Dans l'attitude littéraliste, il y a du respect, et de l'adoration. Il y a aussi de la peur: ... peur de l'exploitation du sens.

Louis Truffaut

When I first read Newmark, I was impressed, educated and, at the same time, somewhat uneasy. I have since read and reread everything bearing his signature to come my way — not that much, really, several articles (four of them later included in Approaches to Translation), and A Textbook of Translation, the latest — and last, if he is to be believed — most comprehensive and systematised articulation of his thoughts on the matter. In the following pages I shall endeavour to show that, his claims to the contrary notwithstanding, Newmark does indeed have a single, coherent theory of translation, that it is a wrong and didactically dangerous one, and that, despite all that, he makes a substantive and most opportune and welcome contribution to the development of our discipline. I believe that both Newmark the thinker and translator are better than his theory.

Let me start with Approaches to Translation. When I finally laid hands upon a copy of it, I was disappointed at the somewhat a-systematic character of the book; it is, after all, a compilation or reworking of previously published more or less self-contained articles. In the opening piece, "The theory and the craft of Translation", Newmark goes as far as he has gone up to now in defining translation and translation theory (1981: 5-7):

"Translation theory derives from comparative linguistics, and within linguistics, it is mainly an aspect of semantics. ... Sociosemantics, ... semiotics, ... literary and non-literary criticism, ... logic and philosophy, in particular language philosophy, have a bearing on the grammatical and lexical aspects of translation respectively. A study of logic will assist the translator to assess the truth-values underlying the passage he is translating; all sentences depend on presuppositions and where sentences are obscure or ambiguous, the translator has to determine the presuppositions. ... Translation theory is not only an interdisciplinary study, it is even a function of the disciplines I have briefly alluded to. ... Translation is a craft consisting in the attempt to replace a written message and/or statement in one language by the same message and/or statement in another language."

This was first published in 1976; later on, in his Textbook (1988a), he is even less specific (1988a: 5):

"What is translation? Often, though not by any means always, it is rendering the meaning of a text into another language in the way that the author intended the text."

Presumably, the latter definition supersedes the former; but what, if anything, is translation always? A definition of translation can hardly stop at calling it an attempt: it is not enough to try to replace a written message and/or statement (what is the difference?) in one language by the same message and/or statement in another language: in order to deserve its name, a translation must at least partially succeed. What are the criteria used to evaluate such a success? What, in other words, qualifies as 'the same message and/or statement' in another language? All these questions come naturally to mind, but Newmark does not address them. Nor does he address the translation of oral texts, nor their interpretation. I have made an intentional distinction: oral texts can be translated in written form, as in the case of speeches and transcripts of conversations or the subtitling of films. Written texts, for their part, can be translated orally, as in the case of sight translation. There is also consecutive and simultaneous interpretation. There is, also, the translation of opera libretti and lyrics in general. And lastly, let us not forget, there is dubbing, the least studied of all the branches of translation. Can they be encompassed by a single theory of text/message/
statement-replacement in another language? Why? Why not?

Next, in "What translation theory is about," he adds (Newmark 1981: 19-20):

"Translation theory is a misnomer, a blanket term, a possible translation, therefore a translation label. ... In fact translation theory is neither a theory nor a science, but the body of knowledge that we have and have still to have about the process of translating: it is therefore an -ology, but I prefer not to call it 'translatology' ... or 'traductology' ..., because the terms sound too pretentious — I do not wish to add any -ologies or -isms. ... Translation theory's main concern is to determine appropriate translation methods for the widest possible range of text-categories. Further, it provides a framework of principles, restricted rules and hints for translating texts and criticising translations, a background for problem-solving. ... Lastly [it] attempts to give some insight into the relation between thought, meaning and language. ... The translator's first task is to understand the text ... so it is the business of translation theory to suggest some criteria and priorities for this analysis."

Apparently, Newmark does not think too much of translation theory: just an eclectic bag of principles, restricted rules and insights. Yet, if translation theory's main concern is to determine appropriate translation methods for the widest possible range of text-categories, then it must have one single point of departure, some feature common to all those different methods, a feature common, moreover, to all texts. I think Newmark himself points to the answer: that insight into the relation between thought, meaning and language. As we shall see, he leaves this crucial area largely unexplored. One thing, though, is already apparent from the formulation: Thought, meaning and language are different things. I couldn't agree more. But Newmark himself goes back on this assertion, refusing to distinguish linguistic, semantic meaning from extra-linguistic sense. If meaning is linguistic, if it is a feature of language, very much as grammar or lexis is, the three elements are not at the same level, and it is no longer a triad we are talking about but just thought and language. Understanding the text, therefore, and very much despite Newmark's own repeated assertions to the contrary, will be in essence reduced to understanding the meaning of the words.

"All texts have aspects of the expressive, the informative and the vocative function: the sentence 'I love you' tells you something about the transmitter of the utterance, the depth of his feelings and his manner of expressing himself; it gives you a piece of straight information; and it illustrates the means he is using to produce a certain effect (action, emotion, reflection) upon his reader. That particular sentence, which also illustrates the most logical, common, and neutral sequence of arguments, viz. SVO, more particularly, animate subject-verb-inanimate object (the object of a sentence is 'inanimate', whether it be a person or a thing, because it has a passive role), with no emphasis on any of the three components, must be translated literally, since literal translation is always best provided it has the same communicative and semantic effect [sic]." (p. 21)

To begin with, Newmark posts "a universal word order", and takes for granted that SVO is "the natural word order of a sentence, ... which follows the natural order of thought," (1988b: 134). To begin with, I would not hasten to assert that 'the order of thought' is necessarily SVO; the linearity of language and the linearity of thought need not be the same. Besides, the SVO order is far from universal: according to Polinsky's "nearly half the languages show the SOV order" (1988: 111). But that substantive quibble aside, let us see how it is that Newmark can climb down from an otherwise unimpeachable premise to an untenably dogmatic conclusion. On the one hand, he seems to be saying that the sense of the sentence is the same as the sum of its meanings; on the other, he wants us to assume it is much more. All he gives us is [first person + singular] + [love' + present + indicative] + [second person + objective case] + (suprasegmentally) [assertion]. Those are the means chosen among the array offered by the English language to the speaker to convey a 'sense.' Why does Newmark take so blithely for granted that any person who utters 'I love you' is giving his addressee a piece of straight information? He may be lying, or mistaken in his feelings, or jesting, or using an example to make Newmark's point, or turning it around in order to refute it. I can imagine Newmark saying what he repeats several times when rebuking similar arguments: Whatever the intention, whatever the secondary act, it will always be as indirectly conveyed in a literal translation. I beg to disagree. To begin with, Newmark drops a sentence and assumes its semantic meaning to be self-sufficient, but he gives no context: no context — no idea of the extra-linguistic situation; no idea of the situation — no hint of the sense; no hint of the sense — no translation, just transcoding. Yet, he asserts that such a sentence must be translated literally (provided it has the same communicative and semantic effect).
How would Newmark go about translating that sentence literally into Italian, French, Russian, German or any language grammatically distinguishing between second person singular and second person plural? How would he, for instance, suggest that it be translated into Spanish, which distinguishes a) between second person singular and second person plural, b) between the formal and informal second person pronoun (only in the singular in Latin America, in the singular and plural in the Iberian peninsula; plus the Riverplatean 'vos' and the Colombian 'Su Merced'), and c) between second person feminine and second person masculine (both singular and plural); plus in which d) the subject pronoun is not mandatory, while e) the accusative may be doubled, and f) the objective pronoun can be both enclitic and proclitic? Which, then, of these literal translations would Newmark advise me to go for: 1) 'Te amo,' 2) 'Yo te amo,' 3) 'Yo te amo a ti,' 4) 'Amote,' 5) 'Amote a ti,' 6) 'Te amo a ti,' 7) 'Yo os amo,' 8) 'Amoos,' 9) 'Aomoos a vos,' 10) 'Aomoos a vosotros,' 11) 'Aomoos a vosotras,' 12) 'Yo lo amo,' 13) 'Lo amo,' 14) 'Amolo,' 15) 'Le amo,' 16) 'Yo le amo a Ud.,' 17) 'Amolo a Ud.,' 18) 'La amo,' 19) 'Yo la amo,' 20) 'Yo la amo a Ud.,' 21) 'Amola,' 22) 'Amola a Ud.,' 23) 'Los amo,' 24) 'Los amo a Uds.,' 25) 'Las amo,' 26) 'Las amo a Uds.,' 27) 'Amoles,' 28) 'Amoles a Uds.,' 29) 'Amolos,' 30) 'Amolos a Uds.,' 31) 'Yo las amo,' 32) 'Yo los amo; plus another 32 sentences with 'querer' instead of 'amar'? And there are quite a few more 'literal' translations into Spanish (all of them back- translating, in principle, as 'I love you'); the reader is cordially challenged to find them when trying to mitigate a sleepless night (I have come up with 82).

And what do these sentences (presumably to be themselves literally translated into English) 'say' about the speaker according to Newmark's logic: for instance, 'Lo amo,' if the speaker is an adult male, probably that he is a shy homosexual. Newmark wants the translator to translate 'sentences'; I suggest it is rather useless and somewhat impossible. An apparently harmless and direct 'sentence' can become different texts when looked at — and used — not as SVO but as a vehicle for thought, a conveyer of sense, a tool of communication. All texts are situated, and no language will offer any translator one 'literal' even 'free' translation that will be apt to frame all those different situations, to convey all those different senses. When Newmark all but plunges from defining translation to legislating on how to translate an isolated sentence, he is simply trampling underfoot the last thirty or so years of translational and paying his students the utmost disservice. Of course, Newmark might say that he is not advocating any specific literal translation, just the literal approach. I still think he is methodologically wrong; besides, what is the use of advocating a choice limited 'exclusively' to one of close to 100 possible literal translations? Especially when Spanish leaves us no alternative but to select only one of at least six semantically different framings of the same 'meanings' (first person singular — amar — present indicative — second person object); i.e., it forces the translator to interpret the text resorting to the extra-linguistic situation via the context, which in turn may very well advise against any of the 64 (or 82) literal translations after all! Simply, the English text conveys insufficient semantic information for its reproduction in Spanish. What is semantically enough to frame an everyday utterance in English proves insufficient for a Spanish utterance. If Newmark's sentence was the one surviving fragment of a Shakespeare play, a translation into Spanish would be impossible; the translator would have to choose arbitrarily one of six interpretations (and I assume the different 'age,' 'sex' and/or 'social' markers in many languages would impose additional restrictions on their translators); his language denying him the possibility of being as ambiguous, he would have only a 15 percent chance of randomly hitting the nail.

Indeed, I would imagine that in many cases, a 'sentence' such as 'I love you' might perfectly and even optimally be translated as 'te quiero.' But it should not be the result of a decision to translate literally. Ideally, the translator would have analysed the text, inferred the sense, weighed the different possibilities Spanish offers him linguistically to re-frame the sense, and found that 'te quiero' is the best possible choice. It stands to reason that if any two languages tend to segment and organise experience along similar lines and through similar means, then the same situations, the same communicative plans, the same emotions, the same sense would tend to end up clad in similar linguistic garb. Again, that is but a statistical coincidence. It may be helpful for the translator to know beforehand that chances are his translation will be formally close to the original (although I doubt it, since it could lead him to lower his guard); but statistical coincidence cannot be

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1 See Lyons (1983), an excellent and most entertaining book.
2 I am indebted to Neubert (1985) for this very useful concept and term.
3 Cf., for instance, the famous example ('I have arrived' i.e. *pristhīd*), leading him to postulate that meaning is language-specific and that two texts can be said to be equivalent when apt in the same situation, is but an illustration of the different situational features mandatorily framed in Russian and

English (1965: 38).
'advocated,' much less 'commanded'. Otherwise we would be mandating the translator to be more literal when translating from French into Spanish than when the ST is in English, i.e. to apply a different 'method' to each pair of languages. That to my mind is unscientific and can only lead to the atomisation of our discipline into as many theories as there are pairs of languages and types of texts. That does not mean, of course, that specific applications of the general theory and method should not produce specific and more 'delicate' (as Catford would put it) principles and even rules, exactly the same way medicine has more particular branches such as tropical or space medicine, or traumatology or dermatology, each with a more specific object requiring a more specific application of the same general principles.3

The next three chapters are the Babel articles on semantic and communicative translation. Semantic and communicative translation are the heirs of the literal vs. free approaches (and, later, in A Textbook, word-for-word vs. adaptation); the gradation Newmark shows is as follows:

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Word-for-word translation is often demonstrated as interlinear translation; its main use is to understand the mechanics of the SL. In literal translation, the SL grammatical constructions are converted to their nearest TL equivalents, but the lexical words are again translated singly, out of context. As a pre-translation process, this indicates the problems to be solved. A faithful translation attempts to reproduce the precise contextual meaning of the TL grammatical structures. Semantic translation differs from 'faithful translation' only as far as it must take more account of the aesthetic value of the SL text, compromising on 'meaning' where appropriate so that no assonance, word-play or repetition jars the finished version; it may make other small concessions to the readership, admits exception to 100% fidelity, and allows for the translator's intuitive empathy with the original. Adaptation is the 'freest' form of translation and is used mainly for the theatre. Free translation reproduces the matter without the manner, or the content without the form. Usually it is a paraphrase much longer than the original, a so-called 'intralingual translation,' often prolix and pretentious, and not translation at all. An idiomatic translation reproduces the 'message' of the original, but tends to distort nuances of meaning by preferring colloquialisms and idioms where these do not exist in the original. Communicative translation attempts to render the exact contextual meaning of the original in such a way that both content and language are readily acceptable and comprehensible to the readership.

The above is a synthesis of Newmark's definitions as further developed in A Textbook (pp. 45-47). We can see quite plainly where his sympathies lie: free translation gets all the invectives, whereas literal translation, its direct opposite, will systematically be preferred. As Newmark rightly points out, there is a dialectical tension between form and content. Semantic and communicative translations would be the strictly translational poles of resolution, as it were, of this dialectical tension whenever the TL forces the translator into a different balancing of the twain. Newmark thus becomes a Saint Jerome of sorts: sensum de senso for communicative texts, verbum de verbo for the authoritative ones (although for St. Jerome, only the Bible was authoritative enough for the verbum de verbo). Methodologically, I think this is an extremely useful device, scientifically spelling out what Ortega y Gasset had hinted at but intuitively.4 Newmark repeats, again and again, that these are but the truly 'translational' extremes of a continuum that goes from word-to-word and literal translation to free translation and adaptation, that there is no exclusively semantic or solely communicative way of translating, that different passages of the same text will advise a more or less semantic or communicative approach. But I'm afraid his disclaimers are too weak for his claims. The reason for this, to my mind, is a crucial methodological gap in Newmark's thinking. The key words are 'exact' [later on 'complete,' and, in A Textbook, 'precise'] contextual

3 In Semko et al. (1988) a general overview is given of the main Soviet translationists' positions on translation theory. From the tens of definitions quoted, it is more than crystal-clear that, with the exception of Rosenthal and Rosenzweig in the early 60's, all of them consider it to be one and applicable to all texts. Although not every Soviet researcher I am acquainted with makes the terminological distinction between meaning and sense, all of them, that I can recall out of hand, differentiate the concepts. For a very brief overview of where several authors stand, see Viaggio (1988: 347).

4 Ortega’s essay, written back in 1937, poses the following Scleriformachian dichotomy: the translation must either bring the SL to the reader or bring the reader to the SL, and he too prefers the latter. And that far back, this Spaniard who was not a linguist came up with this astonishing insight: “The issue of translation, upon closer scrutiny, leads us to the most hidden secrets of that wonderful phenomenon which is speech.” (1907: 109).
meaning' (which I very much doubt is at all possible to reproduce — when talking about translation, 'exact,' 'complete,' and 'precise' are words better eschewed). The question is not what they mean, but what Newmark means by them. Once again, we find a plea for literalism (1981: 39):

"However, in communicative as in semantic translation, provided that equivalent-effect is secured, the literal word-for-word translation is not only the best, it is the only valid method of translation."

As I see it, Newmark blurs or altogether fails to see the difference between accuracy and adequacy, so fully developed by the Russians. Accuracy cannot be but 'content-based'; it is, I think, an almost strictly 'semantical' (no wonder!) category. Adequacy, instead, encompasses a synthesis of the contradiction between form and content. Adequacy is a function of the translator's assessment of his specific task, his ability to pick out the relevant features of the SL text, and his success at reproducing them. A translation may be 'accurate' without being 'adequate' (viz. in the case of Nabokov's Evgeni Onegin, where the elsewhere superb writer disarmingly fails at conveying anything but Pushkin's semantic bones) or 'adequate' without being 'accurate' (as in the successful re-writing of an advertisement). Adequacy being a concept of a higher degree, it must prevail over accuracy. Newmark remains shackled to 'meaning' — 'exact contextual meaning' to be more precise — and that is his theoretical undoing, since not at all paradoxically, as I hope to show, 'meaning' is but a second-degree 'form.'

Semantic translation and communicative translation, on the other hand, are not different methods, but different choices at a specific stage of the translating process (which Newmark himself somewhat belatedly indicates). Until translatology develops any further, there is, that I know of, one and only one universally apt method of translating. Some people proclaim it, others resort to it intuitively, and others, such as Newmark, vigorously deny it in theory and in class, while applying it in practice. That method is rather simple (not to be confused with easy): identification of the translator's purpose; understanding of the SL text; inferring of sense (including any relevant formal features); re-expression of sense as a TL text (with as adequate a re-creation of the relevant formal features as possible);

collation of original and translation for semantic and stylistic adequacy (what Newmark calls 'justification').

Naturally, things are not that simple. Let us be more delicate. a) Identification of the translator's purpose: there are many ways of translating a text (and not only semantic or communicative, as Newmark rightly points out); the translator must ask himself why he wants to translate this text or why he is asked to do so. He is about to generate speech, and he must do what anybody about to make an utterance is called upon to do: take stock of what he has to say, who he is saying it to, what he is saying it for, why he is saying it, under what circumstances he is going to say it, how much time he has to say it, what obstacles (subjective or objective) may stand in the way of successful communication, etc. b) Understanding of the SL text: the translator has to make sure he understands the linguistic framing. Words are his gate to the text and he has to cross that gate properly. c) Inferring of sense: having formally understood the text as a specimen of the SL language, the translator has to re-interpret the linguistic meaning as extra-linguistic sense; he must take stock of all the relevant formants of the situation the original is embedded in (communicative intention of the author, his addressees, his time, his culture, etc.). d) Re-expression of sense: on the basis of his assessment of the communicative task (which may have been totally or partially modified as a result of the interpretation), he then must synthesise that sense into a TL text. Again, he will assess the new situation obtaining between him and his addressees. He will weigh different linguistic alternatives and decide on the most satisfying one — or least disappointing, as the case may be. One crucial task at this stage is assessing what features of the original, at both the formal and content levels, are relevant for the translation. The corollary of such analysis will be deciding on the best way of reproducing them in his text. When any feature becomes impossible to reproduce effectively, the translator must try and find the way of compensating for it somewhere else. Collating both texts: He will do basically two things: 1) check his translation against the original for accuracy and fidelity to content and form as necessary, and 2) read his translation as an

6 This and the concept of the situation as 'actualiser' (aktivizator) of sense, I have stolen from Lvovskaia's splendid book, which has contributed to this one much more than I dare admit. Of all my sources, it is she who makes the most thorough and profound analysis of the difference between sense (smyshlenie) and meaning (znachenie). My only gibe is with the dismal Spanish translations she uses to illustrate her many brilliant points. The formants (formanty) she mentions are the usual Wh's.

5 A crucial distinction. The degree of accuracy is but one — albeit basic — of the criteria for global adequacy, which will basically be measured against the translator's intention, i.e. the degree of success he has had in achieving it.
autonomous piece, paying attention to coherence and cohesion. The choice between semantic and communicative translation as possible practical criteria is, then, but one of the stages in the method, coming, as Newmark himself explains, after the text has been understood and interpreted, and is a result of the translator's assessment of his communicative task.

We can proceed to a still greater delicacy. Interpreting the text is more than identifying words and establishing syntactic connections. Sense is a dialectical, dynamic category that can only be determined by correlating the linguistic and the extra-linguistic, the dictionary and the encyclopaedia (in the general sense of the translator's knowledge of the world, which Newmark shares). Every single linguistic utterance can have countless senses. Sense is, basically, the result of the interaction between the semantic meaning of the utterance and the communication situation, which in turn is its only actualiser. Out of situation, and even within a linguistic context, any word, any clause, any sentence, any paragraph, and any speech have a myriad of possible senses; in the specific situation — only one (which can include deliberate ambiguity). The translator ideally has to know all the relevant features of the situation univocally to make out sense. The vaguer the text, the more relevant a greater number of features of the situation become; if the translator — as indeed any reader — is unable to acquaint himself with all the pertinent formants, he will be unable univocally and unambiguously to make sense out of it, and that is why all modern editions — let alone translations — of ancient works are teeming with glosses. As Neubert explains, the situation ripples away into the outermost realms of culture and civilization, and it also goes deep into the psychology of the individual. Unless the translator's attempt at reproducing the text in another language is carried out by meticulously following the above steps, he is bound to make serious methodological mistakes, whether on the semantic or the communicative end. Poor Faust, unable to check it out with God, has a rough time translating 'logos,' the Bible being both a literary piece and — at least for Faust — the utmost authoritative statement, the wretched devil would not be much helped by Newmark's angel advising him to trust his Maker and translate semantically, conveying the exact contextual meaning, much less literally.

Sense, moreover, is social. Sense is the result of four processes: sense conceived, sense conveyed, sense perceived and sense comprehended. A breakdown anywhere in the chain may impede or prevent communication (viz. a mad author, a stuttering speaker or illegible writer, a deaf listener or illiterate reader, a dumb addressee). And that is why the readership is so important for the author... And even more so for the translator; because, for whatever reasons, the author may have failed duly to take his addressee into account, or the addressee of the translation may be totally unintended by the utterer of the original (for one thing, he may have been totally unaware that someone was 'eavesdropping' on him, as in the case of several bugged conversations between drug dealers I have had to translate for a law-enforcement agency); but the translator knows that he is translating for somebody, and knows or tries to guess what that somebody's expectations, advantages and limitations are. He is, as a rule, being paid precisely to take them into account. Translation is communication, and communication does not begin or end in texts: it originates and culminates in the mind of human beings; texts are just the observable vehicles of such attempts at communicating. The translator's material work is, naturally, on the material of communication; he is not paid for words understood, for sense made out, for tropes re-created, but for words actually consigned to paper. A longer translation of a text will be paid more than a shorter one, even if, as Newmark rightly points out, the shorter version is more likely to be the better one. (I always end up losing money in my 'justification' leg.) But that is the translator's material, physically quantifiable work, even though, as we all know, lots of things go on between reading and writing. The first thing a translation theory should state, then, is that translation operates at the material ends of communication, but that such end-objects as original and translation are neither the beginning nor the end of communication, which is accomplished between subjects.

7 See note 7 above.
8 For an insightful analysis of situationality may I recommend the reader to check Neubert (1985) and, as mentioned, Lyskovskaia (1985).
9 "If you consider Faust's famous struggle to translate the word 'Logos,' a word that is virtually context-free, and therefore has to be translated for itself." (Newmark 1988a: 78).
10 García Landa has in the offering a gem of a book on this subject and much o' what I have to say on this score I owe to him. The reader will unfortunately have to wait for Teoria de la traduccion; I have read but a mangled torso of the work, partly in French, partly in Spanish and partly in both French and Spanish, full of typos and cryptic notes. If it were left as is and became García Landa's 'Unfinished' I would rank it with Schubert's. In it he develops the notions of 'linguistic percept,' 'signstruct,' 'linguistic perceptual space,' and others to be reckoned.
So the translator must be mindful of the communication situation between him and his readership. Features that were relevant for him as a reader of the original may become irrelevant for him as a writer of the translation and vice versa. Translation (as opposed to simultaneous or consecutive interpretation) presupposes displaced situationality and, in different situations, identity of meaning in no way assures identity of sense. As a matter of fact, the translator (and the interpreter) may well find himself in need of changing the meaning in order to preserve sense. This is the heart of translation theory; this dialectic tension between form and content at two basically different levels: linguistic and extra-linguistic, where the vector resulting from the combination of linguistic form and content becomes itself the form of the extra-linguistic sense. As García Landa expostulates, in order to see this you don't have to be a Marxist, just a translator.  

Newmark rejects both the idea that translation is always communication and — in actual practice — the notion that the meaning of words and other linguistic units and structures is subordinate to what the people who use language mean by them. He fails to acknowledge that there is the semantic meaning(s) any unit or even text may have from the standpoint of la langue and the dictionary, and then there is the meaning people want to make, which — deliberately or unwittingly — may be different from what their ‘utterance’ means, or simply not coincide totally with it. As a matter of fact, the latter is systematically the case, since one cannot possibly say all that one means, and, following the maxims of quantity, relation and cooperation, one conveys only as much linguistic information as necessary for successful communication. The Parisians and the Muscovites, among others, have suggested the terminological distinction of both ‘meanings’ followed here: ‘meaning’ for the semantic, ‘sense’ for the extra-linguistic. For instance, above, probably because of a typo, the sentence going “That particular sentence ... must be translated literally, since literal translation is always best provided it has the same communicative and semantic effect” makes no sense unless we a) put a comma between ‘best’ and ‘provided’ or b) add ‘if’ before ‘it.’ The error is slight and easily corrected in either case, but the meaning of the sentence changes, and with it the sense. How do we know which is the right interpretation, unless we give Newmark the benefit of the doubt and decide, as he himself stresses, that “the writer would never have written a drop of nonsense in the middle of a sea of sense?” (1988a: 34) (Notice how Newmark has to make the distinction, after all!) Refusing to make the formal differentiation makes no sense, unless one flatly refuses to accept the conceptual distinction. Newmark states, “The translation theorist is concerned from start to finish with meaning.” (1981: 23) What kinds of meaning? “Linguistic, ... referential, ... intentional, ... performative, ... subjective, ... inferential, ... cultural, ... code, ... pragmatic, [and] ... semiotic (the complete contextual meaning of the text extract)” (1981: 23-24) — which is, by the way, as close to an explanation of the expression ‘exact/precise/complete contextual meaning’ as Newmark gives us. “All varieties of meaning may or may not assist the translator. He is always expected to know the referential (encyclopaedic) as well as the linguistic (dictionary) meaning whether he makes use of them or not.” (1981: 24). I submit that the list, though quite exhaustive, is, at best, haphazard, with no order or priority. If translation theory has a basic task, it is precisely either itself to establish a hierarchy or to provide the translator with the criteria to come up with it in each specific instance. The polarisation between communicative and semantic translation, though pointing in the right direction, is obviously not exhaustive or specific enough. One last observation: a fundamental difference is at work between lexical and grammatical meaning; it ought to be stressed and explained. For instance, English morphology being less formalised than those of Spanish or French, an enormous number of lexical meanings are found simultaneously as nouns, adjectives and verbs, as in the case of ‘cable’ or ‘wall;’ this poses all manner of problems to the beginner — and not only to him. The least a literalist could do to help is to bring out such a distinction clearly.

The next article, “Thought, Speech and Translation,” is crucial (Newmark 1981: 57-58):

“When Vygotsky writes, ‘Inner speech is not the inferior aspect of external speech — it is a function in itself. It is to a large extent thinking in pure meanings’ he provides me with a source of reference for my definition of ‘semantic translation’ in contrast to ‘communicative translation’. I believe that the
primary activity, application and purpose of 
language in the mature adult is thinking, not speech 
or writing or communication or (self-) expression. It 
is not possible to prove or disprove this assertion, 
but merely to produce some evidence. First, one 
cannot think for long without having words in one's 
mind. ... Language therefore informs but does not 
comprise thinking. ... Moreover, whilst thought and 
writing are concurrent activities (it is not possible to 
write without continuous inner speech), the relation 
between thought and speech is intermittent — 
thought sparks off speech, and speech is frequently 
an automatism, a reflex action, the response to a 
stimulus and only 'weakly' the product of thought. 
Therefore thought is closer to writing than to 
speaking, and in this sense, writing, arising from and 
controlled by thought, has primacy over speaking. 
Further, when one listens to a person, one normally 
'thinks' only in the interstices of his conversation — 
otherwise one 'comprehends' wordlessly. ... When 
one is translating orally (simultaneous 
interpretation), one only starts thinking, in the sense 
of inner speech, when one is lost for a word or meets 
some difficulty; when one writes a translation one is 
thinking all the time."

For Newmark, then, writing goes always hand in hand 
with inner speech. I do not think so (nor, by the way, 
does Vygotsky): to begin with, in the booth, when lost 
for a word, I cannot afford to engage in anything 
resembling inner speech. I cannot vouch for the rest of 
my colleagues, but I doubt very much they do either. As 
to translating, again I do not think one is necessarily 
engaged all the time in inner speech, anymore than 
when one is writing an original piece, such as this one, 
for instance. Yes, very often I stop, ponder, wonder, 
argue with myself; that is inner speech indeed. But 
perhaps more often than not — I have no way of 
knowing — I just write, and my writing appendages seem 
to second-guess me pretty much the same way my 
phonatory organs do as I talk: my fingers become my 
tongue, the keyboard my mouth, the screen my voice. 

"If one accepts the proposition that thinking 
precedes speech and writing and therefore that the 
main purpose of language is not to communicate 
(since thought is by definition private and non-
communicative although it is partially, but never 
wholly, communicable) one has to review the now 
generally accepted arguments in favour of the 
'primacy of speech' or 'the priority of the spoken 
language' and reject the proposition that writing is 
merely a poor substitute for an imitation of speech 
[sic]."14 ... The most important reason for challenging 
the primacy of speech over writing is that writing is 
much more closely related physically and mentally to 
thought than is speech. Writing is permanent, it is 
used not necessarily because the addressee is 
inaccessible to speech, but because one wants to 
make a strong and durable impression on him. All the 
world's most important thoughts and statements ... 
were probably written before they were spoken. ... 
Speech, however, is often a response to a stimulus 
and though it is often preceded by thought, it is 
frequently thoughtless while it lasts." (1981: 58)

I, for one, do not accept that proposition.15 No 
serious linguist has ever questioned the primacy of 
speech. Writing is not closer to thought, and precisely 
because it is permanent. When one thinks, one 
improvises: when I sat down to write this paper, I did 
have a pretty good idea of what I wanted to say, i.e. the 
sense I wanted to make, but the words came to my 
fingers almost as they came to my mind. The lag is more 
noticeable because I am a hopeless typist, and that is 
why I normally record my translations (the best school 
of interpretation if anybody should have a mind to try the 
'other' thing). Writing is not a poor substitute or imitation 
of speech, not to me at least; I like writing very much. I 
think it is just another way of talking, with its specific 
pluses and minuses. On the other hand, moreover, if all 
important statements were written before they were 
said, they were thought before they were written, and 
they were thought following the rules of oral speech. 
They may have been edited and revised, and made more 
precise, and more effective, and more convincing, and 
more beautiful, perhaps in successive waves, but they 
were silently 'said' over and over, many times, before 
and after they were written, and I would bet they were 
ever uttered exactly as written. The spoken word must 
always have the last say; what would otherwise be the 
point of minding how a written text, whether original or 
translated, sounds?

"Where writing is closest to thought, where the 
reader is 'listening in' rather than being consciously 
addressed, the method of translation is normally 

14 Another sentence that I am not sure I completely understand: 
'substitute for an imitation' would seem to be an overkill unlikely of 
Newmark; I rather guess it is another typo: 'substitute for and imitation of speech' or, alternatively, 'substitu e for or imitation of speech.' As a 
translator I would hesitate to go either way.

15 I haven't seen Roger Roothauer's gem in Newmark's bibliography. 
Most of my ideas on the subject I have borrowed from him. One example 
I cannot refrain from quoting, since, to my mind, it puts to rest the 
controversy about 'non-verbal thinking'. When composing a symphony, 
the musician definitely thinks about his score, but hardly with words. The 
reader may also want to check Lyons and Wilss.
semantic. ... I take it as axiomatic that in thought or in monologue, the expressive function of language is predominant, the informative is incidental, the social and the phatic inoperative. ... Semantic translation, like thought, relates to the word or the word-group; communicative translation, like speech, relates to the sentence. ... The primary purpose of speech is to communicate, and communicative translation is related to speech as semantic translation is to thought. ... Usually, one translates a text to meet a reader's demands — to inform him, to persuade him, to give him advice. All this is communicative translation.” (1981: 59-60)

We can approach translation from different perspectives, as a result, as a process, as a mental activity, as linguistic transcoding, but whatever our standpoint, it is obvious that it must have materially observable ends: a SL text and a TL text, whether oral or written. No analysis of translation can do without texts. A good point to start our inquiry, then, is to ask ourselves what texts are. No one, I trust, will disagree that all texts are specific acts of speech. We may argue about the difference between langue and parole, about speech acts, about the relationship between thought and language, language and speech, thought and speech, etc.; but whatever the answer we may give to all those questions, texts remain acts of speech, thoughts or emotions uttered. No theory of translation, then, without a theory of texts, and no such theory of texts without a theory of speech. I assume Newmark and I are in agreement thus far. The premise for any theory of translation, whether general or specific, whether eclectic or not, is, therefore, a general theory of speech. A general theory of speech would have to be based on a general theory of language, which would explain the relationship between language and speech, on the one hand, and between language and thought on the other: a general theory of language as langue, i.e. as man's superior nervous activity via the second signal system. It is here that Newmark goes his way, and the Parisians, the Muscovites, the Leipzigers, myself and quite a few others — ours.

Peter Newmark assimilates translation to writing, to spontaneous inner speech, and also, up to a point, inner speech to thought, and thought to lucubration. His theory of language is therefore upside down, and with it, inevitably, his theory of translation. No; when we think, it is not as if we were writing; we talk, we talk to an imaginary interlocutor or directly to ourselves. All the rules of oral speech apply, including what might be, perhaps, the most important for translation: that of shared situationality and of the savoir partagé — the shared knowledge so stressed by the Parisians. We feel everything we feel and know everything we know, we are closely acquainted with all the relevant formants of the communicative situation between us and ourselves (except, perhaps, for the unconscious ones) therefore we can do with the utmost telegraphic inner speech. But we make the same mistakes and incur the same hesitations and detours as when we speak. We do not go back to edit our thought. We think with intonation and, yes, gestures very much in our mind — and often on our face. And when we write, we wish we could be talking, we wish the paper somehow kept track of our gestures and our voice. Punctuation marks, all manner of ways of marking intonation, inverted commas, exclamation marks, capitalisation, underlining and what not are our desperate attempt at bringing the silent, written text as close as we can to our mental uttering of it, in the hope that the reader will be able to reconstruct our voice and face. The great difference between written speech and the spoken word lies not so much in the former's congealment (a transcript of a conversation remains a piece of oral speech, and a statement read aloud is no less a piece of written speech), as in that when we write, we can go back and forth, reread, or simply stop to think, or choose the right psychological or physical moment, or do it over time. We can erase all the imperfections, ambiguities, redundancies and irrelevancies inevitable in oral speech; we can fill all the gaps, reorganise our exposition; it's a bit like the difference between a live performance and a studio recording. Writing allows us to review our own thinking. Thinking, like oral speech, is ephemeral. How many times have we had a brilliant thought, a historical insight, now forever lost for lack of pen and paper! Writing allows us to objectivise our thoughts, to take distance from them, to read them as if they were somebody else's. When we write, we are trying to convince, inform, move an imaginary or at least ideal addressee. When we read we become that addressee ourselves. Precisely: when we read, even our own writing, we also feel we are spoken to, and we react as to an interlocutor or, perhaps, a lecturer. More importantly, as we read, we talk to ourselves. We make our mental comments; we say 'Rubbish!' or 'Wow!' or 'How's that again?' or 'You bet!' or 'If only so and so could read this!' When faced with a difficult passage we paraphrase it, we discuss it with ourselves; we are always talking. When we are not talking, of course, we are, as Newmark states, comprehending wordlessly (so much for 'language-bound' thought!). And come to think

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of it, the stream of consciousness, even when modulated by such a master as Joyce, is not the easiest thing to read, much less write down. The closest thing to thought I’ve seen committed to paper is not the monologues of Hamlet or Richard III but those last seventy-odd pages of Ulysses.

So to the assertion that "all of the world’s most important thoughts and statements ... were written before they were spoken," I retort that they were mentally spoken before or as they were written. I retort moreover that the two capital works of Western literature were never written! Homer and all the great poets of antiquity were masters of the spoken word. There was, in fact, no other word. Would the Odyssey and the Iliad be any better if they had been written? Perhaps. Writing is a wonderful help; but it is not the primary mode of speech, let alone thought. What writing does is fix thought, allow for the working out of thought to give it better shape, to ‘signify’ it better. The better one is at speaking, the less one has to edit one’s writing.

"The concepts of communicative and semantic translation ... were formulated in opposition to the monistic theory that translation is basically a means of communication or a manner of addressing one or more persons in the speaker’s presence; that translation, like language, is purely a social phenomenon." (1981: 62)

One can concede, for argument’s sake, the point that language is not or need not be social, but texts, the linguistic materialisation of a communicative intention and the abstracting of sense thereof, cannot be but social. The closed book is not a text, but a pile of paper. In monologue one is ‘listening in,’ otherwise there is no monologue: Hamlet is alone on the stage, not in the theatre.

"In view of the fact that translation rests on at least three dichotomies — the foreign and native cultures, the two languages, the writer and the translator respectively, with the translation readership looming over the whole process (the facts of the matter — the extra-linguistic reality — is an additional powerful factor) — it seems unlikely that it can be incorporated in one theory. ... Lastly, behind this translation argument there is a philosophical conflict. This is said to be the age of reproduction, of the media, of mass-communication and I am suggesting that the social factor is only a part of the truth, continuously overemphasised by technology and the present political advance to democracy. Thus the 'expressive' text represents an individual, not wholly socialised nor conditioned, voice." (1981: 62)

My guess is that Newmark confuses a) theory, method, and approach; and b) the collective with the social. From the fact that translation rests on those three dichotomies — and much more — it does not follow that it cannot be incorporated into a single theory. What follows, rather, is that it must be incorporated into a theory capable of sorting out such contradictions, or at least help do that. What follows is, therefore, that the theory of translation must a) accept and b) explain that translation is subject to so many and qualitatively different tensions. It must then c) proceed to weigh those different factors against each other (the author, the original situation, the original readers, the transnational situation, the new readership, etc.), and d) provide insight and orientation as to the possible ways of harmonising those competing factors in a TL text. One of the main dichotomies being between meaning and sense, it must help the translator map his way between them. On the other hand, it is not a matter of the voice being socialised or conditioned — though I do not think it could be otherwise — but of communication, what the voice voices, which becomes social as soon as it is overheard. Hamlet does not know he is addressing an audience; but Shakespeare does, and any actor playing the Prince had better be aware of the 'listeners in'. Ditto the translator.

In the eighth section, "The Translation of Synonymy," Newmark reverts again to theoretical questions and devotes a couple of pages to Seleskovitch's interpretive theory. Here is the gist of his argumentation (1981: 98-99):

"... The brilliant Seleskovitch... has explained her interpretative theory of translation which is based on sense, not words or sentences; non-verbal not linguistic meanings; awareness of purpose, not of language; consciousness and language reflexes, not deductions from contrastive linguistics. ... The basis of [her] theory is unsound. Translation and interpretation have to be based on words, sentences, linguistic meaning, language. ... Meaning does not exist without words... It is difficult to understand Seleskovitch's final thesis: 'translation of language and rendering of sense are not to be confused; neither are linguistics and the science of translation', nor her peculiar distinction between 'sense' and 'meaning'. I can only maintain that translation is concerned with words, that it is only partially a science..., and that in as far as it is a science, it can only be based on linguistics."
The basis of Seleskovich’s theory is as sound as hard rock. When she says that one does not translate words, that one does not translate language, she is hitting the nail squarely on the head. That does not mean that words or language are irrelevant; what it does mean is that they are secondary, subordinate, vehicular, a means to an end. Who could seriously maintain that sense has nothing to do with words? What Seleskovich rightly asserts is that sense is larger than words, that it is sense that remains invariant when languages change, i.e., when words are substituted, or disappear, or seem miraculously to emerge in translation. Linguistics is, indeed, the basic science in translatology — at least for now — but it is hardly the only one; we are just beginning to grasp what language is, how languages work, and what goes on in the brain of people as they talk, understand and translate. That is precisely why so many novel concepts and insights have come from interpreters and people who study them. It is in the booth that translation — in the larger sense — can be ‘observed,’ and where interpreters, translating against all odds and with a tremendous time deficit, have had intuitively to come up with the essence, the bare bones, the no-nonsense gist of translation: they have proved the hard, irrefutable way that everything — even Shakespeare’s style — is negotiable and, yes, disposable under adverse circumstances, but that translation, as any other kind of communication, still succeeds as long as sense is conveyed, while it fails completely and inescapably if it is not. We can argue whether such or such other translation of Homer into Urdu or of the UN Charter into Spanish is good or bad or apt or inept, but we can only call it a translation insofar as we recognise the sense of the original in the translated text. As to the alleged peculiarity of Seleskovich’s distinction between meaning and sense, I can only say that, with the sole exceptions of Peter Newmark and Wolfram Wiss, every single source I have consulted, from Nida to Neubert — to mention his most often cited authors — openly or tacitly operates with that distinction, and that people as diverse as García Yebra, García Landa, Lvovskaja and Schweitzer (as early as 1973!) make the terminological difference as well.

Part Two is entitled “Some Propositions on Translation;” in its introduction we read (1981:113):

“In spite of the claims of Nida and the Leipzig translation school, who start writing on translation where others leave off, there is no such thing as a science of translation, and never will be.”

I wish I could be so certain about eternity as Newmark is. All I can say is that if there can be a science of the human psyche, complex and unpredictable as it is, there is no reason to posit the implausibility of a science of translation. I think, moreover, that a scientific observation of any phenomenon is possible, and that such observation — observation of practice verified in practice and by practice — and whatever general rules and principles it allows to infer deserve the name of science. What is science, after all, but experience made awareness, as Marx so tightly and rightly put it?

Our last quotation from Approaches will be from Proposition 54 (1981: 147):

“A lexical item repeated in the same or following sentence of the SL text must be correspondingly repeated in the TL text, unless the original is poorly or loosely written. It should not be rendered the second time by a synonym or a ‘kenning’ (periphrastic expression used to replace a simple name).”

This is, unquestionably, the most dogmatic statement about translation ever published.

I will not dwell on the rest of the book. It contains very useful insights, especially with regard to the translation of metaphor, a Newmark speciality (and in connection to which he must advise his students on occasion to turn it into ‘sense’). I shall next make a brief stopover at “The Translation of Authoritative Statements” (1982b:390) in order to discuss a most bewildering assertion:

“However, in his handling of authoritative statements, the translator has a responsibility to the moral and social truth, which he must exercise independently of his translation, viz. in a separate annotation. Where he believes it to be necessary he has to alert the TL reader to any explicit or latent expression of moral prejudice in the SL text, assuming (and it is some assumption), that he himself is committed to the kind of moral universals that are enshrined in the Constitutions, where they have one, of the countries influenced by the French Revolution. To be concrete: ‘blog’ means ‘non (British) Public School’; ‘gook’ means Vietnamese; ... ‘deficient’ may mean ‘mentally handicapped’, etc. It is not enough to note, as dictionaries do, that such words are ‘derogatory’ or ‘pejorative’. Further, I think that the translator should gloss a statement such as ‘I believe that Zionism is the worst form of racism and anti-human ideology our world has seen’ with a separate comment such as: ‘Israel has never had any extermination camps’. Such a comment is a fact
and does not commit him to a belief in Zionism or Israel."

By the same token, a statement such as "Zionism is the national liberation ideology of the Jewish people" should be glossed with "An ideology according to which one's people is the one chosen by God, and an ideology that deems anybody whose mother does not ethnically belong to the people to be excluded from their numbers, that assimilates race to religion, religion to state, state to territory and therefore territory to race cannot be liberating and is bound to become aggressive and dangerous." I think the UN is wise to award any such gloss by its translators with an automatic kick in the buttocks. Who is Peter Newmark, or Sergio Viaggio, or anybody else, to assume a translator's commitment to 'moral universals' (itself a more than dubious term) and tell him to act accordingly? Why translators? Why not everybody else? Newmark has the right to his principles and to live by them, but that tirade is, to my mind, completely out of place in any paper on translation.

And now let us move over to A Textbook, this time around, a single, more structured opus (though — alas! — far from systematic). It is here that Newmark propounds his theory with more vigour, and starting from the preface itself (1988a: xi-xii):

"I am somewhat of a 'lateralist', because I am for truth and accuracy. I think that words as well as sentences and texts have meaning, and you only deviate from literal translation when there are good semantic and pragmatic reasons for doing so, which is more often than not, except in grey texts. ... There are no absolutes in translation, everything is conditional, any principle (e.g. accuracy) may be in opposition to another (e.g. economy) or at least there may be tension between them. ... When Halliday writes that language is entirely a social phenomenon, ... I disagree. ... The single word is getting swamped in the discourse and the individual in the mass of society — I am trying to reinstate them both, to redress the balance. If people express themselves individually, in a certain type of text, translators must also express themselves individually, even if they are told they are only reacting to, and therefore conforming with, social discourse conventions of the time."

Already on page 5, the book asks the right question: "What is translation?" But the answer, as I warned, leaves a lot to be desired (1988a: 5-6):

"Often, though not by any means always, it is rendering the meaning of a text into another language in the way that the author intended the text. ... The principle with which this book starts is that everything without exception is translatable; the translator cannot afford the luxury of saying that something cannot be translated."

One more time, unless we are told what translation is always, we cannot accept that 'everything without exception is translatable.' Granted, the translator — and I speak from experience — can ill afford the luxury of rejecting a job as untranslatable; but many a time he has no alternative. Even if it were not so, it does not follow that everything is translatable: the fact that a physician cannot afford the luxury of saying that some patient cannot be cured does not mean that all patients are curable.

"A translator, perhaps more than any other practitioner of a profession, is continually faced with choices. ... In making his choice, he is intuitively or consciously following a theory of translation, just as any teacher of grammar teaches a theory of linguistics." (1988a: 8)

Indeed. But, once again, is there a general theory, a principle applied at all times, something that translation is always? If, as he states, this is the last book he plans to write on translation, we will probably never find out from Peter Newmark.

"In a narrow sense, translation theory is concerned with the translation method appropriately used for a certain type of text, and it is therefore dependent on a functional theory of language. However, in a wider sense, translation theory is the body of knowledge that we have about translating, extending from general principles to guidelines, suggestions and hints. (The only rule I know is the equal frequency rule, viz. that corresponding words, where they exist — metaphors, collocations, groups, clauses, sentences, word order, proverbs, etc. — should have approximately equal frequency, for the topic and register in question, in both ... [languages].) Translation theory ... is a frame of reference for translation and translation criticism, relating first to complete texts, where it has most to say, then, in descending level to ... words. ... What translation theory does is, first, to identify and define a translation problem (no problem — no translation theory!); second, to indicate all the factors that have to be taken into account in solving the problem; third, to list all the possible translation procedures; finally, to recommend the most suitable translation procedure, plus the appropriate translation." (1988a: 9)

Fine. But how does translation theory actually go
about doing what it does? And how can it come up with the appropriate translation? Of course, Newmark does not believe that there is one appropriate translation, but that and no other is the meaning of his words above (he may, of course, have a different sense in mind, though). Be that as it may, he more or less leaves the matter at that and takes us to the second chapter, "The Analysis of a Text" (1988a: 11).

"Understanding the text requires both general and close reading. ... Close reading is required, in any challenging text, of the words both out of and in context. In principle, everything has to be looked up that does not make good sense in its context."

Nothing wrong with that, and especially the irruption of sense. The next sections concern the intention of the text, that of the translator, text styles, readership, stylistic scales, attitude, setting, the quality of the writing, connotations and denotations, the last reading.

Conclusion:

"You have to study the text not for itself but as something that may have to be reconstituted for a different readership in a different culture." (p. 18)

Not a word about the situation as actualiser of sense, nary a word about sense itself. Let us read on:

"The Process of Translating" (Newmark 1988a: 19-20):

"My description of translating procedure is operational. It begins with choosing a method of approach. Secondly, when we are translating, we translate with four levels more or less consciously in mind: (1) the SL text level ..., (2) the referential level ..., (3) the cohesive level ... to which we may have to adjust the language level; (4) the level of naturalness. ... Finally there is the revision procedure, which may be concentrated or staggered according to the situation. This procedure constitutes at least half of the complete process. ... The purpose of this theory of translating is to be of service to the translator. It is designed to be a continuous link between translation theory and practice; it derives from a translation theory framework which proposes that when the main purpose of the text is to convey information and convince the reader, a method of translation must be 'natural'; if, on the other hand, the text is an expression of the peculiar innovative (or clichéd) and authoritative style of an author (whether it be a lyric [sic], a prime minister's speech or a legal document), the translator's own version has to reflect any deviation from a 'natural' style. ... 'Naturalness' is both grammatical and lexical, and is a touchstone at every level of a text, from paragraph to word, from title to punctuation. ... The level of naturalness binds translation theory to translating theory, and translating theory to practice."

As I pointed out, I, for one, do not choose a method of approach; I already have one, and I do not change it whatever the intention of the text or, more importantly, mine, since its first step is, precisely, to define them both. I will, though, choose a global approach to rewriting (along Newmark's scale) and adjust it specifically as required. The level of naturalness, on its part, is a formal linguistic level. It is indeed of the utmost importance, but I do not think it qualifies as the binding force between the theory of translation, the theory of translating, and practice. As I have emphasised, the binding force is the level of sense, or, rather, the dialectic relationship between sense and meaning, thought and language, content and form; the synthesis between form (itself a synthesis between language's planes of form and content) and content (itself a synthesis of communicative intention and extralinguistic reality) of verbal communication. A translation may be more or less natural, more or less literal, more or less semantic, more or less communicative, more or less oral, more or less written; but it will always have to make the right extra-linguistic sense in the right linguistic way. That is what adequacy is all about, no more, no less.

"The heart of translation theory is translation problems...; translation theory broadly consists of, and can be defined as, a large number of generalisations of translation problems." (p. 21)

Well, perhaps, insofar as medicine broadly consists of, and can be defined as, a large number of generalisations of health problems. But stating things like that, and approaching translation exclusively as the translation of this particular text, is more or less like teaching surgery as operating upon this particular patient.

"Working on the text level, you intuitively and automatically make certain 'conversions'; you transpose the SL grammar (clauses and groups) into their 'ready' TL equivalents and you translate the lexical units into the sense that appears immediately appropriate in the context of the sentence." (p. 22)

Indeed that is what most students do, and it is dead wrong! Intuition and automatism, unless properly built up, lead systematically astray. The student must be taught to mistrust both. Experience shows that translationese is invariably rampant throughout the first stages of any translator's training (sometimes never to be overcome). The student's linguistic intuition is
blocked by the SL forms. It has to be restored; and that will never happen automatically. The automatism to be instilled is precisely the opposite to 'converting,' 'transposing', and blithely laying hands on 'ready' equivalents. The student must learn that, as in the case of weapons, words may be the veteran's trusted friends, but are the rookie's lethal enemies. The student must discipline himself into avoiding rushing into the arms of ready equivalents. It is the imperative task of the teacher to slap him on the wrist every time he does 16.

"Your base level ... is the text. ... [Then comes the referential level.] Always, you have to be able to summarise in crude lay terms, to simplify at the risk of over-simplification, to pierce the jargon, to penetrate the fog of words. ... Thus your translation is some hint of a compromise between the text and the facts. For each sentence, when it is not clear, when there is an ambiguity, when the writing is abstract or figurative, you have to ask yourself: What is actually happening here? and why? For what reason, on what grounds, for what purpose? Can you see it in your mind? Can you visualise it? If you cannot, you have to 'supplement' the linguistic level, the text level with the referential level, the factual level with the necessary additional information (no more) from this level of reality, the facts of the matter. ... This may or may not take you away temporarily from the words in the text. And certainly it is all too easy to immerse yourself in language and to detach yourself from the reality, real or imaginary, that is being described. ... You have to gain perspective to stand back from the language and have an image of the reality behind the text. ... The referential level, where you mentally sort out the text, is built up out of, based on, the clarification of all linguistic difficulties. ... You build up the referential picture in your mind when you transform the SL into the TL text; and, being a professional, you are responsible for the truth of this picture. Does this mean ... that the (SL) words disappear' or that you 'deverbalise concepts'? Not at all, you are working continuously on two levels, the real and the linguistic, life and language, reference and sense, but you write, you 'compose' on the linguistic level, where your job is to achieve the greatest possible correspondence, referentially and pragmatically, with the words and sentences of the SL text." (pp. 22-23)

16 The reader is referred to read Wiss (1969), where a thorough analysis of translation behaviour awaits him.

The words could not be more eloquently chosen: 'conversions,' 'transpose,' 'ready,' 'the context of the sentence'. Do you deverbalise concepts? What for? Look at the SL text; start transcoding; check if reality does not play a trick on you; go on transcoding. On the other hand, is not 'visualising' what is going on but a retreat from language, an outright de-verbalisation? As to the referential level being 'built out of, based on, the clarification of all linguistic difficulties,' I find it normally to be the other way around: it is precisely the referential level that actually helps sort out those very linguistic trouble spots, as I shall illustrate a couple of paragraphs down the line. In other words, it is not by understanding the linguistic utterance that you come to know the world, but by knowing the world that you come to understand the utterance; i.e. you attribute a specific sense to it. Of course, the linguistic utterance thus understood, or rather its sense (and not the way it is linguistically expressed), becomes itself a new element that adds to and modifies one's knowledge of the world, and will in turn further contribute to understanding new and more sophisticated statements. I have mentioned several authors, I know what they have written, I am influenced by it, I am, up to a point, the product of what other people have said, but I scarcely remember any words; they have evanesced 17, but their sense has very much stayed with me and is partially spilled over these pages. It is that extra-linguistic knowledge that helps me understand and dispute Newmark's words. With regard to the translator building up the referential picture in his mind 'when he transforms the SL text into the TL text,' that picture should be well established before the writing actually begins, unless the translator translates as he reads (which is what I normally do when translating a text on a subject I trust myself in); the student, however, should most definitely be advised against setting out to write before he has understood, and the crucial component of that understanding, the understanding of sense, is precisely the picture of what is actually going on 'in the world.' Lastly, translating is not 'transposing' a text into another, but generating a completely new one.

"Beyond the second factual level of translating, there is a third, generalised, level linking the first and the second level, which you have to bear in mind. This is the 'cohesive' level; it follows both the structure and the moods of the text: the structure ... follows the train of thought. ... This is where the

17 The 'evanescence of words' principle is brilliantly discussed by Garcia Landa (1981 and 1985b).
findings of discourse analysis are pertinent." (pp. 23-24)

No quarrel with that necessary statement, but it is too late, too weak, too short. Of course, nobody can guess the presuppositions, the macropropositions and the propositions before reading the words, but one has not understood the text until one has grasped its conceptual and argumentative framework. Going about translating without a clear notion of the global picture is very much like painting a landscape tree by tree and figure by figure without having perspective or composition in mind. Which is, indeed, exactly the way novices translate and paint.

"The Level of Naturalness":

"With all that, for all texts (except the ones you know are 'odd' or badly written but authoritative, innovatory or 'special', e.g., where a writer has a peculiar way of writing which has to be reproduced — so for philosophy, Heidegger, Sartre, Husserl; so for fiction any surrealist, baroque, and certain Romantic writers) — for the vast majority of texts, you have to ensure: (a) that your translation makes sense; (b) that it reads naturally. ... [But] a translation of serious innovative writing ... may not sound natural, may not be natural to you, though if it is good it is likely to become more so with repeated readings. ...

You may find [the above] sentences [one from Ramuz and one from Thomas Mann] unnatural. Yet, in spite of numerous lexical inadequacies ... this is what Ramuz and Thomas Mann wrote, and we cannot change that." (p. 24-25)

But translating means, by definition, changing that. Take this Japanese sentence, literally rendered by E. Seidensticker: "The I yesterday to you introduced from Osaka aunt tomorrow afternoon on the Sea Breeze Express is going back." I do not know who the author of the text is, but I would imagine it could have come from a novel. We had better change that. If an author achieves an aesthetic effect through his idiosyncratic use of language, the translator must definitely try and do the same. Now 'the same' is not merely aping the form, but achieving with it as close an effect as possible. Seidensticker mentions a tendency in some contemporary Japanese writers to imitate 'Western' syntactic clarity (bending backwards, it would seem, to compensate for the absence of relative pronouns in their language); how would, say, an English translator go about reproducing a deviation of the original meant to make it sound more like English?

"Normally, you can only do this by temporarily disengaging yourself from the SL text, by reading your own translation as though no original existed." (p. 24)

Indeed one should read the translation as if it were not such. Normally, the translation should become an original in its own right, whether innovative or natural: the way the original itself is, whether natural or innovative, an original. That indeed can only be achieved by disengaging oneself from the SL text; that is what deverbalisation accomplishes: a translation that will read as though no original existed.

"The Unit of Translating":

"Normally you translate sentence by sentence..., running the risk of not paying enough attention to the sentence-joins. If the translation of a sentence has no problems, it is based firmly on literal translation..., plus virtually automatic and spontaneous transpositions and shifts, changes in word order etc. ... The first sign of a translation problem is where these automatic procedures from language to language, apparently without intercession of thought (scornfully referred to as transcodage by the ESIT School of Paris), are not adequate. ... The mental struggle between the SL words and the TL thought then begins. How do you conduct this struggle? Maybe if you are an interpreter ... you try to forget the SL words, you deverbalise, you produce independent thought, you take the message first, and then perhaps bring the SL words in. If you are like me, you never forget the SL words, they are always the point of departure; you create, you interpret on the basis of these words." (pp. 30-31)

Well, I am an interpreter, and deverbalising is exactly what I try to do. I have fought a long and gallant battle against my wrong 'literalist' instincts and prevailed. I now deverbalise 'automatically' and 'intuitively,' although, of course, sometimes I fail to and the result is, at best, a mangled utterance, and at worst — sheer nonsense. And deverbalising, by the way, is exactly what I try to do — more successfully, there being so much more time available — when I translate or write my own stuff, as in this case. Mind you, I am not an interpreter turned translator, but very much the inverse turncoat, steeped in the theory and practice of poetic translation since college days. I can vouch that when Seleskovitch avers that the practice of interpretation carries within it the theory of translation, that in
simultaneous interpretation the (good) interpreter minds well nigh sense alone, de-verbalised (i.e. extra-linguistic, abstracted from any specific linguistic clothing), she knows very well whereof she speaks; I, for one, had come to the same conclusion on my own. Let me show you what I mean.

Last year, I had to translate into Spanish a hopelessly written text on demography. This was the most difficult sentence in it: "Tabulations were prepared on the 'behaviorally infecund' married women (i.e. currently married women who had a noncontraceptive [sic] open birth interval of at least five years)." Now, I defy any average reader to understand by sheerly adding the semantic meaning of the 'words' what the deuce the fellow is talking about; I challenge, moreover, any translator to produce a sensible TL text without letting go of the SL words. I, for one, went about it the way I universally propound: first I tried to understand the language. That I could. I knew the meanings of 'behaviorally', 'infecund,' 'non', 'contraceptive', 'open', 'birth', and 'interval'. Still I wasn't sure what the relationship was between 'behaviorally' and 'infecund', nor could I glean it that easily out of the explanation in the text.

I thus proceeded to play Sherlock Holmes, to examine the clues, to treat the meaning of the words as circumstantial evidence of sense. First and foremost, since I could not identify 'behaviorally infecund' with the definition, I sought to find out 'behaviorally infecund' as opposed to what? Translating sentence by sentence (which is indeed the way I, and most colleagues I know, normally work) can do more than risk losing sight of the connections between them, but of their specific contribution to global sense. According to the context, the other 'currently married' women were a) those who 'thought' they were infecund and were not asked about their contraceptive practice, b) those who were fecund and practiced contraception, and c) those who were fecund but wanted more children and therefore were not practicing contraception. Obviously, the 'behaviorally infecund' were not to be confused with any of the others. So they did not think they were infecund, they did not want any more children, they were however not practicing contraception, but they were nevertheless having no offspring. Do you follow me? Good! because it took me a very long time to bring you and myself to this insight. By the way, do you remember how the original definition read? Neither do I; I'm afraid we have forgotten the words — let alone about them. So let's go back to it, shall we? 'Currently married women who had a noncontraceptive open birth interval of at least five years.' Okay... So they are 'women who at the time of the survey were living with a man and had spent at least five years without practicing contraception and without having children.' This, then, is the 'message,' the 'concept,' deverbalised in that it is not wedded to any specific linguistic formulation (definitely not to 'noncontraceptive open birth interval of at least five years').

And now, how do I say this in Spanish? What about 'Casadas en ese momento que habían pasado al menos cinco años sin tener hijos ni usar anticonceptivos' [currently married women who had spent at least five years without having any children or practising contraception]. The 'name' remains a problem, though. How can we couple 'infecundas' to 'actitud/comportamiento/conducta'? I was so elated at having solved the semasiological puzzle, that I forgot about my own proselytising and on my onomasiological way back went for a literal 'infecundas de actitud', not realising that 'behaviour' had nothing to do with the phenomenon. Later that year, I posed the problem to my students at the Centro Internacional de Conferencias, in Buenos Aires; one of them said, 'Oh, yes; I was one of them. I spent five years trying to have a baby with my first husband but I could not. We were both checked and everything looked normal. They told me I was 'Infecunda sin causas aparentes' [infertile for no apparent reason].' I shall never forgive myself for not having thought of that one!

Another example, this time a legal text I had to translate for a Latin-American client: the original, an excerpt from a US law, read, if memory serves me right, roughly as follows: 'In the case that a person found guilty of a crime under this section has previously been convicted of such crime under this section, then such person shall be liable to an additional fine of...'. Now, that can be translated quite literally as 'Toda persona hallada culpable de un delito en virtud del presente apartado que con anterioridad hubiera sido hallada culpable de idéntico delito será multada con... ' or any such legalese. I suspect this orthodox semantic approach — it is after all a Law — would leave Newmark happy. That is a pity, because I translated 'Todas las reincidencias serán multadas con...' (taking due advantage of the legal concept Spanish has found a name for, i.e. the sense it is able to signify as a lexical meaning). Which, by the way, is the one case not contemplated by Newmark, namely when two or more SL units can be combined in

19 It can further be improved to 'aparentemente infecundas' since the definition makes the concept crystal-clear.
the TL (a 'traitement' Malone calls 'reduction')

"By rule of thumb you know literal translation is likely to work best and most with written, prosy, semi-
formal, non-literary language, and also with innova-
tive language; worst and least with ordinary
spoken idiomatic language. Further, it is more often
effectively used than most writers on translation,
from Cicero to Nida and Neubert (but not Wilss), lead
you to believe. ... Primarily, you translate by the
sentence, and in each sentence, it is the object and
what happens to it that you sort out first. Further, if
the object has been previously mentioned, or it is the
main theme, you put it in the early part of the
sentence, whilst you put the new information at the
end, where it normally gets most stress. ... Your
problem is normally how to make sense of a difficult
sentence. ... Below the sentence, you go to
clauses, both finite and non-finite, which, if you are
experienced, you tend to recast intuitively. ... Difficulties with words are of two kinds: (a) you do
not understand them; (b) you find them hard to
translate. ... But be assured of one thing: the writer
must have known what he wanted to say: he would
never have written a drop of nonsense in the middle
of a sea of sense. ... You have to force your word
(usually it is a word) into sense, you have to at least
satisfy yourself at last that there are no other
reasonable alternatives. ... So far I have been
assuming that the word is more or less context-free
—and I do think that far more words are more or less
context-free than most people imagine. ... You are
over- or under-translating most of the time, usually
the latter. ... But my last word is this: be accurate. ...
Many translators say you should never translate
words, you translate sentences or ideas or
messages. I think they are fooling themselves. The
SL texts consist of words, that is all that is there, on
the page." (pp. 31-37)

Again, Newmark beckons his students to translate
language; after all, there is nothing but words on the
page (hieroglyphs and Chinese characters apparently
do not count, nor do knots, which are on no page
whatsoever). This is not so, as I hope I will be able to
demonstrate further on. Maybe far more words are
context-free than I, for one, imagine; but that is not the
point. The point is that there are many, many, many
more words that are not context-free than most
students imagine. The student must be taught to
mistrust both his reflexes and the dictionary; not that
dictionaries are inherently wrong, bad, or evil, but that
students are not aware of the difference between langue
and parole, and their reflex — the wrong reflex they
have to overcome in order to acquire the right one — is
to translate the former for the latter. Newmark even
mocks those who advise to translate sentences rather
than words. His distinction cuts not even between
linguistic meaning and extra-linguistic sense, but
between words, on the one hand, and sentences, ideas
and messages on the other. Newmark’s advice reminds
me of my granny, who would give us candy before
supper and defeat my mother’s strenuous struggle to
educate us for adulthood.

In the next chapter, "Language Functions, Text-
categories and Text-types," Newmark makes the crucial
assertion I have been harping on time after time:

"I suggest that all translations are based implicitly on
a theory of language." (p. 39) He then proceeds to
quote Buhler’s and Jakobson’s functions;
expressive, informative, vocative, aesthetic, phatic
and metalingual... and that’s about all. Then come
"Translation Methods." It starts by stating that "the
central problem of translating has always been
whether to translate literally or freely." (p. 45)
and sets about to articulate his communicative versus
semantic approaches.

"I should first say that only semantic and
communicative translation fulfil the two main aims of
translation, which are first, accuracy, and second,
economy." (p. 47)

I shall again refrain from commenting on Newmark’s
crucial contribution to translatoology, which will be dwelt
upon later. The reader is encouraged to read what our
author has to say about, among other things, the unit of
translation. One last reminder that Newmark fails to see
adequacy above accuracy, and on we jump to page 70,
where, yet again, we hear the leitmotif:

"I believe literal translation to be the basic
translation procedure, both in communicative and
semantic translation, in that translation starts from
there. However, above the word level, literal
translation becomes increasingly difficult. When
there is any kind of translation problem, literal
translation is normally (not always) out of the
question." (p. 70)

Words cannot be translated as such, because
neither language per se nor any of its units makes
sense inherently. Languages can have roughly
equivalent units, semantically, stylistically and
functionally, within their systems, such as 'man' and

20 Malone (1998); a most interesting approach that develops Vinay &
Dabernet’s procédés.
'hombre' or 'eat' and 'comer,' which explains their statistically parallel appearance in parallel contexts (whether original or translated, it makes no difference at all — it is not that 'to eat' is 'normally' literally translated as 'comer,' but that when an English speaker 'eats' a speaker of Spanish usually 'come'). That, for sheer unadulterated comfort, one should start seeking what may lie closest at hand (what's the point of searching for another synonym for 'comer' just for the sake of not writing the word that immediately comes to mind?) is a criterion that can be entertained (dangerous as it may prove for the beginner), but saying that literal translation comes first is at best dogmatic.

"Literal translation above the word level is the only correct procedure if the SL and TL meaning correspond, or correspond more closely than any alternative; that means that the referent and the pragmatic effect are equivalent, i.e. that the words not only refer to the same 'thing' but have similar associations." (p. 70)

I agree one hundred percent. I also believe, on the other hand, that free translation at the text level is the only correct procedure if the SL and TL sense correspond or correspond more closely than any alternative; that means that the sense and the pragmatic effect are adequately equivalent, i.e. that the 'different' words not only make the same 'sense' but have adequately similar associations. Any translation is the only correct procedure if the SL and the TL meaning correspond more closely than any alternative and equivalent effect is maintained!

"For me, a translation can be inaccurate, it can never be too literal. ... If translation is to be regarded — if only partially — as 'scientific', it has to: a) reduce its options to the taste area; b) in claiming accuracy and economy as its main aims, reject both the open choices and the random paraphrasing of free translation; c) eliminate the universal negative connotations of and prejudices against literal translation." (p. 72)

For me, translation can be inadequate, it can never be too free. Besides, I think there are many more widespread, universal prejudices against free translation. Those universal 'negative connotations of' and 'prejudices' against literal translation are found not in most translators — let alone most people — but among most translators, i.e. most practitioners who have reflected thoroughly and deeply upon our discipline, and sought to bring out its essence and specificity. They may be wrong, of course, but it would be too much of a coincidence: all the Leipzigers (Neubert, Kade, Wotjak, Cartellieri, Jäger); all the Russians (Barkhudarov, Kommissarov, Lvovskaja, Schweitzer, Fjodorov, Chernov); all the Parisians, both French and Canadian (Seleskovitch, Déjean Le Féal, Pergnier, Lederer, Bertone, Ladmiral, Gile, Thiéry, Delisle, García Landa); Italian Gran, Hungarian Radó, Spaniard García Yebra, Nigerian Simpson, Vietnamese Ton That Thien and Chinese Dan Shen; Snell-Hornby, Di Virgilio, Mossop and Roothauer, my humble self... We may be indeed prejudiced, but those prejudices are the result of deep and knowledgeable judgement.

"Many theorists believe that translation is more a process of explanation, interpretation and reformulation of ideas than a transformation of words; that the role of language is secondary, it is merely a vector or carrier of thoughts. Consequently everything is translatable, and linguistic difficulties do not exist. My position is that everything is translatable up to a point, but that there are often enormous difficulties." (pp. 72-73)

I am definitely one of them. A different theory of language accounts for that. But I do not think for a moment that linguistic difficulties therefore do not exist. On the contrary. And not only when the aesthetic or metalingual functions are involved. I do not know of any theorist who believes that everything is translatable (except Newmark himself, although this statement seems shyer than the one in Approaches quoted earlier) or that there are no such things as linguistic difficulties (certainly not Seleskovitch or Delisle!). But that language is secondary, in that it is not the aim, nor the object, nor the end of communication; that we do not choose to translate or are asked or paid to translate language but sense; that when Gorbachev speaks or García Márquez writes, they are using language in order to say something, to express something, to make a point, and not merely toying with it, cannot, I think, sensibly be denied.

I could have chosen a different example; I could have chosen a different way of saying what I've just jotted down; for instance, I could have written "I might have selected linguistic expressions other than the ones I used." I could have organised my whole argument in a different way. I could, indeed, have written this paper in Spanish. It would still be the same argument, I would be making exactly the same sense; not a bit more or less, although the particular freedoms and servitudes of either language, or my better or worse command thereof, might help or hamper its effectiveness here or there.

"All the same, we do translate words, because there
is nothing else to translate; there are only words on the page; there is nothing else there. We do not translate isolated words, we translate words all more or less (and sometimes less rather than more, but never not at all) bound by their syntactic, collocational, situational, cultural and individual idiolectal contexts. That is one way of looking at translation, which suggests it is basically lexical. This is not so. The basic thought-carrying element of language is its grammar. But since the grammar is expressed only in words, we have to get the words right. The words must stretch and give only if the thought is threatened." (p. 73)

Newmark says that there is nothing but words on paper; I submit, instead, that there is nothing but shapes. They become words for those who can read the language, the same way the ‘peep-peep-peep’ of the telegraph becomes letters to anyone who knows the Morse code (and is not deaf), but turns into words only for those who, besides, know the language (and spells a ‘message’ only for those who, on top of it all, can make sense out of them). Newmark has already seen on the page something that is not there to begin with: words are but one possible interpretation of the shapes. How can we tell, in the abstract, that the shape ‘x’ is a letter rather than a cross or an erasure, or a symbol for a crossing? (What about an unknown Chinese character, for that matter?) And even when the shapes can be construed as words, one has still to interpret them further. What language is this sentence in: ‘Vengo,’ Italian or Spanish? If it is Spanish ['I’m coming'], that’s one thing; but if it is Italian, then the Spanish translation would probably be ‘Voy’ ['I’m going'], its semantic antonym! Saying that all there is on the page are words is only slightly more helpful than asserting that all there is are contrasts. The shapes have to be interpreted into words, the words into a linguistic structure, and that linguistic structure into a text, into something being said. And, as I pointed out above, that something is not first person singular, present indicative, ‘love,’ objective case, first person singular, personal pronoun, assertion; those are merely the means the speaker has chosen among the resources offered by the English language in order to convey a ‘sense.’

If we do not take his sentence’s ‘meaning’ for his acumen’s sense, then sense must be sought elsewhere, behind, beyond, above or beneath those words. Newmark, though, is quite right in reminding us that there is nothing but words on the page. Those are our clues. We also know that we ‘mean’ much more than we can possibly say, and that, normally, we say no more than we consider reasonably enough to be understood (what Marianne Lederer brilliantly propounds as the principle of ‘synecdoche,’ i.e. the part mentioned for the whole meant). The translator must make sure that he has understood all that the author wanted him to understand and, normally, much more. And he cannot be satisfied with having himself understood: he must now proceed to make someone else understand; the situation, vehicle (language) and addressees having been substituted, he must assess the formal accommodations newly necessitated to ensure successful communication. Now, if the page has less ‘meaning’ than the author intended to convey, if there’s ‘meaning’ that has been left unsaid or implied, if it somehow exists without the actual support of words, then there is a distinction between meaning actually signified and meaning meant. As I stated, Newmark refuses to distinguish between meaning (linguistic, linguistically signified, semantic, of words and structures) and sense (non-linguistic, whether signified as meaning or not), but he cannot make believe they do not exist. It is more than a pity to relinquish such a comfortable distinction: it is outright dangerous.

Newmark reacts — justifiably, in my opinion — against the extremism of some Parisians, but he drops the baby with the bath-water. Most of my sources believe language to be secondary. It doesn’t follow that the words of the original have to be completely disregarded. They must of necessity be taken into account; after all, that is all the (linguistic) ‘evidence’ of sense the translator has. That evidence has next to be interpreted. Once interpreted, the particular exhibits must be momentarily forgotten, so they will not unduly interfere with the re-expression stage. But as soon as the translator has come up with a suitable re-expression, he has to double- and triple-check it against the original, not only for accuracy, but also for style and function, i.e. adequacy. And this is precisely what Newmark was telling us above, but not forcefully enough.

One last caveat: when I spoke about the difference between meaning ‘meant’ and meaning ‘signified,’ I had in mind both what was intentionally left implied or unsaid and what was unwittingly left off, as it were. It is not enough to state that what was intentionally tacit must be also left unsaid in the translation. If the author does not want to say something, even though he means it, we are dealing with one kind of communicative intention: there is a secondary speech act behind the observable one.

21 Lederer (1976).
If, on the other hand, the author left something unsaid because it is linguistically or semantically unnecessary, redundant, bothersome or irrelevant for his addressees (if it violates any of the maxims of conversation), then this is a qualitatively different intention: in this case there is no secondary act intended. Secondary acts, perlocution, circumlocution and the like, must normally remain so in the translation. But this does not exonerate the translator from understanding the unsaid even in order to leave it in turn tactful. On the other hand, anything that becomes necessary and relevant to the addressees of the translation must be made explicit, the empty case valencies being a perfect example at the sheer linguistic level (i.e. the TL structurally demands more explicitness on the part of the translator), and the need for additional situational information another one at the level of sense (for instance, in Argentina, a ‘Comodoro’ is an Air Force officer, while in the UK ‘Commodores’ are navy men; therefore ‘Comodoro’ will have to be rendered as ‘Air Force General’ or, perhaps, ‘Air Force Commodore’). By the way, the reverse is also true: elements that become linguistically or situationally redundant ought to go. In the English-language newspaper The Buenos Aires Herald, the editorial is systematically published in its original and in Spanish translation; in one of the pieces, mention was made of ‘Air Force Commodore Estrella’, who had been involved in an attempted coup d’état a few days earlier. The translation duly went ‘Comodoro de la Fuerza Aérea’, an egregious case of over-translation if the ever was one, equivalent to saying ‘Navy Admiral’; the maxim of quantity (one should not say more than needed to convey sense) is so grossly violated that the translation becomes either patronising or asinine, depending on the reader’s mood.

Newmark is perfectly right when he asserts that the translator’s fidelity to Churchill or Shakespeare may outweigh his fidelity to the reader, but he forgets that both Churchill and Shakespeare wanted very much to communicate (although not at any price, as he rightly warns elsewhere). If the translator forgets that, he is not being faithful to his author. If he could consult either, neither of them would tell him, “Just translate my words as I said them and if people don’t understand them or are not impressed, that’s their problem”22. I am sure Newmark himself would want any translation of his books to be accurate, pleasing and convincing.

22 “Jorge Luis Borges had a fine sense of how words are used and of their Swiftian limitations when he told his translator not to write what he said but what he wanted to say.” G. Rabassa, in “No Two Snowflakes Are Alike: Translation as Metaphor,” in Biguanei and Schulte (1989: 2).
originally performed by the author when translating his thoughts into language; nothing at all! Provided the translation makes the same sense, that it proves adequate, semantically, pragmatically, idiolectally, situationally and what have you, who cares about 'eat' and 'comer'? If Newmark or anybody else, myself included in many instances, finds fault with a translation as being too free, i.e. being inadequate because of arbitrary liberties taken by the translator, he and any knowledgeable critic can justly condemn it. But exactly the same applies to a translation being inadequate because of excessive, arbitrary literalness. It is not that a translation should or shouldn't be literal or free a priori, for all texts and all times and for any pair of languages. A translation should be adequate. Not adequate in the abstract; there is no such thing, as Nida brilliantly pointed out. Adequate for its purpose. If it is adequate, then it follows that it is good that it is literal or that it is good that it is free. I fail to see Newmark's point.

"I am not suggesting that any more or less context-free SL word must always be translated one-to-one or literally by its 'usual' TL equivalent. The SL word may: (a) be used more frequently (within the register); (b) have a wider semantic range than the corresponding TL word. Thus hardiness may translate as 'effrontery' (pejorative) as well as 'daring' (positive, honorific) depending on the context. But la plaine which appears almost to coincide in frequency and semantic range with 'the plain' will always translate as 'plain', unless it is the alternative spelling of 'plane' (plane)." (p. 75).

What if it doesn't rhyme with the word it is supposed to rhyme with, what if it can be replaced by a deictic, what if it can be replaced by 'it' (as opposed to 'she/he') unambiguously whilst the French 'elle' would prove equivocal, or altogether omitted (viz. in Spanish) as a tacit subject; what if it does rhyme with the following word or bring in an undesired alliteration; what if it is used metalingually; what, in short, if the text, that "ultimate court of appeal" (1988b: 116), advises against it? How can anybody, much less such a knowledgeable and able translator as Newmark, claim that any word, even 'endocrinology,' must always be translated by any other given word?

"Literal translation is the first step in translation, and a good translator abandons a literal version only when it is plainly inexact, or, in the case of a vocative or informative text, badly written. A bad translator will always do his best to avoid translating word for word. Re-creative translation — contextual re-creation" as Delisle calls it — which means, roughly, translating the thoughts behind the words, sometimes between the words, or translating the sub-text, is a procedure which some authorities and translation teachers regard as the heart or the central issue of translation ("get as far away as possible from the words"). The truth is the opposite: 'interpret the sense, not the words' is, to my mind, the translator's last resource; an essential resource, certainly, and a touchstone of his linguistic sensitivity and creativity, not to mention his alertness and perspicacity, when words mislead." (p. 76).

I guess that Newmark's bad translators must be better than many good ones I know (and that he has not had the chance of rejoicing in the Spanish 'translations' rife in the U.S). Getting as far away as possible from the words is the only way to make absolutely sure one has understood the sense those self-same words were meant to carry. It means re-expressing without the specter of the SL haunting the translator, or, worse, shackling him. It does not mean never again minding or even looking back at them (except in the booth, where they are gone and you wouldn't have the time anyway); yet precisely by momentarily forgetting about the SL words I have been able to come up with ten or so of the very few metrical translations of Pushkin into Spanish, and I am quite proud of them. Besides, one does not 'interpret the sense'; what one interprets is, precisely, the 'words,' sense is the result of that interpretation. To my mind, by the way, the last resource of any translator is to translate the words and not the sense; it happens when one has not been able to make sense out of them and hopes that sheer transcoding will do the trick, knowing, in the bottom of one's heart, that it most probably will not.

"Looking at translation in an ideal sense", Gadamer has pointed out that 'no translation can replace the original, ... the translator's task is never to copy what is said, but to place himself in the direction of what is said (i.e. in its meaning) in order to carry over what is to be said into the direction of his own saying'. Again, this reliance on the vouloir dire and the significance of what the SL text deliberately left unsaid can be dangerous, and applies only to the most difficult texts, where some kind of interpretation and hermeneutics are essential if the translator is to be active, to 'become again the one saying the text" (p. 79).

This is exactly what I did with the 'noncontraceptive five-year open birth interval' or whatever the words were (I forget). It would probably not qualify as one of the
most difficult texts requiring some kind of interpretation and hermeneutics (except that all texts require interpretation, even that 'I love you' we were supposed to translate literally in view of its SVO unmarkedness). All it takes is... well, common sense, good knowledge of the world and an adequate competence at writing one's own texts, if for no other purpose than to make someone else's sense — albeit in hendecasyllables and alexandrines.

I have brought the reader rather laboriously through some two hundred pages of Newmark's basic theoretical thought and precepts. The rest of them, as well as his other works, go into the specifics. May I now add a few rhapsodic comments.

As Newmark says, there can be no theory of translation without a theory of language. Mariano Garcia Landa has stated, and I tend to agree wholeheartedly with him, that the (not 'a') theory of translation is the theory of language. When Newmark denies the possibility of a single theory, when he refuses to accept the existence of translatorial, when he predicts that there will never be a science of translation, when he speaks of the two 'methods' of translating, when he says that there is no distinction between linguistic meaning and extra-linguistic sense, when he goes on to say that thinking is akin to writing rather than to speaking, he is refusing to tackle language as language, as the specifically human second signal system, socially generated and developed, regardless of its individual, apparently 'non-social' use (I say apparently, because language is social even when we use it to talk to ourselves or to lucubrate). We could not objectivate our experience without it. No one can develop language on his own. If Newmark were shipwrecked in a desert island without books, he wouldn't know English any better when rescued.

In criticizing Seleskovich, Newmark points out that a translation theory that cannot account for the translation of literature is like Hamlet without the Prince. He is right. But a crucial corollary of what goes above is that a translation theory that excuses itself when it comes to interpretation is Hamlet without the Prince, Polonius, Ophelia and half the rest of the characters. Translation and interpretation are different ways of performing basically the same task: to mediate in bilingual communication, conveying sense across languages. The specificity of interpretation resides in its orality. I submit, therefore, that even the freest translation of Hamlet, such as the one quoted above, is a perfectly valid — i.e. adequate — one in that situation; valid because of two criteria: first and foremost, it conveys the sense and does it quite clearly and idiomatically, if by no means poetically or in all its nuances; second, because it is the best possible compromise under the circumstances. A theory of translation must account for such a compromise and such circumstances. If it does, there's nothing to prevent it from accounting for a much more faithful translation under 'normal' circumstances. It will point out how the same translator is expected to solve the problem in different ways according to the situation. It will also add that sense is what is never negotiable. It will add further that sense is not necessarily semantic; it can be purely aesthetic or purely emotional or, more often than not, a diverse mixture of everything.

A theory of translation must start by explaining what languages are used for and how. Only then can it proceed to assess the possibility and necessity of transfer between them in general and in different circumstances. Stating that a word that is repeated in the same sentence or the next one should be also repeated in the translation does nothing to further the theory or the practice of translation and sets the student upon an extremely dangerous path that, for fear of excessive freedom, ends in total bondage. Rather than slavishly abiding by a quantitative criterion, the translator has, first of all, to ask himself why the word is being used to begin with, and then why is it repeated, what is sought with the repetition, and what is actually achieved by it. He must then determine whether repeating it is indeed the best — let alone the only — way of achieving the equivalent effect in the TL. The translator must engage in an earnest imaginary dialogue with the author. He must probe for the answers to all his queries.

I have never ever met any student or beginner — and not that many veterans — who were not too literal. For every excess of freedom I've encountered, I've run literally into thousands of inverse cases, not least among the UN translators, who must take what could well be the most demanding exam in the Spanish-speaking world. I am convinced that excessive liberalism is much more difficult to catch and much easier to cure than obsequious servility. I find Seleskovich a bit too adamant in her rejection of 'words' and 'literalness,' but I think it is Newmark who poses the greater danger.

No matter how many times a given pair of words or phrases or whatever units do actually coincide in both the TL and the SL, it will always — absolutely always — be a simple statistical coincidence. The translator will, of course, be duly mindful that chances are his text
won't be one of the exceptions, or the sole exception, for that matter; but he will constantly remind himself that it is actually possible. Every translator, and most definitely every beginner, will tend to go blindly for the statistically regular equivalent. He needs no prodding by anybody to do just that. The teacher's role, instead, is precisely to make him aware that he must watch for the possibility, however remote, that in this particular case the traditional — and by no means forever 'fixed' — equivalent may not be advisable. In any text, of any sort, whatever the 'method' followed, everything, absolutely everything below textual equivalence is negotiable. This does not mean that, provided the broader textual equivalence is achieved, then anything below that goes. It does mean, however, that, below textual equivalence, no rule can or should be formulated urbi et orbi. I could take Newmark's 'rules' as general observations that will normally apply more often than not. He tells us that such is the way he himself sees them; but by the time he starts dictating them, his initial disclaimer cum cavet has long since been forgotten by the unsuspecting reader, and he never ever qualifies them enough. I am sure that Newmark and I would go pretty much the same way about translating any text. But our students would not. With the best intentions in the world, Newmark does nothing but tighten up the grip of 'the word'.

Newmark advocates modular translating. If it is true that texts — and their translations — are definitely put together word by word, the way symphonies are written out note by note and cathedrals erected stone by stone, it is equally and more importantly true that writing, translating, composing and building have nothing to do with stringing together words or notes or piling up stones. There is always a master plan, a global conception, a statement to be made presiding over it all. Indeed, sometimes in and by the process of actual writing or composing or building, the plan can be modified, but it always remains global and larger than the sum of words or notes or stones. In our case, that global edifice is sense, manifested, of course, through the parts of the whole. But if the student is not taught from the very beginning to approach any text as a global and, within its materiality, both self-contained and situated whole; if he is not taught to analyse each sentence, clause, word and morpheme as a function of that globality; if he is not taught to seek to come up with an equivalent globality, which demands that he himself also choose every word, clause and sentence as a function thereof, if, in short, he is not taught to translate texts or parts of texts, as opposed to words, sentences or even paragraphs, he will find it very difficult not to end up as a transcoder.

As Newmark states, the purpose of justificative analysis is to verify the exactitude of the (provisional) solution retained. One is after an adequate functional equivalent, i.e. an equivalent performing the function relevant to the translator, which in the case of semantic translation is the same as or very close to the one performed by the original relevant segment (from a sound — not even a phoneme — to the whole text). But the translator has to think in terms of functions. If it so happens that a ready equivalent performs the same function in that specific context (and situation), then that is the right choice; if it does not, then it is the wrong choice; it is that simple. The translator must never choose a ready equivalent because it is the 'same' word: it is not. EVER. One should teach the student to fulfill the function and see whether it so happens that the ready equivalent does the job and not to try the ready equivalent and see whether it happens to perform the same function. This is crucial, since the beginner will instinctively go for the ready equivalent and the parallel construction, very much as the infant reaches out for his mother's breast. Only this time round it is the wrong instinct. It must be strenuously combatted. One's conditioned reflex must be to de-verbalise, i.e. to forget about the SL words. Once the teacher has succeeded in creating this, then 'literalism' can be judiciously re-admitted; but starting by it is, in my experience, pedagogically suicidal.

Newmark's bibliography does not mention Snell-Hornby, Mossop, Lvovkaya, and a few other sources that have deeply influenced my thinking. I presume he has not been able to read the Russians; he has, instead, abundantly read the Germans. Unfortunately, I don't know German, so all I have managed to read are the few works listed in my own bibliography. Still, from what I have read, I can see that the Leipzigers see very much eye to eye with the Parisiens and the Muscovites. I am amazed that Newmark remains so adamant in not accepting the distinction between the concepts of sense and meaning and therefore the crucial methodological, and above all pedagogical, value of deverbalisation (if nothing else, as a sheer momentary 'forgetting' about specific words). My amazement is in no way disrespectful; it is obvious to me that Newmark is an erudite scholar, a deep thinker and a gifted practitioner. More often than not I find myself agreeing with him on many important points — grudgingly at first, but then almost invariably wholeheartedly. But in this crucial of all crucial issues — nothing short of the
general theory of language, and therefore speech, and therefore meaning, and therefore sense, and therefore translation — of all my sources (not that many, perhaps, but definitely wide-ranging), he and Wilss stand brilliantly alone.

A Closer Look at Semantic vs. Communicative Translation

There is much juicy meat in Newmark’s works for the theoretician and the practitioner. Basically, I am in agreement with our author’s poles, his main — and capital — contribution to our discipline, but even here I have my quibbles. Newmark speaks of a putative readership. I am not so sure he is right. Does he really think that Shakespeare addressed his sonnets to himself, or that he wrote his plays for his own pleasure without minding a hoot really how his clientele at The Globe might react? I can buy that a few lyric poets may write solipsistically, but not the likes of Dickens or Pushkin. No one writes a play, a novel or even a love poem without caring whether it can or will be understood. I am not saying that authors write exclusively, or even mainly, pour la galerie, but they do normally have a reader — albeit an ideal one — very much in mind. They want, basically, to move their audience. We cannot hope to be moved by Shakespeare the way the Globe audience were moved; but we are moved. A translation of Shakespeare must also aim at moving; that is the essential equivalence of effect the translator should attempt; and this is why any translation of a great work of art ought to be itself a great work of art. When Newmark asserts that a CT will be better than a ST, that a CT will normally be better than the original, whilst a ST will be more awkward, that a CT tends to undertranslate, whereas a ST tends to overtranslate in search of a nuance of meaning, the — I would bet unwanted — implication is that a CT of Hamlet would be better, if not than Hamlet, at least than a ST of Hamlet. Why?

He states that ST overtranslates. How can a sonnet in English, with its shorter words, be overtranslated into the same number of Spanish syllables? He avers that a ST will be worse than the source text. If a good poet translates a bad one, the translation is bound to be better than the original. I can’t pass judgement, but it is said that Poe sounds better when improved by Baudelaire (Newmark mentions Baudelaire’s Poe as well, but he does not say the translations are better). If we do not have many more examples, this is due to the fact that not many first-class poets have condescended to translate their inferior colleagues.

In the case of authoritative statements and literature, Newmark advocates the semantic approach. You may recall that between the word-for-word/literal and the semantic, we had the faithful translation (although, as we have seen, Newmark rarely makes any stopovers between the word-for-word and communicative approaches). A semantic translation differs from ‘faithful translation’ only as far as it must take more account of the aesthetic value of the SL text, compromising on ‘meaning’ where appropriate so that no assonance, word-play or repetition jars the finished version; it may make other small concessions to the readership, admits exception to 100% fidelity, and allows for the translator’s intuitive empathy with the original. Above, I had suggested a communicative translation of ‘To be or not to be’, but what would a semantic translation sound like? ‘Ser o no ser, esa es la cuestión’? I do not quite think so. To begin with, that is no hendecasyllable (the closest formal equivalent to the English pentameter); but let us stick to ‘cuestión’. ‘Question’ is, on the one hand, a ‘problem’, an ‘issue’ that is posed, and, on the other, an ‘interrogation’, a ‘question’ that is asked. Obviously, both ‘meanings’ are relevant. So far, so good. ‘Cuestión’, for its part, is more an ‘issue’ than a ‘problem’ and has nothing to do with ‘questioning’. ‘Cuestión’ is, then, very much out of the question. (I am sure Newmark and I see eye to eye so far.) A much better rendition would be ‘Ser o no ser, he ahí el dilema’. No dictionary that I know of (and I specifically checked several before writing down this sentence) gives ‘dilemma’ as a synonym of ‘question’, or ‘dilema’ as a synonym of ‘cuestión’. But that is what Hamlet faces, is it not?: a ‘dilemma’. The ‘sense’, though, is perfectly and aptly clear with ‘question’. Shakespeare could have written, for instance, ‘To be or not to be, that’s the dilemma’, except that the whole effect is lost: ‘dilemma’ is too long; the line consists neatly of nine monosyllabic words and the final disyllable, and the trochee starting with ‘that’ loses much of its power by becoming ‘that’s’. Shakespeare chooses ‘question’ for the very reason he would certainly have rejected it in Spanish. True, ‘Ser o no ser, he ahí el dilema’ is not hendecasyllabic either. I, nevertheless, would leave it. The inverted fourth foot is already a departure from strict form in the original (a very convenient alibi), but even without it, I suggest that any addition to my version would spoil the music to keep the notes. The syllables in anacrusis, though only three, rather than the required six, end in so abyssal a caesura that the ear doesn’t even realise it’s been shortchanged. (The ear! So much for written speech.) A possible hendecasyllabisation would be achieved by an
otherwise acceptable archaism — 'Ser o no ser, aqueste es el dilema'. Look at all we have accomplished: a neat ST, a by-all-means suitable archaism of the language via a very normal demonstrative in classic Spanish, and an unimpeachable classic hendecasyllable to boot... At what price? The stretching of the acoustic arc òóóóó / òóóóó as opposed to the abrupt óóóóó / òóóóó (as close to Shakespeare's as you can get in this specific instance) wrecks the whole exercise. (A better possibility is 'Ser o no ser, he ahí la disyuntiva', but the problem of the extended acoustic arc after the caesura remains.) I do not know whether Newmark would call my translation semantic or communicative, nor do I really care what the label might eventually be. The point is that global coherence and cohesion are better served this way than the other, and the most important truth, that of poetry, takes precedence over that of poetics. Newmark demands fidelity towards Shakespeare; I submit that one cannot be faithful to Shakespeare without being also faithful to poetry.

In all probability, my translation can be improved — by a better poet applying the same method, and not by an equal poet through a better method. And that method has been a) having a clear notion of the purpose of the translation; b) understanding the words and analysing thoroughly the semantic and formal features of the original, c) making sense out of them, which in turn necessitates resorting to the situation (Hamlet is pondering suicide, whether to kill himself or not; if he is of two minds about whether to do either of two things, he is very much in the (two) horns of a dilemma), a sense hinted at by the words, but lying outside of them; d) re-expressing that sense, trying to find the best and closest formal and functional equivalence. In this particular instance, the translator has seen and understood that he is dealing with an iambic pentameter with fourth foot inversion, that the only disyllabic word is 'question', that the inversion produces an unexpected caesura which gives enormous force to 'that'. He has tried — and failed — to find something parallel in Spanish. He decides — in all good conscience — to make some formal concessions, the most important of which is the abrupt breaking of the metre. He is not happy with it. He invokes as a justification the fact that the metre is also done violence to in the original — in that particular line and elsewhere in the monologue. And he submits and defends his translation as the best possible one under the circumstances (one of which being his limited talent); e) collating the final version with the original for accuracy, coherence and cohesion. This is the same method this translator has been applying and teaching for years, the same he uses in the interpreters' booth at the U.N. Security Council and helping his mother buy the right Revlon cream at Macy's: to assess his specific communicative task for the specific text in the specific situation, to understand the words, to decide what weight to give to the specific form, to make out the sense, and to re-express it in the most suitable form (semantic, communicative, faithful, idiomatic, literal, free) that can be found in the time at his disposal; in short, to make the right extra-linguistic sense in the right linguistic way.

I shall now try and illustrate my assertion with two widely dissimilar texts. One cries out for a communicative approach (or even an absolutely free one) and another demands utmost attention to form. Both were analysed earlier this year in my seminar with the faculty at the translation department of the School of Foreign Languages, at Havana University.

1) Happy the Man, and happy he alone,
   He, who can call to-day his own:
   He, who secure within can say,
   To-morrow do thy worst, for I have lived to-day!

2) Restricted area
   Only ticketed bus passengers beyond this point
   Violators will be prosecuted

The first is the beginning of Dryden's paraphrase of Horace's Ode, the second a notice posted throughout Manhattan's Port Authority Bus Terminal. One is a beautiful piece of 17th century English poetry, the other a prosaic and threatening specimen of 20th century US public English. I suggested the method required, respectively, to come up with the proper translations is one and the same: deciding on the translator's goal, linguistic analysis of the text, formal analysis of the text, selection of its relevant formal features (both linguistic and aesthetic), analysis of the situation, interpretation of the linguistic message in order to extract sense, re-verbialisation of that sense according to the translator's goal and trying to reproduce as adequately as possible all relevant formal features, and collation of both versions. Let us see.

TEXT 1
a) Purpose: The stanza is, for my didactic and polemic purposes, a self-contained poem. I want to come up with a poetic translation that will do at least some justice to the original; I pay special attention to what I actually do
as I translate so that I can show my colleagues how I show my students that poetry can indeed be translated, as well as the different processes involved.

b) Formal features: a classical combination of iambic pentameter, tetrameter and hexameter, with an aabb rhyme scheme. All rhymes are oxytonic, but that is typical of English verse; no meaning should be assigned to the fact that there are no paroxytonic endings. The language is quite modern, save, perhaps, for 'Thy'.

c) Sense: a) Macroproposition: the only true happiness lies in intensely living the present. b) Propositions: True happiness lies in 1) enjoying the present; 2) having the certainty that one has lived the present; 3) not fearing the future.

d) The sense as semantically structured: only that man is happy who can claim possession of to-day, and fearlessly defy destiny or fortune or any personification of the future (a rather 'fickle' and even 'cruel' person at that), by telling him "No matter what doom you may choose to castigate me with to-morrow, you cannot take away this day from me, and to-day I have lived." Key words and syntagms: 'happy', 'alone', 'call', 'to-day', 'his own', 'secure within', 'thy worst', 'I have lived'. There is a progression from 'Happy the man', through 'Happy he alone' to 'He, who can call to-day his own'; and a somewhat parallel one from 'He, who secure within can say' to 'To-morrow do thy worst, for I have lived to-day'. The whole load of the stanza falls upon the last line. The lines carry one proposition each. The macroproposition is repeated in lines two and four.

I shall exert myself to come up with the best piece of Spanish poetry I am capable of to convey that sense. I shall also try to find equivalent key words and expressions, since they so beautifully, precisely and economically convey that sense in Dryden. I know beforehand that I shall be needing many more syllables than those 38 to convey as much semantic information. In the case of the five- and six-foot iambic line, Spanish offers me, ready-made (and that is a good 'coincidence', nothing else), the roughly equivalent meters: hendecasyllable and alexandrine, themselves masters of our poetics. However, the closest equivalents to the shorter meter — octosyllable or enneasyllable — won't mix well with their elders and betters. The heptasyllable, on the other hand, is way too short. The last line being the whole point of the original, it must also be the crowning of the translation. Everything else is, then, more or less negotiable; everything else will therefore depend on this line, will have to lead up to it and rhyme with it. This line should be attempted first. An almost literal translation comes readily to mind: 'pues que he vivido hoy' (I can see Newmark smiling in triumph). Good! It makes exactly the same sense as the equivalent fragment in the original and it is, blissfully enough, a perfect alexandrine hemistich. Maybe I can complete it backwards. 'To-morrow do thy worst, who? Obviously Fortune (fickle, capricious, reckless, cruel...) What could 'her worst' be? Non-life; metaphorical or actual death. 'Me mataráis mañana, pues que he vivido hoy.' Only the de-verbialisation of 'thy worst' can lead to 'You may kill me to-morrow'. 'Pues que' sounds weak and convoluted; better a simple 'pero'.

The last line has come off so neatly that I'll endeavour to preserve it no matter what. I desperately need a rhyme for 'hoy'. Forget 'meaning': aside from pilfered words such as convoy, there are only four rhymes, all of them first person singular present indicative: 'doy', 'estoy', 'voy' and 'soy'. Either I stick one of them into any of the other lines or I have to relinquish my gorgeous fourth line. Suddenly I see the light: the man who can claim to-day as his own says 'I am the owner of this day'; 'I am' = 'soy'; halleyalujah! Now, I have to manage to end any of the other lines with that. (I legitimately discard the aabb scheme; I don't feel bound to keep it, since any other two-rhyme scheme will do — abab or abba.) Now for the next more important feature: the beginning, the 'Happy' that will resolve itself in 'To-day'. I have basically two options, the hendecasyllable and the alexandrine. The hendecasyllable will demand a stress on the sixth syllable or, possibly, on the fourth and eighth. 'Feliz del hombre a-o-o-6-o soy'... 'Feliz del hombre que se dice 'Soy...''; that 'se dice' could do for 'within', but it's too weak; no, not 'to' himself, but 'within', 'secure'... 'Feliz de aquel que puede decir 'Soy...'' Better. But 'alone' is missing; make a note of it. 'Feliz de aquel que puede decir 'Soy/el dueno de hoy...' not quite. 'Hoy' is too resounding (one of four '-oy' words in Spanish, remember?) Peter Newmark's assertion notwithstanding, never mind whether Dryden repeats it three times; it is the last one that really matters, so I save 'hoy' for the last round.

I need an expression that will denote or connote the present. I think I've got it: 'el dueño del día que me toca... Wait, I'm one syllable short (that anacrusis always gets me); how about 'el dueño de este día que me toca? Much better; and 'this day' brings us closer to 'to-day' than simply 'the day'. So far I've got 'Feliz de aquel que puede decir 'Soy el dueño de este día que me toca'.

... "Me mataráis mañana, ¡pero he vivido hoy!"
Not bad; not bad at all! Can I fill in the blank decently enough? For that, I need an ‘oca’ (whatever, in principle, the semantic meaning). If you find my procedure somewhat pedestrian, my only disclaimer is that when I am wrestling with a sonnet of my own, I go about it exactly the same way, except that I can always write whatever I please, rather than mind Dryden or anybody else. (In this I am consistent with my principle that one should translate the way one writes; I use language the same way whether I want to communicate my own sense or someone else’s.)

So I must look for a suitable ‘oca’. ‘Loca’ dawns upon me. I think I know why: somewhere in the back of my mind I know that I'm talking about Fortune (later on I'll be checking my translation against the original and discover that Dryden is indeed referring to Fortune; it must have stuck with me, or, more probably, it's the most plausible personification); anyway, now I have ‘Fortuna loca’. My basic sense will doubtless be ‘y decir a la Fortuna loca’; but this man must say it so that it will be obvious that he is very much ‘secure within’. He must aver bluntly, daringly, defiantly, assuredly... ‘Esperar’ is an apt verb. ‘Esperar en la cara’; or, more nobly, ‘en el rostro’. Let me see:

Feliz de aquél que puede decir “Soy el dueño de este día que me loca”
y esperar en el rostro a la Fortuna loca

Me matarás mañana, pero he vivido hoy!”

Good boy! Now, remember about the ‘alone’; perhaps Feliz sólo de aquél que puede decir “Soy...” My first version respects the metre; this one turns the first line into an alexandrine; also, both hemistiches are oxytonic; it would sound better if the first one were not (to my ears, of course, but then those are the only ones that count for the nonce). A possible solution is to become more literal and go for “Feliz solo del hombre que puede decir “Soy...””, but ‘el hombre’ is too specific. I listen to all three variants repeatedly in my mind and decide that ‘alone’ adds a crucial element: there is no happiness but the present one; I hadn’t quite grasped it initially (too much attention to words and sounds, probably). The third line also turns out to be an alexandrine. It would not be a problem, except that now, instead of the last line standing out, the second one gets shortchanged. Can I shorten it, so that symmetry is restored? I think of ‘y decir fiero a la Fortuna loca’; maybe Spanish had at that time kept the meanings of ‘proud’ and ‘fierce’ side by side with that of ‘wild’, as opposed to today’s ‘ugly’. No such luck. I put my Martín Alonso disappointedly back on its shelf. I rummage through my inner files, I run into ‘altivo’... hm... Back to the dictionaries. On my way to the bookshelf I ponder ‘gallardo’. Julio Casares will probably have an adjective meaning both ‘proud’ and ‘valiant’. Sure enough: ‘bravo’. My search is over... until further notice. (Newmark is again right when he warns that a translation is never really finished!) So my latest update becomes:

Feliz sólo de aquél que puede decir “Soy el dueño de este día que me loca”
y esperar bravo a la Fortuna loca

Me matarás mañana, pero he vivido hoy!”

["Happy only he who can say "I / Am the the master of this day that's been allotted to me" / And bravely say to fickle Fortune,"You may kill me to-morrow, but I have lived to-day!"]

With it, my last line also stands out. My next step will be cutting that first alexandrine short. By the way, Peter Newmark hits the nail one more time squarely on the head when he asserts that the translator seeks to reproduce the effect the effect the poem had on him rather than on its readership. I wish I had been the one to write those lines; through love and gratitude I've made them my own, and that is why I wanted to translate them in the first place, and that is how I want to translate them, as my own, so that others will be able to understand, marvel at and be moved by them.

TEXT 2
a) Purpose: again, I want to show my students how to approach this other kind of text.
b) Formal features: a public notice. Its sole aim is to keep non-ticketed people from entering the platform. It must accomplish the same goal in Spanish. It must also fit the roughly two-by-two foot area, and legibly so. Everything else may be negotiated.
c) Sense: You can’t go through unless you have a ticket.
d) Sense as semantically structured: A general ‘title’, the notice itself with a host of redundancies, a threat.

If, with Dryden, I was after an equivalent piece of poetry with the equivalent effect of aesthetically sensitising the reader to the same sense, now I will seek an equivalent piece of public noticing with the equivalent effect of keeping the un-ticketed off the platform. The original has the typical American ‘Or else’ tagged on. Notices throughout Spain and Latin America are less ominous. ‘Restricted area’ is redundant. Spanish lacks the universal label. We do indeed have ‘Zonas restringidas’, ‘Zonas de acceso restringido’, ‘Zonas vedadas’ and the like, but very seldom do they encompass bus platforms; we tend to reserve them to spaces more consequential, such as military bases and
atomic plants, where you can't just buy a ticket and get in. Putting anything 'equivalent' in our notice will *ipso facto* spoil global adequacy. We must follow text typology and be guided by equivalent notices. We therefore do blithely away with 'Restricted area'. Next, the meat: 'Only ticketed bus passengers beyond this point'. 'Bus' is, again, situationally redundant: no, an ocean liner ticket or a ticket to a movie will not do: you need a bus ticket (presumably — it is not explained — a ticket for a bus leaving from that platform and on that day, only later). We will give our readers the benefit of the doubt and trust them to make all of those inferences by themselves. How does Spanish normally go about saying that only ticketed passengers may go through? By forbidding the rest from passing: 'Prohibido el acceso sin boleto' — or 'billete', or 'pasaje' [No access without a ticket], depending on who one is translating for (the notice applies exclusively to people, and people without a ticket are not 'passengers'). What about the 'Beyond this point'? Again we will trust our readers to guess that it is not beyond the point twenty yards behind or that other one thirty feet yonder, but this point, exactly where the notice hangs, or, rather, the gate next to it. And the 'Violators will be prosecuted'? Again, that's the typical American 'Or else!' (the sense meant by the meanings carried by the words). Spanish tends to show its fangs less. Besides, it lacks, also this time around, the hypernym 'violators' and 'prosecuted'. The closest 'semantic' equivalent would be 'infractores' and 'enjuiciados', but it sounds so preposterous in Spanish that something different is called for, such as 'so pena de multa'; or 'todo infractor será multado'. I, for one, would leave it at that and be done with it; but if my client insists, I would add, for instance, the friendlier 'evite multas'. My translation, then, reads:

**Prohibido el acceso sin billete**

Evite multas

[No access without a ticket / Avoid fines]

Newmark would call my first translation semantic and this latter one communicative (or perhaps even 'free'). He calls these opposing approaches 'methods'. Once again, I suggest they are indeed different approaches, but not methods. I prefer to reserve 'method' to characterise the sequence of operations involved in each case: taking stock of the translator's purpose; appraising the situation; analysing the text globally; analysing its linguistic form, lexically, syntactically, stylistically, acoustically, etc. as relevant; extracting the overall sense (the macroproposition) and its constituents as well as the relationship between sense and meaning, meaning and form; retaining for the nonce the de-verbalised sense, i.e. sense independently of any specific linguistic objectivation in any language (the explanation of sense above could have been in Spanish or German or Korean); the re-verbalisation or re-expression of that sense in the target language under the guise of a suitable text (another poem or a new notice, since adequacy is ultimately measured text to text); the comparison of the translation with the original to double check for sense (and not only semantic) accuracy and formal fidelity, as well as for inner coherence and cohesion.

So the translation of Dryden is semantic, that of the notice — communicative. I am sure Newmark would agree with me and my versions (or at least the approach behind them) in both cases. This, I think, is a crucial point. I do not really believe Newmark and I would go about translating any text differently, but, again, I am indeed very much afraid our students would. To begin with, I do not start by saying Dryden should be translated semantically no matter what; what I am saying is that if the translator's purpose is to do justice to Dryden the poet, he must come up with his best poetic effort. I am also saying that, although in the original every single word weighs, they do not carry the same weight. I am saying further that the translator cannot but take complete stock of every single SL word in itself; indeed, but much more so as it relates to the poem as a whole, since it is there for a purpose larger — if not other — than its own semantic or acoustic semblance. I am stressing, moreover, that the translator ought to assume that Dryden was not merely after rhythm and rhyme, but was using both to stress and give emotive and aesthetic power to a communicative intention, itself based on reason and emotion. I call it sense (Newmark would probably insist upon naming it 'meaning', but that is a matter of 'semantics'). That 'intention' or 'thought' or 'sense' or 'meaning' must be thoroughly grasped and assimilated. Only such a comprehension will make the translator realise the importance of the last line, and particularly its very last word. He must then try and keep that balance in his version.

Trying, of course, does not assure being able to. In Spanish, hoy is conveniently monosyllabic (a genuine exception). In Russian it would be sevódnja; whatever the translator's prowess, he'll never achieve the same effect (and, yes, we are very much after equivalent effect — aesthetic effect, that is). That 'reason' will further tell the translator that between 'Happy' and 'today' well nigh everything is more or less negotiable. He is on his verbal own. He must find a suitable poetic
bridge between those two shores. De-verbalisation, forgetting the ‘words’ in the original, is absolutely essential: they will but hamper one’s own search. In my version, neither ‘Fortuna’, nor ‘loca’, nor ‘espetar’, nor ‘rostro’, nor ‘matar’ is semantically connected with the original; ‘soy el dueño de este día’ is an extremely free rendering of ‘call to-day his own’; nowhere do we find any semantic vestiges of ‘secure’ or ‘within’ or ‘thy’ or ‘worst’. Indeed, if Spanish and my talent had allowed for a semantically closer translation I would have definitely gone for it. But semantic closeness should never be the main purpose of the translator — let alone the only one; what he should at all times strive for is equivalent aesthetic effect: a compromise between linguistic meaning and linguistic form that will bring him closest to the symbiosis of truth and beauty every work of art represents.

Newmark himself has gone from dichotomising the twain to realising they are but one: an excessively ‘free’ translation may well give much of its own beauty, but it won’t be the original’s. A slavish, purely ‘semantic’ — i.e. meaning-bound — one, will give much of the ‘semantic’ truth and none of the beauty. By the by, I’d much rather appreciate the former: good poetry is always welcome, even if translationally unsuccessful. No, I wouldn’t consider Dryden’s paraphrase a translation; I don’t accept his Horace (nor does he: he calls his version a paraphrase), but I love his Dryden! As Newmark would undoubtedly — and again justifiably — point out, I haven’t been able to forget any of the key words. Certainly not! Because they are key functionally and not of themselves. And I am ready to grant much more: I confess to having forgotten none of them, not even ‘the’. What I did was to try and free myself from their haunting presence... I cannot write well when I have some other language watching me. That is what I mean by de-verbalisation; I really cannot tell whether non-linguistic thought is actually possible; I believe it is, but lack the biological, physiological and psychological knowledge to venture a hypothesis. All I suggest that any translator, including Newmark, should do is to divorce sense from any specific linguistic objectification and be, in principle, open to giving it any plausible linguistic guise, even zero (as in ‘Restricted area’ and ‘Violators will be prosecuted’). No, except for cases of metalinguistic translation and the like, I do not believe for a moment that a translation, any translation, should read like one. Let the reader be aware (situationally) that it is not Dryden but Dryden-through-Viaggio, but there is no reason for the presence of linguistic clues.

Newmark states — and, as usual, he is perfectly right — that if the original departs from normal usage, so should the translation (if possible, that is); I have attempted to translate Mayakovsky with compound rhymes. It is devilishly difficult in Spanish, since a) our language doesn’t have even half the consonant sounds and only a quarter of their possible combinations, and b) there are very few proparoxytonic words. Take for instance the ending of Jorosho:

Ljet do sta rasti
Nam bjes stárosti.

God ot góda rasti
Náshej bódrosti.

Slávte mőlot i stikh
Zjemli múldodosti.

[May we grow to be a hundred years old — without old age. / May it grow from year to year — our dauntlessness. / Hail the hammer and verse — of the land of youthfulness.]

It is impossible to come up with anything nearly as effective, but one can — and should — be as bold; it is only that the same boldness won’t carry the poet, phonetically, that far in Spanish. Here are some of my exercises with compound rhymes (and there is no way of compounding more than two at a time, as one of them is necessarily an unstressed monosyllabic preposition, pronoun or article):

La pena mi mano lame
Y echada a mis pies está. Me
Mira con ojos tiernos
Que sólo a mí saben ver. Nos
Une esta tarde gris. Te
Recuerdo mudo y triste,
Triste, mudo, gris y solo,
Que a la cita no acudiste
Y mi pobre cuore no lo
Alcanza a pañar con nada.
No es lluvia de afuera la que
Empana ya mi mirada
Y los versos que me saque
Sabrán a pena mojada.

(Sorrow licks my hand/at my feet it is lying. Me/it looks at with tender eyes/that only me can see.
Us/unites this grey afternoon. You/I remember silent and sad./sad, silent, grey and lonely./for you did not keep our date/and my poor heart not it/can sooth it with anything./It is not an outside rain that which/bedims now my gaze/and whatever verses it may bring out of me/shall have the taste of wet sorrow.)

No match for ‘mőlot i stikh’/’mőlododsti’, I dare say! Of course, a poet of greater caliber might astound us, but
will he be able and willing to translate Mayakovsky? As a poet in his own right, he would — I dare venture — try and put himself in Mayakovsky’s shoes and guess how the great Russian would have gone about making the same sense had he had at his disposal the possibilities offered by Spanish while being denied those available in Russian. And one last thing. Suppose such a Spanish language poet cum translator from Russian did come along; he still won’t be able to make ‘martillo y verso’ [‘hammer and verse/line’] rhyme with ‘juvenud’ [‘youth/youthfulness’]. What would a ‘semanticist’ do, go for fidelity to meaning, choose faithfulness to form, or compromise in the name of poetic sense? I wish I could meet Newmark and we could discuss; he must be a fascinating person to share ideas and a bottle of Bordeaux with.

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