**Dewey and Goodin on the Value of Monological Deliberation**

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**ABSTRACT**  
Most contemporary deliberative democrats contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement and collective action. A critical mass of these deliberative theorists also claims that John Dewey’s writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Unfortunately, very few of them have noted the similarities between Dewey and Robert Goodin’s theories of deliberation, as well as the surprising contrast between their modeling of deliberation as a mixed monological-dialogical process and the prevalent view expressed in the deliberative democracy literature, viz., that deliberation is predominantly a dialogical process. Both Dewey and Goodin have advanced theories of deliberation which emphasize the value of internal, monological or individual deliberative procedures, though not to the exclusion of external, dialogical and group deliberation. In this paper I argue that deliberative theorists bent on appropriating Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation for political purposes should first consider Goodin’s account of ‘deliberation within’ as a satisfactory if not superior proxy, an account of deliberation which has the identical virtues of Dewey’s theory—imaginative rehearsal, weighing of alternatives and role-taking—with the addition of one more, namely, that it operates specifically within the domain of the political.
Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon.

J. Dewey

[...] the more democratically deliberative our internal reflections manage to be, the less it will matter that external-collective decision procedures can never be as directly deliberatively democratic as we might like in large-scale societies.

R. Goodin

0. Introduction

Most contemporary deliberative democrats contend that deliberation is the group activity that transforms individual preferences and behavior into mutual understanding, agreement and collective action. A critical mass of these deliberative theorists also claims that John Dewey’s writings contain a nascent theory of deliberative democracy. Unfortunately, very few of them have noted the similarities between Dewey and Robert Goodin’s theories of deliberation, as well as the surprising contrast between their modeling of deliberation as a mixed monological-dialogical process and the prevalent view expressed in the deliberative democracy literature, viz., that deliberation is predominantly a dialogical process. Both Dewey and Goodin have advanced theories of deliberation which emphasize the value of internal, monological or individual deliberative procedures, though not to the exclusion of external, dialogical and group ones. In this paper I argue that deliberative theorists bent on appropriating Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation for political purposes should first consider Goodin’s account of ‘deliberation within’ as a satisfactory if not superior proxy, an account of deliberation which has the identical virtues of


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The paper is organized into five sections. In the first section, I summarize the positions of those scholars defending the view that John Dewey was a proto-deliberative democrat, anticipating the deliberative turn in democratic theory. The second section examines Dewey’s monological theory of moral deliberation. In the third section, I present the key features of Goodin’s theory of monological political deliberation and reveal some commonalities between it and Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation. The fourth section asks and answers the question: Is there greater continuity or discontinuity between dialogical and monological theories of deliberation? In the fifth and concluding section, I share a lesson that the Dewey-Goodin comparison might impart to commentators enamored with the idea that Dewey’s vision of democracy is essentially deliberative.

1. *Dewey, a Deliberative Democrat?*

Over the past decade, the claim that John Dewey was a deliberative democrat or a proto-deliberative democrat has become increasingly common in both the literature on deliberative democracy and classical American Pragmatism. Among deliberative democrats, John Dryzek acknowledges that “an emphasis on deliberation is not entirely new,” and points to “[a]ntecedents” in the ancient Greeks, Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill and “in theorists from the early twentieth century such as John Dewey.” Likewise, deliberative theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson note that “[i]n the writings of John Dewey [. . .] we finally find unequivocal declarations of the need for political discussion [. . .] [and] widespread deliberations as part of democracy.” Likewise, deliberative democrat Jürgen Habermas invokes John Dewey’s argument that genuine democratic choice cannot be realized by majority voting alone, but must also be complemented by deliberation—or in Dewey’s words, “prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion.”

bridge and John Gastil have taken these Dewey-inspired theories of deliberative democracy a step farther, employing them to study the actual phenomenon of deliberation in communities and small groups. Still, while the general idea can be traced back to John Dewey, the name ‘deliberative democracy’ has a fairly recent origin. With genealogical precision, James Bohman pinpoints “its recent incarnation” in the work of the political scientist “Joseph Bessette, who [in 1980] coined it to oppose the elitist and ‘aristocratic’ interpretation of the American Constitution.”

Among Dewey scholars, the coronation of Dewey as a nascent deliberative democrat has been comparatively slow. One remarkable conversion was signaled by Dewey biographer Robert Westbrook’s admission that Dewey’s democratic vision resembles deliberative democracy more than participatory democracy. Writing after the publication of his widely heralded Dewey biography, he confesses: “[. . .] I think we might say that Dewey was anticipating an ideal that contemporary democratic theorists have dubbed “deliberative democracy.” Indeed, I wish this term was in the air when I was writing John Dewey and American Democracy, for I think it captures Dewey’s procedural ideals better than the term I used, “participatory democracy,” since it suggests something of the character of the participation involved in democratic associations.

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In other words, Dewey developed an ideal of intelligent social action that outstripped the ideal of participatory politics. While Westbrook saw the mass politics and direct action of grassroots groups in the 1960s (e.g., Students for a Democratic Society) as distinctly Deweyan, he later revises his view. Even more than participatory democracy, Dewey’s democratic vision resembles the deliberative strain of democratic theory. Why? If we follow Joshua Cohen’s definition of deliberative democracy (as Westbrook does), that is, an association for coordinating action through norm-governed discussion, then deliberative democracy appears surprisingly similar to Dewey’s vision of democracy. In Dewey’s *The Public and Its Problems*, democratic methods encompass communication and collaborative inquiry undertaken by citizens within a community and against a rich background of supportive institutions. Through the social activity of appraisal or evaluation, private preferences, or what Dewey terms “prizings” (i.e., what is valued or desired), are converted into publicly shared values (i.e., what is valuable or desirable). Similarly, deliberative democrats model deliberation as a communicative process for resolving collective problems that depends on converting individual ends and preferences into shared objectives and values. For instance, deliberation-friendly political theorist Ian Shapiro claims that “[t]he unifying impulse motivating [deliberation]...”

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9 Dewey connects the concepts of communication and community: “To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values.” Dewey, “Search for the Great Community,” in *The Public and Its Problems*, LW 2:332.

is that people will modify their perceptions of what society should do in the
course of discussing this with others.”

A new generation of Dewey scholars has emerged to enthusiastically en-
dorse the proposition that Dewey anticipated the deliberative turn in democ-
ratic theory. Some locate the source of Dewey’s ideas about democratic delib-
eration in his books and articles on politics, while others see a closer connection
to his works on ethics. Two of the more prominent scholars in this group,
Noëlle McAfee and William Caspary, explicitly tie Dewey’s nascent theory of
democratic deliberation to operative concepts in both his political and ethical
writings. For McAfee, “Dewey’s emphasis on publicness” and “public dis-
course” clarifies “how a given policy would or would not satisfy their [i.e., the
discoursing citizens’] own concerns, values, and ends—including the value they
place on the welfare of the community itself.” Publicness for Dewey resem-
bles the contemporary deliberative democrat’s full-blooded sense of public de-
liberation, that is, discourse intended to transform individual perspectives and
goals into shared ideals and public values. Even though deliberation for Dewey
is a way of addressing moral problems, on Westbrook’s account, it also repre-
sents a method for confronting social and political problems: “Dewey’s goal [in
offering a theory of ethical deliberation] is to move toward an account of pub-
lic deliberation on issues of society-wide concern.” As we shall see, West-
brook’s case for Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation converging with con-
temporary theories of deliberative democracy might not be as water-tight once
we gain a fuller appreciation for Dewey and Goodin’s theories of monological
deliberation.

11 I. Shapiro, “The State of Democratic Theory,” in Political Science: The State of the Disci-
12 Among those scholars who see the connection between Dewey’s theory of democratic de-
liberation and his political writings, see, S. Ralston, “Deliberative Democracy as a Matter of
25, no. 3/4 (2005): 17-25; and Z. Vanderveen, “Pragmatism and Democratic Legitimacy:
21, no. 4 (2007): 243-258. For those who see a closer tie to his ethical works, see V. Co-
lapietro, “Democracy as a Moral Ideal,” The Kettering Review, vol. 24, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 21-
31; and G.F. Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics: Democracy as Experience (Bloomington and Indi-
13 N. McAfee, “Public Knowledge,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 30, no. 2
(2004):139-157, 149.
14 W. R. Caspary, Dewey on Democracy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000),
p. 140.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that Dewey never employed the term ‘deliberation’ while addressing political subject-matter. Instead, terminology such as ‘communication’ and ‘dialogue’ took center-stage. For instance, in *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey writes: “Systematic and continuous inquiry . . . and its results are but tools after all. Their final actuality is accomplished in face-to-face relationships by means of direct give and take. Logic in its fulfillment recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue.”15 Moreover, moral deliberation is not exhausted by dialogue, for as Dewey notes, only “[s]ome people deliberate by dialogue.”16 Other deliberators engage in visualization, imaginative agency and imaginative commentary. Despite the terminological shift, moral deliberation often pervades dialogue about politics because these communications involve the disclosure and clarification of personal preferences, or “prizings,” as well as their conversion into shared moral values and ideals.

To avoid foreclosing the many possible avenues for creating a democratic community, Dewey did not lay out the particulars, a plan of action or a final destination in the struggle to institutionalize a better (or best) form of democracy—let alone, a deliberative democracy. According to Aaron Schutz, “Dewey resisted calls for him to develop a specific model of democratic government, arguing that it must look differently in different contexts.”17 Unfortunately, Dewey’s vagueness about how to institutionalize democracy has given rise to a series of trenchant criticisms concerning the feasibility of his democratic ideal.18 Nevertheless, Dewey did propose a set of leading principles or postulations that together he calls the “social idea” of democracy.19 As pos-

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19 Dewey writes: “We have had occasion to refer in passing to the distinction between democracy as a social idea and political democracy as a system of government. The two are, of course, connected. The idea remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human relationships. Yet in discussion they must be distinguished.” Similar to Fukuyama, though, Dewey defines political democracy, generally, in liberal-democratic terms, that is, as those “traditional political institutions” which include “general suffrage, elected representatives, [and] majority rule.” Dewey, “The Search for the Great Community,” in *The Public and Its Problems*, LW 2:325-6.
tulations, these ideas are intended to direct subsequent investigations into the
design of stable and viable governing apparatuses; however, taken alone, they
have no direct correspondence with any particular set of institutions.20

2. Dewey on Moral Deliberation

Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is integral to a broader theory, namely, a
theory (or method) of ethical inquiry. So, to fully appreciate moral deliberation,
one must first look to his larger account of how one inquires about ethical
subject-matter. Ethical inquiry loosely resembles the pattern of experimental
inquiry in positive science, involving the (i) identification of a problem, (ii)
formation of a hypothesis, (iii) working out the implications of the hypothesis
and (iv) testing the hypothesis.21 With respect to their differences, ethical in-
quiry and scientific inquiry have separate objectives: improving value judg-
ments and explaining phenomena, respectively.22 “[T]he moral phase of the
problem,” Dewey notes, is just “the question of values and ends.”23 Values di-
rect choice and action when existing habits prove unhelpful or obstructive to
good conduct. Value judgments can be assessed naturalistically, that is, in
terms of whether they cultivate intelligent habits of ethical conduct—habits
that make humans better adapted to their natural and social environment.24

20 Dewey’s reluctance to specify model institutions for realizing his democratic ideal is mir-
rored in the aversion that contemporary critical theorists have to institutional design.
Dryzek explains: “Overly precise specification of model institutions involves skating on thin
ice. Far better, perhaps, to leave any such specification to the individual involved. The ap-
propriate configuration will depend on the constraints and opportunities of the existing so-
cial situation, the cultural tradition(s) to which the participants subscribe, and the capabili-
ties and desires of these actors,” Dryzek, “Discursive Designs: Critical Theory and Political
21 More precisely, Dewey explains the five stages of inquiry, as follows: “Upon examination,
each instance of [intelligent inquiry] reveals more or less clearly, five logically distinct steps:
(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of possible solution; (iv)
development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; (v) further observation and ex-
perimental leading to its acceptance or rejection; that is, the conclusion of belief or disbe-
24 Id. (with James Hayden Tufts), “The Moral Self,” in Ethics (1932 revision), LW 7:285-
309.
They can also be assessed instrumentally, that is, in terms of their efficacy or success in achieving favored ends. Finally, they can be evaluated conventionally, that is, by recourse to widely approved or potentially approvable community standards. In sum, ethical inquiry for Dewey is a form of experimental inquiry, or method, a way of improving our value judgments relative to naturalistic, instrumental and conventional criteria of acceptability.

Deliberation for Dewey occurs during the third stage of ethical inquiry. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey defines moral deliberation as “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing lines of action.” To deliberate, the moral agent must, first, temporarily disengage the engine of action; then, imagine the possible consequences, good or bad, of “various competing lines of action” (i.e., rehearsing them); and, lastly, decide on the best, or most morally defensible, course of action given the rehearsal of possibilities. Moreover, Dewey’s dramatic rehearsal resembles George Herbert Mead’s notion of ideal role-taking, whereby an agent will adopt the perspective of all those affected by the imagined course of action. So, deliberation involves the indi-

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25 Dewey’s ethics requires that we locate the conditions of justification for our value judgments in both the individual’s community (i.e., in terms of standards of general approval) and human conduct itself (i.e., in terms of instrumental efficacy), not in *a priori* criteria, such as divine commands, Platonic Forms, pure reason, or a fixed Aristotelian *telos*. Dewey, “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” LW 5:278-88. Id. (with James Hayden Tufts), “Moral Judgment and Knowledge,” in *Ethics* (1932 revision), LW 7:262-83.


27 In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey compares ethical deliberation to an imaginative “experiment.” Each possible course of action, once worked out, remains tentative and “retrievable.” Dewey writes: “It [i.e., deliberation] starts from the blocking of efficient overt action, due to that conflict of prior habit and newly released impulse to which reference has been made. Then each habit, each impulse, involved in the temporary suspense of overt action takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical acts outside the body. Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable.” “The Nature of Deliberation” in *Human Nature and Conduct*, MW 14:132-3.

28 Mead writes: “A difference of functions does not preclude a common experience; it is possible for the individual to put himself in the place of the other although his function is different.” *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934), p. 325. Cited by G. Pappas, *John Dewey’s Ethics*, p. 235. Habermas states that discourse ethics formalizes the
individual moral agent projecting her possible choices and actions into the future. Since it occurs “in imagination” and involves individual moral judgment, there is good reason to believe that deliberation for Dewey is for the most part a monological process. \(^{29}\) And since deliberation is abductive (i.e., concerned with hypothesis formation and testing), it is instrumental in the sense that it is aimed at experimental confirmation or disconfirmation (relative to tentative, not fixed, standards of acceptability), but not in the sense that it satisfies an absolute standard or realizes some final end. In contrast, a utilitarian deliberator judges the relative worth (or value) of the alternatives before her relative to a single fixed criterion, viz., whether the alternative maximizes hedonistic pleasure, happiness or utility. \(^{30}\)

In James Gouinlock’s essay, “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” he attempts to show that Morton White’s critique of Dewey’s ethical theory rests on several faulty assumptions. In White’s criticism of Dewey’s theory, he directs his attention to the distinction between ‘desired’ and ‘desirable’. \(^{31}\) Rather than appreciate ‘desirable’ as Dewey does, that is, as the moral quality of a situation which is open to “question,” \(^{32}\) White interprets ‘desirable’ as a good that ‘should be desired,’ ‘imposes a duty’ or ‘is desirable under typical circum-

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\(^{29}\) Given that value judgments are assessed relative to conventional standards, though, the process is never wholly monological. One could say that it is always tainted with dialogue, since the conventions were likely settled upon by a community of fellow value-choosers engaged in discourse and conversation.

\(^{30}\) Pappas, John Dewey’s Ethics, p. 198.

\(^{31}\) Dewey introduces the distinction in the following passage from The Quest for Certainty: “The formal statement [of the difference between immediate and mediated experience] may be given concrete content by pointing to the difference between the enjoyed and the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfactory. To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already in existence; it is not to judge the value of that fact. There is no difference between such a proposition and one which says that something is sweet or sour, red or black. It is just correct or incorrect and that is the end of the matter. But to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain conditions. Function and status in meeting conditions is a different matter from bare existence. The fact that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; it does not settle it.” Dewey, “The Construction of the Good,” in The Quest for Certainty, LW 4:207-208. Stevenson, as we will see, overlooks or misunderstands the last sentence.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
stances.’ However, on Dewey’s view, a good being desired does not settle the issue of whether it is desirable; rather, it invites further inquiry. Consequently, White challenges a claim Dewey never made, namely, that desiring a good operationalizes its normative value, providing a formula for making a thing desired universally desirable. On White’s account, Dewey attempted to close Hume’s fork, or the cleavage between descriptive and normative statements, and ultimately failed. Gouinlock responds to White’s interpretation: “[T]he assumption that Dewey was working on the ‘is/ought’ problem is simply gratuitous.” Instead, Dewey was concerned with how inquiry transforms a disrupted situation into a unified one, from a situation fraught with difficulty to one that is enjoyable, from a situation in which goods are merely desired to one where the goods are reflectively determined to be desirable. According to Gouinlock, “[d]esirable [for Dewey here] means ‘that which will convert the situation from problematic to consummatory’” in a process that Dewey called “moral judgment.” Still, what is instructive about White’s objection is that it relies on the contested assumption that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is wholly monological, or an individual process of choice, rather than dialogical, or a shared process of discussion and decision making.

Contra Gouinlock, there is plenty of evidence to support the assumption that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is wholly monological, or a matter of the individual imagining possibilities and weighing (deliberating about) the acceptability of alternative courses of action. Individuals test their value judgments in lived experience, by (i) acting in accordance with them, (ii) observing the outcomes, and (iii) evaluating the degree to which they are acceptable. Later in Gouinlock’s essay, he contends that agreement “is possible in public affairs” only when we see moral deliberation as “public and social”—that is, as dialogical. Gouinlock continues, “[a]s Dewey repeatedly insisted, social problems are moral problems, for they involve the conflict of values. Hence, democracy, or social intelligence, is moral method.” In other words,

33 Gouinlock summarizes “White’s misunderstanding” in the following manner: “He supposes that Dewey equates ‘desired under normal conditions’ with ‘desirable’ and then ‘desirable’ with ‘ought to be desired.’” “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 224.
35 Ibid., 224, 220.
38 Ibid., 225. Gouinlock also echoes this idea in his introduction to a collection of Dewey’s writings on ethical theory: “Intelligence is far removed from dogmatism. Dewey has no kinship with doctrinaire philosophies and moral finalities. His advocacy of intelligence and his faith in the possibilities of human nature constitute a recognition that the responsibility for
democratic inquiry is a political extension of Dewey’s method of ethical inquiry. Likewise, democratic deliberation is a social extension of Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation. Anticipating McAfee’s thesis by over two decades, Gouinlock insists that the common thread between the two is publicness: “The method is social in that deliberation and consultation are public.”

In seeking to resolve issues of common concern, democratic citizens engage in communication—a notion that, Dewey reminds his reader, is intimately connected with the concept of community. Similar to moral deliberation, political deliberation involves the disclosure and clarification of personal preferences, or “prizings,” as well as their conversion into shared moral values and ideals.

So, the issue returns with a vengeance: Is Dewey’s theory of deliberation monological or dialogical? When elaborated by Gouinlock, McAfee and Westbrook, deliberation has a distinctly dialogical flavor. What Dewey offers in the deliberative stage of his ethical inquiry, Gouinlock insists, is a way of intelligently coordinating individual actions, forging shared moral values, and solving common problems. So, we can safely conclude that Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation is not exclusively monological. Instead, Dewey’s dialogical theory of moral deliberation nicely harmonizes with contemporary theories of deliberative democracy. However, on reading *Human Nature and Conduct* and consulting White’s interpretation, Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation appears predominantly monological. The truth of the matter is likely somewhere in between: Dewey’s theory integrates monological and dialogical aspects into a holistic and balanced model of deliberation. At this point, we turn to consider Goodin’s model of political deliberation.

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40 Dewey writes: “Communication can alone create a great community. Our Babel is not one of tongues but of the signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible.” Dewey, “The Eclipse of the Public,” in *The Public and Its Problems*, LW 2:324. Again, he states: “To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values.” Id., “Search for the Great Community” in *The Public and Its Problems*, LW 2:332. “As in no other method,” Gouinlock affirms, “Dewey’s proposed decision procedure involves communication.” “Dewey’s Theory of Moral Deliberation,” 226.
3. Goodin on Deliberation Within

In his essay “Democratic Deliberation Within,” Goodin rejects two failed strategies that deliberative democrats typically use to negotiate the problem of scale, or the difficulty of instituting deliberative democracy on a massive, society-wide basis: (i) constraining the number of participants and (ii) constraining the amount of communication. According to the first strategy, the aggregated decisions of networked deliberative forums or a single randomly-selected ‘microcosm’ forum should reflect the profile of how the entire population would, *ex hypothesi*, decide if it were feasible for them to gather and deliberate together. The problem with this kind of “ersatz deliberation,” Goodin complains, is that there is no way of guaranteeing that the outcome would map on to the outcome of a deliberation *en masse*. In the second strategy, certain formal and institutionalized mechanisms limit the scope of informal deliberations and the impact they can have on the policy-making process. For instance, on Jürgen Habermas’s account, public deliberation occurs in two channels, one informal and the other formal, that parallel each other and permit mutual uptake: “Informal public opinion-formation generates ‘influence’; influence is transformed into ‘communicative power’ through channels of political elections; and communicative power is again transformed into ‘administrative power’ through legislation.” Unfortunately, when deliberative theorists employ this second strategy, they champion a severely weakened form of deliberation. “In guaranteeing the free and equal expression of opinions in the

42 Ibid., p. 89. Goodin has one particular theorist in mind, James Fishkin, whose deliberative polling technique gathers a randomly selected group of citizens, and polls them before as well as after deliberation to determine how the whole population would shift its preferences if it had the opportunity to deliberate. Fishkin, *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
43 Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, ed. S. Benhabib, 22-30 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 28. Public deliberation occurs “along two tracks that are at different levels of opinion- and will- formation, the one constitutional, the other informal.” Id., *Between Facts and Norms*, p. 314. Informal discourses take place within what Habermas terms “public spheres,” spaces in which publics--or groups of citizens, including social movements and private organizations at all levels of civil society--interact and deliberate independently of the state, and in ways that are typically critical of state power. Meanwhile, “[s]tanding in contrast to the ‘wild’ circles of communication in the unorganized public sphere are the formally regulated deliberative and decision-making processes of courts, parliaments, bureaucracies, and the like.” Id., “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” *Political Theory*, vol. 29, no. 6 (2001): 766-781, 773.
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public sphere,” Goodin notes, “they guarantee everyone a voice but no one a hearing.”44 Thus, public deliberation becomes a “blinker ed” or “emaciated” activity whereby citizens discuss public issues in public forums, but with no assurance that formal institutions and their representatives will meaningfully engage their deliberated opinions.

Goodin’s alternative to these two failed strategies is ‘deliberation within’, an account that bears a striking resemblance to Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation. In contrast to the dominant modeling of deliberation as an almost entirely external process, Goodin sees deliberation as primarily an internal matter of “weighing [ . . . ] reasons for and against a course of action” and “imagining [oneself in] [ . . . ] the place of others.”45 However, to interpret Goodin’s position as stating that deliberation is exclusively a monological process would be a mistake. Instead, it is a shared monological-dialogical process, one that has the distinct advantage of being parallel rather than serial and thus capable of permitting the inclusion, comparison, recollection and evaluation of “five more people/perspectives at once.”46 Indeed, Goodin’s claim that deliberation is initially an internal process of considering alternative rationales or courses of conduct closely resembles Dewey’s idea that moral deliberation involves “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination)” and the evaluation of “various competing lines of action.”47 The rough equivalent of Goodin’s process of ‘deliberation within’ and Mead’s notion of ideal role-taking in Dewey’s oeuvre

46 Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” 105. Goodin relies on Herbert Simon’s studies of human attention. These studies show that serial orderings of information permit the human brain to process one block of information at a time; parallel orderings allow another five blocks to be processed; therefore, serial and parallel processes working together enable six blocks of information to be taken up at one time.
47 “The Nature of Deliberation” in Human Nature and Conduct, MW 14:132. Indeed, Goodin approvingly quotes Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems at length: “‘Artists,’ John Dewey says, ‘have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in itself which is new, but the kindling by its emotion, perception and appreciation . . . Democracy,’ he continues, ‘will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication.’” Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within,” p. 96. Hearing and reading Josh Houston’s paper, “Contestation and Deliberation Within: Dryzek, Goodin, and the Possibility of Legitimacy,” helped me to make this connection between Dewey and Goodin. During his talk, he associated John Dryzek and Robert Goodin’s deliberative theories with the ideas of another pragmatist, George Herbert Meade. His paper was presented at the International Social Philosophy conference, Portland, Oregon, July 18, 2008, and received an award for the best paper by a graduate student.
is sympathy. “A person entirely lacking in sympathetic response might have a keen calculating intellect,” Dewey writes, “but he would have no spontaneous sense of the claims of others.” Likewise, Goodin argues that imagining “the claims of others” helps deliberators forecast how alternative choices will affect the interests of those not present. By allowing “internal-reflective deliberations” to complement “external-collective ones in large groups,” Goodin argues that deliberative theorists can overcome the problem of scale, enabling smaller assemblies of deliberators to “imaginatively represent” the concerns of those for who cannot be present or participate.

Finally, for Goodin, deliberative practice does not needlessly displace current institutional arrangements or threaten political stability: “Instead, aspects of the deliberative ideal must be adapted for and incorporated in the core elements of democratic institutions as they already exist.” In this way, Goodin’s democratic theory, similar to Dewey’s, posits a regulative ideal for political theorists, policy-makers and institutional designers to diligently pursue.

4. Mono/Dia-logical Deliberation

Two crucial standards of democratic behavior are that citizens should be (i) responsive and (ii) responsible. In Robert Goodin’s words, “Democratic citizens are supposed to act responsively, taking due account of the evidence and experience embodied in the beliefs of others. Democratic citizens are supposed to act responsibly, taking due account of the impact of their actions and choices on all those (here and elsewhere, now or later) who will be affected by them.”

For deliberative democrats, responsiveness and responsibility—or what Goodin calls the “pieties of democratic citizenship”—function as relatively uncontroversial norms for regulating citizen deliberations. Unlike most deliberativists, though, Goodin does not believe that responsiveness and responsibility manifest predominantly in dialogue with others. “[D]emocratic theorists can and should,” Goodin argues, “be more sensitive to what precedes and underlies it, accepting internal-reflective deliberations of a suitable sort as broadly on par with . . . the sort of external-collective deliberations that look so impracti-

49 Id., “Democratic Deliberation Within,” 105.
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cally demanding in modern polities."52 External deliberations are enriched, as both a descriptive and a normative matter, when supplemented by internal deliberations. So, Goodin’s conception of the relationship between “external-collective” and “internal-reflective” deliberation mirrors the connection between Dewey’s theories of moral deliberation and social intelligence (especially on Guoinlock’s reading).

Despite the promise of the Dewey-Goodin comparison, mainstream Dewey scholars would have at least two objections to Goodin’s theory of ‘deliberation within’. First, Goodin’s account of deliberation operates largely within the domain of political decision making, whereas Dewey’s theory ranges over many kinds of social—including moral and political—inquiry. Admittedly, Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation does pertain to a much wider domain of subject-matter than Goodin’s theory of ‘deliberation within’. However, this difference is, at best, superficial—a matter of what Dewey calls “selective emphasis.”53 Dewey’s concern was with how humans engage in inquiry generally. In contrast, Goodin’s concern is with how humans clarify and justify their political beliefs—that is, with political deliberation specifically. If anything, this difference of emphasis—as mentioned at the outset of the paper—is a virtue of Goodin’s theory, transforming it into a more effective tool for analyzing political subject-matter, such as the technicalities of preference change in deliberation.54 The second difficulty that Dewey scholars might have with the Dewey-Goodin comparison is that Goodin’s framing of the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ betrays a vicious dualism. Unfortunately, Goodin’s language carries with it the intellectual baggage of a long history of epistemological and metaphysical system-building, whereby the tools of previous inquiries, particularly the labels ‘external’ and ‘internal’, were treated as absolute categories prefiguring all future inquiries, rather than what they are: tentative and functional distinctions which are the products of previous inquiries.55 In addi-

52 Ibid., p. 2.
54 Goodin and Niemeyer have also shown through an empirical study of a citizen jury that more dramatic preference changes occur during the presentation of information to deliberators than when they engage in dialogue with each other. Goodin and S. J. Niemeyer. “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 51 (2003): 627-649.
55 Dewey argued that this faulty move of converting tentative and precarious distinctions of function into absolute and stable categories of existence—what he called the “philosophic fallacy”—was not only disingenuous, but symptomatic of a larger problem in philosophy, a doomed “quest for certainty,” whereby philosophers perpetuated, rather than resolved, ar-
tion, Goodin’s claim that “very much of what goes on in a genuine face-to-face conversation is actually contained inside the head of each of the participants” would raise concerns for Deweyans. Goodin’s claim that “very much of what goes on in a genuine face-to-face conversation is actually contained inside the head of each of the participants” would raise concerns for Deweyans.56 According to Larry Hickman, “Dewey held that mind arises as a complex tool out of such natural interactions as a result of increasing levels of complexity.” Thus, deliberation for Dewey is not solely a mental event, or something that occurs “inside the head.”58 Rather, it is a more inclusive and organic process implicating a nervous system, a brain, a neural cortex as well as, and equally important, a multitude of factors within the human organism’s environment. Still, there is a solution to this apparent incompatibility between Dewey and Goodin’s accounts of deliberation. Rather than speak of deliberation as either an internal-mental event or an external-political activity, Goodin could instead refer to it more generically and without reliance on the internal/external dualism. So, on a Deweyan reconstruction of Goodin’s theory, deliberation would be conceived as a mono/dia-logical cycle, whereby ‘monological’ and ‘dialogical’ stages alternate as part of the continuous and flowing process of patterned deliberative inquiry.59

57 Hickman, L. Pragmatism as Post-postmodernism, p. 238.
58 Gregory Pappas affirms this point: “Moral deliberation is not something that happens in one’s mind. It is experienced as an intermediate phase in the process of transforming a morally problematic situation into one that is determinate.” John Dewey’s Ethics, p. 94.
59 The distinction between monological and dialogical deliberation is introduced by Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, translated by F. G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 298-30. Modeling deliberation as a phasal process, similar to Dewey’s stage-by-stage pattern of inquiry, is nothing new for deliberative democrats. It has been undertaken by a number of normative theorists and positive researchers. Habermas proposes “a two-stage process,” which applies to a single deliberative episode “consisting of justification followed by application.” Whereas in the first stage claims and norms are validated through the test of rational discourse, deliberators in the second stage employ a “principle of appropriateness” to adapt the justified claim or norm “in light of the salient features of the situation.” Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 36-7. The weakness of Habermas’s two-stage model is that it implicates the highly abstract theory of discourse ethics without giving concrete guidance for the conduct of practical deliberation. In their study of an Australian deliberative forum, Goodin and Niemeyer also construct a two-phase account of the deliberative process, with an ‘information phase’, including “site visit[s], background briefings, presentations by and interrogations of witnesses”, and a ‘discussion phase’, wherein “collect-
5. Conclusion

What distinguishes Goodin and Dewey’s conceptions of deliberation is that Dewey’s concerns the personal and collective activity of imagining possible ways to solve moral problems, whereas Goodin’s pertains to the internal procedure of clarifying one’s political beliefs that precedes civic dialogue and decision making—what he terms ‘deliberation within’. Notwithstanding this minor difference of emphasis, Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation shares more in common with Goodin’s model of ‘deliberation within’ than it does with the predominantly dialogical models of deliberation widely embraced by deliberative democrats. So, if deliberative theorists truly wish to appropriate Dewey’s theory of moral deliberation and convert it into a model of political deliberation, then I recommend that they first look to Goodin’s similar, though more politically-oriented, theory of deliberation as a suitable if, not superior, substitute.

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tive conversations among a group of coequals [takes place] aiming at reaching (or moving toward) some joint view on some issues of common concern.” Goodin and Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Begin?” 633. Although this account does not comprehensively describe the deliberative process, it does have the merit of modeling some features of an actual deliberative event—in this case, a Citizen Jury—and in a way that assists researchers in experimentally testing a working hypothesis about the effects of each phase on preference change. Among empirical researchers, David Ryfe and James Hyland propose more complex multi-stage models of deliberation. Ryfe recommends “three moments of the deliberative process: [(i)] the organization of the deliberative encounter; [(ii)] the practice of deliberation within an encounter; and finally, [(iii)] the product of deliberative talk.” The benefit of Ryfe’s account is that, in contrast to Habermas’s, it does deploy an actionable—although perhaps over-simplified—procedure for programming deliberative events: viz., plan, participate, and decide. Ryfe, “Does Deliberative Democracy Work?” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8 (2005): 49-71, 50. James Hyland (1995:56-7) presents a model wherein “every [deliberative] decision has four logically distinct stages or ‘moments’”: namely, (i) agenda-setting or “the identification of both the necessity of choosing and the set of available options for choice,” (ii) debate and discussion which “involves explicit deliberation,” (iii) the decision itself or “the choice to implement one of several available alternative courses of action,” and (iv) implementation, when “the choice arrived at is translated into action.” Hyland, Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 56-7. The advantage of Hyland’s model is that it captures two features of deliberation which are conspicuously absent in Ryfe’s model: first, the very important (and most easily manipulated) stage of establishing the agenda and, second, the final stage of acting on the deliberated decision.
References


