Abstract: I first highlight a main theme of the collection I edited and issued last year, *Realism, Science and Pragmatism* (Routledge 2014), by contrasting classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism in terms of the distinction between semantic externalism and semantic internalism, and exhibiting how both of these semantic views are concisely stated by Carnap (1950a, 1950b), though neither he nor his followers recognised this contrast, nor its profound methodological and substantive implications – although they were highlighted at the time by Wick (1951), published by Wilfrid Sellars and Herbert Feigl in the second year of their journal, *Philosophical Studies*. I exhibit the continuing influence of semantic internalism – which dominates Quine’s, Rorty’s, van Fraassen’s, Brandom’s and Huw Price’s neo-pragmatist views – and argue against it with pragmatic realist considerations drawn from Kant, Carnap and Sellars.

Key Words: Pragmatic realism, scientific realism, neo-pragmatism, conceptual analysis, conceptual explication, semantics, reference, Carnap, Kant.

1. Introduction

To begin I warmly thank Professor Ferrini for so very kindly arranging our seminar today (29 April, 2015)! It is a special occasion in many ways. Starting already in my own undergraduate studies at your age and in courses like this, I began pondering issues about knowledge, truth, realism, relativism and rational justification, in moral and political philosophy and also in epistemology and in history and philosophy of science. I had significant background in construction and in engineering, and was shocked by Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, its anti-realism, relativism and paradigm incommensurability. To my great for-

---

1 I remain grateful to Thomas Nickels, then visiting the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, for his excellent undergraduate introduction to philosophy of science.
tune I was able to study with two past masters in epistemology: William Alston and, informally, Frederick Will, both of whom took very wide-ranging, far-sighted and exacting views on this field and its issues. I was also convinced by another of my professors, Richard Schacht – surely unwittingly – that if anyone had thought through relativism from the inside out and won, it was Hegel. I also became intrigued by Kant’s notion – I then had no more than a notion – of transcendental proof. I wanted to understand what anti-sceptical implications such proof might justify, and further thought that if I were to study Kant in that regard, I should also take Hegel’s views on those same methods and topics into account. – In short, I was utterly out of my naïve, uneducated mind!

Fortunately, no one – certainly not I – then realised just how audacious were my dreams and surmises. No one is more surprised than I to come before you today, to say that in fact it has all worked out astonishingly well! Drawing from these and other past masters of the craft of philosophy, I have been slowly but steadily developing a robust pragmatic account of rational justification within non-formal domains, which identifies and justifies universally valid basic moral norms – regardless of debates about moral (anti-)realism and about moral motivation (Westphal 2016a) – and which shows how a sophisticated social and historical account of empirical justification justifies realism about the objects of commonsense and also of scientific knowledge.

I first made acquaintance with Professor Parrini by correspondence. I wrote to him regarding his excellent 1994 collection, Kant and Contemporary Epistemology; only later did I learn of his extensive, outstanding work in philosophy of science and analytical philosophy of language. It is truly an honour for me – and a tribute to the contributors – that he finds it worth his while to consider and comment upon the volume I edited, Realism, Science and Pragmatism, and the issues addressed in it. Professor Parrini is one of the few genuine experts both on Kant’s epistemology and on philosophy of science – especially Carnap and Quine – and more generally on analytical semantics. Like the very best of my own professors, he too takes a very broad, deeply informed, long-range view on these issues and their critical examination. He is, in brief, the perfect
commentator on and critic for this volume, and regarding my own views on these topics, such as they may be.

2. Realism, science & pragmatism

This volume of essays developed from a conference on the topic: «Realism in Its Multiple Forms: A Case of Mere Homonymy or Identifiable Common Commitments?», hosted and sponsored by the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in June 2011, together with the Academy of Finland, NordForsk and the Swiss National Science Foundation. The conference was excellent; for the last quarter of 2011 the Helsinki Collegium generously hosted me, as I completed most of the editorial work on the collection. It is no accident that this occurred in Helsinki. There is both a philosophical and a practical point I wish to stress: Today the field of philosophy is fragmented as never before into mutually disinterested sub-specialities. One common division is between «philosophy», which by definition is supposed to be contemporary, and historical philosophy; another is between «analytical» and post-Kantian «hermeneutical» philosophy. These divisions are entirely artificial and typically self-serving, but they simplify academic life and are supplanting the much more demanding, comprehensive approach which recognises that philosophy can only be systematic by also being historical and textual, and by exploiting the techniques and insights of both analytical and hermeneutical philosophy. This is how Professor Parrini philosophises, and I sincerely admire and commend him for it! It is, as already indicated, what I aspire to. Why will emerge again later in my remarks.

3. Pragmatism & its revival

Presently there is something of a revival of pragmatism, accompanied by confusion about just what «pragmatism» is. Despite the wide range of distinctively «pragmatist» views, I think there is a significant difference between the original, robustly realist and very practical pragmatism devel-
oped by Peirce, Dewey, Mead, C.I. Lewis (1929), and much of the time by James; and contemporary varieties of neo-pragmatism. Their distinction can be illuminated by considering two important semantic developments by Carnap, both in 1950.

3.1 The context of Carnap’s semantic developments is provided by distinguishing three main aspects of the study of language, as identified by Carnap’s colleague at Chicago, Charles Morris: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. These correspond roughly to grammar, meaning and specific statements made by particular people on particular occasions, whether questions, answers, commands, promises, oaths etc. Carnap first developed formal studies of syntax in *The Logical Syntax of Language* (1934). He then added formal semantics in his *Introduction to Semantics* (1942). Both branches of Carnap’s formal studies abstract from pragmatics, that is, from what people actually say and do by speaking as they do. All of that belongs to pragmatics. Wilfrid Sellars learned the hard way that pragmatics cannot be formalised (Olen 2012, 2016; Westphal 2015e: §6.2).

Carnap’s monumental formalisations of syntax and semantics develop the most sophisticated techniques available for using the ‘formal’ mode of speech for philosophical analysis (Carnap 1928b). The strategy is to restate philosophical issues which initially arise in the ‘material’ mode of speech, purporting to be about objects, events, persons, processes, principles or values. Formulated in those terms, many philosophical problems resist or defy solution. Reformulating them in the ‘formal’ mode of speech, as meta-linguistic statements about sentences rather than substantives; *i.e.*, about nouns, verbs, predicates, linguistic copulae or propositions, rather than about things, properties, persons, actions or their relations – allows philosophers to use the technical resources of formalised syntax and semantics to avoid or to resolve the original object-level, material mode confusions or problems which have plagued philosophy from Parmenides to Putnam.²

² Stated directly, their distinction amounts to this: The ‘material’ mode of speech is ordinary, natural language discourse about things, events, persons, processes, principles or
Classical analytic philosophy aspired to conceptual analysis, *i.e.*, to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of any interesting though puzzling or controversial term, phrase, concept or principle. However, conceptual analysis is inadequate for understanding science. It is also inadequate for epistemology (Gettier 1963). In part this is because philosophical puzzles or problems typically do not arise in isolation; typically they belong to networks of issues, puzzles and problems. Accordingly, the conceptual analysis of any one key concept rarely suffices, by itself, to resolve any serious philosophical issue. Instead, some network of related terms, principles and uses must be clarified, by developing an improved linguistic framework for the relevant domain of issues or phenomena. Carnap’s use of the formal mode of speech developed conceptual explications into explicitly defined «linguistic frameworks».

Carnap’s semantics are the pinnacle of logical empiricist thought, which remains invaluable today, both for its insights and for its shortcomings. Carnap specified far more carefully than any other empiricist what sorts of semantic meaning can be assigned to high-level theoretical statements within a scientific theory, and what aspect(s) of their semantic content can be confirmed by empirical observations. Carnap recommended the most liberal approach to the semantics of theoretical statements consistent with empiricism about confirmation. His liberality about syntactic forms and semantic content worried his empiricist colleagues,
who feared that Carnap’s semantics condoned all sorts of metaphysical excesses which logical positivism had sought to banish from philosophy. Carnap replied by distinguishing three different questions one may ask about any linguistic framework. In brief, Carnap argued in «Empiricism Semantics and Ontology» (1950a) that significant, meaningful questions about what exists or what occurs and how it occurs can be raised only within some specified linguistic framework. Within that framework, and using the methods of investigation and analysis specified within it, we can determine whether any specified kind of object, event or phenomenon exists or occurs. Accordingly, existence questions raised within any linguistic framework are always empirical questions, not metaphysical questions. Those are the first kind of question.

The second kind of question purports to be a metaphysical question about alleged truths, facts or beings, independently of any linguistic framework. This second kind of question, however, lacks any definite sense (meaning) and also any definite truth-value. Accordingly, purported metaphysical issues or questions are meaningless; commit them to the flames, as Hume (1748: §12) advised!

There is a third kind of question: whether to adopt any specific linguistic framework, or which linguistic framework might work better than another for some purpose. This third kind of question, Carnap argued, is entirely practical and is always a matter of degree and estimate. Consequently, such questions and their answers lack bivalence and so lack any truth value; these questions call for decisions, not for reasons which justify any theoretical or cognitive claim.

3.2 I return to this point about adopting (or rejecting) linguistic frameworks shortly. First a word about his other important development in 1950, when Carnap (1950b: 1–18) explicated his method of philosophical explication, which he had been using since at least 1928. The conceptual (explication) of a term or principle provides a clarified, though partial specification of its meaning or significance, for certain purposes, and seeks to improve upon the original term or phrase within its original or proposed context(s) of use. Explications are thus both revisable and are rooted in actual usage and thus in prior linguistic practices, which are
rooted within whatever practices use the relevant terms or phrases in context. Successful explication aims to better facilitate the practice from which the explicandum derives.

It is striking and significant that Kant drew exactly this same distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication, using these same terms, and for very much the same reasons in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*KprV*: A727–30/B755–8). Mere analysis of concepts is insufficient for understanding or resolving any substantive issue in philosophy, whether in practical or in theoretical philosophy. All the key concepts required in practical and in theoretical philosophy can at best be explicated, sufficiently for the purposes of a specific inquiry; none of them can be defined by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for their proper use. (This is one main source of the terminological flexibility which vexes many of Kant’s readers.)

This distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication maps neatly onto the distinction between semantic internalism and externalism. According to semantic internalism, any and all conceptual content or linguistic meaning (descriptive content, intension) can be fully specified without reference to anything non-mental, in particular, without reference to any features of one’s physical environment, or to features of one’s merely somatic (bodily) states. In contrast, according to semantic externalism, at least some conceptual content or linguistic meaning (descriptive content, intension) can be fully specified only by reference to non-mental, non-linguistic or non-conceptual phenomena, especially, by reference to objects, events or persons in someone’s physical environment, or perhaps to features of someone’s merely somatic (bodily) states.

In brief, conceptual analysis requires semantic internalism, because only if we can identify by reflection upon our concepts or our meanings their exact content or significance (intension), can we also determine whether any purported ‘conceptual analysis’ is complete, and so provides the necessary and the sufficient conditions for its proper use. Conversely, conceptual explication requires semantic externalism, because only within the original context of the use of a term, phrase or principle can its explication be assessed, as either improving upon or failing to improve
upon the original within its proper context of use. That usage will be, not merely a manner of speaking, but a manner of speaking developed to aid or facilitate some activity, typically some form of inquiry, the context of which in part determines the content or significance (intension) of the original term or phrase, and also of the newly explicated concept. Accordingly, conceptual explications are tied to the context in which the relevant speech-acts occur and have their sense, point and purpose.

3.3 Carnap’s semantic views in 1950 point in two opposite directions: His (1950a) empiricist account of ‘ontology’ as always internal to one or another linguistic framework requires semantic internalism, because the linguistic framework alone specifies the relevant ontology of the relevant context of linguistic use. However, Carnap’s (1950b) account of conceptual explication requires semantic externalism, because only framework independent facts – at an utter minimum, rates at which various mundane regularities occur – can provide any context for assessing whether, how or how well any new conceptual explication improves upon whatever term or phrase it explicates, and so can provide any reasons pro or contra to adopt or reject any specific linguistic framework. Carnap never reconciled these two tendencies. His framework-internal ontology (1950a), however, is untenable for internal reasons, and also for a further reason, widely neglected by his successors. Carnap recognised, indeed he insisted, that his formal syntax and his formal semantics were only two aspects of any complete semantics. The third aspect he called «descriptive semantics»; its task is to identify which observation statements are uttered by natural scientists. In fact, what Carnap calls «descriptive semantics» belongs to the third class of linguistic studies identified by Morris, namely to pragmatics. Without this pragmatic «descriptive semantics», Carnap’s linguistic frameworks are – as he notes – nothing but uninterpreted semi-axiomatic systems, altogether lacking empirical significance or use. (In this crucial regard, Carnap was not the «formalist» he is so widely reputed to be.) In fact, Carnap’s «linguistic frameworks» are conceptual explications writ large, as formalised fragments of a language

suited to one or another form of empirical inquiry, investigation or experimentation.

Now semantic externalism is fundamental to classical American pragmatism. According to classical American pragmatism, our *pragma* – what we do, how we do it, and what we do it with; in short: our practices and procedures – have philosophical priority over whatever we say about our practices, because they have (*inter alia*) semantic priority over what we say about our practices.

In contrast, according to neo-pragmatism, what there is, what we do, what we can say, and what we can ascribe to one another as believing are all hostage to one’s preferred, merely conventional meta-language (of whatever kind or level). Neo-pragmatism clings to Carnap’s (1950a) untenable view, according to which ‘ontology’ is hostage to one’s preferred linguistic framework. Neo-pragmatism only appeals to ‘pragmatics’ as the third, poor cousin to formalisable syntax and semantics, as a garbage category for whatever cannot be assimilated to formalisable techniques. To the neo-pragmatists, ‘pragmatism’ is no more than another rather chatty species doing its best to muddle through.

The route back to genuine pragmatic realism is via Carnap’s account of conceptual explication and its semantic externalism. Let me illustrate this contrast with a brief example drawn from Huw Price and discussed by Jonathan Knowles in *Realism, Science & Pragmatism* (p. 204ff), about linguistic reference, that is, about how what we say is or can be *about* anything else we purport to discuss.

3.4 Consider whether linguistic or cognitive reference is a significant, substantial relation between any person and any particulars about which s/he makes a claim or statement. Presumably, such reference relations are proper subject matter for empirical linguistics, cognitive psychology, philosophy of language and epistemology. Accordingly, different theories of reference must be true of actual linguistic reference, however it occurs; yet only one can be true of actual linguistic reference, and different theories of reference must be able to conflict (disagree) with one another. Call actual linguistic reference ‘reference’.

Price (2004, 82–3) asks us to consider two theories of reference,
called \(T\) and \(Z\). According to

Theory \(T\): (1) \(\text{Reference} = \text{relation } R\).

In contrast, however, according to

Theory \(Z\): (2) \(\text{Reference} = \text{relation } R^*\).

Hence these two theories of reference appear to conflict about what \textit{reference} is, or how \textit{reference} occurs, or how we \textit{refer} to whatever we discuss. Price argues, however, that according to theories \(T\) and \(Z\) what actually holds is, respectively, the following: According to

Theory \(T\): (3) \(\langle \text{Reference}\rangle \) stands in relation \(R\) to \(R\).

Whereas, according to

Theory \(Z\): (4) \(\langle \text{Reference}\rangle \) stands in relation \(R^*\) to \(R^*\).

Claims (3) and (4) do not conflict. Therefore, Price concludes, reference is not a substantial, empirically specifiable relation; there is no such phenomenon as \textit{reference}, there are no facts about what actual linguistic reference is. This is Price’s «deflationary» view of \textit{reference}.

Price’s argument cannot be sound; I do not think it can even be valid. How can \textit{Price} the deflationist about \textit{reference}, formulate statements (3) or (4)? How can the advocates of Theory \(T\) or Theory \(Z\) affirm either statement (1) or (2)? These statements, and anyone’s capacity to \textit{formulate}, to \textit{assert} or to \textit{deny} them, requires theorists of reference, including Price, to refer meta-linguistically to linguistic formulations of theories of linguistic \textit{reference}. Now if actual linguistic \textit{reference} is supposed to be problematic, why is meta-linguistic reference to any \textit{theory} of reference – especially someone \textit{else’s} theory of reference – any less problematic?

What, exactly, enables \textit{Price} the deflationist about reference to refer to anyone \textit{else’s} theory of \textit{reference}, without using the very resources of linguistic \textit{reference} he purports to deflate? I pose this challenge to such deflationists: to explain cogently how they can refer meta-linguistically to anyone’s theory of \textit{reference}, or to anyone’s theory of \langle reference\rangle, without invoking referential resources officially denied by their defla-
tionary view(s) of «reference».

Here we have a meta-linguistic situation exactly parallel to an important point of Carnap’s semantic practice which Quine never understood, and for which Carnap’s own semantic theory could not account. Carnap always used natural languages as informal meta-languages in which to formulate his formalised syntax and his formalised semantics. That is no problem, so long as one understands what one is doing. Carnap himself did not adequately understand what he was doing in this regard, insofar as he sought to treat mere marks as meaningful symbols. For example, «∧» by itself is just an angle, but has no meaning (neither semantic intension nor extension). Within some logical notations, «∧» is used to indicate exclusive disjunction; in others, «∧» is used to indicate addition; in Euclidean geometry it designates an indicated «angle». The reason why semiotics was not the boon to philosophy and to the sciences that Peirce, Charles Morris and others (such as Apel) expected is that marks do no semiotic jobs by themselves; we use marks as signs or symbols. Their intelligent use by us makes signs or symbols out of mere marks, as Sellars rightly pointed out in criticism of Carnap’s formal semantics (Westphal 2015e: §6.4).

To bring this point back to Price’s deflationary view of reference (or of «reference»): If linguistic reference is only what one or another theory happens to say «reference» is – this is the only sense to be made of Price’s statements (3) and (4) –, then no one can or does refer to anything without first formulating and affirming a theory of reference! And this is paradoxical in the extreme, because affirming any theory of «reference» requires referring to that «theory», which requires being able to refer to that «theory»! By Price’s reasoning, no one can refer to one’s own preferred «theory of «reference»» without first formulating and affirming one’s own preferred «meta-meta-theory of «meta-reference»» – a meta-theoretical «theory of «reference»» used for referring to any «theory of «reference»», etc. This anti-realist, allegedly deflationary regress is infinite, vicious and absurd. (And it has an exact parallel for sceptical versions of the (solely) «intertextual» views of language popular amongst many post-modernists.)
3.5 I hope this argument from Price may recall its progenitor, Kuhn’s (1976: 101–2) argument for the alleged «incommensurability» of Classical Newtonian Mechanics and Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, which cannot conflict (he argued) because the term «mass» is not used the same way in both theories. Instead, according to Classical Mechanics, mass is a constant, independent of velocity, whereas according to General Relativity, mass varies with velocity. Both Kuhn’s argument about «mass» and Price’s argument about «reference» require a strong semantic internalism, together with a «descriptions» theory of reference, according to which any term, phrase or proposition refers only and exactly to whatever is described when the content (intension) of that term, phrase or proposition is completely analysed into an explicit description. In fact, both Kuhn’s argument about «mass» and Price’s about «reference» descend directly from Carnap’s (1950a) account of framework-internal truth and ontology. Indeed, Carnap’s (1956) semantics directly prefigures Kuhn’s account of revolutionary theoretical change and consequent theoretical incommensurability in the natural sciences.

4. Recovering the Kantian roots of pragmatic realism

Kant’s philosophy was enormously important in many ways to the Classical American pragmatists, especially to Peirce and to C.I. Lewis (1929). In my own research in epistemology I’ve taken a different route to recovering the Kantian roots of pragmatic realism, by following an important methodological imperative of Hegel’s: to assess a philosophical view so far as possible strictly internally, on grounds provided by that view itself. One result of examining Kant’s Transcendental Idealism in this way is that Hegel is correct: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism is subject to a devastating, strictly internal critique, which shows that Kant’s key arguments for Transcendental Idealism are not merely unsound, but invalid – fallacious – for reasons Kant himself provides within the Transcendental An-
alytic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This internal critique further shows that Hegel is also correct about a second finding: This internal critique of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism shows how to disentangle Kant’s brilliant critique of rational judgment – throughout his Critical corpus – from his idealism, and how to re-ground Kant’s critique of rational judgment on a broadly naturalistic, realistic basis. This finding has a third important implication: It shows how to honour empiricist misgivings about Kant’s own synthetic *a priori* principles (according to which the most fundamental laws of nature are legislated – *i.e.*, generated and instituted – by the structure and functioning of our finite human minds), whilst reconstructing two sound, genuinely transcendental proofs of mental content externalism.

According to mental content internalism, any and all contents of awareness, or any and all ‹mental› content, can be fully specified without reference to anything non-mental, in particular, without reference to any features of one’s physical environment, or to features of one’s merely somatic (bodily) states. In contrast, according to mental content externalism, at least some ‹mental› contents can be fully specified only by reference to non-mental phenomena, especially, by reference to objects or events in one’s physical environment, or perhaps to features of one’s merely somatic (bodily) states.

Now the key, entirely justifiable and entirely justified thesis of Kant’s «Refutation of Idealism» is that, for us human beings:

> Inner experience in general is only possible through outer experience in general. (*KdrV*: B278)

The main point of Kant’s proof is this: For any human being, if s/he is so much as conscious of some sensory appearances appearing before, during or after others, then s/he is in fact aware of, and has some knowledge of, at least some perceptible, causally interacting spatio-temporal objects,

---

4 For a concise presentation of the key points in Hegel’s critique of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, see Westphal (2004b).

5 Some of these results are presented in Westphal (2015c), (2015d); they are developed in detail in Westphal (forthcoming).
events or persons within his or her surroundings (Westphal 2004a: §65). In short, Kant’s sound transcendental analyses prove mental content externalism.

Kant’s transcendental proofs of mental content externalism block the sceptical generalisation from occasional perceptual error or illusion to the possibility of global perceptual scepticism. Kant’s Critical method cautions us throughout to assess the explication of our key concepts, terms, phrases or principles in actual contexts of their possible use, not in merely possible contexts of their imaginary use! In this crucial regard, Kant joins with Classical American Pragmatism in rejecting Cartesianism, in all its internalist varieties, including rather too much of contemporary ‘analytical’ philosophy, and especially neo-pragmatism.

Consider these basic methodological questions:

What, if anything, can guide a proper conceptual analysis or explication?

On what basis can a conceptual analysis or explication be assessed?

Most importantly:

What can limit or counter-act the importation of linguistic or conceptual confusions into a conceptual analysis or explication?

On these important methodological issues Wilfrid Sellars followed the sage advice of Aristotle: Because philosophical issues are so complex, elusive and easily obscured by incautious phrasing, one must consult carefully the opinions of the many and the wise. Sellars (1968, 62, 71, 77) found the wise throughout philosophical history, from the pre-Socratics to the present day, because core issues regarding the logical forms of thought and the connections of thought with things are perennial, arising in distinctive, paradigmatic forms in each era (Sellars 1968, 67–9). One result of Sellars’ expansive research is a detailed catalogue and critical assessment of philosophical locutions, that is, of the ‘ordinary language’ (so to speak) of philosophers. Only by examining these can one find the most suitable, least misleading formulations of issues, specific theses, distinctions and their relations. Thus even when cast in the formal mode of speech, any philosophical use of conceptual analysis or explication
must be systematic as well as historical and textual; indeed an analysis or explication can only be systematic by also being historical and textual. The semantic interconnection amongst philosophical issues, via the semantic relations amongst their central terms, provides a further crucial check against inapt formulations. Philosophy without exacting scrutiny of its history is both blind and empty; likewise history of philosophy without exacting philosophical scrutiny is both blind and empty. Professor Parrini understands this very well; this is the point of his commending Herbart’s (1837: §§1, 4, 6, 7, 30 Anm., 47, 149, 151) sense of conceptual Bearbeitung, which as Herbart’s discussion and his subsequent works make plain, requires taking carefully into account the actual uses of key concepts, phrases and principles, together with their associated terminology and activities within their respective disciplines.⁶

References

ALSTON, W.  

BRANDOM, R.  

CARNAP, R.  
1928a *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, Weltkreis, Berlin.

⁶ One reason for the incisiveness of the first generation of English analytic philosophers is that they had all trained in Classics. Recently I learned from Graham Bird, who had studied under Austin, that Austin advocated wide reading in the field. This surely has much to do with the cogency of his ordinary language philosophising.

I acknowledge with gratitude that research for this paper was supported financially in part by the Office of the Dean of Ars & Sciences, and by the Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Research Fund (BAP), grant code: 9761.


1934 *Logische Syntax der Sprache*. Vienna, Springer.


CARUTHERS, P.


CHALMERS, A.


DOHRN, D.


EVANS, G.


FERRINI, C., with NASTI DE VINCENTIS, M.
1995 Guida al De orbitis planetarum di Hegel ed alle sue edizioni e traduzioni. La pars destruens, P. Haupt, Bern.

FERRINI, C.

FRIEDMAN, M.

GETTIER, E.
1963 «Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?», Analysis 23(6), 121–123.

GOODMAN, N.

GUYER, P.

HARPER, W.

HEGEL, G.W.F.
1986–2009 Gesammelte Werke, 21 vols., Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, with the Hegel-Kommission der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Hegel-Archiv der Ruhr-Universität Bochum (EDS.), Hamburg, Meiner; cited as «GW» by volume: page.line numbers. Individual works are indicated by their German initials.

HERBART, J.F.

33
HUME, D.
1748 *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by T. Beau-

HUGGETT, N., SMITH, G., MILLER, D.M., and HARPER, W.
s11016-013-9745-y.

JAMES, W.
1907 *Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking*, Longmans,

KNOWLES, J.
2014 «Naturalism without Metaphysics», in: K.R. Westphal (ED.), *Realism,

KUHN, T.
1962 *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3d ed., 1996, University of

LAYMON, R.
1987 «Using Scott Domains to Explicate the Notions of Approximate and
Idealized Data», *Philosophy of Science* 54(2), 194–221.
1991 «Thought Experiments of Stevin, Mach and Gouy: Thought Experi-
ments as Ideal Limits and as Semantic Domains», in T. Horowitz & G.
Massey (EDS.), *Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy* (Row-

LEWIS, C.I.
1923 «A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori», *The Journal of Philosophy*
20(7), 169–177.
1929 *Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge*,

MACH, E.
McCormack, Open Court, LaSalle, Ill..

MORETTO, A.
2004 *Filosofia della Matematica e della Meccanica del sistema Hegeliano*,
NIINILUOTO, I.

O’NEILL, O.

OLEN, P.

PARRINI, P.
1976 Linguaggio e teoria. Due saggi di analisi filosofica, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze.
PEIRCE, C.S.


PHILSTRÖM, S.


2003 \textit{Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmatic View}, Prometheus/Humanity Books, Amherst, NY.


PRICE, H.

REDDING, P.

RENAULT, E.
ROSENKRANZ, S.,  

SCHEIBE, E.  

SCHAEFER, R.  
2011 «A Defence of AI-Functionalism against Brandom’s Arguments from Holism and the Frame Problem», *Dialogue* 50(4), 741–750.

SELLARS, W.  

TRAVIS, C.  


WASZEK, N.  

WESTPHAL, K.R.  


2015b «Some Replies to Remarks and Queries by Professor Parrini, Students and Members of the Audience», *Esercizi Filosofici* (Trieste) 10(1), 63–79.

2015c «Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*», in N. Gascoigne
(ED.), Hegel and Pragmatism; Hegel Bulletin 36(2), 159–186.


2016c «Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophical Semantics and Synthetic Necessary Truths», in S. Brandt and A. Breunig (EDS.), Sellars’s Place in Twentieth-Century Philosophy (Routledge, London).

forthcoming Grounds of Pragmatic Realism: Hegel’s Internal Critique and Transformation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy.

WICK, W.


WILL, F.L.


WIMSATT, W.C.


WOLFF, M.

1986 «Hegel und Cauchy. Eine Untersuchung zur Philosophie und Geschich-
te der Mathematik», in R.-P. Horstmann (ED.), *Hegel und die Naturwissenschaften*, frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 197–263.