

## Vojislav Marinković and Italy, 1927-1932\*

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*The aim of this paper is to analyze the policy of the Yugoslav foreign minister Vojislav Marinković towards Italy, during his mandates in 1927-1932. The bilateral relations are addressed in the scope of his broader concepts of foreign policy, which included a closer cooperation with France and surmounting the main difficulties in the relations with Great Britain. Marinković's major goal was proving that the Yugoslav Kingdom was conducting a pacifistic foreign policy in order to gain the sympathy of the Foreign Office and the international public as a counterweight to Italy's aggressive plans towards the Balkans and the Danube region. During the course of five years, Marinković had changed his attitude towards Italy, within the framework of the relations among the Great Powers. The research is based primarily on partially preserved archival documents of Yugoslav origin and volumes of published documents of foreign origin, as well as on the existing scientific literature.*

**Keywords:** Yugoslavia, Italy, Vojislav Marinković, Aleksandar Karađorđević, Benito Mussolini, Dino Grandi

**Parole chiave:** Jugoslavia, Italia, Vojislav Marinković, Aleksandar Karađorđević, Benito Mussolini, Dino Grandi

Vojislav Marinković was a member of a prominent Serbian family. His father was a minister and state counselor, his older brother was a minister and diplomat. From an early age, Vojislav Marinković was distinguished by his upbringing, intelligence, cultivated manners, oratory skills and clear-cut thought. He finished the law school and obtained a PhD in economics in Paris. Marinković was continuously elected an MP from 1906 to 1931; hired as a financial expert of the Serbian delegation at the Peace conference in London 1912-1913 and the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace conference in Paris in 1919-1920. He received the first ministerial appointment in Pašić's coalition government in 1914 and resigned after officers – members of the organization “Unification or Death” – were sentenced to death in the Salonica trial in 1917. After the First World War, he was one of the three prominent figures in the Democratic Party. His first appointment as the minister of foreign affairs was in Ljubomir Davidović's government from 27 July to 6 November 1924. Later, he served as the foreign minister for five years continuously in various governments from 17 April 1927 till 2 July 1932. He was a PM from April till July 1932. In his first term as the foreign minister Marinković served as a prominent member of the Democratic Party, while in the second term he served as a close associate of the king Aleksandar Karađorđević<sup>1</sup>.

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From the very beginning in 1924 the foreign minister Marinković left a favorable impression on the members of the diplomatic corps in Belgrade. He was sincere, direct, energetic and courteous, with rather European than Oriental working habits<sup>2</sup>. During the first ministerial mandate, he did not have either time or prospects to form a foreign policy concept or particular tactic. Nevertheless, there was no doubt in the mind of the Italian plenipotentiary minister in Belgrade general Alessandro Bodrero that Marinković was «capable of giving the Yugoslav foreign policy a completely unexpected direction»<sup>3</sup>. The most important task of Davidović's government was to reach an agreement with Slovenian and Croatian political parties, and therefore it had to recognize their anti-Italian stand<sup>4</sup>. Also, the government had to respect the king Aleksandar's wish to preserve the foreign policy course<sup>5</sup>. Among ministers, only Nastas Petrović was considered as a «grande amico d'Italia»<sup>6</sup>. Marinković – who was considered in the Quai d'Orsay as a proven Francophile – had to steer

<sup>1</sup> М.Л. Поповић, Личност Војислава Маринковића, Млада Србија, Београд [М.Л. Popović, *Ličnost Vojslava Marinkovića*, Млада Србија, Београд] 1935; В. Глигоријевић, *Демократска странка и политички односи у Кралјевини Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца*, ISI, Београд 1970, pp. 68, 321, 353, 355-357, 386, 387, 465-558; id., *Парламент и политичке странке у Југославији (1919-1929)*, ISI-Nародна књига, Београд 1979, pp. 21, 119, 120, 130, 131, 213-215, 237, 245, 246, 264; id., Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици, ЗУНС, Београд [Кралј Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици, ZUNS, Београд] 2010, pp. 5, 6; id., Историја демократске странке 1919-1928, Службени гласник-ИСИ, Београд [Istorija demokratske stranke 1919-1928, Službeni glasnik-ISI, Београд] 2010, II ed., passim; Д. Тешић, К. Николић, Историја Демократске странке 1929-1941, Службени гласник-ИСИ, Београд [D. Tešić, K. Nikolić, *Istorija Demokratske stranke 1929-1941*, Službeni glasnik-ISI, Београд] 2010, II ed., pp. 42, 44, 219, 220; Р. Гашић, Војислав Маринковић [R. Gašić, *Vojslav Marinković*], in Српски биографски речник, Књ. 6, Мар-Миш [Srpski biografski rečnik, Књ. 6, Mar-Miš], ur. Ч. Попов, Б. Бешлин, Матица српска, Нови Сад [Č. Popov, B. Bešlin, Matica srpska, Novi Sad] 2014, pp. 58-61; С. Мићић, Од бирократије до дипломатије. Историја југословенске дипломатске службе 1918-1939, ИНИС, Београд [S. Mičić, *Od birokratije do diplomatije. Istorija jugoslovenske diplomatske službe 1918-1939*, INIS, Београд] 2018, pp. 134, 135; М. Радојевић, Српски народ и југословенска краљевина 1918-1941 [M. Radojević, *Srpski narod i jugoslovenska kraljevina 1918-1941*], v. 1, *Од југословенске идеје до југословенске државе*, Српска књижевна задруга, Београд [Od jugoslovenske ideje do jugoslovenske države, Srpska književna zadruka, Београд] 2019, pp. 65, 140, 141, 180.

<sup>2</sup> *I documenti diplomatici italiani* (Ddi), Settima serie, v. 3, 23 febbraio 1924-14 maggio 1925, La libreria dello stato-Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Roma 1959, doc. 414, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 29-7-1924, p. 239; *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921-1938*, v. 1, 1921-1930, ur. Ž. Avramovski, Arhiv Jugoslavije-Globus, Beograd-Zagreb 1986, p. 430; *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Izveštaji nemačkih diplomatskih predstavnik 1920-1941*, v. 1, 1920-1929, ur. Ž. Avramovski, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd 2020, doc. 67, p. 215; doc. 76, p. 235; М. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922-1939)*, В. А. Graphis, Bari 2006, p. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted from М. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., p. 53. Bodrero was convinced that Marinković got king's approval for total freedom in action (Ddi, Settima serie, v. 3, cit., doc. 414, cit., p. 239).

<sup>4</sup> В. Глигоријевић, *О питању уласка представника HRSS у Davidovićevu vladu 1924. i o krizi i padu te vlade*, in *Istorija XX veka*, vol. 7, ur. D. Janković, ISI, Београд 1965, pp. 347-394; id., Историја демократске странке 1919-1928 [Istorija demokratske stranke 1919-1928], cit., pp. 227-244.

<sup>5</sup> Ddi, Settima serie, v. 3, cit., doc. 412, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 28-7-1924, p. 238.

<sup>6</sup> G. Latinović, *Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1941)*, Univerzitet у Banja Luci, Banja Luka 2019, pp. 118, 119.

between two opposite policies of friendship with France and with Italy<sup>7</sup>. He had managed to postpone the Yugoslav-French agreement as a precondition to preserve contractual relations with Italy<sup>8</sup>, and yet to slow the pace of rapprochement<sup>9</sup> – which had been pursued by Nikola Pašić and Momčilo Ninčić<sup>10</sup>. Marinković upheld a greater freedom of action toward Italy – thus allowing the PM more room for maneuver in conversations with Slovenes and Croats – yet abandoned his original plan to sabotage economic agreements signed by Pašić's government<sup>11</sup>. Although he did continue the negotiations with Italy on several issues<sup>12</sup> – the idea of Marinković-Mussolini's meeting was also on the table<sup>13</sup> – he was not infinitely accommodating<sup>14</sup>. Marinković was handicapped in diplomatic action since many posts in the diplomatic service were occupied by party colleagues of Pašić and Ninčić – including plenipotentiary minister in Rome Vojislav Antonijević<sup>15</sup>. Bodrero tried to prove before the diplomatic corps and public in Belgrade that the bilateral relations were not jeopardized by Pašić's and Ninčić's descent from power<sup>16</sup>. Nevertheless, he did

<sup>7</sup> *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., doc. 67, p. 213.

<sup>8</sup> Ddi, Settima serie, v. 3, cit., doc. 414, cit., p. 239; ivi, doc. 476, L'incaricato d'affari a Belgrado, Sola, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 31-8-1924, p. 282; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata (Da li je Jugoslavija bila "francuski satelit"?)*, ISI, Beograd 1985, p. 71; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., p. 52; S. Sretenović, *Le poids grandissant de l'Italie dans les relations entre la France et le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes 1924-1927*, in «Istorija 20. veka», n. 2, 2007, p. 21; id., *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918-1929*, ISI, Beograd 2008, p. 315.

<sup>9</sup> B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 1918-1941: diplomatsko-historijski pregled*, Školska knjiga, Zagreb 1975, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup> E. Milak, *Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski sporazum (1922-1924)*, in *Istorija XX veka*, v. 14-15, ur. Ž. Avramovski, ISI, Beograd 1982, pp. 146-170; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 27-34.

<sup>11</sup> *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., doc. 69, p. 223.

<sup>12</sup> Ddi, Settima serie, v. 3, cit., doc. 527, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 3-10-1924, p. 318; doc. 532, Il presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, al ministro Bodrero, a Venezia, 8-10-1924, p. 321; G. Latinović, *Jugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1941)*, cit., pp. 48, 118.

<sup>13</sup> Marinković suggested meeting on neutral ground in Geneva, in mid-August, while Mussolini considered Rome, Milan or Venice as possible places: Ddi, Settima serie, v. 3, cit., doc. 456, Il presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, al ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, 20-8-1924; p. 267; ivi, doc. 459, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 21-8-1924, p. 268; ivi, doc. 471, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 29-8-1924, p. 280; ivi, doc. 484, Il delegato alla Società delle nazioni, Salandra, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 5-9-1924, p. 286; ivi, doc. 526, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 2-10-1924, p. 318; ivi, doc. 532, Il presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, al ministro Bodrero, a Venezia, 8-10-1924, p. 321; ivi, doc. 544, Il ministro a Belgrado, Bodrero, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 20-10-1924; p. 326; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska*, cit., pp. 71, 77.

<sup>14</sup> *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., doc. 76, p. 234.

<sup>15</sup> Ddi, Settima serie, v. 3, cit., doc. 493, Il delegato alla Società delle nazioni, Salandra, al presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, 10-9-1924, p. 291.

<sup>16</sup> French and German diplomats considered Bodrero's attempts to prove the establishment of friendly relations with Marinković and Davidović's government as a proof that the change of government could endanger further development of the Yugoslav-Italian friendly relations: Archive of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade (Asasa), Papers of Charles Loiseau and Lujo Vojnović (14.427), item no. IV-996d, letter of the Légation

not rely exclusively on the Yugoslav foreign minister and he communicated directly with the king Aleksandar<sup>17</sup>. Marinković was the first to test the endurance of the Yugoslav-Italian friendship through his active role in the preparations for Ahmet bey Zogu's and Ceno bey Kryeziu's return to power in Albania<sup>18</sup>. The termination of the first mandate did not allow him to achieve any significant result in the foreign policy.

Vojislav Marinković started his second term as the foreign minister in April 1927 in the government of Velimir Vukićević. This time – as the king's man entrusted with ministerial position – Marinković was acting accordingly to the monarch's wishes and independently from political arrangements<sup>19</sup>. He was exercising more impartiality than his predecessor Ninčić<sup>20</sup>. Longer time period in the ministerial position allowed Marinković to create a foreign policy concept rather than to operate in extant framework as was the case in 1924. He had had some general ideas on the issue even before his appointments<sup>21</sup>.

Marinković believed that the Serbian intellectual elite, peasantry and youth were fatigued after 1918. He believed that those generations had achieved a noteworthy objective by creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and were too exhausted for new great deeds. Therefore, Marinković was convinced that they should pass on great ventures to new generations<sup>22</sup>. Regarding the international order established in Europe after 1918, he believed that the second-rate states represented the main problem. He was convinced that in the framework of the international system created after 1918 on democratic values, the sovereignty of those states was just an illusion which derived certain excessive obligations<sup>23</sup>.

Known for clear-cut thought, he was not limited to general ideas, yet had previously elaborated assessments regarding individual regions and states. The main

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de la République Française à Belgrade to Charles Loiseau, 2 August 1924; *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., doc. 67, p. 214.

<sup>17</sup> *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., doc. 76, p. 234.

<sup>18</sup> С. Мишић, Албанија: пријатељ и противник. Југословенска политика према Албанији 1924-1927, Службени гласник, Београд [S. Mišić, *Albanija: prijatelj i protivnik. Jugoslovenska politika prema Albaniji 1924-1927*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd] 2009, p. 66. It seems that Marinković was deliberately offering a courteous visit to Rome while preparing the ground for Zogu's return to power in Tirana (Ddi, *Settima serie*, v. 3, cit., doc. 460, Il presidente del Consiglio e ministro degli Esteri, Mussolini, al reggente la legazione a Durazzo, Marchetti, 22-8-1924, p. 269).

<sup>19</sup> *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., docs. 108, 109, pp. 322-324. Marinković's role, before 6 January 1929, was also to weaken the influence of the opposition-minded Davidović in the ranks of the Democratic Party (B. Gligoriјевић, *Demokratska stranka i politički odnosi u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, cit., passim; id., *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji*, cit., passim; id., *Историја демократске странке 1919-1928 [Istorija demokratske stranke 1919-1928]*, cit., passim).

<sup>20</sup> Б. Глигоријевић, *Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици*, [B. Gligoriјевић, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*], cit., pp. 5, 6.

<sup>21</sup> The letters exchanged between Vojislav and Pavle Marinković, and some sketches and drafts, document his thoughts and ideas on the foreign policy in the period prior to 1924 (Asasa, Personal papers of Vojislav Marinković 14.439).

<sup>22</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 287.

<sup>23</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 274.

focus of his analyses was on the Balkans, while the Danube region was of secondary importance. Regarding the international system established after 1918, Marinković believed that the key was in Russia. His assessment was that the United Kingdom, France and the United States of America had to win Russia over to their side, otherwise Moscow would turn towards Berlin, and he believed that the German-Russian alliance would be more hazardous to the European peace than the former Central Powers<sup>24</sup>.

The development of relations between the Weimar Republic and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics since 1922, and among the European powers, impelled Marinković to adjust his conception to the main outlines of the Yugoslav foreign policy. During the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, Yugoslavia was relying in international relations mostly on the cooperation with France, while Italy represented the greatest threat. Other great powers were of secondary importance to the Yugoslav foreign policy<sup>25</sup>. Marinković's guiding idea was that Yugoslav state had to preserve results of the Great War and the international order by continuously conducting pacifistic foreign policy regardless of government changes. The main goal was to maintain national unity and military power, and to forge financial stability as preconditions for the reinforcement of international position, particularly in the Balkans. He was avoiding the policy of swift diplomatic successes since his long-term goal was a gradual strengthening of the international reputation of the Karađorđević dynasty and the Yugoslav state<sup>26</sup>. Marinković developed mistrust towards the Italian foreign policy during the First World War. He was convinced that the Serbs «got a strong, skilled and dangerous opponent in Italy», and that the South Slavs were denoted as the main obstacle to Rome's imperialistic plans. As early as 1916, Marinković was convinced in the inevitability of a future conflict between Yugoslav and Italian interests in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. He foresaw an alternative Italian tactic of cooperation with Serbs – «to push us [Serbs] to the east and south» – if the co-operation with Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians could compromise Italy before the international community<sup>27</sup>.

Marinković became the foreign minister at a time when the international position of the Kingdom of SCS was significantly deteriorated after the so-called First Tirana pact was signed in late 1926, and all Yugoslav political parties gave support to Velimir Vukićević's radical-democratic government as a counterweight to the Italian menace<sup>28</sup>. His estimation was that the Italian tactic was to preserve tense bilateral relations through constant threat of military conflict as a means to gradually exhaust patience of the Kingdom of SCS and the pacifist part of the international

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države*, cit.; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, cit.; E. Milak, *Jugoslavija i Italija 1931-1937*, ISI, Beograd 1987; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit.; S. Sretenović, *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918-1929*, ISI, Beograd 2008.

<sup>26</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 43 (Vojislav Marinković's drafts: «A plan for a state policy», s.l., s.a. and «A draft of a state policy», s.l., s.a.); *Nemci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, v. 1, cit., doc. 67, p. 213.

<sup>27</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 35.

<sup>28</sup> B. Gligorijević, *Demokratska stranka i politički odnosi*, cit., p. 478.

public, which would be the first step to force Yugoslav diplomacy to capitulate. Marinković believed that the Italian tactic was calculated on a misjudgment that the Yugoslavs would never decide to use arm forces to defend territorial integrity<sup>29</sup>.

The first possible solution for that situation was to create a new basis for the bilateral relations in such a manner which would not jeopardize nor subject Yugoslav position toward other states<sup>30</sup>. The goal was to establish friendly or even allied relations with Italy – based on the recognition of the dominant position of the Kingdom of SCS in the Balkans – which would enable the Yugoslav diplomacy to consolidate regional international structure and eliminate hostilities in the Balkans and the Central Europe<sup>31</sup>. He was constantly bearing in mind that it was essential not to underestimate Italian diplomatic skills, due to their national power, «unscrupulousness and ruthlessness»<sup>32</sup>. He was convinced that it would be possible to reach a satisfactory agreement that would protect the Yugoslav interests and allow Benito Mussolini to present it as a new success of the fascist regime<sup>33</sup>. From the very beginning Marinković communicated his intentions frankly to Bodrero<sup>34</sup>. He was allotting the initiative to the Italian side in finding a suitable formula for defining new bilateral relations, since he was convinced that Mussolini was a «maestro to find such formulas, which no one anticipated and which could satisfy seemingly conflicting interests»<sup>35</sup>. He was also working on the idea of an agreement with Italy through the expansion of the Little Entente as a basis for a wider anti-German defense system, yet he did not want to allow relations with Italy to hinder the development of the Yugoslav-French relations<sup>36</sup>. However, he was emphasizing that the regulation of all conflicted interests in Albania was a necessary precondition and the first step in forging a new basis of Yugoslav-Italian relations<sup>37</sup>.

Marinković had adjusted the approach to the Yugoslav-French relations in changed circumstances after the First Tirana treaty. As he considered that Italy was pursuing to disrupt the French security system, he changed his view on the Yugoslav-French defense alliance. In 1924 Marinković postponed the signing of the treaty with France in order to avoid a distrust in relations with Italy. In 1927, he was convinced that the defense alliance with France would deter Italy from a potential military conflict, believing that the government in Rome would never go to war if it was aware of the risk that would arise from France's contractual obligations. His

<sup>29</sup> Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade (AY), Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in France-Paris, Vichy (388), box 14, folder 34, folios 205-209.

<sup>30</sup> K. St. Pavlović, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 3, Williams, Lea & Co., London 1957, pp. 46, 54.

<sup>31</sup> A. Mitrović, *Milan Rakić u jugoslovensko-italijanskoj krizi posle pakta u Tirani*, in «Prilozi za jezik, književnost, istoriju i folklor», v. 3-4, 1969, p. 219.

<sup>32</sup> Archive of Serbia, Belgrade (AS), Personal papers of Miroslav Spalajković (MS), item no. MS-308, folios 1-3.

<sup>33</sup> Asasa, Personal papers of Milan Rakić (14.331), item no. 14, doc. 8.

<sup>34</sup> A. Mitrović, *Milan Rakić u jugoslovensko-italijanskoj krizi posle pakta u Tirani*, cit., pp. 218, 219.

<sup>35</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 31.

<sup>36</sup> K. St. Pavlović, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 3, cit., p. 65.

<sup>37</sup> A. Mitrović, *Okosnice politike Kraljevine SHS prema Italiji 1920-1929*, in «Prispevki za zgodovino delavskega gibanja», v. 1-2, 1981, pp. 82, 83.

assumption was based on historical experience. Relying on the interpretation that the Second German Reich and the Habsburg Monarchy decided to start hostilities out of the conviction that the Great Britain did not want to go to war in 1914, Marinković supposed that Italy would not repeat the same mistake in 1920s. On the other side, he was eager to persuade the Quai d'Orsay that the Yugoslav-Italian dispute was *pro forma* and that any Italian military intervention against the Kingdom of SCS – as an avant-garde of the French security system – would be only a preparation for a direct assault on France<sup>38</sup>.

Marinković believed that France had a “mission” to maintain the international order and preserve the peace. Therefore, he was in favor of the balance of power as a precondition to avoid the superiority of Germany, the USSR or the Anglo-Saxons in Europe<sup>39</sup>. Nevertheless, he had to count on a possibility that the outcome of the negotiations with Italy could be further deterioration of the bilateral relations and to prepare scenarios which included the cooperation with other great powers. Marinković considered the idea of creating a Paris-Berlin-Belgrade axis – based on the international system designed by the Locarno Pact – as the pillar for settling international order in Central Europe<sup>40</sup>. However, it was not easy to reconcile the French and German opposing interests with the need of the Kingdom of SCS to organize a mutual defense against Italy<sup>41</sup>. His final decision regarding relations with Germany was reached after the Curtius-Schober plan for the German-Austrian customs union was officially introduced in 1931. Marinković estimated that project as the first step towards the Anschluss of Austria and he openly sided with France in the anti-German group and favored establishing a closer economic cooperation with Italy rather than accepting the projected German domination in the Danube region<sup>42</sup>. In that particular issue Marinković's actions differed from the intentions of the king Aleksandar, and he could not harmonize his standpoints with the Czechoslovak and Romanian foreign ministers Edvard Beneš and Dimitrie I. Ghika<sup>43</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> AY, 388, b. 14, f. 34, folios 205-209; AY, Collection of the microfilms (797), Prince Pavle Karadorđević Papers, reel 11, scans 1080-1082.

<sup>39</sup> K.St. Pavlović, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 3, cit., pp. 6, 7.

<sup>40</sup> Д. Денда, Шлем и шајкача. Војни фактор и југословенско-немачки односи (1918-1941), Матица српска, Нови Сад [D. Denda, *Šlem i šajkača. Vojni faktor i jugoslovensko-nemački odnosi (1918-1941)*, Matica srpska, Novi Sad] 2019, p. 98.

<sup>41</sup> Д. Денда, Шлем и шајкача [D. Denda, *Šlem i šajkača*], cit.; S. Sretenović, *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918-1929*, cit.; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, cit.

<sup>42</sup> К.Ст. Павловић, Дневник 1930-1932 [K.St. Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930-1932*], ur. С. Мићић, Н. Милићевић, Историјски архив Београда-Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд [S. Mičić, N. Milićević, *Istorijski arhiv Beograda-Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije*, Beograd], 2020, p. 212; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, cit., pp. 200, 201; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [B. Gligorićević, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*], cit., p. 125; G. Latinović, *Yugoslav-Italian economic relations*, cit., p. 148.

<sup>43</sup> AY, Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in England-London (371), box 21, folder 49, plenipotentiary minister in London Ђорђе Ђурић to Marinković, Str. Conf. No. 182, personally, 9 May 1931; Marinković to Ђурић, Str. Conf. No. 392, 11 May 1931; AY, Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Romania-Bucharest (395), box 1, folder 8, folio 385; AY, 395, b. 23, f. 231, folios 25-29; Central State

Marinković had two other alternatives – a cooperation with Great Britain or the USSR. As a foreign minister in 1924 he had an idea of officially recognizing and establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR, but did not want to provoke king Aleksandar's reaction<sup>44</sup>. At the beginning of his second term in the office, Marinković was publicly promoting the idea of the official recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR<sup>45</sup>, yet he was careful not to irritate the British government since the importance of a Foreign Office was growing steadily in the Yugoslav-Italian relations<sup>46</sup>. As a possible role of the USSR in deterring the Italian menace was decreasing to insignificant, so was Marinković's animosity towards Moscow growing, and in 1931 he even negotiated with the marshal Józef Piłsudski the creation of the *cordon sanitaire* against the Bolsheviks<sup>47</sup>.

Archives, Sofia, (CDA), Records of the Ministry of Foreign and Religious Affairs (176 k), inventory no. 6, archival item no. 1885, folios 6-8; M. Vanku, *Mala antanta 1920-1938*, "Dimitrije Tucović", Titovo Užice 1969, pp. 57, 58, 103, 104; M. Ванку, Пригисак "Трећег рајха" на чланице Мале антанте-Југославију и Румунију [M. Vanku, *Pritisak "Trećeg rajha" na članice Male antante-Jugoslaviju i Rumuniju*], in «Исторјиски гласник» [«Istorijski glasnik»], n. 1-2, 1975, pp. 118, 119; E. Campus, *The Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance*, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, București 1978, pp. 32, 33; V. Vinaver, "Austrijsko pitanje" i velika preorijentacija kralja Aleksandra prema Nemačkoj (1927-1932. godine), in «Istorija 20. veka», n. 1, 1985, pp. 22, 23; P.S. Wandycz, *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliance 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to Remilitarization of Rhineland*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1988, pp. 198-202; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, cit., pp. 200, 202; Z. Sládek, *Malá dohoda 1919-1938: její hospodářské, politické a vojenské komponenty*, Karolinum, Praha 2000, pp. 116-120, 146-148; J. Dejmek, *Edvard Beneš: Politická biografie českého demokrata, Část první: Revolucionář a diplomat (1884-1935)*, Nakladatelství Karolinum, Praha 2006, pp. 508-515; С. Мићић, Краљевина Југославија и аншлус Аустрије 1938. године, Службени гласник-ЕСРД UPUN, Београд [S. Mičić, *Kraljevina Jugoslavija i anšlus Austrije 1938. godine*, Službeni glasnik-ЕСРД UPUN, Beograd], 2010, pp. 36, 37.

<sup>44</sup> Asasa, Papers of Milan Antić (14.387), items no. 8819, 8820, 8821; AS, Collections of documents of the Security Information Agency, list III, item no. 41; *Beloemigracija u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941*, v. 2, ISI, Beograd 1955, p. 137; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1919-1929. Pitanje priznanja SSSR-a i uspostavljanje jugoslovensko-sovjetskih diplomatskih odnosa*, in *Istorija XX veka*, v. 7, ur. D. Janković, ISI, Beograd 1965, pp. 135, 160.

<sup>45</sup> V. Vinaver, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1919-1929*, cit., pp. 167, 172, 173.

<sup>46</sup> AY, Records of the Permanent delegation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the League of Nations-Geneva (159), box 1. folder I, permanent delegate Konstantin Fotić to Vojislav Marinković, Str. Conf. No. 127, personally, 14 May 1927 and Str. Conf. No. 147, personally, 18 May 1927; Marinković to Fotić, Str. Conf. No. 153, 21 May 1927; AY, 388, b. 10, f. 26, folios 711, 712; Документы внешней политики СССР [Dokumenty vnešnej politiki SSSR], v. 10 (1 января-31 декабря 1927 г.) [(1 yanvara-31 dekabrja 1927 g.)], ur. A.A. Громыко, В.М. Хвостов, Издательство политической литературы, Москва [A.A. Gromyko, V.M. Hvostov, Izdatelstvo političeskoj literatury, Moskva], 1965, doc. 120-122, pp. 199-202; Советско-югославские отношения 1917-1941 гг. Сборник документов и материалов [Sovetsko-yugoslavskie otnošenija 1917-1941 gg. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov], ur. В.В. Зеленин, М. Апостолски, Наука, Москва [V.V. Zelenii, M. Apostolski, Nauka, Moskva] 1992, doc. 158, p. 198, doc. 159, pp. 198, 199, doc. 161, p. 200, doc. 162, p. 201, doc. 170, p. 210, doc. 176, pp. 217, 218, doc. 177, p. 219; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi 1919-1929*, cit., pp. 160, 163-168; Н. Јовановић, Политички сукоби у Југославији, 1925-1928, Рад, Београд [N. Jovanović, *Politički sukobi u Jugoslaviji, 1925-1928*, Rad, Beograd] 1974, p. 204.

<sup>47</sup> S. Mičić, *Poljska u jugoslovenskoj spoljnoj politici tokom 30-ih godina XX veka*, in *Jugoslovensko-poljski odnosi u XX veku*, ur. M. Pavlović, A. Začmiński, D. Bondžić, ISI-Institut za istoriju i međunarodne odnose, Beograd 2015, p. 79.

Marinković's opinion on the British was not in the least bit positive. He was convinced that during 1914 and 1915 the British had a plan to win the war «for free» («на муфре»), and that only during the fall of 1916 «they slowly came to the simple idea that one should roll up one's sleeves and fight in order to win, but as the English were little stupid and stubborn in general, that idea was not quite clear to them yet, and they were very happy to accept any idea *à côté* whenever it seemed they could achieve something without an effort»<sup>48</sup>. Marinković believed that the Serbs would be able to play the card of loyalty with the British once the Great War was over. Namely, he did not completely agree with the widespread opinion that the Foreign Office was conducting a solely hypocritical and selfish policy. He had noticed that the English did not like to be criticized for disloyalty, and on those occasions they were ready to act even to the detriment of their interests<sup>49</sup>. After his appointment as the foreign minister, Marinković's guiding idea was that in any eventuality it was better to have British support, or at least to avoid British hostility. His plan was executed on two different levels. The first was a pursuit to overcome the existing prejudices toward the Serbs that emerged during the XIX and at the beginning of the XX century. He was particularly focused to overcome the opposition of Italophile, Hungarophile and Bulgarophile groups in the British high society. The second was to surmount general British distrust of the continental states and desire to avoid any commitment toward continental Europe. Marinković devised a gradual yet decisive activity of the Yugoslav diplomatic service with a single aim to prove to the British diplomats in Belgrade and Rome – and through them to the Foreign Office – that the Kingdom of SCS was pursuing a consistent foreign policy based on rational calculations and not driven by an affect or the desire to achieve rapid diplomatic success and excessive goals. He was convinced that the cooperation would be difficult due to the British mentality and he took an active role in contacts between particular Yugoslav and British diplomats who were discussing delicate issues<sup>50</sup>.

Mussolini's inconsistency had somewhat facilitated Marinković's beginning of diplomatic action. The promise given to the British ambassador in Rome Ronald Graham that the amicable explanation of the first point of the Tirana treaty would be given to the Yugoslav plenipotentiary minister in Rome Milan Rakić – who was Marinković's closest friend and collaborator<sup>51</sup> – was not kept. Therefore, the foreign secretary Austin Chamberlain concluded that Yugoslavia's fears of Italian aggressive plans were not unfounded. Since the British had no direct interests in Albania, Chamberlain refused to interfere actively in the Italian-Yugoslav negotiations, and retained his advisory role in order to preserve the European peace. Marinković

<sup>48</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 35.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 7; К.Ст. Павловић, Дневник 1930-1932 [К.Ст. Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930-1932*], cit., pp. 143, 144.

<sup>51</sup> Id., *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 2, M. Caplin & Co., London-Croydon 1955, p. 93; A. Mitrović, *Milan Rakić u jugoslovensko-italijanskoj krizi posle pakta u Tirani*, cit., p. 215.

made several concessions to the Foreign Office by rejecting the idea of bringing the dispute with Italy before the League of Nations, ceasing the negative press propaganda and promising the ratification of the Nettuno conventions<sup>52</sup>. He was closely collaborating with the Quai d'Orsay on two issues – French intermediation in conversations with the Foreign Office and the contractual regulation of the Yugoslav-French relations<sup>53</sup>. The first task did not bring any benefits for the Kingdom of SCS, and Marinković later modified his approach. The second task was successfully finalized in November 1927. Marinković continued direct talks with the Italians in order to maintain the favorable attitude of French diplomacy and not to provoke Chamberlain's reaction. However, the signing of the Yugoslav-French agreement strengthened the Italian-Albanian relations by signing the so-called Second Tirana treaty. Also, a new issue was opened in the Yugoslav-Italian relations – the renewal of the Pact of friendship and cordial cooperation or the so-called Rome pact of 1924, which was provisioned in January 1928. The important factor for Marinković was Chamberlain's attitude that the Yugoslav-French agreement would not contribute to the regulation of relations between Belgrade and Rome<sup>54</sup>.

The Yugoslav foreign minister was dissatisfied with the attitude of the British foreign secretary as he was convinced that Chamberlain would cancel his mediation between Belgrade and Rome at the first Mussolini's antagonizing posture<sup>55</sup>. Therefore, he continued with the same tactic toward the Great Britain in 1928. Marinković and the plenipotentiary minister in London Đorđe Đurić were constantly suggesting to the Foreign Office to closely observe the development of the Yugoslav-Italian relations and the international situation in the Balkans, since they were convinced that it was required only to give Mussolini enough time to show his true intentions. The goal was to convince the British statesmen that the Kingdom of SCS was conducting a pacifist foreign policy, and that claims on the alleged Yugoslav imperial-

<sup>52</sup> B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države*, cit., p. 47; V. Vinaver, *Engleska i italijansko "zaokruživanje Jugoslavije" 1926-1928*, in *Istorija XX veka*, v. 8, ur. D. Janković, ISI, Beograd 1966, pp. 102, 119-122, 129; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, ISI, Beograd 1971, p. 347; J. Zametica, *Sir Austin Chamberlain and the Italo-Yugoslav Crisis over Albania February-May 1927*, in «Balkanica», v. 36, 2005, pp. 229-234.

<sup>53</sup> Marinković's effort to regulate relations with France was interpreted differently by his personal secretary Kosta St. Pavlović and Milan Antić, close associate of Momčilo Ninčić: Asasa, 14.387, items no. 8372, 8430, 8489, 8860, 8865, 10032; K. St. Pavlović, *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 2, cit., p. 77; id., *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba*, v. 3, cit., pp. 6-15, 46-48; id., *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 5, Williams, Lea & Co., London 1960, pp. 23, 24.

<sup>54</sup> Id., *Vojislav Marinković i njegovo doba*, v. 3, cit., pp. 46-48; V. Vinaver, *Engleska i italijansko "zaokruživanje Jugoslavije" 1926-1928*, cit., pp. 131, 132, 134, 136-140; B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države*, cit., pp. 47-49; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, cit., pp. 117-124; S. Sretenović, *Le poids grandissant de l'Italie dans les relations entre la France et le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes 1924-1927*, in *Istorija XX veka*, v. 2, ISI, Beograd 2007, pp. 32-34; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 62-67; D. Bakić, *The Italo-Yugoslav conflict over Albania: A view from Belgrade*, in «Diplomacy & Statecraft», n. 4, 2014, pp. 601, 602; id., *Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, 1919-1936*, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2017, pp. 99-102.

<sup>55</sup> AY, 388, b. 10, f. 26, folios 716, 717.

ism was the result of the Italian propaganda<sup>56</sup>. Marinković's delaying tactics in the bilateral negotiations was poorly received by the British plenipotentiary minister in Belgrade Howard Kennard, who attributed the procrastination to «the Balkan's fatalism and laziness»<sup>57</sup>.

At the same time, Marinković decided to exploit to the full extent the seemingly weakened British-Italian relations. He rejected the original idea, dating from the end of 1927, to continue Rakić-Mussolini's negotiation, since he was convinced that the vain fascist regime could not accept the strengthening of the Yugoslav-French relations. His new tactic toward Italy was designed on the exploit of a vague phrase of the Rome pact on the prolongation or cancelation in 1928<sup>58</sup>. Marinković introduced another significant modification. In the late 1927, his intention was to renew the Rome pact before ratifying the Nettuno conventions, since this step was unfavorable in the Yugoslav public after the Second Tirana treaty was signed. Nevertheless, he was keen to keep Chamberlain satisfied and therefore he initiated negotiations with Italians in order to create the maneuver space for the issue of the Nettuno conventions<sup>59</sup>. Marinković told the Italian plenipotentiary minister in Belgrade, the general Alessandro Bodrero, that he wanted to renew the Rome pact, but with some changes in provisions. His first proposition was to connect the resolving issues of the Nettuno conventions and the Italian-Albanian relations. Mussolini accepted the initiative with an explanatory note that the Rome pact was just a facade behind which its construction collapsed. Nevertheless, the Italian PM was not reluctant to accept the role designated by the Yugoslav foreign minister, since he was convinced that any agreement with the Kingdom of SCS was not possible without the French consent. The Italian diplomacy managed to anticipate one part of the Yugoslav tactics, and correctly foresaw that Marinković's and Rakić's action was designed to prove that the government in Rome was solely responsible for the failure in case the Rome pact was not prolonged and the bilateral relations were deteriorated<sup>60</sup>. Marinković assumed that the Italians would apply their tested tactics of starting negotiations with the Kingdom of SCS in order to ease their position towards Britain and France, but only at the moment when they were convinced that negotiations were doomed to failure. His goal was to prevent the successful implementation of the Italian tactics. Marinković sought the official indifference of the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay towards the Yugoslav-Italian negotiations, and their interference only at the request of interested parties or after the extended deadline expired. He had avoided asking the British directly for that favor, so he instructed Miroslav Spalajković, the plenipotentiary minister in Paris, to discuss with the foreign minister Aristide Briand and the Quai d'Orsay's general secretary

<sup>56</sup> Ibid; Asasa, 14.439, item no. 705.

<sup>57</sup> С. Мићић, Од бирократије до дипломатије [S. Mičić, *Od birokratije do diplomatije*], cit., pp. 193, 194.

<sup>58</sup> AS, MS, item no. MS-308, folios 1-3.

<sup>59</sup> AS, MS, item no. MS-308, folios 1-3; Н. Јовановић, Политички сукоби у Југославији, 1925-1928 [N. Jovanović, *Politički sukobi u Jugoslaviji, 1925-1928*], cit., p. 271.

<sup>60</sup> AS, MS, item no. MS-308, folios 1-3; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 98-101.

Philippe Berthelot their mediatory role with the Foreign Office<sup>61</sup>. The main goal was to allow Mussolini to show true intentions before the international community through his proposals for the changes of or annexes to the Rome pact<sup>62</sup>.

The first agreement between Marinković and Mussolini was to prolong the deadline for the final decision on the Rome pact for six months<sup>63</sup>. The change of foreign policy tactics required an adjustment in internal politics. On 20 February 1928 the king Aleksandar offered Marinković a mandate to form a new government, which was supposed to include the representatives of the strongest Serbian parties and the Croatian Peasant Party in order to secure the majority in the Parliament for the ratification of the Nettuno conventions. Marinković failed in that mission<sup>64</sup>, but, on 23 May the new Vukićević's government authorized him to ratify conventions as it was apparent that Mussolini was continuing with his agenda of weakening the French security system and surrounding the Kingdom of SCS in cooperation with Turkey, Greece, Hungary and Poland<sup>65</sup>.

Marinković could finally start the implementation of his real plan. After one year dedicated to convince the international community and foremost the Quai d'Orsay and the Foreign Office in pacifist Yugoslav foreign policy and suppressing the Italian propaganda on the alleged imperialism of the Kingdom of SCS in the Balkans, he concluded that the favorable moment for the diplomatic offensive had come. The essence of the plan was to annul the Italian maneuvers that portrayed the hitherto disputes as a conflict between two imperialisms in the Balkans, primarily in Albania, in which the Yugoslav state as a weaker competitor was bound to lose. With his cold-blooded attitude towards several challenges in the neighboring Balkan countries, Marinković managed to win over Chamberlain, who discarded the distrustful attitude towards the Kingdom of SCS in the mid-1928<sup>66</sup>. The ratification of the Nettuno conventions was the beginning of a planned action to prove to the international public that the Italian aggressive plans posed a real danger to the Balkan Peninsula and the Central Europe. Marinković clarified to all Yugoslav plenipotentiary ministers that all events in the bilateral relations prior to the mid-1928 were just the preparation of the ground for the beginning of work, and warned them that diplomatic conflicts were yet to come. He intended to raise again the issue of the prolongation of the Rome pact immediately after the ratification, in order to discuss the

<sup>61</sup> AS, MS, item no. MS-308, folios 1-3.

<sup>62</sup> AY, 388, b. 10, f. 26, folios 725, 726; Asasa, 14.439, item no. 367.

<sup>63</sup> V. Vinaver, *Engleska i italijansko "zaokruživanje Jugoslavije" 1926-1928*, cit., pp. 139-141; B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države*, cit., p. 49; H. Јовановић, *Политички сукоби у Југославији, 1925-1928* [N. Јовановић, *Politički sukobi u Jugoslaviji, 1925-1928*], cit., p. 273.

<sup>64</sup> Ivi, pp. 261, 262.

<sup>65</sup> B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države*, cit., p. 50; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 104-110.

<sup>66</sup> Plenipotentiary minister in London Đorđe Đurić had noticed a change in Chamberlain's attitude towards Mussolini and concluded that the Kingdom of SCS could introduce «the policy of firm hand, and needed always to show that hand in a perfectly correct English glove» (Asasa, 14.439, item no. 705).

international order in the Balkans and in the Central Europe with Mussolini<sup>67</sup>. The part of Mussolini's statement concerning the ratification of the Nettuno conventions and Marinković's struggle with the opposition in the Parliament<sup>68</sup> was estimated by Milan Rakić as the result of the decline of the cordiality in British-Italian relations and a more cautious and distrustful attitude of the Foreign Office towards Italy<sup>69</sup>. Even the assassination of the leading Croatian MPs in the National Assembly on 20 June 1928 – which instigated a grave internal crisis that led to the subsequent king's dictatorship introduced in January 1929 – did not hinder Marinković. The Nettuno conventions were ratified in mid-August 1928, while the Trade Agreement from 1924 was ratified in November 1928<sup>70</sup>.

After the ratification, the prolongation of the Rome pact was on the agenda. Marinković divided this problem into two groups: the Central European and the Balkan issues. His interpretation was that the two countries were committed in the Danubian region to prevent the Anschluss of Austria and the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty. Marinković did not exclude the inevitability of the unification of the two German states, so he advocated that the better solution was to have a weak Austria than a grand Germany in the neighborhood. Concerning the restoration, he preserved the former view of the Yugoslav diplomacy that the Kingdom of SCS and the Kingdom of Italy could not oppose the re-establishment of the monarchist regime in Austria or Hungary, but they should prevent at any cost the Habsburgs to retrieve one or two thrones. Regarding the Balkan issues, Marinković set the consolidation and preservation of the Yugoslav position in the region as the main goal. His interpretation was that the Rome pact did not regulate any particular issue in the Balkans, yet it compelled the Italian diplomatic support and benevolent neutrality toward the Kingdom of SCS. Therefore, Marinković's main concern was to explore the possibility of the continuation of such policy before the pact was prolonged. He wanted to raise the issue of future relations between Italy on the one side, and Albania, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, on the other. His intention was to press the Italians to declare openly whether they would conduct the Balkan policy based on the cooperation or confrontation with the Kingdom of SCS. Marinković imitated Mussolini's broad concepts of foreign policy in his conversations with the new plenipotentiary minister in Belgrade Carlo Galli. He emphasized that the two countries were not obliged to reach a new agreement on friendship and suggested they could only create a facade for the international public that they are no longer enemies.

<sup>67</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 368.

<sup>68</sup> M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 101, 102.

<sup>69</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 705.

<sup>70</sup> B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države*, cit., pp. 50, 51; H. Јовановић, Политички сукоби у Југославији, 1925-1928 [N. Јовановић, *Politički sukobi u Jugoslaviji, 1925-1928*], cit., pp. 271-276, 308-310; V. Vinaver, *Engleska i italijansko "zaokruživanje Jugoslavije" 1926-1928*, cit., pp. 146, 147, 151; B. Gligorijević, *Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista (ORJUNA). Prilog izučavanju nacionalističkih i terorističkih organizacija u staroj Jugoslaviji*, in *Istorija XX veka*, v. 5, ur. D. Janković, ISI, Beograd 1963, p. 356; G. Latinović, *Jugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1929): Main Aspects*, in «Balcanica», v. 46, 2015, p. 185.

Marinković was convinced that the core problem in the negotiations would be the influence of the Yugoslav-French relations on the Yugoslav-Italian negotiations, and vice versa. He suspected that the motivation of the Italian side for the continuation of the bilateral conversations was to find whether any Yugoslav-French military alliance was disguised with the agreement signed on 11 November 1927. Marinković predicted two possible difficulties in the negotiations: 1) if the Italians concluded that the Yugoslav-French relations were based only on agreements registered before the League of Nations, then they would become more ruthless towards the Kingdom of SCS; 2) if they suspected that some accords were signed secretly, then the fascist propaganda would condemn France for pursuing an «aggressive policy *d'encerclement*» of Italy, which would complicate the future prolongation of the Yugoslav-French agreement. Therefore, he warned Rakić they had to be «especially skilled and very, very careful» in this core problem<sup>71</sup>.

When the Italian side suggested an informal meeting between Mussolini and Marinković in Milan or some other city, Rakić expressed his opinion on 3 October 1928 that the Italian offer should be accepted since they did not insist on an official visit to Rome. Rakić was convinced that this would prove Marinković's political concept, even if they did not reach an arrangement<sup>72</sup>. However, the king Aleksandar anticipated the extreme Italian demands regarding the extension of the Rome pact and their offer of general alliance directed against all other states. Since the Yugoslav side could not accept it, the bilateral relations would deteriorate. On 5 October the king Aleksandar instructed Marinković to examine with the Quai d'Orsay what kind of support the Kingdom of SCS could expect in such a case. He did not want to face an «undefined and dangerous situation» of non-contractual relations with Italy alone. He wanted a precise specification of the existing obligations to avoid the conduct of diplomatic actions based on the overestimation or underestimation of the French position. The king Aleksandar also instructed Marinković to consider a possibility to create the Yugoslav-French alliance. He was convinced that the French rapprochement with Italy had collapsed and that the time had come to clarify the situation<sup>73</sup>. Marinković estimated he could not persuade the French statesmen to accept the alliance and that a full-fledged approach was needed so the Quai d'Orsay would not perceive such an offer as blackmail. He only informed Berthelot of the present situation and emphasized that in case the negotiations failed, the outcome would be a further deterioration of the Yugoslav-Italian relations<sup>74</sup>. Marinković was appalled with Rakić's conduct, as his conversations regarding an official meeting in Rome or an unofficial meeting in Milan were contrary to the instructions. He reiterated the previous clarification that it was not opportune to negotiate with Mussolini personally before the basis for a new Yugoslav-Italian agreement had been reached.

<sup>71</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 32; A. Mitrović, *Okosnice politike Kraljevine SHS prema Italiji 1920-1929*, cit., pp. 84, 85.

<sup>72</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 28; Asasa, 14.439, item no. 709.

<sup>73</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 85.

<sup>74</sup> Asasa, 14.439, item no. 81.

Marinković was ready to accept only the invitation for an official visit to Rome to sign a new agreement:

To go to a meeting blindfolded like this, when all chances were there, that nothing would happen, in my opinion, would only have bad consequences, if there were no results. And I'm not so confident as to think that I could personally influence change of Mussolini's mind, and incline him to change his entire policy towards us. I don't see how our policy, nor I personally, could gain from such visit to Rome.

His assessment was that in this particular situation they could not reach a decision on signing a new pact, which would leave a difficult impression in domestic and international public, and then the Kingdom of SCS could only expect a new Italian intrigue. His position was based on the results of the ratification of the Nettuno conventions, when the Italians launched two consecutive actions – the refusal of great powers' mutual diplomatic action before the Bulgarian government against terrorist actions of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation on the Yugoslav territory and the proclamation of Ahmet Zogu for the king of the Albanians. Marinković was certain that the Italian diplomacy would be compelled to diminish the significance and results of his official visit to Rome with some sort of action and “to tranquilize their clients” which were gathered against France and the Kingdom of SCS. Rakić was allowed to answer, only in the case of a possible Italian offer, that Marinković was ready to meet with Mussolini as soon as the necessary preconditions were fulfilled<sup>75</sup>.

After Marinković's refusal to meet with Mussolini, the king Aleksandar sent Milan Antić – Ninčić's close associate – to Rome to examine the possible prolongation of the Rome pact in December 1928. Antić did not achieve any result and concluded that Mussolini did not want to sign any agreement which would strengthen the Yugoslav international position as he anticipated interior rumbles in the Kingdom of SCS after the assassination in the National Assembly<sup>76</sup>. After the king Aleksandar had established dictatorship on 6 January 1929, Marinković retained his position of the foreign minister in the government of general Petar Živković. Some sources indicate that Rakić was considered as the new foreign minister, as Marinković had compromised himself by the relentless position in negotiations with the Italians. Yet, Rakić remained faithful to his chief and friend and refused the offer<sup>77</sup>. Nevertheless, Marinković started to lose ground in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the PM wanted to interfere with the conduct of the foreign policy and diplomacy<sup>78</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 8, doc. 7, folio I.

<sup>76</sup> Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [B. Gligorijević, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*], cit., p. 87.

<sup>77</sup> В.Ј. Вучковић, Пензионисање Милана Ракића [V.J. Vučković, *Penzionisanje Milana Rakića*], in Зборник историје Одељења литературе и језика САНУ, књижевности, в. 2, Научно дело, Београд [Zbornik istorije Odeljenja literature i jezika SANU, književnosti, v. 2, Naučno delo, Beograd] 1961, pp. 235, 236; B. Krizman, *Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra i kneza Pavla (1918-1941)*, in «Časopis za suvremenu povijest», n. 1, 1975, p. 41.

<sup>78</sup> С. Мићић, Од бирократије до дипломатије [S. Micić, *Od birokratije do diplomatije*], cit., pp. 102, 103, 138, 139.

The bilateral relations further deteriorated in 1929. Mussolini and the foreign minister, count Dino Grandi, continued the policy of the encirclement of Yugoslavia, while the king Aleksandar, Živković, Marinković and Bogoljub Jevtić, the minister of court and the deputy foreign minister, were working on the rapprochement with the neighboring states and encouraged the involvement of the League of Nations' general secretary Sir Eric Drummond in the bilateral relations. Mutually hostile press propaganda and the position of the Yugoslav minority in Italy were further aggravating the situation<sup>79</sup>. The poor state of the bilateral relations led to Rakić's four-month absence from Rome, from the beginning of October 1929 to the beginning of February 1930<sup>80</sup>.

The conversations were resumed unofficially during the wedding ceremony of the Italian crown prince Umberto di Savoia, in January 1930. The Yugoslav representatives were prince Pavle Karađorđević and Jevtić. The meeting had two aims: to examine the possibility to resume official negotiations and to send a message to the Italian side that Marinković had lost confidence of the king Aleksandar and Živković. Concurrently, rumors circulated in Belgrade about the imminent dismissal of the foreign minister due to his hostile attitude towards Italy. Thus, it was possible to conduct the later Yugoslav-Italian negotiations on two parallel tracks. The king Aleksandar, Marinković and Rakić were engaged on the Yugoslav side and Mussolini, Grandi, the general director for Europe and the Levant Raffaele Guariglia and Galli on the Italian side<sup>81</sup>. Guariglia and Galli were among few Italian diplomats who were honestly working to improve the bilateral relations<sup>82</sup>.

<sup>79</sup> V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, cit., p. 393; B. Krizman, *Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra*, cit., p. 41; E. Milak, *Jugoslavija i Italija 1931-1937*, ISI, Beograd 1987, pp. 45-49; D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933: britanska politika prema jugoslovensko-italijanskim sukobima u vreme svetske ekonomske krize*, ISI, Beograd 1987, pp. 36-38; H.J. Burgwyn, *Italian Foreign Policy in Interwar Period, 1918-1940*, Greenwood, Westport-London 1997, pp. 45-47, 60; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 136-153, 167, 168, 176; S. Sretenović, *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918-1929*, cit., pp. 352, 357-359; L. Monzali, *Il sogno dell'egemonia: l'Italia, la questione jugoslava e l'Europa centrale (1918-1941)*, Le Lettere, Firenze 2010, pp. 49, 50; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [В. Глигоријевић, *Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици*], cit., p. 89; С.Б. Мићић, Балкански и подунавски концепт југословенске спољне политике (1925-1938) [S.B. Mičić, *Balkanski i podunavski koncept jugoslovenske spoljne politike (1925-1938)*], PhD thesis, Филозофски факултет, Београд [Filozofski fakultet, Beograd] 2018, pp. 700-705.

<sup>80</sup> С. Мићић, Н. Милићевић, Изазови унутрашње и спољне политике у време диктатуре краља Александра [S. Mičić, N. Milićević, *Izazovi unutrašnje i spoljne politike u vreme diktature kralja Aleksandra*], in K.С. Павловић, *Дневник 1930-1932* [K.С. St. Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930-1932*], cit., pp. 54, 55.

<sup>81</sup> V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, cit., p. 428; B. Krizman, *Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra*, cit., p. 42; D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933*, cit., p. 42; V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, cit., p. 176; id., *Svetska ekonomska kriza u Podunavlju i nemački prodor 1929-1934*, ISI, Beograd 1987, p. 64; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 179-181; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [В. Глигоријевић, *Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици*], cit., p. 96; С.Б. Мићић, Балкански и подунавски концепт југословенске спољне политике [S.B. Mičić, *Balkanski i podunavski koncept jugoslovenske spoljne politike*], cit., pp. 705-707; С. Мићић, Н. Милићевић, Изазови унутрашње и спољне политике у време диктатуре краља Александра [S. Mičić, N. Milićević, *Izazovi unutrašnje i spoljne politike u vreme diktature kralja Aleksandra*], cit., pp. 54, 55.

<sup>82</sup> L. Monzali, *Il sogno dell'egemonia*, cit., pp. 48-49; id., *La Jugoslavia e l'assetto dell'Europa centrale nella*

The official negotiations began by two foreign ministers in May 1930, during the session of the League of Nations' Council. At the end of July, Mussolini informed the king Aleksandar that he was ready to regulate two problems which Galli estimated as the core of the Yugoslav hostility. He was prepared to discuss the preservation of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and exclusion from a potential Italian-French conflict. At the end of August, Mussolini and Grandi agreed on the main goal of further negotiations – the establishment of a long-term Italian-Yugoslav alliance. Their plan was to exclude France from interfering in the regional affairs, prevent Germany from descending to the south, secure the Italian positions in Albania, enable the international emancipation of Yugoslavia as a “great power” and harmonize the foreign policies of Albania, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria with the interests of the two allies. Marinković intended to delay the negotiations long enough until he reduced them to their core issue – preserving Albania's independence<sup>83</sup>.

A new round was held during the session of the League of Nations' Assembly on 9 September. Grandi insisted on the halt of the Yugoslav-French relations as a precondition for the renewal of the Italian-Yugoslav friendship, which would allow Yugoslavia the freedom of action in the Balkans. His claim that Mussolini had not given him instructions served only to convince Marinković that Rakić made an accurate assessment that Grandi did not have the courage to conduct an independent foreign policy. Marinković argued that the Yugoslav foreign policy was not under French patronage due to the development of relations with the Great Britain and Germany. He wanted to open a discussion on the Albanian, Austrian and Hungarian issues<sup>84</sup>. However, the atmosphere was aggravated by the continuation of court proceedings against the Yugoslav minority in Italy, especially due to death sentences in some cases. The severity of this problem was noticeable for the next two months, when the two foreign ministers did not meet plenipotentiary ministers in Rome and Belgrade<sup>85</sup>.

Based on Galli's views, Grandi suggested to Mussolini in November 1930 to exploit a favorable disposition of the Yugoslav statesmen to reach an agreement in the

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*politica estera dell'Italia fascista (1922-1939)*, in *Italien und Österreich im Mitteleuropa der Zwischenkriegszeit*, hrsg. M. Guiotto, H. Wahnout, Böhlau, Wien-Köln-Weimar 2017, p. 158.

<sup>83</sup> B. Krizman, *Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra*, cit., p. 42; E. Milak, *Jugoslavija i Italija 1931-1937*, cit., pp. 49, 53, 54; D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolitički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933*, cit., pp. 42, 73-75; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 182, 183; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [B. Gligorijević, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*], cit., pp. 96, 97.

<sup>84</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 20; К.Ст. Павловић, Дневник 1930-1932 [K. St. Pavlović, *Dnevnik 1930-1932*], cit., pp. 126, 127; id., *Marinković i njegovo doba (1876-1935)*, v. 3, cit., p. 57; E. Milak, *Jugoslavija i Italija 1931-1937*, cit., pp. 53, 54; D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolitički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933*, cit., pp. 75-77; R. De Felice, *Mussolini il duce*, v. 1, *Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936*, Einaudi, Torino 1996, p. 378; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., p. 188; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [B. Gligorijević, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*], cit., pp. 97, 98; D. Bakić, *The Italo-Yugoslav conflict over Albania*, cit., p. 602.

<sup>85</sup> M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., p. 188; С. Мићић, Н. Милићевић, Изазови унутрашње и спољне политике у време диктатуре краља Александра [S. Mičić, N. Milićević, *Izazovi unutrašnje i spoljne politike u vreme diktature kralja Aleksandra*], cit., p. 55.

time when the agreement with France seemed unattainable<sup>86</sup>. Marinković was convinced, in September 1930, that during prior three and a half years he had managed to «gain, preserve and secure» British friendship<sup>87</sup>. He could also benefit from the change of the British government as the Ramsay MacDonald's cabinet abandoned the prior Chamberlain's course of a close cooperation with Mussolini, since May 1929<sup>88</sup>. Contrary to Grandi's assessment, French influence was growing stronger since a new loan was approved for the stabilization of the Yugoslav economy in mid-November 1930<sup>89</sup>. Marinković's tactic required the involvement of the British diplomats and detachment of the French diplomats, and he began to emphasize his trust and sincerity in the communication with the plenipotentiary minister in Belgrade Nevile Henderson<sup>90</sup>. Marinković was scrutinizing the international position of Yugoslavia in the first half of November 1930 and the prospects of the foreign policy from the perspective of the two most dangerous options – a general war «to life and death» and a localized military conflict. He estimated Italy as the most unpredictable subject of the international relations. This conclusion was based on the impossibility of the military leadership to resist the intentions of the fascist regime, and he considered Mussolini as the only person who could prevent Italy to enter the war. After analyzing Mussolini's personality, Marinković was convinced that he was dedicated to the regime's successes in internal politics and had not assessed the practicality of the state policy. Therefore, Marinković anticipated that Mussolini would probably assume that he could carry out the war as successfully as he did the March on Rome since he was a «people's tribune» and not an officer. «And if one day he comes to belief that the fascist regime could not be maintained by preserving international peace, he will enter the war without measuring the chance of winning». Marinković estimated that Mussolini could make various risky moves, because he achieved success «through adventure and risk-taking» over the years, but could not grasp whether Mussolini was still speaking for the «gallery» or did he begin to believe in his own words. Marinković concluded that war was the only option for the fascist regime due to the economic and financial crisis, and that the only reason why Yugoslav foreign services had not registered any military preparations was their expensiveness. He anticipated that any war while Germany was unarmed would be a regional conflict between France and Italy, which the latter was bound to lose, and then the lasting peace could be established through a sincere Franco-German arrangement. Marinković concluded it would be a favorable outcome for Yugoslavia – which did not want a war and longed for peace – since the conflict with Italy and its lesser allies was much less dangerous than the conflict with the German-Italian bloc<sup>91</sup>.

<sup>86</sup> M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 188-190.

<sup>87</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 20.

<sup>88</sup> R. Lamb, *Mussolini e gli inglesi*, Corbaccio, Milano 1998, p. 126.

<sup>89</sup> D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolitički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933*, cit., pp. 80-82.

<sup>90</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, docc. 7, 35; Asasa, 14.439, item no. 169; D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolitički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933*, cit., pp. 82-84.

<sup>91</sup> AS, MS, item no. MS-139, folios 1-5.

Marinković issued new instructions to Rakić on 20 December 1930 as he was preparing for the final stage of the negotiations with Grandi and Mussolini. The main goal was to persuade the Foreign Office that Yugoslavia was conducting an independent, moderate and rational foreign policy. The tactics had not changed. Marinković and Rakić simultaneously informed Henderson and Graham of the negotiations with Italians, but they avoided giving them the impression that something was expected in return. Marinković's approach to the British diplomats was to exploit the Anglo-Saxon conviction of their superiority over other nations, in order to create the impression «that we confide in them simply because they are smart and normal people... so they are the only ones capable to understand our problem with various continental fools [Italians]» and that the Yugoslavs expected only useful advice. Since he was still convinced that the negotiations were doomed to failure, Marinković wanted Graham and Henderson to be informed in detail so they could make the conclusion which of the two sides bore greater responsibility<sup>92</sup>. In January 1931, Marinković concluded that his tactics had started to achieve results since the British diplomats were losing confidence in the Italians and had more confidence in the Yugoslavs, which was a precondition to start open negotiations with Grandi<sup>93</sup>. He could inform the king Aleksandar enthusiastically that the British had «bored Italians with their interventions»<sup>94</sup>. Yet, he was very careful not to undermine British confidence<sup>95</sup>.

During the meetings with Grandi in January, May and September 1931, Marinković spoke openly about the core issue of the bilateral relations – the mutual guarantees of Albania's independence. He dismissed possibility of any mutual policy against France and suggested the Yugoslav-Italian alliance in the Central Europe against the Curtius-Schober plan for German domination. Marinković encountered two problems. On the one side, Grandi was not able to conduct foreign policy independent from Mussolini. Therefore, the conversation between the two foreign ministers could not settle the dispute over Albania. On the other side, the king Aleksandar was preparing to start secret, independent negotiations directly with Mussolini. Marinković was excluded from those negotiations in late 1931 and early 1932, and later was dismissed from the posts of the PM and foreign minister in mid-1932<sup>96</sup>.

<sup>92</sup> Asasa, 14.331, item no. 14, doc. 7; Asasa, 14.439, item no. 169; К.Ст. Павловић, Дневник 1930-1932 [К.Ст. Павловић, *Dnevnik 1930-1932*], cit., pp. 143, 144.

<sup>93</sup> AY, 797, Personal papers of the prince Pavle Karađorđević, reel 11, scans 1080-1082.

<sup>94</sup> AY, 797, Personal papers of the prince Pavle Karađorđević, reel 11, scans 1072, 1073.

<sup>95</sup> AY, 797, Personal papers of the prince Pavle Karađorđević, reel 11, scans 1076, 1077.

<sup>96</sup> AY, 797, Personal papers of the prince Pavle Karađorđević, reel 11, scans 1063-1066; К.Ст. Павловић, Дневник 1930-1932 [К.Ст. Павловић, *Dnevnik 1930-1932*], cit., pp. 196-199, 211, 237, 238; В. Krizman, *Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra*, cit., p. 43; Е. Milak, *Jugoslavija i Italija 1931-1937*, cit., pp. 56-60; D. Hercigonja, *Velika Britanija i spoljnopolitički položaj Jugoslavije 1929-1933*, cit., pp. 86-90, 96-99; M. Bucarelli, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia*, cit., pp. 191-196; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић у европској политици [В. Глигоријевић, *Kralj Aleksandar Karađorđević u evropskoj politici*], cit., pp. 99-102; D. Vakić, *The Italo-Yugoslav conflict over Albania*, cit., p. 602; С.Б. Мићић, Балкански и подунавски концепт југословенске

During the two terms as the foreign minister Vojislav Marinković had the opportunity to lead a diplomatic action towards Italy. A significant difference was that during the first term in the office in 1924 he was operating only within the existing framework of the Yugoslav foreign policy and the plenipotentiary minister in Rome was Antonijević, who was close to Pašić and Ninčić; while during the second term in 1927-1932 he was able to implement a personal concept of foreign policy and the plenipotentiary minister was Rakić – Marinković's closest associate. His basic idea was to establish sincere and friendly relations with Italy or to cooperate with other great powers and deter Italy from the military conflict. The Italians clearly understood that the Yugoslav-French cooperation was a major obstacle to their aggressive plans in the Balkans and the Danube region. However, while the government in Rome was blinded by the Yugoslav-French agreement from 1927, Marinković actually skillfully played the British card behind Italian backs. Over the course of four years, he gradually overcame the existing prejudices of the Foreign Office towards the Serbs and built positions of close cooperation against the Italian threat. Ironically, when the goals of his strategy were achieved at the end of 1930, Marinković was ruled out from the mainstream of the Yugoslav-Italian relations by the king Aleksandar. As a result, he failed to take full advantage of his success.

Alongside Great Britain, Marinković also considered the possibility of cooperation with other great powers. During the early 1920s, he anticipated the formation of the German-Soviet bloc, and as a preventive measure to that menace he considered the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR. However, as the importance of Great Britain in the Yugoslav-Italian relations grew, Marinković gradually abandoned the idea of the cooperation with the Soviets. He anticipated the possibility of the formation of the German-Italian bloc in the early 1930s, and therefore definitely abandoned the idea of the cooperation with Germany and accepted the concept advocated by Momčilo Ninčić in the mid-1920s on the tripartite cooperation between Yugoslavia, France and Italy against Germany. Nevertheless, Marinković's influence was deteriorating as the king Aleksandar had decided to take firm control over the Yugoslav foreign policy in 1931-1932.

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спољне политике [S.B. Mičić, *Balkanski i podunavski koncept jugoslovenske spoljne politike*], cit., pp. 714-720; С. Мићић, Н. Милићевић, *Изазови унутрашње и спољне политике у време диктатуре краља Александра* [S. Mičić, N. Milićević, *Izazovi unutrašnje i spoljne politike u vreme diktature kralja Aleksandra*], cit., pp. 56, 57.