TOWARDS A MORE PRECISE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CONTEXT AND SITUATION,
INTENTION AND SENSE

Sergio Viaggio
United Nations, Wien

Introduction

This work is intended to help interpretation and translation teachers place more precisely before their students a text in the speech situation, a condicio sine qua non in order to disentangle sense from the web of linguistic meanings. It is a truism that no utterance\textsuperscript{1} can be correctly interpreted in a vacuum, as a specimen of a language, rather than as an act of speech, i.e. as a specific use of language in a given situation. In specialised literature the crucial distinction is ever more often made between linguistic meaning and extra-linguistic sense – the latter understood, precisely, as the substantive communicative content of a message, what the speaker means to say with what he says: the Paris school's vouloir dire. This sense may be defined, grosso modo, as the vector resulting from the linguistic meaning of the message and the sender's communicative intention within the specific speech situation. Of these three factors, the first is the only relatively non-controversial one; the second is already more complex (what about the unconscious intention? and what about the lapsus linguæ, the betrayal of conscious intention?); while the third encompasses everything besides the utterance itself, including, at times, the sender's very intention. In order to name it, the term usually resorted to is that jack-of-all-trades "context", which, to boot, also covers the purely linguistic surroundings. So if the conceptual and terminological distinction between meaning and sense is already established (though, unfortunately, not enough), there still prevails in literature an indiscriminate use of "context" and "situation".

The first one to distinguish terminologically linguistic context from extra-linguistic situation, to my knowledge, is Catford (1969), who calls them respectively "co-text" and "context". (The terminology is semantically apt, but "co-text" is perhaps too jarring, and practically no one I have read – Wilss,

\textsuperscript{1} Notice that I use the terms text and utterance interchangeably: for my purposes the difference is but quantitative (a text is an utterance or series of utterances), since the notions I am about to develop apply to both. I do, nevertheless, make the distinctions sender/utterer, and receiver/addressee.
notably, excepted – has dared pick it up.) Catford is among the first clearly to understand that translation cannot be the sheer mechanical substitution of linguistic units: two utterances, he tells us, are equivalent when they are interchangeable in the same situation. He illustrates this point through his famous example "Ja prishlá I have come",² where the array of semes and morphemes relevant in Russian and English to describe the same event coincides only partially. But for Catford the same situation seems to be an identical event: every time a girl has come on foot she will say "ja prishlá" in Russian, and "I have come" in English. Of course, things are not that simple. What matters is not the features chosen by languages but those selected by speakers, i.e. those features intentionally expressed or left implicit taking advantage of a specific language's freedoms and bowing to the servitudes (Vinay 1980). (Witness the controversy around the definite article in UN Security Council 242, which in English urges Israel to withdraw "from occupied territories", which can be interpreted hypothetically, and in French "des territoires occupés", giving to understand that they effectively exist.³)

Almost 30 years later, two books appear simultaneously that do indeed elaborate the distinction: Neubert (1985) and Lvovkaya (1985, with an updated Spanish version in 1997). Neubert describes the situation as a series of concentric circles going further away from the text to reach culture. Among the many outstanding insights in this work is the concept of linguistic 'framing' of

---

² Catford supplies the following list of relevant features picked up respectively in both languages:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{speaker} & : \quad ja \\
\text{female} & \\
\text{arrival} & : \quad \text{on foot} \\
\text{prior event} & : \quad \begin{aligned}
\text{linked to} & \\
\text{present} & \\
\text{completed} & \\
\text{singular occurrence} & 
\end{aligned}
\]

³ Of course, everybody knew what territories it was all about, so there was indeed no misunderstanding. The French text (adopted at the same time as the English one) says what is said in French to say what the collective sender means – as does, respectively, the English text. The greater generality of the English version is a fact of language and not of speech. The French definite article is nothing but a servitude; the alleged controversy, as is the case with every legalistic tug-of-war, is in bad faith, typical of those instances where the Gricean maxim of cooperation (the addressee is willing to understand) falls overboard.
the situation. Russian and English frame differently Catford's situation (the naturalness of framing – i.e. idiomaticity – becomes, precisely, one of the fundamental criteria of translation quality.) Lvovskaya explains the text's sensic structure as a hierarchical function of a) what she calls the speech situation (whose formants are who, to whom, why, what for, how, where, and when) – the product of the interaction of the sender's personality and the relevant circumstances of communication, which motivates the sender's specific linguistic behaviour and the means of its realisation; b) the text's pragmatic substructure – the internal programme of linguistic behaviour, formed in the sender's conscience under the influence of the speech situation, which appears as a series of communicative tasks subject to a main task and to the logic of speech development; and c) the semantic substructure – the objectual, conceptual and linguistic content of a text, its context, and, at the same time, the linguistic form of the realisation of the sender's communicative intention.

Lvovskaya's scheme is the only systematic attempt at analysing the situation I know of, although she does so in the narrow sense just described. Two basic criticisms come to mind: To begin with, in the semantic substructure, Lvovskaya mixes qualitatively dissimilar elements: one thing is the objectual reference, another its conceptualisation (both extra-linguistic), and quite another the way they are both assigned linguistic meaning. But what interests me for my present purposes is that between the sender's personality and his communicative intention, extra-linguistic context, and culture (which Lvovskaya leaves out), there remains around the utterance too wide a space for us to make do with the simple categories of sense and situation.

Communication through speech

In order to understand the models that follow, we have to bear in mind that a) the subjects of communication are specific, historically and situationally conditioned human beings interacting within social reality – i.e. within the production and exchange of commodities and models of the world, b) the essence of communication is exchanging what García Landa (1990) calls "speech-informed perceptions" ("espacios perceptuales hablísticos" or "EPHs" in Viaggio 1998 and Viaggio, in press) as a part of such general social interaction, c) the motivation of communication is a wish (conscious or unconscious, healthy or neurotic, magnanimous or selfish) for what is perceived as a favourable modification or consolidation of the perceived state of the world and/or one's position in it, and d) the purpose of communication is to help achieve such a wish. In principle, in order to do this, neither language nor speech need necessarily enter into play: a smile or a growl will sometimes do (which, of course, would be impossible in animal species incapable of intentional semiotic communication). But in the
overwhelming majority of economically significant exchanges all three are unavoidable, and that is precisely why they evolved. It is in this general production and exchange of commodities and models of the world that all translational speech acts take place.

The García Landa/Viaggio model of verbal communication

Every act of human communication, whether speech-informed or not, is an exchange of mental perceptions. In the case of verbal communication, the perception that is conveyed is mediated and informed by speech and articulated in linguistic signs. In any written or oral speech-act what is communicated is an intended speech-informed perception ("espacio perceptual hablístico intenđido" or "EPHI") – a mental representation that is the result of perceiving that which one wishes to convey as a synthesis of thought and speech. Communication is achieved as long as the receiver manages to generate in his mind a comprehended speech-informed perception ("espacio perceptual hablístico comprendido" or "EPHC") that holds an identity relationship with the one intended. If this identity is achieved, communication has succeeded – regardless of the means or language(s). If, on the other hand, it is not, then communication has failed, in spite of the interlocutors' or the mediator's competence and effort. May I remind the reader that, according to this concept, the biological ability of language (materialised in different languages) is but an organising mechanism for speech, which, far from being reduced to it, largely transcends it. Speech itself is only a social sensorial vehicle – more often than not decisive, but nothing more. Mental perceptions and linguistic signs are ontologically different notions – as are linguistic chains and utterances (i.e. language and speech). Through semantic representations, linguistic signs weld a mental perception and speech (for some 250 milliseconds); the semantic potential crystallised in the semantic representations is the semantic form of the mental perception, and, together with the other forms (morpho-syntactic and phonic) constitutes the linguistic form of the EPHI, whose content is meaning meant, i.e. sense. This perceptual identity, as a socially relevant commonality

4 García Landa's models of verbal communication and translation (initially formulated in his 1978 doctoral thesis and published in 1990 and developed in 1998) are, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive, refined and rigorously formalised to date. Lately we both have been developing them and synthesising them in a mediation model (García Landa & Viaggio, in progress). The first version of our model was published in TEXTconTEXT (Viaggio 1998). The versions discussed here are the latest, as appear in Viaggio (in press).

5 Let me explain what such identity is. You and I both see the pencil you have in front of you from different angles and distances; maybe you are colour-blind and
of features between intended and comprehended EPHs, is at a higher level than equivalences or similarities at the utterance or textual levels – including the level of semantic representations (as when metaphor is reduced to sense or vice-versa).

We have two versions of our models: simple and expanded. In this paper I shall explain only the expanded ones, since they are more universally applicable to mediation. In our expanded model, every speech act is governed by a main pragmatic intention and several secondary pragmatic intentions, governed in turn by a conscious motivation that ends up diluting itself in the miasma of an unconscious motivation. In order for communication to succeed, it is not necessary (it may be even self-defeating) that the interlocutor grasp the pragmatic intention, the conscious motivation or, above all, the unconscious motivation behind the utterer's act (otherwise, manipulation would be ineffective) - decisive though these elements are in the production of any act of speech. Conscious motivation, unconscious motivation, main pragmatic intention and secondary pragmatic intentions are the motors of the speech act itself, and are therefore independent of the semiotic system that they draw on.

In its present form, the model can be summarised as follows:

1) Every act of speech D (whether oral V, written T, or interiorised I) in a given language o is a social transaction whereby someone (the subject of production) – out of a conscious motivation W, governed by an unconscious motivation (which, in order for communication to succeed must be attuned to the addressee's own unconscious predisposition) Z, with a main pragmatic intention Y and secondary pragmatic intentions y – wishes to communicate a perception EPHI which is a part of a given set of pre-comprehension schemes, knowledge base or passing theories K.

cannot make out its colour, but both you and I see the same pencil. In this sense and despite their differences, our perceptions are, nevertheless, relevantly identical. On the other hand, if I ask you for the red pencil – which, you, as a colour-blind person, cannot tell from the green one next to it – our perceptions are no longer relevantly identical and communication cannot prosper. In order for it to succeed, we must find perceptual identity through some other means (viz, that I ask you for the long pencil, or the one on your right, etc.). This is what normally happens in everyday communication: little by little we correct our aiming until we finally hit that target which is EPHI=EPHC.

What is truly relevant instead is that the speech act aptly function according to the kind of reception that the utterer wishes to achieve and the addressee expects: that it duly inform, move, convince, prompt, amuse, bore, etc. A text's or utterance's functionality is thus a synthesis between the speaker's or the addressee's skopos and verbalisation – homofunctionality obtains only if both utterer and receiver share the same or complementary skopos (viz. one wishes to teach and the other to learn).
2) To that effect, he sets in motion a complex mental operation which involves mainly constructing and presenting to his interlocutor(s) a finished social product which is a sign chain \( F \) in such language \( o \). Such chain consists of a) a phono-morpho-syntactic structure \( X \) (actualising a certain phono-morpho-syntactic system \( L \)); b) a semantic potential \( S \) (actualising a semantic system \( H \)); c) a rhythmico-prosodic structure \( V \) (actualising a rhythmico-prosodic system \( R \)); and d) a register \( J \) (from a register series \( Q \)).\(^7\) This chain is also necessarily accompanied by a series of supra segmental (paralinguistic or typographical) features \( C \), and kinetic or graphic features \( E \) that reinforce, nuance or modify its sense. (In face-to-face communication, then, the stimulus triggering the comprehension process consists of three components: \( F, C \) and \( E \), although the latter one is lost in strictly acoustical communications such as radio, telephone, etc., often making comprehension more difficult.\(^8\)

3) The speech act is carried out in a given social situation or socio-historical field \( G \) governed by a system of beliefs, norms and practices, or a certain life and personal experience \( P \), within a given relevant world \( M \), at a historic moment \( VH \), and, within that moment, at a specific time \( t \). (All components are characterised by specific set of features \( m, n, \) etc.).

4) Someone else (the subject of comprehension, who more often than not is the same person playing both roles, i.e. communicating with himself), is listening and understanding in a complex mental operation which results in his producing a perception \( EPHCo \), which is a propositional or perceptual component, both cognitive and affective, of the same knowledge base \( K \). (This base is not a 'fact'. It gravitates upon actualised facts; it consists of elements activable and activated in the speech act thus enabling communication; since what ultimately makes it possible is shared knowledge.) In order to do so, he must resort to or overcome his conscious or unconscious motivation or resistance \( U \) and \( Z \). We should stress the active nature of comprehension, whereby the comprehender (re-)constructs his speech perception of the speaker’s meaning meant retro-applying his own filters \( U, Z \) and \( K \) to the acoustic/optic stimulus \( [FCE] \). In our model, the unconscious motivation to be understood and understand are symbolised as \( Z \) in order to stress the all-important fact that unless both speaker and addressee are minimally attuned at the unconscious level, understanding cannot

\(^7\) It is not clear whether registers constitute a system.

\(^8\) Most kinds of restricted translation (subtitling, dubbing, comic books) are restricted, precisely, by \( E \): background images, lip movement, bubble size.
Towards a More Precise Distinction between Context and Situation

prosper, since the unconscious cannot, by definition, be consciously controlled.

Communications will have succeeded in so far as perceptual identity is achieved between what the speaker wants to convey (EPHI) and what the comprehender has understood (EPHC) – otherwise it will have failed to a greater or lesser degree. Since neither perception is open to observation, such identity is often impossible to verify empirically: it can only be postulated. This is in no way a drawback of our theory, but rather an inescapable empirical fact.

Depending on one’s purpose, the semantic representation could be seen either as $Sm^u$ or as the combination of $Sm^u$ and any of the other attributes of the sign chain $Fo$: $(Xm^t, Vm^r, \text{and} Jm^o)$, but bereft of the crucial extra-, para- and perilinguistic ingredients $W^o, Yy, K, C, E, G^P VHtm$, and $U^o$, which are indispensable both for the verbalisation and for the comprehension of an EPH. The key notion is that, whether written or oral, literary or not, a speech act is much more than its verbalised vehicle – which is, itself, more than its sheer linguistic chain. Resorting to the symbols alone (where $>$ indicates determination, and $<- or ->$ production, the mantissas represent the events and phenomena taking place in real space/time and the exponents the virtual systems or structures gravitating upon them) verbal communication is then formulated as:

$$D(V/T/I)o:$$

$$W^o > Yy > EPHI^o -> [Fo(Xm^t, Sm^u, Vm^r, Jm^o)(CmEm)]G^P VHtm <-> U^o > EPHC^o$$

As pointed out above, communication is achieved when, within a given objective situation influenced by subjective emotional and cognitive factors, perceptual identity is established between what the speaker wishes to convey and what the interlocutor understands:

$$G^P (EPHIo= EPHCo)$$

Our general model of translation

On the basis of our model of verbal communication, García Landa gives a disarmingly simple definition of translation (in its broader sense): translating is talking, a language game whose object is to isolate and reproduce in another language meanings meant – in other words: sense. The translator substitutes himself for the comprehender: in the first speech act Do, he understands on his behalf, he generates his EPHCo, and then, in a second act Di, he substitutes himself for the speaker, producing his own EPHIi and gauging all of the new
factors relevant for its verbalisation in a new chain of linguistic signs $Fr(Xn^i, Sn^k, Vn^k, Jn^k)CnEn$. Thus the general model of translation would be a production of a new speech act — but never a simple mirror-duplication of the original one — in order to convey the same $EPHI$ except that in a new language $i$:

$$W^e > Yy > EPHi^k_o -> [Fo(Xm^i, Sx^m, Vx^m, Jx^m)CmEm] \sim G^m VHm <-> U^p > EPHC^k_o ->$$

$$\rightarrow (W^e > Yy >) EPHi^k_i -> [Fi(Xn^i, Sn^k, Vn^k, Jn^k)CnEn] \sim G^m VHm+n <-> U^p > EPHC^k_i$$

Where the sub-indexes $m$ and $n$ stand for the individual, specific, ad hoc features of the respective exponents $X$, $S$, $V$, $J$, $C$, $E$, and $VHt$, and the sub-indexes $o$ and $i$ for the respective languages, and where the subjectivity of the translator plays a subordinate role: he does not 'tamper' with the $EPHIi$, he simply re-verbalises it. In order for translation to have succeeded, the result must be the same as in monolingual communication:

$$G^m (EPHIi = EPHCi)$$

García Landa and I thus assimilate the translational speech-act to the monolingual one: human beings understand each other (directly or through a mediator) when they attain perceptual identity, which is never complete, since there is no such thing as total communication, but which, partial and limited as it is, often suffices, as corroborated by the fact that the species still survives. It should be kept in mind that the model offers an abstract, ideal reference point, a zero point from which to measure the variations, deviations and distortions typical of any applicatio. The model does not prescribe what to do so that communication or translation succeed: it simply lists the factors necessarily intervening in both and states when it can be said to have succeeded. In other words, it states the conditions a verbal activity must satisfy in order to qualify as a translation — what translation is.

Our sub-model of written communication

Our model of the written speech act consists of two distinct phases: the act of writing $DT$ and the act(s) of reading $DL_{(n)}$, that can be widely separated in time and space, whereby the different acts of reading take place at different moments and in sometimes radically different situations. Comprehension is thus scattered across time and space in a constellation of $EPHC$s around a postulated but more often than not inaccessible archetypical $EPHC$ (viz. what all the different understandings of a "No Smoking" sign or of Hamlet have in common).

In the first phase, there is no other $EPHC$ than that of the writer himself, who, consciously or unconsciously, assumes that the eventual reader(s) will
Towards a More Precise Distinction between Context and Situation

evoke it too. In our model of this phase, we leave out, then, the pole of comprehension - $U^Z$ and $EPHC$:

$$DTo: W^x > Yy > EPH^k_o -> [Fo(Xm^L, Sm^I, Vm^R, Jm^O)CmEm]G^{0M}VH_{m+n}$$

The writer assumes that others will evoke his own $EPHC$, but he does not know it for sure: he lives his own solitary perception of what he means to convey – he is his sole interlocutor. In this respect, writing resembles inner speech, where intention and comprehension interact within the same scull. The lone author of a sonnet, a letter or a job application both writes and reads, produces an $EPHI$ and perceives it as $EPHC$. Such self-comprehension often leaves him dissatisfied and he rushes to modify either $Fo$ or the very $EPHI$. Each phrase before you, dear reader, has jumped the net countless times.

In the second phase, the reader finds himself before the isolated chain $Fo$, and must interpret it often without reference to the original communicative situation or the person who has left it behind – which, by the way, explains the sacralisation of the text: The inaccessible God-author must be interpreted through his Word. Thus, in our model of this phase what is left out is the pole of intention – $W^Z$, $Yy$ and $EPHI^k_o$. Also left out are prosody $V$ and register $J$, which, in actual fact, must be inferred (the way we infer them from the classical Latin and Greek texts) – even if the writer meant to set them down. The reader produces an $EPHC$ believing it matches the author's $EPHI$, except that, alone as he finds himself before the silent page, in a reading situation at times centuries and oceans apart from the original one, he may miscalculate (in which case, of course, communication fails). Reading, as we see, has also a lot in common with inner speech – except that this time around it is the reader who plays the intention/comprehension game inside his head, imagining himself as the author, meaning to mean.

$$DLo: [Fo(Xm^L, Sm^I)Em]G^{0M}VH_{m+n} <-> U^x > EPH^k_o$$

In García Landa's words, the "existential" separation between $DL$ and $DT$ is due to the technique of writing itself. Graphic signs, imprinted upon matter that can be displaced and reproduced, make possible, nay, inevitable a multitude of acts of reading by the same or different readers. The model of the act of reading will therefore be the sum total of potential individual acts.9

---

9 This model can be extrapolated to repeated hearings of the same verbal speech act (such as recordings, films, etc.).
Our model of the reading speech act represents the whole series of possible readings; consequently, the model of the text ends up being the relationship between these two phases:

\[
DLo_i: [\text{Fo}(Xm^L, Sm^H, Vm^g, Jm^O)CmEm]G_i^\text{PM} VHm+n_1 \iff U^g > \text{EPHC}^k o_i \\
DLo_2: [\text{Fo}(Xm^L, Sm^H, Vm^g, Jm^O)CmEm]G_2^\text{PM} VHm+n_2 \iff U^g > \text{EPHC}^k o_2 \\
\vdots \\
DLo_n: [\text{Fo}(Xm^L, Sm^H, Vm^g, Jm^O)CmEm]G_n^\text{PM} VHm+n_n \iff U^g > \text{EPHC}^k o_n
\]

This multiplicity of readings explains the multiplicity of translations: as the translator himself changes or society evolves, so do different individual or collective readings of the same texts, and with them the individual or collective EPHCos – and, in the case of translators, EPHLis.\(^{10}\)

On the basis of this model, may I thus proceed to suggest a draft classification of the space around an utterance with its relevant terminology.

An utterance

Let the reader keep in mind the following example. At a party, chatting with his male friends, a young man points at Mary, a sumptuous fellow student, and says: 'By the way, you know, that girl I know very well.'

1) This side of the utterance

a) The sender's personality

Every act of speech is, undoubtedly, the work of a "personality", single or collective – a synthesis of the sender's psychological, intellectual and social background, which influences or determines his linguistic behaviour, i.e. the form and content of the utterance. Our model does not explicitly incorporate the utterer's or the addressee's personality, which are subsumed under \(K\).

b) The sender's communicative intention and conscious and unconscious motivations

The intersection of the personality of the sender (who can be the originator or the utterer himself) and the need, or conscious (\(W\)) or unconscious (\(Z\)) wish to express something to someone is synthesised in the utterance (\(F\)) – the product and linguistically framed materialisation of a pragmatic intention.

---

10 Naturally, this applies to speech in general and also to interpretation, but it is in written translation that it appears more obviously.
(Yy). It can be the intention of a specific utterer – a historically, socially, and psychologically conditioned person – or that of a similarly conditioned but de-personalised utterer, often expressed through an anonymous and irrelevant utterer, as is the case with most pragmatic texts. But let it be clear that even when we can no longer speak of an individual utterer, behind the text there is always the State, a social group, interests that produce it or command its production.

The motivation may be varied: to communicate true or false information to, to show to or hide from, to create a genuine or misleading impression in a specific individual or collective addressee. This interlocutor can be real or imaginary, or even the very sender in a dialogue with himself. I have distinguished conscious from unconscious motivation (often at odds the one with the other). The individual or collective psychology of the sender (whether unfolded into originator and utterer or not) also governs the tactical and strategic calculation of what to say to whom when and how. Besides, such decision is realised according to the sender's rhetorical and linguistic competence, itself a part of the wider competence required to produce meaningful speech (Neubert 1985).

The pragmatic intention is, thus, the communicative intention where conscious and unconscious motivations converge. With the development of discourse the intention may indeed change, but we can posit that it is always prior to the utterance. This applies even to hesitations and fillers, which, as is known, are due most of the time to the unconscious intention to keep the communication channel open.

c) The sender's intended sense

Prior to the utterance, there is, then, a personality that out of conscious and unconscious motivations comes up with a pragmatic intention that leads him to initiate a speech act. Such intention materialises through an "intended sense", – the sensic equivalent of Lvovskaya's communicative task – that which the sender wishes to say – including the conscious secondary illocutionary effects he consciously intends – in order to produce the desired pragmatic effect. Such intended sense is a synthesis of intentions, thought and speech that manifests itself as a mental representation – an EPHI. Let me stress that intended sense, pragmatic intention and motivation are different things. General Motors extol the virtues of their new model (intended sense) in order to convince buyers (pragmatic intention) so as to increase profits (motivation). GM do not say – or imply – 'Out with your money!'. If they show their cards, their intention fails, even if the intended sense were impeccably framed linguistically. That is why we can assert that in order for communication to succeed, it may be unadvisable or even self-defeating for
the interlocutor to grasp the utterer's true conscious or unconscious motivation.

The interaction between pragmatic intention and intended sense governs, on the one hand, a text's functionality and, on the other, the organisation of the themes and rhemes – i.e. the articulation of logical subjects and predicates, or the distribution of the informative load of each utterance. (An essential criterion to determine the aptness of the linguistic framing is, indeed, the naturalness of rhematisation. Many a translator who has successfully overcome the lexical hypnosis of the original keeps falling into the trap of copying its theme-rheme organisation.)\footnote{Instructions are a typical case. In English the rhyme is normally placed at the beginning: "Call the following number for additional information on our authorised dealers"; whilst Spanish prefers it at the end: "Para mayor información acerca de nuestros concesionarios autorizados llamar al siguiente número". (Note, also, that whereas English prefers the imperative, Spanish chooses the infinitive.)} In simultaneous interpretation, of course, the need to 'naturalise' the syntactic component \( Sm^L \) of \( Fi \) often encounters insurmountable obstacles; yet the interpreter is always left with a priceless resource allowing him nevertheless to confer naturalness upon a syntactically idiosyncratic chain: intonation (C) – so much disregarded by many and very good practitioners.

We can distinguish between "indirect" (for instance, allegorical), and "direct" intended sense (the latter pragmatically subject to the former);\footnote{In Viaggio (1992), I use extensively a speech about Antartica delivered at the UN by Malaysia on behalf of the Group of 77 (the third world), in which the speaker extols the beauty and warns about the fragility of that remote realm and stresses the need for it to be considered as "common heritage of mankind". That direct intended sense does nothing but veil a rather transparent indirect one: developing countries should have a share in the continent's eventual booty too. It is a difficult speech to interpret simultaneously in all its details, except that the details are individually irrelevant – their only purpose is to hammer down the indirect intended sense. Such awareness on the part of the interpreter makes his job much easier, since it allows him to condense without qualms, and without wrecking his brain in order to remember how "cormorants" are called in Chinese.} and, as with the intention, we can also distinguish a "main" intended sense – equivalent to discourse analysis' macro-proposition, and a series of "secondary" intended senses, correlatable to propositions.\footnote{The task remains to correlate the categories in this discussion with those of discourse analysis.}
2) At the utterance

a) The utterance's objective sense

It is desirable to distinguish direct intended sense from "objective sense" – the sense – including usual secondary illocutionary effects – that the utterance would normally have in the specific situation (which often – but not necessarily – would be its literal interpretation), or the interpretation the bulk of the receivers (whether or not intended addressees) would give it, independently from the sender's intention. Although they usually coincide, direct intended and objective sense should not be confused. The allegorical sense of a literary piece, superimposed upon its direct sense, is interpreted on the basis of the latter; the author resorts intentionally to direct sense in order to express the indirect one. Objective sense, let us remind ourselves, is independent from the sender's intention. If it coincides with the EPHI (i.e. if intended sense = objective sense), communication unfolds unencumbered. It is, I hope, the case with this piece, before which the reader (at least the contemporary one) does not need to infer too much in order to go from what I have said to what I mean him to understand.

The discrepancies between direct intended and objective sense are usually due to three series of factors: an intended sense incompetently framed by the sender, insufficient sophistication on the part of the receiver, or a decisive change in one or more of the formants in the second speech situation, so that if in the original situation both senses match, they no longer do in the new one, and since the original situation becomes inaccessible, the text is interpreted exclusively on the basis of the second one. This is often the case with written translation, where the intended sense can remain elusive,

---

14 Milos Forman's The Firemen's Ball used an incompetent fire brigade as an allegory for Czechoslovakia's Stalinist leaders. That allegorical sense, though, was so successfully masked that neither the country's bureaucrats nor her firemen understood it: the censure let the film slip through... and the fire-fighters protested against what they took to be an uncalled for and appalling portrayal. Both mistook objective sense for intended indirect sense.

15 As was the case with Forman's Stalinist and fire-fighting audiences, neither of which, incidentally, were the film's intended addressees.

16 When asked by his translator, Norman Thomas Di Giovanni, what he meant by a certain metaphor in one of his early poems, Borges could no longer remember – the situation having changed, his own indirect intended sense escaped him, and was no longer accessible through objective sense. In that same interview (Borges 1967), by the way, my great compatriot advised Di Giovanni not to translate what he had written but what he had meant, thus both distinguishing between extra-linguistic sense and linguistic meaning, and giving primacy to the latter.
forcing the translator to resort to all manner of philological, historic, literary
and other most variegated kinds of substantive and ancillary knowledge in
order to transcend Fo's objective sense.

b) The utterance's literal sense
As pointed out above, objective sense should not be equated with literal
sense — the literal interpretation of the utterance's linguistic meaning,
without consideration to the relevant contextual factors. One of children's
most endearing qualities is their inability to go beyond literal meaning and
mistaking it for intended sense (for them, literal meaning is objective — and
therefore intended sense). In the homonymous film, retarded Forrest Gump is
the only one in all the American army to believe that they are in the Viet-
Nam jungle looking for a guy called Charlie. With literal sense we exit
communication on the lower end into the impersonal realm of la langue.

c) The utterance's deep sense
Let us, belatedly, add a category indispensable, for instance, with a view to
the psychoanalytic interpretation of a text: "deep sense" — including all non-
intentional secondary illocutionary effects — which comes from the
unconscious and often has nothing to do with either intended or objective
sense. Melville swore that Moby Dick had no allegorical sense; if he did
sincerely believe so, we do not.17 It is known, besides, that detectives and
psychotherapists are more after deep sense — that which the sender does not
consciously mean to transmit, or even means to hide. Deep sense is the last
layer of the textual onion I shall peel away; with it our analysis exits
communication on the upper end into the black box of the human psyche,
whence every human action — including every utterance — comes. Deep sense
is the utterer's unconscious or concealed motivation as discovered by the
interlocutor — which, as I pointed out above, may hamper communication.
Normally, communication succeeds when intended sense is comprehended,
not superseded. (And that is why every verbal skirmish between lovers is, in
fact, a war of deep senses.)
So deep sense is unconsciously transmitted by the sender; intended sense is
the result of his conscious intention; objective sense is the neutral ground
between sender and receiver; and literal sense is the sheer skimming of the

17 On the other hand, if Melville was lying, and he did indeed have the conscious
intention to write an allegory, then the allegorical sense would have been
intended. In any case, I do not think that Sophocles was aware of his Oedipus's
complex — or, for that matter, his own. In his Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the State, Engels quotes an extremely interesting interpretation of
Aeschylus's Eumenides as the triumph of patriarchal over matriarchal society,
which could not possibly have been consciously intended by the playwright
(Marx & Engels 1961).
utterance's linguistic side without attention to the extra-linguistic factors. To a great extent, in pragmatic texts – viz. scientific articles without a polemic intention – intended and objective sense match. Literal sense, on its part, can be disregarded in the certainty that any sophisticated reader will be able to tell when he is to take any utterance literally; whilst deep sense becomes all but irrelevant. (It would be wrong, however, to assume that collective and anonymous pragmatic texts lack deep sense: witness the class, racist, or sexist content of so many advertisements.) In a legal text such as Security Council Resolution 242, however, where the suspect addressee must be denied all alibis, literal sense becomes of the essence (lest there be 'misunderstandings' - although one should remember that even literal sense is subject to interpretation: all honest and crooked references to the "spirit" of the Law – which is supposed to prevail upon its "word" – are but both a recognition of the difference between meaning (Fo(Sm²)) and sense (EPHlo), and of the latter's prevalence).

So far I have referred to sense as intended by the sender or somehow present on its own in his mind or, as it were, in the text itself. Let us now shift completely to the receiver.

3) That side of the utterance

*Sense as apprehended by the receiver*

At the other side of the utterance comes "apprehended sense" (EPHC) – that which the receiver infers from the text, his interpretation of literal, objective, intended and deep sense. Much depends on the receiver's personality, in a way roughly mirroring the importance of that of the sender's. If literal, objective, intended, deep, and apprehended sense were always identical, communication would be perfect... and boring to death. Between these two subjective extremes, which are what the utterer wishes to convey and what the addressee grasps, we have the material aspects of communication, including, but not limited to, the utterance's linguistic vehicle Fo. Let me repeat that the fact that the different aspects of sense are not always identical does not diminish our model's validity: Every act of sense apprehension is, in fact, different (even when the same person is comprehending the same utterance for a second or nth time), but provided relevant EPHI3EPHC identity obtains, communication has prospered. We do not assert that sensic identity invariably obtains, we limit ourselves to posit its existence as an indispensable condition of communication. If the utterer has meant one thing and the interlocutor has understood another, such identity, of course, has not been established, but then communication has failed.
4) Around the utterance

a) The linguistic context
And so the sender produces his utterance or text depending on his personality, motivations, his own or somebody else's intention, and the foreseen receiver; and according to his specific communicative and linguistic ability. The result is a linear utterance, whose different units acquire a linguistic life of their own in the chain, within a "linguistic context" (Fo(Xm, Sm)) that specifies their semantic and syntactic meaning. (Thus, for instance, in the sentence above "result" is grammatically interpreted as a noun rather than as a verb, while "specifies" is semantically interpreted as a synonym of 'makes specific' rather than of 'prescribes'.)

b) The extra-linguistic context
All the rest – the intonation and gestures that go with orality (C), the illustrations and graphic layout specific to written texts (E) – is what I call "extra-linguistic context", which, as the linguistic one, does normally help decisively the interpretation of the utterance. I basically distinguish two components: "supra-segmental" (such as intonation or its typographical equivalent) – which is inseparably incorporated into the utterance, and "peri-linguistic" (such as gestures and illustrations or layout) – which is added on to it. A colleague comes to mind who, by dint of sheer language, had to translate the catalogue of a photo exhibition from Russian into Spanish. One of the pictures was called Dževushka s Ljějkoi, i.e. Girl With Watering Can... though maybe With Camera (i.e. with a Leika); or, for that matter, the beginning of Le petit prince, where instead of a minute description of his protagonist, St. Exupéry shows us the drawing he says he made afterwards. The text of the catalogue, and up to a point that of the novel, are almost at the mercy of their graphic context.

c) The communication's setting
Text and context are moreover situated within a "setting" in which the time/space/person coordinates take shape – the immediate where, when, and who; it is the framework of the anaphoric and cataphoric relations, so indispensable for the interpreter or the film subtitler, since deictics can save a lot of syllables.

---

18 Notice how a marked stress on "that" and/or "very" in the utterance by our young man below: "By the way, you know, that girl I know very well" would ipso facto modify the objective sense and assimilate it to the sense directly and indirectly intended (the way the bold type does in this written transcription).

19 It is in the setting at our young man's party that "that girl" becomes understood as 'Mary'.

d) The communication’s circumstances
Such setting is nothing but the theatre where the "circumstances" intervene – the wider who, to whom, wherefore, why, where, and when. Circumstances are the immediate causes and effects of live, or, at least real-time communication (news items, media reports, ads, and all nonce literature.) Let me explain why I distinguish wherefore from why: the latter is the essential motivation: GM advertise because they want to sell; but the wherefore of this ad for this model of this year is, precisely, that there is a new model this year, and the ad (as well as its linguistic/graphic form and that of its campaign) is due to an ad hoc calculation. The wherefore is always an immediate reaction to the other circumstances of speech.\textsuperscript{20}
In our model, setting and circumstances are telescoped into the situation (\(Gt\)), but, as I have just done here, they can be distinguished if necessary.

e) The relevant world
Sender and receiver communicate and understand by virtue of a relevant world (\(M\)) – all manner of knowledge that enable the crystallisation of intended sense into an utterance, and the synopsis of sense in the mind of the receiver – that click with which the more or less discrete units in the linguistic chain are interpreted at given intervals – normally 250 milliseconds – as a unit of sense; i.e. the blossoming of linguistic perception into apprehended sense. The accessibility, associability, and recallability of the information needed to produce and apprehend sense depend on the knowledge of the relevant world (as well as on intelligence – a decisive formant if there ever was one!). Communication becomes easier and more efficient the greater the shared knowledge of the relevant world, and, even more so, when shared knowledge is known to be shared (Neubert 1985), as is, I presume, our case.\textsuperscript{21} Even so, there are spheres that individually escape some of us: I have referred to the utterance's theme-rheme organisation and the synopsis of sense without being certain that all of my readers would know what they are, trying to explain it so as not to offend those who do know or those who do not. The psychoanalytic conception of the personality and marxism have already crept in. The usual generalisations, typical of every translation, are but an attempt at reducing the relevant world \(M\) to a

\textsuperscript{20} Why does our young man intimate that he has an abundant sexual life? Because he wants to impress his friends. Wherefore does he choose to hint precisely at Mary? Because she is beautiful, because she is coveted by all, because she is there… and so are his friends. All that he knows – his insecurity we guess.

\textsuperscript{21} Our young man's friends do not need any further explicitation respectively to get the intended sense, but the reader, who does not share the relevant world knowledge, could not grasp it unaided by all these footnotes and contextual explanations.
more manageable scope (i.e. increasing the $K$ to $M$ ratio), thus optimising the ergonomy of discourse-processing by the receiver. Communication, let us remember, works inferentially and becomes more efficient as the linguistic, kinetic and paralinguistic explication $FoCmEm$ leads more directly to the relevant implicatures.

f) **Culture**

Lastly, both the sender and, of course, his text are a product, reflection and part of a “culture”, defined broadly as the receptacle of the social group's experience – the historically conditioned values, knowledge, habits, tastes, affections through which each interlocutor filters what he says and what he hears. Needless to say, the receiver may belong to a different culture (as is systematically the case with a translation's addressees). Culture, naturally, is in turn a complex category; it varies with nationality, age, profession, class provenance, ideology, time, and numberless other factors that to a larger or lesser extent influence every act of text production and comprehension. In our model, these aspects are subsumed in the exponent $P$, but, as here, they can be further detailed.

A text, on its part, can modify, re-create or newly invent the different levels. Each character in any novel has its own personality and intention, and is placed within its specific setting, circumstances, relevant world, and culture.

The articulation of the communicative act

a) **The double articulation of the utterance**

We can see, then, a double articulation of any utterance, somewhat analogous to that of language, where linguistic units already doubly articulated (phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, groups, clauses, sentences), but lacking sense on their own, are strung together by the sender, basically according to the semantic and syntactic rules of a given language, to become coupled to a pragmatic intention that avails itself of them in order to express an intended sense embodied in a specific utterance or text.

b) **The multiple articulation of the act of linguistic communication**

A more refined analysis would lead us to perceive a) below the utterance, both articulations of language resulting in a syntactically organised chain of linguistic signifiants and signifiés; b) at the confluence of meaning and sense, the articulation of the utterance's linguistic meanings and its literal sense (where the articulation of meanings functions as the explication – sense's linguistic significant); c) above literal sense, the articulation between it and objective sense (always in a dialectical form-content relationship); d) then that of objective and direct intended sense; e) thereafter the articulation between direct and indirect intended sense; next, f) the confluence
or indirect intended sense and pragmatic intention; and last stop before exiting the communication act — g) the articulation between pragmatic intention and deep sense. (Whereby translation would be, in its turn, a "new articulation", as suggested by Di Virgilio (1984).) The totem could be summarised as follows:

(Deep sense)²²
Pragmatic intention
Indirect intended sense
Direct intended sense
(Objective sense)
(Literal sense)
First articulation of language ([signifiés])
First articulation of language ([signifiants])
Second articulation of language (phonemes/graphemes)

In the case of the young man, our analysis would yield:

(Insecurity)
To cause admiration
[I'm a stallion]
[I've seduced that hell uv a chick Maria]
([Incidentally, I know Maria very well])
[Incidentally, I know that girl very well]

'[By the way, you know, that girl I know very well]'
'By the way, you know, that girl I know very well'²³
/B-y t-h-e w-a -y ...

²² Deep sense is in brackets because they are independent from the sender's conscious pragmatic intention. This can also be the case with objective and literal sense.

²³ Notice that the objective sense of the utterance does not coincide with its literal sense, nor the latter with the linguistic meaning of the sentence (i.e. the chain of [signifiés], which are the morpho-semantic counterparts of the /signifiants/ in the first articulation). The difference between linguistic meaning and literal sense lies in that the former is, as it were, dictionary-bound: interpreting /by the way/ as [incidentally] rather than [next to the path] is a matter of objective sense; witness an utterance such as 'By the way, you know, that girl I know very well — but not when she is on it', where sense depends of what it is referring to (the [way] or something not mentioned explicitly, but presumably known to the interlocutors, such as cocaine). Also sense-bound is the interpretation of (/you/+[second person]) as referring to one or more addressees, familiarly or formally (relevant if the text were to be translated into Spanish, where both markers would unavoidably appear in the verb: sabes / sabe / sabéis / saben). In this case, however, objective sense in English covers simply any addressee(s).
So my scheme of the space surrounding an utterance can be summarised as follows. Prior to elocution, we have a sender, endowed with a personality, who, out of his conscious and unconscious motivations, has come up with a pragmatic intention to be expressed through an intended sense linguistically framed into an utterance or text. Text and linguistic context are placed within an extra-linguistic context that specifies sense. This sense becomes that of the text and thus more or less objective, in so far as the majority of the receivers would agree on it in a specific situation. With the disappearance or ignorance of the relevant extra-linguistic factors, the utterance is left with nothing but its literal sense – a notch above what a machine can manage, which is but literal linguistic meaning. The text lends itself, moreover, to a transcendental interpretation beyond intended and objective sense, in which it reveals its deep sense. The counterpart of deep, intended, objective, and literal sense is the sense apprehended by the receiver. In order to arrive from the sender’s psyche and intention to the receiver’s intellect, a text travels along a rough path: the sender’s affective, intellectual, linguistic, and rhetorical competence; the clarity of the communication channel; the extra-linguistic context; the setting and circumstances of communication; the accessibility of the relevant world; culture; and the rhetorical, linguistic, intellectual, and affective competence of the receiver. (For affective competence, I understand a double sensitivity: the ability to perceive both the utterance’s indirect intended and deep sense, and the aesthetic aspect of the linguistic framing – both a must for the appreciation of literature).

It is obvious that there are no precise boundaries between personality, intention, setting, circumstances, relevant world, and culture; nor is it always possible clearly to distinguish that which is still linguistic from that which no longer is. All factors of speech penetrate and influence each other, and change as discourse develops. On the other hand, we know that even in face-to-face communication the situation formants are not identical for sender and receiver. For one thing, there is always a difference in the extent of shared pre-comprehension schemes K, including the cognitive ability and affective disposition to cooperate; if it becomes to narrow, then EPHI/EPHC identity becomes altogether impossible: Six-year old David Copperfield listens intently while Mr. Murdstone talks cryptically with a friend, without realising that the

In order for matching segments of the utterance to be present in a Spanish version, more facts about the setup must be known than the English utterance linguistically conveys. A translation into Spanish must delve into direct intended sense. Such interpretation is contingent upon the communication’s setup. If the translator does not know what kind of relationship obtains between the young man and his audience or whether it is an audience of one or more, he has only guesswork to rely upon. Of course, such information can normally – but not always – be gleaned from the context.
conversation is about him. (In translation, as Neubert points out, we are dealing with a situationality that is displaced in time, space, and culture; more than the divergent freedoms and servitudes of both languages, it is such displacement that makes it difficult to frame the original sense in the new situation so as to allow it to become apprehended as fully as possible.)

Practical consequences for mediators

All of the above – I hope – is very interesting, but how would the awareness of such subtleties affect translation practice? In other words, in what cases would a translator translate differently out of such awareness? The footnotes so far have hinted at some obvious instances. Here are three practical examples:

i. An archetypical case is the rather evident choice of indirect over direct intended sense when audience response is essential (advertisements being a clear-cut case). One of the English texts for the U.N. Spanish translation exams a few years ago referred to the inordinate number of lawyers in the U.S. and added "Washington D.C. alone boasts several thousand practitioners". I suggest that the phrase be rendered attending primarily to the obviously ironic contradiction between intended (negative) and objective (positive) sense (the author left no doubt that, in his view, having thousands of lawyers is nothing to brag about; as opposed to the case below, this time around the formal incongruity is intentional). Any turn with 'jactarse' and its synonyms would not sound natural in Spanish. A possible rendition could be "Solo por Washington se pasean miles de profesionales" ["Thousands of practitioners roam Washington D.C. alone."]

ii. Next comes a case where direct intended sense prevails over objective sense: a few years ago, a delegate thanked the UN Secretary-General for his "contribution to the crisis" – coward that I am, I thanked him for his "contribution to overcoming the crisis" (see note 10).

iii. Lastly, an instance of deep sense prevailing over intended sense: in several tapped telephone conversations between drug dealers that I have had to

24 The back translation offers a further example of the different rhematisation patterns in Spanish and English. Note also the transmutation of "practitioners" into "profesionales" and back into "practitioners", as well as the lesser irony of "roam" vis-à-vis "pasearse". Had the original been in Spanish, the English translator would be well advised to opt for "boasting". Lastly, "solo por Washington" can be also read as "only in Washington", rather than "in Washington alone", but the intended sense is obvious enough to preclude such an inane interpretation by any sophisticated reader (a translator should never forget Seleskovitch's dictum about the non-imbecility of the reader, e.g. Seleskovitch & Lederer 1989).
translate for a law-enforcement agency in the U.S., an otherwise unnoticeable
*lapsus linguæ* may have proved crucial, since it might be giving away
information that the speakers had no wish to communicate – much less have
overheard by law-enforcement officers: it was an instance of a feminine
adjective mistakenly used to qualify a boy-courier ("El muchacho, tú sabes,
es muy rápida"). Was he in fact a girl? I sensed that the mistake could be
important, so I rendered it as naturally as I could ("the boy, you know, she's
very fast"). I also added the relevant explanatory note. As in the case of the
unintended insult to the U.N. Secretary General, this kind of difficulties
show that the translator or interpreter have a responsibility that goes far
beyond the sheer re-verbalisation of an *EPHI* – that of mediating effectively,
so that the *EPHI/EPHC* identity established is relevant. In the first instance,
the interpreter adopts the *EPHI* and re-expresses it more aptly; thus the
process reproduces the ideal model: *EPH1o=PEHCo=EPHIi=EPHCi*. In the
second one, the translator deliberately reproduces a verbalisation mistake
because he guesses that it may be relevant to his users, who are not
*interlocutors*, but interested *observers*. Strictly speaking, there is no
*EPH1o/EPHCi* identity, since the utterer surely does not mean to give away
the 'boy's' sex. But let us remember that in these circumstances the
mediator's professional position is most particular: He is not mediating
between Spanish-speaking drug-dealers wishing to communicate with law-
enforcement agents. He is at the exclusive service of his client, whose
interest is to nab the utterers. The translator thus offers a faithful
reproduction of the communication between them. Were he to mediate
between a Spanish-speaking and an Anglophone drug-dealer, he would be
better advised not to reproduce the slip of the tongue, lest he find himself at
the bottom of the East River. Conversely, the translation of the insult to the
Secretary General that I offered above is for *my* interlocutors, who are
interested, precisely, in the mistake, and not for the speaker's addressees –
much less for the U.N. Secretary General himself.25

In short, then, the mediator's deontological duty is to a) detect possible
anomalies in *Fo*, b) strive to elucidate whether there is a deep sense behind
them or they are simple mistakes, c) establish whether it might be relevant
for the originator of the translation, and if so, d) opt between correcting,
reproducing and/or explaining them. Although for the nonce no absolute
rules can be established. it is important to remind and teach that, as the
examples above reveal, instances higher than *Fo* prevail – the relevant
decision is one of the most momentous that a mediator is called upon to
make.

---

25 See Pym’s (1992a; 1992b) excellent analysis.
Conclusion

And so we have had for the last few pages sender Sergio Viaggio, with something to say with a relatively admissible aim, which in this instance coincides almost totally with my intended sense, except for several elements that, though I do not mean to hide, I do not consciously mean to communicate either. And thus here you have, little by little, my text, my EPHI embodied in this paper, whose development you do not know completely as yet. You perceive it linearly, understanding synapsis by synapsis, rebuilding, with a greater or lesser degree of success, the edifice of what I mean to say, and getting in passing an idea of who I am and how I felt when I wrote this piece.

This sense I wish to express, this paper’s subject, its macro-proposition does not come to my mind for no reason at all, nor is it for no reason at all that I want to objectify it and communicate it to others. There is a history: mine, translatology’s, of the productive forces, of Judeo-Christian culture, and of all of you behind this act of linguistic communication – i.e. of speech. With this background, I can think and write with reasonable aplomb what I am writing, and you can understand and, maybe, agree with me. Without it... who knows!

The main intention, the strictly translatological intended sense (and notice, nevertheless, that I have scarcely referred strictly to translation) would not have changed with the setting or the circumstances. It depends, basically, on what I think about translation and speech. It is generated and interpreted with reference to a relevant world where Sarajevo, the economic crisis, and my fear that, third-world excrescence that I am, I may not be allowed to stay in Europe if I quit the United Nations, belong less than the eternal philosophic swashbuckling between idealism and materialism, Saussure, Catford, Seleskovich and Newmark; cognitive and deep psychology; the practice of writing; etc. Both I and you, my reader, resort to our knowledge of such relevant world in order to produce and understand this that I am saying about translation (which, let me repeat, is but a part – if fundamental – of all that I am saying).

And this text, all of it, in both its translatological and personal slants, the outcome of my half-conscious, half un-conscious intention, is neatly rooted in a culture, itself complex: Argentine, petite burgeoise, intellectual, adult, cosmopolitan, Judeo-Christian, end-of-20th-century. This culture, and also my ignorance of other cultures, limits it. Perhaps I would have more convincing arguments to put forward or a subtler classification to suggest if I knew non-Indo-European languages or if I looked at the world from behind a lathe rather than a desk. With all its limitations, this culture is one of the many into which our species' universal experience is divided, which ensures that my text be basically comprehensible for most educated adults on the planet, and thus
transferable outside these pages, outside this culture, and, crucial for us, outside this language – or rather into it, since these ideas I first expressed in Spanish.

My scheme of the structuration of text, sense, and situation:

SITUATION
PERSONALITY The interlocutors' psychological and social background (similar to Lvovskaya's, but with the unconscious duly weighted).

UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVATION The deep motivation that governs an act of speech, which escapes the utterer's awareness.

CONSCIOUS MOTIVATION What the utterer consciously pursues with his act of speech.

INTENTION The overall pragmatic intention (together with intended sense, Lvovskaya's communicative task).

SENSE
INTENDED SENSE (indirect or direct) The overall sense – including the intentional secondary illocutionary effects – that the sender wishes to confer to his utterance.

TEXT
LINGUISTIC CONTEXT
LITERAL SENSE The literal interpretation of the utterance's linguistic meaning, without consideration to the relevant extra-linguistic factors.

OBJECTIVE SENSE The sense – including the habitual secondary illocutionary effects – that the utterance would normally have in the specific situation.

DEEP SENSE The unconscious sense – including the unconscious secondary illocutionary effects – that the utterance reveals to the comprehender.

APPREHENDED SENSE The sense – including the secondary illocutionary effects – gleaned by the receiver.

EXTRA-LINGUISTIC CONTEXT Supra-segmental (intonation, graphic resources), or para-linguistic (gestures, illustrations, layout).

SETTING The scene of speech: space-time-person coordinates / anaphoric and cataphoric relations.

CIRCUMSTANCES The immediate factors of the speech situation: what / to whom / wherefore / what for / how / when / where (basically, Lvovskaya's formants).

RELEVANT WORLD The objective and subjective factors, knowledge, experience, etc. directly necessary in order to process the text.

CULTURE The habits, tastes, ideology, experience, etc. of the social group to which sender and receiver belong, as well as its subcultural variables: class, age, profession, etc.
Bibliography


