

Pluralism without Illusions

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ABSTRACT

Much of contemporary Anglo-American Liberal political theory is still living under the shadow of Max Weber. In particular, it seems to accept the idea of disenchantment and has more recently discovered the problem value pluralism. Max Weber’s idea of the political still serves as an antidote to the prevalence in much of this kind of theory of the priority of the moral over the political. Unfortunately, Weber’s own theory is incomplete and needs to be supplemented.

“If one accepts Weber’s premises, it is easy to be imprisoned by them”. (1)

It is a striking feature of much contemporary political theorising that it seems to be living in the shadow of Max Weber without, with a few notable exceptions, recognising or admitting that fact. The nature of the answer to the question of what is still alive in Weber’s thought will naturally depend upon the interest of the questioner. The main claim being made here is that Max Weber is still our contemporary with respect to the problem of value pluralism. He is also, or ought to be, our contemporary, with regard to his insistence upon the hard and tragic realities of political life. Much contemporary political theorising, especially in the Anglo-American world, has become divided between those who see it as being essentially normative and a branch of moral philosophy and those who insist on the autonomy of the political in such a way that denies the value of that kind of work.

The problem of value pluralism has become a central topic in modern political and moral philosophy. This, in turn, is linked to the persistence of the idea of ‘disenchantment’. The deeper the disenchantment the more intense the effects of value pluralism become.

Most modern Anglo-American political theory is written in an analytical style that seems to discount any reference to and, hence, recognition of the presence of an implicit historical interpretation. Political philosophy, even in its most analytical form always presupposes or works within the framework of an implicit historical story. (2)

The ‘historical story’ that pervades modern political thought is the account of ‘disenchantment’ and the ‘war of gods and demons’ that Max Weber so forcefully
proposed. An interesting example of this can be found in the recognition of this fact by John Rawls in his account of his own version of ‘political liberalism’. Rawls argues that in «political philosophy the work of abstraction is set in motion by deep political conflicts». These conflicts are deepened by the special nature of modern democratic political culture. This particular modern culture is ascribed to a historical context that differentiates the ancients from the moderns. In brief, Rawls advances a historical sketch that in pointing to the influence of the Reformation, the development of the modern state and modern science, closely resembles the Weberian account of disenchantment and its accompanying endemic value pluralism. Similarly, Michael Sandel in his critique of Rawls argues that this particular kind of liberalism presupposes ‘a vision of the moral universe’ as a place devoid of inherent meaning, a world “disenchanted” in Max Weber’s phrase, a world without an objective moral order. Bernard Williams takes it as a given that in order to understand the legitimation of the modern state we must take account of the nature of modernity as described by social theorists such as Weber. In particular, he refers to pluralism and disenchantment. Modern moral and political theory, or, at least the Anglo-American variety, has witnessed the emergence of a so-called ‘value –pluralist movement’. What is value pluralism? Richard Flathman has stated that in significant respects ‘we are all pluralists’ in the modern world. He sees the core of pluralism in a broad sense as ‘the recognition of a multiplicity of persons and groups…..A commitment to pluralism, however transitory or transitional, as a descriptive /analytic theory involves the belief that, here and now, such a multiplicity cannot be explained away’. In his discussion of pluralism Flathman claims that there is no one who is not a pluralist to some degree although he admits that there are clearly many philosophers who argue that this view of pluralism is superficial and hides a deeper monistic universalism. Flathman discusses the work of William James, Hannah Arendt, Stuart Hampshire, and Michael Oakeshott as significant thinkers who have attempted to make sense of ‘the fact of pluralism’. Although the concept of pluralism can be used in this broad sense the most significant and puzzling aspect from the standpoint of political thought is that of value pluralism. To a large degree the modern idea of value pluralism restates in more analytical terms an idea that is clearly expressed in Weber’s work and, of course, earlier by Friedrich Nietzsche. This has been recognised in an interesting way, for example, by Charles Larmore. He points out that the problem of moral conflict and the fragmentation of moral value is at the centre of the work of moral philosophers such as Stuart Hampshire, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams. Larmore refers here to the ‘outstanding example of Max Weber who insisted upon the irreducible plurality of “value spheres”’. Indeed, Larmore expresses the central idea here very clearly when he states, in criticising Alasdair MacIntyre’s diagnosis
of the modern condition, that no «mature view of morality can fail to acknowledge
the existence of rationally unsetttable moral conflicts. Pluralism is a truth, not only
about conceptions of the good life, but also about that dimension of the good life
that is morality itself». (9) It is important to note here that despite their reputation for
clarity many of the political and moral philosophers who discuss pluralism do not
always make it as clear as they might whether they are talking about a ‘fact’ or a
theory. In other words, there is more at stake than the simple observation that there
is as a contingent fact a plurality and diversity of beliefs, values, and doctrines. Furthermore, whether the ‘fact of pluralism’ supports any particular normative
principles is itself a controversial question. (10)
William Galston has conveniently summarised the main claims of the theory of value
pluralism. The most important of these are that value pluralism ought not to be
confused with relativism; that there is no available measure for the ranking of value
and that there is no common measure nor *summum bonum* that is the good for all
persons; that, nevertheless, there are some goods that are basic in the sense that
they must form part of any reasonable human life; beyond this there exists a wide
range of a legitimate diversity of goods, purposes, and cultures; and that value
pluralism must be strongly contrasted with all forms of monism in the sense of
theories that reduce all values to either a common measure or attempt to create a
comprehensive hierarchy. (11) Galston states that the foundational text for the
modern value pluralist trend in political and moral philosophy is Isaiah Berlin’s
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. (12)
It is true to say that it was Berlin who was responsible more than anyone else for the
emergence of this theme as a central preoccupation of modern Anglo-American
political thought. However, Berlin’s voice was not the only voice and the distinct
contribution of his colleague Stuart Hampshire ought not to be overlooked. (13)
Berlin’s lecture ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, subsequently published as an essay,
was, at first, read primarily as a provocative discussion of the distinction, held to be
fundamental in modern European political thought, between ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ liberty. Interest has slowly shifted away from the overworked and
problematic nature of that distinction towards an examination of the thesis of value
pluralism that underlies it. For example, in the concluding section of that essay with
the title ‘The One and the Many’, Berlin criticises «the belief that somewhere, in the
past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in
the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted
good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all
the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible,
and perhaps even entail one another». (14)
In many ways Berlin’s vision of pluralism is similar to that of Weber. However, although Berlin possessed an encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of European
political thought it is strange that he makes very little reference to Weber’s writings.
One possible reason is that in the time when Berlin was formulating his ideas Weber was primarily classified by British intellectuals as a ‘founding father’ of the suspect new discipline of sociology. Berlin, although when he does mention Weber does exempt him from the general deficiencies of this new academic discipline, was still, nevertheless, influenced by this prejudice. In this respect, it is interesting to contrast Berlin with Raymond Aron, his contemporary, who shared many of his political views but who was deeply influenced by Weber. When pressed on this topic Berlin stated that when «I first formulated this idea, which is a long time ago, I’d never read a page of Weber. I had no idea that he said these things. People often ask me, but surely Weber was the first person to say this. I answer that I am sure he is, but I had no idea of it». (15)

In Weber’s account the modern disenchanted world is a world that experiences an acute ‘polytheism of values’. As far as Weber was concerned «the different value systems of the world stand in conflict with one another…the different gods struggle with each other and will do for all time. It is just like in the ancient world, which was not yet disenchanted with its gods and demons, but in another sense. Just as Hellenic man sacrificed on this occasion to Aphrodite and on another to Apollo, and above all as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city-things are still the same today, but disenchanted and divested of the mythical but inwardly genuine flexibility of those customs». (16) Furthermore, we must recognise that «the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us». (17)

Max Weber clearly struggled with the problem of value pluralism. His vision of the ‘war of the gods’ clearly justifies the label of ‘tragic pluralism’. He states clearly that «unsettled conflict, and therefore the necessity for constant compromises, dominates the sphere of values. No one knows how compromises should be made, unless a ‘revealed’ religion will forcibly decide.» (18) The problem that arises here is how political institutions and actions can be made legitimate. In Weber’s opinion the fact that in the course of our lives we have to make compromises and that it is generally difficult to individuate particular values ought not to deflect us from the realisation that the at its deepest level the human world is characterised by an ‘irreconcilable death-struggle like that between “God” and “Devil”’. (19)

It has been argued that there we can discern two distinct versions of pluralism at work in much contemporary political theory. Raymond Geuss has made the claim that we can distinguish between a generally moderate and a more radical and, in a sense, ‘existentialist’, version of the thesis of value pluralism. (20) The more moderate version of pluralism is consistent with or, at least, is made to appear to be consistent with liberalism. A major difficulty arises if the claims of value pluralism are correct, that not only does it not offer support for liberalism but, rather, its main effect is to undermine it. Geuss argues that if we accept that ‘the conceptual framework of contemporary politics’ is ‘a highly complex abstract object’ then both
versions of pluralism are important. The problem, however, is that much theorising has either avoided the implications of the more radical version of value pluralism or has oscillated between these two versions in a generally unsatisfactory manner. Putting it crudely, one could argue that while Berlin generally represents the moderate version Max Weber, in contrast, represents the more radical and generally pessimistic view.

If it is true that the theory of value pluralism is a thesis about values and not itself a political or ethical ideal it does remain true that value pluralism does have political implications. The problem is to decide just what those implications are. Isaiah Berlin attempted to argue that pluralism implies liberalism. However, when challenged to explicate this relationship he moderated his claim. It would appear that, contrary to Berlin’s intentions a reasonable case can be made for the compatibility of value pluralism and political doctrines other than liberalism. John Kekes, for example, has argued that conservatism is the most plausible political response to value pluralism. Similarly, John Gray has forcibly argued for a conception of ‘agonistic liberalism’ as the best response to the reality of value pluralism. Gray’s argument, similar to that put forward by Sandel, is that if the thesis of pluralism is true it implies that liberal values are just one set of values among many. As such Liberal values can claim no special foundation or support from value pluralism. If the problem of value pluralism and its relationship to political doctrines such as Liberalism is such a central topic for contemporary political theorists is there anything to be learned from a consideration of Max Weber’s political thought?

The question of the relationship between pluralism and liberalism in Weber’s thought runs up against one major problem. While it is fairly clear that Weber was committed to the truth of value pluralism to describe him as a ‘liberal’ in a straightforward sense is more controversial. Wilhelm Hennis has criticised the idea that Weber’s political ideas can be safely be defined as belonging to the liberal camp. The idea of Weber as ‘a liberal in despair’ popularised by Wolfgang Mommsen among others gets no support here. Hennis’s argument begins by pointing out that apart from two instances Weber never referred to himself using this term. On the other hand, it is also true that Weber, apart from one brief encounter, never allied himself with political forces that could be called ‘illiberal’. Weber wrote for a liberal newspaper, the Frankfurter Zeitung. However, these remarks presuppose an answer to the question of what we mean by Liberalism.

Hennis defines Liberalism in curiously un-Weberian terms of an ‘ideal-typical essence’. The first central idea that Hennis identifies with the core of Liberalism is that of ‘abolition, the removal of limitations, setting free, combined with hope’. The theme of ‘abolition’ refers primarily to the idea of economic liberalism understood as the freeing of economic life from state control in order to increase welfare. Hennis argues that there is no evidence for such a belief in Weber’s work.
As far as Weber was concerned the modern liberal form of economic life is simply our ‘fate’. It was not to be welcomed nor deplored in any kind of utopian sense. On the other hand, while it is true that Weber was a passionate defender of intellectual freedom and of the freedom of the press there is no sense in which his defence rested upon a belief that such freedoms would lead either towards a deeper understanding of the truth or towards greater discrimination and judgement. Modern science has the effect of deepening the disenchantment of the world. It does not deepen our understanding of it.

Hennis points out that Weber’s appreciation of the development of the struggle for the rights of the individual against the state owed much to the work of his colleague Georg Jellinek who had shown how its origins were, to a large degree, to be found in an earlier religious and sectarian struggle. The key point here is that the Enlightenment ideal of a resolution of conflict by means of free rational debate that is central for most varieties of Liberalism was no longer, if it ever was, credible. This consideration alone separates Weber from the claims made by Jürgen Habermas on behalf of his version of discourse theory and the related claims made by various ‘deliberative democrats’.

It is also clear that Weber’s thought is distanced from other familiar central Liberal ideas. In particular, Weber was deeply sceptical of all those attempts, typical of the nineteenth century, to produce theories of social development or of social evolution that were, in effect, theories of progress. Hennis is correct in pointing out that Weber was completely opposed to use of the ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘happiness’ as suitable concepts for social and political theory. However, while it might be said that these ideas were central for nineteenth century Liberal thought it is not so clear that they must be essential elements for all forms of Liberalism.

In Hennis’s account Weber’s distance from Liberalism is grounded in his commitment to the ‘heteronomy of ideals’. Weber could not accept the idea, which Hennis sees as central for Liberalism, that ‘compromise, parliamentary discussion, or rational discourse’ could serve as solutions to the problem created by the modern recognition of the depth of the persistence of plural and conflicting values. In Hennis’s view, the attempt to characterise Weber’s political ideas as ‘tragic’ or ‘pessimistic’ Liberalism are a contradiction in terms. Deeply embedded in Weber’s view of the world is the belief that in all forms of social relations the most fundamental processes are those produced by the inevitable ‘struggle of man against man’. This alone would appear to separate Weber’s political thought from the basic ideas of Liberalism. Furthermore, the centrality of the question of rule (Herrschaft) would also seem to rule out a favourable response to the fundamental ideas of Liberalism.

While all of these comments on Weber’s political thought are true a question still remains to be answered. If Weber’s political thought does not fit in to the conventional mould of Liberalism nor of any other doctrine where does it fit? One
answer is to say that this is not a problem and that there is nothing unusual in this. The thought of all great political thinkers transcends the political ideologies of their time. This is what, to a large degree, makes their thought important. Nevertheless, in whatever way we draw the line between political theory and partisan politics the question of the nature of Weber’s response to value pluralism requires further explication.

Hennis himself admits that there is still something of a puzzle in Weber’s political stance which he accounts for in terms of his personality. Despite Weber’s scepticism towards the dominant and prevailing ideas of nineteenth century Liberalism he was deeply committed to the ideal of individual liberty. In other words, Weber is our contemporary insofar as he remained deeply committed to the ideal of individual liberty that is central for modern Liberalism but recognised, at the same time, that this political value can no longer gain the support that it has received in the past from such doctrines as natural law and natural rights. The liberty of the individual as a fact and as an ideal can only be understood as a product of a unique line of Western historical development. But in so doing Weber points to the fragility of this achievement. There is nothing inevitable about it nor ought we to be sanguine about its future prospects. It is in this light that we can appreciate Weber’s concerns about the future prospects of a ‘new serfdom’. Taking these considerations into account we can, as Hennis concedes, say that if Weber was a Liberal, then he was a ‘strange kind of Liberal’. In this sense Weber can be compared with Tocqueville, also characterised as a Liberal of a ‘strange kind’. It can also be argued that Weber’s significance also rests upon the fact that what we find reflected in his work is the crisis of Liberalism itself. Weber’s political thought is the most significant example of the problem that Liberalism faces when «it becomes divorced from the egalitarian thrust of the natural rights tradition, and its universalist justification of tradition».24 Weber’s Liberalism is then the Liberalism of a political thinker who also argued that it was the moral duty of the genuine political thinker to ‘swim against the current’.25

The argument being put forward here is that looking from the standpoint of contemporary political and moral theory Weber’s significance rests upon his recognition of the problem of value pluralism. Liberalism and pluralism are often seen as being closely related. Charles Larmore, for example, has pointed out that they are «both distinctively modern in that they have something to do with the metaphysical-religious disenchantment of the world»26. However, it can be argued that pluralism understood as a doctrine about the nature of value must be distinguished from another idea that lies at the heart of modern Liberal thought. This is the idea of the inevitability of reasonable disagreement about values or the good. Larmore has argued that there is an important distinction to be drawn here. What some political philosophers, such as John Rawls, call pluralism is, in fact, the inability of reasonable people to agree upon what he calls ‘comprehensive
conceptions of the good’. What Isaiah Berlin, on the other hand, is talking about is itself a controversial doctrine about the nature of the good, one according to which objective value is ultimately not of a single kind but of many kinds. Doctrine and reasonable disagreement about doctrine can hardly be the same thing. Although it is important to be clear about these two aspects of pluralism it would appear that it is a mistake to argue that they can be separated in this manner. It is not at all clear that we can argue that moral disagreement is inevitable among reasonable persons without accepting some version of pluralism. This seems to be right and also to be consistent with Max Weber’s views.

Although, Weber clearly lacked the apparatus and terminology of contemporary political and moral theory it seems that the account that he offered of pluralism as a doctrine about plural and conflicting values is still of immense significance. In fact, it could be argued that it is superior in many ways to the accounts offered in the mainstream of modern Liberal political philosophy for many of the reasons that Wilhelm Hennis alluded to in his discussion of Weber’s Liberalism. In particular, it is Weber’s sense of the significance of ‘the political’. This is not meant in the friend/enemy sense of Carl Schmitt, although there is a connection between their ideas, but in a more general idea of the inadequacy of all attempts to reduce specifically political questions and problems to moral or technical questions that admit of a universal solution. In some ways Weber’s understanding of the nature of ‘the political’ can be compared to Paul Ricoeur’s idea of ‘the political paradox’. The basic idea here is that the political domain can be described in terms of an autonomy that is marked by possession of a unique rationality that can, at the same time, be a unique source of evil.

The distinct character of Weber’s political thought rests upon its recognition that the modern, in reality post-Nietzschean and post-Marxist world, has created the challenge of a new reality that cannot rely upon traditional formulas. It is also true that «all ultimate questions without exception are touched by politics…..». At the heart of Weber’s vision of modern political reality is a view of value pluralism and of the permanence of political disagreement that can serve as an antidote to the abstractness and formalism of much contemporary political theorising. The problem that arises is one of defending the core values and institutions of Liberalism, individual liberty and its protective institutions, while at the same time recognising the demise of the traditional forms of Liberalism as a family of coherent philosophical and political doctrines.

The value of Weber’s approach, if not of his actual institutional recommendations, rests upon the way in which his recognition of the challenge of pluralism in the modern world did not lead him to attempt to ‘bracket’ or marginalise the activity of politics. A steady stream of criticism has emerged in recent years of the tendency, it is argued, of much contemporary political theory and political philosophy to ‘neutralise’ their account of the world of politics. For example, it has been claimed
that the dominant style of modern political philosophy is guilty of applying inappropriate theoretical models and the ‘supersession of the ostensible subject-matter’ –politics. Most modern political philosophers, it is argued, are guilty of aiming for a ‘post-political order’. (30) One response to this perceived problem has been the revival of interest in the political thought of Carl Schmitt. (31) While it is true that there are deep connections linking the work of Schmitt and Weber it is a great mistake to ignore the deep differences that undoubtedly exist between them. The argument here is that Weber’s account of pluralism and disenchantment does still describe in a significant manner the contemporary political predicament certainly as it exists in Western liberal democratic states.

The problem is just that: Weber’s political thought serves as a reliable guide and diagnosis but its weakness, it can be argued, lies in its inability to offer anything other than an incomplete image of a plebiscitary democracy as a possible institutional response to the pluralist predicament. This emphasis remains, however, too close to the surface of Weber’s thought. It is clear that Weber struggled during the aftermath of the First World War to produce an appropriate institutional response to the political crisis in Germany but it would be a mistake to interpret these proposals as the necessary outcome of his political thought.

There is a response to the pluralist predicament that is consistent with the important insight that Weber has given us concerning the difficulty that the condition of modernity presents us in our attempts to think politically. The challenge, it is argued here, is to think politically in the context of a recognition of a pervasive value pluralism without recourse to an abstract formalism that too often seems to ignore the harsh and tragic realities of the political world without moving to the other extreme of an overly histrionic existentialism.

If we agree that Weber presents us with an exceptionally intense example of an attempt to combine a deep understanding of the modern recognition of the challenge of pluralism with a defense of the value of ‘expressive liberty’ (32) then it is worth considering the response to this predicament initially put forward by Judith Shklar and recently developed by Bernard Williams. In her essay ‘The Liberalism of Fear’ Shklar identifies Liberalism as a political doctrine, not as a philosophy of life as it is often taken to be, that has one overriding aim. This is ‘to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom’. (33) The ‘Liberalism of Fear’ does not appeal to any of the traditional supports such as ideas of natural rights or of personal development. In essence this version of Liberalism simply recognises those unpleasant but inevitable features of the political world that arise from struggle, rule and ‘the extremity of institutionalized violence’ that Weber was so keen to highlight. In addition, however, because it recognises these dangers the Liberalism of Fear takes a stand against all forms of the abuse of public power. One important reason for this is that systematic fear makes freedom impossible. Shklar goes one step further, however, in arguing that as the theory of moral or
value pluralism is a controversial theory it ought not to be understood as a foundation for this form of Liberalism. It accepts with Weber and Berlin a general scepticism about the concept of a common good (summum bonum) but, in contrast, it does rely upon an idea of a summum malum. This is cruelty and the fear of cruelty. In contrast with the general tenor of Weber’s political ideas Shklar takes this recognition of the ‘fear of fear’ as implying a universal or cosmopolitan interpretation. Weber is generally understood to be highly suspicious of cosmopolitan claims in political thought and it is here that a genuine tension between his ideas and those of Shklar and others like her cannot be denied. It is here, perhaps, that we capture a sense of the deep influence of Nietzsche’s philosophy upon Weber. Nevertheless, as Bernard Williams has pointed out this particular version of Liberalism has the merit of not displacing politics in the sense of retaining the strong sense of political contest and conflict that is often absent in much contemporary Liberal academic political theorising. This form of political theorising does not displace politics because it can only be understood by presupposing politics.

In summary: Max Weber’s vision of the nature of the political in which value pluralism plays a central role is an indispensable component for modern theory. Unfortunately, Weber’s account is incomplete. In part, this is a consequence of his ambivalent attitude towards normative theorising. Nevertheless, Weber’s understanding of the problem of the political finds an echo in some recent versions of political philosophy which do not attempt to downplay the problems presented by value pluralism under conditions of disenchantment.

Notes

(2) Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 53.
(6) See, for example, William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2002).
(9) Larmore, op cit., p 38.
(11) Galston, op cit., pp. 4-6.
(32) This term is taken from Wiliam A. Galston, *Liberal Pluralism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


(34) Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).