What is presented here is to be considered work in progress, but I believe that even at its present stage it will also be considered rather daring. It is work in progress because the ideas are still taking shape and the implications are still being sorted out. It is daring because one aspect of systemic theory is questioned on the basis of some problems that arise in application. Halliday once described his own approach to language as asking the question "What should we make language look like in order to throw light on questions of this kind?" (Chatman 1971: 408). This is a very practical, application-oriented approach, and gives me the courage to adopt a similar approach myself in this paper. Here I will, in fact, be arguing that treating the 'logical' part of semantics as a subdivision of the ideational metafunction fails to throw sufficient light on a series of questions which arise when Systemics is applied to English language teaching, for describing the system, for analyzing texts as instantiations of the system and as realizations of the three types of meaning potential in the semantics, and for relating texts to situations through the field, tenor and mode of the context. So I'll be asking the theoretical linguists to reconsider their theory. I'll be suggesting that 'logic', like 'function', is something that must be a part of the whole semantics, relating to the whole context of situation, and not specifically to any one area of the semantics and one corresponding area of the context.

In Systemic theory, the metafunctions - ideational, interpersonal and textual, corresponding to field, tenor and mode respectively in the context of situation - cover the range of meaning potential of human beings and of their languages, so that the whole lexicogrammatical system of a language can be seen as a realization of these three universal semantic areas (e.g. Halliday 1978: 33, 142-5, Halliday 1979, Halliday, Hasan 1976:22-23, Halliday 1985a: xxxiv, Halliday, Hasan 1989: 12).

If we consider the reasons normally given for considering one metafunction or another as the one from which a particular part of the lexicogrammatical system derives, we can see that on each account the logical function is somehow different and set aside from the others:

1) The clear relationship of the linguistic phenomenon to a particular part of the context of situation. The logical area of the semantics has no exclusive corresponding part of its own in the context.

2) The phenomenon functions according to the mode described for one or the other of the metafunctions: "representing" for ideational (the observer function),
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(the relevance function) (Halliday 1974: 95). In what follows we will see how unsatisfactory it is to consider logical simply as a representing function, because it is also constituting and enabling.

3) The phenomenon fits into the 'non-arbitrary' structural pattern corresponding to the metafunction - "particle" (constituents) for experiential, "field" (prosody) for interpersonal and "wave" (periodicity) for textual. Logical is simply described as 'recursive' (Halliday 1979: 74).

Typical sites of the encoding of experiential meaning are the clause (transitivity), the group (e.g., the constituent structure of the noun phrase), and the lexicon (Halliday 1979: 63-66). Interpersonal meaning "is strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring" (Halliday 1979: 66). Textual meaning is encoded most typically as the theme and rheme (clause level), given and new (tone unit), and as elements of grammatical and lexical cohesion, all of which receive their justification from outside the sentence and extend their effects beyond the sentence to the level of text (Halliday 1979: 67-70, Halliday, Hasan 1976). But "logical structures present themselves in the semantic system as independent of any particular class or classes of phenomena" and "are not the source of rules about what goes where" (Halliday 1979: 73-4).

Halliday (1977: 176, 178-9) divides the ideational metafunction into two parts, experiential and logical, both of which he relates to field. He justifies linking experiential and logical together in this way on the grounds that "there is greater systemic interdependence between these two than between other pairs" (Halliday 1978: 131).

Even someone as close to Halliday as is Hasan takes a different stand on this matter. Hasan (1978: 243) speaks of four metafunctions (she says 'macrofunctions'), experiential, interpersonal, textual and logical, with the last two relating to mode. It seems to me that Hasan has related her logical component to mode so that, taken together with the textual component, it could cover the two aspects of "textual unity": texture and structure. Texture is the type of textual unity created through cohesion (Halliday, Hasan 1976: 2). The structure of a text (a matter for which Hasan has shown more specific research interest than Halliday has) is the result of the linking together into an organized and unified whole (a text structure or generic structure) of the various functionally defined parts of a text: e.g., in an application for a medical appointment: identification, application, offer, confirmation (see Hasan 1978: 233). In considering text structure a realization of the part of the semantics related to mode, Hasan is, rightly I think, bringing discourse matters into the system (lexicogrammatical in a broader sense, which includes discourse matters?) described as a realization of the semantics. This solution fits my purposes very well, but I have not yet seen a discussion of the implications for other areas of the description.
'Identification', 'application', 'offer' and 'confirmation' are, of course, functions. As far as the concept 'function' is concerned, it is not hard to argue that this must be included at all levels. This is true in various of the many senses of 'function' (cf. Nichols 1984: 98-100). We of course have functions at all levels of the system in the 'grammatical' sense in which 'Agent' (experiential), 'Subject' (interpersonal) and 'Theme' (textual) are all functions, and also at all levels of the semantics in the metalanguage sense in which the three areas of the semantics are all metafunctions. But it also seems obvious that if 'purposive activity' is, as Halliday and Hasan (1976: 22) say, a part of the field, then there must be a corresponding functional component in the ideational part of the semantics, which will have manifestations in the system which can be interpreted on the basis of the functions they carry out in the discourse. Purposive activity also comes into the tenor (see, e.g., Smith 1985: 242) and corresponding interpersonal metafunction in the form of speech acts and the mood choices (Halliday 1971: 335), and into the mode and corresponding textual metafunction in the form of the 'discourse functions' that make up the genre. The negotiation in communication of 'purposes' and 'effects' regards all three metafunctions, and the whole context of situation (see Bailey 1985). In the course of this study more will be said about the 'multifunctionality' of 'functions'. In the work of at least two leading Systemic linguists, Gregory and Martin, multifunctional solutions have been proposed.1

My argument is that the same sort of multifunctionality applies to the 'logic' in the semantics. This logic can, and must, I believe, be seen in different ways. It can be seen dynamically as 'relating' and synoptically as 'relationships'. It can also be seen as 'external', the logic existing in reality (easily represented synoptically) and as 'internal', the logic human beings apply in the processes of relating aspects of reality (best represented dynamically). The external, synoptic use would seem to fit into the 'representing' function of the ideational area of semantics. The internal, dynamic use seems to be a part of the 'constituting' function of the interpersonal area. And both contribute to the 'enabling' function

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1 Gregory (1967:184 ff.) had postulated a functional tenor (speech acts) alongside the personal tenor (formality etc.), a division which Halliday (1985b: 9) accepted, but then Gregory (1988:314-5) decided to get rid of functional tenor on the grounds that "there is no place for a functional tenor, with multi-functional realization". He had, in fact, (Gregory 1982:71) schematized 'functional' in the semiotic stratum, and as a realization in the semantic stratum, but with the 'typical realization' in the lexicogrammatical stratum listed as 'various', and, as for the 'function' it is 'normally associated with', the scheme gives us 'multi-functional'. Interestingly, Gregory (both in 1982:71 and in 1988:313) leaves 'logical' out of his scheme for functions. Martin (1980-81:esp. 25) places functional tenor in a deeper 'stratum' underlying field, personal tenor and mode.
of the textual area (see, e.g. Halliday and Hasan 1976: 239-244 on internal and external conjunctives).

If this idea is accepted, then we need to find a way of fitting it into our description. Perhaps what we need is a logical-functional component which, behind, around, or perpendicular to the levels of the experiential, interpersonal and textual metafunctions, can act on all three levels. Fig. 1 is a possible graphic representation of this. In favour of this view, I think it can be shown 1) that the parts of the grammar that are normally related to the logical metafunction all have important links to the interpersonal and textual metafunctions as well as the ideational, and 2) that some parts of the grammar not normally related to the logical metafunction could, if it were redefined as is proposed here, as a multifunctional, logical-functional component, find a collocation there which is in some ways more satisfactory than the one now granted them.

Fig. 1

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<tr>
<th>CONTEXT OF SITUATION</th>
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To begin with, some questions arise in relation to Hasan's use of the logical function. What difference is there between Hasan's textual functions, and the
relationships between them, and interpersonal speech acts (see e.g. Halliday 1971: 335), and the fit between these (Sinclair, Coulthard 1975: 130-5, Ventola 1983: 242-3)? It seems to me that if there is a difference it is actually in the analysis rather than in the substance: the question would seem to be just whether the analysis is of the text seen as a completed product (related to mode) or as an ongoing process (related to tenor) - the question of synoptic vs dynamic models.2

Halliday, as we know, relates different sets of options in the lexicogrammar to each of the metafunctions. The logical metafunction is presented by Halliday (1985a: 193 ff.) as relating to hypotaxis and parataxis, and to expansion (by enhancement, elaboration, or extension) and projection. It is seen, along with the experiential metafunction, as our way of 'representing' what is 'out there' in reality (Halliday 1975: 40). But if we see the speaker not just as an observer, but more actively involved in shaping his own picture of reality, then we see him, even in this metafunction, as carrying out functions like 'compare', 'contrast', 'sequence' 'explain' (while creating enhancements) and 'add' (while creating extensions), and therefore not just 'representing', but 'constituting' reality, as he does in the interpersonal metafunction, in the part of this which regards discourse functions or speech acts.

So what we have here is a component - what I am calling the 'logical-functional' component - which, rather than fitting nicely into any one slot in our system, seems to be present at all levels: in relation to field, where it gives us the relationships realized hypotactically and paratactically as elaborations, enhancements and extensions, in relation to tenor, where it gives us speech acts which are pertinent to the interaction, and in relation to mode, where it gives us text cohesion through conjunctives (Martin 1983) and text structure through functional fit in a configuration corresponding to a genre.

But once we agree to reconsider the theory in this way, other problems come to our attention. We are led on to take another look at the process types which Halliday relates (as transitivity) to the experiential component of the ideational metafunction. According to Halliday's (1979: 64-5) conception of non-arbitrary structure types corresponding to the metafunctions, the analysis at the experiential level should be an analysis of "discrete elements" or components, "each of which makes its own distinctive contribution to the whole" since

2 Halliday (1985b:10) wrote: "The major problem perhaps is that of interpreting the text as process, and the system as evolution (its ontogenesis in the language development of children): in other words, of representing both the system and its instantiation in dynamic as well as in synoptic terms. Dynamic models of semiotic systems are not yet very well developed, and this is one of the problems that theorists of language now have to solve." Among the Systemic linguists now working on dynamic models are Martin (1985), Sinclair (1985) and Bateman (1989).
"experiential meanings are realized through some kind of constituent structure". Whereas material, mental, verbal and behavioural processes give us 'constituents' in a 'representation' of reality, 'relational' and the closely related 'existential' processes do not. This point has been made in a recent article by McGregor (1990: 23-24). Relational processes are of two types: identifying and attributing. Now, seen in the perspective we are adopting here, 'identify' and 'attribute' are also logical-functional. Through the functions 'identify' and 'attribute', we set up a logical relationship of identity or identification and of attribution. In this light, rather than realizations of the experiential metafunction, attribution and identification would seem to be realizations of our logical-functional component. This view helps us to overcome the problems that come up when we turn to the 'componential', experiential analysis, in terms of transitivity, of certain types of sentences we find in texts. Here are two examples from texts I have been working on with my students:

"Half in fear and half because of the blast, Marcovaldo leaped up and fell back, stunned." (from the translation by W. Weaver of Calvino's *Marcovaldo*, London, Picador, 1985, p. 99)


The problem is how to combine the attribution with the material process. The analysis becomes easier if we accept a logical relationship of attribution as outside of the experiential structure as such, although relating notions which are experiential ('stunned', 'tired', 'discouraged') to the components of this structure. The existence of languages with no relational verbs provides support for this view. Consider the difficulty of analyzing the following sentence:

"It hung, blue and inviting, between two buildings located somewhere near 91st Street and Central Park West, a narrow, distant gap in the brick and concrete thicket outside my window." (from an article in the *International Herald Tribune*, August 4, 1986, p. 5, "It Was Just a Piece of Sky, But It Redeemed the View" by Val L. Ellicott)

3 This has been pointed out by McGregor (1990:24), who also thinks that circumstances should be related to the logical function rather than to the experiential (1990:26-28), and projection to the interpersonal rather than to the logical (1990:376-42), and that existential *there* clauses (and similarly *it*-clefts) are better seen in relation to the textual metafunction (cataphoric indexing to what is presented after the relational verb) than as a process type in the experiential metafunction (1990:21,32).
It (i.e., the piece of sky visible from the window) is at once Actor in the material process expressed in the verb hung, the Carrier of the Attributes blue and inviting and a narrow, distant gap in the brick and concrete thicket outside my window, but the only process expressed is the material one. Again, an analysis where the attribution is not expected to fit into the string of components related to the process of the clause would be of help here. The problem does not regard only the transitivity-type analysis. Even for a syntactic analysis using the seven structure types (SV, SVO, SVC, SVA, SVOO, SVOC, SVOA - Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, Svartvik 1985:53) these forms create problems. A solution I have, out of want of a better one, opted for with my students, that of considering these elliptical relative clauses, does not, in truth, satisfy me, since these attributes are hard to consider as postmodifications of the noun in each of these cases, and even harder in the equally possible case of: "Tired and discouraged, he returned home."

Similar problems arise for presentative forms (cf. Lakoff 1987: 462 ff.) in existential clauses, where the only experiential component in the strictest sense is what is presented. Let's again consider a sentence that came up for analysis during my course:

"There's people living all along the road"
(from Pinter, The Caretaker Act I).

Halliday (1985a: 130) classifies the relative-like clauses in existential sentences as hypotactic. It is, indeed, a problem to consider these as embedded postmodifications of the noun that precedes them, since they seem to relate rather to the whole clause that precedes them. But also as hypotaxis they are particular, since they have none of the intonational signs of division normal for hypotaxis, and basically, the two parts do not seem divisible at all. I'd like to suggest that we might need to consider the function 'presentation' as part of our logical-functional component, acting, in the case of our example, upon a clause with a material process (live). The need for this type of analysis can be underscored by considering two more possible sentences related to the one from the Herald Tribune: "Between two buildings, there hung a piece of sky." "On each side of the piece of sky, there rose dark towering buildings." In the analysis I am proposing, in both sentences the hypothesized logical-functional component would come in as the presentation function. It would also come in for the expansion of location that relates the entity of 'place' to the participant and process constituents. But we will look at this in a moment.

I believe that if we solve the problem of existentials, we can also solve the problem of predicated-theme structures, or clefts, which seems to be related.
Another example from the materials I have been using with my students will illustrate this:

"It was McGuire put me on to them"
(from O'Neill, Long Day's Journey into Night, Act I).

We have precisely the same sort of question about how to analyze the relative-like clause here as we had in the existential sentence. It might be necessary here to think in terms of a logical-functional element of identification acting on our material process clause in a way which involves no real instance of hypotaxis or of embedding.

Whether what we do in relation to elements of reality is 'identify' or 'present', the function is also textual: both the presentative form and the cleft are indexical to the situation, one to introduce a topic into it, the other to index one element to the exclusion of all others in the situation as the one that is relevant to the discourse at hand.

The logical-functional component we are postulating would give us relationships like 'cause', 'condition', 'time', 'place', 'comparison' which are at the basis (in expansion) of enhancement, as well as 'addition', which is at the basis of extension. It would also give us 'identification' and 'attribution'. Not only are these two elements the ones that constitute the so-called 'relational processes', but identification is also at the basis of 'elaboration' (the third type of expansion - the type realized by the non-defining relative and the appositive clause).

Circumstances (tipically, the adverbial elements in the transitivity analysis of the clause) also have the same logical relationships (e.g., 'time', 'place', 'cause') to the other components of the clause as do clauses to each other in hypotaxis, and sentences to each other in text conjunction. It seems to me that this existence at all ranks of the grammar can be taken as another sign that the logical component, just like 'function', is present throughout the semantics. The sentence we have just analyzed from the Herald Tribune might have had, instead of the spatial circumstance between two buildings located somewhere near 91st Street and Central Park West, a hypotactic spatial enhancement like: "It hung where two buildings stood side by side somewhere near 91st Street and Central Park West." Furthermore, these 'enhancements' at clause level, clause-complex level and textual level can, in many cases, be either more 'pragmatic', 'disjunctive' and 'internal' (and therefore more interpersonal) or else more 'semantic', 'adjunctive' and 'external' (and therefore more experiential) (cf. Halliday, Hasan 1976: 240, van Dijk 1977: 209 ff., Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech Svartvik 1985: 612-31, 1070-74). So I would like to bring circumstances,
expansion and conjunction back together in the description, through the logical-functional component.

There are also enhancements within the verb phrase - those process-modulating enhancements 4 of time (begin by ..., tend to ...), manner (hasten to ..., hesitate to ...), cause (happen to ..., remember to) and accompaniment (help to ...) that, in the transitivity analysis, must not be treated as separate processes (Halliday 1985: 259-60). These too can be seen as a manifestation of the logical-functional component.

A grammatical manifestation of time relations in the semantics is tense. Tense figures in Halliday's work as a realization of the ideational metafunction, relating either to the experiential function (Halliday 1977: 180), or partly to the experiential and partly to the logical function (Halliday 1979: 66), or else completely to the logical function (Halliday 1985a: 176). 5 It seems to me, however, that tense actually operates multifunctionally: it is deictic to the discourse time and is so closely related to mood that it is part of the finite of the clause, so it would seem to be interpersonal; it plays an important role in text cohesion and in foregrounding and backgrounding, especially in its aspectual element 6 (see, e.g. Hopper 1979, Delancey 1982: 179), so it is also textual. Tense is ideational in that it is related to the entity time and to the temporal organization of events. An attempt to use the Systemic metafunctions as a basis for the presentation of grammar in language teaching would certainly entail making a decision about what to do about something as basic as tense, and I have begun evaluating the advantages that could come from considering it a realization of the logical-functional element we are postulating.

Time phase elements in the verb phrase (e.g., start/stop doing, keep doing), which the transitivity analysis does not treat as separate processes (Halliday 1985: 256-7), must also, I believe, be seen as manifestations of our logical-functional component.

4 Halliday's use of the term 'modulation' for these process enhancements seems unfortunate to me, since it creates confusion with his more well-known use of the same term for pseudo-modality.

5 See Ellis (1987:111-2) for the argument in favour of considering tense completely as a manifestation of the logical function. Halliday (1979:77), referring to characteristics such as recursiveness and being "rank-free" which are typical of logical structures, singles out tense and report as "nearer the borderline". He says they are "only just logical structures". Of tense, he says that it "is particularly interesting because it has only come into the category of logical structures within the last two to three centuries, and English appears to be unique in treating tense in this way."

6 Halliday (1985a: 180-181) treats aspect in the finite verbal group as a part of tense (present in present, past in present etc.).
Projection (or report), both mental and verbal, is related to the logical component of the ideational metafunction in Halliday's work. Of course we know that the ideational metafunction is the one in which language reflects, represents reality, and in which the speaker's role is that of observer of reality (Halliday 1979:60). However, projection is not simply a way in which parts of reality 'out there' are related. Like modality, it is a way of limiting the commitment of the speaker to the message, and in this sense is interpersonal. Its scope can be limited to any level - even to the object of a preposition as in the headline of an article which we analyzed in class:

"Benefits Threat Over Too Many Rooms"
(from The Guardian, March 6, 1989).

In this case it is very important to realize that 'too many rooms' is a projection, so as to realize that the evaluation expressed in too many is not to be interpreted as the journalist's. Projection can be subtly insinuated, with its effects on the grammar of shared and unshared knowledge (Taylor Torsello 1987: 24-28, 45-49), into a prepositional phrase:

"White House aides are losing patience with what they see as the heavy-handed tactics of Rep. Guy Vander Jagt..." (Newsweek, April 22, 1985, p. 9)

Here the definite article is justified on the basis of the shared knowledge attributed to the White house aides, whereas the writer can avoid committing himself on the matter. To see this we can compare the following form, without projection, where the journalist does commit himself: "White House Aides are losing patience with the heavy-handed tactics of Rep. Guy Vander Jagt". Also compare a version where commitment and definite reference are both avoided: "Rep. Guy Vander Jagt is accused of using heavy-handed tactics." There can be lexical and intonational signs of projection, without any projecting clause. Bolinger (1979: 307-8) gives us an example of this: "His wife knows perfectly well that Tom is a jerk", where knows perfectly well and a rising tone on Tom is a jerk are sure signs that the speaker, at the same time that he is presenting Tom is a jerk as Tom's wife's mental projection, is also presenting it as a previous verbal projection of his own. In Italian we can even use the conditional to indicate that we are projecting the opinion of others:

Projection often extends its scope beyond sentence level, as in the following sequence:

"That's unbelievable," said the young man. "Does he have the best equipment?" (from *The One Minute Manager*, p. 48)

It often occurs without a projecting clause (Young 1988: 33-34). It can even be expressed from a receptive point of view:

"As the man sat and listened to the 'nice' people answer the same question, he heard, 'I'm a democratic manager.'" (*The One Minute Manager*, p. 14).

Furthermore, through the choice of different projecting verbs (*began, continued, concluded*), projection can be used to frame episodes in narrative.7 These considerations lead us to see projection as operating within the textual metafunction as well.

It seems to me that the approach to the logical component as multifunctional might also make some other aspects of the grammar which have created problems in application more manageable.

I have some thoughts about how this approach might relate to some problems which arise in the areas of modulation (considered experiential - Halliday 1977: 180) and modality (interpersonal), and of comparison (considered logical) and intensification (considered interpersonal). There are practical problems related to treating these areas as separate parts of the grammar, realizing different fundamental semantic functions.

The close relationship between modulation and modality makes it hard, and impractical, to treat these as completely separate parts of the grammar. In the system many of the realizations are the same (e.g. must, may, will). Modulation has uses which are clearly interpersonal, such as its performative uses (Huddleston 1984: 358), and its various uses for purposes of speaker control.

Similar difficulty arises from having to treat comparison and intensification as separate in the system, comparison being considered ideational and, specifically, logical, and intensification being classed as interpersonal. The problem is that in the area where distinguishing between comparison and intensification is most difficult Systemic grammar usually makes use of formal

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7Nichols (1984: 109) says that Michael Silverstein in a 1984 article on Chinook shows how in this language verbs for speech acts are used regularly to frame episodes in narrative, with one verb used to report speech events that continue speech interaction and another used to report speech events that bound or cut off such interaction.
criteria: the possibility of predeterminer adjective position (too serious a matter) and of post-adjectival completion by an embedded result clause (too serious to be any fun) (Veltman 1985: 192-3). The conclusion is that too is comparative, and therefore ideational. Now any of us who work with our students on a headline like "BENEFITS THREAT OVER TOO MANY ROOMS" know that there is an aspect of personal evaluation involved in the judgment of the rooms' being 'too many' which is crucial to the understanding of the text, so too has an undeniable interpersonal function here.

Perhaps in relation to these problems too, postulating a logical-functional component which is not restricted to any metafunction can help us.

Modulation (inclination, obligation) can be seen as an aspect of cause, and cause is easy to consider as part of our logical-functional component. When the modulating type of causal function operates on the experiential component, we get the more 'representing' types of modulated expressions: "We were obliged to take a detour because the main road was flooded." When the modulating type of causal function operates on the interpersonal component it enters into the active creation of role-relationships and speech functions: "You must help me now, John."

If we can also relate conation (try to..., manage to...) to cause, and in this way to our logical-functional component, then we will have accounted for another of the parts of the verb phrase which in a transitivity analysis must not be treated as separate processes.

Causative verbs (make do, let do), another group of those which are not treated as separate processes in the transitivity analysis when they occur along with another verb, can also be related to the cause element of the logical-functional component.

It may be that even modality should be seen as the result in the interpersonal area of the workings of an aspect of the logical-functional component which is polarity. Ellis (1987: 109) points out that Halliday has, at different times, related polarity to each of the three metafunctions, and Ellis himself argues for considering it as logical. Polarity, as experiential, represents the being and not being, the doing and not doing, aspects of reality. When polarity becomes interpersonal, it is a close-knit part of the finite involved in mood-forming options, and also gives us the possibility of 'constituting' degrees of meaning between yes and no: "It might rain"; "You must be tired". Textually, polarity 'enables' a whole piece of discourse to affirm or deny, accept or refuse, prescribe or prohibit.

Just as we were able to account for time phase as part of the time element of our logical-functional component, I believe we can account for reality phase (seem to..., turn out to...) by relating it through modality to polarity, and
thereby to the logical-functional component. Halliday (1985: 257) in fact says that "the two categories of phase are related to modality and tense."

Now let's consider the results of postulating comparison, too, as part of a logical-functional component coming in at all levels. In the experiential function, the speaker-observer would be seen as representing reality and the comparative-type relations (e.g., similarities, differences) which he sees between parts of it. In the interpersonal function, the speaker actively constitutes reality through the speech functions of comparing and contrasting. He also expresses his own evaluations by comparing things not only to each other, but also to his own personal, or culturally received, norm. It is this that he is doing when, for example, he says someone is "very old" (usually considered intensification) and also "too old to learn to dance the lambada" (usually considered comparison), or, going back to our headline, when he says that four rooms are "too many rooms" for a family of four claiming housing benefits. In the textual function, relationships of comparison can be realized by conjunctions (e.g., likewise). Even the adversatives would seem to realize logical-functional comparison.

As a final thought, I would like to suggest that 'refer' and 'assert' are functions just like 'identify', 'attribute', 'present', 'project', and 'relate' are, and that the systematic setting up of relationships between what is referred to (as shared information) and what is asserted (as unshared information) is an extremely important part of language activity. This could also be seen as an aspect of comparison - contrasting parts of reality for our interactive purposes. Halliday (1984: 28-29) says that at 22 months Nigel had created a systematic category for differentiating between shared and unshared experience, which he later on lost, and which is not present in adults. In adult use, this is a matter of "packaging information" so as to take into account the hearer's needs, and involves matters of presupposition. It is not simply a matter of information units, or of corresponding tone units and prominence points. These are only elements in a much more complex set of phenomena which goes from the definite/indefinite distinction, to final vs non-final position in clause complexes and in ditransitive structures, to such prosodic options as falling vs. rising tone (see Brazil 1975, 1978, 1985), position of tonic syllable, number of feet, number of tone units, and many other phenomena, which relate to all ranks of grammar and to all parts of the semantics and of the context of situation (see Taylor Torsello 1987). Halliday relates information structure to the textual metafunction. McGregor (1990: 44-4) insists on the interpersonal nature of information packaging and of the presuppositions which this entails. I am suggesting that a logical-functional basis for the relationship between what is
referred to as shared and what is asserted as unshared might make this seemingly unsystematic part of the system easier to describe.  

Several considerations contribute to giving me the courage to postulate a new, multifunctional solution for the logical function:

1) The fact that Hasan has already opened the way to taking it out of the ideational metafunction, by herself making it a separate function, related to mode rather than to field.

2) The fact that 'function' itself has already been postulated as multifunctional.

3) The fact that, on the whole, it seems to me that this adjustment would make the description more usable for what I need to do with it, which is helping students to learn the English language and how it works.

In this approach, I am comforted by recalling that Michael Halliday (1974: 97), in his interview with Parrett, as he discussed his own stand on how the metafunctions should be posited (specifically, he was insisting on equal status for the ideational and the interpersonal metafunctions), was careful to add "though always pointing out that it is simply for the purposes of the kinds of investigation I personally am interested in". So now, I want to turn back to the theoretical linguists and, pointing to the sorts of practical problems I have brought out in this paper, ask Halliday's own question: "What should we make language look like in order to throw light on questions of this kind?" I'll be anxiously awaiting the solutions they might propose. I'm also curious to know whether or not they will be interested in taking up the suggestion I have made here and following it through to see what sort of description it actually leads to.

8 A similar distinction in language use is made between what is treated as fact and what is treated as hypothesis, and in this case too there are consequences on the various parts of the system and at all ranks of the grammar. The fact/hypothesis distinction might also need to be related to the logical-functional component. I can think of three ways in which the link might be posited: 1) the distinction might be considered a development of polarity (with fact at the two poles and hypothesis in between); 2) the function "hypothesize" might alternate and contrast with functions like "assert"; 3) the distinction might be seen as a development of comparison - contrasting two modes of formulating reality. This note is clearly a particularly tentative part of this paper.
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The Logical Function in Systemic Theory


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