphora provides the opportunity to increase décalage, save working memory for reformulation and focus attention on topicality and lexical accuracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• PARENTHETICAL CLAUSES → INTERPRETING STRATEGY: décalage increase with a view to shifting the propositional content to the beginning or the end of utterances → RESULTS: avoidance of the risk of false starts and production of clear utterances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.4 Hollande’s Main Arguments

9.5 Implications for Interpreter Training and Interpreting Research

The findings of the analysis of ARGO show, first and foremost, that the corpus speakers resort to extremely different arguments when faced with the same topic. More precisely, they corroborate the theoretical assumptions regarding the relative nature of argumentation, as the schemes adopted appear to be alternatively culture-specific (e.g. Obama’s argument for reward to the responsible and hardworking), context-dependent (e.g. Cameron’s global race argument) and/or idiosyncratic (e.g. Sarkozy’s ideological arguments or Hollande’s argument for the “social conference”).

Seen through interpreters’ eyes, the analysis of argumentation in ARGO provides empirical evidence of the heterogeneous pragmatic variables which determine the argumentative orientation and pragmatic force of political speeches, thereby warning interpreters against the prospective triggers of the “pragmatic dark” when interpreting the corpus speeches and, especially, speeches like them.

In this respect, tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 have not been drafted with the sole aim of summarising the findings of the PhD analysis. Since the relevance of the argumentative approach to STs lies in the identification and highlighting of patterns (Marzocchi 1997: 181) with a view to promoting anticipation, each table is intended to provide a reliable overview of the argumentative orientation of a given speaker’s discourse on the economic crisis. Indeed, the tables can be said to highlight the “favourite” devices adopted by a given speaker in a given context, and can play an instrumental role in promoting the recognition and reproduction of specific argument schemes that often stand in the way of a quality interpretation by jeopardising speech comprehension and compounding speech reproduction. In particular, the tables have been devised considering interpreter trainees’
need for intuitive and streamlined theoretical indications (Gile 1995a: 18-20), with a view to providing a model to be used in training settings. The most frequently occurring and meaningful argument schemes adopted by the corpus speakers are highlighted, together with their related lexico-syntagmatic indicators and concise indications regarding the communicative functions and specific contexts of use of the arguments. In this respect, the findings are intended to pursue a double objective. On the one hand, the tables provide a tool to be used in classrooms, aiming at promoting comprehension on the part of students of the specific discursive and communicative choices made by speakers. The lack of “translational evidence” which the present study does not further investigate (see section 1.5) could, thus, be gradually countered by testing the actual benefits of mainstreaming argumentation theory in interpreting research; for instance, during a course of simultaneous interpreting from English, the class could be “split” into two groups, one receiving Obama’s table and one being given no previous information regarding the argumentative orientation of the speeches on the economy delivered by the American President. Subsequent student interpretation of one among the speeches drawn from the American sub-corpus of ARGO (or a speech like them) is likely to yield insightful results regarding the actual role of argumentation-driven preparation in promoting content anticipation and preservation of ST illocution and perlocution during interpretation.

On the other hand, the training tool can have a wider significance, lying in the teaching of crucial and recurring argument schemes with a view gradually to enhancing the students’ argumentative competence, i.e. ability in recognising and reproducing source language speakers’ arguments. In this respect, teaching of argumentation concepts also includes emphasis on argumentative equivalence, understood as the co-occurrence in the IT of topical coherence, presentational coherence and respect for audience demands (see section 3.7). Prospective mistakes made by students could, thus, be explained by relating them to the intuitive threefold notions of argumentation and argumentative equivalence.

Despite the beneficial implications the model can have in interpreter training, though, the findings of the PhD study leave crucial questions still pending: to what extent can the arguments used by Obama be labelled Obama’s arguments? Which among them are personal? Which, instead, are typically American and which are typically Democrat? For instance, the argument for Obamacare is characteristic of the President’s argumentation, but it is also true that pro-arguments and contra-arguments revolving around the implementation of health reform are typically American. Other questions include the following: which arguments among Cameron’s were chosen according to cultural conventions (Marzocchi 1998: 6) and which are, instead, the result of the speaker’s idiosyncratic and subjective choice? Do all British Prime Ministers turn to split illocution when dealing with European issues? Are the striking differences between Sarkozy and Hollande an exception or is any politician supposed to adopt distinctive arguments irrespective of cultural assumptions? These are only some of the various questions that still stand in the way of comprehensive understanding of the implications of political argumentation for the activity of the interpreter.
In this respect, apart from the indications regarding the speeches on the economy delivered by Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy and Hollande, the main finding of the PhD study can be said to lie in the fact that the analysis of ARGO has shown the potential of the argumentative approach to STs. Particularly, the descriptive methodology adopted to detect and describe the most meaningful arguments put forward in ARGO speeches has proved a useful framework for analysing and comparing STs, as it has yielded results which show the relative predictability of political speeches and make the case for enhanced language-specific, argumentation-driven interpreter preparation. In other words, the findings indicate that the descriptive argumentation analysis of a set of contextually-compatible speeches is “a powerful key to text structure and text meaning” (Marzocchi 1997: 182) that enables deeper comprehension of the object of the interpreter’s profession, i.e. the source text. In so doing, it paves the way for more comprehensive analyses by indicating promising research paths to study interpreted argumentative situations.

9.6 Promising Lines of Research and Future Work

Deepening the study of political argumentation in interpreting settings entails corpus extension to enable comprehensive synchronic and diachronic studies alike.

Supplementing research with a diachronic dimension would help answer questions regarding the prospective presence in political speeches of distinctively American, British or French arguments. In other words, diachronic analysis would further the study of the cultural aspects of argumentation, pointed out, for example, by the recurrence in the American sub-corpus of the Lincolnian argument from crisis exceptionality, or by David Cameron’s reluctance in viewing society as Margaret Thatcher did. Mayaffre’s claim (2012: 34) regarding the “rupture” marked by Sarkozy’s discourse in French presidential discourse could similarly be verified and the prospective “survival” of typically French arguments pointed out to the benefits of interpreters.

As regards synchronic analyses, speeches delivered by the opponents of the corpus speakers would help assess the prospective party-related adoption of argument schemes, which has already been underlined by the contrastive analysis of Sarkozy’s and Hollande’s speeches. For instance, analysis of Ed Miliband’s speeches would shed light on specific arguments the Labour party leader adopts in solving the “conflict” between his stances and Cameron’s, regarding for instance Labour’s responsibility in worsening the deficit crisis in Britain.

Another promising line of research lies in the analysis of argumentation pertaining to political topics other than the economic crisis, with a view to assessing the topic-related character of argumentation. The presence of ad hominem arguments in specific fields of political deliberation has already been highlighted in section 7.10, which suggests that arguments depend on the macro-topic of speeches. After all, argument schemes such as the argument for the moralisation of financial capitalism are unlikely to be found in war speeches or speeches on immigration.
Furthermore, another crucial and highly promising research line lies in the extension of the analytical practice not only to other speakers and political topics but also to the study of argumentation in other languages. In this regard, students could be involved in the development of ARGO when drafting BA and MA theses. Texts would be collected according to their language combination and analysed after internalisation of crucial theoretical concepts and analytical methods drawn from argumentation theory.

All these approaches combined are bound to result in increasingly substantial findings which would build up “repositories” of data-driven indications on the relativity and predictability of political source texts.

Since ARGO will undergo an extension process, the choice of an exclusively qualitative analytical framework is likely gradually to appear as a crucial limitation. Supplementing argumentation analysis with the adoption of corpus linguistics tools remains a controversial subject. Reference has been made to the quintessentially qualitative nature of argumentation analysis in section 1.4: arguments rely on implicit assumptions, i.e. discursive elements not visible on the text’s surface and eluding computers. Incidentally, the implicit elements of arguments are what compounds message comprehension often leading interpreters to pragmatic failure; they are, therefore, paramount in analysing arguments with a view to promoting the overall comprehension of political speeches. Moreover, specific categories for argument detection by means of corpus linguistics tools have yet to be determined, as arguments do not always rely on given lexico-syntagmatic elements. This implies that the frequent occurrence of a given word or phrase would not be indicative of the recurrence of a given argument.

However, at this stage of research and considering the prospective dimensions of the text collection, considering the contribution of corpus linguistics “as an aid to research” (Garzone & Santulli 2004: 351) might prove useful in streamlining analysis, especially as far as corpus annotation is concerned.

It is usually recommended that corpus builders employ some form of annotation scheme to text their files, however brief, in order to aid analysis and keep track of the structure of the corpus (Baker 2006: 38).

In particular, some type of pragmatic annotation (Culpeper, Archer & Davies 2008) may be necessary to highlight political implicatures and include crucial comments regarding illocution and perlocution, in order to facilitate the retrieval of pivotal arguments and their comparison to newly-found ones. Obviously, this would have to be done after “tailoring” ARGO for corpus linguistics analyses, which would gradually enable analysis of argumentation in a twofold way, “from data to hypotheses” and “from hypotheses to data” (Garzone and Santulli 2004: 355-357).

The former approach, aiming at formulating hypotheses starting “from raw data obtained by means of computer queries” (Garzone & Santulli 2004: 355), would become useful when the corpus is supplemented with a substantial number of other speeches pertaining to different political topics and delivered by different speakers in different languages.
The second approach, aiming at corroborating the findings drawn from qualitative analysis by means of quantitative analyses, could already be adopted by relying on the findings of the present research. Particularly, the lexico-syntagmatic indicators of arguments, as outlined in the third column of each of the tables shown in the present chapter, provide a useful, albeit non-exhaustive, basis for conducting quantitative analyses aiming at detecting specific arguments in a large corpus.

However, the contribution of corpus linguistics will be taken into consideration only when ARGO becomes unwieldy. Corpus development will first and foremost head in another direction considered crucial for interpreting purposes: in addition to supplementing the corpus with further political speeches, the research focus will also shift to analysis of other types of argumentative situations. Indeed, despite the prominence of argumentation techniques in political speeches, argumentation is not only resorted to in political public deliberation.

Politics is widely understood to be a specific context in which argumentation occurs, as are – for example – science, law, religion, and academe (Zarefsky 2014: 1)

The domains mentioned by Zarefsky are all likely to involve interpreters. Particularly, the legal domain extensively relies on translation and interpreting practices, as new professional needs have arisen mainly as a consequence of immigration flows rearranging the demographic shape of Europe (Ballardini 2014). Notably, not only professional but also training needs have multiplied and become more urgent over the last few years, following, especially, the Directive 2010/64/EU concerning the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. Faced with various institutional hindrances to directive implementation (Gialuz 2014), interpreting scholarly spheres have seen a remarkable spate of interest in the subject, as scholars have found themselves striving to cope with training upheavals (Ballardini 2014) revolving around the need to cater for interpreters’ interest in the study of the dialogic and conflictual nature of trial interaction, with particular reference to lawyer-witness interaction.

In this respect, the study of legal argumentation is a thriving domain (Mazzi 2007) and could provide interpreting research with an insightful perspective. In the light of interpreters’ frequent neglect of courtroom pragmatics resulting “in a skewing of a speaker’s intended meaning” (Berk-Seligson 1990: 2), focusing on judicial argumentation is likely to yield findings helping interpreters penetrate the linguistic and procedural mysteries of courtrooms and attain “pragmatic equivalence” (Hale 2004: 7) in judicial interaction. Moreover, deepening research into the argumentative and pragmatic implications of courtroom interpreting appears all the more crucial considering that “members of the legal profession without much knowledge of languages” tend to see

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interpreters “as machines or conduits, repeating verbatim what they hear in one language in another” (Hale 2004: 8).

Against this background, the study of argumentation will be extended to the judicial context. Despite the generally scarce availability of recordings of court hearings\(^5\), reliable material can be found turning to highly “popular” cases whose proceedings are likely to be made available, as attested by Cavalieri’s (2009) analysis of argumentation regarding the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. In this respect, the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides free access to all transcripts and videos of all the trial phases of its cases. Notably, the Court constantly relies on interpreting services; a preliminary survey on website video material has already shown the prominence of interpreters’ role in ICC trials, especially as far English and French are concerned.

The argumentative techniques adopted by judges, lawyers and witnesses will be analysed in the search for argumentative specificities requiring thorough interpreter preparation. Despite the presence of reliable transcripts, transcript accuracy will be cross-checked with the related videos, as has been done for the political speeches of Obama, Cameron, Sarkozy and Hollande. However, prospective transcription with WinPitch software will be also taken into consideration, as it would provide researchers and students willing to use ARGO with a wider range of research opportunities. For instance, transcription would highlight discursive peculiarities not visible in the website transcripts, i.e. strategic pauses, hesitations and hedges (Krouglav 1999). The transcripts and/or transcriptions will then be included in a specific sub-corpus of ARGO concerning judicial argumentation.

Extending research to judicial argumentation will have two major implications. Firstly, it will shift research to *dialogue* interpreting, thereby supplementing and streamlining the PhD indications concerning optimal interpreters’ “behaviour” when involved in *monologue* argumentative situations. A more faithful overview of ST argumentation in interpreted events will, thus, be gradually outlined. Secondly, it will contribute to the definition of best practices in the “bilingual courtroom” (Berk-Seligson 1990), with particular implications for interpreter training. Following in the footsteps of the training experiments carried out at the Translation and Interpreting School in Forlì (Ballardini 2014: 67), the analysed material could be harnessed in classrooms to sensitize students to the specificities of argumentation in courtroom interaction through targeted *jeux de rôle*. In this regard, the project will take research one step forward towards helping interpreters face the institutional constraints and pragmatic challenges of interpreting in judicial settings. However crucial, the results of the argumentative analysis of ICC trials are expected to reveal a more “codified” and constrained use of argument schemes by the participants in the judicial process with respect to political communication. The ethotic nature of politics, the variety of narrow contexts of speech delivery, the presence of heterogeneous audiences (Zarefsky 2009: 118) and the resulting need to adapt argumentation render political speeches the most promising research field for the study of argumentation with a view to the interpreting process. However,

\(^5\) Most proceedings pertain to sensitive cases and are, thus, classified.
extending the research scope and supplementing the PhD findings with further analyses of political speeches and research into judicial argumentation is likely to lead to increasingly substantial findings, which could play a crucial role in helping future interpreters rise to the challenge of interpreting battles by anticipating the strategies and reproducing the convictions of source language speakers.
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