Max Weber in the Post-World War II US and After

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ABSTRACT

This essay analyzes Max Weber’s place in post-World War II US social thought, when English-language translations, interpretations, and applications of his work proliferated and it became widely known in American sociology and related fields. The focus is on shifting interpretations and meanings of Weber’s work in different phases of postwar American culture, society, and politics from the Cold War era through the post-9/11 years. Weber’s ideas have been fused with those of diverse thinkers and traditions and have been applied in ways that he likely would have rejected and that stricter Weberians castigate. The various Weber fusions engage modernization theory - arguably the postwar era’s primary metanarrative for legitimating and challenging the liberal democratic policy regime. The historical discussion provides context for later sections on Weber’s salience in the US today and for a possible Weber fusion after postwar modernization.

Max Weber has been understood and constructed in divergent ways in different historical moments and contexts. His rich, multisided corpus is open to diverse interpretations, and, thus, arguments about its overall shape or main thrust have varied widely. And just when he seems to have lost relevance, like a phoenix he appears again on the horizon. This essay analyzes his place in post-World War II US social thought, when English-language translations, interpretations, and applications of his work proliferated and it became widely known in American sociology and related fields. (2) His ideas have been fused with those of other thinkers and applied in ways that he likely would have rejected and that stricter Weberians castigate. Even Weber’s hostile critics often have employed facets of his thought (often unknowingly) against him. Like Nietzsche’s views, Weber’s ideas have been “in the air,” and much of his impact has been tacit. His concepts and vocabulary have been embedded in wider rationalization and modernization discourses. This essay focuses on shifting interpretations and meanings of Weber’s
work in different phases of postwar American culture, society, and politics. The divergent readings have been entwined with broader debates over modernization, arguably a master discourse of postwar US politics. The historical discussion is context for later sections on Weber’s salience in the US today. Although referring often to Weber specialists, the main focus is on a wider array of thinkers who deployed his ideas to engage wider cultural, political, and theoretical issues. (3)

1. Weber in the Early Post-World War II Conjuncture: Modernization For and Against

1.1. Parsons’ Weber: Modernization as American-led, Evolutionary Progress

Weber’s work became widely known in the US, during the post-World War II era, when American higher education expanded massively and sociology was institutionalized as part of the core college and university curriculum. Leading sociological theorist, Talcott Parsons initiated the reception of Weber among North American sociologists in the 1930s. His translation of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, published in 1930, has been read by several generations of sociologists. (4) In an influential interpretive work, Parsons portrayed Weber as a pivotal figure in a fundamental progressive turn in modern social thought toward the (Parsonian) “voluntaristic theory of action” (Parsons [1937] 1968). After the war, Parsons exerted enormous influence on US sociology, stimulating increased interest in Weber. (5) Parsons (1971, pp. 144) held that Weber’s work, especially his studies of world religions and ascetic Protestantism, constitute the “most important single reference for interpretation of modern society...” He reinterpreted and integrated into his own theory facets of Weber’s views about the formative impact of religious ideas on modern cultural rationalization. Criticizing Marxian and libertarian economism, Parsons implied that Weber converged with the Durkheimian emphasis on the overarching importance of shared social values and social integration. Although acknowledging Marx’s influence on Weber, Parsons pitted the two theorists against each other. (6) Parsons did not emphasize Weber’s ideas about value conflict, coercion, and hierarchy. Stressing societal consensus, he translated Weber’s concept of **Herrschaft** as “leadership,” “authority,” or “imperative control,” rather than as “domination.” (7) Parsons conceived of power as a collective resource to achieve social system imperatives, providing a functionalist twist that was absent in Weber. Parsons
argued that postwar US professionalization reduced sharply line-authority, forged post-bureaucratic “collegial” authority, and democratized corporations. (8) He held that his structural-functionalist views of professional authority and complex organization and of the overall social system and evolutionary progress merely updated Weber’s thought. (9) A central facet of American sociological theory for over twenty years, Parsons’ Weber legitimated the early postwar era’s “liberal consensus,” or the view that US capitalism’s secularized Protestantism, managerial firms, advanced technology, and modest Keynesian regulatory and welfare-state policies unlocked the secret of continuous growth, ended class warfare, and increased substantially the opportunities and participation of disadvantaged minorities. (10) Parsons’ Weber was woven into the fabric of Cold-War era modernization theory, attributing universal significance to American values and institutions. Parsonsian theory portrayed the US as a substantively rational society that reached heretofore unimaginable heights of social integration, equal opportunity, and democracy. Equating unabashedly postwar modernization with “Americanization,” Parsons held that the process was an “irreversible” evolutionary trend in the west and that the US was modernity’s “new lead society.” He argued that an Americanized “New Europe” already was emergent and that all nations that wanted to be modern, even the state socialist bloc, would converge eventually with the US model (i.e., a just meritocracy that balances the market and state and efficiency and social justice) (Parsons 1971, pp. 86, 128-9).

1.2. Critical Weber: Modernization as Domination

The introduction, translation, and selection of essays in Hans H. Gerth’s and C. Wright Mills’ Weber (1946a) collection, which is still widely used today, countered Parsons’ Weber. Comparing their translation of a section of Weber’s work to that of Parsons, Mills declared: “The son of bitch [Parsons] translated it so as to take all the guts, the radical guts, out of it, whereas our translation doesn’t do that!” (11) Rather than opposing Weber to Marx, Gerth and Mills saw the two theorists to converge at key points and to offer supplements to each other’s theories at other important junctures. In Gerth’s and Mills’ (1946, p. 73) view, Weber “incorporated” into his own theory so much of Marx’s critique of capitalism that he too saw “the economic system as a compulsive apparatus rather than as the locus of freedom.” This coercive view of capitalism was the crux of their disagreement with
Parsons. Gerth’s and Mills’ Critical Weber helped stir wider opposition to Parsons’ structural-functionalism and consensus theories of postwar-US capitalism. Translating Weber’s bureaucracy essay, Gerth and Mills used the term “domination” at important junctures. In the translations and introductory essay, they drew out Weber’s emphases on hierarchical subordination, impersonal discipline, monopolies of resources and information, and mass democracy, which limits participation and levels the masses below the top. (12) They also translated Weber’s essays on politics and science as vocations, which stressed Enlightenment rationality’s limits, criticized claims about progress, and warned about political demagoguery and the total state. Holding that Weber acknowledged American capitalism’s material and human waste and racial problems, they wove his ideas into a formally rational vision of the postwar US, efficient in domination, but limited in democracy. Conversely to Parsons’ autonomous view of culture and linkage of Weberian theory to German Idealism, they held that Weber saw ideas to be entwined with material and ideal interests and to be mediated by groups that seek to realize them. Gerth and Mills also published Weber’s arguments about religion’s tensions with politics, art, sexuality, and science and about how modern cultural rationalization multiplies conflictive value spheres. Rather than stressing convergence with Durkheim, they noted Weber’s engagement with Nietzsche as well as with Marx and his affinities with John Dewey’s and George Herbert Mead’s pragmatism. They rejected Parsons’ functionalist, evolutionist reading of Weber, which implied that value consensus and normative integration were “in between the lines” of Weber’s work. Contra Parsons’ effusive cultural optimism, Gerth and Mills stressed Weber’s fears about the possible fate of modernity (e.g., “Egyptification” or the total state) and impassioned warnings about the possible eclipse of the autonomous individual that he valued so dearly. (13)

Parsons’ Weber amplified sensibilities accompanying the early postwar era’s long economic boom, major technological advances, and increased inclusion. Parsons’ believed that US dominance served progressive global trends. By contrast, Gerth and Mills stressed American society’s technocratic features, political and cultural regimentation, and forms of exclusion. They had highly ambivalent views about the US’ leading role in the world. (14) The divergent approaches are transparent in Parsons’ and Mills’ respective stances about postmodernity. Concluding The System of Modern Societies, Parsons dismissed “ideological pessimism,” asserting that the distinctly American, “culminating” phase of modernization would continue for another century or more and that claims about a dawning “‘postmodern’ society”
were “decidedly premature” (1971, pp. 142-3). By contrast, Mills warned about “the ending of the modern age” and a “postmodern” terminus of the Enlightenment dream of fusing rationality and freedom. He decried mass society’s “cheerful robots,” enthralled by “accumulation of gadgets,” compliant to elite demands, blind to injustices, and politically irresponsible (Mills 1961, pp. 165-76). Speaking of “pretentious triviality,” Mills charged that US social science marginalized public intellectuals and disparaged “big discourses,” or social theories of classical breadth, which can offer tools for democratic publics to identify themselves and reclaim the values of freedom and rationality (1961, 182-4). He charged that Parsons’ “Grand Theory” epitomizes sociological theorists’ tendency to withdraw from addressing history, power, and public issues. Mills engaged diverse theorists, but his theoretical ideas and critiques of American culture included a strong Weberian thread. Mills was very critical of Marxism and communism, but his support for radical democratic politics and politically-organized workers was animated, at least, partially, by his engagement with Marx. Mills held that the enduring, culturally significant work of Weber and other classical theorists was, in part, due to their “dialogue with Karl Marx,” a thinker that the vast majority of postwar American sociologists either ignored or dismissed (Mills 1961, p. 48). Mills had a strong affinity for the spirit of Marx, if not the letter of his work. While almost all Marxist and leftist theorists still saw Weber strictly as a bourgeois anti-Marxist, Gerth and Mills began a Marx-Weber fusion that was carried further by the coming generation. (15)

1.3. Anti-Liberal Weber: Modernization as Descent

Anti-liberal “Weberians” are sharply critical of Weber. They turn his Nietzschean side against his liberalism. (16) In a more singular way than Gerth and Mills, they stress his views about the leveling and disciplining force of instrumental rationalization. Weber sometimes implied that the process operated like a locomotive flattening everything in its path and creating an all-encompassing “steel-hard casing,” “cage of bondage,” or “iron cage.” For example, following glowing comments about his experience of local culture in Oklahoma Territory, he declared: “Too bad; in a year this place will look like Oklahoma [City], that is, like any other American city. With almost lightening speed everything that stands in the way of capitalistic culture is being crushed.” (17) Weber elaborated this process in his
arguments about bureaucratic structure, calculation, and routine and about intellectualization and disenchantment. He saw instrumental rationalization and related cultural differentiation to multiply cultural spheres, rationalize them in accord with their own internal logics, sharpen value conflicts, and render culture incoherent and individuals deracinated and homeless. Weber affirmed the value of science, but held that it cannot answer questions of value or create meaning. (18) In his view, this fragmentation is made more problematic by rampant demagoguery, plebiscitarian dictators, corrupt media, poorly-informed, manipulable publics, and short-sighted bureaucrats. I call this dark side of Weber’s account of rationalization, in isolation from other parts of his work that affirm modernity, the “homogenization-regimentation thesis.” Theorists have expressed it in diverse forms, as a single thread in broader arguments or, especially, as a main theme in critiques of “mass society.” (19)

Anti-liberal Weberians imply that cultural erosion and loss of collective agency, arising from instrumental rationalization, are so great that they make a mockery of liberal democracy. (20) They ignore, diminish, or reject Weber’s arguments about individual autonomy and freedom of conscience, bureaucratic accountability and limited authority, scientific culture and political responsibility, cultural freedom and value pluralism, countervailing power, and other affirmative facets of his account of liberal-democratic culture. Anti-liberal versions of the homogenization-regimentation thesis decouple liberalism from democracy and, thus, split sharply from Parsons’ Weber and from Critical Weber, which occupy divergent points on a liberal-democratic continuum. Although converging with Critical Weber’s pessimistic themes, anti-liberals would never accept Gerth’s and Mills’ liberal-democratic reformism or fusion of Weber with Marx, American pragmatism, and Mannheimian sociology of knowledge. Anti-liberals see US-led, liberal-democratic modernization and individualist, consumer freedom to be a descent. They imply that liberal democracy’s fragmentation and moral corrosion create the cultural conditions for totalitarianism. In their view, this liberal regime cries out for fundamental socio-political and cultural transformation. However, anti-liberals usually leave vague the legal, institutional, and political changes called for by their divergent politics (e.g., populism, aristocracy, theocracy). Thus, the meaning of their anti-liberalism for actually-existing democracy is an open question.

During World War II and in the early postwar period, a diverse group of mostly émigré scholars decried “relativistic” American liberalism. (21) Their anti-liberalism has roots in Weimar-era thought. Having wide impact on later generations, Marxist
Georg Lukács and proto-Nazi Carl Schmitt attacked Weber, but they deployed facets of his vision of instrumental rationalization in their dismissive critiques of capitalism and liberalism.\(^{22}\)

Influenced by Weber and other Weimar theorists, postwar émigré scholars posed parallel homogenization-regimentation theses, which portrayed Western modernity to have lost its moral compass and to be in profound crisis. They contended that liberalism subverts the firmly held values needed to resist totalitarianism and to provide an alternative to consumer culture’s mediocrity and excess. Anti-liberals saw American sociology’s postwar ascendance and, especially, its positivism to manifest a leveled, degraded culture. Few of these thinkers knew much about the discipline, but they all had some knowledge of Weber’s social thought and its wide impact on Weimar era culture and politics. Many of them viewed him to be the greatest social scientist (Strauss [1950] 1965, pp. 36-37, Gunnell 2004, pp. 151-52). However, they argued that his ideas about value neutrality and value pluralism manifest the type of relativistic, nihilistic liberalism that they believed to be rampant in postwar, US sociology and culture. They saw American interest in Weber to be a destructive influence. As Allan Bloom later claimed, Weber’s “sociological terminology” spread “German Pathos” in the postwar US.\(^{23}\)

The émigré scholars attacked John Dewey’s pragmatism for its parallel affirmation of liberal pluralism and social science. Like Weber, Dewey rejected moral absolutes, but he had higher hopes about social science’s possible contribution to public life and democracy. Max Horkheimer charged that Dewey’s “optimism... conceals a greater political defeatism than the pessimism of Weber.”\(^{24}\) Émigré scholars thought that Weber’s tragic view of modernity’s profound ambiguities and unresolvable problems to be more penetrating and revealing about the depth of liberalism’s crisis.\(^{25}\)

Although attacking Weber, they viewed him and American culture through lenses colored by his ideas, especially those that reflected his pessimistic side and were influenced by his engagement with Nietzsche. Countering Weber’s liberalism, émigré political theorists, Leo Strauss ([1950] 1965 pp. 35-80) and Eric Voegelin ([1952] 1966 pp. 13-26) advocated “natural right” theory or the establishment of a regime based on objectively true, absolute values. Both theorists attacked Weber’s arguments about the separation of facts and values in scientific practices and about the inevitable conflict of values in the wider culture. In their view, his nihilistic “historicism” or “Gnostic immanentism” favors a culture of lost souls who cannot grasp the good and for whom nothing is forbidden.\(^{26}\)

They saw Weber’s views to cultivate individualism and egalitarianism, which they argued undermine moral authority and genuine culture. They held that his rejection
of a higher rationality that can identify true values from the vortex of incommensurable, conflictive opinions and his limitation of social knowledge of normative matters to hermeneutic clarification of conflictive values and sociological analysis of value-oriented action’s consequences abandon truth and good to individual whim. They wanted cultural leadership by philosophical or religious elites, capable of exercising reason, forging political rule based on true values, and insuring that people know the good and observe the duties it commands. They attacked Weber’s alleged nihilism, but their view of the US as an ethically flattened, instrumentalized, philistine culture bore the imprint of the Nietzschean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis. Strauss and Voeglin held that Marxism and communism culminate monstrously liberal historicist or gnostic immanentist tendencies and threaten permanent neutralization of genuine culture. (27) Seeing the US to be the global bulwark against communism, however, they did not reject American culture entirely and made concessions to its liberal-democratic institutions with the hope of defeating communism and igniting reform based on a recovery of the West’s religious and classical philosophical roots. Both theorists were vague about their precise political intentions, but their emphatic arguments about the need for an absolute order of value imply a hierarchical political order converse to liberal-democratic conceptions of discursive democracy.

Herbert Marcuse argued that Weber’s type of value relativism and positivism undercuts the will and imagination to forge a liberated society and, thus, consecrates the existent liberal order as substantively rational. Although rejecting Weber more emphatically than either Strauss or Voegelin, Marcuse deployed the Nietzschean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis more transparently and sweepingly. He portrayed relentless instrumental rationalization and bureaucratization constructing an “ever more solid shell of bondage.” (28) Other Frankfurt School theorists made parallel moves. Their original Hegelian-Marxian roots typified the historicism that Strauss and Voegelin deplored. Rejecting absolute truths, they claimed to derive their normative standpoints from analyzing emancipatory possibilities embedded in existing culture and social institutions. (29) However, Nazism, Fascism, Hiroshima, the Holocaust, Stalinism, and consumer capitalism dimmed their hopes about “finding the ideal in the real,” or identifying, radicalizing, and realizing historical, emancipatory ideals. Their views about “one-dimensional culture,” “dialectic of enlightenment,” “eclipse of reason,” “total administration,” and “culture industry” portrayed a culture devoid of opposition and resources to even envision transcendence of alienated social relations. Their
immanent critique or ideology critique came up empty; the emancipatory working class failed to appear and they could not detect an alternative collective subject on the horizon. They held that propaganda and mass culture blurred the line between ideology and reality, foreclosing possibilities for liberation, and shifted to an entirely negative critique or sought a nonhistorical basis for critical theory. (30) Describing liberal-democratic capitalism as an “open-air prison,” Adorno argued that there: “are no more ideologies in the authentic sense of false consciousness, only advertisements for the world through its duplication and the provocative lie which does not seek belief but commands silence.” He concluded that “phenomena rigidify, become insignias of the absolute rule of that which is” and that the “immanent method.... is dragged into the abyss by its object” (1981, p. 34). Similarly, Marcuse (1964, p. 257) ended his One-Dimensional Man with the declaration that critical theory offers no hope about a “good end” to postwar culture and that the theory “remains negative” - loyal to the hopeless ones, who dedicate their lives to the “Great Refusal.” Some Frankfurt School theorists did not give into this pessimism, and those who embraced the regimentation-homogenization thesis did not always do so consistently. However, pessimistic Frankfurt School theorists, although not attacking liberalism as fundamentally as Strauss and Voegelin, implied such a low estimation of its existent forms that they left vague needed institutional and political changes. (31)

These types of early postwar era, anti-liberalism reappeared with later shifts in American politics and culture. The Frankfurt School, especially Marcuse, had impact on the New Left, while Natural Right thinkers, especially Strauss, helped shape the intellectual and political backlash to New Deal liberalism, the New Left, and 1960s youth culture. As stated above, Carl Schmitt exerted major influence on émigré scholars. (32) However, Heidegger may have had even wider impact on many of these thinkers. Karl Löwith provided a moving description of Weber’s “Science as Vocation” speech that portrayed him as the prototype anti-Nazi spirit. Löwith followed this portrayal with a chilling portrait of his former teacher Heidegger, during his Nazi phase, as the opposite type of character. (33) Heidegger’s view of cultural leveling, which had little to do with Weber, had a much greater affinity for Nazism than the Weber-infused version of the homogenization-regimentation thesis. Heidegger exerted an independent influence on the anti-liberal émigré scholars. (34) However, many “Weberians,” who engaged seriously Heidegger’s work (including the émigré scholars), likely read Weber through a Heideggerian lens, or the converse, and, thus, fused themes from both theorists. A
later 20th century revival of interest in Schmitt and Heidegger helped renew anti-liberalism on the left as well as on the right.

2. The Postwar Era Winding Down: Vicissitudes of Modernization and Postmodernization

2.1. New Sociology and Marx-Weber Fusions: Rethinking Modernization

By 1970, the idea of progressive modernization was superceded by concern over fractious splits, crises, and decline. In the preface of a much debated book, Alvin Gouldner declared that:

Social theorists today work within a crumbling social matrix of paralyzed urban centers and battered campuses. Some may put cotton in their ears, but their bodies still feel the shock waves. It is no exaggeration to say that we theorize today within the sound of guns. The old order has the picks of hundred rebellions thrust into its hide. (35)

Gouldner held that social theory is needed to address these crises. This sense of rupture spurred renewed interest in classical social theory, which, as C. Wright Mills argued, offered the “big discourse” and sufficient purview to generate critical thought and debate over the historical directions and normative foundations of socio-political life. Theorists began to employ the classics in critiques of postwar capitalism and of modernization theories. Anthony Giddens (1971, p. vii) opened his highly influential study of classical theory with the assertion that many sociologists believe that: “contemporary social theory stands in need of radical revision,” which demands reconsidering sociology’s founding theorists. (36) Seeing social theory to be historically rooted and embedded in the wider culture, Gouldner and Giddens thought that re-engaging the classics would encourage critical rethinking of the present. Like Mills, they held that the rejection of normatively-oriented, broad-scope social theory, or classical-type theory, leaves sociology without systematic means to illuminate and debate its normative and empirical directions and relations to wider culture and public life. (37) They hoped that attending to the best work in classical theory would generate fresh social theory of similar breadth and stir reflexivity and critical discourse about the bearings of specialized sociological research and sociological theory. This view of the classics was a driving force in the new phase of the Weber revival. Social critics’ and social theorists’
strong normative emphasis was, however, in tension with Weber’s thought, and this same tension, although usually overlooked, characterized Marx-Weber fusions. Parsons’ Weber dominated the early postwar era, but as the liberal consensus eroded in the national political culture, many theorists attacked structural-functionalism for being too static, ideological, and blind to fragmentation and conflict. Expanding upon Gerth’s and Mills’ Critical Weber, social theorists developed “conflict theories” or “critical sociologies,” which attacked Parsonsian theory and other mainstream sociological views. Marx-Weber fusions abounded. (38) However, they were part of a much broader, second postwar wave of Weber scholarship and Weberian sociology. More English-language translations of Weber’s original work appeared. (39) The appearance of the full translation of Economy and Society ([1921] 1968) was an especially important event, helping fuel debate over Weber’s relationship to Marx. (40) However, co-editor and one of the work’s leading translators, Guenther Roth held that its nonpartisan, sociological thrust illustrated the divergence of Weber from Marx. In the introduction to a new edition of Reinhard Bendix’s Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, Roth implied that his mentor’s emphasis on Weber’s comparative-historical studies was a much needed corrective to Parsons’ Weber and antiliberal Weber as well as to Critical Weber. (41) Contributing substantially to the academic side of the Weber renaissance on both sides of the Atlantic, Roth criticized what he saw as politicized interpretations of Weber’s work. Many secondary works on Weber were translated, and many books and journal articles by younger and mid-career English-language Weber scholars appeared. By the 1980s, Weber scholarship became a cottage industry in Anglo-American sociology. (42) His ideas were also applied in diverse sociological subareas (e.g., comparative-historical sociology, the sociology of work, organizations, and economy, political sociology, rural sociology, sociology of religion). While having an increased presence in disciplinary work, social theory was emerging, as well as an independent practice. (43) Thus, Weber was inserted into important interdisciplinary theory debates over epistemological, cultural, and political issues. Marx-Weber fusions resonated with the times, stirred debate, and helped animate the wider Weber revival.

Alvin Gouldner was a leading figure in the 1960s “new sociology,” which championed the type of theoretically guided and historically and politically engaged critical sociology that C.Wright Mills advocated. (44) According to Time Magazine (1970), new sociology overthrew the US “public image” of the sociologist as an irrelevant, obscurantist “pedant.” Marx-Weber fusions proliferated in the new
sociology. After youthful engagement with Marxism, Gouldner applied Weberian ideas centrally in his work. He deployed them to address the sociological deficit he saw in Marx’s thought. Gouldner criticized overly partisan positions and appreciated empirical-historical sociology, but his widely-read “Anti-Minotaur” (1962) essay on Weber helped inspire new sociology critiques of scientism, technocracy, and militarism. Gouldner composed his major Marx-Weber fusion, during the 1970s (the last decade of his life). His massive, multiple volume project was arguably the broadest study of social theory by a later 20th century sociologist. He analyzed the historical roots of western social theory, framed an original theory of ideology and civil society, employed a linguistic turn to rethink contemporary class relations, provided a normative standard to guide social criticism, and created a basis for post-Marxist critical theory. His main contribution, however, was development of a theory of “social theory” (distinguished from middle-range theory and empirical sociological theory). He portrayed it as a primarily normatively-oriented practice that justifies values, social movements, and socio-political regimes on the basis of their actual or possible social consequences. In his view, social theory provides a post-traditional alternative to transcendental and absolutist ethics, opening normative matters to discussion and contestation and coming to terms with modern civil society’s pluralistic culture. Gouldner saw social theory as a potential language to debate the normative directions of social science and public life and to link the two realms. He engaged Marx and Weber throughout the project. Perhaps telling, he chose the title “Max Weber Research Professor of Social Theory” for his Distinguished Chair. However, Gouldner employed Weberian ideas to criticize Marxism, with the aim of reconstructing and reviving Marx’s vision of normatively-driven critical social theory and, therefore, of going beyond what Weber believed was prudent and possible.

In the 1970s, English-language translations of Frankfurt School and Western Marxist works proliferated, and interest in the topics grew explosively in North American, social theory circles. Most theorists, identified with these traditions, considered Weber to be the leading bourgeois theorist and rejected him on that basis. However, they often drew substantially, albeit usually tacitly, from his work on rationalization and bureaucratization and applied the ideas in critiques of orthodox Marxism, communism, sociology, and capitalism. By contrast, the leading second generation, Frankfurt School theorist, Jürgen Habermas employed Weber’s ideas much more directly and affirmatively than his critical theory predecessors. As Parsons had done earlier, Habermas criticized and reconstructed Weber.
He meshed his Marx-Weber fusion with ideas from Durkheim, Mead, Parsons, and other theorists. Like Gouldner, he made a linguistic turn in an effort to fashion post-Marxist critical theory. Habermas has refined his project for more than four decades, exerting enormous influence on interdisciplinary social theory. He has been a central figure in the era’s great debates over critical theory, liberalism, postmodernism, feminism, communitarianism, citizenship, and human rights. His ideas have been a major force in North American social theory. If Gouldner had not died suddenly and prematurely in 1980, before his project was complete, he might have had wider impact on social theory. Gouldner and Habermas framed their own approaches, engaged many thinkers, and left tacit part of what they borrowed Marx and Weber. However, Marx-Weber fusions provided their works a critical thrust stressing the need to theorize democratic alternatives to existing socialism and capitalism.

In the 1970s, Telos was the leading North American outlet for Frankfurt School and Western Marxist thought. The Telos circle debated and published diverse types of earlier 20th century and contemporary work, with the aim of reconstructing critical theory and providing an alternative to the old left and the New Left. Lukács’ Marx-Weber fusion and homogenization-regimentation thesis were discussed widely in the early years of the journal. Gouldner and Habermas later published in Telos. (48) However, chief editor, Paul Piccone believed that they did not break sharply enough from Marxism or from conventional philosophy and sociology and, thus, failed to grasp the depth of the exhaustion of leftist thought and of the wider culture. Declaring a “crisis of one-dimensionality,” Piccone portrayed total instrumental rationalization and bureaucratization, which annihilated otherness, liquidated cultural particularity, eliminated political opposition, and foreclosed democratic change. According to his “artificial negativity” thesis, the welfare state and left-liberal activism and reform simulate progressive change, tame radical impulses, and empower “New-Class” apparachnicks, who impose total administration. (49) Such extreme versions of the homogenization-regimentation thesis can lead, as they did in the Weimar era, to radical turns left or right. Piccone’s search for “organic negativity” led Telos, in the 1980s and 1990s, to engage Carl Schmitt, Italy’s Northern League, and the French New Right in a friendly manner and to embark on a politically ambiguous “postmodern populist” path. Piccone scathingly dismissed Marx and Weber as obsolete thinkers, but he engaged their ideas and employed them centrally, although tacitly, in his own theory. (50)
Pierre Bourdieu’s views on “cultural capital” focused on the intersection of class and status, borrowed heavily from Marx and Weber, and framed a cultural turn in critical theory.\(^{(51)}\) English-language translations of his works and commentaries about them helped stimulate the rise of a new, North American sociology of culture and contributed to interdisciplinary cultural studies. Other thinkers employed Weber against Marx-Weber fusions and critical theory. Jeffery Alexander’s (1982-83) multi-volume tome revived the Parsons-Weber fusion. He stimulated neofunctionalist work, which drew criticism from the left and from Weberians. Convergent with Habermas, he opposed the homogenization-regimentation thesis, and affirmed progressive liberalism. Other theorists attacked progressive liberals and post-1960s liberalized American culture. For example, conservative, social theorist, Robert Nisbet deployed a Durkheim-Weber fusion against the liberal-left. Peter L. Berger’s work on modernity, religion, and disenchantment fused Weberian themes with ideas from Alfred Schutz, Mannheim, Marx, Durkheim, and others. Berger was always ambivalent about modernity and opposed to the left, but his *Invitation to Sociology* (1963) and co-authored study on the sociology of knowledge were widely-read nonpartisan works. By the mid-1970s, however, he made his strenuous opposition to Marxism, critical theory, and the New Left clearly evident. He castigated new sociologists’ value-laden ways as part of his own emphatic political and normative arguments for religion, tradition, and capitalism. Former new sociologist, turned neoconservative, Irving Louis Horowitz also applied Weberian ideas against Marxism, the left, and progressive liberalism. Like Berger, he invoked value freedom against their partisanship in the same pages that he posed his own strongly partisan arguments.\(^{(52)}\) Former leftist, Christopher Lasch and left-leaning Richard Sennett also deployed Weberian themes to challenge liberal modernization theories. Lasch’s and Sennett’s politics and normative views diverged from Nisbet, Berger, and Horowitz, but they all framed homogenization-regimentation theses, portraying erosion of the Protestant work ethic, exhaustion of the postwar liberal-left, and depletion of wider American culture. They also criticized liberal views of secularization and de-traditionalization. However, they did not break as radically with liberalism as Piccone.\(^{(53)}\) Gouldner also turned pessimistic. He ended the last work completed during his lifetime with the chapter, “Nightmare Marxism,” holding that late-1970s events upheld Weber’s views about the failure of socialism, triumph of capitalism, and tenuous nature of liberal democracy (Gouldner [1980] 1982c, pp. 380-89). By the mid-1980s, Marx-Weber fusions faded in the face rightward social and political trends and new forms of
cultural and political opposition. Weber’s Nietzschean threads took on increased importance.

2.2. Postmodern Weber: Nietzsche-Weber Syntheses

In the 1980s, interdisciplinary debates about modernity and postmodernity intensified in response to major socio-political and technical shifts (e.g., withered communism and national liberation movements, ascendent Thatcherism-Reaganism, deregulation, deindustrialization, new information-communication technologies, and struggles over national and cultural identity). Postmodernists held that entirely new theoretical and political practices were needed to come to terms with the nascent postmodern order. Their claims about the “end of modernity” expressed, in an exaggerated way, erosion of the postwar system and, specifically, decline of its chief mode of legitimation - progress through modernization. Postmodernism subsumed diverse approaches with varying relations to modern social theory (Antonio 1998). Postmodernists usually operated in the tracks of modernity discourse; their views of technocracy, discipline, cultural exhaustion, and negative critique or “deconstruction” were reminiscent of the Frankfurt School. Milder versions of their critical views about representation, objectivity, and perspectivism had affinity for Weber’s methodological essays. But radical postmodernists attributed a sweepingly deterministic primacy to language (often detached from history and society), embraced irrationalism, and quit modern social theory. Yet even moderate postmodernists rejected Marx-Weber syntheses; they attacked materialism and scientism and portrayed Marxists as retrograde “totalizers,” who justified technocracy, ignored noneconomic oppression, trivialized culture, and legitimated bloody revolutions and authoritarianism. Giving voice to a new “cultural left” embracing flourishing, “post-Marxist,” “new social movements” (e.g., feminist, gay/lesbian, and racial/ethnic politics), postmodernists argued that Marxism’s labor-centered, class politics were obsolescent and had been superseded by struggles for recognition. Cultural theorists, mostly from the humanities, engaged a flood of translations of French poststructuralist and deconstructionist works and related postmodern commentaries and critiques. North American versions of postmodernism and deconstruction were deployed in culture wars over multiculturalism and were the focus of intense generational battles in Philosophy, English, and Comparative Literature Departments. In related sociological circles,
enthusiasm for classical theory dimmed, and sociological theory’s Marx-Weber-Durkheim canon was attacked by feminist, minority, and other, usually younger, sociologists for being Eurocentric and phallocentric, perpetuating the discipline’s old guard, and suppressing fresh thought and new thinkers. This “holy trinity” became the “dead white males,” later emblazoned on T-shirts at the annual American Sociological Association meetings. Still Nietzsche-Weber fusions proliferated in the new political and cultural context. However, the social science side of postmodernist discourse took place mostly outside the mainstream journals and on the margins of formal disciplinary circles or beyond them. Debates over postmodernism extended beyond academe, and furthered social theory’s emergence as an independent discipline.

Postmodernist arguments about rationalization’s homogenizing and regimenting force were influenced heavily by the postwar, French reception of Heidegger’s thought, especially his critique of technology and interpretation of Nietzsche. Nietzsche is the most important forerunner of postmodernism; he raged against western rationality’s excesses and declared that the end of modernity was at hand. Postmodernists often acknowledged passingly his influence on them, but he usually had a larger tacit presence in their works. Frankfurt School-like, Weberian themes also suffused postmodernism, although they usually were left implicit, mentioned passingly, or mixed with other thinkers’ views. For example, the homogenization-regimentation thesis had a central place in Michel Foucault’s work; his “carceral system” and “normalization” paralleled Marcuse’s “repressive administration of society” (Foucault 1978, Marcuse 1964). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, p. 166) contended that Foucault took up Weber’s “concern with rationalization and objectification as the essential trend of our culture and the most important problem of our time.” Foucault acknowledged his affinity with Weber and the Frankfurt School, but he asserted that his generation of French theorists, as younger scholars, did not read these thinkers and that any influence was indirect (Foucault 1989, pp. 241-43). Foucault stressed Heidegger’s major impact on his thought, saying that he “probably wouldn’t have read Nietzsche if... [he] hadn’t read Heidegger.” Concluding that “Nietzsche prevailed,” Foucault declared that he was “simply a Nietzschean” (1989, pp. 326-27). However, Foucault (1989, p. 239) also acknowledged Georges Bataille as a major influence on his thought and another important source of his Nietzscheanism. Bataille read Nietzsche and Weber and blended their ideas with his own in the 1930s. The extent of the Nietzsche-Weber fusion in the thought of postmodernism’s French founders is an open
question and a detective story. Their 1970s and 1980s, English-speaking interpreters and appropriators, however, had been exposed to the fusion, especially via the Frankfurt School, and often read postmodernism through that lens. (57) Mike Gane (2002, p. 4) described an “implicit dialogue” between Weber and postmodern theory (i.e., Lyotard, Foucault, and Baudrillard), and offered detailed analyses of multiple points of convergence, including prominent Nietzschean threads. Paralleling Weber’s views, Gane argued, postmodernists addressed centrally rationalization’s leveling and regimenting tendencies. However, he held that their “transgressive,” antirationalist moves resisted processes that Weber deemed inevitable and legitimated. Gane deployed a Nietzschean-Weberian, homogenization-regimentation thesis to argue that postmodernists superceded Weber’s views. (58) William Bogart’s (1996) Baudrillardian-Foucaultian description of “telematic” surveillance provided a grim, wired vision of total administration in which efforts to reform or resist it politically simply enhance its power. He claimed to have updated Weber’s argument about instrumental rationalization, but his portrayal of postmodern “hypercontrol” is more reminiscent of Piccone’s “artificial negativity” thesis. By contrast to Piccone’s “organic negativity” and populist politics, however, Bogart advocated political indifference. (59) Gane’s and Bogert’s Nietzschean-Weberian, homogenization-regimentation theses heralded postwar modernization theory’s exhaustion, but they exemplify divergent threads of postmodernism. Gane considered postmodernist theory to be a method and language to resist homogenization-regimentation and advance postmodern politics. Treating postmodernism as a progressive advance over modernization theory, he retained ties to critical theory and liberal-democratic politics. By contrast, Bogart’s description of terminal evaporation of modernity’s socio-cultural bases and of its liberal-democratic potentials and his endorsement of extreme ennui open the way to anti-modern and anti-liberal countermoves. Taking a very different direction, postmodernist, Zygmunt Bauman employed a Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis to theorize the roots of the Holocaust. He held that modern bureaucracy’s instrumentally rationalized power, dutiful officials, and amoral functionality opened the way for genocide - i.e., the Holocaust was a “hidden possibility” of modernity. (60) Critics also deployed Weber’s ideas against postmodernism; they held that his scaled-down views of rationality and science offer a desirable alternative to its relativist irrationalism (e.g., Raynaud 1997, pp. 148-52). Daniel Bell’s (1976) trenchant critique of postmodern culture bore a clear imprint of Marx and Weber,
but it also expressed a strong Nietzschean side. Bell’s Marxian-Weberian themes are clearly visible in his arguments about capitalism’s rationalized, disenchanted, bureaucratized features, while Nietzschean elements are just as apparent in his portrayal of postmodern culture’s asceticism, fragmentation, and immediacy. Similar themes appear throughout Fredric Jameson’s (1984) and in David Harvey’s (1989) influential analyses of postmodern culture. They engaged postmodernism more affirmatively than Bell, but they neither celebrated it nor treated it as a finality. They believed that Marxist theory could be revised to address postmodern tendencies and that it was, in fact, needed to grasp them and overcome their contradictions. Like Bell, they articulated postmodernism’s Nietzschean sensibilities in a largely Marx-Weber synthesis that remained within orbit of modern social theory and retained, at least, modest hopes to revive the progressive side of postwar modernization. (61)

Alan Bloom’s best seller, Closing of the American Mind (1987) was a major broadside in the neoconservative attack on postmodern culture and on the ascendant cultural left. (62) He held that rampant postmodern sensibilities manifest America’s “worst instincts” and hasten a cultural crisis (Bloom 1987, p. 379). Bloom argued that French deconstructionism’s heavy influence on the 1980s US left caused them to drop Marx for Heidegger and Nietzsche and, consequently, embrace extreme cultural relativism and nihilism (Bloom 1987, pp. 217-26). Like Bell, Bloom believed that postmodernism justified postwar consumer culture’s release from normative constraint and fanned already excessive carnal appetites and philistine individualism. He argued that the postwar US reception of Weber made him the “intermediary between Nietzsche and us Americans” and ultimate source of the receptivity to European Heideggerianism and extremism left and right (Bloom 1987, pp. 195). He claimed that Weber’s “dogmatic atheism,” expressed in his analysis of the Protestant ethic, injected Nietzscheanism into the “American Bloodstream.” Although implying that the late-1960s shift from Parsons’ Weber to Critical Weber was also an important step, Bloom contended that post-Marxist, Nietzsche-Weber syntheses made the US receptive to postmodernism (Bloom 1987, pp. 147-151, 208-16). However, Blooms’ portrayal of leveled values and extreme cultural exhaustion converged with the so-called Heideggerian left’s views. (63) His argument parallels his mentor Leo Strauss’ earlier critique of Weber and anti-liberal Nietzsche-Weber synthesis. Bloom and other late 20th century Straussian helped shape the cultural right and neoconservative versions of the homogenization-
regimentation thesis that later had greater force and blossomed politically, during the George W. Bush presidency.

2.3. Weber’s Shadow in the Age of Globalization: Modernization Theory Redux and its Critics

By the early-1990s, postmodernist works sold briskly at Borders and Barnes and Noble bookstores. Postmodernism had become a “cultural dominant” in the humanities and specialty niche in sociological theory. However, the freer movement of goods, capital, images, and people across national borders, neoliberal restructuring, and geopolitical realignment (following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and first Gulf War) helped stir a shift in interdisciplinary social theory discourse to US-led “globalization.” Francis Fukuyama’s much publicized “end of history” thesis appeared at the moment that the Soviet Bloc was collapsing and pro-democracy protest was raging in China (Fukuyama 1989). He charged that procapitalist, modernization theory, fashioned by postwar US Weberians, crashed after relativist, leftist, social scientists lambasted its alleged Eurocentric bias. However, Fukuyama declared that modernization theory was more convincing in 1990 than it was twenty years before, when it came under attack (Fukuyama 1992, pp. 68-9, 133-134). He vindicated the Parsonsian equation of Americanization and modernization, but stripped of its postwar, liberal emphases on regulation and redistribution. (64) He held that this leaner, neoliberal vision of modernization now rules among all people who want to be modern; they cannot imagine an alternative regime that would “represent a fundamental improvement over our current order” (Fukuyama 1992, p. 51). Qualifying his optimism, however, Fukuyama warned that neoliberalism’s prosaic economism could not satisfy humanity’s Nietzschean desire for glory or to be recognized as superior. He held that a modest revival of religious and patriotic sentiments could infuse the neoliberal world with meaning and civic spirit and defuse neopopulist and neofascist threats. His Nietzsche-Weber synthesis justified the neoconservative alliance between economic and cultural conservatives and their shared view that American New Deal liberalism and European-style Social Democracy are exhausted. (65)

Endings discourses proliferated in Fukuyama’s wake - diverse social theorists praised or bemoaned the neoliberal “end of alternatives,” “end of left and right,” or “end of politics” (66). “Third Way” theorists, like Anthony Giddens, held that free-
market reform streamlines social democracy to better accommodate to globalization and its more interdependent, cosmopolitan, and democratic “reflexive modernity” or “second modernity” (67) They retained Weberian ideas, but their enthusiasm for the free-market severed ties to Nietzsche and suggested a nascent Smith-Weber fusion (68). In unabashed, effusive celebration of deregulated capitalism, Third Way or Clinton “New Democrat,” Thomas L. Friedman (2000) argued that neoliberal globalization’s “Golden Straightjacket” enriches societies by strictly subordinating politics to markets or, in his words, by reducing political options to choices between “Pepsi and Coke.” Like homogenization-regimentation theorists, he described neoliberal globalization’s all-encompassing instrumental rationalization, but he consecrated the process as revolutionary progress. Like Parsons, Friedman declared the US to be lead-society of modernization’s new phase. In his view, US neoliberalism’s on-line, de-regulated, stockholders’ democracy “blew away all the major ideological alternatives to free-market capitalism” (Friedman, pp. 103, 106). Friedman’s best-seller mirrored the soaring optimism of the enlarged, affluent, “roaring 90s,” US “investor class.” Modernization theory and end of ideology discourse ruled again, but the neoliberal versions diverged from postwar modernization theories’ emphases on planning, welfare, and just meritocracy (69).

Although “globalization” became the master discourse of interdisciplinary social theory, the shift did not diminish the importance of postmodern cultural representation, hybridization, fragmentation, homogenization, and retribalization. George Ritzer’s highly accessible works on global consumer culture have been among the best selling sociology books in the US and around the globe. Employing directly Weber’s theories of bureaucratization and rationalization, his “McDonaldization” thesis portrayed hyper-rationalization of the global consumer sector and consequent homogenization and regimentation. Ritzer fused threads from Marx and critical theory with Weberian themes. Postmodern culture and postmodernist theory have a substantial presence in his work, but he implied that these tendencies and globalization constitute a fresh phase of modernization. (70) Benjamin Barber’s (1996) widely-read study about the entwinement of globalized, US popular culture (“McWorld”) with “retribalized” nationalist, populist, and traditionalist movements (“Jihad”) made only passing references to Weber or Marx, but themes from the two theorists’ are visible in the work. (71) Like Ritzer, Barber deployed a moderate liberal-democratic version of the homogenization-regimentation thesis to criticize US “monoculture’s” neutralization of particularity. Both theorists, however, acknowledged that key facets of local culture survive and
leave strong imprints in hybridized cultural products. The two theorists engage globalization’s culturally progressive features and postmodern facets. However, Ritzer focused mainly on consumption and related cultural matters, and did not address closely the neoliberal policy regime. By contrast, Barber framed his analysis of postmodern images and consumption as part of a critique of neoliberalism calling for increased regulation by nation states and by transnational civil society. Barber meshed his Weberian vision of cultural rationalization with a Deweyan emphasis on democratic publics and socially and culturally embedded markets.

Theorists have debated heatedly the degree to which globalization weakens the state’s regulatory powers and the consequences and inevitability of the alleged erosion. Even scholars, who counter excessive claims about the state’s eclipse, concede that globalization has reduced its capacity to control its internal and external environments. For example, Bauman (1998) and Giddens (2000) have argued that global markets and global production limit substantially and make much more problematic state sovereignty. However, Bauman’s description of consequent polarized economies and criminalized underclasses offers a much darker vision of globalization than Giddens’ cheery, albeit qualified, portrayal of the rise of a detraditionalized, democratized “global cosmopolitan society.” Both theorists agreed, however, that neoliberal globalization’s beneficial or desired consequences make it “unstoppable.” By contrast John Gray (1999) and Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (1999) held that globalization advocates attribute universal significance to a parochial process that has US origins and that depends on, for its reproduction, American cultural, economic, and political imperialism. They portrayed neoliberal globalization as a US state project that has largely destructive consequences and that should be resisted. Manuel Castells’ sweeping portrayal of the postmodern “informational economy,” “network organization” and “virtual culture” acknowledges that globalization has eroded some facets of postwar political regulation, but explains that states execute neoliberal policy, coordinate and provide infrastructure for global interchanges, and subsidize capitalism. In his view, neoliberal globalization builds on the logic and institutional matrix of earlier modernization and the new order is “more” capitalist than ever before. (72)

Presuming this continuity, Castells argued that Weber’s “theoretical principles” are still excellent tools to engage the changes and new regime.(73) Regardless of disagreements over globalization’s nature and consequences, the various theorists, discussed in this paragraph, imply that capitalism drives globalization. Continuing
capitalism-centered modernization discourse, they still operate in the shadow of Marx-Weber fusions.
Other theorists decouple globalization and modernization and decenter the relationship between globalization and capitalism. (74) For example, Weber scholar, Martin Albrow (1997) portrayed “globality.” as an epochal rupture from “modernity.” He contended that an entirely new global cultural, political, and social complex is emergent and that modern social theories, with their bankrupt Eurocentric presuppositions, obscure vision of it and blunt imagination about its possibilities. Albrow argued that capitalist economic change does not drive globalization, but is a subordinate part of a much more “comprehensive social transformation.” Rejecting claims about capitalism’s axial status, he aimed to move beyond Marx and Weber (Albow 1997, pp. 4-6, 85-90, 168-83, and passim). Yet Albrow’s repeated dismissals of modernity and modern social theory preserve them as a backdrop and illustrate their embeddedness in globalization discourse and how difficult they are to break from entirely. Like extreme market-centered globalization analysts, however, he held that globality terminally weakens all states, even that of the US. Consequently, he contended that theorists should scuttle classical theory’s core concept of “nation-state society,” which Weber framed and justified. Such claims about severe erosion of state power confronted new, unanticipated conditions after 9/11.

2.4. The Age of Tribalism: Schmitt-Weber Syntheses and Friend-Enemy Politics

In the early postwar era, Wolfgang Mommsen charged that Weber’s ideas of plebiscitary leadership and legal-rational legitimacy helped inspire Carl Schmitt’s antiparliamentary and anti-liberal views, which justified Nazi dictatorship. During the postwar de-Nazification, Mommsen charged, German scholars ignored this connection because they did not want to address Weber’s nationalist or elitist themes. He also implied that Parsons’ influence on postwar German thought helped cultivate a one-sided, liberal-democratic view of Weber. Although Mommsen’s position has been contested, Weberian facets are transparent in Schmitt’s work. (75) Stressing liberalism’s exhaustion, Schmitt’s version of the Weber-influenced homogenization-regimentation thesis has had major impact on several generations of diverse thinkers. International interest in Schmitt has grown substantially in recent decades, stirred by globalization and erosion of postwar geopolitical arrangements,
which also helped generate Nietzsche-Weber fusions. Thinkers from right and left have combined Schmittean-Weberian themes with ideas from Nietzsche, Marx, and other theorists. They hold that Schmitt was prescient about today’s ongoing geopolitical changes - porous territorial borders, weakened nation-states, and global US dominance - and that he provided unique analytical resources to criticize outmoded postwar modernization theories, address fundamental socio-cultural changes still in motion, and imagine new forms of theory and politics (e.g., Mouffe 1999). Resonating with today’s intense neotribal politics, Schmitt’s “friend and enemy” dichotomy has become especially poignant after 9/11 (76). Schmitt held that political community and collective identity necessitate shared culture, which binds most powerfully when it is experienced against the backdrop of an “other” or “stranger” who personifies “evil” - a “public enemy” who represents an opposed culture and threat to one’s way of life. Schmitt held that: “high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy” (1996, p.67). Seeing liberal pluralism to preclude such clarity and unity, he rejected liberalism’s conflictive values, market-centeredness, deracinated individuals, and multicultural citizenship, or, in his words, its “entire system of demilitarized and depoliticized concepts” (Schmitt 1996, p 71). He considered the friend-enemy dichotomy’s “grand politics” to be the bulwark against globalizing Anglo-American capitalism and its “possessive individualism,” which he thought neutralize particularity, fragment culture, and shatter community. He unhinged liberalism from democracy. However, Schmitt considered democracy to be simply “an identity of governed and governing” based on shared culture and, therefore, compatible with Fascist or Bolshevik dictatorship (Schmitt 1988b, pp. 10-17, 90, notes 26 and 28, 91 note 32). He contended that liberal-democratic pluralism must be defeated at the national level to preserve a “pluriverse” of culturally distinct nations. He also held that universalistic claims about spreading democracy and extending human rights justify cultural homogenization and Anglo-American imperialism. Arguing that divergent national cultures are incommensurable, Schmitt held that cross-cultural communication and cooperation are limited to closely related peoples. Although dismissing Weber’s liberalism and warnings about mass politics, Schmitt’s skepticism about the creation of transnational cultural consensus and his warnings about the cultural consequences of capitalism’s instrumental rationality and technical rationality draw on Weberian themes.

Starting in the late-1980s, the Telos Circle turned to Schmitt, deploying his concepts
in acid critiques of liberalism and in support of neopopulism and federalism (e.g., *Telos* 72 (Summer 1987); 83 (Spring 1990); 85 (Fall 1990); 102 (Winter 1995); 109 (Fall 1996); 122 (Winter 2002); Wolin 1990b; Strong 1996; Müller 2003). They held that his ideas can be used to formulate alternatives to the failed left and failed right. Regular *Telos* author and leading French New Right theorist, Alain de Benoist posed a Schmittean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis that declared liberalism and the entire liberal-democratic nation-state system to be moribund. Drawing on the ancient idea of “empire,” he advocated replacing the European state system with a loosely-coupled federated regime of self-governing units in which full citizenship would be based on shared culture and common identity. He embraced Schmitt’s argument that culturally homogenous communitarian regimes favor a “democratic” unity of leader and mass. He held that local participation and direct democracy, anchored in community, would replace liberal-democratic politics. Benoist did not articulate the political and legal institutions of the new regime. However, Benoist argued that the imperial regime would put Europe on a new path that escapes cultural and political fragmentation and consequent subordination to the “American superpower” (1993-4).

Telos associate editor, paleoconservative Schmittean, Paul Gottfried argued that a progressive-liberal “New Class,” operating in US government offices, higher education, corporations, and social movement organizations, wield “political correctness” as a weapon, manipulating welfare, human rights, and multicultural ideas and policies to eliminate enemies and exert overarching cultural and political hegemony. He held that left-leaning public intellectuals created a house of bondage based on therapeutic justifications. Converging with Piccone’s vision of total administration, Gottfried’s paleoconservative critique of the “managerial state” employed an extreme homogenization-regimentation thesis that constructed liberals as the internal enemy. Although warning that this liberal regime could be further consolidated and even extended into a global domination system, Gottfried declared that it is unleashing severe disintegrative forces and is stirring populist resistence, which could forge a post-liberal Schmittian scenario (1999b, p 140).

Schmitt-Weber fusions stress limits to communication and to diffusion of knowledge, which preclude wider or more participatory democracy. Such views counter Albrow’s vision of emergent global democracy and Barber’s argument about development of global civil society. Samuel Huntington’s best-seller, *The Clash of Civilizations* expresses a strong Schmittean-Weberian current. Like Weber, Huntington saw religion to be a root of enduring civilizational differences (77). He
held that incommensurate cultures prevent universalization of western democracy and generate friend-enemy dynamics. Although acknowledging that commonalities ought to be sought, Huntington contended that it “is human to hate” and that “people need enemies” to define and motivate themselves (1997, p. 130). He implied that Chinese authoritarianism and Islamic antimodernism are the West’s chief enemies. (78) To maintain global leadership and defend the West’s unique democratic culture, he argued, the US must dispense with multiculturalism at home and build cultural unity around its democratic institutions (Huntington 1997, pp. 125-30, 218-38, 304-08, 318).

Stephen Turner (2003) employed a self-identified Schmittian-Weberian fusion to explore knowledge-based limits to democratization. He concurred with Schmitt’s views that rational persuasion and discussion are central to liberal-democratic ideals, but are not realized in liberal democracies. Turner countered Habermas and other left-liberal theorists who advocate creating stronger democracy by building vibrant civil societies, which improve the quality and reach of cultural and political communication. Besides the demagogic facets of mass democracies stressed by Weber and Schmitt, Turner held that the preeminent role of scientific expertise and highly specialized technical knowledge, today, effectively precludes average citizens from ever grasping sufficiently complex public problems (e.g., global warming) and competently communicating about them and judging them. In his view, expert-based “knowledge organizations” or “commissions” now set policy in government, business, and social movement organizations and, thus, expert discourse supplants public dialogue, bankrupting progressive liberal notions of popular sovereignty and discursive democracy. Arguably, Turner updated Walter Lippmann’s elite theory of liberal democracy. (79) However, Turner did not say if his vision of commission-dominated “democracy” calls for “democratic” reform, points to a fundamental crisis that demands regime change, or suggests a condition impervious to change.

As should be apparent from the discussion above, Schmitt-Weber fusions diverged in their evaluations of existent liberal democratic politics and regimes. Still Schmittean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation theses posed major questions about the vitality of liberal-democracy and, especially, about neoliberal globalization. In particular, New Right, paleoconservative, and conservative Schmitteans rejected deregulated global markets and transnational regulatory, redistributive, or human rights regimes. They dismissed hopes that increased global economic intercourse would lead to socio-cultural and political interdependence. These Schmitteans held that globalization deepened liberal democracy’s already
profound contradictions or exhausted the regime and called for a regime change. But nearly all Schmitt-Weber fusions suggested a severe erosion and legitimacy crisis of postwar liberal democracies.

2.5. Twilight of the Postwar Era; Post-9/11 Schmitteanism, Terror, and the Camps

The bitterly contested presidential race between George W. Bush and Al Gore, decided ultimately by the Supreme Court, polarized the nation and intensified friend-enemy dichotomies among party members and among politically interested segments of the US populace, who knew nothing about Schmitt. However, the Bush Administration’s dominant neoconservative activists and intellectuals often have been exposed to Strauss and his students. Weberian threads are interwoven with Straussian and Schmittean currents in their thought, deriving sometimes from direct knowledge of the two theorists, but likely more often from readings of writers influenced by them (e.g., such as Morgenthau, Huntington, and Fukuyama). The degree of Schmittean influence is a matter of debate, but the Bush administration has employed friend-enemy strategies at home and abroad. (80) It first positioned China as the chief US enemy. Tensions between the two nations were obvious after a collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a US spy plane (on what some policymakers saw as a provocative mission on the edge of China’s airspace). But after 9/11, Islamist radicals became the main US enemy. The Bush Administration characterized its “War on Terror” and “Iraq War” as major beachheads in a US-led struggle of the “civilized world” against “rogue states” and, especially, against the “axis of evil” (i.e., Iran, Iraq, and North Korea). However, the US’ European allies and core western states were split over the policies. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld’s inflammatory comments about “New Europe” (i.e., supporters of US Iraq policy) versus “Old Europe” (i.e., France and Germany, who opposed the war) and Donald Kegan’s widely-read, provocative justification of US unilateralism and pre-emptive strikes (i.e., American power and European weakness necessitate the policies) intensified the split. Invoking former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright’s claim that the US is the “indispensable nation,” Kegan declared that the US aspiration “to play a grand role in the world” is merited because it is the lone superpower and because Americans’ believe (i.e., with good cause) that their founding principles are “unquestionably superior” to those of all other nations throughout history (2003, pp. 85-103). Seeking mass support for military
interventions, the Bush administration and its supporters also have invoked the old rhetoric of “American Exceptionalism”; US global leadership derives from its covenant with God and consequent moral leadership. They deploy claims about seeking God’s consul and serving his will especially to mobilize the evangelical “base” of the Republican Party and to consecrate friend-enemy dichotomies applied at home and abroad.

Before 9/11, Chalmers Johnson (2000) argued presciently that “American Empire” has generated global hostility and violent counter-responses. (81) He and other Bush Administration critics now hold that US-led globalization, combined with post-9/11 unilateralism, militarism, and torture scandals, have helped generate anti-American, friend-enemy binaries that construct Americans as the unwelcome Other and the US as the “Evil Empire.” (See Bull 2005; Johnson 2004; Chua 2004, and Pew Center “Global Attitudes Surveys”, http://pewresearch.org/trends). During and after the bitterly fought 2004 Bush-Kerry presidential election, which hardened the divide of the year 2000 election, the US media reported a sharp cultural and political polarization between the so-called “red states and blue states,” implying that friend-enemy dichotomies divide Americans as well as the US and the rest of the world. For over two decades “liberals” have been attacked incessantly by very well funded right-wing foundations representing neoconservative, conservative, and religious-right interests (e.g., The Heritage Foundation). Their well-publicized broadsides have been so successful that even the progressive wing of the Democratic Party has shed the liberal label. Although the right has had the upper hand, bitter opposition has been building among liberals and Democrats since the Reagan Administration and is being intensified in opposition to George W. Bush’s policies. After 9/11, right-wing critics charged that liberals and especially the “liberal press” forged the “permissive” climate that made the US vulnerable to the terrorist attacks and that liberal criticism of the Iraq War and War on Terror undermined support for and morale of the troops. Right-wing Americans treat “liberals” as the internal enemy, while liberal-left Americans (and even many centrist Democrats) see the Bush Administration and its hard-right Republican base, in a similar light, as a sort of domestic “Evil Empire”. (82) The influence of Schmitt is debatable, but the affinity of his ideas for the current climate is had to dispute.

The 9/11 events brought another Schmittean dichotomy to the foreground - the normal situation versus the “state of emergency” or “state of exception.” Defining the sovereign as the person who is able to declare a state of emergency and exercise total power, Schmitt argued that state power is rooted in decision not in legal norms.
He held that the state of exception, becomes the rule.(83) After 9/11, President Bush asserted his role as “Commander in Chief” in the “War on Terror,” holding that he would employ any measures necessary to catch or kill terrorists. The tragic images of the attack on the World Trade Center, replayed repeatedly on TV, the Anthrax scare, and a media saturated with flag lapels and talk of terrorism affirmed to most Americans a borderless war that threatened the “homeland” (a new term in US political discourse). In this climate, the Bush Administration was able to pass the US Patriot Act, suspend rule of law for undocumented aliens and suspected terrorists, put aside Geneva Convention rules for accused enemy combatants, transfer detainees to the Guantánamo camp, where they could be held indefinitely without recourse to US law and constitutional rights, and send others to undisclosed locations around the globe (i.e., “extraordinary rendition”) with lax human rights policies and experienced torturers. The crisis mentality was perpetuated by the brutal Iraq War, images of beheadings on Internet, repeated terror warnings from the new Office of Homeland Security, and constant media attention about the US at war and possible attacks at home, looming on the horizon. Many of the policies passed with bipartisan support. The summer 2005, London terrorist bombings helped sustain the US sense of vulnerability. Americans have had polarized views of President Bush and the Iraq War, but elected officials and ordinary citizens have not mounted sustained resistance to extralegal measures. American criticism of the Guantánamo internment camp and torture at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere has been tame and countered by assertions that the abuses have been trivial or even justified. The lawyer Alberto Gonzales, who provided the Bush Administration possible legal justifications favoring relaxed rules against torture, was appointed US Attorney General! (Whitlock 2005, on rendition; Sengupta and Masood 2005, on how Muslims’ have come to perceive the US through the Guantánamo internment camp; White 2005, on new “Human Rights Watch” charges of abuse). As I write, pent up progressive liberal and minority group hostility is being expressed openly and emphatically against Bush Administration’s slow initial response to the victims of Hurricane Katrina. They accuse the President of failing to act like a Commander in Chief, in a State of Emergency that imperiled the poor, infirm, and black. (84) Paleoconservative and left-leaning Schmitteans have attacked the Bush Administration and neoconservatives for employing universal claims about spreading democracy and protecting human rights to justify imperialist interventions, neoliberal globalization, and US-imprinted cultural homogenization. Left-Schmittean, Giorgio Agamben employed the idea of a state of exception to
criticize the concentration of state power, rather than to affirm it in the fashion of Schmitt. Agamben’s fusion of Schmitt with Benjamin, Foucault, Arendt, and others manifests threads of a Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis (likely derived from the theories he appropriated). Posing the argument before 9/11, Agamben (1998) held that the growth of government power over the individual and its extralegal mechanisms and violence make the state of exception the normal state of affairs today and that the concentration camp is the dominant political model. His recent work situates Bush Administration policy in the long-term development of this repressive regime (Agamben 2005). Critics argue that Agamben does not provide sufficient evidence to support his sweeping equation of modernity with the camps, but it is hard to deny that his left-Schmittian argument poses probing questions about the much increased emphasis on state security and extralegal measures that has followed 9/11. His views converge with fears expressed by others on the anti-Bush left and even by some critics on the right; that the US may be in a transition to a garrison state or, paralleling ancient Rome, is at the “end of the republic.” However, Agamben’s vision of the camp as the essence of political modernity expresses a characteristic problem of extreme versions of the homogenization-regimentation thesis. If historical resources for democracy are neutralized, must it be recreated de novo, and, if so, what insures against a simulated totalitarian version? The estimation of liberal democracy is so low that it is hard to imagine the institutional complex that would come after the current one. Such analyses may contribute to the very erosion of legal rights and democracy that they criticize. Still Schmitt-Weber syntheses suggest a deepening legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy and, perhaps, even a postmodern evaporation of the very idea of democracy or blurring of its borders with autocracy that should be addressed.

3. Conclusion: Weber in the US After Postwar Modernization

3.1. Searching for Justice: Is the Normative Project of Modernization Reawakening?

By the late 1980s, even left-leaning thinkers held that a “post-Marxist” era had dawned and that new social movements, failed communism, and triumphant neoliberalism had relegated Marx permanently to the “dustbin of history.” Thus, pundits were caught by surprise when Marx recently won a second straight BBC Radio 4 poll as history’s greatest philosopher. The survey aside, interest in Marx
has been growing for over a decade. (88) His return comes after the postwar era when memory of communist regimes and insurgencies is less vivid and contradictions of the dominant free-market ideology are felt increasingly in daily life. Marx’s writings offer analytical tools and research questions pertinent to the current historical moment. However, the revived interest in his thought likely is animated more by his normative arguments for just distribution of the material means for relieving unnecessary suffering and for activating individual rights and powers. In these neoliberal times, Marx is once again emblematic of a yearning for social justice.

Achieving liberty and equality has been long a central issue in modernization debates, and, for liberal democrats, a normative project of the process. Balancing the two ideals always has been problematic and contested by right and left. In US history, liberty has usually held the upper hand. At certain historical moments, however, equality has been brought to the foreground by left-leaning social movements and reform politics. (89) The Neoliberal policy regime was posed against 1960s, Johnsonian, “Great Society,” social legislation, and was aimed to reverse the long wave of “New Deal,” progressive-liberal, welfare-state social and labor policies. The neoliberal view that economic costs and negative social outcomes of regulation, redistribution, and other social programs outweigh their benefits has been ascendent for nearly three decades. Neoliberals hold that welfare dependence is the main cause of intergenerational poverty. In their view, liberty trumps equality. Neoliberal policymaking and consequent declining unions, falling wages and benefits, increasing job insecurity, eroding social safety-nets, and growing economic inequality and plutocracy manifest the socially disembedded capitalism Marx described. Hurricane Katrina suddenly made the grinding poverty of the poorest people in the richest country visible. Critics of neoliberalism argue that the normative project to secure social justice has been neutralized and that neoliberal globalization exports American-style Social Darwinism to the entire globe.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, post-Marxists attacked Marx’s limited view of civil society and Marxism’s one-sided emphasis on labor movements. However, their celebratory view of the triumph of cultural politics over class politics and new social movements over labor movements were shortsighted at a moment when neoliberal hegemony and economic inequality were rapidly on the rise. Today, antiglobalization politics link culture and class and revive a concern for labor issues. (90) Still sensitized to the importance of civil society and generally adverse to authoritarian centralism, left-leaning movements now operate under the flag of
“democracy” (Claus Offe 1996, pp. 260-61). Democratic aspirations animated the peaceful revolutions in the former communist regimes. Today, they oppose fundamentalist absolutism, sectarian terror, authoritarian security procedures, and cruelty (e.g., children’s rights and animal rights). Democracy discourses suffuse campaigns for minority recognition (e.g., of women, gay and lesbian people, first peoples, ethnic/religious minorities), environmental justice, and economic justice. However, a vague, contested referent, “democracy” also has been deployed to justify neoliberal deregulation, pre-emptive war, torture, and terror. At the end of the postwar era, capitalist development and modernization continue in a more extensive, rapid, disjunctive fashion than ever before; local and regional variants multiply. Complexly entwined with these processes, the future of democracy is hard to envision in a neatly bounded alternative regime. However, the desire for substantive freedom, or real liberty and real equality, is as central as ever to aspirations for progress. Polestars of the past debates, Marx and Weber are themselves embedded in the modernization process and, thus, continue to be a lingua franca for engaging it. However, their deficits with regard to theorizing democracy preclude them from being the guide for this vital facet of the next phase of the big discourse. Neopragmatists hold that neoliberal individualism, postmodernist deconstruction, anti-liberal absolutism cannot come to terms with increased social inequality and eroded social integration from globalization, tribalism, and the post-9/11 climate. They argue that John Dewey’s thought contains vital resources for rethinking democracy, absent in Marx’s and Weber’s views, and offers a deeper, wider vision of the cultural problem of democratization than other theories of the process. Dewey contended that the “human meaning of democracy” is the “realization of human equality and freedom” (Dewey [1934]1989c, p.103). His democratic vision resonates with today’s nascent sensibilities that link economic justice to cultural justice and that counter claims that liberty and equality cannot be meshed. Below I fuse Dewey’s ideas with themes from the progressive-liberal side of Weber’s thought. Antiliberals usually have seen Dewey to be a counterpoint to their positions and, thus, rejected his ideas more emphatically than they did Weber’s thought. Arguing that the problem of democracy cannot be resolved on an abstract level, Dewey aimed to draw attention to the depth of the crisis of democracy and articulate a starting point for thinking critically about alternatives to free-market liberalism and authoritarian centralism. The fusion below is posed in the same spirit, and counters to the already emergent Schmitt-Weber alternative. By contrast
to the other Weber fusions discussed above, the Dewey-Weber fusion is a product of theoretical imagination and speculation about the future, rather than an analysis of neo-Weberian trends. (93)

3.2. The Communication Model Contra Schmitt: A Dewey-Weber Synthesis (94)

In Weber’s lectures on economic history, delivered during his last year and framed in the context of the post-World War I economic crisis, he warned that capitalist society could now be held accountable by the “poorest laborer.” He argued that Smitean arguments about capitalism’s natural harmony of interest, which replaced the Protestant work ethic, were embraced mainly by writers who romanticized the free-market and by economic elites who justified. He held that the working class lack religious consolation for their lowly material station and the misery they suffer in economic crises. Weber said that they see economic inequality through a this-worldly lens, as a condition “that must be changed” (giving rise to the idea of “rational socialism”), (Weber [1927] 1981, pp. 291-92, 369). Although stressing the growing desire for economic justice, Weber did not believe that it could be achieved or, at least, not without great economic costs, much instrumental irrationality, and political repression. In his view, equality would trump liberty. Thus, he stressed, with regret, the triumph of efficiency over substantive freedom and liberty over equality. By contrast, Dewey implied that the tension Weber saw between formal rationality and substantive rationality could be resolved in ways that favor increased substantive freedom and equality. In the midst of the Great Depression, Dewey held that free-market liberty masked unfreedom (e.g., Dewey [1934] 1989b; [1939] 1988e). He rejected the Lockean view of property as a natural right, arguing that it is a social compact that could and should be altered to avert sharp inequalities. Dewey embraced Jefferson’s view that relative economic equality is needed for intelligent citizenship and active political participation. (95)

Most importantly, Dewey’s ideal of radical democracy stresses extending, as widely as possible, the distribution of the cultural and material means for achieving substantive cultural freedom and political freedom as well as economic justice. Following Jefferson, Dewey saw democracy as a “social idea” or a cultural project to create a just and participatory private life and civil society as well as responsive political institutions. For Dewey, democracy must be nurtured in local spaces (e.g., families, schools, workplaces) to cultivate the type of social selves capable of
democratic participation in national and global affairs. He held that Fascism’s, Nazism’s, and Stalinism’s garnering of working class support called for fundamental rethinking of democracy. In his view, liberal political institutions would not survive if they remained demagogic and merely formal.

In the unstable aftermath of World War I, Weber warned about demagogues’ bloody absolute ethics and “psychic proletarianization” of the masses. By contrast, he advocated that leaders take responsibility for outcomes and, in that light, consider means as seriously as ends, evaluate soberly as possible consequences of their rhetoric and policy, and adjust their action accordingly. His ideas of “value neutrality” and “objectivity” call for similar realism and prudence in scientific practices. (96) Weber denied vehemently charges that his views about separation of factual arguments and normative claims endorse relativism and that value freedom means ethical disengagement. His “objectivity” essay portrayed science’s perspectival, value-rooted nature and fluid borders between fact and value (Weber [1904] 1949c, pp. 80-82, 94, 107-12). Conversely to sterile scientism, his position on values and science manifested, at least, in part, his Nietzschean sensibilities about living “without illusions” and facing obdurate realities. (97) He thought that inquiry about factual matters clarifies questions of value and identifies “inconvenient facts,” which, when engaged honestly, generate critical reflexivity about normative aims. He believed that highly differentiated cultural spheres, each rationalized according to its own internal logic, and culturally diverse citizenry preclude ethical consensus in the public sphere. Weber embraced pluralism, however, seeing liberal diversity and value conflict to provide cultural space for autonomous individuality or critical deliberation about one’s life-course and socio-political participation. And he equated absolutist belief with “intellectual sacrifice” or a suspension of critical faculties. Rather than leveling values, Weber held that “scientific” or “objective” standpoints provide means to inform difficult normative choices and are essential to the “trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life” that he declared to be “decisive” in politics. (98) He stressed science’s ethical meaning as much as its instrumental powers. Weber was aware that science serves diverse and sometimes destructive ends, but he still saw it as a vital post-traditional, cultural resource that can provide tools for living, illuminate and moderate political actions, and counter absolutist illiberality. (99)

Paralleling Weber, Dewey held that socio-cultural differentiation forbids a return to traditional authority, except in simulated, authoritarian form. Like Weber, he spoke primarily about the public sphere and civil society. Both theorists acknowledged
that traditional authority is not extinguished in modernity and that it may thrive in domains of private and associational life. Neither theorist treated rationalization and disenchantment as a total leveling process. Dewey saw plural values and value conflicts to generate splits and tensions, but he also held that they can nurture ethical reflexivity and enhanced ability to engage difference (Dewey and Tufts [1932] 1985, pp.162-310). He argued that absolutist normative beliefs preclude deliberation and justify elitism and autocracy. Cold-War era, anti-liberal attacks on his alleged naive optimism and scientism paid little attention to his texts. Dewey declared bankrupt the Enlightenment equation of technical progress with social and political progress, and warned emphatically about democratic institutions’ fragility, authoritarian threats, media propaganda, and failed political vision at home and abroad (Dewey [1939] 1988e, p. 156. See Dewey [1935] 1987; [1927] 1988b; [1929] 1988c; [1929] 1988d; [1939] 1988e; [1939] 1988f). He railed against science’s service to war machines and corporate advertisers, but he held that it is still needed to make complex policy judgments more intelligent and responsible. Engaging Lippmann’s critique of popular sovereignty, he acknowledged the suffusion of expert knowledge and information and rampant media manipulation, but he denied that active citizenship required “omnicompetence.” He held that technical modernity’s expertise and related complexities call forth the need to cultivate critical capacities and intelligent citizenry. (100) Like Weber, Dewey embraced a post-Enlightenment conception of science; its knowledge is uncertain, incomplete, and temporal and thus, is necessarily open to dialogue, contestation, and revision. Both theorists saw consequential knowledge and awareness of science’s limits to be essential facets of a post-traditional ethic of responsibility. By contrast to automatic obedience to tradition or authority, they held that post-Enlightenment science’s uncertainty, discursively-mediated nature, and ideal of open, honest, systematic, uncoerced inquiry has “integrity” in culturally-diverse, post-traditional settings and provides a fundamental resource for liberal-democratic culture and deliberative democracy. From their vantage points, democracy and science are imperfect, convergent historical projects. That these ideals are not often realized in practice, they held, is all the more reason for affirming them. However, Dewey saw value conflict to be less pervasive, intense, and intractable than Weber, and had much higher hopes about creation of collective understandings and substantive democracy. Weber did not theorize the social psychological processes by which people reach normative understandings or forge social integration and, thus, in regard to ultimate values, he does not escape the
“philosophy of the subject.” By contrast, the Dewey-Mead communication model focuses on just these issues. This approach contends that reflexive social integration is rooted in people “taking the attitude of the other” (i.e., “sympathetic placing of themselves in each others roles”), rather than in simple adherence to shared norms or values per se (Mead [1934] 1964 passim; [1922] 1963c, p. 246). Dewey and Mead held that individuals reach understandings and cooperate by imagining themselves in the place of the other emotionally as well as instrumentally, meshing their action accordingly, and modifying it through reciprocal communicative acts. They considered this process to be a matrix from which values and norms originate. They did not equate value judgment and normatively-guided action with application of a norm per se. In their view, values and norms employed reflexively are not commands that orchestrate action, but are cultural means to orient to divergent social situations and share attitudes with diverse others. Rather than mechanical compliance to norms, Dewey and Mead held that reflexive ethical decisions depend on engaging specific conditions of particular situations and choosing and interpreting norms accordingly. By contrast, they considered fundamentalist adherence to norms and rigid application of them to be ethically irresponsible. Finally, their communication model does not presume that social integration requires consensus or shared identity. For example, taking the attitude of others with divergent sexual orientations or ethnicity can forge understandings that resolve conflicts, express respect, and build friendships, while they increase awareness of difference. According to Dewey and Mead, one does not have to embrace the sexual activities, food traditions, or religious beliefs of the other to understand, respect, or cooperate with her or him. They embraced a pluralistic or multicultural vision of democracy in which different ways of life coexist and thrive. Creating and reproducing this type of order, they held, requires effective attitude-sharing, or communication.

Dewey and Mead were cognizant, however, that social conflict is sometimes extremely destructive, mean spirited, and enduring and, thus, is often the source of one-sided, hostile, or even hateful attitude-sharing, which undermines communicative mediation. Moreover, they acknowledged that even effective, fairminded communication cannot resolve all problems and that habit, reification, and coercion will likely endure in cultural reproduction. However, against conservative anti-liberals, they contended that friend-enemy dynamics do not inhere in difference per se. In their view, presupposing that peoples sharing sharply divergent cultures have inherent animosity toward the other and that all bitter
conflicts between them are immune to discursive mediation erects a massive self-fulfilling, culturally-constructed barrier to communication and peaceful, cooperative coexistence. It also denies the empirical reality of the historical settings where diverse cultures have coexisted peacefully. Mead and Dewey held that communicative capacities make possible extension of deliberative democratic processes in local settings, wider voluntary associations, and corporate and public institutions. They also argued that even apparently intractable civilizational barriers are sometimes bridged by communication. They saw modern socio-cultural differentiation and ever wider extension of technical and social means of interchange to multiply differences, erode normative justifications based purely on tradition or authority, and make possible much wider attitude-sharing capacities. Yet they stressed emphatically that attainment of such powers and peaceful cooperation is not automatic and must be cultivated consciously against myriad forms of cultural manipulation, distortion, and conflict. In this light, they would have viewed today’s globalization, with all its contradictory features, to be both a major problem and great opportunity for building communicative capacities.

Against absolutism, Dewey held that shutting down deliberation about norms and values formalizes them, undermining their “spirit” and legitimacy, depleting resources for attitude-sharing, and opening the way for friend-enemy politics. (103) From this perspective, absolutist normative claims are a subterfuge for top-down control favoring authoritarianism, rather than being a prophylactic against it. Dewey held that natural rights theory is a fiction erected originally to support individual autonomy against the tyranny of traditionalist compulsory association and the early-modern absolutist state. He held that laissez-faire individualism had the same root. However, he contended that, today, the two theories justify respectively autocratic state power and unchecked corporate power. Dewey decried demagogic exploitation of friend-enemy dichotomies, which mask an escape from responsibility and favor authoritarianism (1988e, pp. 88-89). By contrast to Schmittean contentions about the incommensurability of culture, futility of dialogue, and need for national homogeneity, Dewey held that a society rich in difference has a larger cultural toolbox of resources for sharing attitudes and, thus, for living, coping with problems, and creating new culture. He thought that promoting openness and even receptivity to difference can forge multicultural social integration. The fragmentation decried by antiliberals, he argued, derives not from diversity per se, but primarily from the failure to achieve substantive equal opportunity and extend substantive liberty widely enough. Building on Jefferson, Dewey held that the fate of democratic
political and legal institutions depend on building a democratic culture that provides individuals cultural acceptance and economic and social means for participation. (104) He argued that the lack of cultural freedom weakens the vitality of political democracy and paves the way for autocracy. In his view, democratization of local social relations and civil society - the space where people lead their daily lives - is essential to substantive democratization and active citizenship. Dewey and Mead stressed the importance of voluntary association; they saw its patterns to be a formative force in constituting the self and linking the individual and society and citizen and state. (105) This theme builds on ideas that go back to Jefferson and Tocqueville, were stressed by Durkheim (“professional” or “intermediate”groups), later became a central focus of American sociology (studies of “secondary groups” or “voluntary associations”), and are still central to current debates over the state of American democracy. (106) Dewey and Weber diverged on many points. Referring to democratic citizenry, they employed the same metaphor; that “one does not have to be a shoemaker to know if the shoe fits” (Weber [1921] 1968, pp. 1456-7; Dewey [1927] 1968, p. 364-65). Weber applied the phrase to qualify his warnings about abuses of plebiscitary politics, while Dewey used it to call on theorists to engage “the problem of the public”- to improve or democratize “the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion” and fashion a more participatory, inclusive democracy. Weber expressed grave doubts about the prospects for establishment of sufficient agreement and mediation of conflictive interests to advance social justice, but, like Dewey, he embraced liberal democracy and warned that it would be in peril if such progress is not achieved. A Dewey-Weber fusion would address this unresolved tension in Weber’s thought. Weber’s work has more sociological depth than Dewey’s corpus, offering better tools to detect structural and institutional blockages to democratization and distinguish plausible possibilities for stronger democratization from wistful hopes about it. However, Dewey saw democracy as a work in progress with no endpoint, dependent on variable cultural conditions and historical contingencies. He implied that the democratization process needs to be informed by the types of tough-minded cultural science and policy analysis that Weber called for. In Dewey’s view, treating democracy as a utopian endpoint sets an impossible standard that denies democratic ideals incremental advancement and that creates fertile conditions for claims about exhaustion and autocratic solutions. Dewey and Weber embraced convergent historicist views, which antiliberal, natural rights theorists and pessimistic critical theorists assert pave the way for nihilism,
fascism, and communism. From a Dewey-Weber standpoint, antiliberal critics’ absolutist, formalist, and decisionist “alternatives” cultivate the very problems that they attribute to historicism and their homogenization-regimentation theses reflect distorted political vision, rooted in their “quest for certainty,” rather than actual exhaustion of the historical process.

4. Postscript: Rupture, Theory, and Reconstruction

It will not be long before new peoples shall arise and new springs rush down into the depths... The earthquake reveals new springs. Nietzsche (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) Dewey feared that liberal democracy was too thinly institutionalized, or not yet embedded deeply enough in people’s beliefs and habits, to withstand the global economic crisis and grave authoritarian threats of the 1930s. He warned that liberal institutions were unsustainable if they were reduced to formal legal rights, occasional votes, and consumer freedom for those who could afford it. Liberal democracy’s survival, he held, depends on forging a “fighting liberalism” that embraces and extends substantive freedom (Dewey [1927]1988b; [1929] 1988d; [1935] 1987; [1939] 1988e). He saw the project of democratization to be a matter of practical politics and active agency. But he held that such efforts must be “intelligent” and, therefore, include a theoretical moment. He stressed especially the need to engage and debunk self-fulfilling ideological assumptions and claims, which block cultural and political vision or the ability to formulate democratic alternatives and to steel the will to pursue them against tough opposition. Dewey believed that the deep crises of his time made people receptive to new political visions. He advocated a fundamental rethinking of democracy, or what he saw as an effort to recover and reconstruct the suppressed “spiritual” side of the American tradition. (107)

We likely live on the verge of a moment of rupture. The return of Schmitt and antiliberal politics already suggest the start of a seismic shift in cultural and political vision. Today, the range of new cultural and political alternatives is not yet clear in the postwar era’s fading twilight, but its sharper outline may be a crisis away. Dark possibilities already loom on the American horizon in the wake of several decades of neoliberal policy, the Iraq War and War on Terror, and Hurricane Katrina’s human and material wreckage. Dewey’s type of radical democratic sensibilities are embedded in US political culture and have erupted, in times past, into social
movements and policy regimes, which have made American democracy more inclusive (Dewey 1988e and Foner 1998). While interest in Dewey has grown, it is an open question whether his vision will return to US politics. A key facet of his thought has strong affinity for views manifested in the aforementioned “return of Marx” and other signs of a revived search for justice. In the shadow of the Great Depression and Nazi and Fascist threat, Dewey attacked the Liberty League’s reduction of democracy to capitalism and liberty to free-markets and property rights, He declared:

Let radicals make clear that an infinitely greater amount of real liberty is possible than our present system provides for. Let them make clear that they are the ones who would extend the liberties that our forefathers fought till they include all members of society and until every normal human being has the opportunity to develop to the full, in peace and security, the capacities with which [she and] he is naturally endowed. Regiment things and free human beings. Regiment machines and money and other inanimate things, and give liberty to human beings (Dewey [1934] 1989b, p 90).

This ideal of substantive equal opportunity has deep historical roots and lives in American self-identity; most middle-class Americans like to think that it has already been realized. We want to believe that our culture is just and that personal success and status are earned through our own individual efforts in fair competition (108). However, this cherished ideal has long been in conflict with the society’s chief ideological and lived forms of liberty and consequent inequalities. Equality remains an unfulfilled project of American modernization. Will its time ever come?

Concluding the “objectivity” essay, Weber held that in an “age of specialization” social researchers would focus on routine work and be oblivious to its “rootedness” in “ultimate value ideas.” He said that the “analysis of the data” would become an “end in itself.” “But,” he added: there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes. The significance of the unreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight. The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then science too prepares to change its standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought”(Weber [1904] 1949, p. 112). Weber implied that sweeping social change makes problematic the normative and analytical presuppositions of taken for granted routine in science and the broader culture. He was likely pondering the motivation of his own query into “objectivity.” His generation reformulated social thought in response to the sudden rise of mechanized, urban, secular capitalism and, later, to
World War I, when modernization was awry. Dewey, Mills, Gouldner, and others have since held that “social theorists” should reflect on the directions of science and society in stable times as well as in moments of rupture. The various Weber fusions, discussed above, engaged modernization theory - arguably the postwar era’s primary metanarrative for legitimating and challenging liberal democracy. Multiple waves of homogenization-regimentation theses express uncertainties inhering in modernization theorists’ hopes and fears about progress. Long-term concerns aside, however, global economic, geopolitical, and cultural changes and catastrophic threats or risks (e.g., global warming, resource depletion, and terror) have ended the postwar conjuncture and might call forth the type of fundamental critical reflection of which Weber spoke and, perhaps, a day of reckoning that will reawaken more broadly the sense of justice.

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Notes

(1) Thanks to Ira Cohen, Steve Kalberg, Bob Kent, Hal Orbach, Larry Scaff, Sandro Segre, and David Smith for their critical readings and good suggestions. Thanks to Pasquale Carraciolo for instruction on things Nietzschean. While their criticism helped the essay, it would have been stronger had I been able to carry out all their suggestions. Any mistakes are mine.

(2) This essay focuses on Weber in the postwar US, but national borders and intellectual boundaries are fluid. Shifts in Weber interpretation, originating in non-English speaking parts of the world, often reach the US, where they are interpreted through an American lens. Also, some of the shifts discussed below originated from other English speaking countries, especially the United Kingdom. Emphasis will be on their meaning in the American context. Occasionally, “North American” is used to remind readers that these trends often spread across the continent.

Since the initial publication, Parsons’ translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* has been standard, assigned reading in many sociological theory classes. The accuracy of the translation has been contested (e.g., see Scaff 2005a; Kalberg 2001a), but it is still in print, with an introduction by Anthony Giddens (Weber 2001). Two new translations, based on different versions of the German original, have been published (Weber 2002a and 2002b). On the relevance of the work and long debate over it, see Lehmann and Roth 1995

the postwar view of Weber. See Parsons 1980, on his encounter with Weber’s thought.

(6) See e.g., Parsons 1951, p. 368. Parsons (e.g., 1971, p. 7) expressed his debt to Weber in quasi-Durkeheimian arguments about “pattern maintenance” and normative integration. Parsons argued that Weber started out as a materialist, convergent with Marx, but after Weber’s nervous breakdown and at the start of his work on ascetic Protestantism, Parsons held, he forged an “anti-Marxian interpretation” of modern capitalism. Parsons claimed that Weber’s methodological shift to explaining capitalism by its “system of values and value attitudes,” was “a direct polemical challenge to the Marxian type of explanation” ([1937] 1968 pp. 503, 510). He held that Weber’s mature work and bulk of his corpus was inspired by this “Parsonsian” turn.


(8) Parsons held that postwar US leaders deployed power to serve system integration and its functional operation, rather than to exert “power over” others. Although overstating coercion in modern organizations, Parsons held, Weber recognized the fundamental role of technical competence and professional expertise and, thus, anticipated the ascendancy of collegial decision-making over top-down operations. See Parsons 1947, pp 58-60, note 4; 1947, pp. 131, note 59,152, note 83; 1960b, pp. 41-44, 182, 219-21; 1971, 116-21. See Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope, on “De-Parsonizing Weber.” In these organizations, Parsons held, professionals were the hardest workers and the working class was the “leisure class.” See Parsons 1971, pp. 105-6, 112, 133; Antonio 1984.

(9) Favorable references to Weber are scattered throughout Parsons (1951) postwar tome, *The Social System*, which is the most comprehensive statement of his structural-functionalism. Parsons (1964) also claimed that his later “evolutionary universals” argument was inspired by Weber. Parsons was aware of Weber’s scathing criticism of theories of evolutionary progress. However, Parsons held that Weber leaned toward a systemic or organicist theory of society even though he objected strenuously to this view on methodological grounds (Parsons 1947, pp. 18-25). Parsons argued that his own evolutionary views were consistent with the “spirit” of Weber’s work; i.e., following in the tracks of his alleged belief in the “universal significance” of Western civilization and “general pattern of human social evolution” (Parsons 1971, pp. 2-3, 139).
See Godfrey Hodgson’s (1978, pp. 67-98) succinct yet comprehensive portrayal of the of “the ideology of liberal consensus” and its key proponents.

(11) See Mills [1943] 2000a, p 53. He was referring to a section from Weber’s *Economy and Society* ([1921] 1968) on Class and Status-Groups. Gerth’s and Mills’ translation appeared first in the journal *Politics* ([1921] 1944) and later in their collection (Weber 1946a, pp. 180-95).

(12) Compare Gerth’s and Mills’ (1946, pp. 61-65) argument about the role of ideas and interests in Weber’s thought with Parsons’ autonomous view of culture (e.g., 1971, pp. 1-28)

(13) Gerth’s and Mills’ interpretation was a more accurate rendering of Weber than Parsons’ views, but it also a selective or one-sided view and was not free of translation problems. By the 1950s other English-language works offered different alternatives to the Parsons’ Weber (e.g., see Hughes [1958] 1977, passim). On translation problems, see Roth 1992.

(14) Mills was critical of the US and USSR. See especially, his *The Causes of World War Three* (1958), where he discussed the rise of the “permanent war economy,” and *Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba* (1960).

(15) In a Guggenheim Fellowship application, Mills (2000b, p. 79) portrayed his intellectual roots: “In sociology my main impulse has been taken from German developments, especially the traditions stemming from Max Weber and, to a lesser degree, Karl Mannheim.” Mills’ analytical separation of political power and class converged with Weberian sociology, but, in a critical exchange, he explained his admiration for Marx: “I happen never to have been what is called ‘a Marxist,’ but I believe Karl Marx one of the most astute students of society modern civilization has ever produced; his work is now essential equipment of any adequately trained social scientist as well as any properly educated person. Those who say they hear Marxian echoes in my work are saying that I have trained myself well. That they do not intend this testifies to their own lack of proper education” (Mills [1957] 2000c, p. 237) See e.g., Mills 1951; 1956; 1958; 1963; and Gerth and Mills 1953. On Mills and Weber, see Tillman 1984, pp. 42-50; Aronowitz 2003.

(16) Weber’s so-called “despairing liberalism” is often associated with Nietzschean facets of his work. Poignant references to Nietzsche are scattered in his corpus. He is supposed to have said that the “honesty of a contemporary scholar” can be judged by his or her “stand in relation to Nietzsche and Marx.” (Scaff 1989, p. 6). On Nietzsche and Weber, see e.g., Eden 1982; 1983; 1987; Schroeder 1987; Warren 1988; Hennis 1988; Mommsen 1989; Scaff 1989; Treiber, 1995.
Quoted in Marianne Weber [1926] 1975, p. 293. Lawrence Scaff (2005b, p. 64) explains that the meaning of the quote is blurred a bit by lines that she omitted. He holds that Max Weber’s point was more subtle and qualified than the antimodern or anticapitalist tone of this fragment. However, homogenization-regimentation theorists also tend to see Weber’s comments about the leveling force of instrumental rationalization in isolation from other facets of his work or to ignore qualifications, which moderate or condition his views about the process. See Kalberg 1980; 2001b; 2005, for a balanced view of the complexities of Weber’s theory of rationalization and bureaucratization and his related conception of “iron cage.”

According to Weber, “monocratic” or “fully developed” bureaucracy is modern capitalism’s dominant, formal organizational type. He stressed its machine-like character, dehumanized activity, calculative emphasis, narrow specialization, and top-down domination. In his view, the single head fixes ultimate responsibility at the top, and makes possible quick, unambiguous, decisive moves with regard to important matters and crises ([1921] 1946d). Weber saw science to be a legitimate, major arbiter of modern public culture, but he also held that it contributes to “devastating senselessness” – it cannot answer fundamental normative questions about the direction of individual life or social policy or “Which of the warring gods shall we serve.” See Weber [1919] 1946b; [1919], 1946c; [1915] 1946f, pp. 350-57.

The homogenization-regimentation thesis has been expressed by diverse thinkers, including liberals. For example, compare the accounts of American “mass society” by Weber-influenced Daniel Bell, a culturally-conservative liberal ([1960] 1988, pp. 21-38) and by anti-liberal Weber critic Leo Strauss’ ([1968] 1995, pp. 260-72). For criticism of one-sided views of Weber, including the anti-liberal versions, see e.g., Roth 1965; 1975; Weiss 1987.

Not all facets of “anti-liberal” theorists’ social thought and political views are anti-liberal. Different theorists stress the exhaustion of liberalism in varying degrees, and their theories and overall corpora often combine anti-liberal with liberal elements.

Gunnell (1988, p. 73) held that these anti-liberal critics (e.g., Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, Hans Morganthau, Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, Franz Neumann, Arnold Brecht, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse) posed “the thesis that liberalism, either inherently or because of its degenerate condition, was at the core of a modern crisis and implicated in the rise of totalitarianism.” See also Gunnell
1993. Recall, however, my qualification that not all facets these thinkers’ thought and political views were anti-liberal. My focus is on the homogenization-regimentation thesis, which the theorists employed in varying degrees. 

(22) Earlier German speaking thinkers also contributed substantially to anti-liberal currents. For example, Nietzsche had an enormous, multisided impact on them, and Simmel’s arguments about the leveling and relativizing force of money and consequent growing “tragedy of culture” influenced younger scholars (e.g., Lukács). Weimar era thinkers, such as Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, and Martin Heidegger, contributed directly and substantially to anti-liberal views.

(23) Bloom’s view of Weber was likely influenced heavily by his antiliberal, émigré mentor Leo Strauss’s critique. See Bloom 1987, pp. 147-51 and Horkheimer [1947] 1974, p. 81.

(24) Some of these thinkers saw Weber-influenced Karl Mannheim’s views about ideology, scientific politics and planning and, especially, his relativistic sociology of knowledge to be an influential carrier of these Weberian themes (e.g., Adorno 1981, pp, 37-49). See Mannheim [1936] 1955. Mannheim’s optimistic views about postwar reconstruction paralleled those of Dewey, but tended to be more socially conservative. See Mannheim 1950, especially footnotes on pp. 52, 206, 222; Gunnell 1982, pp. 395-96. See Baehr 2002, for commentary on Hannah Arendt’s critical analysis of relativistic sociology and totalitarianism, and Parvikko 2004, for discussion of Max Weber’s impact on her thought.

(25) Strauss ([1950] 1965, p.48) criticized Weber’s “noble nihilism,” or allegedly misguided belief that “intellectual honesty” and preference for “human freedom” dictate acknowledgment of the “baseless character” of noble ideals or “objective norms” (i.e., absolute truths).

(26) Strauss’s and Voegelin’s approaches have some affinity for Thomist philosophy, which admonishes ethical individualism and calls for strict adherence to Catholic dogma. Thomists usually do not embrace Strauss and Voegelin, but they see them as allies in the fight against relativism and share their critical view of Weber as a leveler of values. See e.g., Midgley 1983. On Strauss’ and Voegelin’s reading of Weber, see Gunnell 2004. See McDaniel 1998, for analysis of Strauss’ view of inequality and an argument that he stops short of anti-liberalism. Like Weber, Strauss argued that modern secular people try to “escape into the self and art.” However, Strauss held that such flight is a denial or flight from true values and from legitimate moral authority. He declared that “the self... does not defer to anything higher”and its autonomy today is a source confusion and
despair” (Strauss 1968, p. 261).

(27) Nietzsche also had a relatively independent influence on Strauss and Voegelin. They criticized Nietzsche as the master philosopher of nihilism, but they lauded his recognition of it as a profound crisis of modernity and converged with his view that philosophical leadership was needed to fashion a new civilization. Voegelin’s Platonist quasi-Catholic thrust otherwise departed Nietzsche. By contrast, strong Nietzschean taints are manifested in Strauss’ points about “exoteric writing” (or “writing in between the lines”) and the “noble lie,” which imply that his embrace of objective value was strategic; aimed at empowering the “wise” or a philosophic elite capable of grasping the dangers of liberalism, cultivating belief and obedience among the “vulgar.” and, thus, securing and perpetuating western culture’s highest values. However, Strauss’ hoped-for disciplinary regime contradicted Nietzsche’s vision of a post-traditional, aesthetic-centered culture. See Strauss [1952] 1988, pp. 22-37; Gunnell 1978. Strauss spoke of Nietzsche and Marx, exemplar figures of modernity’s “third wave,” as the culmination of its nihilistic tendencies and root of fascism and communism. Strauss held that the triumph of Marxist egalitarianism would produce a future characterized by the well-fed, comfortable, Nietzschean “last-man” - “the lowest and most decayed man, the herd man without any ideals or aspirations...” A defense of the superiority of liberal democracy, Strauss held, requires support from “the premodern thought of our western tradition.” See e.g., Strauss 1989a, pp. 97; [1968] 1995, pp. 270-72; 1989b, pp. 3-26; Voegelin [1952] 1966, pp. 162-89.


(29) On the Frankfurt School’s fusion of Nietzschean and Weberian themes, see e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 1972; Marcuse [1955] 1966; Kellner 1985. Critical theorists believed that these normative resources could be derived by analyzing capitalism’s structural contradictions, its unfulfilled, universal ideological claims (e.g., about freedom, equality, justice, and plenty), and possible, nascent, or existent social movements that seek to realize such claims. See Benhabib 1986; Antonio 1981.

(30) For example, Marcuse ([1955] 1966) made a Nietzschean-Weberian aesthetic turn to the body and sexuality. Favoring utopian vision, he countered his pessimism and encouraged left radicalism. He had a formative influence on 1960s and 1970s alternative culture and antiwar politics (i.e., thinkers who proposed new political alliances between alienated youth, people of color, and the Third World poor). However, Nietzsche-Weber fusions and their homogenization-regimentation theses
had divergent liberal directions as well. For example, second-generation Frankfurt theorist, Jürgen Habermas stressed cultural exhaustion; he stated: “bourgeois ideals have gone into retirement, there are no norms and values to which an immanent critique might appeal [with the expectation of] agreement. On the other hand, the melodies of ethical socialism have been played through without result” (1979, p. 97). However, his doubts about historicism did not cause him to embrace purely negative criticism or abandon liberalism. Rather, he framed a quasi-transcendental or nonhistorical “communicative ethics,” which he employed to defend aggressively liberal democracy. The pessimistic threads in his thought were countered by his engagement with liberals, such as Mead, Parsons, and Durkheim.

(31) For example, Eric Fromm did not stress the homogenization-regimentation thesis nearly as strongly as Horkheimer and Adorno. Also, Horkheimer and Adorno contributed to the Frankfurt School studies on authority, anti-Semitism, and authoritarianism, which had a liberal-democratic thrust and were criticized later for their “liberal bias.” Frankfurt School theorists were repulsed by many important features of existent liberal democracies, but they did not reject its institutions in principle or in toto. By contrast to Strauss and Voegelin, they did not take anti-modern stances, which broke with the modern ideals of liberty, equality, and democracy. Most of them remained left-leaning, modern social theorists.

(32) Schmitt exerted substantial influence on Strauss and on various other major postwar thinkers (e.g., Hans Morgenthau and Samuel Huntington). See McCormick 1998. Schmitt’s Nietzsche-Weber fusion and “friend-enemy” dichotomy, which will discussed below, provided a theoretical basis for convergent anti-communism and anti-liberalism.


(34) Strauss’ (1989b, pp. 41-46) discussion of Heidegger’s fears about the possible rise of US- and Russian-led global technocracy, or “night of the world,” offers insight into the extreme Heideggerian regimentation-homogenization thesis. Strauss said that he was first impressed with Weber. However, after engaging Heidegger, he declared, “Weber appeared to me as an ‘orphan child’ in regard to precision and probing and competence” (Strauss 1988, pp. 27-8). Strauss drew inspiration from Heidegger, but Weberian threads are still evident in Straussian thought.

(35) See Gouldner 1970, pp. vii. The antiwar movement, campus revolts, counterculture, assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, street
protests and police violence at the Chicago Democratic Convention, and New-Left revolutionary rhetoric neutralized what remained of the early postwar, liberal consensus. Centrist and right-wing politicians spoke of a breakdown of “law and order,” and left-liberal sociologists stressed major structural crises and fundamental social and political shifts (e.g., Perrucci and Pilisuk 1968; Skolnick and Currie 1970). Divisions over race, the Vietnam War, and counterculture animated generational and ideological splits in US sociology. Sociologists pitted scientific sociology against politically engaged sociology. They also began to envision a multiperspectival or multiparadigm discipline; a Weber-influenced view that different theories have divergent normative content and distinctive lenses, which illuminate different facets of a pluralistic, conflictive social order. See Ritzer 1975.

(36) Giddens’ contended that Marx, Durkheim, and Weber engaged incisively capitalist modernity, framing issues and formulating concepts that are still relevant for today’s capitalism. In the 1970s, many theorists argued that the work of these three classical theorists illuminate the roots of contemporary theoretical splits and the historical contexts that generated them. This alleged “holy trinity” became the core theoretical canon of 1970s American sociological theory. Even introductory textbooks often began with brief portraits of them, holding that their ideas were a major source of contemporary paradigmatic and ideological splits.

(37) By the early-1950s, mainstream, American sociologists had rejected the idea of using the classics to analyze contemporary society and, especially, of treating them as a model for creation of new theory. The dominant view was that the classics are a good source of hypotheses and ideas, but that the style of work (i.e., “armchair” speculation) is passé and its decline as a practice marks sociology’s scientific progress. “Scientific” theorists wanted broader theories to be “objective” or be based strictly on empirical “middle-range” theories and related sociological research. See Merton 1957, pp. 3-16, 85-117. For an opposing view that inspired the critics, see Mills 1961, pp. 143-76. During the 1970s classical theory revival, however, the majority and, perhaps, even the vast majority of American sociologists (e.g., specialized researchers and scientific theorists) still saw classical theory to be moribund and ignored it in their work.

(38) Weberian-influenced theories contributed substantially to the functionalism-conflict debate, which raged in American sociology from the mid-1960s to the early-1970s. See e.g., Demerath and Peterson 1967. On Weberian conflict theory, see Collins 1975; 1979. Irving Zeitlin’s (1968) theory textbook, which interpreted classical theory as a debate with “Marx’s ghost” was widely read by sociologists. On


(40) This extremely important translation was republished again in 1978 by the University of California Press. The two volume paperback version was acquired by many.

(41) Roth (1977) held that Bendix’s work expressed Weber’s approach comprehensively and accurately and, therefore, demonstrating shortcomings of Parsons’ Weber and of the various political readings of Weber. See also Roth’s (1968) lengthy introduction to Economy and Society, where he asserted that he intended simply to supplement Bendix’s work.


(43) Increasingly, social theorists operated at the margins of the disciplines in which they earned their degrees and were employed. Rather than focusing on specialized work in their disciplinary fields, they read and engaged largely the work of other similarly located social theorists. On social theory’s independence from disciplinary work, see Stephen Turner 2004.


(45) The seeds of this approach are visible in his early work; see Gouldner 1950, pp. 6-9, 53-66, 644-59. Gouldner cited, and likely was influenced by Gerth’s and
Mills’ Weber collection.

(46) Gouldner’s project included his trilogy, or *The Dark Side of the Dialectic*, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* ([1976] 1982a); *The Future of Intellectuals and The Rise of the New Class* ([1979] 1982b); and *The Two Marxisms* ([1980] 1982c) and his posthumously published *Against Fragmentation* (1985). His earlier *Enter Plato* (1965) and *The Coming Crisis of Sociology* (1970) set the stage for this project. A final volume was said to be ready for publication, but did not appear. For analysis of Gouldner’s project, see Antonio 2005b.

1 Gouldner implied that post-traditional normative arguments should have a sociological moment, deploying empirical-historical knowledge in claims about the consequences of value-oriented positions and actions. Moral principle does not disappear from such arguments, but it is historicized and emphasis on consequences replaces justification on the basis of authority per se.


(48) Gouldner was loosely associated with *Telos*. He was not officially part of the staff, but he interacted with the editors and was friendly with chief editor, Piccone. Gouldner taught at Washington University (St. Louis), where the journal was housed and where Piccone taught, until he was denied tenure. Piccone criticized Gouldner (especially his positive view of sociology), but considered him an ally. However, Habermas had a much greater presence than Gouldner in the pages of the journal and in debates among its editors and regular contributors. Habermas stopped publishing in *Telos* after a nasty exchange with Piccone over the disposition of an article that he submitted to the journal. Yet the source of the split between the two theorists was their sharp intellectual and political differences. Piccone and his inner circle held that Habermas’ linguistic turn to “discourse ethics” departed critical theory for conformist, neo-Kantian liberalism.

(49) See especially, Piccone 1977; 1978; Luke 1978. However, the same currents could be found easily in a perusal of *Telos* throughout the middle and later 1970s. Piccone claimed that liberal-left Democratic Party officials, welfare-state functionaries, educators, social movement leaders, and their professional-class allies were an hegemonic elite that shaped US social and political policy. The New Class thesis was shared by neoconservatives, was deployed centrally by right-wing think tanks, and became a mantra of the Republican Party. By contrast, Gouldner employed the same concept, but held that this stratum, regardless of its
contradictory facets, had emancipatory potential and is the last best hope for the left.

(50) The ascendance of Piccone’s views, sharp attacks on Habermas, and drift toward populism led Telos’ Habermasian wing to break with the journal in the early-1980s. However, Weber still had an obvious, albeit usually tacit, presence in Telos’ pervasive debates over rationalization, disenchantment, and bureaucratization, which remained central even after the journal staff severed its ties with critical theory and veered toward anti-liberal populism. See Telos 78 (Winter 1988-89) for a symposium and special section on Weber.

(51) Ferry and Renaut (1990, pp. 168) stated: “Bourdieu’s position still explicitly calls for a ‘generalized materialism,’ which it is true, he defines by bringing together both Marx and Weber.” See e.g., Bourdieu 1993, pp. 176-191; 1973; 1987.

(52) Berger’s and Luckmann’s (1966) analysis of reality construction processes employed analytical themes from Marx’s thought and was later embraced, to Berger’s displeasure, by some left-leaning social constructionists. Horowitz’s Transaction Publishers remains a leading outlet for Weberian works.

(53) David Smith suggested that I address these thinkers, and they deserve more thorough attention than can be provided here. See Nisbet, e.g., 1966; 1975; Berger, e.g.1967; 1970; 1977; 1986; 1990; 1992a; 2004; Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1974; See Berger 1992b and Horowitz 1993, on the decomposition of sociology and of progressive liberalism. See Lasch e.g., 1977; 1979; 1984; 1991; 1996; and Sennett [1974] 1992. Daniel Bell (1976) also contributed centrally to this stream of criticism, but his work will be discussed in the next section. These thinkers contributed to a broader wave of cultural criticism, stressing the eroded American work ethic, depleted Puritan character, and overall US cultural and political exhaustion. They resurrected parallel Cold War era cultural insecurities in a new historical context (see Ehrenreich 1990). In Lasch’s later works, his positions on populism, tradition, political exhaustion, and the New Class converged with Piccone’s views. Piccone dedicated an issue of Telos to Lasch’s passing (Piccone 1993; Jacoby 1993). Lasch (1991) attacked the liberal ideal of progress and cultural-left elitism, and analyzed sympathetically works of the conservative critics discussed in this section. However, he maintained that he remained on the left in regard to economic issues (i.e., holding that democracy requires “equal access to the means of competence”) and that he did not gravitate to the New Right (Lasch 1995, p. 88; Brawer and Benvenuto 1993).
Many sociological works on the Marx-Weber connection were published in the mid- and late-1980s, but the peak, critical intellectual force of this theme had already passed.


Nietzsche’s ideas had a formative impact on the Weimar era cultural climate; often they were not cited or mentioned directly, but they were “in the air” and exerted a major influence on the new wave of modernization critics and later theorists who followed in their tracks. Similarly, Weber’s ideas have been so central to the modernization debate and so culturally diffused that they too have exerted major tacit influence on modernity-postmodernity discourses. See Hughes [1958] 1977, p. 34 and passim; Habermas 1987b, pp. 1-4 and passim; on Nietzsche and Weber, see Schroeder 1987; on the roots of the Nietzsche-Weber fusion and on its original intellectual and cultural contexts, see Scaff 1989; Antonio 1995; Safranski 1998; 2002.

Habermas (1987b, pp. 211-42) held that Bataille’s earlier engagement of Weber and deployment of Weberian ideas in radical cultural criticism, likely influenced Foucault’s generation. On Weber and Foucault, see Gordon 1987; Whimster 1995. Depending on the disciplinary background, some North American postmodernists read directly Nietzsche and Weber. However, they seldom addressed their texts closely.

However, Gane presented Weber’s views carefully and mostly sympathetically, and supported continued engagement between Weberian theory and postmodernist thought.

Following Baudrillard, Bogart held that, in the absence of its simulated opposition, the postmodern system of control would implode from indifference and boredom. Bogart 1996, pp 179-83 and passim; Baudrillard 1983, pp. 77-104 and passim; 1987, pp. 97-101 and passim.

Bauman ([1989] 2000) made many direct references to Weber as the theorist who expressed most compellingly modernity’s bureaucratic formalism and, to some
degree, justified it. Bauman’s argument countered Daniel J. Goldhagen’s much debated view that the Holocaust originated strictly from widespread German hatred of Jews (Bauman 2000, pp. 222-50). Ira Cohen drew my attention to Weber’s role in the ongoing Holocaust debate. However, this important matter deserves more attention than can be given it here.

(61) On the need to reconstruct Marxist theory to take account of postmodern culture, see Harvey 1989, pp. 343-59; Jameson 1984, pp. 77-92. Harvey held that Weber and Nietzsche anticipated postmodernism. He stated: “If Weber’s ‘sober warning’ reads like the epitaph of Enlightenment reason, then Nietzsche’s earlier attack upon its very premises must surely be regarded as its nemesis” (1989, p. 15). See Jameson 2002, pp. 31-2.

(62) Postmodernism’s “antidisciplinary” or “multicultural” politics helped fuel the intense culture war between the cultural left and neoconservatives, manifested recently in heated battles over Jacques Derrida’s legacy in the media reportage of his death. His supporters portrayed him as a cultural genius, while critics described him as a culture destroyer. See Antonio 2005a.

(63) This type of tacit convergence also appears in Bell’s critique of postmodernism. Both theorists deploy Nietzschean themes against what they portray as Nietzschean cultural trends.

(64) Fukuyama saw Weber’s rationalization theory to be “despairing and pessimistic” - a “nightmare of a rational and bureaucratized tyranny.” He implied that Parsons’ Weber fit better postwar, liberal society than Weber’s original theory. See Fukuyama 1992, pp. 68-70, 90.

(65) Fukuyama saw economically-centered modernization theory to be incomplete and in need of cultural support. Although highly optimistic about US neoliberalism, he still subscribed, in part, to homogenization-regimentation theory. Although more moderately than Bell and Strauss, he acknowledged the limits of consumerism and economic individualism. Fukuyama held that Weber’s work on Protestantism confirms that religion can be harmonized with capitalism (1992, 226-34). Broader Nietzschean-Weberian themes inform Fukuyama’s overall discussion, bearing the imprint of his engagement with Strauss (and Strauss’s friend Alexandre Kojève). On the Nietzschean elements, see Fukuyama 1992, pp. 211-34, 287-339. See Fukuyama 1996, for extended discussion of neoliberalism’s need for cultural support or embeddedness.

(66) See Titunik 1997 for a critique of this type of Weber application; See Bobbio 1996 and Antonio 1998 on 1990s “ endings discourses.”

In the later 20th century US, Adam Smith, has tended to be reinterpreted and radicalized through the lens of Austrian economic theory. Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Heyak’s work has had major influence in neoconservative circles and on broader arguments about the need to roll back state regulation. Milton Friedman has also shaped these views. But Weber was a critic of Austrian economics and libertarianism. For a libertarian critique of Weber, see Anderson 2004.

Full citizenship in Friedman’s deregulated, market-dominated democracy requires participation in stock-market and financial trading. The extent of participation depends on how much an individual owns and invests. Friedman held that the neoliberal regime accelerates vastly the creation of wealth and that its benefits, although very highly concentrated, trickle down to almost everyone. On the 1990s phase of globalization, see Antonio and Bonanno 2000.

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Ritzer’s postmodern points about re-enchantment, simulation, hybridity are developed more comprehensively in the later versions of his McDonaldization thesis and in his works on consumption and globalization. See Ritzer 1995; [1993] 2004a; 2004b; [1999] 2005.

As stated above, however, Weber’s ideas are embedded in modernization discourses and are often implicit in globalization debates, especially in arguments about its continuities with and departures from modernity. Yet Weber’s impact should not be exaggerated. It is often indirect and hard to trace, and it is not present in all globalization discourse.

Castells (1996; 1997; 1998) mapped technical-economic, organizational, political, and cultural transformations, and addressed regional differences as well as overall trends. His hefty three volume work has affinity for Harvey’s (1989) earlier globalization study and Marx-Weber synthesis. By contrast to Harvey, however

(73) On Weber, see Castells 1996: 195-200. Castells engaged Marxism seriously in his earlier work, and traces of Marx’s ideas appear in his discussion of globalization. For example, Castells’ vision of “information capitalism” parallels Marx’s view that science and technology would reduce greatly “living labor’s” role and drive overall development in advanced capitalism.

(74) For a discussion of the varieties of globalization discourses and divergent stances over the role of capitalism and the state, see e.g., Held et al 1999, pp. 1-31 and passim.


(77) However, Huntington implied that the religious roots of divergent civilizations exert a more singular causal force than Weber ever suggested. Moreover, Huntington did not execute Weber’s type of detailed historical analysis of the various religious threads that traced their connections to divergent causal factors.

(78) Huntington implied that China is becoming the US’ main enemy; he claimed that its leadership already views the US as its principal enemy, it has the economic and military power to resist US aims, and it will likely be the world’s top economy in fifty years. By contrast, he held that relations between the West and the Muslim would become less conflictive, as the population ages and other demographic pressures diminish, in the long term [1997, pp. 118-21, 232].

is limited and distorted by symbolic politics and “manufactured consent” and that elite decision-making is inevitable. Lippmann advocated the increased role of experts, which parallels Turner’s rule by commission.

(80) Some and perhaps many persons in the Republican foreign policy network, especially those associated with neoconservative think tanks and organizations, such as the “Project for a New American Century,” have, at least, some knowledge of Strauss and Schmitt and express themes rooted in their theories. However, these threads are often hard to trace. On Schmitt and Strauss, see Strauss [1932] 1996; Drury 1997, pp. 65-96; On Schmitt’s and Strauss’ relation to US neoconservatism, see Drury 1997; McCormick 1997; and Norton 2004. For criticisms of left-leaning claims about Schmitt’s impact on American conservatism and neoconservatism, see Piccone and Ulmen 2002 and Bendersky 2002. On the neoconservative critique of liberal modernity and consequent vision of international relations, see Williams 2005.

(81) Taints of this dynamic appear in popular works such as Barber’s *Jihad versus McWorld* (1996) and Friedman’s *Lexus and the Olive Tree* (2000).

(82) A group of wealthy liberals announced recently that they will fund development of opposition Democratic think tanks to counter the Republican attacks (Edsall 2005).

(83) Schmitt ([1922] 1988a) justified full executive control of the state apparatus in a crisis, neutralizing the role of parliament and the courts. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution already allowed the president unlimited power in a state of emergency. However, Schmitt’s argument about the state of exception, combined with his friend-enemy politics (which envisioned the liberal world to be in perpetual crisis), provided grounds for a permanent state of exception and authoritarian concentration of power. Schmitt did not only analyze the state of exception, but he embraced it normatively. Moreover, his actions as a star Weimar era, lawyer and legal theorist helped bring the Nazi regime to power. His argument about the state of exception was “initially part of a volume dedicated to the memory of Max Weber” (Müller 2003, p. 22) Mommsen held that Weber, who helped draft the Weimar constitution, expressed “no interest” in article 48. However, he also claimed that Weber anticipated and influenced Schmitt’s ideas about the state of exception (Mommsen 1984, pp. 377-78, 382). For divergent views on this matter, see Bendersky 1979; Wolin 1990b: Gross 2000; Gottfried 2005.

(84) CNN employed the term “State of Emergency” as the lead to its TV reports on the Hurricane Katrina crisis and especially on the slow response to get food and
water and help rescue the mostly poor, Afro-American citizens of flooded and devastated New Orleans.

(85) Few contemporary Schmitteans dwell on the issue of the state of exception or its connections to fascism. Rather they usually deploy Schmitt’s ideas to attack liberal democracy’s shortcomings, defend the need rein in or institutionally embed neoliberalism’s hegemonic economism, or criticize US imperialism. Even Telos’ 9/11 symposium did not draw directly on the concept. See Telos 120 (Summer 2001; Fall 2001), pp 129-85. By contrast, the liberal editors of *Theory, Culture and Society’s* 19[4] (August 2002) called their special 9/11 section “State of Emergency.” Schmitt is discussed, but not extensively.

(86) He and Negri express a related variant of homogenization-regimentation theory, expressing a growing Italian, left-Schmittean influence on US social theory.

(87) His equation of modernity with the camps converges with Bauman’s ([1989] 2000) view of the holocaust as inhering in the structure of modernity.

(88) Wittgenstein was a distant second in the 2005 vote. Marx also won the BBC 1999 poll - Einstein was second! Caught by surprise and very disappointed by the outcome, the liberal *Economist* (2005) magazine charged that the vote must have been rigged. See also, Wheen 2005; and (http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/greatest_philosopher_vote.shtml). See e.g., John Cassidy’s (1997) *New Yorker* article about how the consequences of neoliberalism are bringing about a “return of Marx.” Certain left-leaning, cultural theorists and social theorists moved from postmodernism back toward Marx or stressed the need to address the issues of economic inequality and social justice. For example, Derrida’s *Specters of Marx* (1994) broke with the anti-Marxist left-Heideggerianism portrayed by Bloom. Jameson and Harvey also shifted back toward Marx. Jameson (2002, p 215.) concludes a recent work on modernism with the argument that theorists should substitute the term capitalism for modernity, and Harvey (2003) takes an emphatic Marxist stance against neoliberalism and imperialism. In another work, Harvey (2000, pp. 3-18) explains that his current undergraduates, regardless of political views, are engaged by *Capital* and easily connect its themes to current events. He says that teaching this text is much easier in today’s neoliberal context than in the early-1970s, when political interest in Marx peaked. He argues that it was harder then, at the height of the postwar welfare state and ascendent social democracy, for students to see the connection of Marx’s economic ideas to advanced capitalist societies. The anti-Marxist, postmodernist, pragmatist Richard Rorty also exhorts the US, cultural left to take up the issue of

New political forces are stirring. For example, diverse international groups supported the July 2005 “Live 8” concerts, rally and protests at the Gleneagles, Scotland, G8 meeting of economic ministers and movement to “make poverty history.” The earlier electoral victory of the left-wing, Venezuelan populist, Hugo Chavez took US pundits by surprise. His anti-neoliberal stances have made him an example to other Latin American groups wanting to seek alternative policy regimes. Chavez’s use of oil revenues to pay for programs for the poor helped inspire the 2005 peasant and worker uprising in Bolivia calling for nationalization of natural-gas preserves and bringing down the old leadership. Center-left and left parties have been making gains in much of the region and challenging neoliberal, free-trade policies. In the US, “living wage” campaigns, opposition to the superstore, Wal-Mart’s labor policies and local retail monopolies, and other local, regional, and national efforts to regulate and socially embed capitalism run against the neoliberal consensus that rules in official American political circles.

Ira Cohen (1985) posed a similar argument years ago. I have much more appreciation for his prescient theoretical insights now than I did then.

The later 20th century pragmatism revival (e.g., Richard Rorty, Nancy Fraser, Cornell West, Benjamin Barber) fuse cultural politics with class politics and oppose neoliberalism’s minimalist vision of democracy and antiliberal homogenization-regimentation theses.

Like other theorists discussed above, neopragmatists have sometimes absorbed themes from Weber via arguments about modernization, rationalization, and bureaucratization (e.g., in the Habermas debate; see Aboulafia, Bookman, and Kemp 2002). Indirect fusions also appear in their theories of “deliberative,” “pragmatic,” or “communitarian” democracy (e.g., Anderson 1990; Kloppenberg 1998, pp. 82-89; Selznick 1992). Kloppenberg (1986) engaged Dewey and Weber directly at key junctures in his intellectual history. However, the Dewey-Weber fusion here is my own effort to trace convergences and mesh differences between the two theorists.
Although I speak of a Dewey-Weber fusion to be succinct and for ease of expression, George Herbert Mead contributed substantially to the “Deweyan” position and is also discussed below. Dewey and Mead were colleagues early in their careers, and developed their basic views of pragmatism together. Dewey was a much more prolific writer than Mead, and developed a much larger corpus of social theory and political theory. However, Mead developed the social psychology presumed by Dewey’s theories of communication, society, and politics. Dewey asserted that Mead’s social psychology “worked a revolution” in his thought, after he grasped its “full implications.” He saw Mead to be the most “original mind” of his generation in American philosophy. On Mead’s seminal contribution, see Dewey 1989a. However, most of the theory of democracy and science that I link to Weber comes from Dewey.


Weber saw value judgements and empirical-historical judgments to be based on fundamentally different types of discourse, and argument. Ignoring the difference, he held, abjures “responsibility” and “the elementary duty of scientific self-control” ([1904] 1949c, p. 98).

Like Nietzsche, Weber stressed that science in the broad sense, or systematic inquiry, has a usually tacit, normative basis that makes the knowledge “worth knowing” and that directs inquirers’ attention to a finite portion of experience. Although not free of values per se, Weber argued that “cultural science” demands highly disciplined restraint, or a focused effort to hold back from snap judgements; inquirers must be open to the world’s obdurate facets to engage “inconvenient facts,” which contradict their cherished values, firm expectations, pet theories, linguistic conventions, and moral beliefs. Marianne Weber’s ([1926] 1975, pp. 684) reference to Max Weber’s “illusion-free illumination of the various roots of existence” referred to his storied capacity for this type of restraint or, in his words, “objectivity.” This theme converges with Nietzsche’s views about overcoming moral illusions. He called for an education that teaches us “to see - habituating the eye to repose, to patience, to letting things come to it; learning to defer judgment, to investigate and comprehend the individual case in all of its aspects. This is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately to a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-taking instincts in ones control” (Nietzsche [1888] 1968,
p. 65). Mead ([1934] 1967, pp. 98-9) also saw this “delayed reaction” as a fundamental feature of intelligence.

(98) Describing hearing Weber’s “science as a vocation” speech, Karl Löwith ([1960] 1982, p. 17) stated: “The acuteness of the questions he posed corresponded with his refusal to offer any cheap solutions. He tore down all the veils from desirable objects, yet everyone none the less sensed that the heart of this clear thinking intellect was profoundly humane. After innumerable revolutionary speeches by literary activists, Weber’s words were like a salvation.”


(100) Regardless of the extension of expert knowledge production and decision-making, Dewey held that educated citizens can still make informed choices between conflictive positions, detect and resist forms of manipulation, and distinguish democrats from demagogues. He stressed that these capacities are always imperfect among the masses, but that the same holds for judgment of technical and political elites.

(101) Fusing threads from Mead and Dewey with those from Durkheim and other classical and contemporary theorists, Habermas also aimed to forge a communication model that escapes western epistemology’s dualistic subject-object split and consequent contradictions. By giving privilege to the normative realm of “symbolic interaction” over the instrumental realm of social organization and holding that they are in inherent tension, however, he splits entwined social processes into separate domains and, thus, continues the subject-centered, epistemological dualism he claims to overcome. This split or dualism inheres in his self-described “quasi-transcendental” move to communicative ethics. Like Weber, Habermas does not escape from the philosophy of the subject or philosophy of consciousness (Antonio 1989). By contrast, Mead and Dewey saw the domains of symbolic interchange and social organization to be co-present in the social process; they treated communication as an embodied practice entwined with cooperative activity and associational and organizational life. Mead stated that: “Communication is a social process whose natural history shows that it arises out of cooperative
activities... in which some phase of the act of one form, which may be called a
gesture, acts as a stimulus to others to carry on their parts of the social act” ([1927]
1964e, p. 312). See Mead [1934] 1967, for a detailed account of “taking the
attitude of the other” and other social psychological aspects of the communication
model. See also Mead [1908] 1964a; [1917-1918] 1964b; [1922] 1964c; [1924-
61, for a brief account of his view of meaning and communication.

(102) Like Jefferson, Dewey and Mead held that the “moral sense” arises from
cooperative social intercourse. Dewey and Mead argued that cooperation and moral
judgment require “taking the attitude of others.” In their view, this capacity is
forged in face-to-face social relationships, beginning in parent-child relations and
extending into informal play groups, schools, and other local associations).
Participating in wider networks of local cooperative activities (e.g., a sports team),
they held, gives rise to the “generalized other”or, the ability to share attitudes,
though abstraction, with distant others (e.g., a particular manager) and collective
others (e.g., district managers or the firm) and, thereby, grasp one’s location and
duties in relation to complex sets of related, impersonal roles. On the generalized
other, see Mead [1934] 1967, pp. 151-63.

(103) For an earlier version of the argument above, see Antonio and Kellner
1992a. See e.g., Dewey and Tufts [1932] 1985, pp. 275-84. See Beth Singer
1999, for a contemporary Mead- Dewey theory of rights and related critique of
natural rights theory.

(104) Dewey’s conception of the rise of democratic government counters libertarian
claims about split between public and private. See Dewey1988b, pp. 238-58

(105) These links have to be rethought in today’s global context, but Dewey and
Mead imagined already the development of transnational “generalized others” and
the formation of larger international connections and forms of cultural integration.
In their view, wider attitude sharing in a regional or national cultures favor
transnational connections and the converse.

(106) See e.g., Putnam 2000. Bob Kent reminded me of convergence between
Dewey and Weber on the importance of voluntary association in American
democracy. This issue deserves more attention than I can give it here. See Weber
[1906]1946e.

(107) Dewey argued that this task requires re-embracing and broadening a tradition
that originated with Jefferson. Dewey claimed that it is still alive, though dormant,
within American culture ([1939] 1988e, pp. 187, 173-188 passim). He held that capitalist “pecuniary culture” suppresses the democratic aspects of the US tradition; i.e. “equal opportunity and free association and intercommunication” are “obscured and crowded out” by a free-market individualism that has “become the source of inequalities and oppressions”(Dewey ([1929] 1988d, p. 49). Dewey saw social and political ideals to be rooted in historical social relations and social processes and often to be in direct contradiction to existent social realities. Like the early Frankfurt School, he held that critique should build on historical tensions between democratic claims and institutional social realities. Dewey argued that: “Ideals express possibilities; but they are genuine ideals only so far as they are possibilities of what is now moving. Imagination can set them free from their encumbrances and protect them as a guide in attention to what now exists. But save as they are related to actualities, they are pictures in a dream”([1929] 1988d, p. 122).

(108) In a survey of people from forty-five nations (worldwide), Americans disagreed most strongly with the question that their “success is determined by forces outside their control,” and, in a survey of twelve western nations, Americans expressed the least support for state-supported, social welfare, safety-nets. See Pew Center 2005.