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DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN
POLITICHE TRANSFRONTALIERE PER LA VITA QUOTIDIANA
TRANSBORDER POLICIES FOR DAILY LIFE

Dialogue, Stability and Security in the Central Asia Region:
Comparative study on the EU and the NATO commitments in the
Central Asia-region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABP Afghan Border Police
ACG Armed Criminal Group
ADAM Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism
ADB Asian Development Bank
ALP Afghan Local Police
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
AOG Armed Opposition Group
APRP Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
BBIED Body Borne Improvised Explosive Device (suicide vest)
BCP Border crossing point
BO Border outpost
BOMCA Border Management Program in Central Asia
CA Central Asia
CABSI Central Asian Border Systems Initiative
CADAP Central Asia Drug Action Program
CAREC Central Asia Regional Environment Centre
CARICC Central Asia Regional Intelligence and Coordination Centre
CF Coalition Forces
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CN Counter-Narcotics
COIN counter-insurgency
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
DAC District Administrative Centre
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
DPU Drug Profiling Unit
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Communities
ECE Economic Commission for Europe (also UNECE/United Nations Economic Commission for Europe)
ECHO European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Assistance
EECCA Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia
EIB European Investment Bank
EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMECW Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window
ENPI European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
ESDP European Security Defense Policy
EU European Union
EUPOL European Police Mission in Afghanistan
Eurasec Eurasian Economic Community
EUSR European Union Special Representative
EUWI European Union Water Initiative
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FLEG Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council
GSP Generalized System of Preferences

HR/SG High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union/Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IAGS Illegal Armed Groups

IBPP Institution Building Partnership Program

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IFI international financial institution

IGC Intergovernmental Commission

ILO International Labor Organization

INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

IT information technology

JCMC Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MoD Ministry of Defense (Afghan)

MoI Ministry of Interior

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MP Member of Parliament

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS National Directorate of Security

NGO non-governmental organization

NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan

ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC Private Security Company
RCIED Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
SAF Small Arms Fire
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SFA Security Force Assistance
SME small and medium-sized enterprises
SSR Security Sector Reform
SVBIED Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
TEMPUS Trans-European mobility scheme for university studies
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (also ECE)
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US United States of America
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WFP World Food Program
WTO World Trade Organization
Using notions of *Change* developed by Thomas Kuhn, *Governance* by Michael Walzer and *Persistent Conflicts and New Wars* by Mary Kaldor, this thesis argues that the stability, security and cooperation among States as a whole, and in Central Asia States in particular are threaded by different issues as state collapse, religious extremist, terrorism, illegal narcotic and weapons trafficking. The attempt to find an ideal solution and the definition of common understanding have been hardly implemented due to different national interests and regional Powers’ pressure. Since the Soviet Union collapse, NATO and European Union institutions have adopted various political, economical, military instruments in order to pave the way of dialogue, cooperation, stability and security among states and in particular in the central Asia countries. As a result, both the theory and the practice of International Relations are in the midst of a paradigm shift. Emerging from this shift is particular global configuration of the practice of international relations. Kuhn’s thought of “incommensurability” appear to typify the relationship between the two components, while Kaldor’s concept explain the characteristic of contemporary civil conflicts, helping to understand the changed nature of intrastate warfare in terms of factors behind the wars: politics of warfare, economy of warfare, military strategies and religions struggles. Walzer proposes an international system lying between the antipodes, a thoroughly centralized global government under which all individuals are equal citizens of the world on the far left. As a result, such a system foresees the lack of sovereign states. On the far right, global anarchism, in which sovereign states are not subsumed by any meta-state structure. Kuhn provides a fundamental change in our vision of the discipline of International Relations, where the ontological side between access or denial World have a pivotal role. Kaldor affirms that the practice of International Relations and new War Economy are affected by factors emerged from globalization and transnational networks. All this entail to recast the study of International Relations as an emancipator system and the recognition of the centrality of Human Beings in the practice of International Relations for cooperation. If we are able to carry out this very ambitious End State, we can success. Hence, this research intends to evaluate the degree of the EU and the NATO commitments and impact on the Central Asia countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan), taking into account that changes in power structures could trigger violent confrontation between factions within States’ leadership.
- FIRST PART -

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CHANGED MULTILATER SYSTEM

1.1 Chapter layout and Research Objectives

This research is basically divided into two parts, which correspond respectively to a theoretical and to a practical approach and the study consists of six chapters. In Chapter One, an effort has been made to state the nature of the problem, the central hypothesis, the aim of the Thesis, the frame, the methodology and the theoretical framework as clearly as possible and general overview of Russia and the Central States interdependency. Chapter Two attempts to shed more light on the concept of knowledge of the Main Actors involved in the Dialogue, Stability and Security Cooperation in Central Asia, with EU’s economic cooperation, US-led Security Sector Reform in established in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and NATO troops in Afghanistan all with a view to develop and enhance political economic relations and security energy agreements in the region.

The chapter finally endeavors to provide an answer to the question of why European foreign policies should enhance Europe’s position within the international system and share the elements of security, economic and political power with the emerging region powers.

Chapter Three is dedicated to analyzing NATO’s Strategic Objectives and serves as a general point of reference to the broader tenets of Mary Kaldor’s theory of “new wars” and “change”, which represents the leitmotif of the study.

Chapters Four, deal with the deeply comparative analysis of EU and NATO commitments and their impact on the region within the Dialogue, Cooperation, Security issues.

Chapter Five analyzes the case studies of Afghanistan as unit of study, by stating practical examples, the anomalies that have arisen with regard to the traditional understanding of the discipline of the International Relations.

The main strands of Kuhn and Kaldor’s works are used in this research to explore the themes under discussion, with particular attention to the EU and NATO commitments in Central Asia. Indeed, both International Organizations cannot remain totally indifferent to the insecurity of others,
a minimum of external cooperation and stabilization of crises will continue to be necessary to bring about the expected change.

Following from this and through Kuhn and Kaldor’s “lens”, the research endeavors to answer three key questions:

- What system of security does best serve Europeans’ values and interests? Should defense and consolidation of the interests of democratic West be the prime aim? Should European foreign policies shore up a Western supremacy and enhance Europe’s position within the international system or, on the contrary, to share the elements of security, economic and political power with the emerging globe powers?

- Why and what extent have the EU and NATO impacted on the democratic transition process in the countries of Central Asia and in particular in Afghanistan? The wide-range analysis about various aspects of territorial cooperation, both at national and local levels, focuses on the progressive acknowledgement of territorial cooperation as an indispensable method of governance.

- What’s the implication for EU, NATO, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan in terms of energy security in the long-term period?

### 1.2 Problem statement

International Relations reflect on human being journey which sometimes moves through flat landscapes and sometimes through mountain passes that most of these passes are only topography with little or no difference in climate, language or culture between the valleys on either side. But some passes are different; they are true divides (Drucker, 1989:3). In the past, International Relations have traversed these passages and once they have been crossed, the social and political landscape changes.

The social, economical and political climate is different, there are new realities, insists Drucker, (1993:2). Draper (1997:21) comments that the fall of the Berlin Wall proved to be a “historical instant” that changed “old verities”, and also (Chomsky, 1998:45) is in line with this view. The twenty-first century is a world of fundamental interconnections and interconnectedness and one of most important outcomes is this is the emergence of new politics and new Wars (Kaldor 2006:8) that prefigure the partial demise of the nation-state autonomy.

Humanity seemed to have little control over these fast-moving changes and fluidity appeared to have become the hallmark of developments in the international arena. Rosenau (1990:7) expresses a similar sentiment when he refers to a period of “global turbulence” which has commenced with uncountable actors.
Also the sociologist Daniel Bell clearly foresaw this problem when he remarked that “the nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of the world and too big for the small problems of life” (Bell, 1988:3). Bell’s statement encapsulated the dilemma of the nation-state as a structure unable to respond to “new” challenges such as unchecked global financial flows and endemic social and political troubles or to “small” challenges such as job losses at the local level and tending to complaints that government is perceived as being far away and unable to cope with the problems.

No longer is the nation-state the sole actor in the field of international development: transnational social movements, community-based organizations (CBOs), no-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental organizations (GOs) as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (E.U) now also influence the entire process.

However, as the globalization itself, the withdrawal of the state as the sole locus of power in the international system and the attendant arrival of a more pluralistic governance architecture have not been uniform processes. Indeed, the need for a more responsive global governance framework is acute when one considers the changing nature of “complex emergencies” and the fundamental challenge to the international aid system.

As a result, the “Westphalian paradigm” had effectively become obsolete and the events of the end of “Cold War” in 1989 merely confirmed this. The loss of this guiding principle of international relations led to disarray and confusion. Both theorists and practitioners were overwhelmed by or oblivious to some of the complexities of post-international politics, the interdependence that sustains it, and the structural relations that underpin it” (du Plessis, 2001:135).

The need of new thinking or new agenda (Lawson, 2002:15) to resolve these crisis became increasingly evident and the post-Cold War period in Europe has been favorable for the development of new regionalization projects in which Europe is surrounded.

Nevertheless, the focus on instability problems and its geopolitical and geo-economic importance triggered by Central Asia States’ position as a link between Europe and Asia bring them more closely to the European Union region. It is to be said that not every geographical area represents a stable and secure region from a political and economical point of view.

Therefore, it is important to distinguish among horizontal and vertical relations between state and non-state actors in the economic, social and political, and region which define a particular geographical area (Fawn, 2009:12-13).

The existence of several pre-conditions favors the stability of the area, such as the existence of a common historical experience, intense interactions between the members of that region which
are more intense than with the outsiders setting the borders of the state, and the existence of a legal and institutional setting.

Thus, stability, governance and security are complex phenomenon with many types and forms in a continuous transformation and adaptation.

What was necessary were new ways of seeing the world, a new ontology and the crafting of the language to make this ontology plausible and comprehensible. Unwilling or unable to escape from the principle of nation-state predominance, scholars and analysts of international relations should constantly tempt to be acquainted with assumptions about issues such as security, sovereignty and identity.

We live in a world of fundamental interconnectedness and decentralization, in which the political and economic megatrends have unleashed powerful centrifugal forces, largely as a result of a multidimensional set of process began middle of last century.

As said, Nation-state is no longer the sole actor in the political arena and in the international relations, but transnational movements, community-based organization and particularly nongovernmental organization have replaced states and have influenced the process as a whole.

Keeping in mind the Weberian definition of the state as that agency, which upholds the monopoly of legitimate violence, it becomes clear many central governments are unable to implement and coordinate political and economic activities. The need for a more responsive global governance framework is ever more acute, considering the changing nature of complex security and emergency and the challenge posed to the International System.

To make a conjecture that nowadays many states are ineffectiveness to develop and delivery security and assistance, it presumes three things: this thesis supposes a change in the nature of the international violence, second that violence undermines the stability and assistance developments, third that assistance is worthwhile process to be addressed since the very beginning of the crisis.

The increased involvement of external actors in Central Asia is often characterized as a new great Game. If there is a geopolitical game among Russia, China, US, EU, Iran, and Pakistan over influence in Central Asia, it seems centered on energy, primarily gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. But there are also other factors at play that counter this perception of the region as a geopolitical struggle among major powers and emerging powers.

1 “Nation-state” is defined here, as it was by Max Weber in his seminal 1918 essay, Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf), as the agency that upholds the monopoly of legitimate violence. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).

2 “Complex emergencies” are defined as the humanitarian crises associated with conflicts. They are multi-causal and their annual number has grown from 9 in 1985 to eighty-five in 2012. Mark Bradbury, Aid under fire: defending relief and development assistance in unstable situations, 2005.
There is more at stake in Central Asia than just energy, there is a long list of security threats ranging from internal threats to stability to regional ethnic tensions and from bad inter-regional relations to negative spillover effects from Afghanistan. Security is studied in state-by-state fashion, highlighting the location of past security problems (ethnic conflicts/uprisings and wars) and where potential problems are likely to find their sources in the future. Often researches are incorporated inter-state-relations, but these are generally limited to the bilateral conditions of hostility, neglecting to provide a complete picture of regional security.

Thus, early observers could define that Central Asia States would not be affected by the interests of external powers.

The reality is that each competing state considers itself to have an advantage to the others. On the one hand, Russia for instance had its historical ties and continuing economic hegemony and its interest remains an essential variable in many decision made by local leaders, as its power continues to loom large over the region. The United States could apply for economic, terrorism and drug-trafficking related issues, Iran was connected by a common Islamic sceeity faith and Turkey had the advantage of its shared Turkish heritage.

Yet, Pakistan has an open issue, with regard to the Durand line\(^3\) as the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other hand, US and European Union influence have made major inroads as a useful counterweight to Russian predominance, providing the post-soviet states with Security Sector Reforms\(^4\) (SSR) and Security Force Assistance\(^5\) (SFA). As for the remaining candidates for the “Great Game”, Iran and Turkey have not been able to provide enough financial and military support to keep their place at the table, while China has been increasing its financial and “moral support”.

Central Asia is considered a vacuum power and the inner core of a greater region of instability that connect Central Asia and Middle East, the Black Sea Region and Southern Russia. Many analysts see the future of the region shaped by the interplay of external actors, but with a delicate balance among competing interests to avoid potential ethnic conflict and political fragmentation\(^6\).

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3 The Durand Line was drawn up in 1893 as the border between Afghanistan and British India after intense negotiations between the founder of modern Afghanistan, King Abdur Rahman Khan, and the British Foreign Secretary of India, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, after whom the line was named. Since then, there have been endless debates on every aspect of the 1893 agreement among politicians, intellectuals and media on both sides of the Durand Line – debates that have further complicated the already difficult relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

4 According to OECD, SSR can cover a wide range of topics, including non-proliferation of weapons, the global war on terror, weapons of mass destruction, intelligence, nuclear disarmament, small arms flow, land mines, armed non-state actors, child soldiers, women, civilian-military relations, military/police training.

5 The US Department of Defense defines Security Force Assistance (SFA) as all activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.

Central Asia is a region of systemic security analysis as the subject of the international balance of power dynamics would produce or ameliorate regional instability, subordinating the course of regional security relations to global or higher regional security dynamics. The analysis of the regional security relations provides the focus for the following chapters.

1.3 Literature review

Since the publication of Kuhn’s book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” in 1962, the concepts coined by him has been applied in the natural, social and political sciences. The centre of Kuhn’s theory is the notion of a “paradigm” and his main concept and content have always been contested. Margaret Masterman (1970:61), for example, complained that the use of paradigm concept in no less than twenty-one different ways. “The vagueness of what is, after all, a central concept of Kuhn’s theory is also a reason this notion so quickly became the focus of criticism.”

Given the various definitions of the concept, the most useful is Kuhn’s own description of a paradigm as “what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm” (Kuhn, 1996:176).

Rephrasing some of Kuhn’s views, these “shared” aspects include a common framework, the latter which Kuhn (1970:242) maintains as a “prerequisite”, a shared worldview that helps to define problems, a set of tools and methods and modes of resolving the research questions.

Adopting a paradigm, Maclaurin (2005:2) asserts that it means adopting a way of seeing the world, while remaining within the International Relations context, MccGwire (2001:777) defines a paradigm as “a mixture of beliefs, theory, preconceptions and prejudices that shapes ideas of how the international system works, generates expectations and prescribes appropriate behavior”.

Javaid (1997:2) notes that, while Kuhn cannot claim total credit for coining the term “paradigm”, no intellectual work had popularized the word like Kuhn’s. The concept of “paradigm” subsequently became widely and generally entrenched in both academic and popular texts, indeed Kuhn’s book is prescribed reading for most university courses on the history and philosophy of science.

Given its widespread use of paradigm, the question may therefore rightfully be asked: Why turn to Kuhn again as a theoretical point of departure? Why “flog this notion of ‘paradigm’ any further, given its imperfections?

The answer to this question is that Thomas Kuhn’s theory provides the International Relations researcher with a powerful instrument with which to engage the concept of change. Vale (2004:242) asserts that the “promise of deep-seated conceptual change is the inherent in the idea of
the paradigm”. Underlining the importance of change as a concept in International Relations, O. R. Holsti (1998:2) notes that one of the most important features distinguishing different schools of thought about International Relations is the notion of change.

The same author, however, and importantly, adds that despite its critical importance, the concept of change remains under-theorized in International Relations literature. Holsti (1998:2) laments that in International Relations, we do not have even the beginning of a consensus on what constitutes change or transformation in political life” (also see Burch, 2000:182; Linklater, 1998:3-8). Pointing out this same weakness, Vale (2003:13) contends that “neither academia nor the policy end of international politics has demonstrated a capacity to anticipate change, let alone adequately explain its immediate impact”.

In the introduction it was argued that contemporary international relations is currently in the midst of a “crossing-over” period that commenced in 1989. In this period, the concept of change seems to be different in terms of its ramifications (the impact of change now progressively seems to be global) and in terms of its defining feature, indeed the year 1989 apparently signaled the onset of a period of fundamental change in international relations.

It is against this background that Thomas Kuhn’s theory becomes even more relevant, as it allows for more than merely a better grasp of the concept of change. Kuhn’s theory also speaks directly to periods marked by profound change, it talks about episodes of “crossing-over”.

In this context, and as will be explained, Thomas Kuhn’s theory addresses yet another aspect which has not been adequately dealt with in International Relations literature so far. Hence, the second reason for choosing Kuhn’s theory is the insight that it brings pertaining to an understanding not only of change in general, but of periods of fundamental or pervasive change specifically. Kuhn addresses Laxer’s concern that “although our society is constantly awash in the rhetoric of change, fundamental change is nonetheless exceedingly difficult to imagine” (Laxer, 1998:58).

Walzer calls for a complex arrangement of layered and geographically overlapping international institutions that would form a nexus of social relations crisscrossing state borders and would concern themselves with different aspects of global governance.

However, because of the various International Organizations such as the U.N., the W.T.O., the I.M.F., the World Court, and various non-governmental organizations - ex hypothesis, conflicting aims as one group’s priority is A and another’s is B, then they are, in virtue of this fact in conflict - it is quite unclear how disputes between them might be resolved. Indeed, such opposing conflicts would seem to give rise to precisely what Walzer argues is the primary problem of independent and sovereign states, operating anarchically at the global level: War.
In other words, these meta-state structures, when equipped and armed, as the UN, NATO or EU, should operate as quasi-states at the global level to face violence. Although Walzer’s discussion of degrees along the continuum from anarchism to totalitarianism is interesting, his proposal for proliferating and overlapping meta-governments created to address lower-level problems does not demonstrate why or how such problems will miraculously become soluble by individuals acting within international structures of governance.

Regarding the new nature of violence, the clear distinction between “Old” and “New” wars is well documented in the research of Mary Kaldor (2001:34-36).

She argues for a cosmopolitan political project as a way of responding to new challenges and suggests that this argument can be treated as a way of deducing the more general case for a cosmopolitan political project for three reasons:

First, the rupture with classical modernity that is associated with the process of globalization is perhaps most decisively illustrated by the changes in the pattern of organized violence. The twentieth century can be described as the period in which the nation-state system reached its apogee and this period will probably be best remembered for the terrible barbarity of totalitarianism and war. But in future, the twentieth century may also be remembered as the moment when the nation-state system exhausted itself and when these statist phenomena (totalitarianism and inter-state war) were abolished, like slavery in an earlier period.

Secondly, what she call ‘New Wars’ is an extreme manifestation of the erosion of the autonomy of the nation-state under the impact of globalization. Indeed in contrast to the wars of modernity, in which States were able to mobilize resources and extend administrative capacities, these wars could be described as implosions of the State. The general case for cosmopolitan democracy is based on the argument that democracy at a national level is weakened by the erosion of the autonomy of the state and the undermining of the state’s capacity to respond to democratic demands. In the specific case of war-torn societies (Held, 1995:65) argues that it is the collapse not just of democracy but of the consensus on which state rule is based under the impact of globalization.

Thirdly, the legitimacy of political institutions is intimately linked to the physical protection of citizens. New wars can be viewed as ‘protection-failures’. Jones (1999:293) argues how and whether this protection is provided will shape the future of political institutions. The extent to which it is possible to echo Diogenes’ claim to be a world citizen (Kosmou polites) may depend on whether protection (at least against threats to physical security) can be guaranteed at a global level.

The seventeenth century theorists of civil society based their argument on the concept of a social contract. For them, a civil society (societas civilis) was a rule of law in which citizens gave
up the freedom of the state of nature in exchange for the guarantee of certain rights – security for Hobbes plus liberty and property for Locke.

Later definitions of civil society included the idea of an active citizenry checking violations of the social contract by the state. The emergence of civil society in the West was bound up with the construction of modern states and with inter-state wars. What Norbert Elias called the ‘civilizing process’ - the removal of violence from everyday life within the boundaries of the state - was based on the establishment of public monopolies of violence and taxation.

The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all in the West, by a certain level of monopolization. Free use of weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever kind, and likewise, the taxation of property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority.

The construction of these public monopolies was, as Tilly has shown, intimately bound up with war against other states. Tilly, (1990:70) sustains that Inter-state war became the only legitimate form of organized violence and, moreover, was sharply distinguished from peace. In place of more or less continuous warfare, war became a discrete episode that was reserved for use against other states and was excluded from internal relations.

The individual rights that citizens enjoyed in peacetime were exchanged for the abrogation of those rights in wartime. In wartime, the citizens became part of a collectivity, the nation, and had to be ready to die for the state. In exchange for individual civil and political rights in peacetime, the citizen accepted a kind of unlimited liability in wartime.

Hence, Elias, writing just before the Second World War, feared that the civilizing process would be engulfed by the barbarity of war. Inter-state war is sometimes described as Clausewitzian war. The wars of classical modernity had a kind of extremist logic that is well analyzed by Clausewitz. As war became more extreme and terrible, so the social contract was extended, reaching its logical end point during the Cold War period. Essentially, during this period, there were unprecedented gains in economic and social rights. But the risks were also dramatically extended.

The price of these gains, during this period, was readiness to risk a nuclear war. This was the essence of the political compromises made in the late 1940’s between Democrats and Republicans in the United States, the Democrats retained big government in exchange for an anti - Communist crusade and between Europe and America, the Social Democrats could come to power in exchange for agreeing to NATO.

The changes in the States system, on this analysis, can be explained by two phenomena. First of all, the social contract of the Cold War period was called into question. On the one hand, after
Vietnam, the readiness to risk life in war was no longer automatic. Indeed by the 1980’s, mass movements against nuclear war had developed.

On the other hand, the growing neo-liberal consensus and the spread of globalization eroded the guarantee of economic and social rights. Under the impact of globalization, the distinction between Western and non-western societies is collapsing. The capacity of non-western States to sustain populist projects within closed societies is undermined and the increasing interconnectedness at a political as well as a cultural level provides some protection for disaffected individuals and allows them to demand extensions of political and civil rights.

As the categories framing world society - the distinction between highly developed and under developed countries, between tradition and modernity - are collapsing. In the cosmopolitan paradigm of second modernity, the non-western societies share the same space and time horizon with the West (Beck, 2000:62).

Globalization is a wild process involving interconnectedness and exclusion, integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversity. The fundamental source of the new wars is the crisis of State authority, a profound loss of legitimacy that became apparent in the post-colonial states in the 1970’s and 1980’s and in the post-communist States only after 1989. Part of the story of that crisis is the failure or exhaustion of populist emancipator projects such as socialism or national liberation, especially those that were implemented within an authoritarian communitarian framework. But this failure cannot be disentangled from the impact of globalization.

What is new about the crisis of state authority in the 1980’s and 1990’s is not simply the uncompleted character of the ‘civilizing process’ in non Western societies but, rather, something that could be described as its opposite - the unraveling of the process. The monopoly of violence and taxation is being eroded and the balance between public and private and internal and external has shifted. In those areas prone to conflict, the balance between public and private has shifted as a consequence of the legacy of authoritarianism, the longevity of ruling groups or the failure of populist projects.

In particular, centralized economic systems often tend to generate shortages of resources, which are rationed according to privileged and personal networks. The combination of privatization and globalization can give rise to a process, which is almost the reverse of the process through which modern states were constructed. Corruption and clientilism lead to an erosion of the tax revenue base because of declining legitimacy and growing incapacity to collect tax and because of declining investment (both public and private) and, consequently, production.

The declining tax revenue leads to growing dependence both on external sources and on private sources, through, for example, rent seeking or criminal activities. Reductions in public
expenditure as a result of the shrinking fiscal base as well as pressures from external donors for macro-economic stabilization and liberalization further erode legitimacy.

A growing informal economy associated with increased inequalities, unemployment and rural-urban migration, combined with the loss of legitimacy, weakens the rule of law and may lead to the re-emergence of privatized forms of violence - organized crime and the substitution of “protection” for taxation, vigilantes, private security guards protecting economic facilities, especially international companies, para-military groups associated with particular political factions. In particular, reductions in security expenditure, often encouraged by external donors for the best of motives, may lead to break away groups of redundant soldiers and policemen seeking alternative employment.

These are the circumstances that give rise to the “new wars”. It is the lack of authority of the state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatization and informalisation of violence that gives rise to violent conflicts.

Moreover, this “un-civilizing process”, tends to be reinforced by the dynamics of the conflicts, which have the effect of further reordering political, economic and social relationships in a negative spiral of incivility. Rather than conflicts, they are called “new wars” because of their political character although they could also be described as massive violations of human rights and organized crime (Kaldor 2000:92). They are violent struggles to gain access to or to control the state.

In the majority of cases, these wars are fought in the name of identity, a claim to power on the basis of labels. These are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels - ethnic, linguistic, or religious - and the wars themselves give meaning to the labels. Labels are mobilized for political purposes. They offer a new sense of security in a context where the political and economic certainties of previous decades have evaporated.

They provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to maintain or capture power, that uses the language and forms of an earlier period. Undoubtedly, these ideologies make use of pre-existing cleavages and the legacies of past wars.

But nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments, often assisted by Diaspora funding and techniques and speeded up through the electronic media, that is the immediate cause of conflict. In these wars, violence is itself a form of political mobilization. The aim is to capture territory through political control rather than military success. And political control is maintained through terror, through expulsion or elimination of those who challenge political control, especially those with a different label.
In these wars, physical destruction is very high, unemployment is very high and the various parties finance themselves through loot and plunder and various forms of illegal trading; thus they are closely linked into and help to generate organized crime networks and often depend on support from neighboring states, Diaspora groups, and humanitarian assistance. The division between so-called realists and cosmopolitans has come to supplant the traditional division between left and right and observing events in Seattle and Washington, it is clear that those traditional divisions still exist (Giddens, 1994:60).

The character of ‘new wars’ that efforts aimed at conflict prevention or management should focus on a reversal of the “un-civilizing process”, on the reconstruction of relations based on agreed rules and public authority.

Above all, the centerpiece of any peace strategy has to be the restoration of legitimate authority. It has to counterpoise the strategy of “fear and hate” with a strategy of “hearts and minds”. This kind of restoration of legitimate authority cannot mean a reversion to statist politics; it must imply multi-layered authority – global, regional, and local as well as national (Kaldor 2002:132).

In nearly all conflict zones, it is possible to identify individuals, groups or even local communities that try to act in inclusive democratic ways. Precisely because these are wars which are not total and in which participation is low, in which the distinction between war and peace is eroding, there are often what might be called “zones of civility” that struggle to escape the polarization imposed by the logic of war and provide space for cosmopolitan politics.

Examples include Tuzla in Bosnia Herzegovina, Northwest Somaliland as well as many other places (Kaldor 1999:173). Pro-democracy groups are not, moreover, confined to non-violent resistance. Self-defense groups or reformist forces like the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda or even elements in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo conflict may be counted among these cosmopolitan or democratic political groupings.

Strengthening cosmopolitan politics is much more important than trying to reconcile opposing exclusivist groups, even though conflict resolution efforts at a societal level may be important in changing political perspectives. Negotiations among warring parties help to legitimize those who support exclusive approaches to politics and may result in impossible compromises involving various types of partition and power sharing that entrench identity politics.

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7 The Rwandan Patriotic Front is the current ruling political party of Rwanda, led by President Paul Kagame. It governs in a coalition with other parties. Its ideology promotes democratic socialism and left-wing nationalism.

8 The Kosovo Liberation Army (Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or Serbian: Ослободилачка Војска Косова) was an Albanian insurgent organization which sought the separation of Kosovo from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
There may be a case for negotiations to stabilize the violence and create space for alternative cosmopolitan groupings but how this is done and with what aim should be understood as part of a common cosmopolitan strategy.

Kuhn’s conception of the type of change that accompanies a “scientific revolution” (Kuhn, 1996:25) provides insight into the epochal change confronting international relations today. The concept of a “paradigm shift” (Kuhn, 1996:150) has the potential to reflect something of the “cataclysmic change that precludes the effective operation of social structures and processes and destroys long-held convictions about the world” (De Santis, 1996:xii).

Kuhn’s ideas of revolutionary change provide the basis for a credible response to critics such as Ruggie (1993:143-144) who argue that International Relations as a discipline has never been very good at explaining periods of “fundamental discontinuity” in the international system (also see Hopmann, 2003:101). Pointing perhaps to the crux of the matter, Shaw (2000:56) lays the charge that “theories of political change have not seriously grappled with the global”. Nef (1999:5) also underlines this shortcoming when he asserts that “scholars have been slow to react to global transformations and to fill the intellectual void”. Kuhn’s theory provides an instrument with which to address this particular concern.

If, as De Santis (1996:xii) argues, this period of cataclysmic change has destroyed long-held convictions about the world we live in, using Kuhn’s theory thirdly seems to be justified because it allows for a better understanding of change from an ontological perspective. In this context, ontological concerns are those that “you recognize as the factors you will invoke to account for social life” (Taylor, 1989:159).

Harper (2000:12-17) states that Kuhn’s book is about more than the method of scientific enquiry, it is about human ways of perceiving reality. Kuhn himself acknowledges that a paradigm shift indeed implies a change of worldview (Kuhn, 1996:111).

Kuhn’s theory therefore creates the space, especially in periods of uncertainty and confusion, for a change of worldview, for breaking out of the mould, and for exploring new and original ontology. Here is agreement with Walker (1993:82) who insists that differences between approaches to contemporary international relations must be addressed at the level of basic ontological assumptions.

This leads to the final reason why Kuhn, who once described himself as a bit of a “troublemaker” (Kuhn, 1970:246), might have a recipe to breathe new life into International Relations. Kuhn was never afraid to challenge orthodoxy, individuals challenging the status quo and imagining worlds beyond the conventional are, indeed, at the heart of Kuhn’s theory.
Kuhn’s views are compatible with critical theory, a strand that can be traced throughout this research. Critical theory argues that emancipation should be given precedence over traditional International Relations themes such as power and order (Booth, 1991:539).

Thomas Kuhn’s theory allows for change with emancipation intent, it allows for an approach to change, which puts humanity and not the nation-state, at the heart of the International Relations project. Tying these various arguments together and at a first level, Thomas Kuhn’s theory provides an instrument with which to engage the concept of change. More importantly still, it provides insight into periods of fundamental change such as the one prevailing in contemporary international relations.

Arguing that international relations should come to grips with the pervasive dynamics of transformation or with “new realities” (Drucker, 1990:63), the study represents an attack on the “states-are-forever habit” (Rosenau, 2002:23), the latter which is at the heart of the Westphalia paradigm. A “paradigmatic jailbreak” is required if International Relations wants to counter accusations such as that lodged by Erickson (1985:51) that “in the social sciences, paradigms do not die, but they develop varicose veins and get fitted with cardiac pacemakers”.

This attack on the “states-are-forever habit” also includes criticism of its conceptual substructure. Deibert (1997:169) asserts that, as they are utilized today, traditional concepts act as ontological blinders rather than as aids to understanding. This inevitably leads to “one-eyed social science” (Strange, 1996:195). Especially when it comes to addressing change, these concepts are inadequate.

Walker (1993:78) states that analysis remains caught within “what are essentially seventeenth- and eighteenth-century conceptions of space and time”. In the conceptual jails in which they lived and worked, academics’ and policymakers’ paradigms served them well as creative guides to the framing and analysis of problems. The same conceptual equipment now, however, blinds them to change that lie outside its scope (Rosenau, 1990:37).

At a second level, Thomas Kuhn’s theory facilitates an understanding of change from an emancipatory perspective. This change entails that humanity is put at the centre of international relations. International relations should provide a voice to humanity – especially to “the poor, oppressed and otherwise disadvantaged” (Wapner, 2002:167).

Drawing on the latent idealism in Kuhn’s theory, there is a belief that international relations could be other than it is at both the theoretical and practical levels. There is a need to move beyond our “constrained imaginations” (Booth, 1998:344) and to explore how we “can get from the present to a better future” (Rorty, 1999:231).
The Westphalian paradigm’s “preselected ontology” (Vale, 2003:42) must be forsaken to allow for new ways of seeing international relations. Only if this would be achieved the building conflict between “Access World” and “Denial World” would avert and the discipline of International Relations would remain viable and its lexicon relevant in a turbulent and fluid global environment.

1.4 Research Methodology

As stated in the introduction, this research aims to make a contribution to the debate raging in both theoretical and practical sphere of international relations between European and Central Asia States, following the interest of NATO and EU after the Soviet Union collapse in the region.

Much comparative research is biased as well as limited by its way of selection, which may well impair the external and internal validity of results. Furthermore, too often comparisons are made without explicitly departing from theory-guided questions to the research design developed.

All this imply that comparative political analysis remains shallow in developing new theoretical insights. Therefore, essential is that theory becomes before method to advance proper comparative analysis of politics and society.

To do so, the research will also explore how national comparison can expand and strengthen the methodological process. I believe that, based on research findings, focusing on national unit is an important tool for increasing the number of observation and for making controlled comparison, thus mitigating some of the characteristic limitation of a small-N research design. Finally, national comparison better equip research to handle the uneven nature of major process of political, social and economic transformation.

The research would move by inquiring about the rationale behind the starting point of the EU and NATO interests and objectives in Central Asia region (main actors - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan- aims, context, opportunity, constrains and mechanism), evaluating in each case the role of systemic factors and local dynamics.

Then, the research would underline the effects of the cooperation upon the main actors, the level of cooperation and the changes within the process across time.

The selected areas were chosen in part because of the high degree of instability and lack of administrative capacity/infrastructure to cope with the basic needs of the population; besides this, target provinces are also chosen because of the most affected by political instability and the high degree of the drug and weapon trades. These will be monitored through appropriate indicators:

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General indicators: Area (millions KM2), Population (millions), Urban population (% of total), Population growth rate (annual %), Human Development Index (HDI)/ranking, Adult literacy (%), International and bilateral agreements established (%), Armed Forces personnel (hundreds) and number of conventional weapons (% of total).

Governance indicators: Control of corruption, Rule of Law, Voice and accountability, Regulatory quality, Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness;

Economic Indicators: GDP (Billions US $), GNP per capita (US $), Services (%), Real GDP growth rate (%), External debt stock (US $), Debt Service (% of export of goods and services), Inflation rate % 2011, Exports and Imports of goods and services to and from E.U., Trade Balance with E.U.;

Educational Indicators: How much is spent per student, number of schools, how much public investment is there in education, how much are teachers paid.

Social Indicators: Access to safe water, access to improved sanitation, regional cooperation, regional projects, democratization and rule of law.

Security Indicators: Number of incidents and threats to physical safety and security, degree of corruption, borders and migration smuggling, perceptions of safety and violence, number of the armed conflicts.

About the methods of Data Collection, the research uses qualitative methods as survey methods, methods for elite and mass interviewing, archival and documentary research, life histories and political biographies, and the use of electronic search materials appropriate for political analysis and election monitoring.

On the Data Analysis Method, the research carry out a qualitative methods as content and textual analysis of political texts, ethnographic and narrative analysis of political processes, familiarity with computer-based coding of political variables.

All this in order to provide a robust and up-to-date socio-economic-politic-security data, by filling gaps and putting findings into a broader perspective. Moreover, it is intended to outline means and methods of work of the European Union (Security Strategy), NATO (Strategic Concept and Comprehensive Approach) and the bilateral agreements among the E.U., NATO and Central Asia States, with a view to respect the sovereign will of each country.

This thesis analyses the E.U. and NATO Strategies towards Central Asia Region and their impact on the political, social and security cooperation.

Therefore, it will be underlined the findings and advises, despite a deliberately optimistic vision of what the EU and NATO can achieve in their external policies, the content of cooperation
and how it impact elite accountability. Moreover, it examines the degree of EU and NATO involvement as an instrument that has served to enhance the quality of these democracies.

The thesis ends with a deep Analysis and Evaluation of Afghanistan national development framework and on the implication of these findings for the long-term economic projects and international cooperation.

The thesis warns against theories of international cooperation that treat States as unitary actors and overlooks the domestic distribution of international collective action benefits. It is clearly too early to assume that these advances will translate into lasting progress towards a coherent and effective NATO and EU strategies.

Moreover, all efforts have been put in place to offer realistic reasons for optimism, an approach that the candidate believes to be justified by the wide-range of activities by the EU and NATO. This research is not be considered as a mono-thematic approach towards dialogue, cooperation, security and stability in Central Asia, but the analysis, since its very beginning, has stated from the concrete observation of the phenomenon and the related practical solution and observing the effects of different instruments adopted.

About the impact of the instruments adopted to achieve a full and effective cooperation, it is necessary to underline that the aim of this research has a double objective: on the one hand, the attention is focused on the implementation and the interaction of all those agreements settled for a constructive cooperation and stability among the main stakeholders. On the other hand, the survey focuses on the capacity of EU and NATO to positively impact on the basic political and economical frameworks of those central Asian countries.

The model of cooperation encountered in the Central Asia region is established by centuries-old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together since Marco Polo’s journey in XV century. The Great Powers as Russia, France and Great Britain had been always interested in controlling the “Silk Road” and they feared each other for controlling the British expansion in the south of Asia during the second century.

For each of them, the issue of who controlled Central Asia was understood through the lens of security and the battle for territorial control to attain this security and mineral resources exploitation: it came to be known as the Great Game. At the end, Russia and then Soviet Union accomplished the task of capturing the heartland.

Central Asia is a region that is broadly contained between China, the Caucasus Mountains, the Russia borders, the Middle East and South Asia. Most authors agree that its core is the five post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Other areas often
included are Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Xingjian, but for this research, Central Asia will be deemed to be the five core states of the post-Soviet Union and Afghanistan too.

1.5 Overview of Russia and Central Asia States

1.5.1 Russia
Russia was founded in the 12th century, the Principality of Muscovy, was able to emerge from over 200 years of Mongol domination (13th – 15th centuries) and to gradually conquer and absorb surrounding principalities. In the early 17th century, a new Romanov Dynasty continued this policy of expansion across Siberia to the Pacific. Under Peter I (ruled 1682-1725), hegemony was extended to the Baltic Sea and the country was renamed the Russian Empire. During the 19th century, more territorial acquisitions were made in Europe and Asia.

Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which resulted in the formation of a parliament and other reforms. Repeated devastating defeats of the Russian army in World War I led to widespread rioting in the major cities of the Russian Empire and to the overthrow in 1917 of the imperial household. The Communists under Vladimir Lenin seized power soon after and formed the USSR.

The brutal rule of Iosif Stalin (1928-53) strengthened Communist rule and Russian dominance of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of lives. The Soviet economy and society stagnated in the following decades until General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize Communism, but his initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 splintered the USSR into Russia and 14 other independent republics.

Since then, Russia has shifted its post-Soviet democratic ambitions in favor of a centralized semi-authoritarian state in which the leadership seeks to legitimize its rule through managed national elections, populist appeals by former President Putin, and continued economic growth.

Russia has severely disabled a Chechen rebel movement, although violence still occurs throughout the North Caucasus. Today, Russia owns ethnic groups as the follow: Russian 79.8%, Tatar 3.8%, Ukrainian 2%, Bashkir 1.2%, Chuvash 1.1%, other or unspecified 12.1% (2002 census), with Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2% (2006 est.), a population about 142,517,670 (July 2012 est.) and its society has 0-14 years 15.7% (male 11,498,268/female 10,890,853), 15-64 years 71.3% (male 48,851,357/female 52,806,900) and 65 years and over 13% (male 5,622,464/female 12,847,828) (2012 est.).

Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a globally-isolated, centrally-planned economy to a more market-based and globally-integrated economy. Economic reforms in the 1990’s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy and defense-related sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak and the private sector remains subject to heavy state interference.

Russian industry is primarily split between globally-competitive commodity producers. In 2011, Russia became the world’s leading oil producer, surpassing Saudi Arabia; Russia is the
second-largest producer of natural gas and holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves, the second-largest coal reserves, and the eighth-largest crude oil reserves.

Russia is the third-largest exporter of both steel and primary aluminum and relies on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that follow the highly volatile swings in global commodity prices. The government since 2007 has embarked on an ambitious program to reduce this dependency and build up the country's high technology sectors, but with few results so far.

The economy had averaged 7% growth in the decade following the 1998 Russian financial crisis, resulting in a doubling of real disposable incomes and the emergence of a middle class. The Russian economy, however, was one of the hardest hit by the 2008-09 global economic crisis as oil prices plummeted and the foreign credits that Russian banks and firms relied on dried up.

According to the World Bank the government’s anti-crisis package in 2008-09 amounted to roughly 6.7% of GDP. The Central Bank of Russia spent one-third of its $600 billion international reserves, the world’s third largest, in late 2008 to slow the devaluation of the ruble. The government also devoted $200 billion in a rescue plan to increase liquidity in the banking sector and aid Russian firms unable to roll over large foreign debts coming due.

The economic decline bottomed out in mid-2009 and the economy began to grow in the third quarter of 2009. However, a severe drought and fires in central Russia reduced agricultural output, prompting a ban on grain exports for part of the year, and slowed growth in other sectors such as manufacturing and retail trade. High oil prices buoyed Russian growth in 2011 and helped Russia reduce the budget deficit inherited from the lean years of 2008-09.

Russia has reduced unemployment since 2009 and has made progress on reducing inflation since 2010 and long-term challenges include a shrinking workforce, a high level of corruption, and difficulty in accessing capital for smaller, non-energy companies, and poor infrastructure in need of large investments. Its GDP real growth rate is estimated 4.3% in 2011 and country comparison to the world is 87, while 4.3% in 2010 est. and -7.8% in 2009 est., with a labor force occupation agriculture 9.8%, industry 27.5% and services 62.7% in 2010.

Industries have complete range of mining and extractive industries producing coal, oil, gas, chemicals, and metals, all forms of machine building from rolling mills to high-performance aircraft and space vehicles, defense industries including radar, missile production, and advanced electronic components, shipbuilding.

In conclusion, Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from Afghanistan through Central Asian countries. China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed

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islands at the Amur and Ussuri confluence and in the Argun River in accordance with the 2004 Agreement, ending their centuries-long border disputes.

The sovereignty dispute over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group, known in Japan as the “Northern Territories” and in Russia as the “Southern Kurils”, occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, now administered by Russia, and claimed by Japan, remains the primary sticking point to signing a peace treaty formally ending World War II hostilities.

Russia’s military support and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence in 2008 continue to sour relations with Georgia, while with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Russia ratified Caspian seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance and Iran continues to insist on a one-fifth slice of the sea.

Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010 and various groups in Finland advocate restoration of Karelia (Kareliya) and other areas ceded to the Soviet Union following World War II but the Finnish Government asserts no territorial demands.

Russia and Estonia signed a technical border agreement in May 2005, but Russia recalled its signature in June 2005 after the Estonian parliament added to its domestic ratification act a historical preamble referencing the Soviet occupation and Estonia’s pre-war borders under the 1920 Treaty of Tartu. Russia contends that the preamble allows Estonia to make territorial claims on Russia in the future, while Estonian officials deny that the preamble has any legal impact on the treaty text.

Lithuania and Russia committed to demarcating their boundary in 2006 in accordance with the land and maritime treaty ratified by Russia in May 2003 and by Lithuania in 1999 and operates a simplified transit regime for Russian nationals traveling from the Kaliningrad coastal exclave into Russia, while still conforming, as an EU member state with an EU external border, where strict Schengen border rules apply.

Preparations for the demarcation delimitation of land boundary with Ukraine have commenced and the dispute over the boundary between Russia and Ukraine through the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov remains unresolved despite a December 2003 framework agreement and ongoing expert-level discussions.

Kazakhstan and Russia boundary delimitation was ratified on November 2005 and field demarcation should commence in 2007. Russian Duma has not yet ratified the Bering Sea Maritime Boundary Agreement with the US, while Denmark and Norway have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental shelf (CLCS) and Russia is collecting additional data to augment its 2001 CLCS submission

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1.5.2 Kazakhstan

Ethnic Kazakhs, a mix of Turkish and Mongol nomadic tribes who migrated into the region in the 13th century, were rarely united as a single nation. The area was conquered by Russia in the 18th century and Kazakhstan became a Soviet Republic in 1936. During the 1950’s and 1960’s agricultural “Virgin Lands” program, Soviet citizens were encouraged to help cultivate Kazakhstan’s northern pastures.

This influx of immigrants (mostly Russians, but also some other deported nationalities) skewed the ethnic mixture and enabled non-ethnic Kazakhs to outnumber natives. Independence in 1991 drove many of these newcomers to emigrate. Kazakhstan’s economy is larger than those of all the other Central Asian states largely due to the country’s vast natural resources.

Current issues include: developing a cohesive national identity; expanding the development of the country’s vast energy resources and exporting them to world markets; diversifying the economy outside the oil, gas, and mining sectors; enhancing Kazakhstan’s economic competitiveness; developing a multiparty parliament and advancing political and social reform; and strengthening relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers.

Major deposits of petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold, uranium are available. The ethnic composition see Kazakh (Qazaq) 63.1%, Russian 23.7%, Uzbek 2.8%, Ukrainian 2.1%, Uighur 1.4%, Tatar 1.3%, German 1.1%, other 4.5% (1999 census), while main religions are Muslim 47%, Russian Orthodox 44%, Protestant 2% and other 7%.

Population is about 17,522,010 (July 2012 est.), with social composition 0-14 years 24.4% (male 2,154,544/ female 2,126,508), 15-64 years 68.8% (male 5,846,991/ female 6,213,990), 65 years and over 6.7% (male 404,254/ female 775,723) (2012 est.).

Kazakhstan, geographically the largest of the former Soviet republics, excluding Russia, possesses enormous fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals, such as uranium, copper, and zinc. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. In 2002 Kazakhstan became the first country in the former Soviet Union to receive an investment-grade credit rating and its economy has largely recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008.

Extractive industries have been and will continue to be the engine of this growth. Landlocked, with restricted access to the high seas, Kazakhstan relies on its neighbors to export its products, especially oil and grain. Although its Caspian Sea ports, pipelines, and rail lines carrying oil have been upgraded, civil aviation and roadways have been neglected.
Telecoms are improving, but require considerable investment, as does the information technology base. Supply and distribution of electricity can be erratic because of regional dependencies. At the end of 2007, global financial markets froze up and the loss of capital inflows to Kazakhstani banks caused a credit crunch.

The subsequent and sharp fall of oil and commodity prices in 2008 aggravated the economic situation, and Kazakhstan plunged into recession. While the global financial crisis took a significant toll on Kazakhstan’s economy, it has rebounded well. In response to the crisis, Kazakhstan’s government devalued the drop (Kazakhstan’s currency) to stabilize market pressures and injected around $10 billion in economic stimulus.

Rising commodity prices have helped revive Kazakhstan’s economy, which registered roughly 7% growth in 2010-11. Despite solid macroeconomic indicators, the government realizes that its economy suffers from an overreliance on oil and extractive industries, the so-called “Dutch disease”.

In response, Kazakhstan has embarked on an ambitious diversification program, aimed at developing targeted sectors like transport, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, petrochemicals and food processing. In 2010 Kazakhstan joined the Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union in an effort to boost foreign investment and improve trade relationships. The government expects to join the World Trade Organization in 2012, which should also help to develop the manufacturing and service sector base.

Its GDP\textsuperscript{12} increased 7% year-on-year in 2011 and the real growth rate is 7.5% (2011 est.), 7.3% (2010 est.), 1.2% (2009 est.), labor force is agriculture 25.9% industry, 11.9%, services 62.2% (2010 est.). Ongoing demarcation with Russia began in 2007, while demarcation with China was completed in 2002. The creation of a seabed boundary with Turkmenistan in the Caspian Sea remains under discussion\textsuperscript{13}.

\subsection{1.5.3 Tajikistan}
The Tajik people came under Russian rule in the 1860's and 1870's but Russia’s hold on Central Asia weakened following the Revolution of 1917. Bolshevik control of the area was fiercely contested and not fully reestablished until 1925. Much of present-day Sughd province was transferred from the Uzbek to the newly formed Tajik in 1929.

Ethnic Uzbeks form a substantial minority in Tajikistan, becoming independent in 1991 following the breakup of the Soviet Union, experiencing a civil war between regional factions from

\textsuperscript{12} Source: The World Bank, \url{https://www.econ.worldbank.org}

\textsuperscript{13} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, \url{https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html}
Tajikistan experienced several security incidents in 2010, including a mass prison-break from a Dushanbe detention facility, the country’s first suicide car bombing in Khujand, and armed conflict between government forces and opposition militants in the Rasht Valley.

The country remains the poorest in the former Soviet sphere and therefore attention by the international community since the beginning of the NATO intervention in Afghanistan has brought increased economic development and security assistance, which could create jobs and strengthen stability in the long term. Tajikistan is seeking WTO membership and joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2002.

Ethnic groups see Tajik 79.9%, Uzbek 15.3%, Russian 1.1%, Kyrgyz 1.1%, other 2.6% (2000 census), religions are Sunni Muslim 85%, Shia Muslim 5%, and other 10% (2003 est.), the population is about 7,768,385 (July 2012 est.), with the age structure 0-14 years 33.7% (male 1,332,136/ female 1,285,643), 15-64 years 63% (male 2,424,903/ female 2,471,409), 65 years and over 3.3% (male 107,335/ female 146,959) (2012 est.).

Economy in Tajikistan has one of the lowest per capita GDPs among the 15 former Soviet republics. Because of a lack of employment opportunities in Tajikistan, as many as a million Tajik citizens work abroad, almost all of them in Russia, supporting families in Tajikistan through remittances. Less than 7% of the land area is arable.

Cotton is the most important crop, and its production is closely monitored, and in many cases controlled, by the government. In the wake of the National Bank of Tajikistan’s admission in December 2007 that it had improperly lent money to investors in the cotton sector, the IMF canceled its program in Tajikistan.

A reform agenda is underway, according to which over half a billion dollars in farmer debt is being forgiven, and IMF assistance has been reinstated. Mineral resources include silver, gold, uranium, and tungsten. Industry consists only of a large aluminum plant, hydropower facilities, and small obsolete factories mostly in light industry and food processing. The civil war (1992-97) severely damaged the already weak economic infrastructure and caused a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural production.

Tajikistan’s economic situation remains fragile due to uneven implementation of structural reforms, corruption, weak governance, seasonal power shortages, and the external debt burden. Electricity output expanded with the completion of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower dam - finished in 2009 with Russian investment. The smaller Sangtuda-2, built with Iranian investment, began operating in 2011.

The government of Tajikistan is pinning major hopes on the massive Roghun dam which, if finished according to Tajik plans, will be the tallest dam in the world and significantly expand
electricity output. The World Bank has agreed to fund technical, economic, social, and environmental feasibility studies for the dam, scheduled to be completed in 2012.

In January 2010, the government began selling shares in the Roghun enterprise to its population, ultimately raising over $180 million but Tajikistan will still need significant investment to complete the dam. According to numerous reports, many Tajik individuals and businesses were forced to buy shares. The coerced share sales finally ended in mid-2010 under intense criticism from donors, particularly by the IMF.

Food and fuel prices in 2011 increased to the highest levels seen since 2002 due in part to an increase in rail transport tariffs through Uzbekistan. Tajikistan imports approximately 60% of its food and 90% of that comes by rail. GDP\(^{14}\) real growth rate is 7.4% (2011 est.), 6.5% (2010 est.) 3.9% (2009 est.).

In 2006, China and Tajikistan pledged to commence demarcation of the revised boundary agreed to in the delimitation of 2002, while talks continue with Uzbekistan to delimit border and remove minefields, but disputes in Isfara Valley still delay delimitation with Kyrgyzstan.

Major transit country for Afghan narcotics bound for Russian and Western European markets. Tajikistan seizes roughly 80% of all drugs captured in Central Asia and stands third worldwide in seizures of opiates\(^{15}\) (heroin and raw opium).

1.5.4 Turkmenistan

Present-day Turkmenistan covers territory that has been at the crossroads of civilizations for centuries. The area was ruled in antiquity by various Persian empires, and was conquered by Alexander the Great, Muslim crusaders, the Mongols, Turkic warriors, and eventually the Russians.

In medieval times Merv (today known as Mary) was one of the great cities of the Islamic world and an important stop on the Silk Road. Annexed by Russia in the late 1800’s, Turkmenistan later figured prominently in the anti-Bolshevik movement in Central Asia. In 1924, Turkmenistan became a Soviet republic, achieving independence upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Extensive hydrocarbon/natural gas reserves, which have yet to be fully exploited, have begun to transform the country.

Turkmenistan is moving to expand its extraction and delivery projects and its Government is actively working to diversify its gas export routes beyond the still important Russian pipeline network. In 2010, new gas export pipelines that carry Turkmen gas to China and to northern Iran began operating, effectively ending the Russian monopoly on Turkmen gas exports.

President for life Saparmurat Nyyazow died in December 2006, and Turkmenistan held its first multi-candidate presidential election in February 2007. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, a deputy cabinet chairman under Nyyazow, emerged as the country’s new president and reelected in February 2012.

Ethnic groups see Turkmen 85%, Uzbek 5%, Russian 4%, other 6% (2003), religions are Muslim 89%, Eastern Orthodox 9%, unknown 2%, population is about 5,054,828 (July 2012 est.); age structure is made of 0-14 years 27.1% (male 692,297/ female 675,224), 15-64 years 68.8% (male 1,723,403/ female 1,755,457), 65 years and over 4.1% (male 90,703/ female 117,744) (2012 est.).

Turkmenistan is largely a desert country with intensive agriculture in irrigated oases and sizeable gas and oil resources. The two largest crops are cotton, most of which is produced for export, and wheat, which is domestically consumed. Although agriculture accounts for roughly 10% of GDP, it continues to employ nearly half of the country’s workforce. Turkmenistan’s authoritarian regime has taken a cautious approach to economic reform, hoping to use gas and cotton export revenues to sustain its inefficient and highly corrupt economy.

Privatization goals remain limited. From 1998-2005, Turkmenistan suffered from the continued lack of adequate export routes for natural gas and from obligations on extensive short-term external debt. At the same time, however, total exports rose by an average of roughly 15% per year from 2003-08, largely because of higher international oil and gas prices.

Additional pipelines to China and Iran, that began operation in early 2010, have expanded Turkmenistan’s export routes for its gas, although these new routes have not completely offset the sharp drop in export revenue since early 2009 from decreased gas exports to Russia. Overall prospects in the near future are discouraging because of endemic corruption, a poor educational system, government misuse of oil and gas revenues, and Ashgabat’s reluctance to adopt market-oriented reforms.

The majority of Turkmenistan’s economic statistics are state secrets. The present government established a State Agency for Statistics, but GDP numbers and other publicized figures are subject to wide margins of error. In particular, the rate of GDP growth is uncertain, however, here some estimation: GDP real growth rate is 14.7% (2011), 9.2% (2010) 6.1% (2009).

Since his election, President Berdimuhamedow unified the country’s dual currency exchange rate, ordered the redenomination of the manat, reduced state subsidies for gasoline, and initiated development of a special tourism zone on the Caspian Sea.

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Although foreign investment is encouraged, and some improvements in macroeconomic policy have been made, numerous bureaucratic obstacles impede international business activity.

Cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan creates water-sharing difficulties for Amu Darya river states and field demarcation of the boundaries with Kazakhstan commenced in 2005, with Caspian seabed delimitation remains stalled with Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kazakhstan due to Turkmenistan’s indecision over how to allocate the sea’s waters and seabed.

Bilateral talks continue with Azerbaijan on dividing the seabed and contested oilfields in the middle of the Caspian.

1.5.5 Kyrgyzstan

It is a Central Asian country of incredible natural beauty and proud nomadic traditions, most of Kyrgyzstan was formally annexed to Russia in 1876, but a major revolt was held against the Tsarist Empire in 1916, in which almost one-sixth of the Kyrgyz population was killed.

Kyrgyzstan became a Soviet republic in 1936 and achieved independence in 1991 when the USSR dissolved, nationwide demonstrations in the spring of 2005 resulted in the ouster of President Askar Akaev, who had run the country since 1990.

Subsequent presidential elections in July 2005 were won overwhelmingly by former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev. Over the next few years, the new president manipulated the parliament to accrue new powers for himself and in July 2009, after months of harassment against his opponents and media critics, Bakiev won re-election in a presidential campaign that the international community deemed flawed.

In April 2010, nationwide protests led to the resignation and expulsion of Bakiev, his successor, Roza Otunbaeva, served as transitional president until Almazbek Atambaev was inaugurated in December 2011. Continuing concerns include the trajectory of democratization, endemic corruption, poor interethnic relations, and terrorism.

About the ethnic groups Kyrgyzstan owns Kyrgyz 64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Russian 12.5%, Dungan 1.1%, Ukrainian 1%, Uighur 1%, other 5.7% (1999 census), while religions are Muslim 75%, Russian Orthodox 20% and other 5%. The population is about population 5,496,737 (July 2012 est.).

Age structure is 0-14 years 29.6% (male 830,939/ female 795,028), 15-64 years 65.5% (male 1,761,524/ female 1,840,319), 65 years and over 4.9% (male 103,679/ female 165,248) (2012 est.). The Kyrgyzstan economy is a poor, mountainous country, with a dominant agricultural sector.

Cotton, tobacco, wool, and meat are the main agricultural products, although only tobacco and cotton are exported in any quantity. Industrial exports include gold, mercury, uranium, natural gas, and electricity. The economy depends heavily on gold exports - mainly from output at the Kumtor gold mine.

Following independence, Kyrgyzstan was progressive in carrying out market reforms, such as an improved regulatory system and land reform. Kyrgyzstan was the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country to be accepted into the World Trade Organization. Much of the government’s stock in enterprises has been sold. Drops in production had been severe after the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, but by mid-1995, production began to recover and exports began to increase.

In 2005, the Bakiev government and international financial institutions initiated a comprehensive medium-term poverty reduction and economic growth strategy. The government made steady strides in controlling its substantial fiscal deficit, nearly closing the gap between revenues and expenditures in 2006, before boosting expenditures more than 20% in 2007-08.

GDP grew about 8% annually in 2007-08, partly due to higher gold prices internationally, but slowed to 2.9% in 2009. The overthrow of President Bakiev in April 2010 and subsequent ethnic clashes left hundreds dead and damaged infrastructure. Shrinking trade and agricultural production, as well as political instability, caused GDP to contract 0.4% in 2010.

The fiscal deficit widened to 11% of GDP, reflecting significant increases in crisis-related spending, including both rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure and bank recapitalization. The economy grew 5.7% in 2011, and the budget deficit was reduced to just over 5% of GDP. Progress in reconstruction, fighting corruption, restructuring domestic industry, and attracting foreign aid and investment are key to future growth. GDP real growth rate is 5.7% (2011 est.), 0.5% (2010 est.) and 2.9% (2009 est.).

Kyrgyzstan has yet to ratify the 2001 boundary delimitation with Kazakhstan and disputes in Isfara Valley delay completion of delimitation with Tajikistan and its delimitation of 130 km of border with Uzbekistan is hampered by serious disputes over enclaves and other area. Illicit drugs cultivation of cannabis and opium poppy for CIS markets are country widespread and limited government eradication of illicit crops favor transit point for Southwest Asian, Russia and the rest of Europe.
1.5.6 Uzbekistan

Russia conquered the territory of present-day Uzbekistan in the late 19th century. Stiff resistance to the Red Army after the Bolshevik Revolution was eventually suppressed and a socialist republic established in 1924. During the Soviet era, intensive production of “white gold” (cotton) and grain led to overuse of agrochemicals and the depletion of water supplies, which have left the land degraded and the Aral Sea and certain rivers half dry.

Independent since 1991, the country seeks to gradually lessen its dependence on the cotton monoculture by diversifying agricultural production while developing its mineral and petroleum reserves and increasing its manufacturing base. Current concerns include terrorism by Islamic militants, economic stagnation, and the curtailment of human rights and democratization.

Ethnic groups are Uzbek 80%, Russian 5.5%, Tajik 5%, Kazakh 3%, Karakalpak 2.5%, Tatar 1.5%, other 2.5% (1996 est.), with Muslim 88% (mostly Sunni), Eastern Orthodox 9%, other 3%, a population about 28,394,180 (July 2012 est.) and age structure is 0-14 years 25.8% (male 3,757,958/ female 3,577,644), 15-64 years 69.5% (male 9,805,718/ female 9,924,871), 65 years and over 4.7% (male 567,148/ female 760,841) in 2011 est.

Uzbekistan is a dry, landlocked country, 11% of the land is intensely cultivated, in irrigated river valleys and more than 60% of the population lives in densely populated rural communities. Export of hydrocarbons, primarily natural gas, provided about 40% of foreign exchange earnings in 2009 and other major export earners include gold and cotton.

Uzbekistan is now the world’s second-largest cotton exporter and fifth largest producer and it has come under increasing international criticism for the use of child labor in its annual cotton harvest. Uzbekistan enjoyed a bumper cotton crop in 2010 amidst record high prices, but is gradually diversifying away from cotton toward more high-value fruits and vegetables.

Following independence in September 1991, the government sought to prop up its Soviet-style command economy with subsidies and tight controls on production and prices. While aware of the need to improve the investment climate, the government still sponsors measures that often increase, not decrease, its control over business decisions.

A sharp increase in the inequality of income distribution has hurt the lower ranks of society since independence. In 2003, the government accepted Article VIII obligations under the IMF, providing for full currency convertibility. However, strict currency controls and tightening of borders have lessened the effects of convertibility and have also led to some shortages that have further stifled economic activity.
The Central Bank often delays or restricts convertibility, especially for consumer goods. Uzbekistan has posted GDP\(^{18}\) growth of over 8% for the past several years, driven primarily by rising world prices for its main export commodities - natural gas, cotton and gold - and some industrial growth. In 2006, Uzbekistan took steps to rejoin the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurASEC), which it subsequently left in 2008, both organizations dominated by Russia.

In the past Uzbekistani authorities have accused US and other foreign companies operating in Uzbekistan of violating Uzbekistani tax laws and have frozen their assets, with several new expropriations in 2010-11. At the same time, the Uzbekistani Government has actively courted several major US and international corporations, offering attractive financing and tax advantages, and has landed a significant US investment in the automotive industry, including the opening of a power-train manufacturing facility in Tashkent in November, 2011.

Uzbekistan has seen few effects from the global economic downturn, primarily due to its relative isolation from the global financial markets, with a GDP 8.3% (2011 est.), 8.5% (2010 est.), 8.1% (2009 est.).

Prolonged drought and cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan created water-sharing difficulties for Amu Darya river states, while field demarcation of the boundaries with Kazakhstan commenced in 2004, but border delimitation of 130 km of border with Kyrgyzstan is hampered by serious disputes around enclaves and other areas.

Currently, Uzbekistan is a source country for women and girls trafficked to Kazakhstan, Russia, the Middle East, and Asia for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation and men are trafficked to Kazakhstan and Russia for purposes of forced labor in the construction, cotton, and tobacco industries; men and women are also trafficked internally for the purposes of domestic servitude, forced labor in the agricultural and construction industries, and for commercial sexual exploitation.

The government did not conduct any awareness campaigns regarding forced labor in the annual cotton harvest or other internal trafficking, but did continue its previous awareness campaigns about the dangers of transnational trafficking (2008). Transit country for Afghan narcotics bound for Russian and, to a lesser extent, Western European markets\(^{19}\).

1.5.7 Afghanistan

Ahmad Shah DURRANI unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747. The country served as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires until it won independence from notional British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 Communist counter-coup.

The Soviet Union invaded in 1979 to support the tottering Afghan Communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war, but withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by internationally supported anti-Communist mujahedin rebels. A series of subsequent civil wars saw Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hard-line Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 1994 to end the country’s civil war and anarchy.

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., a US, Allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama Bin Laden. The UN-sponsored Bonn Conference in 2001 established a process for political reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005.

In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and the National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Karzai was re-elected in August 2009 for a second term and next Presidential and Parliamentary elections are scheduled in 2014. Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban and continuing provincial instability - particularly in the south and the east - remain serious challenges for the Afghan Government.

In January 2011, Afghanistan assumed a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2012-13 terms. Afghanistan sees its ethnic groups with Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%; religions are Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1% and its population is about 30,419,928 (July 2012 est.). Regarding the age structure, Afghanistan owns 0-14 years 43.2% (male 6,671,683/ female 6,460,034), 15-64 years 54.4% (male 8,414,716/ female 8,121,616) and 65 years and over 2.5% (male 350,692/ female 401,187) (2012 est.).

Afghanistan’s economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid.

Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, weak governance, and the Afghan Government’s difficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. Afghanistan’s living standards are among the lowest in the world.

While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan’s development, pledging over $67 billion at nine donors’ conferences between 2003-10, the Government of Afghanistan will need to overcome a number of challenges, including low revenue collection, anemic job creation, high levels of corruption, weak government capacity and poor public infrastructure. Its GDP\textsuperscript{20} growth real rate is 5.7% (2011 est.), 8.4% (2010 est.), 21% (2009 est.).

Afghan, Coalition, and Pakistan military meet periodically to clarify the alignment of the boundary on the ground and on maps. Afghan and Iranian commissioners have discussed boundary monument densification and resurvey. Iran protests Afghanistan’s restricting flow of dammed Helmand River tributaries during drought; Pakistan has sent troops across and built fences along some remote tribal areas of its treaty-defined Durand Line border with Afghanistan which serve as bases for foreign terrorists and other illegal activities.

Russia remains concerned about the smuggling of poppy derivatives from Afghanistan through Central Asian countries. World’s largest producer of opium, while poppy cultivation was relatively stable at 119,000 hectares in 2010, a poppy blight affecting the high cultivation areas in 2010 reduced potential opium production to 3,200 metric tons, down over 40 percent from 2009.

The Taliban and other antigovernment groups participate in and profit from the opiate trade, which is a key source of revenue for the Taliban inside Afghanistan.

Widespread corruption and instability impede counterdrug efforts and most of the heroin consumed in Europe and Eurasia is derived from Afghan opium, with wide vulnerability to drug money laundering through informal financial networks and regional source of hashish\textsuperscript{21}.

\textbf{1.6 Russia influence and cooperation with the Central states}

The five Central Asian countries include the great culture of the ancient Silk Road, moderate Islamic societies organized in secular states, governments that lend themselves as partners in the “global fight against terrorism” as well as for immediate tasks in neighboring Afghanistan, and the region’s mineral resource wealth.

On the other hand, critics emphasize a deplorable human rights situation in almost all countries of the region, the despotic nature of at least some of the ruling regimes, corrupt


\textsuperscript{21}
bureaucracies, and inequitable economic growth that benefits small elite while poverty and social injustice endure and investments in human development remain inadequate.

Central Asia is also described as a mixture of features, from which there are five of critical importances: a) the post-1991 power vacuum in which a complex geopolitical game occurs, among Russia, China, US, EU, as well as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates; b) it is a strategic area of energy resources; c) an important part of the Islamic world in which, because of low living standards, ethnic tensions and the oppressive nature of the political regimes often create a fertile area for terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking, and organized crime; d) a region at the crossroads of the great trade routes; e) several pipelines established and to be established and a buffer zone between countries with nuclear arms (or those developing the potential), e.g. Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, on December 26, 1991, Russia tended to neglect its relations with the former Central Asian republics and its foreign policy seemed to have a pro-Western orientation, while Central Asia occupied the second or even the third place among Russia’s interests.

Later on, Russia became more actively involved in Central Asia as a result of the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-97), especially because of the large Russian minorities in the region. The Minsk Agreements and the Declaration of Almaty, from December 1991, set the foundation for a common security policy22. The civil war in Tajikistan and the incapacity of the Central Asian countries to preserve their security led to several agreements regarding peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution.

These documents paved the way for the “Protocol on the Temporary Procedure for the Formation and Use of Collective Peace-Keeping Forces in Zones of Conflict between or within Member States of the CIS23”, and led to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992, by the heads of state and government of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Armenia, he treaty was later joined by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus.

The Collective Security Treaty sets up a defensive alliance, forbids joining any military alliance or group of states against other members, and considers that aggression against one member is aggression against all.

22 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed on December 8, 1991 by Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk Agreement Establishing the CIS. The Alma-Ata Protocol, which formed the initial legal basis for the operations of the new regional organization, became an integral part of the Minsk Agreement.
23 Source: the Global Security website, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been unproductive and has not materialized into the political-military pact, Moscow had envisioned as a competitor to NATO and the EU. Moreover, several states rejected the May 1992 Treaty on Collective Security, or Tashkent Treaty, which Moscow had initiated as a “regional security structure within the CIS”.
In spite of this, all CIS member states established national military structures during and up to the end of 1992. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty in 1999.

However, Moscow was willing to promote renewed “special relations” between Russia and Central Asia, with the Russian National Security Council that articulated the new policy in “Main Aspects of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”. The document asserted that Russia could not leave Central Asia without endangering its southern borders.

Consequently, the Russian control over CIS borders in Central Asia was a desirable objective with priorities such as the Russian troops and their military bases in the region, the development of economic relations, Russia’s contribution to conflict prevention and resolution through efficient peacekeeping mechanisms and no interference from third parties in Central Asian affairs.

Russia has insisted on pragmatic policies in Central Asia, taking into account the contracts of the Western energy consortiums in the CIS, as well as NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.24

Vladimir Putin took the presidency in 1999, with the objective of Russia’s reemergence as great power, following the model used by Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov in the nineteenth century that was based on internal reforms and flexible foreign policy.

Putin could develop a coherent and pragmatic foreign policy with clear priorities and well-structured interests, concentrating on Russia’s “near abroad.”

His strategy went in two directions. First, his administration looked to build a consistent strategy regarding the development of political and economic relations with Central Asia. The introduction of a customs union in 1996 and the decision to allow the free movement of citizens between several of the former Soviet republics, which altogether resulted in the creation of the EurAsEC25 (Eurasian Economic Community) in October 2000, strengthened the inclination toward cooperation.

In order to enhance the Treaty’s effectiveness, the heads of state ratified a number of documents in May 2000 in Minsk, for example, the “Memorandum on Increasing the Effectiveness of the CST and its Ability to adapt to the Present Day Geopolitical Situation” and “A Model for a Regional Security System” both promoted the fight against terrorism and the need to build rapid deployment peacekeeping forces.

24 Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization www.nato.int. Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries.

25 Source: the Eurasian Economic Center, www.eurasian-ec.com. It is an international economic organization of the Member States aimed to form common external customs borders, to develop common external economic policy, tariffs, prices etc., and other functioning parts of a common market, adapted from European Community, WTO, and other international norms. EurAsEC is created in compliance with UN principles and international legal principles, EurAsEC is an Observer in the UN General Assembly. The Member States are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; Moldavia, Ukraine and Armenia are Observers of EurAsEC.
The new foreign policy concept, from 28 June 2000, asserted that Russia’s geopolitical role as one of the largest Eurasian powers came with the responsibility of maintaining security in the world, both at global and regional levels.

Russian official statement emphasized the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism, which took on a special urgency after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, hence Russia was thus able to receive further Central Asian support for its military actions in Chechnya.

As a consequence, Russia and and six former Soviet republics agreed to establish a rapid deployment of force of some 1,500 men who will be based in Kyrgyzstan, during the meeting of the Collective Security Council held in Yerevan, Armenia, in May 2001. Indeed, the CIS members created a Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) in order to be able to provide a collective response to terrorist attacks or incursions. The CRDF for Central Asia, according to an August 2001 decision, would comprise Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik units, totaling around 4,000 persons.\(^{26}\)

In May 2002, the Collective Security Treaty became the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the CSTO Charter entered into force on September 18, 2003.\(^{27}\) The CSTO focused on three important areas: foreign policy, opposition against threats and challenges and the military dimension. The strengthening of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is both a result of these processes and an instrument to further enhance Russian supremacy.\(^{28}\)

In 2003, President Putin developed a new foreign policy concept. The policy instruments became more diverse: support for and personal relationships with local leaders, military cooperation, investments in energy and infrastructure, scholarships for attending Russian universities, and the huge influence over the mass media of the region, whereby Russia became the most important source for news in Central Asian countries.

Beginning in 2004, Russia promoted the systematic cooperation within the CSTO and in June, the members of the Council on Collective Security and of the Council of Defense Ministers laid out plans for the military component of the organization.\(^{29}\)


\(^{27}\) There were some underlying tensions at the CSTO summit. Kazakhstan showed strong commitment to the project, but Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had concerns over the legal issues and the precise terms under which the new force structure could be used within Central Asia. Uzbekistan secured a separate protocol limiting its participation in CSTO operations and will make military forces available for CSTO operations under certain conditions, depending on the political decision made at the time.

\(^{28}\) The Collective Security Treaty Organization, formed under the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, serves as a mutual defense alliance among Russia, Belarus, Armenia and the four Central Asian states except Turkmenistan. The Eurasian Economic Community comprises a similar grouping of states but focuses on economics, including the creation of a common market, border security standards, a customs union, standardized currency exchange and joint programs on social and economic development. Both of these organizations are strongly supported by Russia and capitalize on residual political, economic, and bureaucratic linkages among former Soviet republics.

\(^{29}\) Source: United Nations Organization report, [www.un.org](http://www.un.org). The Russian-Georgian war accelerated the militarization of the CSTO, indeed the Moscow Declaration of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO (September 5, 2008) was considered the first real consolidated position of the alliance, a view on international politics and the place of CSTO.
In August 2004, the Collective Security Treaty Organization conducted an extensive military anti-terrorism exercise, Exercise Rubezh-2004 “Border” 2004”, held in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, testing the CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force in action for the first time. Further Military Exercises were organized on the premise of pre-emptive strikes, Ex “Rubezh 2005” and Ex “Rubezh 2007” which were held in Tajikistan30.

The “Plan for the Construction of the CSTO’s Military Coalition Forces through 2010” proposed the establishment of military ties on an interstate level and the formulation of a structure for political cooperation, as well as a second phase of the integration of the military forces on a macro-level.

Yet, in 2010 Putin spoke frequently of several issues, including the requirement of treating Russia on the same level as the developed countries, a multi-polar world order, the rejection of “exporting democracy,” the development of the CSTO, and Russia’s right to retain “special interests” in the CIS.

The strengthening of Russia’s position in Central Asia was in part made possible by Russian Government firm initiatives, which promoted closer relations with Central Asia’s neighbors - Iran, China, and India - in order to weaken relations between the Central Asian states and the West.

On March 2011, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a document about the revision of the foreign policy, stating that Russia’s most important achievement was its new independent foreign policy31.

The document underscored the importance of the Single Economic Space (SES), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and EurAsEC.

The bilateral relations between Russia and Central Asian states were described separately, while Kazakhstan was considered Russia’s most important strategic partner in Central Asia.

The new approach took on a more critical tone toward the US and was followed by the first military intervention in a CIS member state (Georgia) after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (7 August 2008).

According to an Russian high-ranking Official in 2011, the Russian foreign policy focuses in five points: Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law; the world should be multipolar; Russia does not want confrontation with any other country, has no

30 The Collective Rapid Reaction Force will have the same sort of training as the troops of the North Atlantic Alliance, it would comprise 16,000 troops, with Russia providing 8,000 troops, Kazakhstan 4,000, and Tajikistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia 1,000 troops each. Of the 16,000, Russia will consider deploying 5,000 troops to Central Asia.
31 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced on July 20, 2011, stated: [Russia] will promote in every possible way the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a key instrument to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area, focusing on adapting the CSTO as a multifunctional integration body to the changing environment, as well as on ensuring capability of the CSTO Member States to take prompt and effective joint actions, and on transforming the CSTO into a central institution ensuring security in its area of responsibility. The document mentions the concern about Georgia’s attempt to resolve the conflict in South Ossetia by force, concerns about the growing military capabilities and escalating tensions in the Caucasus region, the situation in Afghanistan, the situation around Iran, the prospects of establishing relations between the CSTO and NATO on a number of issues and support for the initiatives of the Russian Federation relating to a treaty on European security.
intention of isolating itself and will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries as far as possible.

Yet, protecting Russian citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority and Russia will respond to any aggressive acts committed against them and finally, Russia has privileged interests in certain regions\(^{32}\) (former Soviet Union).

\(^{32}\) During a press conference, following the Moscow CSTO summit on February 4, 2009, President Medvedev stated that “the Collective Rapid Reaction Force should be an effective, all-purpose instrument that can be counted on to realize security objectives throughout the CSTO, including the fight against extremists, organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as dealing with the consequences of natural and industrial disasters.
CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO’S INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
2.1 The Europeans in Central Asia: EU and NATO’s Strategic interests

The price of insecurity is huge and even though the number of conflicts has declined, civil wars are devastating entire region of the world and long-lasting conflicts such as in Sudan, Middle East, Afghanistan create conditions under which development reversals are transmitted across generations and where whole generations of children do not have access to even basic education, development is seriously hampered¹.

It is difficult to quantify the impact of conflicts on development, but it is clear that the absolute amounts are very large and that they dwarf the potential benefits of aid flows. In developing countries these threats have different degrees of relevance and urgency and are compounded by further structural challenges: poverty, weak state structures and governance, but also the trafficking and violence around the wealth or scarcity of natural resources and the availability of large quantities of firearms.

When these threats materialize, they can cause the loss of millions of lives, undermine governance structures, fuel corruption and delay the development of countries and regions by decades. These situations are furthermore at the origin of sudden and massive displacements of populations, malnutrition, disease and increased environmental degradation. Their negative impact goes well beyond the countries involved and threatens the stability of whole regions.

Security and development policies, together, have the potential to address these problems². In response to this reality, EU and NATO have been strengthening their links to prevent violent conflicts and build sustainable peace, while security measures are sometimes needed to provide the basis for humanitarian assistance and long-term development. In situations of insecurity it is often difficult to act effectively, indeed, often, there is no clear interlocutor in the partner country or it is not clear to what extent the individual actors are actually prepared to cooperate with.

The EU and NATO as a whole, have sometimes difficulties in speaking with one voice and institutional procedures and competence issues further complicate their task, hence having a coordinated approach is crucial if Europe wants to contribute to peace and development.

To this end, it has been developing a wide array of instruments to prevent conflicts and to build peace in developing countries. As it has been said, it ranges from political dialogue, to more coercive or one-sided measures such as military operations, sanctions, embargos, through cooperation instruments in support of governance, including human rights initiatives, security sector reform, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, control of flows of weapons, regional cooperation and reconciliation.

The EU and NATO have been using these instruments in an increasingly coherent and convergent way for the benefit of sustainable peace and security world-wide. With their work on governance, the promotion of democracy and human rights the EU makes an important contribution to the prevention of situations of fragility and the outbreak of violent conflicts and NATO enhance internal and external security.

Situations of fragility are typical in countries where either governance structures are weak or deteriorating or in countries that suffered from a natural disaster or an economic or human shock. The EU and NATO have a tradition of engagement and pay particular attention to addressing and preventing situations of fragility with a view to establishing conditions which are more conducive to development.

With regards to the Central Asia countries, EU and NATO have established, at different levels, relations on governance, education, role of law, gender equality, infrastructures, security, economy, quality of life, energy, health, private sector and trade, with all six former Soviet republics after the fall of the U.R.S.S. in 1991. In this respect, they have known considerable evolution in political and economic transformation, influencing the regional political and economical developments.

In its new regional strategy adopted in 2006, the EU has given priority to the political issues, human rights, democratization, good governance and eradication of poverty which represents the central concepts in its new approach. Since then, the regional countries are entitled to receive assistance from the EU according to their performance in the field of political and economic reforms, regardless of their size in population and geography.

Nowadays Central Asia countries are facing fundamental economic, social, political and defense secure changes since they achieved their independence in 1990’s and both NATO and EU have a regional strategic plan for assistance and cooperation in the long period 2011-2030.

The European Union Security Strategy (December 12, 2003) identified the following major threats for the European Union: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, organized crime, and recognized the energy dependence as a special concern for Europe. Although Central Asia was not specifically mentioned, all these challenges from the international environment are valid for this region.

The EU’s interests in Central Asia are mainly geopolitical and geo-economic: growing stability and the capacity of these states to manage the threats, tackling drug-trafficking and organized crime, prevention of states from failing and enhanced capacity of crisis management, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and migration and energy security.

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Although the Central Asian countries have not been included in the European Neighbourhood Policy\(^5\) (ENP), they could be involved in its regional programs. The ENP and the EU’s relationships with the Central Asian states reinforce each other. Consequently, the concepts of “wider neighborhood” or “the neighbors of the EU’s neighborhood” are often considered to be of great importance. According to its renewed 2007 Political Strategy, the EU has a strong interest in a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Central Asia, because the strategic, political, and economic developments, as well as trans-regional challenges, affecting the EU in some capacity, whether directly or indirectly.

Regarding the security initiatives, in January 2001 the European Union set up the Central Asian Drugs Action Program\(^6\) (CADAP), as main objective was the development of drug control strategies in Central Asia in line with EU anti-narcotics strategies. Initially, CADAP covered Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, offering equipments and trainings, while Anti-Drugs Measures in Tajikistan\(^7\) (ADMIT) has functioned apparently well.

The Border Management in Central Asia Program\(^8\) (BOMCA) was launched in April 2003 in order to strengthen border control and to facilitate transit and legal commerce. BOMCA also has the support of the US, OSCE, and UNDOC (the UN’s Office on Drugs & Crime) and introduce also the concept of an integrated border management\(^9\) (IBM) and a corridors approach, which were also embraced by the SCO\(^10\) and EurAsEC.

In Central Asia, BOMCA projected two corridors: the Ferghana Valley\(^11\) and the North-South transit corridor in the west of Central Asia, however, the European Commission stated that progress was limited because of the insufficient expertise of the local institutions, uncontrolled border areas, corruption, and lack of political will.

The topic of the insecurity of Central Asia was approached in other international organizations as well, as within the OSCE framework which has promoted projects regarding police reform, water management, antiterrorism, the fight against organized crime, weapons and drugs trafficking and crisis management in Central Asia.

On September 2008, the EU-Central Asia Forum on Security Issues was launched by the EU French Presidency, where consultations between the EU and the five countries in the region have

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\(^8\) Source: [http://www.bomca.eu](http://www.bomca.eu), Accessed in March 2012.


actually emphasized convergence on the importance of the region’s stability and the need to step up cooperation between all the parties to find common answers to the challenges ahead.

On the other hand, NATO has also formal relations with all central Asia countries, which entered the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1992), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997), and Partnership for Peace program (1994). Indeed, the cooperation and exchange of information are developed proportionally with national interests, expectation and capacity.

The 50 - nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and Partner countries. It provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and for the bilateral relationships developed between NATO and individual Partner countries under the Partnership for Peace program.

Partner states has chosen various activities such as defense reform, defense policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military cooperation, common exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster response all in order to prepare an Individual Partnership Action Plan.\(^\text{12}\)

Since 2006, Kazakhstan has an Individual Partnership Action Plan and then Kyrgyzstan in 2007, have participated in the NATO Planning and Review Process. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have limited relations with NATO, but all five Central Asian states have established diplomatic representation at NATO’s headquarters at Mons (Belgium).

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are also represented in the so-called Partnership Coordination Cell, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) supported by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2003 and 2005.\(^\text{13}\)

NATO has an Information Center and a Partnership for Peace (PfP) Center in Almaty which although have a symbolic and little practical impact on Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces those centers cooperate with local institutions, universities, NGOs, and local media. Furthermore, the whole project to build peacekeeping forces that can take part in North Atlantic Alliance or UN operations in no sense reflects wider trends or capabilities in other Central Asia country’s armed forces, as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

At the last NATO Foreign Ministers’ Session, in 2012, confirmed NATO’s long-term commitment in Central Asia, which plays a crucial role for the gradual NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) withdraw in Afghanistan. Moreover, analysis of fields as energy

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13 Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is NATO’s principal civil emergency response mechanism in the Euro-Atlantic area. It is active all year round, operational on a 24/7 basis, and involves NATO’s 28 allies plus partner countries. The Centre functions as a clearing-house system for coordination both requests and offers of assistance mainly in case of natural and man-made disasters.
needs, security sector reform, regional cooperation and the interdependency were discussed among the key players, NATO, EU, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan representatives.

Also EU deploys specific efforts in all the areas of governance: political, economic, security, defense, environmental and social, strengthening the social fabric and the democratic culture of a country are further important avenues in dealing with situations of fragility. NATO addresses threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, ethnic violence and lack of adequate legal frameworks or law enforcement capacity, which fuel crime-based economies and perpetuate the grip of illegality and illegitimacy.

In addition, the EU addresses the problems of corruption, organized crime as well as other security concerns of the populations in partner countries through its work on SSR, while NATO through SFA\(^{14}\), by taking a comprehensive approach including reforms in border management, justice and police.

Those programs have been identified as priority areas in post-conflict situations where NATO and EU are deployed. In the past few years, the EU has provided SSR support in over 70 countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe. In order to ensure a proper transition and restore national capacity to provide essential basic services, EU main external instruments are used and coordinated in the best way possible.

On the short-term Instruments, EU operates under CFSP/ESDP, political dialogue as an important instrument for EU engagement and through ESDP missions, so far 15 in total, the Member States are able to undertake civilian and military joint action. The Instrument for Stability (IfS), which came into operation on 1 January 2007, enables the EU to provide strategic support in relation to potential or real crisis situations and kick-start assistance that will then be followed up with long-term support under other Community instruments.

It can be used in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, initial post-crisis political stabilization and early recovery from natural disasters, complementing or spearheading support under the mainstream EU external instruments.

On the long-Term Instruments, EU puts in place Enlargement Instrument which can contribute to long-term stability and conflict prevention through financial support. The perspective of joining the EU is a strong incentive for candidate countries to strengthen democratic governance and minority rights.

\(^{14}\) Security Force Assistance: In March 2012, NATO finalized the Security Force Assistance (SFA) Conceptual Study with the aim of comprehensively approaching a problem and proposing a solution. The study determined that existing identified requirements are a subset of a much broader NATO capability gap, necessitating a redefined NATO requirement. The application of comparative interpretation helped to shift the focus from a “training-only” paradigm to a more comprehensive understanding of the problem that needs to be addressed.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) plays an important role as a foreign policy tool, it draws on all available EU instruments and include commitments in political areas such as democratic reforms, minority rights, rule of law, regional cooperation, cooperation on CFSP and ESDP issues, organized crime, terrorism, ICC, weapons of mass destruction.

The European Development Fund (EDF) for the ACP countries is increasingly used for conflict prevention and peace-building. In countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone the EDF provides substantive resources to security-sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, reconciliation, democratic governance, human rights and natural resource management.

The Development Cooperation Instrument for Asia and Latin America is providing support to conflict prevention and peace-building in a range of countries including Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Timor East, Cambodia, Indonesia and Nepal. This is done either as a follow-up to the Stability Instrument and in relation to ESDP or through stand-alone activities in the areas of dialogue processes, security-sector reform, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, natural resource management, mine action, human rights, democratic governance, transitional justice and reconciliation.

The EU has managed to work increasingly on the synergies between security and development. However, many questions are still open and the different elements do not yet add up to a comprehensive and coherent approach.

### 2.2 The European Union Policy and Instruments

The European Union is a unique economic and political partnership between 27 European countries that together cover much of the continent. It was created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first steps were to foster economic cooperation with the clear aim to trade with one another become economically interdependent and so to avoid conflict.\(^{15}\)

The result was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958, and initially increasing economic cooperation between six countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Since then, a huge single market has been created and continues to develop towards its full potential.

But what began as a purely economic union has also evolved into an organization spanning all policy areas, from development aid to environment, a name change from the EEC to the European Union in 1993 reflected this change.

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The EU has delivered half a century of peace, stability, and prosperity, helping to raise living standards and launching a single European currency. Thanks to the abolition of border controls between the EU countries, people can travel freely throughout most of the continent, becoming much easier to live and work abroad in Europe.

The EU is based on the rule of law, this means that everything that it does is founded on treaties, voluntarily and democratically agreed by all member countries. These binding agreements set out the EU’s goals in its many areas of activity.

The EU covers over 4 million km² and has 495 million inhabitants - the world’s third largest population after China and India and its living standards can be compared by measuring the price of a range of goods and services in each country relative to income, using a common notional currency called the purchasing power standard (PPS). Comparing GDP per inhabitant in PPS provides an overview of living standards\(^\text{16}\) across the EU.

Helping countries that have the potential to become members has been the EU’s response to changes in the European political landscape over the past 50 years, promoting economic growth and strengthening democratic forces in countries emerging from dictatorship from uniting East and West. Indeed, the 6 founding members of the EU in 1957 were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but from 1973 on, most of the other Western European countries joined the Union.

Then, following the collapse of their regimes in 1989, many former communist countries from central and eastern Europe became EU members in 2 waves, between 2004 and 2007.

The EU operates according to the principle of sub-sidiarity, which means that the European Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive jurisdiction) unless it is more effective than action taken at the national, regional, or local level.

The EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in fields including the customs union, the common commercial policy, competition rules, and monetary policy for euro countries, jurisdiction is shared between the EU and the Member States in specified areas including internal market rules, aspects of social policy, economic, social, and territorial cohesion, agriculture and aspects of fisheries, security, and justice.

The decision-making is formed by the European Council, made up of the presidents or prime ministers of Member States, along with the presidents of the European Commission and European Council. It represents the highest political authority in the EU.

The European Commission is the executive branch of the EU, European Commission proposes legislation, manages the Union’s day-to-day business and budget, enforces the rules, and negotiates international trade agreements on behalf of the EU.

Council of the European Union, which is made up of ministers from the 27 Member State governments, the Council adopts laws in conjunction with the European Parliament, coordinates the Member States’ broad economic policies, concludes international agreements between the EU and other countries or international organizations and approves the EU budget (jointly with the European Parliament).

The European Parliament, which represent the voice of European citizens, Members of the European Parliament are directly elected for five-year terms. The Parliament also approves the membership of the European Commission and its leadership.

In order to intensify cooperation with Central Asia states, the EU makes full use of the potential of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Commission and Member States programs, cooperation frameworks, political dialogue, using the variety of CFSP structures and instruments:

The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council and it is composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

In parallel with the EUMC, the PSC is advised by a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee provides information, drafts recommendations, and gives its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management.

The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) contributes to the objectives of the European External Action Service, the EU Common Security and Defense Policy and a more secure international environment by the political-strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations, ensuring coherence and effectiveness of those actions as part of the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management and developing CSDP partnerships, policies, concepts and capabilities.

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17 Source: www.europe.eu, it is the Common Foreign Security Policy and represents the use of diplomacy - backed where necessary by trade, aid and security and defence - to resolve conflicts and bring about international understanding, accessed in March 2012.
The European Union Military Staff (EUMS - working under the direction of the EUMC and under the authority of the HRVP) is the source of collective (multi-disciplinary) military expertise within the EEAS. As an integral component of the EEAS’s Comprehensive Approach, the EUMS coordinates the military instrument, with particular foci on operations/missions (both military and those requiring military support) and the creation of military capability.

Enabling activity in support of this output includes: early warning (via the SIAC), situation assessment, strategic planning, CIS, concept development, training and education, and support of partnerships through mil-mil relationships. Concurrently the EUMS is charged with sustaining the Kortenbergh OPSCEN (both activated and dormant parts) and providing its core staff when activated.

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), which is part of the EEAS, is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee and the overall authority of the High Representative, the CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.

Since its establishment, the EU has developed a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to continually expand and deepen relations with its partners. As a major global actor, the EU is at the forefront of promoting free trade, sustainable development, the fight against poverty, freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights\(^{18}\).

The EU also holds regular summit meetings with major partners such as the United States, Japan, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, India, China, and Brazil. The EU also holds regional dialogues with other countries in Asia, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. These relationships cover political dialogue, investment, economic cooperation, finance, energy, science and technology, human rights, environmental protection, counterterrorism, and international crime.

The EU is a staunch proponent of multilateralism - relying on an effective multilateral system - principle at the core of its external relations, whether in international trade, development, human rights, or foreign and security policy\(^{19}\).

Indeed, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the European Union immediately established bilateral and multilateral relations with the Central Asian states, especially


with the framework of TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of independent States) program and signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA\textsuperscript{20}) with each regional state.

In the period between 1996 and 2001, the European Union provided technical assistance primarily to economic and commercial reforms, state-building processes, and encouragement of foreign investments, although the Union expressed that democratization and liberal market economy were integral part of its mutual relations. Thus, these agreements were oriented towards concrete areas rather than political matters.

The EU’s policy has evolved from a project based one to a new strategic partnership approach based on the contemporary democratic values, but the existing regional conditions, such as the authoritarian culture of the Central Asian countries and Islamic religion wide-spread, may prevent the EU’s success in the region.

Hence, this research focuses on the change in the EU’s Central Asia policy and its impact on the C.A. countries, examining the EU’s new partnership strategy. The EU stepped up its efforts to address the five countries of Central Asia in a comprehensive EU-wide external relations approach encompassing the fields of foreign, security, energy, and development policies.

Later on, the EU Council has also elaborated a Political Strategy paper for Central Asia (2007), with bilateral level agreement through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). It promotes stability and security, sustainable economic development and poverty reduction and facilitates closer regional cooperation of the Central Asian countries.

The challenge has been to devise a policy that is both in line with the EU’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” and with the individual member states’ diverse economic, political and security interests in that still-near-by and yet so-far-away region.

From a development policy perspective, Central Asia is a difficult “client” - or rather five difficult clients. While fast-growing, resource-rich Kazakhstan has slowly graduated out of many donors’ aid portfolios, Turkmenistan is only slowly re-emerging from President Niyazov’s isolationist policy since his death in December 2006, just few examples.

Long-time aid to Kyrgyzstan has been puzzling the international community with continuous political infighting since its “Tulip Revolution” in March 2005, heavy-handedly ruled Uzbekistan has provoked international sanctions with the brutal suppression of protest in Andijon barely two months later, and Tajikistan appears to be falling back into a repressive dictatorship again after a peaceful post-civil war transition had been brokered by international mediators in 1997.

\textsuperscript{20} PCAs have provided the legal framework for formalizing bilateral relations between the EU and the states of Central Asia. The purpose of the PCAs was to undergird the developing network of ties between the EU and Central Asia with a stronger political foundation. The PCAs concluded between the EU and its partners are intended to facilitate the development of free trade, and they can be seen as a road map for the introduction of economic and trade-related policies in the fields of goods, services, labor, current payments, and capital movement.
Neighboring Iran, Russia, and China which share common borders with the region, have kept a vigilant eye on developments inside Central Asia, in particular, external attempts (by EU for instance) to influence these developments.

From an EU point of view, many believe the risk of instability is high despite appearances of calm on the surface and analysts point out a number of problems that could feed instability, including Islamic radicalism - especially in the Ferghana Valley- which straddles the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; drug-trafficking; potential conflicts stemming from the spread of infectious diseases; environmental pollution; corrupt governance and so on²¹.

The EU’s huge stake in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and its interest in access to energy markets in Central Asia are also compelling reasons to focus on the security situation in the region. Although there is no question that stability and security in the region are very important to the EU, there is some debate about what is the biggest threat facing Central Asia.

Since 2001, the European Union changed its regional strategy in a radical way due to its need for new external energy resources, the emergence of regional issues that threaten the security of the region as well as global security and its enlargement process.

Therefore, the European Union intends to find solutions to its security concerns within the framework of its Good Neighbourhood Policy, to respect democracy and human rights, especially countries that are considered within the framework of the Good Neighbourhood Policy due to the fact that the Union has indeed viewed these concepts as a basis of having friendly relations among the states.

In line with new Security Strategy, the EU wants to enhance its relations with the Central Asian states in the fields expressed in the Strategy, such as terrorism, organized crime, regional issues, drug trafficking, trade, economical development and others. For this reason, the EU urges former socialist countries to have democratic and pluralist regimes because promotion of good governance, fighting against corruption and abuse of power, the advancement of the rule of law, and respect for human rights have been considered as the integral parts of the Security Strategy²².

Secondly, the EU has initiated an energy program, the Baku Initiative²³, regarding its security in energy supply and giving priority to the regional cooperation in order to reach regional energy

22 Under the title of the Democratic Development and Good Governance, the European Union plans to attempt 1) to develop respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 2) to establish national human rights institutions, 3) to provide participation of the public into the decision making processes, 4) to promote cooperation between governmental and non-governmental (such as education institutions, media, associations, organizations), 5) to improve structures of democratic institutions, and 6) to develop social dialogue among private, public and civil society organizations. See: The European Union, ‘Central Asia Indicative Program (2007 - 2010)’, Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006, pp.21 -23.
23 The “Baku Initiative” was launched on the occasion of the Energy Ministerial Conference held in Baku on 13 November 2004 with the participation of the European Commission and the Black Sea and the Caspian Littoral States and their neighbors, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran (observer), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation (observer), Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
resources and encouraging the discovery of new energy resources and helping to repair existing energy infrastructure in the Central Asia.

On this occasion, the participants agreed on their mutual interest for supporting the gradual development of regional energy markets in the Caspian Littoral States and their neighboring countries, enhancing the attraction of funding for new infrastructures, embarking on energy efficiency policies and programs and making progress towards a gradual integration between the respective energy markets and the EU market.

The “Baku Initiative” is aiming to facilitate the progressive integration of the energy markets of this region into the EU market as well as the transportation of the extensive Caspian oil and gas resources towards Europe. Indeed, secure and safe export routes for Caspian oil and gas will be important for the EU’s security of energy supply by increasing the geographical diversification of the EU’s external energy supplies.

Supplying the EU market at competitive international prices will also be crucial for facilitating the economic, social and political development of countries of the Caspian region.

Moreover, with the adoption of the Instrument for Development Cooperation, the EU plans to force the countries, which have relations with, to act in conformity with the UN Millennium Development Goals. Thus, they will spend their energies to eradicate poverty, to develop universal fundamental education, gender equality, to secure women’s rights, to improve health services and so on.

The budget allocated under the DCI for the period 2007-2013 is €16.9 billion, €10.06 billion for the geographic programs (60% of the total), €5.6 billion for the thematic programs (33% of the total), €1.24 billion for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries (7% of the total).

Although the EU Strategy does not encourage the Union to become a party in the “New Great Game”, by mentioning strategic importance of the Central Asia region, the EU points out that the regional states should become more democratic, peaceful and economically developed countries. In favor of new mentality, the EU attempts to have regular political dialogue, starting from the European Education and the European Rule of Law Initiatives, to organize Human Rights and the Energy Dialogues with the regional states.

In this manner, the EU would continue supporting human rights issues, to help the establishment and development of independent courts, to promote the legal reforms and cooperating in to support membership to the WTO, INOGATE, TRACECA and other regional projects.

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24 Launched in January 2007, the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) replaces a wide range of geographic and thematic instruments which was created over time. In this way, it increases the effectiveness of the EU development cooperation.

25 The Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe is a regional project that the European Union initiated in order to provide its energy security.

26 The Transport Corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia is a regional project, accepted by the Union during the Brussels Conference of 1993. It will connect the European Union with the Central Asian and Caucasian states via the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
2.3 The EU’s Regional Strategies

The European Union has prepared three different regional strategies. The first strategy, “Central Asia Regional Strategy Paper 2002 – 2006”, was adopted in 1999 that covered the period between 2002 and 2006 and its basic objectives were to make contributions to the stabilities and securities of the regional states as well as making efforts to eliminate poverty and to contribute their sustainable economies.

In this context, the European Union proposed to take concrete steps in the fields of security and conflict management, political and social difficulties, and lastly commerce and investments. Meanwhile, the EU Council expressed that it gave priority to the development of political dialogue, the eradication of poverty, social and economic development, good governance, fighting against the drugs, and border management. However, the regional states again preferred to receive assistance in economic and administrative fields despite the EU’s insistence that the assistance should go to political reforms27.

The second strategy, “ENPI28 Eastern Regional Indicative Program 2007 – 2010”, gives priority to three fields: 1) the development of regional cooperation and Good Neighborly relations in the Central Asia; 2) the eradication of poverty and the improvement of the living standards, and 3) good governance and economic reforms.

The third one, “ENPI Eastern Regional Program Strategy Paper 2010 – 2013”, has repeated the basic principles of the previous strategies, but the Program aims at supporting the political and economic transition of the region, strengthening the rule of law, democracy, good governance, and reinforcing the respect for human rights.

It has indicated the following objectives:

1. Assuring the stability and security of the Central Asia region;
2. Eradicating the poverty and to raise the living conditions;
3. Developing the regional cooperation on the subjects of energy, transportation, high education and environmental issues.

To achieve these objectives, the Union plans to provide assistance to these areas:

1) In the context of the regional cooperation: INOGATE, TRACECA, Black Sea and Central Asia energy corridor, environment, border management, organized crimes, and fighting against terrorism.

2) In the context of the eradication of poverty and improvement of living standards: social development, the development of urban areas, and agricultural sectors, and other national sectors.

28 European Neighbourhood Policy.
3) In the context of the good governance and economic reforms: political reforms, strengthening states institutions, supporting civil societies, democratization and trade.

The transformation of the Central Asian states to more democratic and liberal ones in the short - and medium terms is not an easy task for the EU, as the “authoritarian” mentality of the regional regimes are still in place. A matter of fact is that the regional Leaders have provided some privileges to their clans in order to preserve their regimes

As a result, bad governance, corruption, radical movements and illegal migration have become ordinary issues due to the weak administrative institutions and existence of the privileged clans in these countries. For that reason, the Political Leaders and privileged clans have viewed any democratic, economic and political reforms as a threat to their political and economic positions.

As a result the regional regimes do not support so much EU project that demands the promotion of civil society organizations and more political participation. They began to pursue more suppressive policies in order to protect their regimes, especially after the colorful revolutions, openly violating the human rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of press

Today, the Central Asian states do not have effective democracies but it is also clear that the colorful revolutions are not influential instruments to make their democracies more effective. The common goal of achieving stability and prosperity by means of peaceful inter-action makes Europe and Central Asia partners for increased cooperation.

The strong EU commitment towards its Eastern neighbors will also bring Europe and Central Asia closer to each other, both in terms of political cooperation and economic development. The development and consolidation of stable, just and open societies, adhering to international norms, is essential to bring the partnership between the European Union and Central Asia states to full fruition.

Good governance, the rule of law, human rights, democratization, education and training are key areas where the EU is willing to share experience and expertise. Lessons learnt from the political and economic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe can also be offered. With their rich traditions and centuries-old exchanges, the EU and Central Asia can contribute actively to the dialogue between civilizations. Many challenges facing the globalised world affect Europe and Central Asia alike, and warrant a common response.

Therefore, the European Union has to make serious attempts, such as implementing economical programs, in order to create next generations who are familiar with the European values

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in the long-term period. The European Union has to encourage the regional young people to be educated at the European Universities in order to embrace the contemporary values, such as human rights, as their own properties. In the meantime, the European universities and/or research centers can inform them about the European values while being in cooperation with the local education institutions and research centers.

For that reason, the EU has to have close relations with local firms, non-governmental organizations and governmental institutions in order to realize effective implementation of the projects. But, at the current stage Brussels has only one representative Office in Almaty, capital of Kazakhstan.

Nevertheless, its representatives play a very low profile role in getting direct and reliable knowledge about the regional affairs, providing facilities to the European researchers and investors, monitoring the regional projects closely, and preparing TACIS\textsuperscript{31} strategy papers in a true and reliable way.

Unlike other regional and external powers, the EU has not been motivated by a logic of great power struggle in the region, which is called the “New Great Game”. This is an advantage for the EU to cooperate with other regional powers such as Russia and China in order to implement the regional projects collectively, such as TRACECA and INOGATE.

Indeed, from this point of view, the European Union should continue to follow its existing attitude, and to support the projects that provide regional development and improve the living conditions in the region. Meanwhile, it should also continue its aim of contributing to the transformation of the region within the framework of prevailing contemporary values rather than acting as a strategic competitor.

The aim of the EU Strategy is therefore to actively cooperate with the Central Asia states in reaching these goals as well as to contribute to safeguarding peace and prosperity in neighboring countries.

The Strategy builds on the progress which the Central Asia states have themselves made since attaining independence, taking into account their common aspects as well as specific national contexts and requirements and also builds on the results obtained under the implementation of the various Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.

The Strategy is based upon common interests of the EU and the states of Central Asia and lines up expectations of Central Asian partners with those of the EU will be a mutually beneficial, reinforcing process as a whole. The EU has an interest in security and stability as well as in adherence to human rights and the rule of law in Central Asia states because:

\textsuperscript{31} Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States.
a) strategic, political and economic developments as well as increasing trans-regional challenges in Central Asia impact directly or indirectly on EU interests; b) with EU enlargement, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU are moving closer together; c) significant energy resources in Central Asia and the region’s aim to diversify trade partners and supply routes can help meet EU energy security and supply needs.

Therefore, EU strongly believes that strengthening the commitment of Central Asia states to international law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, as well as to a market economy will promote security and stability in Central Asia, thus making the countries of the region reliable partners for the EU with shared common interests and goals.

Strong cooperation with the UN, in particular the UNECE\(^{32}\), the OSCE, NATO and other international financial institutions and regional organizations are also in place.

Moreover, public-private partnership initiatives as well as bilateral agreements, Member State programs can play an important role in increasing the EU’s commitment in Central Asia, linking with international financial institutions as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development\(^{33}\) (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank\(^{34}\) (EIB).

Human rights dialogues constitute an essential part of the EU’s overall strategy aimed at promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, sustainable development, peace and stability. Against this background and on the basis of the relevant EU guidelines, the EU raises human rights issues with each Central Asian state through an appropriate channel for discussion, inter alia by entering into a structured, regular and results-oriented human rights dialogue.

### 2.4 EC 2007-2013 Regional Assistance Strategy for C.A.

The EC’s 2007-2013 Assistance Strategy for Central Asia is conceived as a tool to support strengthening of political dialogue with the Central Asia states at regional and national level and to pursue the objectives defined above.

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32 Source: [www.unece.org](http://www.unece.org), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) was set up in 1947 by ECOSOC. It is one of five regional commissions of the United Nations. UNECE’s major aim is to promote pan-European economic integration. To do so, it brings together 56 countries located in the European Union, non-EU Western and Eastern Europe, South-East Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and North America. All these countries dialogue and cooperate under the aegis of UNECE on economic and sectoral issues. Accessed in April 2012.

33 Source: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [www.ebrd.com](http://www.ebrd.com): it provides project financing for banks, industries and businesses, both new ventures and investments in existing companies. It also works with publicly owned companies and each project is tailored to the needs of the client and to the specific situation of the country, region and sector. Direct investments generally range from £5 million to €230 million. It provides also loan and equity finance, guarantees, leasing facilities and trade finance. Typically, the Bank funds up to 35 per cent of the total project cost. The Bank invests only in projects that could not otherwise attract financing on similar terms. Accessed in March 2012.

34 Source: the European Investment Bank, [www.eib.org](http://www.eib.org): it is an European Union’s Bank owned by and representing the interests of the European Union Member States. As the largest multilateral borrower and lender by volume, EIB provides finance and expertise for sound and sustainable investment projects which contribute to furthering EU policy objectives. More than 90% of its activity is focused on Europe but we also implement the financial aspects of the EU’s external and development policies. Accessed in March 2012.
In order to reflect greater EU engagement in the region, the EC assistance budget to Central Asia has been significantly increased under the new financial perspectives 2007-2013 to a total 750 million EUR, with the average annual allocation to the region under the development cooperation instrument increasing from 58 million EUR in 2007 to 139 million EUR in 2013.

The bulk of EC assistance to Central Asia - 70% - will be directed at the bilateral assistance programs, taking into account the policy agenda of the individual Central Asia countries and their distinct political and social realities. With more than 50% of the rural population living below the poverty line, poverty reduction through social sector reforms and schemes, including education, to increase living standards especially in rural areas, C.A. States will continue to be the key priority for EC bilateral assistance.

Implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and similar policy documents to which the Central Asian governments have committed themselves would serve as guiding framework for such programs.

The content of the programs has been defined in agreement with the authorities and tailored to the specific needs of each country. Given its importance for the sustainable development of Central Asia, 30% of assistance has been dedicated to facilitating closer inter-state cooperation both within Central Asia and between Central Asia, South Caucasus and the EU, particularly in the energy, transport, environmental and education sectors.

In these domains, the alignment of regional cooperation priorities and programs for Central Asia with the regional strategy for EU Eastern neighbors lies at the heart of future assistance policy.

The 2007-2013 regional assistance strategy puts a clear focus on three main areas of intensified policy dialogue and enhanced co-operation: Rule of Law, Education, Environment.

Accordingly, three related initiatives have been launched as Rule of Law is an essential condition for the development of a stable political framework and efficient economic structures. In the context of the EU-CA Strategy, the EU - Central Asia Rule of Law Initiative launched in November 2008 has supported reforms and sharing of experience between the EU and Central Asia in the area of legal and judicial reforms, including intensified policy dialogue at all levels.

The Initiative envisages two kinds of actions, an EU-Central Asia Rule of Law Platform (with regular meetings at ministerial level, regional level and national level) and specific long-term projects. The EU-Central Asia Rule of Law Platform project became operational at the end of 2011.

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35 Source: International Monetary Fund, [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are prepared by the member countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as eng development partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Updated every three years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated eng financing needs and major sources of financing. Interim PRSPs (I-PRSPs) summarize the current knowledge and analysis of a country’s poverty situation, describe the existing poverty reduction strategy, and lay out the process for producing a fully developed PRSP in a participatory fashion. The country documents, along with the accompanying IMF/World Bank Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs), are being made available on the World Bank and IMF websites by agreement with the member country as a service to users of the World Bank and IMF websites. Accessed in March 2012.
This project supports the cooperation objectives set between the European Union and Central Asia, and provides services required for an efficient implementation of the Rule of Law Initiative work plan, also promoting regional cooperation between the countries of Central Asia, in order to advance constitutional, legal and judicial reform in the region.

On the Education side, the EU - Central Asia Education Initiative, endorsed by the European Council in 2007, has led to closer links of Central Asia with the European Education Area, supported by a significant increase in EU support for educational exchanges, education reform, and vocational training, a key area for economic and social development.

The initiative also plays the role of a coordination mechanism for EU donors. Under the initiative a number of cooperation programs take place at a regional level, as Tempus (modernization in the higher education sector), Erasmus Mundus Partnerships (academic partnerships and student/scholar mobility) and the Central Asia Research and Education Network - CAREN (financing for high-speed information and communication networks).

The European Union also supports the EU-Central Asia Education Platform which started in February 2012, which aims to strengthen education reforms in the region by promoting policy dialogue as well as better coordination of donor financed education projects and programs.

On the Environment side, the EU-Central Asia Environment and Water Initiative is led by Italy with the support of the European Commission, representatives from the Central Asian countries, and international organizations such as the OECD or the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).

The regional environmental programs for Central Asia - in accordance with the objectives of the Environment and Water Initiative - aim at enhancing regional cooperation and partnership with Europe. The programs facilitate the development of the EU - Central Asia Environment and Water Cooperation Platform and focus on integrated water resource management, environmental protection measures, environmental governance and climate change.

2.5 EU Human Rights, Rule of Law, Good Governance and Democratization

The EU Strategy recognizes that human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratization as long - term political commitment to develop the CA States.

The EU is working on establishing or upgrading Human Rights dialogues with all Central Asian countries and systematically raised in all the political meetings, including to the meeting of National Coordinators (the last held on 20 March 2012 in Brussels).
The Human Rights dialogue with Uzbekistan was the first to be formally agreed, as indicated in the GAERC\textsuperscript{36} conclusions of 16 November 2006, and is held in the framework of the Subcommittee on Justice and Home Affairs, Human Rights and related issues under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The last round was held in July 2012 and an ad hoc Human Rights dialogue with Turkmenistan has also been held since 2005.

The EU - Central Asia Ministerial meeting in Ashgabat in April 2008 marked an important agreement to begin such dialogues with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic in the context of the European strategy, a specific initiative - the EU Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia - is being developed to support reforms and the sharing of experiences between the EU and Central Asia in the area of legal and judicial reforms, which is recognized by Central Asian countries as particularly needed.

Italy, France and Germany are the lead coordinators on the EU side in developing this Initiative and a first concept paper was agreed within the EU and shared with Central Asian partners at the Ministerial meeting in Ashgabat. The Initiative includes intensified policy dialogue at all levels and more resources for judicial reform programs by the EC and EU Member States.

Cooperation in the areas of human rights, rule of law, good governance, and democratization is supported by assistance projects, both those of the EC and Member States, which aim to promote reform efforts. EC assistance includes projects under thematic budget lines such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Non-State Actors Program, as well as the Institution Building Partnership Program (IBPP), which also support civil society development, so crucial for ensuring citizen participation in transformation and reform efforts.

The objectives of a human rights dialogue with each of the countries of Central Asia includes:
- discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing cooperation on human rights, inter alia in multilateral forum such as the United Nations and the OSCE;
- concerns felt by the EU as regards the human rights situation in the countries concerned, information gathering and initiatives to improve the relevant human rights situation.

In addition, human rights dialogues contribute to supporting practical steps aimed at meeting human rights objectives at national level, in particular through financial and technical cooperation and specific projects to be funded under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

\textsuperscript{36} Source: The General Affairs and External Relations Council, \url{www.ec.europa.eu}. GAERC meets once a month bringing together the EU Foreign Ministers. Ministers responsible for European affairs, defense, development or trade may also attend the meetings, depending on the items on agenda. In addition to the Union’s external relations, the Council coordinates the work of the other Council formations, prepares for European Council meetings, and attends to institutional matters and issues concerning enlargement. Accessed in April 2012.
The EU will respond to suggestions put forward by the Central Asia states and will further intensify cooperation on matters pertaining to the rule of law, good governance and combating corruption.

Within the framework of this Rule of Law Initiative, the EU supports the Central Asia states in core legal reforms, including reform of the judiciary, and in drawing up effective legislation, for example in the fields of administrative and commercial law. In promoting the consolidation of peace and international justice, the EU and its Member States are determined to share, with the Central Asia states their experience in the adoption of the necessary legal adjustments required to accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and in combating international crime in accordance with international law.

The EU and Member States aim to:
- allocate adequate funds to this Rule of Law Initiative;
- second judicial and administrative experts to Central Asia states on both short-term and long-term assignments;
- provide training opportunities to experts from Central Asia states;
- support the transparent implementation of legal reform;
- offer the possibility of international exchanges by organizing and sponsoring specialized conferences;
- facilitate cooperation by Central Asia states with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe;
- encourage implementation of ILO\(^\text{37}\) norms and conventions for decent work;
- coordinate closely with existing activities of OSCE field missions, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), bilateral programs as well as the UN and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;
- provide technical assistance and establish close cooperation aimed at making the legislative and constitutional amendments required for accession to and implementation of the Rome Statute.

The task of sustaining a culture of human rights and making democracy work for its citizens calls for the active involvement of civil society, indeed, a developed and active civil society and independent media are vital for the development of a pluralistic society.

The EU cooperates with the Central Asia states to this end and promotes enhanced exchanges in civil society, pursuing its objectives of ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights

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\(^{37}\) Source: The International Labour Organization, [www.ilo.org](http://www.ilo.org). It is an international organization responsible for drawing up and overseeing international labor standards. It is the only ‘triplarite’ United Nations agency that brings together representatives of governments, employers and workers to jointly shape policies and programs promoting Decent Work for all. This unique arrangement gives the ILO an edge in incorporating ‘real world’ knowledge about employment and work. Accessed in April 2012.
throughout the world, as well as in Central Asia states, through international bodies such as the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council.

High standard education is also essential in order to open up potential improvements for the younger generation, therefore, EU has set up a European Education Initiative for Central Asia\(^{38}\) in order to contribute to the adaptation of the education systems of Central Asia states to the needs of the globalised world.

In particular, under the European Education Initiative, the EU and Member States are willing to offer the support in the fields of:

- primary school education;
- secondary school education;
- vocational education and training;
- higher education cooperation, academic and student exchanges, for instance under the new Erasmus Mundus facility and TEMPUS and bilaterally.

The EU supports the development of regional education centers and cooperates closely with the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and ready to open an European Studies Institutes in the region.

The EU also supports the continuation of the activities performed by the European Training Foundation in the field of vocational education and training in Central Asia and enhances the EU e-network through the development of an “e-silk-highway” long distance learning.

It is the EU aim to link Central Asia to global Internet-based communication networks and to enable Central Asian students, teachers, academics, and scientists to participate in modern forms of life-long learning.

In the margins of the next Tempus Ministerial meeting, to be held in Brussels, a special meeting with Central Asian partners will be set up to discuss cooperation activities. Preparations for this project are well under way but for implementation to go ahead successfully the political commitment of the Central Asian countries is needed, including the nomination of one focal organization that would represent the research and education community of their country in the project and the readiness to consider co-financing of the project in order to secure the longer - term viability of the project.

\(^{38}\) More than 130 universities from all over Central Asia have participated in 230 projects over the past 15 years, involving several thousand scholars (an estimated 5,000 have been directly involved and students from the EU and Central Asia Through these projects. Tempus has supported the development of new curricula at Bachelors and Masters Level in a wide range of disciplines - including a few joint degrees with EU universities - bringing modern teaching and learning methodologies in line with the principles of the Bologna process. Through the CAREN (Central Asia Research and Education Network) project, it provides high capacity Internet links for the first time for one million students and researchers in over 200 universities and research institutions along the ancient Silk Road in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
2.6 The EU as a promoter of Economic Development, Trade and Investment

The EU supports the removal of trade barriers between the Central Asia states and it of course continues to support World Trade Organization (WTO) accession for the five Central Asia states which are not all yet WTO members (currently Kyrgyzstan is a WTO member, 20 December 1998) on commercially viable terms and in full compliance with WTO requirements.

WTO accession is a key factor for wider economic reforms and diversification and better integration of the countries into the international trade and economic system.

The EU promotes the creation of regulatory and institutional frameworks for an improved business and investment environment and further support economic diversification and in this respect, the EU continues to cooperate with Central Asia states in order to improve access for Central Asian products to EU markets.

In this regard the renewed EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP – 2006/2015) offers the best ever preferential framework aimed at encouraging exports and economic diversification in these countries.

Equally, it will be an incentive for diversifying their economies on the basis of the market access advantages offered by the EU and through INOGATE (Baku Initiative) and TRACECA (funded through DCI and ENPI), the EU promotes the development and expansion of the regional infrastructure in the fields of transport, energy and trade in order to make better use of Central Asia’s economic potential, not least through improved regional cooperation.

As an important trade corridor between East and South Asia and Europe, Central Asia can benefit from increasing trade and in this connection, the EU cooperates with interested companies from the EU in a public-private partnership to promote the market economy, offering training and assistance programs for Central Asian partners.

The EU supports the aspirations and actions of the Central Asia states towards market economy structures through:

- full support for deeper integration of Central Asia into the world trade and economic system, in particular through the WTO accession process and eventual membership;
- support economic diversification with a view to promoting sustainable development by improving local skills and potential (science and technology, innovation, tourism), promotion of SMEs, development of basic infrastructure (road, rail, telecom, IT);

39 Source: The European Union, www.europa.eu. The purpose of the generalized system of preferences (GSP) is to help developing countries to reduce poverty by using tariff preferences to help them obtain international trade revenue. In the Communication the Commission sets out the principles that should underpin regulations between 2006 and 2015 in order to achieve this objective. It proposes improving the current system (GSP for the period 2002-2005) in several areas by simplifying the GSP (reducing the five arrangements currently in place to three), targeting the system on the developing countries that need it most, encouraging regional cooperation and increasing the additional preferences granted for sustainable development, good governance and so on. Accessed in April 2012.
- support substantial reforms of the financial systems which are needed in most countries, especially in the banking and micro credit sector; improved banking regulation, supervision and enforcement; privatization of state banks; increased competition among banks and easier entrance for foreign banks are key steps which Central Asia states need to take;
- study further possible options to enhance the Central Asia states’ ability to make better use of the available GSP and encourage regional trade;
- develop the necessary systems, including with regard to regulatory approximation to the EC acquis, to allow a practical better access to the EU market for Central Asian products;
- continue to support the efforts of the Central Asia states to fully implement the trade and economic provisions of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements;
- extend trade-related technical assistance and policy advice to facilitate the creation of legislative and institutional frameworks conducive to better business environments and to attracting foreign direct investment;
- help the countries of the region to work out strategies to improve their individual credit ratings in order to qualify for future lending programs;
- support these countries in enforcing best customs practices as set by the World Customs Organization;
- support initiatives for know-how transfer and capacity building.

The EU and Central Asia share a paramount interest in enhancing Energy Security as an important aspect of global security. There is a common interest in diversifying export routes, demand and supply structures and energy sources.

Besides oil, gas and electricity, water management is a decisive aspect of energy cooperation with Central Asia and hydro-power production and distribution are crucial to promoting stability and prosperity in Central Asia and beyond, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The development of resources in oil and gas has significantly increased the role of Central Asia states as energy producers and transit countries. Increasing oil and gas exploitation will contribute to better world market supplies. Gas deliveries from the region are of special importance to the EU.

The key elements for a long-term partnership based on common interests and reciprocity can therefore be established in the years to come: the exploitation of the energy resources of Central Asia states calls for substantial and sustained investment as well as for comprehensive policies addressing all the components of their energy sectors and facilitating access to most developed markets.
The EU, for its part, is ready to consider all options for the development and transportation of these resources, in cooperation with other interested partners. A market-based approach to investment, procurement, transparent, stable and non-discriminatory regulatory frameworks guarantee, for all sources of energy, the best prices and increased opportunities for all stake-holders.

Against this background, the EU conducts an enhanced regular energy dialogue with Central Asia states in the framework of the Baku Initiative.

The EU lend political support and assistance to Central Asian countries in developing a new Caspian Sea - Black Sea - EU energy transport corridor, promoting the creation of an integrated Central Asian energy market and supporting public-private partnerships which encourage EU investment. Based on the objectives laid down in the Baku Initiative the EU would focus on cooperation with Central Asia states in particular on the following matters:

- converging of energy markets on the basis of the EU internal energy market principles taking into account the particularities of the partner countries;
- enhancing energy security by addressing the issues of energy exports/imports, supply diversification, energy transit and energy demand;
- transparency and capacity-building in statistics and in the governance of the energy sector;
- supporting and enhancing technological cooperation between the EU and the Central Asia states in the energy sector;
- supporting sustainable energy development, including the development of energy efficiency, renewable energy sources and demand side management;
- attracting investment towards energy projects of common and regional interest;
- supporting the rehabilitation of existing pipelines and the construction of new pipelines and electricity transportation networks inside the region and towards Europe;
- supporting the development of comprehensive action programs aiming at the promotion of energy saving, energy efficiency and renewable energy, notably with a view to meeting commitments in the framework of the Kyoto protocol;
- supporting the “Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund” initiative40;
- encouraging the countries to take initiatives similar to those taken by the EU in the Action Plan for an Energy Policy for Europe (European Council of March 2007).

40 Source: www.climatefundsupdate.org, the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) is a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) designed to maximise the private finance leveraged through public funds funded by the European Commission and managed by the European Investment Bank. GEEREF is structured as a fund of funds, and invests in private equity sub-funds that specialise in financing small and medium-sized project developers and enterprises (SMEs) to implement energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in developing countries and economies in transition. Accessed in April 2012.
In the meantime, the EU continues to promote the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative\(^{41}\) within the Central Asian region as a means to contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction.

The EU is already one of the major trading partners for Central Asia, but there is still much scope for further intensifying trade and economic ties, encouraging Central Asian partners to make better use of the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and to increase and diversify their economic production and exports.

The gradual approximation of the countries’ legislation and practices to the main EU trade related acquis as foreseen in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements should support this process and the EU is ready to continue providing the partners with its technical assistance in this respect.

EU assistance programs have put specific emphasis on supporting reform efforts in the area of improving the investment climate in Central Asia, as it is essential for attracting more investments into the region.

The EU remains committed to the success of the Nabucco project\(^{42}\) and appreciates the progress achieved in the last year, supporting the further steps needed in order to implement the project as scheduled. Transport is a long-established area of cooperation between the EU and the Central Asia countries, as the extension of the trans-European transport networks and the approximation of transport regulations would facilitate transport and trade flows between the EU and the Central Asia countries.

Improving energy and transport links is a third priority of the new EU strategy. Though researchers still debate whether EU seeks to ensure energy supplies is the most important goal of the EU’s Central Asia policy. The debate in academic circles arises from different assessments of the capacity of Central Asian states to provide oil and natural gas to the EU.

Several factors could have an impact on that capacity: The Central Asian states are interested in having a diversified market for their energy products and want to attract investment and cooperation from various actors. Thus, they certainly support the EU as a potential huge consumer of their energy products, particularly natural gas.

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\(^{41}\) Source: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, [www.eiti.org](http://www.eiti.org). It is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organisations. This is reflected not only in the EITI processes in the countries implementing the EITI, but also on the international level: the EITI Board consists of members from governments, companies and civil society, and is appointed at the bi-annual EITI Global Conference. Accessed in April 2012.

\(^{42}\) Source: The Nabucco Gas Pipeline, [www.nabucco-pipeline.com](http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com), is the new gas bridge from Asia to Europe and the flagship project in the Southern Corridor. It will be a pipeline to connect the world’s richest gas regions - the Caspian region and Middle East - to the European consumer markets. The pipeline will link the Turkish-Bulgarian border to Baumgarten in Austria - one of the most important gas turntables in Central Europe - via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. When completed the 1,300 km pipeline’s annual capacity will be scalable between 10-23 bcm. The construction of the pipeline is supported by the 2009 Intergovernmental Agreement signed in Ankara in July 2009, which harmonises the legal framework and grants stable and equal transport conditions for all partners and customers. Accessed in April 2012.
EU access to the Central Asian energy market, however, remains an issue. One possibility is the Nabucco gas pipeline, which received EU backing since 2006. Extending for 3,300 kilometers, the pipeline would link Turkey and Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and expand EU access to Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin supplies.

The potential capacity of the line is 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year by 2020 and it is scheduled for construction from 2009 to 2013. However, the pipeline has been plagued by setbacks.

The main sources of natural gas for Nabucco would be the Caspian region and the Middle East. Theoretically, Turkey’s neighbors, particularly Russia (through the under-utilized Blue Stream pipeline\(^{43}\)), Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Syria and Iraq, could be another source for Nabucco.

But there is no direct infrastructure to tie gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into Nabucco and there are doubts about how much gas Turkmenistan can provide. The future of Nabucco is further complicated by the South Stream pipeline, a joint venture between Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s Eni.

This line, which will run from Russia to Europe across the Black Sea floor, will enable Gazprom to compete with any new pipelines not controlled by Russia that threaten to bring gas from Central Asia or the Middle East into Europe via Turkey.

At this point, from an economic and political standpoint the South Stream pipeline seems to have a brighter future than Nabucco and besides this, Russia’s energy policy towards the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia significantly affects whether the EU could successfully adopt its policy of diversification of energy supplies and gain access to the Central Asian market.

In May 2007, the Presidents of Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to build a new pipeline along the Caspian Sea coast to transport Turkmen natural gas to western markets\(^{44}\).

The construction of the pipeline has started in 2008 and it is expected to have an annual capacity of 10 bcm by 2012. Gazprom has also signed long-term contracts with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the rights to a large portion of their gas reserves. This necessarily reduces the share of their gas reserves that the Central Asian countries can sell to other consumers.

Yet, Russia has been extraordinarily successful in picking off the major gas distribution companies in Europe, which has limited the EU’s ability to diversify its gas supplies.

\(^{43}\) Source: Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, [www.eni.com](http://www.eni.com), Blue Stream is a transport system for the supply of gas from the network of southern Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea, with transport capacity of 16 billions m\(^3\)/yr. The system is owned and operated by Blue Stream Pipeline Company BV (BSPC), a joint venture between Eni and Gazprom. Accessed in April 2012.

\(^{44}\) Source: Gazprom, [www.gazprom.com](http://www.gazprom.com). In cooperation with Central Asian countries Gazprom is intent on contributing at best to exploiting gas resources. Together with gas transmission organizations and companies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Gazprom has completed the operations required to expand the Central Asia gas transmission system. In particular, the project is ongoing to restore gas production from the Shakpakhky field in Uzbekistan under the PSA (Production Sharing Agreement). The work is underway on the geological survey of subsurface resources in the Usturt region of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Agreement on the general principles for the geological survey of subsurface resources was signed with the Government of Tajikistan for the Rengan, Sargazon, Sarykamysh and Western Shuamhary oil and gas prospects. In 2010 Gazprom Group slightly increased the purchases of Central Asian gas and acquired 37.8 versus 38.3 billion cubic meters in 2009, including 10.7 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas, 13.9 billion cubic meters of Uzbek gas and 12.4 billion cubic meters of Kazakh gas. Accessed in April 2012.
Since the EU is still at the early stage of formalizing its very complicated common external energy policy, it is not easy for the EU to get the upper hand over Russia in efforts to diversify its gas supply with imports from Central Asia. However, some analysts argue that, given the amount of energy reserves in Central Asia is still unclear, it is too early to conclude the EU will be unable to get as much energy from that region as it would like.

In addition, the new leadership in Turkmenistan has shown interest in following Kazakhstan’s lead in adopting a reform policy that might lead to the diversification of Turkmenistan’s export of natural gas in the future. These are opportunities for the EU that should not be squandered; unlikely, EU should pursue energy cooperation with the regional countries more aggressively.

**2.7 Facing common threats and challenges**

Modern border management could facilitate trade and exchange in the region and help combating regional criminal activity, especially the international drug trade. Assistance in fighting organized crime is one of the priorities of the EU in the region, aiming at a reduction of non-conventional threats to security. Moreover, Migration is another of the major global challenges of the 21st century.

The impact of migration, both positive and negative, can be felt in all countries, including in Central Asia. The EU seeks to enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration with regions of transit, origin and destination through the EU’s Global Approach to Migration. As part of the Global Approach the EU proposes to launch a close dialogue on migration with the eastern and south-eastern neighboring regions.

The EU wants to steps up its support for the development of modern border management in the region of Central Asia, including the borders with Afghanistan. Through BOMCA, the EU seeks a multilateral and regional approach and synergy with projects under implementation to reform customs services. In fact, the EU through close cooperation between BOMCA, the OSCE and other border projects from Member States and third countries wants to:

- continue to introduce the basic principles of integrated border management in border guard services and other relevant services;
- work on specific border crossing points;
- provide organizational assistance to support transformation of border guards from a conscript to a professional service;
- support transition from a purely military system to a more police-style law enforcement agency and to support efforts to strengthen control mechanisms;
- seek increased involvement of customs services to facilitate trade;
- update the legal framework in accordance with international law in the field of combating organized crime (e.g.: UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols), with a focus on illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, preventing and countering drugs and precursors trafficking;
- improve institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies, and strengthen regional cooperation in fighting trans-national organized crime.

At the same time, the EU continues to offer its assistance to help the interested Central Asia states - both at national and at regional level - to manage migration in a more balanced manner, which implies setting up of well functioning systems, matching labor demand and supply, facilitating integration of legal migrants and providing international protection to asylum seekers and refugees and other vulnerable persons.

The EU gives greater support to the fight against corruption, the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal trade of weapons from and to Afghanistan and organized crime in Central Asia, with a specific EU presence in Dushanbe.\(^45\)

Yet, the EU, dedicating special attention to programs on border management, intra-regional trade and free movement of goods and persons, wants to secure “issues” at regional level which requires close cooperation between the EU and each Central Asian state, not neglecting countries as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.

The EU Strategy for Central Asia serves as an overall framework for the EU external policies, seeing a mutual interest in sustained dialogue and cooperation with the five Central Asia states, respecting their differences and fostering closer cooperation among them on regional issues.

CA states and EU are attributing increasing importance to “common threats and challenges” as a cornerstone of intensified relations to consolidate the shared awareness of security common threats and challenges, by launching a periodic EU-Central Asia Ministerial Forum on Security Challenges.

The introduction of modern border management practices, creating open but at the same time secure borders would facilitate trade and economic exchanges in the region and help combat drug trafficking. A number of border crossing points (BCPs) have been modernized through BOMCA assistance and about 20 additional BCPs received equipment, while a number of border outposts (BOs) along the “green border” have been upgraded.

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\(^{45}\) The European Commission has sought to significantly enhance its presence in Tajikistan in 2008. Under the EC’s strategic development document, covering the years 2007 through 2013, Tajikistan stands to receive 43 million euro in assistance for 2011-2012. That total represents nearly a 100 percent increase over the aid allocated during 2009-2010.
Numerous training sessions on Integrated Border Management for approx. 1500 Central Asian border guards and customs officers have been carried out and some operations have also been planned to support the adoption of modern drug prevention methodologies in one pilot prison.

Furthermore, support continues by the EU to the setting up of Drug Profiling Units\( ^{46} \) (DPU) at Central Asian airports and railway stations with a particular focus on providing training on precursor detection skills.

An important new project to combat drug trafficking in the region has been launched in the framework of the Instrument for Stability to support combating drugs and precursors trafficking and organized crime, and includes the setting up of a secured network of national intelligence units in the countries members of CARICC\(^ {47} \) (Central Asia Regional Intelligence and Coordination Centre) and cross border cooperation with Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.

CARICC was established under the UNODC project TD/RER/H22 “Establishment of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC)” as part of “Rainbow” strategy and its objectives are:

- Coordination of the efforts of the member-states in combating the illicit drug trafficking at the regional level;
- Facilitation of the enhanced cooperation between the competent authorities of the member-states in combating trans-border crime associated with illicit drug trafficking;
- Establishment of cooperation mechanisms between competent authorities of the member-states;
- Assistance in organizing and executing joint international operations and investigations, including controlled deliveries;
- Collection, storage, protection, analysis and exchange of information in the field of combating illicit drug trafficking.

\( ^{46} \) The EU-UNDP Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) has handed over in 2009 a newly constructed building for a Drug Profiling Unit (DPU) to the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The DPU would help Uzbek drug control agencies to detect drug trafficking and make searches for drugs as well as collect, collate and analyze information for the detection of illegal drug trafficking. The DPU has been established as a part of the CADAP “Drug Control at Airports and Railway Stations” project. The agencies responsible for implementing the project in the Republic of Uzbekistan are the National Security Service, the State Customs Committee, the Ministry of the Interior and the State Border Guards Committee. The total cost of the construction work and equipment (computers, furniture, and the drug detection devices) is about 76,000 euro. The CADAP and its government partners have established interagency DPUs in all the countries in the region to promote border security by analysing collected information and by working with the drug control agencies in the country.

\( ^{47} \) Source: www.caricc.org, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, established within the Memorandum of Understanding on sub-regional drug control cooperation dated May 4 1996 (Tashkent, Uzbekistan) between the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Accessed in April 2012.
2.8 Dual Approach: the German Bilateral and Regional approach

Efforts have been undertaken over the past year to give concrete emphasis to bilateral and regional aspects of the EU Strategy to different areas of the globe. In addition to that, the meetings held with each country under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or the Trade and Cooperation Agreements have been used to discuss bilateral priorities.

These discussions paved the way for the elaboration of the five “bilateral priorities papers” which combine Commission and Member States’ programs and would guide the implementation of bilateral aspects of the Strategy in particular.

As far as Central Asia region is facing a significant regional challenges, which require cross-border cooperation, the need for a regional approach has been duly taken into account while implementing the Strategy in such areas as combating drug trafficking, modernizing border management, dealing with environmental problems and fostering energy and transport links.

In line with the EU Strategy, two regional initiatives are being developed as a whole: a European Education Initiative for Central Asia, and a European Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia, underlining particular emphasis on the need for increased coordination between EU and Member State instruments and assistance.

Part of the implementation effort over the past year has included two assistance coordination meetings organized by the Commission with Member States, contributing to the elaboration of the bilateral priorities papers and allowing for a comprehensive overview of ongoing and planned assistance and policy dialogue initiatives.

For instance, the Ismaili spiritual leader Aga Khan\(^\text{48}\), who has been engaged in development projects in many parts of Central Asia, endorses the EU’s “regional diagnosis” of Central Asia and also Germany pointed out the advantages of regional cooperation. Even policy-makers in the region have gradually accepted that Central Asia could be seen as a regional entity, though, so far, national identities are still stronger than a regional identity.

The EU is still struggling with its regional approach towards Central Asia from its own historical experience and recognizes the importance of regional development, integration and hopes its experience would be translatable to the context of Central Asia too.

It is argued that many EU policies involved in its process could be successfully adapted by the Central Asian countries, in fact, Central Asia urgently needs to cooperate on a regional level to

\(^{48}\) The agencies of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) are private, international, non-denominational development organisations. They work to improve the welfare and prospects of people in the developing world, particularly in Asia and Africa, without regard to faith, origin or gender. Its programmes are designed to bring a critical mass of economic, social and cultural activities to bear on a given area. Its projects encompass many of the determinants of the quality of life, including the natural and built environments in both urban and rural areas, food security, health, education, access to financial services and economic opportunity, as well as the cultural areas of traditional music, architecture and art.
tackle many of the problems it currently faces, such as drug-trafficking, water management, migration, environmental protection and so on.

Overcoming the problems of small markets and a disproportionate distribution of natural wealth (oil, gas, water and minerals) it is important to set up a regional approach towards the development of Central Asia.

It is also important to note some analysts in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have criticized the EU’s previous lack of a regional strategy toward Central Asia in the past. In their view, there are four main reasons for these critics:

1. The countries of Central Asia lack the political will to work as a regional entity. Many of them are still seeking to forge their own political and cultural identities and jealously guard their national interests, and relations between the countries are often poor.
2. The five countries have different paths to development based on different needs. The EU should develop strategies based on the specific needs of the individual countries. The assumption of the EU that the Central Asian countries can successfully cooperate on a regional basis and present a united front in international forum like the Baltic States do is wrong.
3. Uzbekistan is the main obstacle to a regional approach. It has borders with all the other Regional countries. Instead of cooperating with others, it has become the source of trouble, making regional cooperation impossible. Several EU officials have offered responses to these criticisms. For these reasons each of the Central Asian countries is specific in nature and legitimately anxious to assert its independence. As a result the EU plans to carry out three quarters of its projects by way of bilateral cooperation.

The debate is a reflection of the EU’s ongoing uncertainty over the basic question of whether Central Asia can be seen as a region. The new strategy paper proposes “a balanced bilateral and regional approach,” but so far it is still not clear whether the EU can successfully convince those skeptical of its regional approach.

Germany is the only country among the EU member states that has embassies in all the Central Asian states, becoming involved in Central Asia very quickly after independence and being within the EU, the largest bilateral donor in Central Asia, playing a leading role in the release of the new Central Asia Strategy, which in some ways is driven by several factors, both historic and realist in nature.
First, approximately one million German-Russians lived in the Central Asian region and after the beginning of the Second World War, they were deported from the area where they had settled along the Volga river to Central Asia.

When the states in the south of the former Soviet Union gained independence, the desire to immigrate to Germany was awakened in these German-Russians and over two-thirds have since made the move49.

Second, Germany has been an active North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) participant in Afghanistan since 2001, keeping as many as 3,500 troops in Afghanistan, part of a larger NATO force of roughly 41,000 in the country. Almost the entire German contingent is based in Kabul and other parts of northern Afghanistan, close to the German military base in Termez, Uzbekistan.

The Termez military base is favorable because of its comparatively better infrastructure and relative security. As long as Germany keeps its position in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, it will be a priority to maintain good relations with the Uzbek government to ensure the continued use of the Termez base.

Third, among the EU member states, Germany is the Central Asian countries’ chief trading partner, especially Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and the Uzbekistan’s fifth most important supplier of goods, after Russia, China, South Korea and the United States.

After a number of difficult years, trade with Germany has picked up again since 2001, reaching approx. US$ 300 million in 2011 (an increase of 9% over the previous year). German crude oil imports from Kazakhstan for the period August 2005 - July 2006 amounted to 7.458 million tonnes (August 2009 - July 2011: 9.459 million tons). As such, Kazakhstan ranks fifth among Germany’s sources of oil (total imports for the period August 2009 - July 2011: 213,585 million tons).

The Central Asian countries, however, prefer bilateral security relations with the United States of America and other NATO members, such as Germany, France, and Netherlands.

They supported the operations in Afghanistan with military bases for Western forces. Germany has an air base with 300 soldiers in Termez (Uzbekistan) while US has an air base in Manas (Kyrgyzstan). France had troops in Kyrgyzstan and one logistic centre in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), while the Netherlands had an agreement with Kyrgyzstan, allowing the use of Bishkek airport by its Air force jets.

Besides all these reasons, it should be noted that Berlin is frustrated by what it perceives as the EU’s failure to address developments in the eastern part of the European continent in a proper way\textsuperscript{50}.

Also the focus on the “northern dimension” by the Scandinavian EU states has failed to incorporate Russia and former Soviet Republics into a broader European context and it seems Germany feels compelled to take up the role of an advocate for Europe’s eastern neighbors.

After many years of development assistance, the EU is frustrated by being seen only as an aid donor, with a view from Brussels that its effort to influence the CA States is not proportionate to its economic contribution and strategic weight. The EU aspires to being an outside player on par with Russia, China and the United States.

The release of the new strategy paper has certainly raised Europe’s visibility to some extent. It is unclear, however, what resources the EU could draw on in order to raise its visibility in Central Asia in the future. Russia has political, historical and cultural links that help it to maintain its huge influence in the region and the markets of the region are awash in Chinese commodities, evidence of China’s significant presence.

As for US, its military bases in the region and involvement in Afghanistan clearly show it will to stay in CA region for a long time to come. Other problem regarding visibility is how to establish an image for the EU that is distinct from its member states, some of which have already been quite visible in the region (as already mentioned the case of Germany).

If the EU cannot successfully coordinate with its member states, the regional countries will be left with images of some European countries, but not of the EU as a whole.

The EU is not a unitary actor when it comes to foreign policy and major joint decisions need unanimity among 27 member states and one could one wonders whether Central Asia as a region would continue to garner attention from the EU: France, for example, while attentive to the region, is primarily interested in getting EU foreign policy to focus on the Mediterranean.

Germany, on the other hand, is determined to develop the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbors, following a new “Ostpolitik”, Germany wants the EU to have a coherent and comprehensive set of policies for the former Soviet Union, including the Central Asian countries.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether Germany would get sufficient support from other member states, providing enough momentum to push the implementation of the new strategy forward. Another question is whether the member states can reach a consensus on making a favorable human rights record a precondition for development assistance.

In fact, during the 1990’s, the EU did link assistance programs with human rights records in some countries in the region, but they were not very strong. With the urgent need for an alternative supplier of energy, it is very unlikely the EU would want to further strengthen such conditionality.

According to some political analysts, EU officials privately would “close an eye” on the current human rights concerns in order to avoid that it will negatively affect the EU’s pursuit of energy supply in the region. In fact, the EU is quietly reviewing the premises of its foreign policy posture and is currently involved in a “period of reflection” on the usefulness of sanctions against countries such as Uzbekistan.

2.9 EU and the Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Central Asia is confronted by trans-national, regional and national security threats. The main trans-national threat derives from Afghanistan in the form of drug trafficking and the risk of conflict spilling over as Taliban factions try to get a foothold in Central Asia.

In Afghanistan, even though the EU is increasingly active in support of SSR, it is not an influential player in security issues nor in assistance to SSR as it has been in the Western Balkans, or currently in Congo and Georgia.

As far as SSR goes, the EU has little room to fund or work on genuine SSR projects with a strong good governance focus. Nonetheless, Brussels and member states should use the opportunities that are available, especially since SSR is the ideal link between the human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law priority it has set out to pursue and the security concerns that underpin EU engagement with Central Asia.

The main programs of ESDP\(^{51}\) consist of police mission (EUPOL) and Commission involvement in justice reform. Europe’s SSR support is largely still provided by individual member states - especially those that contribute to the ISAF mission - and the EU’s programs are still in need of more funding and qualified personnel.

The main link between EU SSR support to Afghanistan and Central Asia is border control, for instance through the Border Management Badakhshan (BOMBAF) that was largely EU funded, implemented by UNDP and focused on building three border crossing points on the Tajik-Afghan border while training Afghan border guards and providing equipment too.

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share a border with Afghanistan that is over 2000 kilometers long and the EU would do well to step up BOMCA work through increased funding,

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\(^{51}\) In December 1998 the French and British governments signed an agreement at St. Malo, which paved the political path for EU governments to launch the European Security and Defense policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999. The St. Malo Declaration stated that the European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.
bringing in more partners and, in a broader sense, using the BOMCA experience in other parts of the security sector such as police or disaster relief.

The most substantial regional threat facing Central Asia derives from tensions over water management. Energy-rich Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan lack sufficient water resources for irrigation of crops, while mountainous and water-rich Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack sufficient fossil fuel resources. Over the past few years tensions have risen between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in particular. The former plans to construct an enormous dam in the Vakhsh River which would enable the Tajiks to generate the electricity they badly need while being able to control water flows to Uzbekistan and other countries in the region.

Uzbekistan fiercely resists Tajik water projects, fearing that it would not have enough water to irrigate its extensive cotton fields. Uzbekistan has already on a few occasions restricted the flow of gas to Tajikistan. Regional cooperation between the Central Asian countries has not yielded substantial results, and international organizations and important powers such as Russia, the EU and the US have been reluctant to get involved in regional disputes over water resources.

With climate change having a further negative effect on available water resources, the risk of regional conflict rises, especially between Uzbekistan and its water-rich though devastatingly poor Tajik and Kyrgyz neighbors. The EU is involved in water management issues through an Initiative on Environment and Water which is aimed at donor coordination.

A large water governance project is one of the key projects the EU is implementing, although unfortunately Uzbekistan is not included.

Although maybe not directly SSR related, the EU engagement in good governance on topics that have a clear security bearing is crucial to the implementation of the security-oriented Strategy for the region. Lastly, the countries of the region deal with internal instability to different extents.

Moreover, at first sight all five regimes seem to have a strong grip on power. However, strong presidential regimes or authoritarianism are no guarantee for staying in power as became clear in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 when President Akayev was ousted by frustrated elites in favor of current President Bakiyev.

Also it is unclear whether power transitions as a result of a leader’s sudden death will always run as smoothly as in Turkmenistan following Niazov’s death in December 2006. Disloyal political and business elites, the poor and disillusioned populations as well as radical Islamic groups can all threaten the status quo in Central Asian republics.

These factors provide reason enough for Central Asian leaders to have strong intelligence services that can detect potential threats in time, or internal security forces that can quell unrest if
necessary. An extreme example of when such services were deployed was the situation that arose in the Uzbek city of Andjion in 2004, where hundreds of protesters were massacred.

In this sense SSR, if understood by Central Asian leaders as contributing to democratic reform of security structures, is likely to be considered a threat to the regime.

Although all five Central Asian states have strong presidential regimes there are substantial differences between the leaderships, the conditions they work in, the level of freedom and the possibilities for reform.

In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there might be interest in EU-supported small scale projects on SSR that touch on governance and even democratization aspects. Large overhaul projects are unlikely but smaller civil society driven projects, with support through EIDHR, the Non State Actors/Local Authorities in Development program and especially through EU national government funding.

In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are dim for EU involvement in SSR and governance support, but the EU should make an effort to closely liaise with NATO, which upholds reasonably positive diplomatic and military contacts with these countries.

Yet, radical Islam is characterized by most Central Asian governments as internal security threat number one. Until now the EU has been wary of initiating EU-Central Asia exchanges of experience in working on and with moderate Islamic groups on society-related issues, including security.

In the EU-Central Asia Strategy the final priority outlined is ‘Building Bridges and intercultural dialogue’. Again, although not directly related to SSR, both moderate and radical Islam are societal forces to be reckoned with; the former to build a dialogue with, the latter, if violent, to address through security services.

Still, only a little of the EU’s technical assistance through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) or the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) - the two main EU assistance instruments that apply to Central Asia - can be regarded as Security Sector Reform assistance.

However, some initiatives, such as a project on human rights awareness in the Kyrgyz police forces or assistance to judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are part and parcel of SSR, although maybe not presented directly in this way by Brussels. The EU Instrument for Stability (IIF) that would be suitable for SSR work until now barely applies to Central Asia.

Although the EU does not have a SSR strategy for Central Asia, it has become one of the foremost international donors and promoters of SSR through Commission funding and long-term
projects and EU Council driven European Security and defense (ESDP) missions in Afghanistan, Africa, the Balkans, South Caucasus and the Middle East.

The main focus of EU SSR is on police forces, border guards and the judiciary, generally excluding reform of the military.

The EU sees SSR as a tool that can help reach broad objectives of the Union’s external and security policies such as poverty reduction and strengthening human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law. Finally, Brussels devotes attention to SSR in fragile states as outlined in the new EU Security Strategy.

With no ESDP missions active in a region beset by a range of security challenges, it would make sense for the Special Representative to discuss possible EU-Central Asia cooperation on SSR in his regular meetings with Central Asian political elites. Security structures in Central Asia are characterized by a lack of training and resources (the Armed Forces in particular), corruption (for example in the police forces) and absence of oversight mechanisms besides presidential power (internal security forces and intelligence come to mind).

It is unlikely that EU would receive any interest from Turkmen and Uzbek authorities but it might find an opening for cooperation in the somewhat more liberal regimes of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

A final aspect of EU engagement in SSR in Central Asia can be related to the OSCE and NATO due to the large overlap of membership and both regional security organizations’ activities in Central Asia.

Cooperation between the EU and NATO is limited in Central Asia and non-existent when it comes to SSR. All five countries are members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace ( PfP), but only Kazakhstan is actively engaged in SSR activities through the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) that it agreed with NATO and which incorporates aspects of security-related reform of armed forces and oversight mechanisms.

Kazakhstan also participates in the PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan – Defense Institution Building) initiative in which NATO liaises with partners from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Kazakhstan on good governance of the defense sector.

While NATO holds consultations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on defense and security sector reform, but is not directly involved through substantial cooperation or assistance programming, OSCE is an interesting partner for the EU in Central Asia in terms of SSR activities.

OSCE has a presence in all five countries and has broad experience of ‘doing’ SSR, both through the politico-military and human dimensions. Over 70 per cent of the OSCE budget is
funded by EU member states, most of them in full support of OSCE field missions, although the OSCE centers in Central Asia only have small budgets.

One way for the EU to step up support for SSR in Central Asia would be to provide so-called “extra budgetary support” to projects that can be implemented by the OSCE; this would be advantageous since Central Asian countries themselves are members of the OSCE and thus have a stake in the defining and implementation of SSR activities.

Although some Central Asian countries, particularly Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, would be unwilling to have the OSCE work on democratization of the security sector, the other three states are more open to this. But there are also less sensitive SSR related issues the OSCE works on in Central Asia, such as police and border guard training.

These are areas where the EU and OSCE need to carefully coordinate and cooperate since the EU also tends to focus on these areas in support of SSR. In that sense close cooperation is expected between the EU BOMCA project and the newly opened Border Management Staff Office in Dushanbe.

In conclusion, a strong EU involvement including a unified vision in support of Security Sector Reform in Central Asia is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The political landscape in Central Asia is largely not receptive to key aspects of SSR such as democratic control of armed forces and other state security institutions through the power ministries, the parliament and civil society.

Although the EU Strategy’s underlying theme is based on security, it would be worthwhile to look into ways of feeding SSR aspects into the political dialogue between the EU and Central Asian republics.

In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there might be interest in EU supported projects on SSR. The EU and its member states could increasingly look into possibilities of supporting SSR projects implemented by local and international civil society organisations, also in cooperation with the governments of the three countries.

In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan prospects are largely absent for a substantial EU involvement in SSR that goes beyond current work in BOMCA. Nonetheless, the EU should make an effort to closely liaise with NATO and the OSCE, also in practical terms through small awareness-raising exercises.
2.10 Conclusion: the way forward

The implementation of a new Central Asia Strategy is well under way by EU institutions and the past year has seen a significant intensification of political dialogue and practical cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. With high expectations in Central Asia and increasing relevance of Strategy priority areas such as energy diversification, the fight against drugs, or the impact of climate change on the environment, it is crucial that the current pace of implementation be maintained by EU.

New EU Member States have an important role to contribute to EU-Central Asia relations, given their own transformation experiences, like in the field of Rule of Law. A number of Member States are also actively engaging and are providing significant levels of assistance for the countries of Central Asia.

Nevertheless, to support the realization of larger-scale projects of interest for the EU and Central Asia, is also a priority of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), with the clear scope of financing new projects.

The most important challenge in the years to come will be maintaining the political momentum created over the last year, namely through reinforced coordination between the EU institutions and Member States, greater EU visibility in the region, increased financial resources and active involvement as well as contributions from Central Asian countries that are all essential for delivering on the ambitious goals of the new Strategy52.

The EU is aiming to make further substantial progress in all priority areas of the Strategy. A greater effort should be made to promote human rights and democratization and to ensure active involvement of civil society, Parliaments, local authorities and other actors in the monitoring and implementation of the Strategy.

The EU will continue work on establishing or upgrading Human Rights dialogues with all Central Asian countries and in the field of education, the Central Asia Research and Education Network (E–Silk–Highway) should get underway and supported by a broad exchange between European and Central Asian educational institutions.

In the field of Rule of Law, solid cooperation should continue addressing key areas of legislation and the judicial system. In the field of environment and water, the EU should be supporting a dynamic political process with the aim of putting an integrated regional resource management system in place.

52 Source: [www.europe.eu](http://www.europe.eu), the Europe 2020 is the EU’s growth strategy for the coming decade. In a changing world, Member States want the EU to become sustainable and inclusive economy. These three mutually reinforcing priorities should help the EU and the Member States deliver high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion. Concretely, the Union has set five ambitious objectives - on employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy - to be reached by 2020. Each Member State has adopted its own national targets in each of these areas. Concrete actions at EU and national levels underpin the strategy. Accessed in June 2012
In the field of common challenges, the EU should continue to play an active role in stakeholder coordination on drugs and borders and contribute to reaching tangible results on reducing drug trafficking and enhancing border management in Central Asia.

Finally, the EU will also have to develop further the dialogue started with other regional organizations active in the region, with an aim for its part to engage in concrete cooperation on Central Asia, especially in the fields of border and water management, as well as the fight against drug trafficking and trans-border crime.
CHAPTER III

THE NATO STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE C.A. REGION

### 3.1 An overview of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and several Western European nations in common agreement to provide collective security against the Soviet Union. In this agreement, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom recognized to consider attack against one an attack against all, a prospect that led to the treaty’s most famous provision, Article V.

Today, the Alliance consists of 28 independent member countries and after than sixty years later, the threats facing the alliance’s members have changed considerably.

NATO member states share common interests in preventing disruptions to the global economy, fostering stability across Europe by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans.

In the 2000’s, NATO has broadened its scope through the mission in Afghanistan as well as a counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa.

At Summit in Lisbon in 2010, Allied leaders declared that NATO’s partnerships “can provide frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation in the field of security and defense, contribute to strengthening Allied common values and essential are the success of the current operations and missions.”

A focused effort to reform NATO’s partnerships policy was launched at Lisbon, with a view to making dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful and strategically oriented.

Following up on the Lisbon decisions, a new partnership policy was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.

The new policy aims to reinforce NATO’s existing partnerships by strengthening consultation mechanisms and by facilitating more substance-driven cooperation. In addition, the new policy outlines a “toolbox” of mechanisms and activities, simplifying the way that NATO develops cooperation offers to partners.

In line with the new Strategic Concept, NATO offers its partners “more political engagement with the Alliance and a substantial role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

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1 Source: NATO website, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed June 2012.
3 Source: NATO website, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), the NATO Strategic Concept is an official document that outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces based on the changed environment. Accessed in July 2012.
NATO is also prepared to widen its engagement to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with key global actors and other new interlocutors across the globe that share the Allies’ interest in peaceful international relations but have no partnership program with NATO⁴.

The Alliance also engages actively with other international actors and organizations on defense and security-related issues, and is seeking to deepen this cooperation as for the Central Asia States⁵.

The complexity of today’s peace-support and stabilization operations and the multi-faceted nature of 21st century security challenges call for a comprehensive approach⁶ that effectively combines political, civilian and military instruments.

NATO pursues dialogue and practical cooperation with non-member countries on a wide range of political and security-related issues, and partners contribute to NATO’s goals and tasks, including to NATO-led operations and its actions against terrorism and emerging security challenges.

In the Euro-Atlantic area, the Alliance engages in relations with non-member countries through the 50-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a major program of bilateral cooperation with individual Euro-Atlantic partners. Among these partners, NATO has also developed specific structures for its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia States.

NATO is developing relations with the southern Mediterranean-rim countries through the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as with countries from the Gulf region through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative⁷.

In addition to these more structured partnerships, NATO cooperates with a range of countries which are not part of these structures. Formally referred to as “partners across the globe”, including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mongolia. Under the new partnership policy, the strategic objectives of NATO’s partner relations are to:

- Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability;
- Promote regional security and cooperation;

⁴ “Our new policy recognizes that in today's world we need cooperative security if we are to accomplish our security tasks. And to that end we want to reach out to major players across the globe,” said NATO’s Secretary General after the Berlin meeting. Source: NATO website accessed in July 2012.
⁵ KALDOR, M., Elaborating the 'new war', Rethinking the Nature of War, 2005, Frank Cass, p. 122.
⁶ Source: NATO website: www.nato.int, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction. Accessed in July 2012.
⁷ Source: NATO website, www.nato.int, NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance’s Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO. ICI focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. To date, four of these – Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - have joined.
- Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges;
- Prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership;
- Promote democratic values and reforms;
- Enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions;
- Enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises;

Within these strategic objectives for partnership, dialogue, consultation and cooperation, NATO prioritizes in the following areas:

- Political consultations on security developments, as appropriate, including regional issues, in particular with a view to preventing crises and contributing to their management;
- Cooperation in NATO-led operations and missions;
- Defense reform, capability and capacity building, education and training;
- Interoperability;
- Counter-terrorism;
- Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- Emerging security challenges, including related to cyber-defense, energy security and maritime security, including counter-piracy;
- Civil emergency planning;
- better engage with partners across the globe who contribute significantly to security, and reach out to relevant partners to build trust, increase transparency and develop practical cooperation;

While respecting the specificity of existing partnership frameworks, all partners are offered access to the whole spectrum of partnership activities NATO offers. All partners with which NATO has an individual program of cooperation (whether they are Euro-Atlantic partners, or partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, or global partners) have access to a new Partnership Cooperation Menu 8, which comprises some 1600 activities.

NATO further develop the “28+n” formula as a mechanism to provide more flexible formats for meetings and, as appropriate, activities which brings NATO and partners together, across and beyond existing frameworks.

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8 Source: NATO website, www.nato.int. NATO has developed a number of partnership tools and mechanisms to support cooperation with partner countries through a mix of policies, programs, action plans and other arrangements. Many tools are focused on the important priorities of building capabilities and interoperability, supporting defense and security-related reform. Accessed in July 2012.
A meeting “28+n” meeting was held at NATO Headquarters in September 2011 to discuss counter-piracy, involving representatives from 47 nations and organizations involved in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.

In terms of widening NATO’s engagement to key global actors and other new interlocutors with which NATO does not have formal partnership arrangement, NATO is prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation across the globe that shares its interest in peaceful international relations.

These new interlocutors may include countries such as China, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia or Brazil.

Allies also decided at Lisbon to review the Political-Military Framework that governs the way NATO involves partners in political consultation and the decision process for the operations and missions to which they contribute. At Berlin summit, NATO foreign ministers endorsed proposals for the establishment of a more structured role for NATO’s operational partners in shaping the strategy of NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

Since the 1990’s, NATO has developed close working relations with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This is an integral part of the Alliance’s ongoing transformation to address effectively the complex challenges of crisis management, as well as terrorism and emerging security challenges such as the proliferation of weapons, cyber security, energy security and piracy⁹.

The Alliance is also developing cooperation in specific areas with a number of other international and non-governmental organizations, including the African Union, Central Asia States¹⁰, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

NATO is committed to pursuing efforts towards enhancing its relations with other relevant international organizations in accordance with the Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Summit Declaration, and the action plan for the Comprehensive Approach.


3.2 NATO Strategic Concept

Since the birth of NATO, there have been three distinct periods within which NATO’s strategic thinking has evolved, the Cold War period, the immediate post-Cold War period and the security environment since 9/11.

One could say that from 1949 to 1991, NATO’s strategy was principally characterized by defense and deterrence, although with growing attention to dialogue for the last two decades of this period. From 1991 a broader approach was adopted where the notions of cooperation and security complemented the basic concepts of deterrence and defense\textsuperscript{11}.

From 1949 until the end of the Cold War, there were four Strategic Concepts, accompanied by documents that laid out the measures for the military to implement the Strategic Concept, while in the post-Cold War period, three unclassified Strategic Concepts have been issued, complemented by classified military documents.

Since the terrorist attacks\textsuperscript{12} of 9/11, NATO’s military thinking, resources and energy have given greater attention to the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, NATO has committed troops beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and reached a membership of 28, because of new threats have emerged such as energy security and cyber-attacks.

These are among the factors that brought Allied leaders to produce a new Strategic Concept: From 1949 to 1991, the International Relations were dominated by bipolar confrontation between East and West. The emphasis was more on mutual tension and confrontation than it was on dialogue and cooperation. This led to an often dangerous and expensive arms race\textsuperscript{13}.

The immediate post-Cold War period, 1991, a new era commenced and the formidable enemy that the Soviet Union had once been was dissolved and Russia, together with other former adversaries, became NATO partners and in some case NATO members (Poland, Hungary and so on). For the Alliance, the period was characterized by dialogue and cooperation, as well as other new ways of contributing to peace and stability such as multinational crisis management operations.

NATO’s second unclassified Strategic Concept, 1999, the year of NATO’s 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that committed members to common defense and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security which recognized the importance of political\textsuperscript{14}, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defense dimension.


\textsuperscript{12} BUSH, G.W. President discusses war on terrorism. World Congress Center, Atlanta, GA - 08 November 2001, source www.whitehouse.gov, accessed in July 2012.


It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

The document stated that the Alliance’s fundamental tasks were security, consultation, and deterrence and defense, adding that crisis management and partnership were also essential to enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It noted that NATO had managed to adapt and play an important role in the post-Cold War environment, and established guidelines for the Alliance’s forces, translating the purposes and tasks of the preceding sections into practical instructions for NATO force and operational planners.

The strategy called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defense to peace support and other crisis-response operations. It also stipulated that the Alliance would maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

The security environment since 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to the fore. NATO needed to protect its populations both at home and abroad, therefore underwent major internal reforms to adapt military structures and capabilities to equip members for new tasks, such as leading the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

NATO also proceeded to deepen and extend its partnerships and, essentially, accelerate its transformation to develop new political relationships and stronger operational capabilities to respond to an increasingly global and more challenging world.

These radical changes need to be reflected in NATO’s strategic documents as a first step in that direction was taken in November 2006 when NATO leaders endorsed the “Comprehensive Political Guidance”.

This is a major policy document that sets out the framework and priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years and analyses the probable future security environment and acknowledges the possibility of unpredictable events. Against that analysis, it sets out the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform in light of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept and the kinds of capabilities the Alliance need.

Later, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009, NATO leaders endorsed the “Declaration on Alliance Security” which, inter alia, called for a new Strategic Concept.

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16 The 2009 Strasbourg–Kehl Summit was a NATO summit of heads of state and heads of government held in Strasbourg, France, and in Kehl and Baden-Baden, Germany, on 3–4 April 2009.
This provoked a thorough debate and analysis of NATO issues and, together with the economic context, has presented an opportunity for rethinking, re-prioritizing and reforming NATO.

The 2010 Strategic Concept was issued in Lisbon that basically equips the Alliance for security challenges and guides its future political and military development and reflects a transformed security environment and a transformed Alliance.

New and emerging security threats, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO’s crisis management experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the value and importance of working with partners from across the globe, all drove NATO to reassess and review its strategic posture in view of the evolution of the strategic environment\textsuperscript{17}.

After having described NATO as “a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”, one can affirm that NATO’s three essential core tasks are collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security.

Yet, the Strategic Concept also affirms how NATO aims to promote international security through cooperation, reinforce arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, emphasizing NATO’s open door policy for all European countries and significantly enhancing its partnerships in the broad sense of the term.

3.3 The NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)

The Alliance seeks to foster security, stability and democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area by engaging in partnership through dialogue and cooperation with non-member countries in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia\textsuperscript{18}. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership is underpinned by two key mechanisms: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

The 50-nation EAPC\textsuperscript{19} brings together the 28 Allies and 22 Partner countries in a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation, and provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner countries.

The PfP program facilitates practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO, tailored according to the specific ambitions, needs and abilities of each Partner.

\textsuperscript{17} OIROUSSOF, N., A tower shaped by fear: N.Y design hints at a changed America, 2005, International Herald Tribune: Jun. 30.
\textsuperscript{19} Source: NATO website, \url{www.nato.int}, the 50-nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and Partner countries. It provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and for the bilateral relationships developed between NATO and individual Partner countries under the Partnership for Peace program. Accessed in July 2012.
NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which was approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, states that the EAPC and the PfP program are central to the Allies vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. At Lisbon, Allied leaders reiterated their commitment to further develop the EAPC/PfP as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability, and that they would continue to develop policy initiatives within this framework.

Three priorities underpin cooperation with Partners:
- Dialogue and consultations;
- Building capabilities and strengthening interoperability and supporting reform.

After having reiterated NATO’s enduring purpose and key values and principles, the Strategic Concept highlights the Organization’s core tasks.

The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations and to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members and always in accordance with international law:
- Collective defense, in which NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
- Crisis Management, in which NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises - before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts.
- Cooperative security, in which the Alliance is affected by and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations. This is through the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament and by keeping the door of membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

Nowadays, NATO is adopting a holistic approach to crisis management, envisaging NATO involvement at all stages of a crisis, encouraging a greater number of actors to participate and coordinate their efforts and is considering a broader range of tools to be more effective across the crisis management spectrum.
At the root of this cooperation is the principle of seeking security “at the lowest possible level of forces” by supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. A fundamental component of its cooperative approach to security is partnership, understood between NATO and non-NATO countries, as well as with other international organizations and actors. Activities under the EAPC and PfP are set out in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan and this is a catalogue of around 1600 activities covering over 30 areas of cooperation, ranging from arms control, through language training, foreign and security policy, and military geography.

The EAPC and the PfP program have steadily developed their own dynamic, as successive steps have been taken by NATO and its Partner countries to extend security cooperation, building on the partnership arrangements they have created.

As NATO has transformed over the years to meet the new challenges of the evolving security environment, Partner countries are engaged with NATO in tackling 21st century security challenges, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The ways and means of cooperation developed under NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership have proven to be of mutual benefit to Allies and Partners, and have helped promote stability. The mechanisms and programs for cooperation developed under EAPC/PfP are also being used as the basis to extend cooperation to other non-member countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

### 3.4 NATO and the C.A. States’ cooperation

NATO has many hard decisions to make in shaping its policy of cooperation and assistance toward Central States, driven primarily by the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and by its Strategic Concept in providing extensive resources and expertise to CA States in a variety of areas, including humanitarian relief and assistance, capacity-building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs, and infrastructure projects.

A further instrument handle by NATO in providing cooperation is the NATO - Russia Council (NRC), which represents another forum in which pilot project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel has been launched in December 2005 to help address the threats posed by the trafficking of narcotics in Afghan and CA States.

It seeks to build local capacity and to promote regional networking and cooperation by sharing the combined expertise of NRC member states with mid-level officers from Afghanistan,

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Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan\textsuperscript{21}. Pakistan became the seventh participating county in 2010.

The project is being implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), it represents a joint endeavor of many NRC nations - Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States - and Finland (since 2007) together with the project’s beneficiary countries\textsuperscript{22}.

Fixed training takes place in one of four institutes either in Turkey, Russia or the United States and mobile courses are being conducted in each of the six participating countries. At the Lisbon Summit, NRC leaders agreed to expand the scope of the project to provide further direct assistance to institutional capacity building in the future, hence by April 2012, some 2000 officers had been trained under the NRC project.

3.4.1 NATO and Kazakhstan cooperation

NATO-Kazakhstan relations began in 1992, when Kazakhstan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997) and the cooperation increased by Kazakhstan joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995.

In 2002, Kazakhstan joined the PfP PARP and the main focus was on supporting Kazakhstan’s domestic reform processes.

NATO and Kazakhstan actively cooperate on democratic, institutional, and defense reforms, having developed practical cooperation in many other areas. The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) lays out the overall program of cooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO.

Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia conducts high-level political dialogue with Kazakh authorities through regular visits to the country.

NATO and Kazakhstan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), setting out reform plans and timelines in IPAP, which is agreed for a two-year period 2010-12 and completing the second cycle of the IPAP 2008-2010 and is currently developing a third cycle action plan in consultation with NATO: The IPAP covers key areas to include political, military and security-sector reforms\textsuperscript{23}.

\textsuperscript{21} Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States in Isabelle Duyvesteyn & Jan Angstrom, \textit{Rethinking the Nature of War}, USA, 2005, Frank Cass, p.102.
\textsuperscript{23} Jeffries Ian, op.cit.
Kazakhstan also cooperates with NATO and other partner countries in a wide range of other areas through the Partnership for Peace ( PfP ) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, tailoring its own participation in the PfP program through an annual Individual Partnership Program, selecting those activities that will help achieve the goals it has set in the IPAP.

Another area of tight cooperation is the Security sector, in which Kazakhstan has allocated an air assault battalion as a peacekeeping battalion for potential deployment in NATO-led peace support operations, under UN Security Council mandates. Elements of the Peacekeeping battalion have joined NATO Allies in a number of live exercises.

The defense-related fields of cooperation are supported by the Planning and Review Process ( PARP ), in this framework, one of the major projects is the expansion of this force into a brigade structure (KAZBRIG), giving Kazakhstan the capability to sustain a battalion size contribution through rotation.

Kazakhstan, along with Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Belarus, completed an agreement with NATO in 2010 allowing the transportation of non-lethal ISAF cargo to Afghanistan by rail, the first trial shipment was successfully completed in June 2010 and regular shipments are now ongoing.24

Kazakhstan plays an active role in both hosting and participating in PfP training and exercises, establishing a PfP regional training centre and continuing to work with Allies and regional partners in military and language training techniques.

Kazakhstan contributes to the fight against terrorism through its participation in the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, enhancing national counter-terrorist capabilities and improving border security.

NATO and Kazakhstan have hosted major military exercises, named “Steppe Eagle”, yearly since 2006, contributing to strengthen the interoperability of KAZBRIG with Alliance forces.

On the Security Sector Reform, NATO is supportive of the democratic and institutional reform process underway in Kazakhstan, which is outlined in its IPAP, contributing a considerable expertise that Kazakhstan can draw upon.

In consultation with the Allies, Kazakhstan continues to lay the conceptual framework for defense and security sector reform and in advancing key reform projects within the Ministry of Defense. Kazakhstan’s subscription to the objectives of the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building initiative (PAP-DIB) is reinforcing these efforts.

Kazakhstan’s participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 2002 has helped in developing the ability of its forces to work with NATO through interoperability, giving also emphasis on its Air-Mobile Forces.

Moreover, NATO and Kazakhstan have been cooperating to the Civil emergency planning, enhancing its national civil emergency and disaster-management capabilities through an active role of participation in activities organized by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

To further develop cooperation in this area, Kazakhstan appointed a representative to the EADRCC in 2008. In 2009, the country hosted the EADRCC “ZHETYSU” exercise near Almaty.

Along with mentioned areas of cooperation, NATO and Kazakhstan have been developing tight relations on the Science and environment, in which the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program, has received grant awards for over 20 cooperative projects for collaborate scientific and environmental projects.

Projects include collaboration on studies into radiological risks in Central Asia, integrated water resources management and new technology exploration for seismic resistant construction. In total, scientists and experts from Kazakhstan have had leading roles in 82 activities.
Kazakhstan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to improve internet access for academics and research communities in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based network.

In October 2009, participants from Kazakhstan attended an advanced training course on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through enhanced border security, in May 2010, scientists and engineers from Kazakhstan, as well as other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, took part in a NATO science program designed to train participants in securing cyber networks. The primary goal of the training was to strengthen the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the CIS region.

A very interesting area of cooperation and development between Kazakhstan and NATO is the Public information, where increasing the public awareness of NATO and the benefits of its relations with Kazakhstan is also an important tool to enhance the area of cooperation in Central Asia.

A joint NATO-Kazakhstan workshop was conducted to contribute to training the Kazakh press and public information officials since 2007 and the Resource and Information Centre on NATO, at the Al Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, which opened in 2007, hosts a number of NATO-themed events and visits from NATO representatives annually.

In addition, a NATO Depository Library was inaugurated in Astana in 2008, establishing a wider public information strategy.

Moreover, in every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance.

3.4.2 NATO and Kirgizstan cooperation

Kyrgyzstan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997). The country joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, to work alongside the Allies in areas where bilateral aims converge. Since PfP accession, Kyrgyzstan has participated in a number of PfP exercises, with a special focus on command and control, civil-emergency planning and civil-military cooperation.

The Kyrgyz Republic cooperates with NATO within the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO and Kyrgyzstan have developed practical cooperation in many areas, with the goal of enhancing regional and global security. The Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) lays out the program of cooperation between NATO and Kyrgyzstan.
Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, conducts high-level political dialogue with Kyrgyz authorities, along with the NATO Liaison Officer in Central Asia in Bishkek reviews cooperation with the government.

NATO and Kyrgyzstan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), which is jointly agreed each year, where the key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, counter-terrorism cooperation, border security, crisis management and civil emergency planning.

The country joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 2007 to work more closely with the Allies on military interoperability and defense planning initiatives, with objectives underpinned by a set of tailored Partnership Goals.

Kyrgyzstan attends all the meeting on the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is taking place in expanded format at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, while in the security cooperation, it can be added that Kyrgyzstan participates in numerous PfP exercises, identifying a number of units as available for NATO/PfP operations and training exercises.

NATO and Kyrgyzstan have developed recently an agreement on the transit of surface (rail and road) cargo for ISAF across Kyrgyz territory.

On the Defense and Security Sector Reform, Kyrgyzstan is in the process of reforming its armed forces and through the PARP, which Kyrgyzstan joined in 2007, has the potential to further assist the government in developing reform plans and activities.

These reforms could also enhance Kyrgyzstan’s ability to take part in peacekeeping operations alongside NATO forces. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan is working to enhance its military education which plays a role in these processes and cooperation, covering a wide range of areas, including language training, search and rescue education and training, border security and control, and the law of armed conflicts and human rights.²⁵

Kyrgyzstan also participates in a NATO-supported retraining program for released military personnel, with the clear goal of cushioning the socio-economic consequences of the country’s restructuring armed forces, facilitating the re-entry of former military personnel into the civilian job market.

As far as the Civil emergency planning is concerned, this is a key area of cooperation for Kyrgyzstan and NATO, improving its effectiveness in responding to natural disasters and emergency situations and Kyrgyzstan seems to be particularly interested in relevant scientific and

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technical cooperation of the mechanisms available through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

Also Kyrgyzstan is interested in Science and environment development, indeed, scientists from Kyrgyzstan have received grant awards in a range of subject areas under NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program, working alongside of experts from Belgium, Russia and the Slovak Republic, on a project to prevent landslide dam disasters in the Tien Shan, a mountainous region in the Kyrgyz Republic prone to major earthquakes and vulnerable to landslides.

In addition, scientists from the Kyrgyz Republic, United Kingdom, Italy and Uzbekistan have been working together on a project aimed at increasing geo-environmental security in the region of Toktogul Hydroelectric Power Station.

Kyrgyzstan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to increase internet access for academic and research communities in countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based network, in September 2008, participants from Kyrgyzstan attended an advanced training course on the concept and parameters of the use of force in countering terrorism.

In May 2010, scientists and engineers from Kyrgyzstan, as well as other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, took part in a NATO science program designed to train participants in securing cyber networks. The primary goal of the training was to strengthen the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the CIS region. In total, scientists and experts from the Kyrgyz Republic have had leading roles in 49 activities under the SPS program.

Last, but not least, Public information continues to be a very important field of cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and NATO, increasing public understanding of NATO and the benefits of cooperation. This is done through different strands of activities, including visits to NATO Headquarters, international workshops in Kyrgyzstan, and video conferences between NATO and Kyrgyz academic institutions.

Work is ongoing to build and enhance networks with universities, non-governmental organizations and the press and media in order to increase awareness of the Alliance and Euro-Atlantic security issues in general.

NATO supports educational activities relevant to security and defense issues and is working with Kyrgyzstan to increase public access to NATO and security-related documents. To this end, NATO and Kyrgyzstan opened a NATO Depository Library at the Diplomatic Academy in Bishkek in February 2009.
In every partner country an embassy of one of the NATO member states serves as a contact point and operates as a channel for disseminating information about the role and policies of the Alliance and the current NATO Contact Point Embassy in Kyrgyzstan is the embassy of Germany.

3.4.3 NATO and Uzbekistan cooperation

NATO-Uzbekistan relations began in 1992, when Uzbekistan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997) and further relations were developed in 1994, when Uzbekistan signed up to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and in 2002, when the country acceded to the Planning and Review Process (PARP).

NATO and Uzbekistan are actively developing practical cooperation and the Alliance appreciates the country’s attendance at Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meetings and its engagement in discussions with Allies and partners.

Defense-related fields of cooperation are being carried out through the Planning and Review Process, which Uzbekistan joined in 2002, while other areas of practical cooperation include education, training of personnel, civil emergency planning and science.

In 2008, Uzbekistan and NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program reached an agreement to convert several tons of toxic mélange into a harmless chemical and the conversion process was successfully completed during the summer of 2010.

Dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, conducts high-level political dialogue with Uzbek authorities through regular visits and meetings to the country. Also the NATO Liaison Officer in Central Asia tightly cooperates with Tashkent and on regularly basis support the Ministry of Defense on planning and doctrine related-issues.

Under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, NATO and Uzbekistan have been developing different practical activities in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Program (IPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP).

Form 2002, with regards to the Security cooperation, Uzbekistan has been playing a key role in supporting Allied operations in Afghanistan, allowing Germany the use of its airfield at Termez and permitting over-flights and transit permission for Allied forces and supplies. Yet, Uzbekistan continues to be a main transit route for humanitarian supplies to Afghanistan, the majority of which is delivered via the Hairaton Bridge.

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Specialists from Uzbekistan have also assisted in implementing tangible infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, including the reconstruction of ten bridges connecting the northern part of the country with Kabul.

Also Uzbekistan, along with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, made an agreement with NATO in order to allow the transportation of non-lethal ISAF cargo to Afghanistan by rail. As far as Defense and Security Sector Reform are concerned, NATO supports the institutional reform processes undertaken by Uzbekistan, with particular attention to the reform of the Armed Forces.

Uzbekistan’s participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 2002 aims at attaining interoperability between elements of its armed forces and those of NATO Allies. While there was a pause in PARP cooperation following the events in Andijan in 2005, but Uzbekistan reaffirmed its participation in the program from 2010 onwards.

Along with several other countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan has received counter-terrorism training through NATO-funded courses and in May 2010, officials from Uzbekistan attended an Advanced Training Course, funded through NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Program, to learn the latest counter-terrorism methods and strategies.

Uzbekistan has also benefited from counter-narcotics training, hence Uzbek officers were able to put to use the counter-narcotics training they received through an initiative of the NATO-Russia Council, when they seized nearly 600 kilograms of heroin that was being smuggled through the country.

Uzbekistan continues to participate in seminars and workshops on defense policy and strategy within the PfP framework, as well as military education of Uzbek officers, with an emphasis on English language training.

Finally, on Civil emergency planning and disaster-relief cooperation, Uzbekistan has significant areas of cooperation, hosting the first EAPC exercise held in Central Asia in April 2003, so called Exercise “Ferghana 2003”, in which was simulated an international response to a major earthquake in the region.

On the Science and environment, Uzbekistan is enhancing the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program and the local authority has received grant awards for over 50 projects for scientific and environmental collaboration, while scientists and experts from Uzbekistan have had leading roles in 164 activities.

In May 2010, scientists and engineers from Uzbekistan, as well as other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region, took part in a NATO science program designed to train participants in securing cyber networks. The primary goal of the training was to strengthen
the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the CIS region. Also Uzbekistan participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project.

The process of supporting Uzbekistan’s domestic reforms\textsuperscript{27} intensified, and the country’s role in PfP activities continued to increase. While Uzbekistan-NATO relations declined to some extent following the events in Andijan in 2005, currently NATO and Uzbekistan engage in regular dialogue through the EAPC, and are actively redeveloping cooperation in a number of specific fields.

### 3.4.4 NATO and Turkmenistan cooperation

NATO’s relations with Turkmenistan have to be viewed through the Partnership for Peace framework, which Turkmenistan joined in 1994. Turkmenistan adheres to a policy of permanent neutrality and does not offer any armed forces units or infrastructure for use in the context of NATO-led operations.

NATO and Turkmenistan have been actively cooperating in security-related, science and environmental issues and other areas and an Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP) lays out the program of cooperation between NATO and Turkmenistan.

Regular political dialogue takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and even in this case, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia and the NATO Liaison Officer conduct high-level political dialogue with Turkmen authorities\textsuperscript{28}.

NATO and Turkmenistan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), aiming at introducing and familiarizing Turkmen personnel with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) issues, as well as enhancing deepening cooperation in areas such as border control and security, civil emergency planning, and defense planning.

Based on its policy of permanent neutrality, Turkmenistan does not offer any armed forces units or infrastructure in the context of NATO-led operations, however, Turkmenistan is willing to contribute to disaster relief, humanitarian and search and rescue operations.

Every year, officials from Turkmenistan’s armed forces participate in a range of courses provided by NATO and NATO member states, covering topics as arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, the law of armed conflicts, courses aimed at familiarizing officers with combating


terrorism techniques and illegal trafficking issues, border security and control, defense planning and budgeting, language training, medical services and other areas.

In the case of trafficking, in particular, Turkmenistan has worked with NATO to address several of these issues and since 2006, Turkmenistan has sent numerous personnel to attend counter narcotics training sponsored by an initiative of the NATO-Russia Council.

Civil emergency planning and disaster-relief coordination are key areas of cooperation between Turkmenistan and NATO in preparing Turkmenistan’s units to contribute to international disaster relief operations.

To assist Turkmenistan with its intention of establishing a Ministry of Emergency Situations, NATO has held a number of seminars on civilian emergency planning in Ashgabat since 2009.

Since its involvement with NATO’s science activities began in 1996, Turkmenistan scientists and experts have participated in over 30 activities, under the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program, receiving grant awards for over 8 cooperative projects for scientific, environmental and educational collaboration.

These collaborative projects include studies into radiological risks and the safe handling of radioactive waste in Central Asia, oil spill risk prevention and pollution in the South Caspian Sea and strategic management of sensitive natural resources.

As part of a networking project, teachers from European institutes trained Turkmen from different institutions, via internet-based distance-learning technologies, supporting the expansion of the academic and educational internet communication system in Turkmenistan, including the connection of additional academic centers in Ashgabat and medical colleges in other regions of the country, as well as training Turkmen researchers in how to use the network.

Turkmenistan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to improve internet access for academics and research communities in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based network.

NATO continues its information and outreach activities with Turkmenistan since the very beginning and in 2011, Turkmen parliamentarian and diplomatic officials visited NATO Headquarters for a series of information and discussion sessions on the current NATO’s priorities, including its partnerships with Central Asian Republics.

NATO-Turkmenistan relations began in 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, in 1997). Increasing relations were developed in 1994, when Turkmenistan joined the Partnership for Peace program and through this framework have expanded to include a range of activities in which the aims of NATO and Turkmenistan coincide.
3.4.5 NATO and Tajikistan cooperation

NATO-Tajikistan relations date back to 1992, when the country joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, joining the Partnership for Peace in 2002 to work alongside the Allies in areas where bilateral aims converge. Since joining PfP program, Tajikistan has played an active role in hosting and participating in PfP exercises, with a special focus on command and control, civil-emergency planning and civil-military co-operation.

NATO’s relations with Tajikistan²⁹ have been implemented through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, in which the country joined in 2002 and actively cooperates in the fight against terrorism. Tajikistan Dialogue with NATO takes place within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and tight exchange of political and military relations have been established since the country became independent.

NATO and Tajikistan are developing practical cooperation in a number of areas through the country’s Individual Partnership Program (IPP), which is jointly agreed for a two-year period and the major key areas include security and peacekeeping cooperation, especially counter-terrorism cooperation and border security, crisis management and civil emergency planning.

It is worth mentioning that Tajikistan plays an important role in supporting Allied operations in Afghanistan through the hosting of French military aircraft at Dushanbe Airport, where NATO and Tajikistan also cooperate in the fight against international terrorism. NATO is supporting the country in its efforts to create an educational course on counter-terrorism for the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defence and a number of SFA project in order to enable the Tajikistan Armed Forced capable to deal with internal and external threats.

Tajikistan has listed a number of units as available for NATO/PfP operations and training exercises, including an infantry platoon to support PfP activities, a group of staff officers and a group of military medics. Tajikistan is also seeking to enhance cooperation with NATO Allies in mine-clearing activities, participating in a number of PfP exercises with NATO Allies and other partner countries.

As hinted above, Tajikistan aims to develop sustained and effective democratic control of its armed forces, developing coordination procedures between the government, parliament and the military. It is also in the process of reforming its armed forces through the SFA concept. Cooperative processes with the PfP framework assist in achieving these goals and enhance the country’s ability to take part in peacekeeping or other operations alongside NATO forces.

Tajikistan is also considering the participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) mechanism, consolidating its efforts to hence Defense policies, Strategies and relevant legislation within the SSR process as a whole.

NATO and Tajikistan are working to further cooperate in strengthening the country’s border security and countering cross-border crime, especially drug trafficking, hence Tajikistan has sent numerous personnel to attend counter-narcotics training sponsored by an initiative of the NATO-Russia Council.

Military education is also a key area of cooperation and joint efforts are ongoing to develop courses in several areas, including border security and control, as well as language training. NATO and Tajikistan continue to work on preparing selected individuals from the country for NATO-related activities and possible introduction of Alliance standards in the country’s military education programs.

Tajikistan has sent officers to take part in NATO familiarization courses and in various other courses at the NATO School at Oberammergau (Germany) and within the PfP Trust Fund project Tajikistan wish eliminating stockpiles of large munitions, as well as assess the security of weapons’ storage facilities is currently under development. Moreover, NATO is engaged with Tajikistan providing Civil emergency planning support and course to further familiarize itself with Allied disaster-relief organization and procedures.

The country is establishing the creation of its own disaster-relief operation centre and the creation of a small, NATO-compatible disaster-relief unit in order to develop early warning systems for natural disasters. This is made by Tajikistan representatives participating in NATO-run tactical and operational civil-military-cooperation courses: a NATO introductory course on civil emergency planning took place in Dushanbe in July 2011.

On the “Science and environment”, it is to be said that scientists from Tajikistan have received grant awards in a number of areas under NATO’s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program (more detail will be given in the Chapter IV. Since 2006, a networking infrastructure grant was issued to upgrade the cooperative area network in the Tajik technical university, to teach scientist and engineers the latest technology to secure the cyber networks of the educational and scientific communities in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region.

Collaboration with NATO and other Partner countries is also ongoing on uranium extraction and environmental security and new SPS projects are under preparation. Tajikistan also participates in the Virtual Silk Highway project, which aims to increase internet access for academic and research communities in countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia through a satellite-based network.
Tajikistan is also working along NATO to increase the public understanding of NATO and the benefits of cooperation, aiming to increase public awareness in support of defense and security reforms.

A number of networks with universities, non-governmental organizations and the press/media have been established in order to increase awareness of the Alliance and Euro-Atlantic security issues, continuing to enhance it through different activities: these include international conferences in Tajikistan and Tajik participation to yearly NATO-Afghan Student Forums. Work is ongoing on the potential establishment of a NATO Depository Library at the Tajik National University of Dushanbe.

NATO supports educational activities relevant to security and defense issues in the country, sponsoring the summer academy in Tajikistan which brings together advanced students from around the country and beyond, to learn about and discuss international security issues.

### 3.4.6 NATO and Afghanistan cooperation

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001, when Afghan opposition leaders, attending the conference, began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority\(^{30}\).

The concept of an UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan\(^{31}\).

These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and ISAF.

NATO agreed to take command of the force in August 2003 and the UN Security Council subsequently mandated the expansion of ISAF’s operations to cover the whole country by October 2006. ISAF is in Afghanistan at the express wish of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan.

Since August 2003, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been conducting security operations, while also training and developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been the main objective of the Alliance.

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To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations in partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provides support to the government and international community in security sector reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP).

The intention of this counterinsurgency strategy is to isolate extremists by building relationships with the Afghan people\textsuperscript{32} and the government and ISAF\textquoteright s campaign aims at:

- Protecting the population from violence, coercion, intimidation and predatory groups;
- Neutralizing insurgents networks and degrade their capability to a level that the Afghan national security forces can manage, and to deny sanctuary in Afghanistan to the extremists;
- Building a professional, independent and sustainable Afghan National Army and Police, so that they are able to provide security and law enforcement to the Afghan people throughout the country;
- Promoting effective governance by helping the Afghan Government to become inclusive, accountable and acceptable to the people.

Moreover, in agreement with Afghanistan Government, NATO has established on 21 November 2009, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which brings together national training efforts under one single umbrella.

It works in close partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, as well as in collaboration with the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and the European Gendarmerie Force\textsuperscript{33} (EGF).

NTMA\textquotesingle s key tasks include the provision of training and mentoring to the Afghan national security forces, support the ANA\textquotesingle s institutional training base and the ANP reform at the district level and below.

It also aims at addressing the ANA enabling capability shortfalls (including close air support, medevac\textsuperscript{34}, and intelligence) through \textquoteleft train the trainer\textquoteright -modeled programs.

The launch of NTM-A was made hand in hand with the establishment of the ISAF\textquoteright s Joint Command (IJc), which is focused on operations.

Whilst NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruits and building the institutional training capability of the Afghan national security forces, development of the Afghan army and police


\textsuperscript{33} Source: The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), \url{www.eurogendfor.org}, is a multinational initiative of six EU Member States - France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain - established by treaty with the aim to strengthen international crisis management capacities and contribute to the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy.

\textsuperscript{34} NATO acronym of medical evacuation.
continues in the field. The IJC is responsible for developing fielded ANSF units through advising and assisting.

NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan is to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that the country can never again be a safe haven for terrorists.

As of July 2012, fifty nations are contributing troops to the mission, including 22 non-NATO partner nations from around the globe, working alongside the 28 NATO Allies.

As part of the international community’s overall effort, ISAF is working to create the conditions whereby the Afghan government is able to exercise its authority throughout the country.

While not technically a UN force, ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Fourteen UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF have been issued: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1817, 1890, 1917, 1943 and 2011 (12 October 2011).

However, at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, ISAF Heads of State and Government agreed a list of principles which guide ISAF’s gradual shift from a combat to an increasingly supporting role.

The aim was to make Afghan Authorities capable to keep a safe and secure environment through strengthening Afghan National Security Forces and working through increasingly skilled Afghan institutions.

The draft model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of US $4.1 billion, and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment.

Sustaining a sufficient and capable ANSF is the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan supported by the International Community, as part of the wider International Community, and building upon existing mechanisms in developing, coherent and effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of the ANSF.

As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least US $500 m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces35.

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Both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will play a crucial role in ensuring security and stability, and in supporting legitimate governance and sustainable economic growth across the country.

To this end, the International Community launched in 2011, the transition to Afghan full security responsibility to be completed at the end of 2014, and giving NATO lead a follow-on mission to continue to support the development of ANSF capacity.

Wider cooperation between NATO and Afghanistan are in place under the Enduring Partnership agreement, signed in 2010 at the Lisbon Summit.

Transition to Afghan leadership is well underway and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is growing stronger and more capable, bringing ISAF’s mission to evolve in nature and scope it own mission.

Since the beginning of transition implementation in July 2011, ISAF’s mission has been gradually evolving from one focused primarily on combat to an enabling Security Force Assistance (SFA) role, which centers on training, advising and assisting its Afghan partners.

*Integal* - the Dari and Pashtu word for transition - is the process by which the lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan is gradually being transitioned from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces.\(^{36}\)

Implementation is well underway with Afghan forces in the lead for security for around 75% of the Afghan population. The aim is for Afghan forces to have full responsibility for security across the country by 2014 and it foresees three main phases:

- **Transition Tranche 1**

  On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start transition. This decision was based upon operational, political and economic considerations, drawing on the assessment and recommendations of the Afghan government and NATO/ISAF through the Joint Afghan-NATO *Integal* Board (JANIB).

- **Transition Tranche 2**

  On 27 November 2011, following the decision-making process above, President Karzai announced the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities for transition implementation.

- **Transition Tranche 3**

  On 13 May 2012, President Karzai announced the third set of areas to enter the transition process, covering over 75% of the Afghan population, meaning in every one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, including every provincial capital, and will cover almost two-thirds of the country’s districts.

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Transition draws on the JANIB’s recommendations, which are based on a thorough assessment of the security, governance and development situation on the ground. The following elements are taken into consideration as part of the decision-making process:

- the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;
- the level of security allowing the population to pursue routine daily activities;
- the degree of development of local governance, so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced and whether ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

For Transition to be successful, the Afghan National Security Forces, under effective Afghan civilian control, need to assume their security responsibility on a sustainable and irreversible basis - albeit with some level of continued support from ISAF.

A secure and stable Afghanistan would make an important contribution to the Central Asia Region, in which security, stability and development are interconnected.

Fulfilling the Lisbon Roadmap and building the Enduring Partnership, NATO decided on the phased transition of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in order to enable Afghans to take full responsibility for their own security.

Meanwhile, NATO appreciates fact that a number of ISAF countries have concluded, or are in the process of concluding, bilateral partnership agreements with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which would form the basis of cooperation and friendship between an independent, sovereign and democratic Afghanistan and those countries on the basis of equality and mutual interest.

A political process involving successful reconciliation and reintegration is key to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan and in this context, NATO reiterates the importance of the principles decided at the Bonn Conference. These are that the process leading to reconciliation must be truly Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and must be inclusive and representative of the legitimate interests of all Afghan people, regardless of gender or status.

Reconciliation must also contain the reaffirmation of a sovereign, stable and united Afghanistan, the renunciation of violence, the breaking of ties to international terrorism, and compliance with the Afghan Constitution, including its human rights provisions, especially on the rights of women.

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A peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan will positively contribute to economic and social development in the wider region and deliver progress in the fight against narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and crime.

3.5 Silk-Afghanistan, an example of regional cooperation

Named after the Great Silk Road trading route linking Asia and Europe, the SILK-Afghanistan project provides high-speed internet access via satellite and fiber optics to 18 Afghan universities as well as some governmental institutions in Kabul.

The project assists the Afghan authorities in developing their educational system. It became operational at Kabul University in Afghanistan in 2006 and the network has since been expanded to the provinces.

Today, the vast majority of university students and lecturers from 18 universities in Baghlan, Balkh, Bamiyan, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul (four universities), Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktia and Parwan provinces are connected to the information highway through the SILK-Afghanistan project.

Over the past few years, the Afghan Ministry of Higher Education and some fifteen universities across the country have been equipped with video conferencing systems and the aim is eventually to equip all universities with this facility.

A Metropolitan Area Network (MAN), which has been up-and-running since autumn 2009, provides internet connectivity to a number of government and academic institutions in Kabul. The MAN consists of a WiMax “blanket” connected to the network operation centre at Kabul University.

SILK-Afghanistan is jointly funded by the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program and the US Department of State. In addition to connectivity, it provides extra funding to build information technology (IT) infrastructure and to train IT staff at the universities.

The program builds on NATO’s experience of initiating and running the “Virtual Silk Highway” project, which provided high-speed internet access (via satellite) in NATO’s partner countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia from 2002 to 2011.

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3.6 A new framework for Security Assistance

In March 2012, NATO agreed on an Updated List of Tasks to update its Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, these tasks are being implemented by a dedicated civilian-military task force that involves all relevant NATO bodies and commands.

NATO takes full account of all military and non-military aspects of crisis management, and is working to improve practical cooperation at all levels with all relevant organizations and actors in the planning and conduct of operations. The Alliance promotes the clear definition of strategies and objectives amongst all relevant actors before launching an operation, as well as enhanced cooperative planning.

The Allies agree that elements of stabilization and reconstruction are best undertaken by those actors and organizations that have the relevant expertise, mandate, and competence. However, there can be circumstances which may hamper other actors from undertaking these tasks, or undertaking them without support from NATO.

To improve NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and its ability to contribute, when required, to stabilization and reconstruction, Allies agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management.

Applying a comprehensive approach means a change of mindset, the Alliance is therefore emphasizing joint training of civilian and military personnel to encourage better coordination.

This is no easy task in view of the complexity of the concept. A lot more work is needed to forge a common understanding on the scope, nature and direction of the Alliance’s Comprehensive Approach.

NATO cannot be successful in achieving Allies’ agreed political goals in an operation without well-coordinated civil-military capabilities throughout the campaign.

Well-coordinated capabilities must be planned and exercised; they require integrated training. Best practices and lessons learned must update training and education programs to be understood and employed. They cannot be achieved through ad hoc methods.

Improving NATO’s capability for working with others actors such as the EU and the UN is critical in this context.

There are two distinct but related asset pools for preparing NATO as an organization to work closely on a Comprehensive Approach - military forces and critical civilian capabilities. Both are indispensable if NATO, internally and with partners, is to achieve optimum civil-military teamwork.
First, NATO commands must determine the military resources necessary to achieve initial stability and the return of essential services in the immediate wake of military operations. These are assets such as military police, CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation), construction engineers and military medical personnel. These forces have the mission to move into areas in the wake of conflict and work with combat forces that are still securing the area.

They must provide public security, temporary governance and the most basic of services. These forces must be culturally aware and accustomed to working with both traumatized populations and civilian actors, including NGOs that may already be in the conflict area.

Second, NATO military organizations at all levels must be able to prepare and conduct integrated military-civil missions, including through two-way, co-equal organizational interfaces.

This requires pre-established information sharing, comprehensive planning methods, role integration and ultimately operational support. Military support to civil agencies can be extensive and generally requires resources (vehicles, shelter, communications, security, supplies, etc) in excess of the kit required by the military unit alone.

Joint pre-mission exercises and training are key to ensuring common understanding of the different organizations’ approaches, cultures and objectives. Civilian capabilities that might be integrated with military capabilities can come from two broad sources.

First, they can come from NATO Allies’ and partners’ national assets. In fact, as with military assets, so too with civilian - the preponderance of capabilities are owned by nations. These include capabilities such as interagency departments of member governments. Contractor support has also become a large factor in national support.

If this is indeed to be the primary and most dependable source for embodiment of a Comprehensive Approach, there is reason to consider establishing a modest NATO capacity to coordinate national contribution and planning efforts.

Second, civilian support can and usually does come from a host of international organizations, both nongovernmental and multinational, many with specialized and highly desirable skills. Key organizational partners for NATO are well known: the UN, EU, and OSCE. Other potential partners include regional organizations and major NGOs such as the Red Cross.

When working with these organizations, a memorandum of understanding to enable planning and capacity development should be agreed upon well in advance, in addition to crisis-specific work from the earliest stages in the pre-deployment planning phase. Most operations have a dearth of civilian resources, and military commanders are eager to partner with any quality civil resource.
That calls for cooperation with national and international partners, both nongovernmental and multilateral. For any civilian-military cooperation, institutional liaison is essential at the operational and tactical levels, and ideally at the strategic level as well.

Unfortunately, unlike military capabilities, civilian resources are rarely available and ready on the massive scale required for deployment to current crises. It can take considerable time to identify and deploy necessary civilian resources. Allies should consider organizing a standing civilian corps for international crisis response.

Such a capability could be used under NATO or the EU so long as it was available to both organizations. Merely compiling a list of volunteers and skills is not sufficient. These resources should be afforded specialized education and exercise opportunities that expose them to the operational environment they will have to manage.

Any Comprehensive Approach to civil-military cooperation must address the justice, rule of law and governance sector. Without a systematic effort in this field, securing a sustainable transition to post-conflict development and reconstruction has proven to be extremely difficult.

Critical to this is addressing the problem of organized crime that often fills the gaps in governance in the immediate aftermath of major combat. Civilian capabilities must take the lead in dealing with this pervasive de-stabilizing menace.

That requires specialized advanced intelligence planning and continued access to information both from international law enforcement and from local governments. In turn the military must be tied closely to the information flow on criminal activity and enforcement actions in their operational area.

Another critical civilian task in crises resolution is police training. Here again, close coherence of civil and military efforts is key to operational effectiveness. Justice and rule of law could be an area suitable for enhanced cooperation between NATO and EU, for example through the establishment of joint centers of excellence with a view to enhancing transatlantic thinking and developing common strategies, based on lessons learned, on how to solve this difficult challenge in future peace missions.

Another challenge to be overcome in building an integrated comprehensive capability is the task of communicating across dissimilar cultures. Just as NATO’s many militaries have cultural differences, so too each civilian organization has a unique culture. Operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo experienced hard communication stovepipes among organizations that proved difficult to breech.

For civilian organizations working with a strong, large and ever-present military organization, individuality is important. NGOs are special organizations with cultures of strict impartiality that
are essential to self-protection and effectiveness. The military should do nothing in word or deed to compromise NGOs’ impartiality.

To break down barriers between military and civilian partners, NATO must engage in integrated training, educating, exercising, and planning for military and civilian personnel who may be operating together. It also needs to emphasize as a top priority the imperative to share information laterally as well as vertically across the network.

There is a single pool of both civilian and military resources among Allies and partner nations for operations. These assets overwhelmingly belong to nations who commit them to organizations such as the EU, NATO or the UN. Enhancing the capabilities of these forces helps all organizations.

The most potent civil-military organizations for transatlantic cooperation are the EU and NATO. In response to unfolding or extant crises in Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan, these two organizations have created “on-the-spot” provisions to work together. A far better approach is to plan ahead for cases where NATO-EU cooperation is in order.

There is potential in the coming year or two for major strides on several interrelated efforts, including maturing EU preparations for military and civil missions, full integration of NATO’s own capacities, and a mechanism to coordinate expeditious planning and decision making between them.

Some initiatives both NATO and the EU can pursue to help realize these goals might include:

- Continue strengthening ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) where practical;
- Seek Allied acceptance of ways to renovate the effectiveness and timeliness of NATO’s political decision making processes, formally and/or informally;
- Further rationalize the NATO command structure to accommodate participation by France and for more optimal command and control, including for a Comprehensive Approach, at all levels;
- Synergize a Comprehensive Approach to capabilities and operations, both internally and through NATO-EU structures, such as a standing NATO-EU planning group;
- Consider establishment of a transatlantic framework for civil-military cooperation to systematically collect experiences, to develop common concepts, and to conduct training and exercises for officials and military staff engaged in reconstruction and development in peace missions;

These steps, if pursued in parallel, could over time allow an evolution that would strengthen both NATO and the EU, and appeal to the interests of all Allies. A fundamental ingredient for its success would be for all Allies to embrace the broadened range of NATO capabilities and roles in practice – most of which Heads of State have already agreed in principle to give the Alliance.
Concluding on the real civil-military capabilities that operate within the Comprehensive Approach concept is that prior, civil-military integrated planning and coordination is essential to achieving and maintaining early post-conflict success and setting the optimum conditions for a return to normality.

The more effective the civil-military team, the quicker the operation moves to subsequent phases and ultimately its culmination and drawdown, reducing deployment times, costs and casualties, both civilian and military.

With that in mind, NATO should re-double its efforts to move beyond the current limited ad hoc arrangements, and take another step at Bucharest to ensure that the Comprehensive Approach initiative moves closer to a Comprehensive Capability.

3.7 Conclusion

Transnational insurgent groups exploit limitations on government power and authority, placing themselves outside of the state’s reach. They make the best efforts at counterinsurgency more complex by increasing the transaction costs that governments face when they deal with their neighbors.

Often times, cross-border fighting between rebels and the state sour regional relations and can prompt escalatory dynamics that lead to clashes between neighbors. Rival neighbors use rebel organizations as an alternative to the direct use of force, but these groups can provoke interstate violence.

Weak rebel hosts can be drawn into conflicts with their neighbors because they are unable to prevent rebel access or incursions by other states. However, states can and do cooperate on border security matters to prevent the escalation of conflict. Learning from these examples can provide lessons for today’s challenges.

Promoting clear lines of communication, sharing intelligence, and establishing border cooperation regimes can go a long way in both countering violent groups and preserving friendly relations between states. Thus, effective diplomacy is critical to preventing the escalation of regional crises.

Afghanistan and its neighbors and allies will certainly confront transnational violence for some time to come. As foreign forces begin to withdraw it is essential that agreements with neighbors are struck so as to establish appropriate coordination mechanisms and border security regimes.
Such steps will help to limit insurgent movements and preserve stability in neighborhoods that have long been plagued by conflict. But there are some feeling that neighborhoods States, as Kazakhstan could not play along with NATO auspicious.

Indeed, Kazakhstan has recently participated in international military exercises with its NATO partners as well as through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in what at first sight appears to confirm that its multi-vector foreign policy also strongly influences its defense and security policy.

Nonetheless, the scope, intensity and seriousness attached to the country’s defense and security relations with Moscow and its involvement in the CSTO goes far above the lip service it pays to cooperation with NATO and EU in some extent.

This critical distinction in Astana’s defense policy is amply demonstrated by the country hosting the CSTO’s first peacekeeping exercises from October 8 to October 17 2011.

In early September, Kazakhstan hosted its annual Steppe Eagle military exercise, which provided an opportunity for the United States and United Kingdom to train and showcase the Central Asian country’s peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT).

The Steppe Eagle exercise also represented ongoing efforts to fully expand KAZBAT into a NATO interoperable brigade (KAZBRIG). Also in early September, Astana signed a new Individual Membership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO for 2012 to 2013, representing its third cycle since becoming the first country in the region to join IPAP in January 2006.

While NATO officials publicly welcomed this as a step toward deepening cooperation with the Alliance, Kazakhstan’s Defense Minister was much more circumspect in his comments, avoiding any political claims concerning the extent of Kazakhstan’s defense cooperation with NATO.

None of these developments suggest that Astana would suspend its cooperation activities with NATO, but ahead of the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 there are growing signs that Astana’s security policy is distinctly Eurasian, rather than Euro-Atlanticist.

Astana’s efforts to boost the CSTO and deepen bilateral cooperation with Russia reveal that its defense policy will remain much more Moscow-friendly for the long term.

NATO’s interest in Central Asia largely equals that of the EU (partnership, stability and security) but its activities are mostly constrained to some military cooperation and most importantly, political dialogue and diplomatic exchanges with a view to increase access to Afghanistan for NATO’s ISAF mission.
4.1 Introduction to the Technical Methodology

This Chapter explores the methodology of how to measures and assesses the Central Asia States through the “Human Development Index (HDI)”, since there has been a global change in the understanding each country prosperity. It has been taking in account an assigned prosperity ranking, which is calculated from the average score of the country’s rankings across four different sub-indices.

Through this HDI, the research endeavors to measures and assesses the impact and effects (positive or negative) generated by the EU and NATO over the CA states, since their full involvement in supporting, assisting, advising and cooperating with them in a wide range of political, social and economical segments. Each sub-index represents a fundamental aspect of prosperity and those pillars are the economy, governance, education, safety & security.

This Chapter gives also an overview of the Methodology, meaning the method for choosing variables, the weighting of each variable and data sources used in the construction of the index, the standardization procedures and the four sub-indexes.

Therefore, this holistic approach would allow painting a more complete picture of the Central States’ developments, providing an empirical basis for the insight of each country. The HDI confirms that key drivers of national prosperity include a blend of income and wellbeing such as entrepreneurship, job opportunity, effective accountable government, freedom of movement and the implementation of the Rule of Law.

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1. Source: UNDP, [www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org) (accessed in July 2012), the first Human Development Report introduced a new way of measuring development by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income into a composite human development index, the HDI.

2. A score is a standardized value that allows to order, compare, aggregate and rank each variable or sub-index.

3. Standardization is a common statistical method used to reconcile variables or scores that are based on different units of measurement. It allows comparison between variables that are measured in different units such as euro, years, percentages, etc.

4. Whenever it is used the terms income regressions or income scores, it refers to regressions and scores that are related to the GDP per capita, or “income” variable.

5. Whenever it is used the terms wellbeing regressions or scores, we are referring to regressions and scores that are related to the “life satisfaction” variable.
For each of these four sub-indices, the research looks at two kinds of variables: those related to income and those related to wellbeing. As a consequence, there are about 72 different variables in the index, split between the sub-indices, which combine to produce both an income score and a wellbeing score. These overall sub-index scores are the sum of both the income and wellbeing scores. This is then the averaged to give each country on its overall prosperity ranking. As far as HDI is concerned the thesis analyzes the last 10 years of developments in the region of Central Asia States, 4 sub-indexes as said above, 10 Global data sources, 72 variables, 90% CA region population coverage, 99% CA region GDP coverage, 6 countries, a number of people interviewed by Gallup Institute in each country and 5000 Data-points used for HDI.

At large, global prosperity is increasing despite the most severe financial crisis in modern times, despite citizen uprisings that have toppled some of the world’s most autocratic regimes (Arabic Springs), despite protests and riots that have erupted around the world (see tab.1).

### Difference in index score 2001-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central Asia</th>
<th>South East Asia</th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the other hand, security and safety are decreasing (see tab. 2, pag. 3), as the Arab spring has been driven by countries such as Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt; yet the worst performers for
citizen safety and security are driven by Central Asia States were extremely high rates violence, which are due to assaults and thefts and official high-ranking corruption.

The global assessment of prosperity in the Central Asia States are based on Economy, Governance, Education, Safety & Security and Social Capital Indicators and for the purpose of this research, it is considered to promote a holistic understanding of the regional prosperity by providing a framework for its measurement.

The HDI focus on providing an empirical basis for the intuitive sense that true prosperity is a complex blend of income and wellbeing, examining the correlates of both income and wellbeing across different dimensions of society and exploring how these factors may influence a country’s income and the happiness of its citizens.

The human development represents the expansion of people’s opportunity, which builds on shared natural resources, addresses sustainability-locally, nationally and regionally through ways that are equitable and empowering. To this regard, EU and NATO have aimed at pathways that enable people, communities and countries to promote sustainability, dialogue, cooperation and equity so that they are mutually reinforcing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Sub-indexes 2001-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe &amp; Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Selecting Variables:

Based on the current academic literature on income growth and wellbeing (Romer, 1990;45), it has been identified a large number of variables (Deaton 2008:72) that have an impact upon wealth and wellbeing and could therefore be considered for inclusion in the HDI.

Then these variables (Deaton and Kahneman, 2010:96) were reduced to 72 considering a global coverage for each variable and that includes at least 90% of the countries in the Index. Approximately two-thirds of the Index variables are objective and they fall into three categories:

1) survey-based objective variables, such as how many computers are in a household;
2) objective “hard” statistics, such as the inflation rate;
3) estimates or assessments that are based on expert research, such as the World Bank Governance indicators.

These variables are objective, not because they are flawless, but because a comparable standard of objectivity has been applied across observations. The remaining one third of the variables consists of variables that measure respondents’ perceptions of life, such as how much people is worried, how satisfied they are with health system and so on.

The HDI has tried to maintain a balanced approach, using both objective and subjective variables, to prevent the country rankings from being biased due to either prejudice or misperceptions.

At the end of the process, 72 independent variables from 10 widely recognized global data sources, 45 variables are national-level averages, obtained using the Gallup World Pull surveys, 27 variables are national-level statistics provided by the World Development Indicators from the World Bank and the remaining variables are provided by a variety of globally recognized sources.

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7 See Annex 1, p.296.
4.3 Standardization, Weighting, Income and Wellbeing scores

The 72 variables are based on many different units of measurement. For example, subjective variables, such as the proportion of citizens that express confidence in financial institutions are measured in percentage terms, while capital per worker is measured in US dollars. These variables were transformed to a common scale using a statistical technique called standardization. The standardized variables are then comparable and can be combined to form composite indices.

A variable is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. A variable’s weight, which the technical term is ‘coefficient’, represents its relative importance to the outcome (either income or wellbeing).

Because some variables within each sub-index capture different elements of the same theme, there is a potential for high correlation between these factors. These weights are not arrived at through subjective judgments or discretionary choices, but are based on the particular statistical relationship between each variable and changes in income and wellbeing.

The initial choice of variables was worked out through a careful study of current empirical and theoretical research, as well as on the availability of data. But the variables’ weights are determined by their statistical correlations with income and wellbeing.

For each country, the latest data available in 2011 were gathered on the 72 independent variables. For each country, the “raw values” are standardized and multiplied by the weights determined by the prior regression analysis discussed above. These weighted variable values are then summed to produce a country’s wellbeing and income score in each sub-index. The income and wellbeing scores are then standardized so that they can be compared.
4.4 Sub-index scores and rankings

The standardized income and wellbeing scores are added together to create the countries’ sub-index scores and the countries are ranked according to their scores in each of the four sub-indices. Finally, the HDI score is determined by assigning equal weights to all four sub-indices for each country. The average of the four sub-indices yields a country’s overall prosperity score.

For each country, an overall income score was also produced, obtaining as the average of the four sub-index income scores and an overall wellbeing score obtained as the average of the four wellbeing scores. The HDI applies equal weights to each sub-index for the six countries, regardless of their level of development. While it is true that countries at different levels of development will each have different needs, constructing a global index it is crucial to measure each country by the same yardstick. Giving different weights to countries would make country rankings incomparable across income levels.

The *Economy sub-index*, which measures countries’ performances in four areas: macroeconomic policies, economic satisfaction and expectations, foundation for growth, and financial sector efficiency.

The *Governance sub-index* measures countries’ performance in three areas: effective and accountable government, fair elections and political participation, and rule of law.

The *Education sub-index* measures countries’ performance in three areas: access to education, quality of education, and human capital.

The *Safe & Security sub-index* measures countries’ performances in two areas: national security and personal safety.

### Central Asia: Basic Facts:

- **Total area**: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; **Kazakhstan**: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; **Kyrgyzstan**: 77,000 sq. mi.; **Tajikistan**: 55,800 sq. mi.; **Turkmenistan**: 190,000 sq. mi.; **Uzbekistan**: 174,500 sq. mi.; **Afghanistan**: 652,700 sq. mi. **Total population**: approximately 92 million; **Kazakhstan**: 15.5 m.; **Kyrgyzstan**: 5.6 m.; **Tajikistan**: 7.6 m.; **Turkmenistan**: 5.0 m.; **Uzbekistan**: 28.1 m.; **Afghanistan**: 29.5 (July 2011 est., (Source: CIA). **Total gross domestic product**: approximately $346 billion in 2010; per capita GDP is about $5,600, but there are large income disparities and relatively large percentages of people in each country are in poverty. **Kazakhstan**: $196.4 b.; **Kyrgyzstan**: $12.0 b.; **Tajikistan**: $14.7 b.; **Turkmenistan**: $36.9 b.; **Uzbekistan**: $85.9 b. (Source: CIA)

4.5 Sub-Index description

4.5.1 Economy sub-index

Stable and growing economies increase their own per capita income and promote the overall wellbeing of its citizens.

As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these areas. The sub-index demonstrates that outcomes of sound macroeconomic policies, such as robust domestic savings rates, low rates of inflation and unemployment, and an efficient financial sector have a positive impact on average levels of both income and wellbeing.

Variable Weights:

1) Income
   - Macroeconomic Policies (GDS\textsuperscript{8} +, UR\textsuperscript{9} -, I\textsuperscript{10} -).
   - Foundation for Growth (Capital per Worker +, Market size +, High-Tec Export +).
   - Financial sector Efficiency (Non-performing loans -)

2) Wellbeing
   - Macroeconomic Policies (GDS +, I -, ES\textsuperscript{11} +, five year Rate of Growth +).
   - Economic Satisfaction and Expectations\textsuperscript{12} +.
   - Financial Sector Efficiency (Confidence in Financial Institutions +).

This also shows that investing in physical capital per worker, innovative high-tech exports, and a competitive economy that attracts foreign investment, are essential to boosting per capita income. Positive expectations about the future of the economy and satisfaction with living standards also make an important contribution to the overall wellbeing of a country’s citizens.

Data collection also shows that increased economic strength over time is generally good for everyone but the rapid increases in GDP are related to lower levels of happiness in a society.

The financial crisis of 2008 and its spread into a global recession have continued to have damaging effects on the world economy. According to the IMF, the world economy shrank by 0.5% in 2009 and growth returned in 2010 at a rate of 5.1%, despite its projection slows to 4% in 2011.

---

\textsuperscript{8} Gross Domestic Savings.
\textsuperscript{9} Unemployment Rate.
\textsuperscript{10} Inflation.
\textsuperscript{11} Employment Status.
\textsuperscript{12} Satisfaction with Standard of Living, Adequate Food and Shelter, Perceived Job Availability, Expectations of the Economy.
However, despite the recent financial crisis has severely affected the global economy, the HDI shows that prosperity has increased in every region between 2009 and 2011. Furthermore, certain subjective survey-based data capture humble signs of recovery.

The Economy Sub-Index, for example, captures aspects of the downturn through the decline in domestic savings rates and foreign investment and the higher rates of unemployment and non-performing loans. Certain variables across the five sub-indices tend to be more long-term or enduring by nature and are therefore less affected by temporary fluctuations in the global economy.

As might be expected, for instance, the countries hardest hit by the crisis as Afghanistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have seen decline in their Economy ranking (see tab. 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank 2011</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany(^\text{13})</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kirgizstan</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- High ranking countries (Top 30)
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50)
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward )

\(^{13}\) Germany has been selected as reference country (sub-unit) to compare the 6 Central Asia States.
4.5.2 Governance sub-index

Well-governed societies enjoy higher levels of economic growth and citizen wellbeing as a whole. As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these areas.

Stable and democratic governing institutions protect political and economic liberty and create an environment of civic participation, leading to higher levels of income and wellbeing. The Governance sub-index measures levels of competition and corruption in the government and citizens’ confidence in elections, the judicial system and the military.

The sub-index shows (see tab.4) that citizens prefer governments that are stable and accountable. Public wellbeing is also related to people’s perceptions of how well the country addresses poverty and preserves the environment. The research shows that political freedom, strength of institutions and regulatory quality are significant contributors to economic growth.

Effective, fair, and accountable governments also increase public confidence, leading to higher levels of life satisfaction among citizens.

Variable Weights:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Income} & \quad \text{Rule of Law} + \text{Regulation} +, \text{Fair Election and Political Participation} +, \text{Political Rights} +. \\
& \quad \text{Efforts to Address Poverty} +, \text{Business and Government Corruption} -, \text{Government Effectiveness} +, \text{Confidence in Government} +.
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Wellbeing} & \quad \text{Rule of Law} +, \text{Confidence in the Judicial System} +, \text{Confidence in Military} +, \text{Financial Sector Efficiency} (\text{Voiced concerned} +, \text{Confidence of in the Honesty of Elections} +).
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{14 Government Effectiveness.}\]
\[\text{15 Government Stability.}\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank 2011</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country Scores</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>-1.82</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
<td>-1.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kirgizstan</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>-1.93</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>-1.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>-1.87</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>-1.67</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- High ranking countries (Top 30)
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50)
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward)
4.5.3 Education sub-index

Education is a building block for prosperous societies and this sub-index measures countries’ performance in three areas: access to education, quality of education, and human capital. As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these areas (see tab.5). The Education sub-index demonstrates how access to education, as measured by enrolment rates, allows citizens to develop their potential and contribute productively to their society.

In addition, it shows that human capital stock, which is measured by the average levels of education in the workforce, is essential for promoting research and development as well as producing useful knowledge for a society.

Because of the importance of citizen’s own perceptions of the educational opportunity available to them, the sub-index uses both objective and subjective variables to assess the quality of education in a given country. The Education sub-index uses pupil to teacher ratio, as well as measures of citizens’ perception of education, to assess quality.

This sub-index is built on research on economic growth that has found human capital to be an engine for growth, making a case for the non-diminishing effect of education on rising GDP levels. While the relationship between higher levels of education and wellbeing is less clear-cut, research shows that basic education enhances people’s opportunities to increase life satisfaction.

Variable Weights:

\[
\begin{align*}
5) \text{ Income} & \quad \begin{cases} 
\implies \text{Access to Education (GSE}^{16}+, \text{ NPE}^{17}+, \text{ Girls to Boys ER}^{18}+). \\
\implies \text{Quality of Education (Pupil to teacher ratio -).} \\
\implies \text{Human Capital}+, \text{ Political Rights}+. 
\end{cases} \\
6) \text{ Wellbeing} & \quad \begin{cases} 
\implies \text{Access to Education (GSE}+, \text{ NPE}+, \text{ Girls to Boys ER}+). \\
\implies \text{Quality of Education (SEQ}^{19}+, \text{ LS}^{20}+). \\
\implies \text{Human Capital}+, \text{ Secondary Education per Worker}+. 
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

\[16\] Gross Secondary Enrolment.
\[17\] Net Primary Enrolment.
\[18\] Enrolment Ratio.
\[19\] Satisfaction with Educational Quality.
\[20\] Learning in Society.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank 2011</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>-1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kirgizstan</td>
<td>-1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>-1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-2.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- High ranking countries (Top 30)
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50)
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward)
4.5.4 Security & Safety sub-index

Societies hindered by threats to national security and personal safety cannot foster higher income and wellbeing. The Safety & Security sub-index measures countries’ performances in two areas: national security and personal safety. As illustrated in the chart below, the variables in the sub-index are categorized into these areas.

Stable social and political conditions are necessary for attracting investment and sustaining economic growth. In addition, when citizens worry about their personal safety, their overall wellbeing is diminished. The Safety & Security sub-index combines objective measures of security with subjective survey responses about personal safety. Instability resulting from group grievances and demographic pressures, for example, is a key element in limiting per capita GDP.

Similarly, the ability to express political opinions without fear of persecution and feeling safe walking alone at night, are positively correlated with higher levels of wellbeing. When people and basic institutions are unsafe and unstable, then capital, investment and people begin to flee.

The research shows that organized political violence such as riots, coups, and civil war, as well as general crime and mistrust stemming from a lack of social cohesion, impede economic growth. In addition, conditions that produce fear and uncertainty negatively affect life satisfaction (see tab.6).

Variable Weights:

7) Income

\[ \text{National Security (GG}^{21}, R^{22} \text{-and IDP}^{23}, \text{SSPV}^{24}). \]

\[ \text{Personal Safety (Assault -}, \text{Property stolen -}, \text{SWAN}^{25} +). \]

8) Wellbeing

\[ \text{National Security (DI}^{26}, \text{CV}^{27}, \text{IDP}-). \]

\[ \text{Personal Safety (SWAN +}, \text{Assault -}, \text{EPO}^{28}+). \]

21 Group Grievances.
22 Refugees.
23 Internally Displaced People.
24 State-Sponsored Political Violence.
25 Safe Walking Alone at Night.
26 Demographic Instability.
27 Civil War.
28 Express Political Opinion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank 2011</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kirgizstan</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- High ranking countries (Top 30)
- Medium ranking countries (Middle 31-50)
- Low ranking countries (Bottom 51- onward)
4.6 The Central Asia countries and the sub-indexes

It is clear, by analyzing the data in Table 3, 4 and 5 that differences between the countries of Central Asia in the economy, governance, education and security spheres can present major challenges in terms of the free movement of goods, services and people and finding joint approaches to solving shared problems.

Therefore, developing regional economic cooperation among the Republics of Central Asia, neighboring countries and with Europe, will represent a key factor to their sustainable socio-economic developments. Therefore, the strong EU and NATO commitment towards the CA countries will also bring Europe and Central Asia closer to each other, in terms of both political cooperation and economic development.

The EU can offer experience in regional integration leading to political stability and prosperity, while NATO can accelerate the development and the capacity to the security & safety responsibilities. Equally, a number of issues are most appropriately addressed through assistance at national level, where lessons learnt from the political and economic transformation can also be offered with specific value added and impact.

Going into details, the EU has set, during 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 periods, the so called CA DCI Indicative Program, with a total EU grant of ~ € 821 million planned for Central Asia under DCI4\textsuperscript{29}, equivalent to an average annual budget of € 107m per year (+/- 21 % compared to the previous CA IP).

The indicative average allocation per year to Promotion of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations is set at € 35 m, while € 72 m on average per year is indicatively earmarked for the CA national assistance programs at country level, for the priority areas poverty reduction and increasing living standards, and good governance and economic reform.

\textsuperscript{29} Development Cooperation Instrument.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual Average</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>~ € 10 m/yr</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>~ € 17 m/yr</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>~ € 20,7 m/yr</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>~ € 10,3 m/yr</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>~ € 14 m/yr</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>~ € 72 m/yr</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The promotion of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations foresees around 33% of available DCI financial allocation for CA countries and the main focal sectors are:

- Rule of law;
- Sustainable regional development, as energy, environment and business cooperation networks;
- Education, and People- to- People activities;
- Border management, customs, and the fight against organized crime.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Cooperation Programme</th>
<th>Indicative allocations over the period € million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focal sectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sustainable regional development;</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Energy;</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environment;</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Business cooperation.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Education People- to- People activities</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rule of law, border management, customs and the fight against organised crime</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL regional CA</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Central Asia -regional and bilateral programmes )</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the main economic/social developments is the extraordinary rise in mobile cellular subscriptions through the 6 CA countries. By the end of 2001, the number of mobile cellular subscriptions had grown to an estimated six million, bringing mobile cellular penetration levels to 70 per cent in the developing CA region. At the same time, more than one third of the countries is using the Internet. Key factors driving consumer demand and allowing more and more people to join the information society are EU and NATO technological influence and user-oriented service, communication technology (ICT) infrastructure investments and falling ICT service prices.

The number of Internet users continues to grow rapidly, close to 30 per cent in Afghanistan and 90 per cent in Kazakhstan, while an average of 60 per cent in the remaining CA region. Mobile technology and services have helped to overcome major infrastructure barriers and brought more people online. But there is still a big gap to bridge, between countries in CA, in terms of capacity, quality and speed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € euro million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Capacity Development of Selected Developing Member Countries on the Implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.</td>
<td>450,0 2006 - ongoing</td>
<td>Assistance in development of a plan for implementing the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>Integrated Trade Facilitation Support for CA Regional Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>33,5 2007-ongoing</td>
<td>Assistance in strengthening customs cooperation among the EU Program countries, expanding trade facilitation work into new areas with a focus on the six transport corridors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrading border checkpoints in the Central Asian region.</td>
<td>21,8 2005 ongoing</td>
<td>Upgrading border checkpoints incl. introduction of IT systems for document processing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On the bilateral assistance programs, the DCI indicative budget 2011-2013 for CA country (except for Afghanistan, which will highlighted later on) has allocated by country as follows:

The 67% of available DCI- CA financial allocations, with priority area 1, reduction of poverty and increasing living standards, by focusing in agriculture, regional community development, support to social sector reforms as health and education; priority 2 area, Governance and economic reform as strengthening public administration and public finance management.
### Central Asia bilateral country programmes: DCI Indicative allocations 2011-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CA Bilateral Indicative Programmes</th>
<th>Priorities: Focal Sectors</th>
<th>Indicative allocations over the period, € million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kazakhstan</strong></td>
<td>Regional development and local governance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial reform</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancement of public service capabilities for social and economic reforms</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kyrgyzstan</strong></td>
<td>Social protection reform and income-generating activities</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education reform</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial law and rule of law</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tajikistan</strong></td>
<td>Social protection and employment</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health sector reform</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private sector development</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public finance reform</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkmenistan</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening economic and social development of rural areas</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support the improvement of human capital development</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long term sustainable energy development</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uzbekistan</strong></td>
<td>Raising living standards through rural and local development schemes</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of law and judicial reforms, and support to local government bodies</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing mutual trade, business climate and SMEs development</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL bilateral CA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total CA Regional and bilateral programmes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>321</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One should take into consideration that financial allocations are indicative over the three year period and in case of serious sector or country specific absorption issues, re-allocations could possibly be considered within the limits allowed by the relevant legal basis and after agreement between all EU services concerned.
In summary, total country bilateral allocations are increased by 31% compared to the previous CA IP 2007-2010, while regional allocation is increased by only 4% taking into account the frontloading of € 40m made for CA regional allocations in DCI AAPs 2009/10 to support the implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia.

Throughout the improvement of regional economic cooperation, the Republics of Central Asia, the neighbors’ countries and the European Union, are providing huge support to the sub-national institutions, civil service capabilities, rule of Law and socio-economic development at large. Several of the challenges faced by Central Asian countries, such as developing regional trading corridors, creating efficient energy systems and networks, managing river basins and environmental issues and keeping security & safety through the establishment of robust security forces, are inherently trans-border in character and can only be tackled effectively through a cooperative effort at regional level.

In this respect, NATO has realized a Border Security and Management project, allocating € 85 mln., in the period 2001-2011, to transfer to the CA countries, with particular attention to the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and local institutions in order to enhance the capacity and leadership in security & safety; moreover, the Security Assistance Force programme (SFA) on the field continues on schedule to enable the Afghan National Army and Police in order to take the lead for security responsibility in transitioning areas. About, € 232 mln have been allocated in the period 2001-2011 to continue fielding the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with counter mining explosive equipment, mentoring and strengthening border guard capacities.

In particular, the NATO Science for Peace Projects (SfP) gives a “flavor” on 48 Science for Peace (SfP) projects that NATO carried out ongoing as of 31 October 2011. These summaries the main project of each SfP project, providing the main objectives and states the most significant accomplishments in the priority areas overseen by the NATO Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC). In addressing Defense Against Terrorist Threats, advances are noted in the Detection of Explosives as well as Cyber Defense. In addressing Defense against CBRN Agents, accomplishments are described in the area of development of novel Detection Methods for CBRN agents as well as Detection and Decontamination, Destruction and Countermeasures against CBRN agents.

In addressing Other Threats to Security, there have been significant accomplishments in areas encompassing Environmental Security and especially Management of Water and other Non-renewable Resources, Radioactive Waste/Tailings, as well as Disposal of Dangerous Chemicals and...
Pesticides. Progress is also reported in dealing with the protection against Natural Disasters including those caused by Earthquakes and Floods.

Also described is important work underway on Energy Security and Security Related Technologies, as well as Security-Related Regional Studies involving three or more Neighboring Partners, encouraging cross border cooperation. The SfP program has enabled scientists and engineers from Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to engage in these projects jointly with their counterparts in NATO countries. The training of young scientists, infrastructure development, publications and technical exchanges carried out within the framework of these projects are noted here. Also described are some of the concrete measures taken for the implementation of the results through government agencies, private industries, academia and highly placed decision makers.

These have been organized in three major parts, i.e. “Defense against terrorist threats”, “Defense against CBRN agents” and “Other Threats to Security” i.e develop Good Governance. Each of these parts is further divided into subtopics that relate to the approved priorities of the Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC). Each project summary report includes a numerical reference to the original SfP Project. All projects are listed in Theme order, according to the key priorities and the names and affiliations of the project co-directors, approval date, duration, NATO budget and, if applicable, NATO consultant, other collaborating institutions, intellectual property rights and internet references are provided.

SfP projects are jointly carried out by NATO countries in cooperation with Partner and/or Mediterranean Dialogue countries. These countries are eligible for NATO funding.

- **NATO countries**: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

- **Partner countries**: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,1 Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

The following Partner countries are ineligible for NATO funding support, but may participate fully in SPS activities at their own expense: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland.

- **Mediterranean Dialogue Countries**: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
- **Countries of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative**: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates

NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched in 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral cooperation with NATO. These countries may participate in SPS activities at their own expense.

- **Global Partner Countries (formerly called Contact Countries)**: Afghanistan, Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan and New Zealand.

NATO cooperates with a range of countries which share familiar strategic concerns and key Alliance values and have expressed an interest in deepening relations with NATO. These countries may participate in SPS activities at their own expense. Participation in NATO’s Science for Peace initiative helps Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue scientists to increase contacts in the NATO science community, while building a stronger science infrastructure in their home countries. SfP projects require collaboration between science and industry or between science and governmental authorities.

SfP projects have as essential characteristics:

- relevant to the key NATO SPS Key Priorities;
- high quality applied science and technology with a potential for commercialization in the case of industry-oriented projects;
- substantial scientific cooperation among Partner and NATO scientists;
- ability to contribute to the solution of problems, dealing with industrial or environmental issues;
- ability to promote collaboration among scientists, industry and end-users;
- good prospects for promoting the integration of the country’s scientists into the international R & D community;
- application of modern management practices and techniques;
- substantial participation of young scientists.

SfP projects are non-proprietary and fully open to inspection by the Project Co-Directors, SfP Program Staff, the Independent Scientific Evaluation Group (ISEG) and NATO consultants. The ownership of all intellectual property rights and patents on equipment, processes or protocols resulting from a SfP project shall be governed by the national laws and regulations of the participating countries. Progress on all projects, including the financial status, is reported on a semi-
annual basis to the SfP Program Working Group by 20 April and 20 October each year. Individual progress reports are then compiled in a SfP progress report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € euro million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Border management Combating; human trafficking Combating; terrorism Conflict prevention and resolution Military reform and co-operation</td>
<td>ongoing budget 1,6 2001-2011</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management Systems; Techniques of search international transport and risk analysis; Document Integrity, Profiling and Imposters; Intelligence gathering, Analysis and Info Sharing; Chemical precursors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Support to Regional Cooperation in Border Security and Management Conflict Prevention and Early Warning</td>
<td>1,3 2001-2011</td>
<td>Training in conflict prevention to address issues of concern with local authorities and communities in near-border areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Development of National Border Strategy and Implementation Plan Development of Canine Center Patrol Programming &amp; Leadership Customs assistance; Development of the Tajik Border Troops Academy Development of Cross-Border Cooperation within the Border Delegate cooperation framework Police.</td>
<td>6.9 2001 – 2011</td>
<td>Provision of infrastructure, equipment and training, workshop and conferences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meetings in Brussels, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) (accessed July 2012).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € euro million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Strengthening border guard capacities in Turkmenistan</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Skills training of border guards in patrolling, map reading, basic reconnaissance methods, navigation, information gathering, reporting, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Assistance to the Fight against Illicit Drug Circulation; Assistance in introduction of a local system of machine readable travel documents with biometric identifiers</td>
<td>1.0 1.3</td>
<td>Trainings for middle level officers of Uzbek law enforcement agencies including representatives from Uzbek Border Guards; Committee on organization and tactics of counteraction to illicit drugs circulation and identification of drugs smuggling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Establishment of a Border Management Information System (BMIS)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Development of a systematic migration data collection, analysis and sharing mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training Centre for Border Guards in Khorog and Dushanbe</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Training on border control and identification of false documents, computer skills, migration legislation, English language.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meeting in Brussels, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) (accessed July 2012).
<table>
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<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € euro million</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Border Crossing Point Upgrades at Bahram Chah (South)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Training/improvement of training facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Construction of Border Outposts (ODC)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Improvement of accommodation and working facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Office of defense cooperation (ODC), Equipment for Afghanistan Special Forces Units</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Training/improvement of training facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>ODC, Interagency Communications</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Provide modern tactical and training equipment as well as radios, computer equipment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>ODC, National Training Center in Kabul, training ranges construction</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Vehicles to Afghan Armed Forces (ANSF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Border Interdiction Training</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Interdiction and Enforcement Techniques for those inspecting cargo at borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Training at State Customs Service Training Academy Export Control and Related Border Security Program.</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Training for customs officers supply chain security, SFA methodology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meeting in Brussels, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) (accessed July 2012).
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Budget € euro million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Border Interdiction Training</td>
<td>3.0 2005 ongoing</td>
<td>Interdiction and Enforcement Techniques for those inspecting cargo at borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8 Nov 2009 - Dec 2011</td>
<td>Training &amp; Equipment for law enforcement agencies. International Conferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening drug and related crime control measure in selected checkpoints</td>
<td>11.3 2001-2011</td>
<td>Technical (expertise) assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to strengthening of the State Drug Control Service</td>
<td>2.5 On – going 2005</td>
<td>Training of ANA, ABP, ASF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening control along Tajik-Afghan border Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates</td>
<td>9.2 2001 –2011</td>
<td>Training activities (for Tajik-Afghan officers) Enhance border crossing facilities with established lines of communication and intelligence-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Container Control regime</td>
<td>9.6 2008-2012</td>
<td>Expertise, training/equipment to enhance knowledge of the staff and technical capacity of the checkpoint Training in supply chain security to facilitate the legal trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meetings in Brussels, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) (accessed July 2012).
Here are some projects of interest:

NATO Science for Peace Projects in Theme Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project nr.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>983945</td>
<td>Assessing Transboundary Water Pollution in Central Asia</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan</td>
<td>2001, 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Example of project:
SfP 983945 Assessing transboundary water pollution in Central Asia

Project Co-Directors: - Prof. Eiliv Steiness Trondheim, Norway (NPD);
- Prof. Oktiabrin Sadyrov Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (PPD)
- Prof. Zafar Razykov, Hudjand, Tajikistan
- Prof. Nasrulla Ismailov, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
- Prof. Uylesbek Besterekov, Shymkent, Kazakhstan

Approval Date: 23 May 2011
Effective Starting Date: 1 July 2011
Duration: 3 years, until July 2014 NATO Budget:
EUR 869,000

Abstract of Research
Due to initial delay the effective starting date of the project is fixed at July 1, 2011. The main equipment to be used in the project has been decided, and installation is expected in the near future. Efforts to renovate the laboratory areas designated for the project are under way in the four participating universities. No research can be performed before the equipment is in place and the personnel working in the project has received the necessary training. The basic training session is scheduled at January 2012.

Major Objectives
To follow the concentration of nine key heavy metals in the Syr-Darya river systems over a period of three years in order to assess variations in contamination levels and the extent of transboundary transport of these metals between the Central Asian countries of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

To lay the foundation for a permanent joint water monitoring program in the region, involving these four countries, who all depend on Syr-Darya as a main water resource.

Overview of Achievements since the Start of the Project until 30 September 2011.
Decision has been made on the purchase of equipment for Atomic Absorption Spectrometry (AAS), the main instrumental tool to be used in the project.

The AAS equipment has been ordered, and delivery to the four universities and installation in underway.

Equipment for the purification of water, which is a must for the trace element analyses to be performed, has been ordered and will be delivered in due course.
The first official Project meeting was organized in Bishkek on September 5-8, 2011. Renovation of the laboratory facilities to be used in the project is completed in Kyrgyzstan and underway in the other Partner Countries.

An agreement has been reached with the Alex Stuart Laboratories, Karabalta, Kyrgyzstan on the conditions for training of personnel from the four universities in AAS Spectrometry. Payments through NATO Funds: EUR 76,550

**Milestones for the Next Six Months**

- Final installation of AAS equipment (December 1, 2011)
- Preparation of Quality Assurance Project Plan (March 1, 2012)
- Training of laboratory staff (March 15, 2012)
- Acquisition of equipment for field registrations (February 1, 2012)
- Development of field schedules (February 15, 2012)
- Start field sampling (March 1, 2012)

NATO Consultant : N/A

Other Collaborating Institutions : N/A

Intellectual Property (IP) Rights : N/A

**Abbreviations:** AAS: Atomic Absorption Spectrometer; CPO: Common Procedures of Operation; GLP: Good Laboratory Practice; FCCT: Faculty of Chemistry and Chemical Technologies; ICP: Inductively Coupled Plasma spectrometer; KNU: Kyrgyz National University; KR: Kyrgyz Republic; MiTA: Micro-Trace Analysis; MMIT: Mining- metallurgical Institute of Tajikistan; MSU: Moscow State University; NPD: NATO Country Project Director; NTNU: Norwegian University of Science and Technology; PPD: Partner Country Project Director; QA: Quality Assurance; QAPrP: Quality Assurance Project Plan; QC: Quality Control; RK: Republic of Kazakhstan; SAEL: Stewart Assay and Environmental Laboratories; SKSU: Southern Kazakhstan State University; TCTI: Tashkent Chemical-Technological Institute; TR: Tajik Republic; UDS: Unified Database System; UzR: Uzbek Republic
4.6.1 Governance

Both EU and NATO have encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, supporting integrative goals through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical anti-democratic regimes and terrorist groups from gaining influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade and aid ties with Iran.

The societies of Central Asia have been beset by lackluster and often abusive rule, first by warring and insular feudal chiefs, then by colonial conquerors from Russia, and then by their Soviet successors. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union 20 years ago, the five Central Asian republics have struggled to find viable governance models and to place their economies, long moored to Moscow, on stable footing. The region’s governments have largely failed in that quest.

Central Asia faces a bleak political landscape, with corruption and human rights are routinely ignored and economic opportunity is limited. The early 1990s, well-placed Communist Party officials ascended to presidencies across Central Asia and twenty years later, three out of five remain in power, with no clear succession plans in sight. The other two left the scene, leaving behind muddled aftermatts. Central Asia does not need external reminders of its instability, Kyrgyzstan had its own season of political renewal, the country went through two revolutions in the space of five years, both predating regime overthrows.

Most recently, security forces in Kazakhstan shot and killed at least 16 people in December protests in a Western oil town— the most serious explosion of violence in the country’s history. For instance, Ralph S. Clem, political analysts at Florida International University, has attempted to quantify the similarities between Central Asia and the Middle East by studying data on governance, economic development, corruption, and wealth gaps from sources such as the United Nations, the World Bank. The empirical data in his possess suggest a very close fit between socioeconomic conditions in Egypt and Tunisia on the one hand and the five Central Asian countries on the other, especially with regard to the youthfulness of the population.

In other respects and in some countries, the pre-conditions associated with political unrest are even more problematic in Central Asia than in North Africa," Clem writes. He goes on to say that this comparison, between the Middle East and Central Asia, portends turbulence ahead, particularly for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. None of this is to suggest that political change in Central Asia will follow the Middle Eastern or Kyrgyz scenarios of street protests and revolutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO EU</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Border Crossing Point Upgrades at Nizhniy Pyanj</td>
<td>50.0 2004-2011</td>
<td>Training/improvement of training facilities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of Border Outposts (Zastavas)</td>
<td>2007 – ongoing 0.5</td>
<td>Improvement of accommodation and working facilities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Office of defense cooperation (ODC), Equipment for Tajikistan Special Forces Units</td>
<td>2.0 2001-2011</td>
<td>Provide modern tactical and training equipment as well as radios, computer equipment, and vehicles to Tajik special forces teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ODC, Interagency Communications, National Training Center in Karatag, Phase 1: Training ranges construction</td>
<td>2010-2012 0.7</td>
<td>Provision of modern life support and training facilities for the Tajik Armed Forces to enhance their forces’ capacity to counter narcotics trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Border Interdiction Training</td>
<td>0.3 ongoing since 2007</td>
<td>Interdiction and Enforcement Techniques for those inspecting cargo at borders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Training at State Customs Service Training Academy Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS)</td>
<td>0.2 ongoing 2010-2012</td>
<td>Training for customs officers in IBM, supply chain security, DPU methodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO website and meetings in Brussels, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) (accessed July 2012).
For all the structural similarities between parts of Central Asia and the Middle East, there are critical differences, too; as the population of Central Asia tends to be depoliticized and some of its most active members are either content with the relative economic stability as in Kazakhstan or are working in Russia as in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and they are not clamoring for political change. The tumultuous experience of Kyrgyzstan has given authoritarian regimes in the neighboring countries a resonant argument: revolutions lead to chaos and bloodshed and authoritarian stability is preferable to half-baked democratic experiments.

In the years to come, political change in Central Asia will likely be driven by inter-elite tussles, particularly during succession struggles following the death, retirement, or incapacitation of longtime rulers: There are no simple solutions in the region. A rush toward democracy and elections, by itself, will not solve Central Asia’s many crises and may exacerbate them in the short term. The precise events that triggered street protests in Kyrgyzstan and the Middle East vary from country to country, but what they all have in common is popular anger at the anything-goes crony capitalism practiced by the ruling elites coupled with a lack of economic opportunity.

Across much of Central Asia, the failures of the ruling regimes and their crackdowns against many forms of dissent have left their citizens with few political alternatives. In the absence of a secular opposition, religious groups may enter the fray, a scenario that is plausible in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, particularly in light of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.

Despite their façade of invincibility, some Central Asian regimes are inherently unstable, as the example of Kyrgyzstan has demonstrate. But as Kyrgyzstan also shows, the sudden collapse of a dictatorial regime may also have unforeseen consequences and unleash violence and given the historical, cultural, and linguistic kinship among the five nations that make up Central Asia, one would expect a degree of regional unity.

Such unity could help the states tackle common problems, advance a coordinated position with respect to foreign powers, and ease cross-border travel for Central Asian citizens, to mention just a few possible areas of cooperation. The Central Asian states inherited a complex set of borders from centuries of Russian gerrymandering, giving rise to border disputes that continue to this day. In a region that is dependent on agriculture, management of scarce water resources across borders has sharpened mutual recriminations, particularly between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which historically have sparred on a variety of issues.

The region’s primary waterway, the Amu Darya River, flows northwest, giving the countries upstream, including Tajikistan, control over how much water travels downstream to Uzbekistan, where thirsty crops such as cotton require a lot of irrigation. Tajikistan wants to build a large dam
and harness the Amu Darya’s power for electricity production, a plan that is causing consternation in Uzbekistan.

However, according to international analysts in the longer run, their foreign policies may not be anti-Western but may more closely reflect some concerns of other Islamic states. Some Western organizational ties with the region have suffered in recent years, in particular those of the OSCE, which has been criticized by some Central Asian governments for advocating democratization and respect for human rights. However, despite this criticism, President Nazarbayev successfully pushed for Kazakhstan to hold the presidency of the OSCE.

The EU has become more interested in Central Asia in recent years as the region has become more of a security threat as an originator and transit zone for drugs, weapons of mass destruction, refugees, and persons smuggled for prostitution or labor. Such interests contributed to the launch of a Strategy Paper for assistance for 2002-2006 and a follow-on for 2007-2013 (see below), and the EU’s appointment of a Special Representative to the region.

The EU has implemented Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs, which set forth political, economic, and trade relations) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. An existing Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) program was supplemented in 2004 and 2006 by a Baku Energy Initiative and Astana Energy Ministerial Declaration to diversify energy supplies. One project involves the proposed Nabucco pipeline, which could transport Caspian region gas to Austria.

In June 2007, the EU approved a new “Central Asian strategy” for enhanced aid and relations for 2007-2013. It calls for establishing offices in each regional state and assistance of $1 billion over the next five years. The strategy argues that the EU ties with the region need to be enhanced because EU enlargement and EU relations with the South Caucasus and Black Sea states bring it to Central Asia’s borders.

The strategy also stresses that the dependency of the EU on external energy sources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security open further perspectives for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia and that the EU will conduct an enhanced regular energy dialogue with the states. Under the strategy, the EU holds dozens of projects, meetings and seminars each year with the Central Asian states on such issues as human rights, civil society development, foreign policy and assistance, trade and investment, environmental and energy cooperation and other issues.

4.6.2 Economy

Economy and trade is a cornerstone of the European Union’s economic prosperity and for consumers, trade provides access to a wider variety of goods at lower prices than could be produced domestically. For EU businesses, it provides larger markets and access to essential production inputs, including technology developed abroad. International trade takes place within a framework of rules developed through negotiations, refined through practice and clarified through litigation before the national courts and international trade dispute settlement mechanisms under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

However, the global economy witnessed unprecedented economic stresses in terms of massive global imbalances, very large real exchange rate swings, and a boom-bust cycle of exceptional amplitude in the first decade of the 2000’s. These had profound consequences in terms of real activity, wealth effects, fiscal situations, unemployment, social and political stresses, and consequent resort to extraordinary policy measures which directly or indirectly have had significant implications for global trade flows. These rules are designed to ensure that trade works to the mutual benefit of the trading partners and is based on genuine competitive advantages.

On the economic front, a qualified exception could be made for Kazakhstan, where aided by the country’s generous oil reserves, an authoritarian government there has presided over economic growth. But Kazakhstan also faces real challenges of governance, economic diversification and equitable distribution of wealth going forward. Elsewhere in the region, pronouncements of economic growth and low inflation do not tell the full story of the economy’s true shape. Oil-rich Kazakhstan, for instance, is a far cry from the poor and fractious state of Tajikistan and the ongoing political ferment in Kyrgyzstan offers a stark contrast to the sterile political atmosphere of Uzbekistan. As it can be seen from the table below, another driver for EU engagement in CA region is economic. Trade over Central Asian hydrocarbons, uranium and electricity is part of the European Union strategy to gain confidence and support dialogue as a regional driver in Eurasia. However, the EU economic presence is facing with stiff competition from China and the Russia, with regards to gas and a few niche areas.
European Union imports, exports and total trade with Central Asian states in 2011 in millions of Euros

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports from EU (in millions) (in %)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Exports to EU (in millions) (in %)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total trade (in millions) (in %)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>4,238.4 (18.7%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31,780.8 (4.9%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,019.2 (10.3%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>810.4 (15%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>268.7 (32.1%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,079.1 (17.3%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>646.8 (32.2%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76.9 (8.5%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>723.7 (24.9%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>600.6 (14.2%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>101.9 (4%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>702.5 (10.3%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>1,382.8 (21.4%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,047.8 (24.1%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,430.6 (22.5%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Featured statistic

EU merchandise trade with non-EU countries: monthly growth

(%, year-on-year, nominal, non-seasonally adjusted data)
4.6.3 Education

In the developing regions of the globe, the net enrolment rate for children of primary school age rose from 82 to 90 per cent between 1999 and 2011. However, a closer look at the data reveals that nearly all of this growth occurred between 1999 and 2004, and that progress in reducing the number of out-of-school children slowed considerably after 2004. At the same time, many of the countries facing the greatest challenges have recorded significant progress towards universal primary education.

More than 90 per cent of children of primary school age were enrolled either in primary or secondary schools in 2011. In central Asia, at least 95 per cent of primary-age children were in school. Globally, there has been progress in reducing girls’ exclusion from primary education, with the female share of out-of-school children in developing countries as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan dropping from 58 to 53 per cent between 1999 and 2011.

In 2011, the primary completion rate, assessed by the gross intake ratio to the last grade of primary education, reached 90 per cent, compared with 81 per cent in 1999. Regional values ranged from 70 per cent to almost 100 per cent in Central Asia. With more children completing primary education, the demand for secondary education is growing.

This increased demand poses a serious challenge for Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with limited resources and unsecure environment. Indeed, Afghans and Uzbeks, about one quarter of the children who complete primary school do not continue on to secondary education. The regional average, however, hides substantial differences between countries. The transition rate from primary to secondary education ranges from around 30 per cent in Afghanistan, Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan to 98 per cent in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Young people who do not pursue their education join the group of adolescents of lower-secondary age who are not enrolled in either primary or secondary school.

The continued degradation of the education systems in Central Asia, including vocational and higher education, has had a negative impact on the quality of education at all levels. It has also exacerbated the mismatch between education and training on the one hand, and the needs of labor markets and employment on the other one.

Resolving these issues will be essential for the implementation of CA countries’ poverty reduction/social welfare improvement strategies. The demand by CA partners for the EU to strengthen its cooperation in this field remains very high, including for vocational education and training. CA countries request for assistance to gradually bring their education systems in line with the Bologna process\textsuperscript{32} and the EU’s higher education modernization agenda are also of particular

\textsuperscript{32} http://www.bolognaprocess.it/
strategic importance. Training of faculty staff and graduates is part and parcel of a comprehensive approach to adjust education to market economy requirements and upgrade knowledge and competencies to face the sustainable development challenges of the region.

Actions in the area of higher education institution building and cooperation and mobility of students and teaching staff have been made as contributions to the development of the partner countries. Moreover, increased action in science and research is supporting the development of a knowledge based economy.

The TEMPUS IV and ERASMUS MUNDUS programs have the flexibility to adjust to the specific needs of each country’s sustainable development strategies in the field of education it continues to constitute a main instrument for delivering assistance.

In all such activities, gender balance should be ensured. Another recent initiative is the Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN), the aim of which is to narrow the digital divide and contribute to the modernization of the education and research sector in the region. CAREN is also assist in building the capacity of higher education and research institutions to take part in the 7th Framework Program and increase their involvement with the European Research Area.

The EU and its Member States have set up a European Education Initiative for Central Asia in order to help the education systems of Central Asian states adapt to the needs of the globalized world. A regional approach leading to the emergence of a harmonized regional education area is also highlighted as an important issue for the future sustainable development of the countries of the region, particularly in view of the sizeable flows of migrant workers.

They have been keen to adapt the reform of their higher education systems to the principles of the Bologna Process and in line with the Lisbon Agenda, in particular through the TEMPUS and the ERASMUS Mundus programs and participation in the 7th Framework Programs for research and technological development. All these EU programs have been given a new impetus through support for political dialogue mechanisms and new initiatives set up under ENP, the Eastern Partnership and the EU Central Asia Strategy.
4.6.4 Security & Safety

Central Asian states face continued challenges in managing their borders and the movement of people and goods across them. The principles of integrated border management have proven effective in ensuring transparent but secure borders. There is potential for enabling sustainable cooperation mechanisms among the CA countries by applying shared principles for border management, which deliver economies of scale for certain activities such as legal approximation and training.

The region is a key trafficking route for arms, illegal drugs and human beings. Addressing these issues requires intervention at national level to improve existing legal and judicial frameworks, tackle corruption and improve border management. Security remains the first driver shaping EU and NATO involvement in Central Asia. The challenges are multiple, as any destabilization in the weak Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, or the most unpredictable Uzbekistan might lead an Islamist infiltration, an increase in the inflow of drugs, reaching European population, which is already widely targeted by drug traffickers. Even though Europe has no border with Central Asia and thus no territorial contiguity, the securing of the south-east borders of Central Asia is seen as a question of wide-range of security.

It can be said that Central Asia is therefore viewed by NATO and then by EU as a buffer zone with a south that is increasingly subject to a strategic uncertainty and non-traditional threats. Even if the EU and NATO do not officially endorse interference in the internal affairs of Central Asia, international analysts are becoming more and more aware of the fact that slow development in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan creates insecurity and lack of preparation for political change may have a destabilizing impact.

Europe is discretely starting to encourage the Central Asian governments to undertake reforms for avoiding the Arabic spring-type situations may occur because of the potential “cocktail” of political repressions, social and economic depression and the “securitization” of national resources by a shrinking elite.

The EU strategy for Central Asia outlines seven priorities,38 its main interests lie foremost in the stability of the region and countering negative spill-over effects from Afghanistan, as well as in securing energy resources (potential gas imports from Turkmenistan and oil from Kazakhstan). At the same time the EU tries to place an emphasis on democratic values and human rights, which is challenging considering the authoritarian nature of the Central Asian regimes.

In practice, these objectives have competing logics. The European desire to diversify gas export routes in order to reduce its dependence on Russia has led to a relaxation of EU human rights
pressure on Turkmenistan. The potential for the country to participate in the Southern Corridor, even at a modest 10 billion cubic metres per year, has led to some human rights and rule of law criticisms being overlooked.

Meanwhile, the Central Asian governments that participate in the Northern Distribution Network, with Uzbekistan at its core, want to be rewarded for their “support” to the Western campaign in Afghanistan. When faced with NATO, the EU has not succeeded in arguing its case and has instead found itself somewhat paralyzed by security priorities, which is all the more paradoxical considering that the domestic stability of the Central Asian states partly depends on a secure Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the EU’s development investment is still limited and spreads thinly over the region and is having little effect due to the corrupt nature of the Central Asian ruling classes. Taken together, the EU’s objectives seek to link energy, security, values and development goals and interests, though not in a structural or achievable manner. The EU and NATO role as a hard security actor on the international scene is limited and most European countries place their trust in NATO to guarantee their security on a global level.

The reasons for disagreements between European member states on the development of CSDP structures, the awkward relationship between the EU and NATO caused by a large overlapping membership and above all to defense cuts around Europe.

In Central Asia, EU mechanisms barely relate to hard security and the soft security initiatives are too dispersed to have a serious impact. Moreover, security assistance is often associated with institutions other than the EU. The OSCE, for instance, has a border guard training program in Central Asia, while NATO support own association strategies, via the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) program and an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) for Kazakhstan. Member states are also engaged in bilateral programs (including aid for police training) Moreover, enhancing cooperation at regional level in the fields of migration and asylum and combating organized crime, including trafficking and related police/judicial reform, is an essential tool, providing the capacity to cope with issues of major trans-border dimensions in line with the EU approach.

With the implementation of the projects mentioned above table, the long-term impact that EU and NATO foresee is the adoption of an Integrated Border Management approach allowing for the facilitation of legitimate trade and transit whilst reducing illicit cross-border movement of goods and people. Yet, the enhancement of cooperation between border, customs and migration services within states and between the states of Central Asia will be also relevant for EU and international community.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € euro million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination center-CARICC</td>
<td>15.4 2004-2011</td>
<td>Information &amp;intelligence sharing among the region to promote regional cooperation against drugs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO, UN, OSCE, WB, JICA, US GOV</td>
<td></td>
<td>Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan, Central Asian and Pakistani Law Enforcement Personnel.</td>
<td>5.9 2007-2013</td>
<td>Mid-level drug control training pilot project in Central Asia &amp; Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Precursors control in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Azerbaijan</td>
<td>7.5 2001-2011</td>
<td>Assistance in precursor control to improve national and regional regulatory, scientific &amp; law enforcement capacities; to improve precursor control cooperation with other countries in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Countering the trafficking of Afghan opiates via the northern route by enhancing the capacity of key border crossings points and through the establishment of Border Liaison Offices (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan &amp; Uzbekistan).</td>
<td>21.6 2007-2013</td>
<td>Enhanced capacity for international cooperation against organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cross border resources and conflicts</td>
<td>125.00 2007-2011</td>
<td>Enhancing cooperation via joint training and conference events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO, UN, OSCE, WB, JICA and US GOV websites and meetings in Brussels, in 2012.
Moreover, the gradual adoption of EU best practice in the field of drugs policy should lead to foster the improved application of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human rights. Of course, EU and NATO expect as main outcome a greater harmonization of procedures at regional level, including with regard to integrated border management principles, the fight against organized crime and anti-drugs related legislation.

The enhancement of the border and migration management cooperation and systems, increased trade flows and more effective combatting of illicit trafficking through increased regional cooperation. Further, the institutional and operational capacity of border, customs, law enforcement authorities and judicial bodies would support the exchange of inter-agency coordination information on the main threats for the CA countries. As a result, the enhanced of the regional and cross-border cooperation among border authorities (including exchange of information, progress towards joint border crossing points, joint patrolling or controlled deliveries for drugs, anti-money-laundering) should put in place the creation of a modern customs administration geared to facilitating the exchange of goods, whilst implementing controls at the required level of quality.

Better understanding and shared information, and increased cooperation on migratory flows would also facilitate the circulation and integration of legal migrants, assistance to asylum seekers and increased capacity to detect and prevent trafficking of human beings.

On the terrorism fighting, the CA states have supported the operation in Afghanistan with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, fearing Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking. Most Central Asian states agreed to facilitate the air and land transport of U.S. and NATO non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan as an alternative to land transport via increasingly volatile Pakistan, providing aid and increased trade and transport links with Afghanistan.

But later on (October 2010), although Kazakh President Nazarbayev announced that the country would send some officers to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, the Taliban reportedly issued a threat two days later to retaliate against Kazakhstan for supporting ISAF, with a bombing attack occurred at security offices on May 17 and 24, 2011. Hence, the Kazakh Senate rejected the bill approved by the lower chamber.

In Central Asia the EU’s focus lies primarily in the sphere of soft security or human security. Development assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is largely underpinned by stability and security concerns, for instance in the fields of poverty reduction and migration. EU assistance programs seek to build more inclusive societies that can resist security threats such as ethnic violence, internal instability and interstate tensions. In this sense the EU’s regional programs are
designed to bring the five countries, which have weak and strained relationships with each other, to the table in order to foster cooperation on water management or rule of law reforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 4 European Union interests in Central Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Helping to secure and stabilize Central Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Promotion of democratic values and human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Meeting internationally agreed development criteria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Combating corruption is an important element in countering many of these security challenges”. The EU development policy, focus on democratic values and security, supporting the concept of security and stability in the event that it differs from Central Asian one and recognizing that the denial of basic rights and opportunities is equal to the absence of democracy and the rule law can lead to situation of insecurity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Rank</th>
<th>Country / Territory</th>
<th>CPI 2012 Score</th>
<th>Surveys Used</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>90% Confidence interval</th>
<th>Scores range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>73 89 73</td>
<td>81 89 78 75 88 73 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11 48 28</td>
<td>40 21 48 30 21 11 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18 32 23</td>
<td>23 23 18 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11 32 15</td>
<td>23 32 11 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11 21 15</td>
<td>23 11 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11 22 15</td>
<td>12 22 11 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 12 10</td>
<td>12 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The anticorruption group Transparency International maintains that high levels of bribery, abuse of power and secret dealings continue to “ravage” societies around the world and in particular in the Central Asia countries, despite a growing public outcry over corrupt governments. The annual Corruption Perceptions Index, the Berlin-based group, shows that two-thirds of 176 countries are perceived by citizens to be highly corrupt. Transparency International report states the findings indicate a public demand for institutions and officials to be more transparent and accountable.

Afghanistan, along with North Korea and Somalia, were once again at the bottom of the Corruption Perceptions Index, while two-thirds of the 176 countries scored below 50 on a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 100 (perceived to be very clean).

Despite the demonstrations all over the world, in many countries, which were sparked on the ground of corruption, the governments still remain inactive and still continue to act as before, and continue not to take effective measures to tackle corruption. Russia placed 133rd, alongside Iran and Kazakhstan.

Elsewhere in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan ranked 154, followed by Tajikistan (157), Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (both 170). There are situations which are not improving in Russia and other former Soviet republics, with the very small exception of Georgia. These governments continue to be utterly opaque and no accountable to citizens, even though many of these governments introduced very elegant anticorruption legislation, these remain to be not enforced and not implemented. And also there is a continued lack of citizen oversight over what the governments are doing or not doing.

It is to be said that the world’s leading economies can influence the global fight against corruption by making sure their institutions are fully transparent and their leaders are held accountable. Unfortunately, EU officials have difficulty explaining to Central Asian counterparts what their security objectives are and how they plan to meet them and the EU’s security approach to the region remains vague and all-encompassing. The 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia lists security among its goals, particularly in regards to border management, Afghanistan’s proximity and drug trafficking.

Among EU programs for border securitization, the best known - BOMCA (Border Management in Central Asia Program) and CADAP (Central Asia Drug Action Program), implemented by the UNDP - focus on the upgrading and/or building of border posts, on equipping them with high-tech material, training border guards in searching goods and people, detecting illicit sub – stances and on performing combined exercises with neighboring countries as it is described in the below table. Currently the BOMCA program is moving increasingly from providing hardware to
know-how. In addition, both programs are also designed, at least in theory, to help improve cross-border trade.

European countries support several multilateral initiatives, one example being the Central Asia Border Security Initiative (CABSI), organized by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior with support from the European Union, to provide a platform for dialogue and discussion. The EU meets at regular intervals with members of the international donor community and agencies involved in border security technical assistance, such as the UNDP, OSCE, UNODC, IOM, Japan, the Russian Federation and the United States. Another initiative, the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances.

However, due to a lack of independent evaluation, it is unclear if any of these Western-led programs have had a positive impact, or if they are even sustainable. One could argue that the EU’s border management program BOMCA should be turned into a CSDP mission, at least the part that refers to the Tajik-Afghan border. This would make sense because the CSDP has experience with border management programs (EUBAM in Moldova) and with border monitoring (EUMM in Georgia and in the Balkans).

Such a mission, deployed on the Tajik-Afghan border, would be able to prepare for possible negative consequences of NATO troop withdrawal from Afghanistan over the coming years and fit nicely with EU activities in Afghanistan on border control or the CSDP police mission. Also a CSDP border mission might establish greater pressure on Tajik political elites to get serious about reform of border management and maybe even spur some anti-corruption action.

But clearly the EU member states lack the political will and the resources to think ahead and invest in a region far away and of less interest than the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighborhood and in the event that interest or necessity rises to the level required for the deployment of a CSDP mission, the EU would first need to reach an agreement with Russia, but Moscow would be unlikely to be happy to see another CSDP mission be deployed in what it sees as its sphere of influence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Program/Project</th>
<th>Budget € million</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO, UN, OSCE, US GOV, WB, JICA</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Border Management in Northern Afghanistan (BOMNAF) Tajik-Afghan Poverty Reduction Initiative</td>
<td>13.0 2004-2011</td>
<td>Training activities (for Tajik-Afghan officers);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combating illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials in CA</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Training in border security for border/customs officers; provision of specialized equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fighting organized crime &amp; trafficking alongside heroin routes</td>
<td>12.0 2011-2012</td>
<td>Reinforcement of national and regional activities; law enforcement cooperation, intelligence sharing, integrated response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project of Demining Activities in Rushon District;</td>
<td>15.3 2006 ongoing</td>
<td>Advisory/Advocacy for safety of local population;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project for the Installation of X-ray Scanning Equipment at the Check Points of Uzbekistan Borders with the Neighboring Countries</td>
<td>5.5 2009-2011</td>
<td>Improvement of customs clearance and strengthening narcotics/arms control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Airport, new passenger terminal</td>
<td>27.0 2009-2011</td>
<td>Training in security and smooth flow of passengers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: made by the author based on the NATO, UN, OSCE, WB, JICA and US GOV websites and meetings in Brussels, in 2012.

One could ask himself, why it is so hard to stop Central Asia’s drug trade and the answer is not to easy to be explained. An underreported and underappreciated aspect of international security in Central Asia is the fight against drug trafficking. As everyone should know, Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium and it reaches world markets through Central Asia and Russia. Central Asian countries western partners have been increasingly focusing on drug trafficking in
their security assistance to the region, but thus far too little effect. Indeed, defining drug trafficking as a “spillover” effect from Afghanistan also leads to a poor assessment of the mechanisms that are needed to counter it.

EU and NATO are focused on improving border security, principally its material aspects (like buildings, infrastructure, and equipment), and of course, true is that Central Asian states need better border security. Their border guards require better material conditions and training in new technologies and best practices and as new states on the international scene, they require foreign assistance to rise to international standards.

However, it is naïve to assume that the fight against drug trafficking can be waged successfully with such measures and in the short term-period. To secure a border with checkpoints, barbed wire, and watchtowers is not enough to make the frontier impermeable, as the recurrent failure of the United States to “close” its southern border with Mexico has shown. In Central Asia, all border points, even those that the international community has best equipped, are open borders, as corruption has rendered them permeable. Every entry into Central Asian territory can be negotiated.

Drug traffickers are the only ones that try to get across borders by avoiding checkpoints, through mountain passes or across rivers and Central Asian borders with Afghanistan cannot be made secure by physical means alone. It requires the political will to fight against corruption, and for the long term. To be effective, efforts to combat drug trafficking in Central Asia must therefore be first political in nature. Russia tries to press the E.U. and NATO to eradicate poppies at the source in Afghanistan, which the coalition is unwilling to do because it would alienate the large numbers of ordinary farmers who make their livelihood in opium farming.

But Russia has its own problems that keep it from effectively combating drugs in Central Asia. For one, suspicion of European presence in Central Asia has led Moscow to shun cooperation with Western drug combating efforts. Secondly, when Russia has been more seriously involved in policing the border with Afghanistan, deploying border guards in Tajikistan, its officers got involved themselves in the drug trade.

So with feckless Western and Russian responses, it looks like the fight against drug trafficking depends on the Central Asians themselves.
4.7 Conclusion

It was a quite daunting task to assess and measure the impact for several reasons: First, there was a wide range of methodological problems.

To give an example, claiming that a specific bundle of projects have made life safer for the rural population of a district in Afghanistan for instance, it means that it is quite sure that the same district would be less safe and less stable if it had not received these projects. Hence, we have to know what would have happened.

There are different ways of reaching an answer to such a question: One is to link a specific project to a specific outcome, by tracing the processes - step by step - by which the spark created by a project can lead to a certain outcome lends a certain plausibility to the argument that it was indeed the project that contributed to these changes.

A second way is to compare the actual development (for example, of household incomes in a country that participate in a poverty relief program) with the expected “normal” future development. Such a comparison requires that the process can be estimated with some confidence how the future development would have been without the intervention. A third way is to compare how households that received aid have fared compared to households that did not. Provided that all households are similar at the onset of the program, one can attribute observable differences with some plausibility to the impact of aid. This research used the first and the third approach, but adapted both to the context.

The second challenge stemmed from huge amount of data available for a complex research questions. The third challenge was very much from real life and can be summarized as “no roads, no names, no data”. It was one peculiarity of conflict zones where collecting data were often logistically demanding. That means that driving from A to B might take weeks and one cannot be sure to reach B in one “piece”. Another peculiarity was that reliable data is Afghanistan was not so good due to the conflict in place.

Many areas/villages have no names at all, while others have more than one name, borders areas are unknown or just being redrawn, hence, the research took also into account the challenging conditions typical for conflict zones.

4.7.1 The General Model

A general model posits the major hypotheses of the investigation, proposing the causal chains that bring along those changes which are, according to the research framework, helpful for stabilizing the conflict zone and assess the ongoing. It specifies which political, economical and
social changes the research will focus on and which factors may have caused these changes. At its most basic, such a general model is a set of testable assumptions about the causes of the observed changes.

The research assumed that positive impacts of development cooperation will reflect in much more security for communities, a better resource endowment, increased government capacities, a more positive perception of the state’s capacity to deliver basic services, better institutions that facilitate dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way and a broad acceptance of international organizations and development agencies on the ground.

The model also defines the factors that have presumably caused the observed changes in the dependent variables. It is presumed that the changes may be caused by three different sets of factors: By the ongoing development projects, by preexisting local capacities that enable countries to better deal with the conflict situation and by a range of other exogenous factors.

**THE BASIC MODEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Cooperation (Study Variable)</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preexisting Local Capacities (Control Variables)</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Conflict Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other external factors (Control Variables)</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Resource Endowment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governmental Organizational Capacities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State Services</td>
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</table>
The research used the basic model as a guideline for specifying what data was needed. Accordingly, it was collected data on security, governance, education and several development cooperation projects, preexisting local capacities other external factors which may have an impact on the changes that was observed.

Furthermore, collected data on changes occurred on the dependent variables were also taken into consideration: security for the countries, a better resource endowment, increased governmental organizational capacities, a more positive perception of the state’s capacity to deliver basic services, better institutions or dealing with conflicts in a non-violent way and a broad acceptance of international organizations on the ground.

Data were collected through five different methods, by survey among Key Leader Engagement (KLE) in the target countries, making sure that the sample was representative for the country, which let the research establish profiles of six countries and comparing previous surveys in order to trace changes.

Then, based on NGO collection data, the research was able to profile and compare the data collected by other Agencies, for example, the number of schools or the access to markets before or later the EU and NATO deployment. The same logic applies to the country community clusters comparing the data from the survey, more objective, whereas the survey data is more subjective.

Yet, semi-structured reports were used to be filled in by local correspondents four times a year, the so called quarterly reports of major events and significant changes, for examples major new cooperation initiatives, outbreaks of violence, fear and democratic development of public elections and natural disasters. This kind of data was useful to construct time series on a limited range of variables.

The research was also conducted in-depth qualitative case studies, representing untypical high or low values on the dependent variables and relying on standard qualitative methods: expert interviews and focus groups interviews.

Finally, it was used existing data bases from a development agency to create data on the infrastructure situation of the countries.

6.7.2 The Surveys

The basic assumption was that the impact of the EU and NATO presence should be observable at different countries levels, therefore, a baseline questionnaire (Annex 2, pag 301) was established, allowing the capacity of gathering relevant data on our variables for selected areas. The main unit of analysis was therefore the community.
It was also assumed that in Afghanistan, for instance, the household (rather than the individual) forms the structure of the community. Hence, it was imperative to make sure to have a representative and random sample of households for each community. Indeed, it was surveyed 2,034 households in 77 communities. The size of the samples varied according to the size of the community in order to ensure that the sample was representative for the community as a whole, making possible to aggregate data on country level.

The two main limiting resources in doing survey research, were the budget available and the time that taken by respondents to answer.

Before implementing the survey, it made sure that the questionnaire was peer-reviewed by country experts and carefully followed the process of translating the questions into local languages or for those much more educated were translated in English.

7.4.3 Profiles, Quarterly Reports and Qualitative Case Studies

The data collection of the profiles can best be understood as a combination of expert interviews and focus group interviews. These profiles contain information on the history, demography, ethnic composition, political and social organization, resource endowment, and levels of received aid of communities.

It should be noted that in other settings much of this data would be readily available from statistics and censuses. In the Afghan context, however, we had to collect this data on our own. The quarterly reports are semi-structured reports, to be filled in by local correspondents four times a year. The correspondents were trained in a weeks-long workshop in Kabul.

The quarterly reports record major events and significant changes that affect the dependent variables, but that are not captured in village profiles and surveys, such as major new development initiatives, outbreaks of violence, military operations, natural disasters, etc. While the surveys and the profiles provide “snapshots” of a given situation at a given time, the quarterly reports provide information on change and allow for process-tracing.

The standardized questions focus on political leadership and violent conflicts within the communities, on violent conflicts affecting the community, on threats and developments that affect the security situation of the community, on relations between the community and state officials and state institutions, especially instances of compliance and non compliance with state rules, and, most importantly, on new projects and new aid flows that affect the community.
CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS, EXPLAINING THE CHANGE

This Chapter provides an analytical information and data on the geography and society issues, along with the assessment of the governance, economy, education and security & safety indicators for the six Central Asia countries. Moreover, it studies the political and social dynamics of the mentioned countries not just from the short-term perspective, but also from the wider and longer-term perspective of the resilience and weaknesses of organizations, warlord networks and institutions. Finally, here is depicted the implications and dynamics with three main actors: Russia, US, EU and NATO influence and commitments.

Russia and China are the most influential external actors in Central Asia, while the US, EU and NATO has substantially increased their activities and presence in the region since 1990’s. The security and development interests of these five actors are sometimes at odds but can also overlap. The five actors are usually perceived in terms of different stereotypes. Whereas the Westerns are known for its emphasis on democratic values and human rights, Russia is seen as the main security actor (not including the United States and its actions in Afghanistan) and China as the main investor in infrastructure and importer of energy.

Russia and China do not share Europe’s view on numerous international questions and have criticized Western policies in Central Asia, denouncing interference in internal affairs in the name of human rights and democracy promotion. On the international scene, China is increasingly presenting itself as an alternative to the West.
5.1 Kazakhstan

5.1.1 Geography

Kazakhstan is located in the centre of the continent of Asia, with a coastline only on the landlocked Caspian Sea. Russia forms its entire northern border.

**Size:** At 2,717,000 square kilometres, Kazakhstan’s area is about four times that of Texas, making Kazakhstan the ninth largest nation in the world. Some 47,500 kilometres of the total area is occupied by bodies of water.

**Land Boundaries:** Kazakhstan has common borders with the following countries: China (1,533 kilometres), Kyrgyzstan (1,051 kilometres), Russia (6,846 kilometres), Turkmenistan (379 kilometres), and Uzbekistan (2,203 kilometres).

**Disputed Territory:** Post-Soviet border disputes with China and Kyrgyzstan have been settled, but numerous points along the Uzbekistan border remained in dispute in 2006. Kazakhstan has signed seabed distribution treaties with Azerbaijan and Russia on resource exploitation in the Caspian Sea. Remaining unresolved in 2006 was the distribution of the Caspian Sea water column among the littoral states.

**Length of Coastline:** Kazakhstan’s only coastline runs 1,894 kilometres along the landlocked Caspian Sea.

**Maritime Claims:** Jurisdiction over oil, natural gas, and other resources in the Caspian Sea is in dispute with other littoral states.

**Principal Rivers:** Seven of Kazakhstan’s rivers are 1,000 kilometres or more in length: the Chu, Emba, Ili, Irtysh, Ishim, Syr Darya, and Ural. The Irtysh and Ural rivers flow partly through Kazakhstan and partly through Russia. The Ili River flows from China into Lake Balkhash in eastern Kazakhstan. The Syr-Darya flows from eastern Uzbekistan across Kazakhstan into the Aral Sea.

**Natural Resources:** In 2006 Kazakhstan’s estimated reserves of oil and natural gas were 35 billion barrels and 1.9 trillion cubic meters, respectively. Future exploration of offshore fields in the Caspian Sea is expected to significantly raise the oil estimate. The country is believed to possess about 1 percent of the world’s total reserves of natural gas and petroleum. Also present are significant reserves of chromium, coal, copper, gold, lead, tungsten, and zinc. Substantial amounts of good agricultural land are present, although Soviet and post-Soviet agricultural practices have greatly reduced the extent of that land.

**Environmental Factors:** Most of Kazakhstan’s water supply has been polluted by industrial and agricultural runoff and, in some places, radioactivity. The Aral Sea, which is shared with Uzbekistan, has shrunk to three separate bodies of water because of water drawdown in its tributary
rivers. A Soviet-era biological weapons site is a threat because it is located on a former island in the Aral Sea that is now connected with the mainland. The reduction in the Aral Sea’s water surface has exacerbated regional climatic extremes, and agricultural soil has been damaged by salt deposits and eroded by wind. Desertification has eliminated substantial tracts of agricultural land. Plants in industrial centers lack controls on effluents into the air and water. The Semey region in the northeast has long-term radiation contamination from Soviet-era weapons testing. The Ministry of Environmental Protection is underfunded and given low priority. Some new environmental regulation of the oil industry began in 2003, but expanding oil operations on Kazakhstan’s Caspian coast add to that sea’s already grave pollution. International programs to save the Aral and Caspian seas have not received meaningful cooperation from Kazakhstan or other member nations.

5.1.2 Society

**Population:** In 2006 Kazakhstan’s population was estimated at 15,233,244, of which about 52 percent was female. Population density was 5.9 persons per square kilometer. Some 56 percent of the population lives in urban areas, and the population is heavily concentrated in the northeast and southeast. In the early 2000’s, economic growth brought significant movement from rural to urban areas. Because the annual growth rate has been negligible in the early 2000’s, population growth is a critical issue for policy makers. Although in recent years a large number of legal and illegal immigrant workers have come to Kazakhstan from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, in 2006 the estimated net migration rate was - 3.33 individuals per 1,000 populations.

**Demography:** In 2006 some 23 percent of the population was younger than 15 years of age, and 8.2 percent was older than 64. The birth rate was 15.8 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate was 9.4 per 1,000 population. The overall fertility rate was 1.9 births per woman. The infant mortality rate was 28.3 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy at birth was 61.6 years for males and 72.5 years for females.

**Ethnic Groups:** According to the 1999 census, 53.4 percent of inhabitants were Kazakh, 30 percent Russian, 3.7 percent Ukrainian, 2.5 percent Uzbek, 2.4 percent German, and 1.4 percent Uyghur. In 1991 the Kazakh and Russian populations were approximately equal. Between 1989 and 1999, 1.5 million Russians and 500,000 Germans (more than half the German population) left Kazakhstan, causing concern over the loss of technical expertise provided by those groups. These movements have continued in the early 2000s. The Kazakh population is predominantly rural and concentrated in the southern provinces, while the German and Russian populations are mainly urban and concentrated in the northern provinces.
Religion: Some 47 percent of Kazakhs are Muslim, primarily Sunni Muslims; 44 percent are Russian Orthodox, and 2 percent are Protestant. Because the Muslims of Kazakhstan developed their religion in isolation from the rest of the Islamic world, there are significant differences from conventional Sunni and Shia practices. For example, the teachings of the Quran are much less central to the Kazakh version of Islam than in other parts of the Muslim world.

5.1.3 Governance

Kazakhstan has emerged as the most prosperous country in the region and is reluctant to be treated in the same category as the rest, maintaining that the Soviet designation of Central Asia and Kazakhstan is still valid. Its political economy is increasingly important for regional dynamics. Kazakhstan is one of the former Soviet Union countries that have emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is a ninth largest country in the world and one of the developed countries in the Central Asian region, with abundant natural resources. Its population is 15.6 million and its GDP per capita is $9,832. Based on Human Development Index Kazakhstan is considered being a medium developed country with unemployment rate 7.3%, population below poverty line 13.8%, with literacy rate 80.4%.

In the post-Soviet era, Kazakhstan remained closely tied to Russia by energy supply lines, national defense, and the importance of Russian technologists in Kazakhstan’s economy, but Kazakhstan also sought closer relations with the West.

Beginning in the 1990s, the discovery of major new oil fields and subsequent international investment enabled Kazakhstan’s economy to pull far ahead of its Central Asian neighbors. Indeed, Kazakhstan choose a path of democratization that implied the active economic liberalization and adopting a western style of governance. Economic reforms proved to be effective contrary to political reforms that reverted from democratic rule toward old style Soviet rule that was based on an idea of a total control of one leader or party.

Today, Kazakhstan political regime can be described as monocracy, with a strong institution of presidency and one of the fastest growing economies in the CA region, but also is an important player in the regional arena. It actively involved in strengthening its influence not only in CA but also in the Caspian region that is vital for Europe current economic stagnation. Moreover, its political leadership was able successfully reform an economic system by reducing a role of ideology in economic policies, adhering e to the principles of a market oriented reforms and so significantly increasing living standards.

The political establishment, having made some questionable policy decisions after independence, including bringing ethnic Kazakhs from Mongolia, has found a happy medium,
elaborating a policy the cornerstones of which are a commitment to the country’s multiethnic character, economic success, European social values, and Asian culture and traditions. Kazakh history and tradition enjoys official encouragement, but not at the expense of other peoples. This state orientation reflects a forward-looking project, based on future progress rather than dwelling on past injustices.

Economic success of Kazakhstan partly contributed to an export of oil and gas but it is the effective leadership that was able to manage monetary policies, increasing general living standards that cannot be done without certain degree of control and effective management. Despite the significant progress in economic area, Kazakhstan is still considered to be a monocracy where all power belongs to a highly centralized political institution in the face of the communist party that does not tolerate any type of disobedience or critique of the regime that often leads to human rights abuse.

Kazakhstan is one of the 20 least democratic countries on the Human Development Index and its government is only the 68th most effective globally. With almost two decades since the last major constitutional shift, the country ranks around the global average for regime stability, but there are very few checks and balances, preventing arbitrary action by those in power and Kazakhstan ranks among the five lowest nations for the degree of competition in the legislative and executive branches of government.

Nevertheless, the Kazakh government has a very high approval rating of 82%, placing it 11th on this variable. Almost four in ten Kazakhs approve of the country’s welfare programs, which is in line with global averages. In contrast, levels of public confidence in environmental policy are below the global average. Perceptions of corruption in government and business are relatively low, with Kazakhstan placing in the top 30 countries on this variable.

Nevertheless, the rule of law is relatively weak by global standards and the quality of regulation of business and the economy is among the bottom 30 on the Index, while 86% of Kazakhs have confidence in the armed forces and only 53% have confidence in the judiciary.

Political rights are very poor in Kazakhstan; just 11% of people had expressed an opinion to a public official in the year prior to being surveyed in 2011 and over half of the population has confidence in the honesty of the electoral process, which is above the international average. Despite differences, important similarities exist among CA States, with the exception of Kazakhstan where progress in judicial reforms, coupled with enrichment, has increased the role of its Government, while the decline in education and healthcare have lost momentum along with many other Soviet social achievements.
The biggest challenge lies in the nature of the rule of the groups in power, as this means that the foundations of political systems are shaky and are prone to shock and crises. The cornerstones of such rule are networks of patronage underpinning governance, the monopoly of the ruling group over the main assets, the dominant role of the security sector and a strong leader as a centerpiece of a political regime.

While some of Central Asia’s problems can undoubtedly be traced back to the circumstances of the Soviet collapse, many of the current sources of tension result from practices, which flourished at the time of independence and for Kazakhstan since the beginning of 1999, a series of corruption scandals arose and frequent changes of government disrupted economic policy.

### 5.1.4 Economy

Kazakhstan is the region’s economic powerhouse, with an economy larger than all the other Central Asian countries combined and a key investor in Kyrgyzstan, with investments in gas distribution, telecommunications and banking. An Agreement on Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments entered into force on 1 June 2005. This is in part due to the country’s significant hydrocarbon wealth - both oil and natural gas - full development of which could make the country one of the top five oil producers in the next decade.
In recent years, Kazakhstan has endeavored, with success, to implement a program of economic, social and political reforms. Kazakhstan’s economy is driven by the hydrocarbon sector and there are significant disparities in income levels and between the central and peripheral regions. Although efforts have been made by the EU, the main challenges continue to be the modernization of the public administration, developing good governance, including at the local level, diversification of the economy and social sector reform.

These challenges are reflected in the government’s strategies, which aim to achieve sustainable development for the country. By 2002 new oil extraction operations restored the GDP share of industry to about 30 percent and overall economic indicators rose substantially. The government engaged in widespread privatization, although many profitable enterprises went to members of the government-connected elite. The economy has remained poorly diversified, but oil has accounted for more than half of Kazakhstan’s industrial output, and many other industries are dependent on it.

Indeed, proven reserves include about 85 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 30 billion barrels of oil, concentrated in the massive Tengiz, Kashagan and Karachaganak fields. Production is already at 1.54 million barrels per day in 2009, and up to a third of GDP is generated by the oil and gas sector. Further sector development is expected to double productivity by 2019. A key economic goal is membership in the World Trade Organization where negotiations were active in late 2006. As oil continues to spur rapid growth, key goals of mid-term economic policy are diversifying the economic base by expanding non-oil manufacturing, raising agricultural productivity, and improving the environment for small and medium-sized enterprises.

In 2008, in order to underpin the objective of further strengthening its links with the EU, the Government of Kazakhstan, at the request of President Nazarbayev, adopted the “Path to Europe” Program, which was implemented in the period 2009 - 2011. The focus of the program aimed to promote economic cooperation, modernize Kazakhstan’s economy.

Despite this resource wealth, by some estimates about 20 percent of the population continues to subsist below the poverty line and Kazakhstan still lacks access to a major seaport and is reliant on overland pipelines, leaving exports vulnerable to regional geopolitics.

EU bilateral cooperation in 2011 was valued at roughly € 2.6 million, an increase of over 400 percent since 2001 and its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) accounted for about 25 percent of the country’s total, giving the European companies room for investment about € 3 million in Kazakhstan, mostly in the oil and gas sector.

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Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010


Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013


The reform of the judiciary has been identified by the Government of Kazakhstan as a top priority in its modernization program for state administration. Indeed, the Support to Strengthen the Judiciary program (€ 3.5 million) provides technical assistance for the development of a sector strategy for judicial reform, with a specific focus on capacity building and developing the legal framework to improve the investment climate for local and foreign investors.

The EU is sharing its own experience of modernizing public administration and building on previous EU programs, implementing the Public Sector Reform and Modernization program (€ 10
million). The Support to Kazakhstan’s Local Development Policies program (€ 15 million) launched in 2010 aims to transfer EU know-how and experience in territorial development, local governance and development policies. The program builds on achievements of the former policy development and advice program and is establishing synergies with the economic diversification and public sector reform programs, thus providing a coherent assistance framework for public sector reform and development.

Kazakhstan performs relatively well on a number of macroeconomic indicators. The country has one of the top 20 rates of gross domestic savings in the Index, at above 38% of GDP. The unemployment rate is almost 7%, in line with global averages and 65% of respondents to a 2011 survey indicated that they had paid or unpaid work, again one of the 20 highest rates in the Index.

Nevertheless, 36% of Kazakhs have a positive view of local employment opportunities, an above average figure, and overall levels of economic confidence are among the 30 highest in the world. The amount of physical capital available to workers and the size of the domestic market are just above global averages and in addition, high-tech goods account for 30% of manufactured goods exports, placing the country 10th on this variable. Kazakhstan also attracts one of the 20 highest rates of foreign direct investment in the Index, as measured by both net inflows and volatility.

There are, however, concerns over banking sector stability, over 20% of total bank loans are classed as non-performing, and fewer than six out of 10 Kazakhs express confidence in the financial sector.

5.1.5 Education

Access to primary education is relatively limited in Kazakhstan, with a net primary enrolment rate of 89%, ranking 87th globally. However, enrolment figures improve significantly at secondary and tertiary levels: Kazakhstan ranks 22nd and 50th respectively on these variables. There is near gender equality in primary and secondary education in Kazakhstan and primary school children are likely to get a fair amount of individual attention, with one teacher for every 16 pupils.

Measured subjectively, however, education quality is poor. Only two-thirds of people are satisfied with the education provided in their local areas, and just 68% feel that children have the opportunity to learn and grow every day; both figures rank in the bottom half of the Index. Nonetheless, high enrolment ensures the country has a relatively highly educated workforce. An average of 3.8 years of secondary education per worker ranks Kazakhstan eighth internationally, while 1.1 years of tertiary education per worker places the country 42nd on this variable.

Education is mandatory between ages seven and 15, where Primary school is a four-year period, followed by five years of mandatory secondary school. Two years of specialized secondary
school are optional. Beginning in the early 1990s, the primary language of instruction shifted from Russian to Kazakh, although in 2005 many institutions still were instructing in Russian. The public education system has declined since the Soviet era, in part because of insufficient funding and in part because the emigration of Russian and German scientific experts has exhausted the teaching corps in the technical fields.

From 1999 through 2005, government spending on education declined as a percentage of gross domestic products; it accounted for 3.5 percent of the budget in 2005. Between 2001 and 2005, enrollment in the primary grades decreased and programs to restructure the Soviet-era education system have not been completed. Between 1996 and 2004, the number of private education institutions nearly quadrupled; private schools increasingly are preferred by those who can afford them because of deterioration in the public system. In 2005 some 181 institutions of higher learning were in operation, attended by 747,100 students. Enrollment in higher education increased rapidly in the early 2000s, with some 1,440,700 students were enrolled in the 2001-2011.

5.1.6 Security & Safety

Kazakhstan has a moderate level of problems from refugees and internally displaced persons and from group grievances based on recent or historical injustices, ranking 48th and 57th on these variables in the Index. There are also reports of state-sponsored political violence, with relatively few Kazakhs feel safe expressing their political views, placing the country ranking in the bottom 30 on this variable.

There is a moderate level of demographic instability resulting from border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, or proximity to environmental hazards. Despite these national security issues, the flight of professionals, intellectuals, political dissidents and voluntary emigration of the middle class is the 33rd lowest worldwide. Government control of the media has increased in the early 2000s and newspaper and broadcast reporters have been beaten and imprisoned when government corruption became a major focus of reporting. As an additional control, the government has restricted access to printing and distribution facilities.

Killings of politicians in 2010 in Kazakhstan, seemingly the most stable Central Asian country, which the international observers began to see as having turned the corner of endemic post-Soviet mismanagement. Corruption is widely attributed to emerging succession struggles, although
in theory it seems too early for succession competition to unfold. Bureaucratic succession would be the most realistic option, but no preparation for this is visible.

Instead, some leaders continue to behave as if they are immortal and a crisis of succession in a fragile state can easily lead to social disorder. No Kazakhs died in episodes of civil violence in 2011 and personal safety is also relatively good overall. Just 4% of respondents reported being assaulted in the year prior to the 2011 survey and only 9% had property stolen in the same time frame.

Kazakhstan ranks 19th on this variable, nevertheless, only 58% feel safe walking alone at night, putting Kazakhstan below the global average for this variable. Besides monitoring cross-border trade, Kazakhstan’s border police are also seen as the first defense against trafficking, particularly the lucrative drug trade emanating from Afghanistan.

Border guards, who often work alongside customs officials and other law-enforcement officials, are seen as vulnerable to corruption and often jockey with rival agencies for a share of the profits.

This is especially true along the Kazakh-Chinese border, where China produces an estimated 80 percent of household goods sold to Kazakhstan’s middle-class consumers. Many traders prefer to offer bribes at the border rather than pay legal customs charges as punishingly high. The importance of education and training of the border Police is something that is totally dropped from the focus of the Government.

Some critics say this lack of autonomy has further hampered the service, particularly at a time when both terrorism fears and growing obligations to regional trade and security bodies like the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union have put a priority on border issues.

Although the critical foreign military link remains Russia, which is the main source of military equipment and personnel training, Kazakhstan is a signatory of the Collective Security Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan also has cultivated military links with the NATO, under the Partnership for Peace program, while U.S. and Kazakhstani troops have engaged in regular joint training exercises since 1997. Finally, Kazakhstan signed a five-year cooperation program supplying small amounts of U.S. military equipment. Police-wise, the government has used police to harass and incarcerate opposition journalists, political figures, and demonstrators. Human rights organizations have reported frequent incidents of police brutality. The secret police have been effective in discouraging
opposition organizations, but the regular police, who are poorly paid, are ineffective and often corrupt.

The government has successfully discouraged civil unrest except for demonstrations on specific issues such as pension arrears. Crime figures on Kazakhstan are not available, but organized narcotics smuggling and human trafficking have prospered in recent years because of Kazakhstan’s location between source countries and Russia and the ineffectiveness of border controls. Seizures of smuggled narcotics from Afghanistan increased substantially in 2011.

Although Islamic fundamentalism has no attraction for Kazakhstan’s Muslims, the government poses the terrorist threat as a pretext for domestic repression and in 2005 the Majlis banned the pan-Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization because of the group’s calls for an international Islamic government, hence Kazakhstan’s international diplomatic and economic position continued to advance region-wide, supporting antiterrorism campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

5.2 Kyrgyzstan

5.2.1 Geography

Location: Kyrgyzstan is located along the eastern border of the Central Asian region, southeast of Kazakhstan, west of China, east of Uzbekistan, and north of Tajikistan.

Size: The second-smallest of the five Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has an area of 198,500 square kilometres, of which 7,100 square kilometres is water.

Land Boundaries: Kyrgyzstan has 1,099 kilometres of border with Uzbekistan, 1,051 kilometres with Kazakhstan, 870 kilometres with Tajikistan, and 858 kilometres with China.

Disputed Territory: Kyrgyzstan has unresolved border disputes with Tajikistan (in the Isfara Valley to the southwest) and with Uzbekistan (on the status of Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere along the common border).

Length of Coastline: Kyrgyzstan is landlocked.

Principal Rivers: Kyrgyzstan has no navigable rivers. The Chu River arises in the mountains of northern Kyrgyzstan and flows northwest into Kazakhstan. The Naryn River arises in the Tien Shan Mountains of eastern Kyrgyzstan and crosses central Kyrgyzstan before meeting the Kara Darya to form the Syr Darya in the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley.

Natural Resources: Kyrgyzstan’s only mineral resource of economic value is gold. Substantial amounts of antimony and coal are present, but economic factors preclude large-scale
exploitation. Kyrgyzstan also has deposits of mercury, tin, tungsten, and uranium oxide. Most of Kyrgyzstan’s terrain is too mountainous to grow crops, but higher-elevation pastures support livestock rising.

**Environmental Factors:** Because it was not designated as a heavy industrial zone in the Soviet system, Kyrgyzstan has avoided the grave environmental problems encountered by the other Central Asian countries. The main problems are inefficient use and pollution of water resources, land degradation, and improper agricultural practices. Gold and uranium mining operations have leached toxic chemicals into soil and water in the eastern half of the country, and salinization is a problem along the eastern stretches of the Naryn River.

In the post-Soviet era, increased automobile use has made air pollution a problem in urban centres. Overuse of forest reserves also is an environmental issue. In 2004 an unusually high number of avalanches, floods, and landslides was attributed to the melting of glaciers in the eastern mountains. The Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations is the national enforcement agency for environmental policy, which is summarized in the National Environmental Action Plan. However, that plan is heavily subsidized and directed by international donors, and the president’s strong role in environmental policy has politicized some issues.

**5.2.2 Society**

**Population:** In 2006 Kyrgyzstan’s population was estimated at 5,213,898. The annual growth rate was 1.32 percent, while in the early 2000s, increased emigration of Russians and other minority nationalities with technical expertise has been an important economic issue. In 2005 the net migration rate was - 2.5 persons per 1,000 population. The population is concentrated in small areas in the north and southwest in the Chu (north-central), Fergana (southwestern), and Talas (northwestern) valleys. About two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, and that figure has risen as the predominantly urban Russian population decreases.

**Demography:** In 2006 some 31 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, and 6 percent was 65 years of age or older. The birthrate was 22.8 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate was 7.1 per 1,000 population. Infant mortality was 34.5 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy for the total population was 68.5 years: 72.7 years for females and 64.5 years for males. The fertility rate was 2.7 births per woman. In 2006 the population’s sex ratio was 0.96 males per female.

**Ethnic Groups:** According to the 1999 census, the following ethnic groups were present in Kyrgyzstan: 65 percent Kyrgyz, 14 percent Uzbek, 13 percent Russian, 1 percent Dungan (ethnic Chinese Muslim), 1 percent Tatar, 1 percent Uyghur, and 1 percent Ukrainian. Substantial numbers of Tajik refugees entered the country in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, about 15,000 Russians left
the country annually, while the Uzbek minority is concentrated around the southwestern city of Osh, and the Russian population is concentrated in Bishkek and adjacent Chu Province.

**Religion:** About 80 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population is Muslim, and 16 percent is Christian. The vast majority of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations are Sunni Muslims. The Kyrgyz practice a version of Islam that is influenced by earlier beliefs and practices and by the nomadic nature of earlier Kyrgyz society. This combination is most prevalent in the north, while the Islam practiced in the southwestern population centers (where the Uzbek minority is concentrated) resembles more closely that practiced elsewhere in Central Asia.

Most of the Russian population professes Russian Orthodoxy. In the post-Soviet era, some Protestant and Roman Catholic missionary activity has taken place, but proselytization has been discouraged officially and unofficially. A “black list” of harmful sects includes the Seventh Day Adventists, Ba’hai Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

**5.2.3 Governance**

In 1989 the liberalized policies of Communist Party First Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev ignited strife between the Kyrgyz and the minority Uzbek population in Osh Province. In the presidential election of 1990, the resulting general democratization movement led to the defeat of Communist Party by physicist Oskar Akayev.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Akayev took several steps to increase presidential power vis-à-vis the legislative branch, including questionable referenda and suppression of opposition groups. Before the 2000 presidential election, chief rival for the presidency was imprisoned.

In 2001 Kyrgyzstan offered the United States an air base at Manas Airport in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, reinforcing relations with the United States but increasing tension with Russia.

In February 2005, international monitors declared the first round of national parliamentary elections to have been unfair. In March the protests that arose in response, which came to be known as the Tulip Revolution, forced Akayev to flee into exile.

During the elections, the International Community provided support for election administration, training for political parties, assistance with televised candidate debates, support for civil society engagement and robust election monitoring efforts.

With EU and U.S. support, civil society has taken a more prominent role in public life, particularly with their mandated participation in public supervisory boards that include oversight of
government ministries and the public broadcaster. One example of I.C. support for civil society stabilization and reconciliation efforts through small grants was a successful SMS news service, which sends text messages via mobile phone in Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek.

In 2009, the four donors, plus the World Bank, established a multi-donor trust fund to support public finance management reforms. Activities include strengthening the budgeting process, improving the midterm budget framework, improving the internal audit function, and building capacity in the Ministry of Finance and for public finance management training providers.

Despite the political crises of 2010, Kyrgyzstan held a constitutional referendum and successful and competitive parliamentary and presidential elections, all of which reflected the will of the people. The peaceful and democratic presidential transition in 2011 marked the first such transfer of power in the country’s history.

Indeed, the people of the Kyrgyz Republic witnessed the successful transition of power following the October 2011 presidential election, the first such peaceful, democratic transfer in Central Asia. The E.U. provided assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic to support its transition to a stable, democratic country, strengthening democratic institutions, promote regional security, and support the rule of law and broad-based economic opportunity. Rapid deployment of E.U. and NATO humanitarian assistance helped stabilize conflict-affected areas, alleviating suffering of those affected.

Moreover, the EU contribution to the trust fund is € 2.8 million. Under the Operational program on Good Governance for Social Justice (€ 3 million) the EU and several UN agencies have been working together to improve access to social services for children, youth and women in 30 selected municipalities. The program also serves to strengthen the capacity of government institutions and civil society organizations for mutual dialogue and for planning and delivering quality social services, and to increase public awareness, dialogue and demand for quality social services.

Rule of law and judicial reform is one of the main areas of cooperation identified in the Multi-annual Indicative Program for 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 there are several supporting interventions. Through the project Supporting Prison Reform in the Kyrgyz Republic (€ 3 million) the EU is supporting the State Service for Execution of Punishments in policy formulation and design for prison reform.

This project addresses the internal training capacity of the institutions and helps to improve their financial effectiveness. It also supports income-generating activities in the prisons as well as improving sanitary premises in selected prisons to enhance hygiene and prevent the spread of disease. Following the April 2010 political crisis, the EU, with the support of the Venice
Commission, the Council of Europe advisory body on constitutional matters, provided important and rapid assistance to the Kyrgyz interim authorities in drafting a new Constitution.

Further support to the constitutional referendum and the legislative elections in October 2010 was quickly provided through a Democratization and Stabilization Package (€ 7.2 million) financed by the EU Instrument for Stability. After the elections, actions have focused on capacity building for new institutions, conflict prevention (e.g. addressing inter-ethnic relations) and social stabilization (e.g. engaging unemployed youth in labor activities and vocational training).

However, Courts often do not observe the nominal right to counsel and to presumption of innocence of the accused. Prisons are overcrowded and have serious shortages of food and medical support. In the early 2000’s, tuberculosis and human immunodeficiency virus rates in prisons were high and authorities were accused of having lost control of the prison population when a major prison riot occurred in November 2005. The reporters of some independent media outlets have been harassed and threatened acts of violence have occurred, and copies of independent newspapers have been confiscated.

5.2.4 Economy

Prior to 1991, Kyrgyzstan’s economy was highly dependent on the economy of the Soviet Union. The loss of key Soviet inputs caused severe economic contraction in the 1990s and has required substantial restructuring. The market reform program pursued in the 1990s has been partly abandoned as the state assumed a greater planning role in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Agriculture and services are the most important sectors, as industry remains concentrated in specific regions and outputs and in the early 2000’s, workers have moved from industry to subsistence agriculture as industrial enterprises fail. A Comprehensive Development Framework has set economic goals from 2001 to 2010, with strong guidance from international financial institutions. As much as 50 percent of the gross domestic product is contributed by the gray economy.

The government has launched two major programs to privatize state enterprises, which by 2003 had shifted about 7,000 enterprises to the private sector. However, domestic opposition and low foreign investment have slowed the rate of privatization. In 2006 widespread unemployment was a major cause of large-scale street demonstrations. In 2010, the Kyrgyz Republic’s economy contracted significantly due to political instability and E.U. assistance helped to restore food and animal feed production levels. Middle 2000, the E.U has started with a $4.1 million voucher program which supplied 3,600 metric tons of quality seed to 34,000 farmers, enabling them to produce at least $20 million more food than in the previous year.
Besides this, in the early 2000s, international funding upgraded the main airport, Manas, at Bishkek and a smaller facility at Osh. In 2006 Manas was the only one of Kyrgyzstan’s 37 airports with a runway longer than 3,000 meters and the only airport supporting international flights. Smaller airports provide connections among domestic destinations.

The state agency Kyrgyzaltyn owns all mines, many of which are operated as joint ventures with foreign companies. Uranium and antimony, important mineral outputs of the Soviet era, no longer are produced in significant amounts. Investment and restructuring have remained at low levels and the electricity industry (traditionally an important part of industry’s contribution to GDP) has stagnated in recent years. Government support is moving away from the machine industries, which were a major contributor to the Soviet economy, toward clothing and textiles.

The limitations of Kyrgyzstan’s pipeline system are a major impediment to fuel distribution, with 367 kilometers of natural gas pipeline and 16 kilometers of oil pipeline in 2003, after adding 167 kilometers of natural gas pipeline in 2006.

However, Kyrgyzstan’s isolated geographic position and import requirements have hindered the development of trade relations outside the former Soviet Union. Business environment reforms resulted in estimated costs savings of $110 million for entrepreneurs and the Kyrgyz Republic jumped from 99th to 47th place in the World Bank’s Doing Business report in just three years. The need to reform revenue collection and allocation systems has delayed a planned revision of the state unemployment insurance system.²

The government’s 10-year Comprehensive Development Framework includes a poverty reduction program supported by the International Monetary Fund.

The first E.U. Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development and Cooperation Instrument allocated € 55 million for bilateral programs with Kyrgyzstan. The second Multi-annual Indicative Program for the period 2011-13 earmarked € 51 million for bilateral cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. The indicative priority areas for cooperation during this period are social protection reform and rural development activities, education reform, and judicial reform and rule of law.

Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010


Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013

5.2.5 Education

The need to reform the education system in Kyrgyzstan has been identified by the Kyrgyz Government as one of the most urgent social development priorities. In 2003 some 4.5 percent of gross domestic product was spent on education.

In 2003 the literacy rate in Kyrgyzstan was 98.7 percent, with education compulsory for nine years, between ages seven and 15. Following four years of primary and five years of lower secondary school, the system offers two years of upper secondary school, specialized secondary school, or vocational/technical school.

In 2004 some 89 percent of the relevant age-group was enrolled in the compulsory program, but this figure has decreased in the late 2000’s. In 2005 some 49 institutions of higher learning were operating, most notably the Kyrgyz State University, Kyrgyz Technical University and Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University. The majority of primary and secondary schools teach in Kyrgyz, but the language of instruction in the higher institutions is Russian. Budget cuts that have reduced teacher salaries and equipment availability are reflected disproportionately in reduced numbers of female students.

The EU, although a recent donor in the education field in Kyrgyzstan, has nevertheless adopted a long-term approach. Through the Support for the Kyrgyz Education Sector program (€ 5.5 million) the EU is providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Education to help it refine the current education policy and build up the institutional and human resources capacity for formulation, management and monitoring of a future sector strategy. The Ministry of Education and its regional branches will be technically upgraded with equipment and necessary software for financial management.

Under the Multi-annual Indicative Program 2007-10, further assistance to the education sector was planned in the amount of € 20 million. The Commission and EU Member States are helping to determine education sector strategies with the catalyst fund, Education for All - Fast Track Initiative. This is a global partnership between donors and developing countries for accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015.

The EU has been one of the leading donors for the reform of the social protection system in Kyrgyzstan, providing significant financial resources, policy advice and technical assistance over the years. The Sector Policy Support Program in Social Protection and Public Finance Management (€ 40 million) receives both geographic and thematic funding since 2007. Additional funds (€ 13 million) have been earmarked in the Multi-annual Indicative Program 2011-13.
5.2.6 Security & Safety

In the post-Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan has joined several regional organizations in an effort to improve its security and economic position, among those organizations is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Asian Development Bank, Central Asian Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty Organization (of the Commonwealth of Independent States), Economic Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Community, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Food and Agriculture Organization.

Moreover, it has also joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), International Monetary Fund, International Organization for Migration, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Partnership for Peace (of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), United Nations, United Nations Committee on Trade and Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Universal Postal Union, World Customs Organization, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Health Organization, and World Trade Organization. Because such organizations have not had the intended effect, Kyrgyzstan’s meaningful foreign relations have largely been bilateral.

Between terrorist attacks that occurred in 1999 and 2003, military spending increased by about 50 percent, but the armed forces did not grow significantly during that period, while the ground forces constitute the main fighting element. Kyrgyzstan has suffered incursions by terrorist groups (notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—IMU) from hotbeds of Islamic insurgent activity in nearby Tajikistan and the Fergana Valley.

In 1999 Islamic terrorists took a group of Japanese and Kyrgyzstani hostages in Kyrgyzstan, and an Islamic insurgency continued in Batken and Osh in 2000. In 2003 a series of minor incidents in Osh were attributed to terrorists. Those events showed that Kyrgyzstan did not have sufficient security forces to prevent a major terrorist incursion. Events in 2006 caused speculation about a possible resurgence of the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in that area. As of 2006, membership in the security-oriented Shanghai Cooperation Organization had not materially improved Kyrgyzstan’s border security. A bilateral border treaty with China has improved security to the east.

The SCO membership assumed particular meaning for Kyrgyzstan in 2005 as the SCO, assuming a more active geopolitical role than previously, urged that Kyrgyzstan expel U.S. troops stationed there. Relations with Russia have remained a primary concern because Kyrgyzstan had been unusually dependent on the Soviet structure in security and economic matters. After the
posting of U.S. troops in Kyrgyzstan for the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan in 2002, President Akayev sought to balance that presence with ongoing Russian interests.

However, U.S. influence diminished in September 2005 as Russia concluded a bilateral agreement with Kyrgyzstan. Since 2000 tensions with Uzbekistan have increased because of disputes over the two countries’ fuel-for-power arrangement and Uzbekistan’s unilateral steps against cross-border terrorist organizations. Uzbekistan’s mining of the common border has brought complaints from Kyrgyzstan. In 2005 more than 500 refugees from the Andijon crisis in Uzbekistan fled to Kyrgyzstan, causing further tension when Uzbekistan demanded their return.

In 2011 Kyrgyzstan’s army had 8,500 active personnel and its air force had 4,000 active personnel, with some 57,000 individuals were in military reserve status and the paramilitary Border Guard Service had 5,000 troops. None of the neighbor countries constitute a conventional military threat to Kyrgyzstan. The porous southern and western borders, however, have allowed terrorist groups to enter and occupy southwestern Kyrgyzstan from the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan.

Corruption and incompetence in the police force have led to uncontrolled crime in urban parts of Kyrgyzstan and in 2005 and 2006, the Bakiyev government came under increased criticism for failing to control criminal organizations as incidents of violent crime increased.

Kyrgyzstan’s location between Tajikistan (a major transit country for narcotics from Afghanistan) and Russia has made the western part of Kyrgyzstan a major transit region for narcotics and human trafficking, with related increases in overall crime. Since middle 2000, domestic narcotics production and abuse have grown sharply and in 2011 Kyrgyzstan had the third-highest rate of opium addiction in the world. Domestic crime groups also have become linked increasingly with transnational groups. In the Fergana Valley, tension exists between citizens of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over land and housing rights.

Domestic forces have been upgraded somewhat in 2000’s, but Kyrgyzstan likely would need assistance from Russia or Uzbekistan to counter a serious insurgency. In the recent years, Kyrgyzstan received by I.C. about 2 billion to combat domestic terrorism as part of the new Manas rental agreement.

The E.U. provided in-depth interactive training to prosecutors throughout Kyrgyzstan and training and equipment to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and other law enforcement and justice system agencies.
5.3 Tajikistan

5.3.1 Geography

**Location:** Tajikistan is located on the southern edge of the Central Asian group of nations, bordering Afghanistan to the south, China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, and Uzbekistan to the west.

**Size:** The smallest of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Tajikistan has an area of 143,100 square kilometers, of which 400 square kilometers is water.

**Land Boundaries:** The border with Afghanistan is 1,206 kilometers; with Uzbekistan, 1,161 kilometers; with Kyrgyzstan, 870 kilometers; and with China, 414 kilometers.

**Disputed Territory:** Tajikistan has a territorial dispute with Kyrgyzstan over land in the Isfara Valley in the far northeast, and full demarcation of the border with Uzbekistan has been delayed by Uzbekistan’s mining of its borders.

**Length of Coastline:** None. Tajikistan is landlocked.
**Principal Rivers:** In Tajikistan’s dense river network, the largest rivers are the Syr Darya, the Amu Darya (called the Panj in its upper reaches in Tajikistan), the Vakhsh (called the Surkhob in its upper reaches in Tajikistan) and the Kofarnihon. The Amu Darya carries more water than any other river in Central Asia. The Vakhsh is an important source of hydropower.

**Natural Resources:** Tajikistan’s most notable resources are rich deposits of gold, silver and antimony and the water power provided by its rivers. About 85 percent of arable land requires irrigation to grow cotton and grain, the main crops.

**Environmental Factors:** The major environmental problems are concentrations of agricultural chemicals and salts in the soil and groundwater, pockets of high air pollution caused by industry and motor vehicles, water pollution from agricultural runoff and disposal of untreated industrial waste and sewage, poor management of water resources, and soil erosion.

Soil erosion affects an estimated 70 percent of irrigated land, and overgrazing also contributes to soil erosion. Air pollution is a particular problem during times of the year when atmospheric conditions hold industrial and vehicle emissions close to the surface in urban areas. In summer, dust and sand from the deserts of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan cause air pollution across the entire southwestern lowland region.

A large Soviet-era uranium mining operation left poorly constructed repositories of radioactive waste in northwestern Tajikistan. Other operations in Tajikistan extracted and processed gold, antimony, tungsten, mercury and molybdenum, each of which is known to leave toxic waste. The Kofarnihon, Zarafshon, and Vakhsh rivers pass through heavily polluting industrial regions of the country, carrying pollutants into the Amu Darya and thence to the Aral Sea. The expansion of aluminum processing at Tursunzade, a key but long-delayed economic goal, would increase industrial pollution in the Dushanbe region. Tajikistan’s withdrawal of water for irrigation from the Syr Darya and tributaries of the Amu Darya also influences the quantity of water downstream. Therefore, Tajikistan’s water management policies are a regional concern.

**5.3.2 Society**

**Population:** In 2006 Tajikistan’s population was estimated at 7,320,815 people. The growth rate was 2.19 percent per year and the average density was 51.3 people per square kilometer, but the population was concentrated heavily in the western, southwestern, and northwestern regions. Some 30 percent of the population was classified as urban, the lowest percentage among the former Soviet republics. In 2006 an estimated 700,000 Tajikistanis, mostly men, spent some or all of the year as migrant workers in Russia and other countries, creating a significant male-female imbalance in the adult population. In 2006 the net migration rate was about - 2.5 per 1,000 population.
**Demography:** In 2006 some 37.9 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, and only 4.8 percent was 65 years of age or older. The birthrate was 32.6 births per 1,000 population. The death rate was 8.3 per 1,000 population. In the early 2000s, estimates of the infant mortality rate have varied widely, from 54 to 111 deaths per 1,000 live births, according to differing standards of calculation. In 2006 overall life expectancy was 64.9 years: 62 years for males, 68 years for females. The fertility rate, four children per woman, was the highest among the former Soviet republics.

**Ethnic Groups:** Tajiks are the country’s largest ethnic group, with Uzbeks making up a quarter of the population, over half of which is employed in agriculture and just one-fifth in industry. Nearly half of Tajikistan’s population is under 14 years of age.

According to the 2000 census, 79.9 percent of the population was Tajik, 15.3 percent Uzbek, 1.1 percent Russian, and 1.1 percent Kyrgyz. Smaller ethnic groups include Germans, Jews, Koreans, Turkmen and Ukrainians. Between the censuses of 1989 and 2000, the Uzbek population decreased from 23.5 percent to 15.3 percent, and the Russian population decreased from 7.6 percent to 1.1 percent.

In the same period, the Tajik population increased from 62.3 percent to nearly 80 percent. Particularly in the Fergana Valley, intermarriage between Tajiks and Uzbeks has essentially merged the two groups. The Russian population is concentrated in Dushanbe and Khujand. Since 2000 the rate of Russian emigration has slowed. Tajikistanis also have a strong regional affiliation: mountains divide the country into northern and southern regions, whose rivalry spurred the civil war of the 1990s.

**Languages:** The official state language is Tajik, which is related to Persian. Russian is widely used in government and business, and Uzbek is the main language of about 25 percent of the population. Variants of Tajik are spoken in the mountains of the autonomous province of Gorno–Badakhshan, Tajikistan’s eastern region. The Tajik language is very close to Persian, spoken in Iran and to Dari, spoken in Afghanistan.

**Religion:** Some 85 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim and 5 percent, Shia Muslim. The Pamiri population of the autonomous province of Gorno–Badakhshan is mainly of the Ismaili sect of Shia Islam. About 3 percent of the population is Christian, mainly Russian Orthodox and concentrated in Dushanbe. Small groups of other Christian denominations and a small Jewish community also exist.
5.3.3 Governance

The five-year civil war between the Moscow-backed government and the Islamist-led opposition, in which up to 50,000 people were killed and over one-tenth of the population fled the country, ended in 1997 with a United Nations-brokered peace agreement. Tajikistan is a republic with three branches of government dominated by the executive branch. The current constitution was adopted in 1994 and amended significantly in 1999 and 2003. Political stability has improved since the civil war ended in 1997, but in order to gain control of certain areas, the central government has compromised and forged alliances among regional factions and clans, which retain substantial political influence.

Particularly important is the rivalry between politicians of the northern regions and those of the south and the accumulated power of southerner President Imomali Rakhmonov’s clique has caused substantial resentment in the north, which had held a dominant position in the Soviet era. The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but bribery and nepotism are endemic in the political system.

The Supreme Court is the highest court and other high courts include the Supreme Economic Court and the Constitutional Court, which decides questions of constitutionality. The president appoints the judges of these three courts, with the approval of the legislature, with judges of all courts are appointed to 10-year terms. Suffrage is universal for citizens 18 years of age and older and a new election law passed in 2004 has received international criticism for its restrictive candidate registration requirements.

Election requires an absolute majority of votes, if no candidate gains a majority, a second round is held between the top two vote getters. In the early 2000’s, independent political parties continued to exist, but their operations were circumscribed and their influence marginal. The governing People’s Democratic Party (PDP) gained strength as some opposition party leaders joined the government and others were disqualified from participation in elections. The Communist Party of Tajikistan, a nominal opposition party that has supported President Rakhmonov on most issues, has lost support since 2000.

In the post-Soviet era, newspaper circulation has decreased sharply because of the high expense of materials and the poverty of the population. As a result of government pressure and refusal of license renewals, no opposition newspapers were operating in the run-up to the 2006 presidential election.

Tajikistan is divided into three main provinces: Soghd (formerly Leninobod), including all of the northwestern part of the country; Khatlon, including all of the southwest, and the autonomous province of Gorno–Badakhshan, which covers the entire sparsely populated eastern half of the
The country, with Dushanbe, the capital, is administered separately from the rest of all provinces. Because of its isolated location, Tajikistan continues to rely chiefly on economic, military, and political support from Russia.

In turn, Russia has used Tajikistan as a foothold in Central Asia and in 2005 Tajikistan owed Russia about US$300 million and remittances from Tajik migrant workers in Russia were an important source of national income. With Russia’s approval, Tajikistan offered the United States use of air bases in the anti-Taliban campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-2. In the early 2000’s, Tajikistan has sought closer economic ties with the United States and U.S. military and humanitarian aid increased significantly. From the U.S. perspective, Tajikistan became more important as a base in Central Asia when neighboring Uzbekistan rejected reforms and cooperation with the United States late 2000’s.

Tajikistan has signed a series of bilateral treaties with China, improving relations with that powerful neighbor, while Iran was a key facilitator of the 1997 accord ending Tajikistan’s civil war. In the early 2000’s, Iran, the traditional rival of Russia for influence in Tajikistan, has funded major projects such as the completion of the Sangtuda hydroelectric power plant. Following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, Tajikistan’s relations with that country have improved substantially and relations with neighboring Uzbekistan, however, remain problematic.

Key bilateral issues include the ostensible presence of terrorist groups in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan’s mining of the common border and disputed allocation of Tajikistan’s water resources. Tajikistan’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan) has not provided the expected improvement of commercial or security conditions.

5.3.4 Economy

Tajikistan’s economy, which had been the poorest in the Soviet Union, was severely disrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the civil war of 1992–97. With independence, Tajikistan lost the nearly 50 percent of its state revenue that had come as transfers from Moscow, as well as barter arrangements that brought food from other republics in exchange for cotton and aluminum.

The civil war disrupted both agricultural and industrial production. Particularly hard-hit was the cotton industry, a key economic element in the Soviet era. The output of aluminum, Tajikistan’s most important industrial product, has not approached the pre-independence level in the early 2000s. Economic reform has been uneven, privatization has occurred mainly in the services sector, and the overall economy remains a command-and-control system.

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The European Union has been supporting the health sector in Tajikistan since 2007, mainly through institutional strengthening, support to the implementation and financing of a National Health Strategy and by contributing to the improvement of the Health Management Information System. These reforms have been assisted by the projects Development of a Health Management Information System (€ 1 million) and Health Sector Support Strategy (€ 5 million).

In 2010, encouraged by the EU budget support benchmarks, Tajikistan raised the priority of the health sector and started to increase its relative share of government spending. The country also adopted a comprehensive National Health Strategy which includes an action plan for 2011-13.

In 2009, the Commission has striven to promote agriculture-related private sector development through the project Support to Private Sector Development (€ 7 million). The project's finance framework component has been improving access to finance for Dehkan farmers to purchase supplies, and has been advising them on efficiency measures. The methodology developed by the project is now used by most Tajik banks to provide credit to farmers.

In 2011, the EU plans to support a comprehensive package for both health and social protection with a Human Development Support Program (€ 40 million), including capacity development assistance for ongoing reforms in these sectors, and continued improvements to the health information systems. Since 2008, the Social Protection Sector Policy Support Program (€ 34 million) has been providing assistance to support reforms of the pension system, social insurance, insurance and labor market policies.

The EU is also supporting the development of a more business enabling environment in Tajikistan. It is helping to build up the strategic, legal and regulatory framework, improve the government’s capacity to implement reforms, and increase opportunities for accessing finance. The project Support to the Establishment of a Single Window for Export, Import and Transit Procedure (€ 2 million) has allowed for a simplification of procedures for businesses in the area of trade.

Notably, the country improved its position in the ‘Doing Business’ 2011 ranking to 139, from 149 in 2010 (out of 183 countries worldwide). In addition, following the soaring world food prices of 2008, Tajikistan was selected to receive funds from the EU Global Food Facility. This allocation was shared between two projects: Support to Social Safety Nets (€ 7.8 million) and Public Employment for Sustainable Agriculture and Water Management (€ 7.8 million).

The first project channels funds through sector budget support for social protection, i.e. the pension fund. The second project is helping to mitigate the risk of soaring food prices in Khatlon Oblast by increasing household food security while generating temporary employment. Moreover, in 2010, the EU allocated € 2 million under the Food Security thematic program to strengthen the country’s Food Security Information System.
Macroeconomic support projects and technical assistance, under the TACIS and the more recent projects, Public Finance Management Modernization (€ 2 million) and Public Finance Management and Institutional Capacity Development (€ 3 million), have contributed to the improvement of the capacity of the Ministry of Finance for budget planning. Activities have included macroeconomic modeling and forecasting, development of the medium term expenditure framework, automation of the local budget preparation process, internal audit and financial control, and surveillance of state-owned enterprises.

In 2011, these efforts led to a new public finance law and the establishment of a national court of auditors. Tajikistan has faced severe budget constraints over the past two decades and the social protection system has no longer been able to meet the basic needs of the poor.

The first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development and Cooperation Instrument allocated € 66 million for bilateral programs with Tajikistan. An additional € 62 million was allocated by the second Multi-annual Indicative Program for the period 2011-13. The focus continues to be on priority areas of social protection, health, private sector development linked with agriculture, and public finance management.

### Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010

![Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010](image)

Tajikistan’s economy has never really recovered from the civil war, and poverty is widespread. In 2005 Tajikistan’s GDP grew by 6.7 percent, to about US $1.89 billion and growth for 2006 was about 8 percent, marking the fifth consecutive year of annual growth exceeding 6 percent. The official forecast for GDP growth in 2011 is 7.5 percent. Per capita GDP in 2005 was US $ 258, lowest among the 15 countries of the former Soviet Union. In 2007 services contributed 48 percent, agriculture 23.4 percent, and industry 28.6 percent to GDP. Almost half of GDP is earned by migrants working abroad, especially in Russia, but the recession in 2009 threatened that income. The country is also dependent on oil and gas imports.

Economic hardship is seen as a contributing to a renewed interest in Islam - including more radical forms - among young Tajiks and the country has been accused by its neighbors of tolerating the presence of training camps for Islamist rebels on its territory, an accusation which it has strongly denied. Economic ties with neighboring China are extensive. China has extended credits and has helped to build roads, tunnels and power infrastructure. Chinese firms are investing in oil and gas exploration and in gold mining.

5.3.5 Education

School attendance is mandatory between the ages of seven and 17, but many children fail to attend because of economic needs and security concerns in some regions. The core years of school attendance include four years of primary school and two stages of secondary school, lasting five and

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two years, respectively. In 2001 preprimary enrollment was less than 6 percent of eligible children. At all levels, Tajikistan’s education system suffers from a useless infrastructure and an acute shortage of teachers, which will increase because of the relatively high birthrate. The state-supported Soviet system remains in place, but the poor condition of the national economy and years of civil war sharply reduced funding in the early 2000s, although government spending began to increase in 2004. In 2005 the total government expenditure on education was about US$80 million, 15.9 percent of the national budget. The figure was scheduled to rise to US$108 million, 17.3 percent of the budget, in 2006. A presidential program raised the salaries of teachers by 25 percent in 2005. The official literacy rate is 98 percent, but the poor quality of education since 1991 has reduced skills in the younger generations. Some private schools and colleges have appeared in urban centers, and some Russian and Uzbek schools exist. Tajik is the main language of instruction through secondary school, but in 2003 Russian was restored as a mandatory subject. Some 33 institutions of higher learning were operating in 2003, when a constitutional amendment abolished free higher education, that year total enrollment was 96,600.

5.3.6 Security & Safety

Tajikistan has relied heavily on Russian assistance to counter continuing security problems and cope with the dire economic situation. Skirmishes with drug smugglers crossing illegally from Afghanistan occur regularly, as Tajikistan is the first stop on the drugs route from there to Russia and the West.

Russia maintains military garrisons in Tajikistan and in 2004 took back control over a former Soviet space monitoring centre, since 2005 Tajikistan depended heavily for border control on 12,000 troops of the Russian Federal Border Guard (which includes Tajikistani enlisted personnel). These developments were widely seen as a sign of Russia’s wish to counter increased EU and US influence in Central Asia.

Russia is also mindful of the planned NATO pullout of Afghanistan in 2014 and is keen to maintain security in the region.

In 2011, at least 42 people including 12 soldiers and 30 rebels have been killed in fighting in the remote Tajik region of Gorno-Badakhshan, due to the fatal stabbing of a top security forces, State Committee on National Security (GKNB) regional head, leading to military action against local opposition strongman Tolib Ayombekov.

People were trapped in their homes because of the heavy fighting in the streets, where armoured vehicles have been seen and dozens of people have been reported wounded, while the dead included more than 100 military personnel and about 200 civilians.
Security forces decided to use force after Mr Ayombekov refused to surrender, who was a member of the opposition which fought against the government during Tajikistan’s civil war in the 1990’s. This kind of operation was another attempt by the Tajik government, which has little influence in the area, to bring Gorno-Badakhshan under its full control. The pre-dawn attack on fighters loyal to Mr Ayombekov deep in the Pamir mountains underlines the continuing instability of the impoverished former Soviet republic 15 years after the end of a civil war.

EU financial support has helped turn a crumbling Soviet-era compound into a modern training facility for Tajikistan’s future border guards, while their training is important, with almost 1,400km (870 miles) of mountainous border with Afghanistan, a frontier that is challenging to police.

But after the Russians left, the EU and US began assisting with border security, implementing various projects from border guard training to supplying outposts with modern equipment in order to deter drugs, arms and terrorists can flow across the border. Of course one of main reason why they are spending money in Tajikistan is because the Central Asian nation is on a new supply route for US and NATO troops deployment in Afghanistan.

The route is known as the Northern Distribution Network, the NDN, it is a series of rail, water and road links via Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia through which non-lethal military cargo such as construction materials, fuel and medicine is transported to troops in Afghanistan.

The NDN is an alternative to the main supply route via Pakistan which is under constant Taliban attack, where 40% of supplies for US and NATO troops are now shipped via the NDN making sure that we are able to fully support our troops, fully support our development efforts in Afghanistan.

The US has a long-term aim of boosting trade between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors and for this purpose in 2007 it built a major bridge linking Afghanistan with Tajikistan.

Although most of the NDN cargo enters Afghanistan via Uzbekistan, the Nizhny Pyanj bridge also serves as an important connection point, with trucks that carry US and NATO supplies. Tajikistan already has major security challenges, with reports of armed drug gangs making incursions into Tajik territory, with Taliban fighters trying to cross the border.

In addition to reported incursions, however, there has also been a decline in the internal security situation, where more than 60 soldiers and Special Forces personnel have been killed in incidents in 2011. Tajikistan was also shaken by its first suicide bombing in September against a police station in the northern town of Khujand, where a number of officers were killed.

The government blames religious extremists for the violence and recently launched a campaign to bring back young Tajik men studying at religious schools abroad and the President has
publicly claimed that many scholars are returning home as terrorists. For this reason both EU and
NATO do not want Tajikistan to import Afghanistan’s problems.

All over Tajikistan it is now possible to see evidence of the renewed interest in Islam, where
CDs and DVDs of radical preachers are openly on sale at markets and outside mosques and in some
areas it is no longer possible to buy alcohol or tobacco, with female on the streets wearing the
burka.

But it is evident that militant groups operating inside and outside Central Asia see poverty-
stricken and fragile Tajikistan as a weak spot in the regional armor. Over the past 18 months there
have been reports of IMU fighters moving across Afghanistan into the northern districts bordering
Tajikistan.

In early September, IMU fighters were involved in a violent jail break in Dushanbe that left
six prison guards dead. They are also thought to be behind several attacks on a Tajik army convoy
in a remote eastern area and these incidents are just the latest in a string of militant attacks across
Tajikistan in 2011.

The government’s response has been to crack down on the Islamists and hundreds of young
people have been arrested and jailed, but the hard-line approach does not seem to be working. It is
only hardening the resolve of a new generation who sees their government as corrupt and morally
bankrupt and Islam as the only real alternative.

5.4 Turkmenistan

5.4.1 Geography

Location: Turkmenistan, the farthest southwest of the former Soviet republics of Central
Asia, is located on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. To the south is Iran, to the south and east is
Afghanistan, and to the north are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Size: Turkmenistan occupies 488,100 square kilometers, almost all of which is land surface.

Land Boundaries: The length of Turkmenistan’s borders with neighboring countries is as
follows: with Uzbekistan, 1,621 kilometers; Iran, 922 kilometers; Afghanistan, 744 kilometers; and
Kazakhstan, 379 kilometers.

Disputed Territory: Boundary disputes with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were settled by
treaties signed in 2001 and 2004, respectively.

Length of Coastline: Turkmenistan’s only coastline, along the Caspian Sea, is 1,768
kilometers long.
**Maritime Claims:** Turkmenistan has an ongoing dispute with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan over division of the Caspian seabed, which contains deposits of oil and other natural resources.

**Principal Rivers:** The most important river is the Amu Darya, which flows across northeastern Turkmenistan, thence eastward to form the southern borders of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Other major rivers are the Tejen (1,124 kilometers), the Murgap (852 kilometers), and the Atrek (660 kilometers).

**Natural Resources:** By far the most plentiful natural resources are natural gas and oil. Reserves of gas, estimated in 2005 at 2 trillion cubic meters (fifteenth in the world), could rise to as much as 9 trillion cubic meters if the newly discovered Iolotan field is as large as predicted. Reserves of oil are estimated at 500 million barrels. Small amounts of salt and gypsum are extracted. Agricultural land generally is of poor quality and requires intensive irrigation.

**Environmental Factors:** Turkmenistan has fewer critical water- and air-pollution problems than most of the other former Soviet republics because it has relatively little heavy industry, a low concentration of motor vehicles, and low population density. Turkmenistan’s major environmental problems are the various effects of the desiccation of the Aral Sea; contamination of soil and groundwater by agricultural chemicals; desertification, which is reducing the stock of arable land; and a complex of conditions resulting from water levels and industrialization on the Caspian Sea.

Related to the first two problems is an intensifying shortage of water, which is an absolute requirement for the development of agriculture, industry, and large population centers anywhere in the country.

**5.4.2 Society**

**Population:** In 2006 Turkmenistan’s population was estimated at 5,042,920. The annual growth rate was 1.8 percent and in 2006 some 55 percent of the population lived in rural areas. Population density, 10.3 people per square kilometer overall, varies greatly between desert areas and areas where water is available, while in the first post-Soviet years (1991–95), Turkmenistan experienced a strong rate of immigration as ethnic Turkmen returned to their homeland, but by 2006 the net migration rate was -0.75 per 1,000 population.

**Ethnic Groups:** In 2003 the population of Turkmenistan was 85 percent Turkmen, 5 percent Uzbek, and 4 percent Russian, smaller ethnic groups, in order of size, are Tatar, Kazakh, Ukrainian, Azeri, and Armenian. The Turkmen are divided into five major tribes: the Ersary, Goklen, Teke, Yasyr, and Yomut. The Teke, to which President Niyazov belonged, predominate in top cultural and political positions. In the early 2000’s, government and societal discrimination against minority
citizens, particularly Russians, has increased the rate of emigration and squandered the fund of Russian technical expertise. Dual Russian-Turkmenistani citizenship was abolished in 2003.

Languages: In 2003 officially 72 percent of citizens spoke Turkmen, the official state language. Some 12 percent spoke Russian, and 9 percent spoke Uzbek. Russian is spoken mainly in urban areas, and Uzbek is spoken mainly in northern Turkmenistan. Since the late 1990’s, the government has discouraged the use of Russian. In 2000 President Niyazov decreed that all governmental office holders and officials in higher education must speak Turkmen, and a campaign has sought to abolish non-Turkmen instruction in institutions of higher learning. No Russian-language newspapers or radio broadcasts were permitted as of 2005.

Religion: Turkmenistan has no state religion, with an estimated 89 percent of the population practices Sunni Islam and 9 percent, Russian Orthodoxy. Islam in Turkmenistan often includes elements of mysticism and shamanism.

Demography: In 2006 some 35.2 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, and 4.1 percent of the population was 65 years of age or older and the sex ratio was 0.98 males per female. The birthrate was 27.6 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate was 8.6 per 1,000 population. The infant mortality rate was 72.6 deaths per 1,000 live births. Overall life expectancy, which fell substantially in the early 2000’s, was 61.8 years: 58.4 years for males, 65.4 years for females. In 2006 the fertility rate was 3.4 children born per woman.

5.4.3 Governance

Turkmenistan’s government nominally has three independent branches, however, after winning an uncontested presidential election in 1992 President Saparmurad Niyazov effectively dominated governance in all branches and at all levels until his death in late 2006.

Political opposition reportedly is nearly non-existent and harsh, arbitrary punishments of administrative mistakes and unforeseen shifts in top government positions have discouraged competent individuals from seeking government appointments.

After the parliamentary elections of 1999, the Parliament received nominal new powers, including a mandate to form committees examining a wide range of public policies, but because all members of that body were from Niyazov’s party, this mandate was meaningless and the Parliament has been a rubber-stamp body.

The only national court is the Supreme Court, whose 22 members are appointed by the president without legislative review to five-year terms and he also has the authority to dismiss any judge and no constitutional court is in place. Although the constitution calls for an independent
judiciary, in practice the judicial branch is under the control of the president because of his authority to appoint and dismiss judges.

Even EU also supports the modernization of the Judicial, Legal System and the public administration, with institutional strengthening and policy support. Therefore, the EU Institutional Strengthening and Policy Support Facility, with allocation of € 2.5 million, aims at identifying, defining, coordinating and managing programs to help modernize the state administration.

The program also introduces international legal practices and requirements. The Legal Capacity Building project (€ 1.4 million), which is part of this facility, aims at supporting the building up of an appropriate training resource facility to enable the creation of in-country expertise in the area of comparative law and international practices.

The EU also co-finances a program for Strengthening the National Capacity of Turkmenistan to Promote and Protect Human Rights (€ 2.2 million). The project aims at improving the capacity of the Government of Turkmenistan to comply with international human rights standards and developing a wide-scale public awareness strategy on human rights. In line with the priority reforms in the economic sector, the EU supports Turkmenistan in its implementation of public finance management reforms.

The project Support to Further Economic Reforms (€ 2 million) seeks to enhance public finance management skills and assist the Turkmen administration in building capacity in key public finance areas. In 2011-12, new programs are foreseen to provide support to economic policies and the development of the Parliament.

### 5.4.4 Economy

As in the Soviet era, central planning and state control pervade the system, and the Niyazov government (in power 1991–2006) consistently rejected market reform programs. The state subsidizes a wide variety of commodities and services and economic planning is done in long-term programs, the latest of which is the Strategy for Turkmenistan’s Economic, Political, and Cultural Development for the Period to 2020.

Privatization has been minimal, particularly in larger enterprises, while corruption is common and the business and legal systems are poorly developed. Based on Turkmenistan’s oil and gas deposits, industry is the dominant sector and because official economic statistics are unreliable and a dual exchange rate is used, the most accurate economic figures are estimates by international organizations.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the early 2000’s has risen annually and at current prices, the GDP for the years 2001-4 has been estimated at US$3.2 billion, US$3.7 billion, US$4.5 billion,
and US$5.3 billion, respectively. In 2005 the World Bank estimated the GDP at US$6.8 billion, or US$1,350 per capita. According to estimates for 2005, the industrial sector contributed 38 percent of GDP. By comparison, for 2004 the respective shares were 42.7 percent for industry, 28.8 percent for services and 28.5 percent for agriculture. The private sector’s share of GDP was estimated at 25 percent in 2005.

Turkmenistan is self-sufficient in oil and natural gas, although a decaying infrastructure and state subsidies hinder efficient distribution and discourage conservation. In the early 2000’s, gas output has increased sharply because of export agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, while in that same period, Russia and Ukraine have made substantial investments in Turkmenistan’s fuel industries. In 2001 natural gas output was estimated at 48.2 billion cubic meters and oil output was estimated at 162,000 barrels per day.

In 2003 gas output increased by 8 percent and oil refinery output by 19 percent compared with 2002 and the discovery of the large Iolotan gas and oil field in southeastern Turkmenistan in 2006 promised to further improve the country’s position as a fuels exporter. Turkmenistan also is a net exporter of electric power, exporting 980 million kilowatt-hours in 2001. Natural gas generates most of Turkmenistan’s electric power and an excess of generating capacity has stimulated the refurbishing of the power generation and distribution systems in the early 2000’s, with assistance from Iran, Turkey, and the United States. That process is expected to improve generating efficiency by 40 percent starting in 2011.

The first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development and Cooperation Instrument allocated €22 million for bilateral assistance programs in Turkmenistan. The second Multi-annual Indicative Program covering the period 2011-13 allocated €31 million. The indicative priority areas for cooperation focus on poverty alleviation, comprising rural development and education, as well as governance, trade and sustainable energy development.
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010


Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013


The European Union supports the modernization and reform of the education sector as one of the major long-term areas of cooperation with Turkmenistan. A first series of programs targeted at the education system has been launched. The program Support to the Modernization of the Education System in Turkmenistan (€ 1.5 million) supports the reform of the education system to bring it closer to international standards.

In 2006 Turkmenistan had 6,441 kilometers of natural gas pipelines and 1,361 kilometers of oil pipelines. The critical export of natural gas has depended on outmoded Soviet-era pipelines. The
Asian Development Bank has granted funding for a new gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan, linking Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea gas deposits with ports in Pakistan and reducing dependence on Russian lines. The onset of construction, which would take seven years, was delayed in 2006 by hostilities in the southern Afghanistan portion of the proposed route. Agricultural production in Turkmenistan is the second largest sector in the economy and is very important due to the fact that more than half of the population resides in rural areas and makes its livelihood from farming activities. Therefore, sector reforms in agriculture and rural development are of prime importance in developing a sustainable policy and practice for effective use of resources and development of the social sectors.

The current program Support to Further Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development (€ 1 million) supports the Ministry of Agriculture in the achievement of the national sector objectives with regard to sustainable agriculture and rural development. It supports the institutional and technical capacities of the Ministry.

The project strengthening the National Capacity of Turkmenistan to Promote and Protect Human Rights was launched in 2007 with an EU contribution of € 2.2 million. It is jointly implemented by the EU, UNDP, and OHCHR, in partnership with the government of Turkmenistan. The project has two interrelated objectives. Firstly, it aims at improving the capacity of the Government of Turkmenistan to comply with international human rights standards.

Secondly, and crucially for the EU and its Member States, it aims at developing a wide-scale public awareness strategy on human rights.

5.4.5 Education

In the Soviet era, Turkmenistan’s population was considered to be well educated, but in 2002 the literacy rate was estimated at 98 percent, however, since independence a serious deterioration of the education system has depleted the overall skill level of the working population. The government has limited curricula by eliminating a wide variety of studies that are considered dangerous or useless.

Funding has not matched the growing population, teacher salaries have been reduced and the infrastructure is in poor condition. The dismissal of many ethnic Russian teachers also has damaged the system, along with the reduction of obligatory education from 11 years to nine years putting Turkmen students at a disadvantage in continuing their education past secondary school. Some institutions of higher learning were operating in the early 2000’s, but the government has limited access to higher education by eliminating free tuition in 2003 and by requiring ethnic background checks on applicants.
Instructors in higher education must have degrees from institutions in Turkmenistan and bribes often are necessary to enter a university. The EU Further Improvement of Quality and Relevance of Professional Education program (€ 3 million) contributes to reestablishing and strengthening the vocational and training education system by providing skills and qualifications in accordance with the labor market needs, thus contributing to the economic and social development of Turkmenistan.

5.4.6 Security & Safety

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Turkmenistan inherited the largest armed force in Central Asia, however, since that time neutrality and isolationism have dominated Turkmenistan’s defense doctrine and the armed forces have been neglected. A 1992 bilateral treaty named Russia as guarantor of Turkmenistan’s security and provided for command of the armed forces to gradually shift from Russian to Turkmenistani officers.

That process concluded with the withdrawal of the last Russian border forces in 1999. In a move to balance Russian influence, Turkmenistan established an agreement for limited military cooperation with China in 1999. To maintain its neutrality, Turkmenistan consistently has refused to join multilateral military groupings of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although it participates in the Caspian Sea Flotilla with Russian and Kazakhstani naval forces.

In 2001, Turkmenistan allowed the passage of humanitarian but not military supplies for the U.S. campaign in neighboring Afghanistan and the United States provided equipment and training to Turkmenistani border guard personnel.

The criminal justice system of Turkmenistan essentially retains the structure of the Soviet system, where the Ministry of National Security has most of the same functions as the Soviet-era Committee for State Security (KGB). The chief responsibility of security forces is to ensure that the government remains in power, using whatever social controls and repressive measures are necessary.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs directs the operations of police departments, which cooperate closely with the forces of the Ministry of National Security on matters determined to affect national security. Personnel numbers for the police and security forces are not known.

As far as the internal threat is concerned, in the early 2000’s the volume of narcotics trafficking, mainly in heroin, from Afghanistan through Turkmenistan increased significantly, in part because Turkmenistan’s long borders are poorly controlled. Opposition groups in exile accused the Niyazov government of involvement in arms and drug trafficking operations, which are known to rely on the corruption of local officials and police.
The presence of narcotics also has increased the incidence of related crimes and drug addiction and Turkmenistan has a low rate of violent crime, but in the early 2000’s common street crime increased. About terrorism, although the government has used the threat of terrorism to justify repressive policies, there is no record of a terrorist presence or of terrorist acts committed in Turkmenistan.

5.5 Uzbekistan

5.51 Geography

Location: Uzbekistan is located in Central Asia, east of the Caspian Sea, directly south of Kazakhstan, north of Turkmenistan, and on the western borders of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Size: The area of Uzbekistan is 447,400 square kilometers, of which 425,400 square kilometers is land surface.

Land Boundaries: Uzbekistan has land boundaries with the following countries: Kazakhstan, 2,203 kilometers; Turkmenistan, 1,621 kilometers; Tajikistan, 1,161 kilometers; Kyrgyzstan, 1,099 kilometers; and Afghanistan, 137 kilometers.

Length of Coastline: None. Uzbekistan is landlocked.

Principal Rivers: Uzbekistan is not endowed with substantial river systems; the most important rivers are the Amu Darya, the Syr Darya, and the Zarafshon, all of which flow from other countries across a small expanse of Uzbekistan. Other rivers are the Akhangaran and the Chirchik, both in the northeast.

Natural Resources: Uzbekistan is self-sufficient in natural gas and oil in the near term and Gold is the most plentiful mineral having export value, but significant amounts of copper, lead, silver, tungsten, uranium, and zinc also are present. Nearly all of Uzbekistan’s arable land requires intensive irrigation and water is Uzbekistan’s most crucial resource, comes mainly from rivers whose sources are in other countries, requiring bilateral agreements with source countries as well as with other user countries downstream.

Uzbekistan’s chronically poor water and irrigation management has resulted in severe environmental crises and regional tensions.

Environmental Factors: The Aral Sea, half of which is in Uzbekistan, has been severely desiccated by overuse of its tributary rivers, a situation recognized as one of the world’s worst environmental disasters. Enormous overdrafts on these rivers are caused by the extremely low efficiency of irrigation systems in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Without the moderating influence of the sea, winters became significantly colder and summers hotter. Vozrozhdeniye Island in the
Aral Sea, now connected to the shore by shrinkage of the sea, contains the lethal remains of a Soviet anthrax weapons testing laboratory, most of which lies in Uzbekistani territory.

Drinking water quality also is a major problem, especially in the western province of Karakalpakstan, where water is not properly distributed and sources are exposed to various types of surface and underground contamination. Inadequate sewage disposal adds to Uzbekistan’s water pollution problem. Indeed, only 40 percent of the population is served by sewerage systems.

5.5.2 Society

Population: In 2006 Uzbekistan’s population was estimated at 27.3 million, the largest of the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia. The annual growth rate was 1.67 percent, and overall population density was 64.2 people per square kilometer. Population density varies greatly, as the Fergana Valley includes most of Uzbekistan’s population centers. In the middle 2000’s, the greatest population growth has occurred in rural areas and emigration has occurred mainly from urban areas.

Demography: In 2006 some 32.9 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, and 4.8 percent of the population was 65 years of age or older. The sex ratio was 0.98 males per female. In 2006 the birthrate was estimated at 26.4 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate at 7.84 per 1,000 population. Infant mortality was 70 deaths per 1,000 live births. Overall life expectancy was 64.6 years: 61.2 years for males and 68.1 years for females. In 2011, the fertility rate was 2.91 children per woman.

Ethnic Groups: Before the Soviet era, Uzbeks identified themselves by clan and by khanate rather than by nationality, which became an ethnic identifier only in 1924 with the union of the khanates in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. According to the 1998 census, 76 percent of the population was Uzbek, 6 percent Russian, 4.8 percent Tajik, 4 percent Kazakh, 1.6 percent Tatar, and 1 percent Kyrgyz. However, a substantial portion of the officially Uzbek population, estimated as high as 40 percent, is of Tajik ancestry and Tajiks predominate in the urban centers of Bukhoro and Samarqand. Substantial numbers of Germans and Ukrainians left in a mass emigration during the 1990’s. The Karakalpaks, about 475,000 of whom inhabit western Uzbekistan, are a Turkic people of unclear ethnic origin who now are included with the Uzbeks in official ethnic statistics.

Languages: Some 74.3 percent of the population speaks Uzbek, 14.2 percent Russian, and 4.4 percent Tajik. Speakers of Karakalpak, a Turkic language related to Kazakh and Tatar, are included under “Uzbek” in statistics; the number of Karakalpak speakers is not known because many ethnic Karakalpaks use Uzbek dialects. Speakers of Russian, which is officially designated as the “language of interethnic communication,” live mainly in the large cities. Tajik is the most common language in Bukhoro and Samarqand.
Religion: About 88 percent of the population is Muslim and 9 percent Russian Orthodox, while most Uzbek Muslims practice a type of mystic Sufism that is Sunni and distinctly non-political. Uzbekistan also has between 15,000 and 20,000 Jews and congregations of Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Korean Protestants, and Seventh-Day Adventists.

5.5.3 Governance

Moscow’s control over Uzbekistan weakened in the 1970’s as Uzbek party leader Sharaf Rashidov brought many cronies and relatives into positions of power, but in the mid-1980’s, Moscow attempted to regain control by again purging the entire Uzbek party leadership. However, this move increased Uzbek nationalism, which had long resented Soviet policies such as the imposition of cotton monoculture and the suppression of Islamic traditions.

In the late 1980’s, the liberalized atmosphere of the Soviet Union under Mikhail S. Gorbachev fostered political opposition groups and open opposition to Soviet policy in Uzbekistan. In 1989 a series of violent ethnic clashes involving Uzbeks brought the appointment of ethnic Uzbek outsider Islam Karimov as Communist Party chief.

When the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan reluctantly approved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Karimov became president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in 1992 Uzbekistan adopted a new constitution, but the main opposition party, Birlik, was banned and a pattern of media suppression began. In 1995 a national referendum extended Karimov’s term of office from 1997 to 2000, but a series of violent incidents in eastern Uzbekistan in 1998 and 1999 intensified government activity against Islamic extremist groups, other forms of opposition and minorities.

In 2000 Karimov was re-elected overwhelmingly in an election whose procedures received international criticism and later that year, Uzbekistan began laying mines along the Tajikistan border, creating a serious new regional issue and intensifying Uzbekistan’s image as a regional hegemonic. In the early 2000’s, tensions also developed with neighboring states Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan provided logistical support to the U.S. antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan.

This move continued a rapprochement that began in the late 1990’s however, in 2004 the United States cut non-humanitarian aid to Uzbekistan, citing recurrent human rights violations. Indeed, the mid-2005 brutal suppression of riots in Andijon brought severe criticism from the United States and the European Union (EU) and under pressure from the Karimov regime, the United States vacated its air base at Karshi-Khanabad and sanctions by the EU and the United States followed.
In the same period, a mutual defense treaty substantially enhanced relations between Russia and Uzbekistan. Tension with Kyrgyzstan increased in 2006 when Uzbekistan demanded extradition of hundreds of refugees who had fled from Andijon into Kyrgyzstan after the riots. A series of border incidents also inflamed tensions with neighboring Tajikistan. In 2011 Karimov continued arbitrary dismissals and shifts of subordinates in the government, including one deputy prime minister.

Within the framework of the rule of law, the EU program Support to Criminal Judicial Reforms in Uzbekistan (€ 10 million) supports the reform process of the criminal justice sector. There will be long-term capacity building at strategic and operational levels within the Uzbekistan Supreme Court Research Centre, the General Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, regarding the implementation of new decrees on the rule of law and on the death penalty.

Through the project Strengthening of the Bicameral Parliamentary System and Networking with Regional Assemblies (€ 1.5 million) the EU will be supporting capacity building of the Oliy Majlis by establishing an electronic library and a centre for legal expertise, providing information and analytical support, introducing a new training curriculum and exchanging best EU practices in legislative drafting and functioning of bicameral parliaments.

Economic reform The EU supports the capacity building for SME managers and business support organizations through the Management Training Program - Capacity Building for Small Business and Private Entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan (€ 3 million). This program will facilitate an exchange of experience through training courses and internships for entrepreneurs, managers and business support organizations in European companies.

At the local level, the program will support capacity building and institutional strengthening of chambers of commerce and industry. Among the program’s achievements to date, over 13 000 health providers (doctors, nurses, midwives and health managers) have been trained, and infant mortality rates, though still quite elevated, are falling. 16 regional training centers have been renovated and re-equipped. They have been running targeted training courses on maternal care for key medical staff from the eight regions covered by the program. A pool of 665 national and oblast trainers was established.

Uzbekistan is the second most autocratic state in the Index and there are no checks and balances on the power of the executive and very little competition for legislative or executive power and no independent judiciary. However, the government has brought stability of a sort to the country, with almost 20 years since the last major constitutional change. Over nine in 10 Uzbeks voiced confidence in their national government, and around seven out of 10 reported satisfaction.
with the country’s efforts to address poverty and preserve the environment, placing Uzbekistan amongst the top 10 countries in the Index on both variables.

Uzbeks are equally quick to voice support for other state institutions: 97% expressed trust in the country’s armed forces, and a high 78% had confidence in the judiciary. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s government is one of the 10 worst at enforcing the rule of law and regulating the business sector.

Surprisingly, although political rights are almost non-existent in Uzbekistan, nearly one-quarter of the population said that they had voiced their opinion to an official in the previous 12 months, and over seven out of 10 Uzbeks expressed confidence in the honesty of the electoral process, which places Uzbekistan in the top 30 countries in the Index for both these variables.

5.5.4 Economy

Although Uzbekistan’s economy has an inflation rate above 14%, gross domestic savings amount to 26% of GDP, the 31st highest in the world. Official unemployment stands at 8%, although when asked in a 2011 survey, a relatively high 60% of respondents said that they were in paid or unpaid work, which suggests an informal economy exists.

Uzbekistan performs well below average for the number of people who struggle to feed and shelter their families, although 79% of Uzbeks claim to be satisfied with their standard of living, a figure well above the global average and between 2005 and 2011, Uzbekistan’s GDP per capita grew at an average almost 7% per annum.

A relatively high number of people report that job market opportunities are good and overall levels of optimism about the economy are the fourth highest in the world. Uzbekistan has a relatively small domestic market, and physical capital per worker is among the 20 lowest in the Index, so foundations for future growth are relatively weak.

However, Uzbekistan ranks first in the world for foreign direct investment, as measured by both net inflows and volatility. A high 6% of loans are non-performing, indicating inefficiencies in the banking sector yet a robust 65% of people had confidence in their financial institutions. No data were available for levels of high-tech exports.

Transport infrastructure is like blood arteries of the economy of any country, therefore well-developed transport system is particularly important for developing countries. That is why transport infrastructure development was and remains to be one of the priority areas of EU cooperation in Uzbekistan where European projects had long and impressive records of assistance for development of transport infrastructure, including grant aid for road construction and maintenance for
Samarkand-Termez highway and loan project for construction of the Tashguzar-Kumkurgan new railway line through difficult mountainous area, including erection of state-of-arts steel bridges.

In this respect, on February 2011 the Uzbekistan Government has signed loan agreement amounting for USD 220.6 million for Karshi-Termez Railway Electrification Project, which is logical continuation of the previous new railway construction project. Electrification of the railway will strengthen transport capacity of Karshi-Termez line by increasing efficiency of both passenger and cargo transportation and enhancing the quality of railway services.

Moreover, it is expected that the Project will contribute to the social and economic development not only Uzbekistan but also its neighboring countries including Afghanistan. As Uzbekistan is the double-land-locked country sharing borders with all Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, the Project will be vital for further regional development.

Today infrastructure is a key concept as nations along the original Silk Road in Central Asia and the Caucasus region struggle to overcome decades of under-development, ingrained poverty, conflict and ongoing political and social instability, therefore, new infrastructure and connectivity is vital to this nation, not only build new roads and ports but also act in concert and close cooperation, together with donors and private enterprise.

In southern Uzbekistan Japan financed the construction of five ultra-modern railroad bridges on a 219-kilometer stretch of new track which helps by pass old routes through neighboring Turkmenistan and provides a vital link for supplies to Afghanistan.

A major EU project in Uzbekistan was the modernization of a thermal power plant and water where it is a particularly contentious issue in a region where some areas enjoy an overabundance and others are reduced to virtual desert. There are longstanding governmental differences about how much available water should be allocated to power production, how much for farming and irrigation and how much for domestic use. Since 2009 EU consultants and experts have helped construct new boreholes and replace hundreds of kilometers of pipelines.

The first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the Development and Cooperation Instrument allocated € 28.6 million towards the development of national cooperation programs in Uzbekistan. These provided targeted technical assistance, training, opportunities for benchmarking with EU experiences and specialized equipment. Cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and social inclusion for vulnerable groups of the population have also been addressed.

The second Multi-annual Indicative Program covering the period 2011-13 allocated € 42 million. The indicative priority areas for cooperation include governance, rural development and environment.
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010


Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013


Improving living standards at community level is at the core of the EU-Uzbekistan cooperation. Since 2002, and under the TACIS approach, a set of programs on Enhancement of Living Standards in Rural Areas (€ 6.5 million), this has been helping to respond to immediate community needs. By means of these programs and in joint management with the UNDP, the European Union has provided support for improved water services, health and education, as well as training, equipment and supplies.
Through the Institution Building Partnership Program the EU has also been delivering technical assistance to Uzbek local initiatives. This has been made possible through a partnership between local organizations and international NGOs. Focal areas of this program include women entrepreneurship, job creation and integration of children with disabilities in the mainstream education system. So far, the Institution Building Partnership Program has already implemented 22 projects with an average budget of €200,000 each.

In the area of integration of disabled children into mainstream schools, the EU envisages supporting the process with the transfer of EU Member States’ experiences and know-how. The Improvement of Mother and Child Care Services (€3.5 million) is a joint program of the EU, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Ministry of Health.

5.5.5 Education

Although Uzbekistan enrolls fewer than 90% of eligible children in primary school, which is in the bottom twenty of the Index on this variable, it achieves enrolment in secondary education that places the country 13th.

However, only around 10% of students proceed to university, which is one of the 30 lowest rates of higher education in the Index. There is a slight under representation of girls in primary and secondary education in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, levels of public satisfaction with schooling are among the highest in the world: 85% of Uzbeks reported themselves happy with the quality of the education, while an even higher 93% said their children can learn and grow every day.

Primary schools have one teacher for every 17 pupils, placing the country in 17th place for this variable. However, the Uzbek labor force is generally under-educated and the average worker has had just 1.6 years of secondary education and 0.4 years of tertiary education: on both variables, Uzbekistan ranks in the bottom half of the Index.

Eleven years of primary and secondary education are obligatory, starting at age seven. This requirement includes four years of primary school and two cycles of secondary school, lasting five and two years, respectively. The rate of attendance in those grades is high, although the figure is significantly lower in rural areas than in urban centers and in the post-Soviet era educational standards have fallen. Lack of budgetary support has been more noticeable at the primary and secondary levels, as the government has continued to subsidize university students. The three largest of Uzbekistan’s 63 institutions of higher learning are in Nukus, Samarqand, and Tashkent.
and are all state-funded. Private schools have been forbidden since the establishment of Islamic fundamentalist schools in the early 1990s brought a government crackdown.

5.5.6 Security & Safety

There are many refugees and internally displaced people in Uzbekistan and a high number of groups with a grievance deriving from recent or historic injustices. The country also has one of the 30 highest levels of demographic instability resulting from border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, or proximity to environmental hazards.

Although there were no casualties from civil or ethnic strife in 2010, there are some incidents of political and state-sponsored repression or violence, with Uzbeks are less likely than the global average to believe that people feel safe expressing their political views openly. In response to this, a high proportion of middle class Uzbeks, professionals, intellectuals or political dissidents flee abroad in search of better opportunities.

In terms of personal safety, however, around 1% of the population reported being assaulted in the 12 months prior to being surveyed in 2011, while fewer than 5% had experienced theft. These figures place Uzbekistan in the top five of the Index on these variables. This is not entirely reflected in perceptions of crime, however, as just 72% of Uzbeks feel safe walking the streets at night.

Another issue that afflicts central Asia republics is the border one, where border confrontation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is creating hardship for citizens of both countries, along the non-delimited frontier and in at least one case, is stoking a food shortage in area.

Authorities in Uzbekistan try keeping a low profile on the event but that approach should not be confused for passivity. Indeed, according to some international analysts sustain that some high-ranking security officials are purportedly pushing for armed action, itching for a chance to gain retribution for what they see as Kyrgyz persecution of ethnic Uzbeks going back to the Osh events of June 2010.

The border standoff in the ethnically diverse Ferghana Valley where hundreds of residents of Sokh, a densely populated valley that belongs to Uzbekistan, is mostly populated by ethnic Tajiks and is entirely surrounded by Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Province, have attacked Kyrgyz border guards several times, as they were installing electricity poles on contested territory. Many Kyrgyz villagers have blocked the main road linking the Sokh exclave to Uzbekistan proper, apparently in retaliation and as consequence Uzbekistan has closed more than once its border with Kyrgyzstan and blocked rail shipments.
In one tiny Kyrgyz enclave surrounded by Uzbekistan’s Andijan Region, 300 families are running out of food and Uzbek leaders have also threatened to stop gas shipments to southern Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Kyrgyz villages those are in Kyrgyzstan proper, but depend on road connections through Sokh, have also been cut off and are running short of essential supplies.

Once again, the Ferghana Valley is a checkerboard of enclaves, exclaves and non-delimited borders dating from the Communist era, when all three countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were part of the Soviet Union. Since independence in 1991, the three countries have been unable to agree on frontiers, especially in densely populated areas, such as Sokh. These events bout of tension is connected to population growth and poverty in the Ferghana Valley where arable land and water are limited and competition among residents for scarce natural resources is increasing.

Throughout the standoff, one mystery has been how Uzbekistan, which has a much larger military than Kyrgyzstan, might respond, if conditions deteriorate for Uzbekistani nationals in Sokh. Though both sides have pledged to negotiate, there has been little visible progress toward a border agreement.

President Islam Karimov strongly opposes military action, fearing that a regional border war would destabilize the whole region and being Kyrgyzstan a member of the CSTO, the Russia-led security alliance that Uzbekistan recently abandoned, plays a considerable role in the thinking of Karimov and his interventionist-shy allies, where CSTO members are treaty-bound to aid Kyrgyzstan in the case of external aggression.

The fact that Karimov, who often ignores requests from his neighbors, quickly ordered local officials to negotiate with the Kyrgyz underscores the gravity of the situation, highlighting that Karimov doesn’t like to be perceived as weak, therefore, he order to negotiate with the Kyrgyz side reflecting his deep concern.

According to open sources, Uzbek military officers are eager to engage their counterparts across the border in Kyrgyzstan, whom they blame for ethnic violence in June 2010 that left over 400, mostly minority Uzbeks, dead. Indeed, the Sokh incident is actually a continuation of a long-running feud between the Uzbek and the Kyrgyz military leadership.

In his effort to calm trigger-happy generals, Karimov has resorted to a familiar crisis-management tactic, blaming faceless outsiders for stirring up trouble, who are eager to foment tensions among the five Central Asian republics, banning and attracting investment.

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4 Source: www.euorasia.it, accessed in December 2012.
5.6 Afghanistan

5.6.1 Geography

**Location:** Afghanistan is located in Central Asia, north and west of Pakistan, east of Iran, and south of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The narrow Wakhan Corridor extends from northeastern most Afghanistan to meet with China.

**Size:** Afghanistan occupies approximately 647,500 square kilometers, slightly less than Texas.

**Land Boundaries:** Afghanistan has borders with the following countries: China, 76 kilometers; Iran, 936 kilometers; Pakistan, 2,430 kilometers; Tajikistan, 1,206 kilometers; Turkmenistan, 744 kilometers; and Uzbekistan, 137 kilometers.

**Disputed Territory:** Afghanistan has no boundary disputes; ongoing incursions, smuggling, and terrorist movement across the Pakistan border are addressed in periodic bilateral tripartite meetings.

**Natural Resources:** Agricultural resources are primarily grazing land, with fertile crop-growing land is concentrated in Kandoz Province in the north and Helmand Province in the south. Afghanistan is known to have major deposits of chrome, coal, copper, iron, and salt, as well as lesser amounts of a wide variety of minerals including gold, silver, and uranium. Natural gas is the most abundant hydrocarbon resource, while substantial oil deposits are recognized but not yet quantified. Water for all purposes is in critically short supply.

**Environmental Factors:** Although little studied before recent times, the environment of Afghanistan is assumed to have been spared large-scale disturbances until the Soviet invasion of 1979. Afghanistan, which has no appreciable bodies of water, suffers from a limited freshwater supply that makes potable water unavailable to more than half the population. In recent years, groundwater quality has deteriorated because of agricultural and industrial runoff and water quantity has been diminished by large-scale land clearing and desertification. Because of insufficient water treatment, the incidence of water-borne diseases is very high.

Widespread overgrazing, soil erosion, salinisation, and water logging have reduced agricultural productivity. Although Afghanistan has little industry, particularly pollutants from the Aral Sea and industrial complexes in Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan contaminate the atmosphere in northern Afghanistan. Chemical use and physical destruction in recent military conflicts have damaged the environment and landmines are residual hazards endangering an estimated 4 million Afghans in 32 provinces.
5.6.2 Society

**Population:** In the early 2000’s, population assessment has been difficult because many people have not had fixed residences. In 2008 the estimated population was 32.7 million, with growth rate was 3.1 percent per year. The population is approximately 75 percent rural and after heavy out-migration and internal displacement in the 1980’s and 1990’s, an estimated 3.5 million Afghans returned to Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 before the numbers began to decrease. In the early 2000s, hundreds of thousands were internally displaced within Afghanistan, mainly from rural to urban areas, because of drought and instability. In 2007 more than 2 million Afghans were living in Pakistan and 1.5 million in Iran, later on both countries, the main recipients of Afghan refugees, began preparations for large-scale deportation. Tajikistan closed its border with Afghanistan in 2007, meanwhile, in that year insecure conditions in Afghanistan noticeably decreased the rate of return. The United Nations reported that in 2008 some 365,400 Afghans returned to their country, bringing the total of repatriations since 2002 to 4.1 million. In the first quarter of 2008, an estimated 13,000 people fled their homes as conflicts occurred in previously safe regions.

**Demography:** In 2010 some 45.8 percent of the population was younger than 15 years of age and 2.4 percent was older than 64. The estimated birthrate was 46.3 per 1,000 population and the estimated death rate was 20.4 per 1,000 population. The infant mortality rate was 158 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy was 43 years for males and 45 years for females with fertility rate were 6.6 children born per woman.

**Ethnic Groups:** The main ethnic groups are Pashtun 42 percent, Tajik 27 percent, Hazara 12 percent, Uzbek 9 percent, Aimak 4 percent, Turkmen 3 percent and Baloch, 2 percent. The largest remaining nomadic group is the Kuchis, a Pashtun group whose population has dwindled to about 1.5 million since 1980’s. The Pashtuns are the major ethnic group in the south and the east, the Tajiks in the northeast, with Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks as predominant groups in north-central Afghanistan.

**Languages:** More than 30 languages are spoken in Afghanistan, but the official languages are Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashtu. Dari is spoken by 50 percent of the population, while Pashtu is spoken as a first language by 35 percent. Turkic languages (primarily Turkmen and Uzbek) are spoken by 11 percent of the population. Of the languages spoken by smaller segments of the population, the most important are Balochi and Pashai.

**Religion:** Virtually the entire population is Muslim, but between 80 and 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni and 15 to 19 percent Shia. The minority Shia are economically disadvantaged and frequently subjected to discrimination, moreover, there are small numbers of Hindus and Sikhs who live in urban centers.
5.6.3 Governance

The adoption of a new constitution in January 2004 and the election of Hamid Karzai as president in October 2004 were considered major advances in Afghanistan’s fragmented political life. However, day-to-day control of the provinces proved to be difficult both before and after the election and substantial regional power centers are still in place. After the first National Assembly was seated in December 2005, the balance between the executive and legislative branches was uncertain and Karzai has been obliged to award cabinet positions to key regional warlords. The role of Islamic principles in governance remains extremely controversial, particularly in the judicial branch. The UN, EU and NATO have continued its policy of one-year renewals of its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, designed to coordinate international aid and guide the rebuilding process.

Following the reorganization in early 2009, the government included 25 ministries; appointments to these ministries have been distributed among influential regional and military groups, but reducing the number of ministries by two and shifted key individuals. One woman headed a ministry and the National Defense Commission, headed by Karzai, is a six-member advisory board that includes leaders of the main regional groups. Karzai has attempted to manipulate key regional individuals and groups to maintain a base of power. An example is Karzai’s careful treatment of Abdul Rashid Dostum, a powerful Uzbek warlord considered vital in holding northern Afghanistan against the Taliban. That strategy has involved Karzai in complex regional power struggles. He has been accused of supporting certain opium traffickers in exchange for support in southern provinces.

The constitution calls for a bicameral legislature, the National Assembly and members of the lower house, the 249-member are elected directly for five-year terms. The government can convene a Loya Jirga (Constituent Assembly) to decide urgent matters of independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Such an assembly, which can amend the constitution and bring charges against the president, must include members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils.

The first parliamentary and local elections were held in September 2005 after being postponed for nearly a year for security reasons. Although the election commission ostensibly disqualified individuals commanding armed groups from the parliamentary elections, several of the most powerful regional warlords gained seats. The complex voting system for those elections, in which about 50 percent of eligible voters participated, received substantial criticism. Because all candidates ran as individuals and no party representation was allowed, substantial fragmentation of parliamentary coalitions resulted. The next presidential election is scheduled for 2014.
On the Afghanistan’s judicial branch deteriorated during the Soviet occupation, and justice was administered by strict Islamic law during the Taliban era (1996–2001). To replace the ad hoc system in place under the transitional government, the constitution of 2004 stipulated that the Supreme Court include nine justices appointed by the president.

According to the constitution, provinces, districts, and villages are governed by directly elected councils. The chief executive at the province level is the governor, who is appointed by the president, as is the case with the national cabinet, the president has distributed governorships among influential regional and military groups. Province and district administrations have the same basic structure as the national government.

According to the current Constitution, the central government, which theoretically stands at the center of a highly centralized system, delegates authority to the sub-national jurisdictions in matters where local or regional action is more efficient. In some southern jurisdictions, the Taliban insurgency has been able to establish parallel governments, including administrators and judges.

Although every province has a lower and a higher court, judicial procedures are influenced by local authorities and traditions. The respective roles of Islamic and secular law in the new national judicial system have not been well established and a large portion of the current law code is based on laws passed under the last king, Mohammad Zahir Shah. In rural areas, where local elders and tribal authorities resolve criminal cases, Taliban laws have remained in effect. Indeed, according to a 2006 estimate, in all provinces some 90 percent of local cases are based on Islamic and tribal law.

The Political Parties Law of 2003 requires that all political parties be registered with the Ministry of Justice and observe the precepts of Islam. Most political groupings are based on alliances that formed during the military struggles of 1979–2002. The Northern Alliance is an influential loose confederation of several Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups who fought against the Taliban. Factions of the alliance were key forces in the parliament elected in 2005, but in 2008 the largest individual parties were the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, the National Congress Party of Afghanistan, the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, the National Movement of Afghanistan (a coalition of 11 parties also known as the Afghan Nationalist Party), the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the Islamic Unity Party and the United National Front.

5.6.4 Economy

**Overview:** Economic statistics for Afghanistan are inexact and Afghanistan’s economy, which always has been heavily agricultural and one of the poorest in the world, was shattered by the wars of the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Industry, much of which depended on agricultural output, suffered as well and after the wars, small-scale trade in urban centers and agriculture in some regions revived quickly. Since 2007, some 17 provincial reconstruction teams led by Western
civilian and NATO military personnel were working to restore economic infrastructure and security in Afghanistan, with large-scale international aid, recovery of the agriculture sector and substantial growth in the services sector.

The 2006 London Conference on Afghanistan pledged US$10.4 billion for economic infrastructure reconstruction during the following three years, in 2008 President Hamid Karzai announced a new five-year National Development Strategy, which includes economic and social components, to be supported by US$50 billion of foreign funds. Donor countries at the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan pledged US$21 billion for this program over five years, starting from 2009.

Afghanistan faces a number of serious economic challenges, as the need to replace the income generated by opium production, which in 2011 yielded an estimated 68 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. Smuggling, particularly across the Pakistan border, also is an important part of the “black economy,” which drains resources from the formal economy. Privatization, designed to promote economic growth and productivity, was to have been completed in 2011 according to the 2006 Afghanistan Authorities, but further efforts in that direction have been officially postponed by the lower house of parliament.

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP):** Excluding illegal poppy production, for the fiscal year running from March 21, 2010–March 20, 2011, Afghanistan’s GDP was estimated at US$ 9.8 billion or US$ 370 per capita. In 2011 agriculture contributed an estimated 38 percent to the GDP, services 26 percent and industry and mining 23 percent. Following the economic standstill of the late 1990’s, GDP growth rates in the early 2000’s have been very high, although they moderated after reaching 16 percent in 2010 and 14.5 percent in 2011. The growth rate for 2010 was between 7 and 8 percent. However, the starting points upon which such figures are based were very low.

**Inflation:** Under the pro-Soviet regimes of the 1980’s, inflation was high but limited by government controls. Inflation reached 150 percent per year during the civil war of the early 1990’s and is believed to have remained high under the Taliban. After the currency reform of 2002, inflation averaged about 10 percent per year for the first two years, but it rose to 18 percent in 2011.

**Agriculture:** Agriculture traditionally has been the foundation of Afghanistan’s economy, employing as much as 80 percent of the workforce and contributing at least half of the gross domestic product (GDP). Because of the poor quality of most agricultural land, subsistence agriculture predominates. Although many displaced Afghan farmers returned to their land in the early 2000’s, land mines and the destruction of irrigation systems had made much agricultural land unusable. The drought of 1999–2002 devastated the rural population and further reduced all types of agricultural output.
With increased rainfall, 2006 output again increased, but delays in the restoration of irrigation systems hampered the reclaiming of additional agricultural land. The main legal crops are wheat, vegetables, grapes, rice, barley, corn, fruits, and potatoes. The main types of livestock are cattle, sheep, and goats; cow’s milk is the most valuable product of livestock raising. In the winter of 2007-8, Afghanistan faced a severe grain shortage, partly because poppy cultivation replaced wheat in some areas, partly because of intensified violence and partly because of reduced grain imports.

The internationally supported program to replace poppies with legal crops showed progress, mainly in the poorer agricultural regions of the north and west, but since 2007 the area and volume of poppy cultivation increased substantially in the richer soils of the south, especially in Helmand Province.

**Industry and Manufacturing:** Before the wars of the late twentieth century, industry was based on the processing of local agricultural products, including textiles, sugar, and chemical fertilizers made from natural gas or coal. The main manufacturing center was the Kabul region. In 2004 all of Afghanistan’s industrial sector had stopped producing or was producing at a substantially reduced rate. The reasons for this reduction in productivity are war damage, shortages of raw materials and spare parts and the postwar priority of rebuilding overall infrastructure before industry. In the 2000’s, foreign investment in the industrial sector focused on small and medium-sized enterprises, predominantly in telecommunications. Revival projects have concentrated on agricultural processing and carpet enterprises. In 2007 the carpet industry, which provides the most valuable legal export commodity, employed an estimated 1 million people directly. Some small plants in Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-e Sharif produce textiles, leather goods, and processed foods.

**Energy:** War damage depleted Afghanistan’s energy generation infrastructure, particularly generators and power lines. Some natural gas wells and 31 oil wells that were active during the Soviet occupation have remained capped since that era. In 2004 energy shortages were a critical obstacle in resuming economic activity, but between 2005 and 2010 the electricity supply improved under Minister of Water and Energy. Reconstruction of the Kajaki Dam on the Helmand River in south-central Afghanistan, begun in 2005, aims to provide electricity to an additional 3 million people and to expand the existing irrigation system in the region. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have sent electric power to some northern regions of Afghanistan.

In August 2008, Afghanistan signed an agreement for construction of new lines bringing electric power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan by 2013, within a new regional energy grouping, the Central Asia/South Asia Regional Electricity Market. In 2008 Turkmenistan also signed a new agreement to supply natural gas for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Given adequate extraction and distribution infrastructure, Afghanistan’s domestic coal, natural gas, and oil resources can meet its energy needs.

In 2004 natural gas reserves were estimated at 5 trillion cubic feet, while in the early 2000’s, oil reserves were estimated at 95 million barrels and coal reserves at 73 million tons, but substantially larger oil reserves have been identified in the Amu Darya Basin and the Afghan-Tajik Basin north of Kabul. Resumed extraction of natural gas, once a key export, is a top economic priority. Afghanistan is a natural pipeline route between Central Asian natural gas fields and the Arabian Sea, and the often-discussed Trans-Afghan Pipeline, clearly would be an economic boon to Afghanistan, but the line would pass through territory controlled by the Taliban.

Hence, security issues have prevented construction since the original agreement was signed in 2002 by Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan. Afghanistan’s domestic pipelines connect gas fields only with local consumers and the Mazar-e-Sharif power plant.

**Services:** Afghanistan’s banking system, which collapsed during the civil war of the early 1990’s, was limited to financial transactions supporting retail commerce. With the collapse, money-changers became the main source of financing and opium and wheat became the primary forms of capital for the agricultural population. Elimination of poppy cultivation would mean destitution for many farmers relying on opium for credit. Since 2002 the government has encouraged recovery of a formal banking system. New commercial banking laws were passed in 2003 and banks from Britain, India, and Pakistan opened branches in Kabul. In mid-2004 the Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) began operating with the backing of the Asian Development Bank and 75 percent ownership by Afghan businessmen.

**Labor:** Because of the very large black-market economy, statistics on the labor force are incomplete, however, in 2004 the labor force in the legitimate economy was estimated at 15 million, of whom about 28 percent were women. The conflicts of the 1980’s and 1990’s seriously depleted the supply of skilled labor. According to a 2004 estimate, about 80 percent of the workforce was in agriculture, 10 percent in industry, and 10 percent in services.

**Foreign Economic Relations:** The United States has given Afghanistan status as a least-developed beneficiary developing nation, which removes tariffs on several U.S. imports from Afghanistan. In 2004 the United States signed a bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, which increased trade levels with Afghanistan. In 2007 a joint statement under that agreement created a new framework for bilateral commercial cooperation. The European Union also gives Afghan products preferential trade status.

Trade with Iran has increased substantially in the post-Taliban era and it has given Afghanistan the use of its Arabian Sea port at Chabahar under favorable conditions, despite U.S.
objections. In 2003 Afghanistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan established a trans-Afghan trade corridor linking Uzbekistan with Chabahar and Bandar-e Abbas. Uzbekistan’s border procedures have slowed commerce along the route, however. Trade with Pakistan is complicated by a high level of smuggling across the border.

In 2009 an estimated 80 percent of goods entering Afghanistan from Pakistan were subsequently smuggled back into Pakistan and the volume of that commerce was estimated at US$10 billion, compared with US$2 billion of legitimate trade between the two countries. Several attempts to review their Joint Economic Commission, which had been moribund for 10 years, brought improving commercial relations. The main purchasers of Afghanistan’s exports in order of volume were India, Pakistan, the United States and Britain. The main suppliers of Afghanistan’s imports in order of volume were Pakistan, the United States, Germany and India.

The main legal export commodities were fruits and nuts, carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, and precious and semi-precious gems. The main imports were capital goods, food, textiles, and petroleum products. Afghanistan’s foreign trade increased substantially in volume in the early 2000’s.

**Balance of Payments:** For fiscal year 2011, Afghanistan had a balance of payments surplus of US$ 131 million, mainly because of US$ 2.7 billion in international grants.

**External Debt:** In 2010 Afghanistan had US$ 11.9 billion in external debt, but in 2011 it qualified for World Bank assistance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

**Foreign Investment:** To encourage foreign investment, in 2002 the government began allowing 100 percent foreign ownership of Afghan enterprises, offering substantial tax benefits and unlimited transfer of assets out of the country. The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency was established in 2003 to centralize foreign investment activities. However, Afghanistan’s highly corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy has limited investment, there is no legal system for adjudication of commercial disputes, there is significant resentment in the provinces against foreign intrusion, and the government has passed no significant reforms.

In addition, the liberalized ownership policy does not apply to investment in pipeline construction, telecommunications infrastructure, the fuels and minerals industries, or other heavy industry where state-owned enterprises predominate. In 2011 the World Bank’s international rating on business conditions rated Afghanistan number 162 in the world, in part because of security conditions. In 2006 Coca-Cola opened a US$ 25 million bottling plant in Kabul and in 2007 two Chinese companies agreed to invest US$ 3.7 billion for access to the Aynak Valley copper deposits, the largest single foreign investment ever made in Afghanistan. Other large investors include
Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Central Asian countries, members of the European Union, and the United States.

**Overview on the Transportation:** Afghanistan’s transportation system, which prior to 1979 was just rudimentary, suffered severe damage during the ensuing two decades. In the post-2001 era, the weak transportation infrastructure has been a major deterrent to realizing Afghanistan’s potential commercial crossroads. The road system, which provides the only transport in most parts of the country, has been an urgent reconstruction project implemented by the International community. At the current stage, there is no rail system and the main and quick transport system is the air, where several airports have been reviving in the early 2000’s.

**Roads:** The main internal road system that was built in the 1960’s included about 2,000 kilometers of roads. After an intensive international road-building and restoration effort, in 2011 Afghanistan had an estimated 15,100 kilometers of paved roads, however, even in Kabul the condition of many roads still was poor and heavily damaged.

The main arteries connect the cities of Ghazni, Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar with roads crossing the Pakistan border. Critical commercial and military roadways through the Salang and Tang-e Gharu Mountain passes, north and east of Kabul, respectively, were badly damaged during the Soviet occupation and ensuing conflicts.

The railroad connecting Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, with the Uzbekistan border town of Hairatan, has opened in 2011, putting into operation a key node of the NATO military’s overland transport route through Central Asia to Afghanistan.

As of 2011, most of the so-called Ring Road network, which link most population and commercial centers, had been completed, including a highway connecting Kabul with Kandahar, but a connector between Kandahar and Herat, begun in 2004, was not yet complete in 2008. EU and in particular Germany are financing a road connecting Jalalabad with the Pakistan border. India, Iran, and Pakistan are constructing roads connecting Afghanistan with their respective national road systems and another route is to connect Iran’s port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman with Tajikistan via Afghanistan. Provincial roads, which also received heavy damage during conflicts of recent decades, generally have not been repaired since the end of hostilities.

**Civil Aviation and Airports:** In 2007 some 46 airports were in operation and 12 had paved runways, but only four had runways longer than 3,000 meters. Nine heliports also were in operation, especially for military use. In 2006, the Kabul International Airport, the only destination for international flights into Afghanistan, began a major reconstruction project with Japanese aid, followed by NATO - led International Security Assistance Force begin turning over air traffic

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control at Kabul International to civilian operators. Connections to Kabul are made via Delhi, India; Islamabad, Pakistan; and Baku, Azerbaijan. Airports at Herat, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e Sharif also were renovated in the early 2000’s.

**Telecommunications:** In 2004 Afghanistan had an estimated 50,000 main telephone lines and 600,000 cellular phones. Mobile phones, introduced to Afghanistan in 2001, became the principal means of communication in the early 2000’s. In 2006 an estimated 3.2 million mobile phone subscriptions were active and in 2008, four mobile phone companies were in operation. The number of Afghans with Internet access increased rapidly between 2000 and 2011, multiplying from an estimated 1,000 to 890,000. Public Internet facilities are available in Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif. In many areas, however, unpredictable power cuts hinder Internet access.

### 5.6.5 Education

Despite substantial improvements during the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah (ruled 1933–73), in 1979 some 90 percent of Afghanistan’s population was illiterate, with a 2006 estimation of 57 percent of men and 87 percent of women were illiterate, bringing a major economic disadvantage as lack of skilled and educated workers. Beginning with the Soviet invasion of 1979, successive wars virtually destroyed the education system and most teachers fled the country. By 1996 only about 650 schools were functioning and moreover, the Taliban regime banned education for females, imposing the madrassa (mosque school) as the main source of primary and secondary education.

After the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the interim government received substantial international aid to restore the education system, but for the next six years the Taliban attacked public schools wherever possible. In 2007 increased Taliban activity forced the closure of 35 percent of the schools in the southern provinces, while the Taliban were able to open some fundamentalist schools in regions. Later on, through the International Community commitment about 9,500 schools reportedly were operating, at least some in every province. The Ministry of Education\(^6\) estimated that in 2011, about 9 million children were in school, including nearly 3 million girls.

Despite renewed emphasis on educating girls, in 2011 the ratio of girls to boys in secondary schools was one to three or four, as rural families continued the tradition of educating only males. Higher education also has been problematic, but the Kabul University\(^7\) reopened in 2002, some 44,000 students, male and female, enrolled. Nowadays, it suffers from lack of enough


infrastructure such as classrooms, labs, libraries and qualified teaching staff, which has been the result of many years of war and destruction. Projects have been carrying out by US and EU to realize number of schools and departments, the central administrations, long-term academic strategy. However, in the middle 2000's, the rehabilitation of five other universities progressed very slowly. Although seven universities were operating in 2007, only a total of 22,700 students were active in higher education.

5.6.6 Safety &Security

Overview: Beginning with the accession of the Karzai government in 2004, national security policy has aimed to establish a credible armed force, the Afghan National Security Forces\(^8\), including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). In 2008 some 65,000 soldiers had been trained by U.S., NATO and EU forces and participated in counterterrorism operations. The long-term goal has been to prepare an army of 70,000 (in five corps), an air force of 8,000, a border guard force of 12,000, and a police force of 82,000 in order to move the Afghanistan into an active role and taking the lead for a wide range of operations. But the security forces mirror image the corruption and weaknesses of the government they served, often committed abuses equal to or greater than those of the insurgents, and had no ability to “win and hold” on a lasting basis.

With forces near their current goal of 352,000, nowadays, only a total of 194,466 (57%) were military - including 7,809 ANA Commandos, 646 ANA Special Forces and 5,541 Air Force. The rest - a total of 149,642 (43%) were police with very different functions, plus large numbers of Afghan Local Police (ALP). Additionally, there was no clear plan to create enough men in the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) to replace virtually all private security contractors. The police have only one comparatively small element that is really intended to fight as a paramilitary force. However, ANSF capacity and the various elements of the Afghan military might be able to replace US and allied forces during 2014-2020, that will determine the Afghan government’s ability to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and its training mission, National Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), did make major progress in developing the Afghan forces after 2009, and some aspects of this progress have accelerated over time. Current plans talk about a future force level of 230,000 and a budget reduced to around $4.1 billion a year, but it is not clear such plans will be put into practice, how the current force goals will be adjusted, what budget will actually be available, and how much the Afghan government can spend of its own revenues.

The security situation remains unpredictable, as do the challenges posed by peace negotiations and the police effort presents special problems both because of corruption and because it is being developed without a matching real-world justice system and Afghan government presence in the field. It is unclear whether the International Community are willing to fully fund the necessary development and support effort through 2014 and for as long as it takes after this time to achieve lasting security and stability - a truly massive funding effort that so far has dominated total aid expenditures in Afghanistan.

The National Security Directorate, the national intelligence agency, is administered by the Ministry of Interior and about 10,000 militia organizations existed, many of them commanded by regional warlords. A series of amnesty programs have disarmed some militia units and reintegrated them into society, but the elimination of militias remains an elusive goal of the central government. Much territory remains outside government control and is dominated by narcotics traffickers, tribal leaders and insurgent groups.

**Foreign Military Relations:** Afghanistan has depended almost entirely on U.S. and NATO, as Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to provide security in and around Kabul and to combat Taliban forces elsewhere in Afghanistan. In 2008 the ISAF, which since 2003 has been under the rotating command of officers from NATO countries, included about 43,000 troops from 40 countries.

In 2003 Afghanistan received an estimated US$ 191 million in foreign military assistance, in 2005 that figure was US$ 396 million and a 2008 U.S. proposal would expend a total of US$ 20 billion developing the ANSF and reorganizing occupation forces between 2009 and 2013. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and EU have also ongoing advisory programs on Police and Rule of Law (Justice, Anti-Corruption, Human Rights and Gender). Moreover, the Crime Management College has recently established (2013), through a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the European Union Delegation in Kabul and the Ministry of Interior.

It is expected to open its doors for students by September 2013 and currently, the Crime Management College is housed within the Central Training in Kabul. Since it was formally opened by General Patang (then Head of Afghan General Training Command) in February 2012 over 1400 students have attended training courses run by EUPOL’s Training Component. This latest commitment of over one million Euro will see the renovation of two buildings within the Afghan National Police Academy. A comprehensive curriculum is currently being trained at the Crime Management College, jointly by EUPOL trainers and Afghan trainers.

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**External Threat:** The major external threat is the movement of hostile forces, militias and terrorists from staging areas across Afghanistan’s porous borders of Pakistan.

**Defense Budget:** Between 2003 and 2011, the estimated military expenditure increased from US$ 65 million to US$ 241 million.

**Police:** Increasingly after 2002, the police were the only defense for civilians against insurgent forces in many parts of the country. Thus police duties often include paramilitary activities that are vital to national defense. Plans call for Afghanistan to increase its police force, the Afghan National Police (ANP), to 82,000, including conventional, border, highway, and counternarcotics police, by 2012. The force, which had an estimated 75,000 members in 2011, was to include members of all ethnic and tribal groups. Germany initiated the restoration program in 2002 and the European Union took over in 2007, where some 200 European trainers were in Afghanistan as said before. However, the program has been handicapped by low pay, low recruit quality, pervasive corruption and the increasing insecure environment. Indeed, in 2009 an estimated 1,295 local police were killed, often by insurgents and none of the 433 police units that have been trained to face insurgent forces properly.

**Internal Threat:** In 2008 a large part of the country remained without adequate security and armed bands launched attacks in regions not controlled by the central government. Reportedly, in 2009 the number of violent incidents increased by one-third over 2008, killing about 6,500 combatants and 2,500 civilians. In 2010 - 11 the number of suicide attacks increased from 216 to 340 and the number of roadside bombings increased from 2,571 to 3,488. In 2004 the international medical organization Doctors without Borders withdrew its aid workers from Afghanistan when five members were killed and in the years that followed other international nongovernmental organizations periodically suspended operations because of insecurity. In the first half of 2011, some 12 international aid workers were abducted and 8 killed.

A major internal security factor has been criminal and terrorist activity associated with the prosperous drug trade, where drug-processing laboratories are located throughout the country, traditional informal financial networks launder narcotics profits, and some provincial and national government officials have been implicated in the drug trade. Forcible eradication of poppy crops has caused controversy between Western policymakers and the Karzai government and Western troops have been reluctant to antagonize local populations by eradication measures.

Some government agencies have been implicated in the protection of the opium trade. The smuggling and other illegal economic activity that were pervasive during the war periods left a very strong residual black-market economy specializing in exporting goods illegally into Pakistan and moving illegal drugs northward into Central Asia and ultimately Russia and Western Europe. The
opium production supporting the latter activity remained very high (accounting for an estimated 93 percent of the world supply in 2007), despite government efforts to reduce it.

**Terrorism:** Between 2002 and 2008, President Karzai suffered four assassination attempts during which some government officials were killed and the latest such attack occurred in April 2008. Small-scale attacks on villages and in Kabul were common throughout the 2009-2011.

### 5.6.7 Afghanistan Future

The International Community, EU, NATO and the Afghan government have established a framework for reconstruction assistance through the 2014 security transition and into what they are calling the “transformation decade” (2015–2024). Through 2014, the international community estimates that Afghanistan will require at least $9 billion a year to sustain current operations and fund development. It will take about $5 billion to cover the costs of the Afghan security forces at current levels and another US $4 billion to support the Afghan budget and provide economic assistance. The Afghan President has request to include nearly $9.7 billion to strengthen the Afghan security forces during this critical transition period and to fund programs to build governing capacity, promote economic development, and counter the drug trade. Funding needs are expected to decline gradually after 2015 as Afghanistan generates increased government revenue and becomes more self-reliant.
Three key events this quarter - the signing of the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement, the NATO Summit and the Tokyo Donors Conference - broadly outlined Afghanistan’s security relationship with the United States, endorsed an accelerated timetable to transition security to the Afghan government. On May 2, 2012, after over a year of negotiations, President Barack Obama and President Hamid Karzai signed a new pact, laying a foundation for a relationship between the United States and Afghanistan after the bulk of American troops have gone home. The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement signaled a long-term U.S. commitment to sustain the Afghan security forces, fund economic-development programs, promote good governance, support regional security and cooperation, and help Afghanistan deal with its budget shortfall. The United States said it would support efforts to build Afghan governing capacity. The Agreement was intended to reassure Afghans and warn insurgents that the United States had learned the lessons of the past and would not abandon Afghanistan after 2014. President Obama said the agreement ensures that “as Afghans stand up, they will not stand alone”. The agreement also underscored the importance of fighting corruption. Afghanistan pledged to strengthen its anti-corruption institutions, adopt measures to protect its financial system, and take steps to increase efficiency and accountability at all levels of the government. Afghanistan also committed to protect and promote democratic values and human rights, including “the essential role of women in society, so that they may fully enjoy their economic, social, political, civil, and cultural rights”. Afghanistan’s National Assembly ratified the agreement in early June.

5.6.8 Afghanistan Designated a Major Non-NATO Ally

The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement included a provision that the United States would designate Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), thus establishing a framework for continuing security and defense cooperation. NATO is the major international organization providing military assistance in Afghanistan. MNNA countries are eligible for U.S. training, loans of equipment for research and development and ultimately for foreign military financing for defense purposes. On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed the order giving Afghanistan MNNA status and signaling the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan after the transition. Afghanistan is the first country to be designated an MNNA since 2004, when Kuwait, Morocco and Pakistan were added to the list.

On May 21, 2012, the leaders of the 50 countries contributing to the NATO mission in Afghanistan met in Chicago and agreed to a new transition timetable that would put Afghan security forces in charge of security throughout the country by the summer of 2013. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will support the Afghan security forces as coalition
forces withdraw. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the one-day meeting, the leaders said that by the end of 2014, the NATO mission will have shifted from combat to one of training, advising, and assisting. The leaders pledged that their close partnership with Afghanistan “will continue beyond the end of the transition period.

The Afghan government does not have sufficient revenue to pay for its security forces and looks to the international community for funds to help cover the salaries and operating costs of the ANA and the ANP through 2024. The United States and its coalition partners have been building the ANSF to a combined strength of 352,000 soldiers and police. NATO leaders agreed to scale back the total force to a more financially sustainable 228,500 by 2017, security conditions permitting. They estimated it will cost $4.1 billion per year to maintain a force of this size. NATO leaders pledged to play their part in creating funding mechanisms for these forces, but cautioned, “such mechanisms will be flexible, transparent, accountable, cost-effective, and will include measures against corruption”.

The United States is covering most of the costs of the ANA and provides a substantial amount for the ANP along with EU and other International Organizations. The NATO Summit stipulates that the Afghan government will contribute $500 million in 2015 toward the sustainment of its security forces and gradually increase its share of the ANSF costs until 2024, when it will have full financial responsibility for its security forces. In the meantime, however, the United States is likely to be footing much of the bill for the ANSF. In 2012, President Karzai announced that a third group (“tranche”) of provinces, districts, and cities would begin transitioning to Afghan government control of security. After the third tranche transition, about 75% of Afghanistan’s population will live in areas where Afghan forces have the primary responsibility for security. Coalition forces began transitioning areas in March 2011. The first tranche accounted for about 25% of the Afghan population. In November 2011, the Afghans took the security lead in a second set of areas. However, coalition forces are still engaged in combat in many of the areas in transition.

At the Tokyo Summit, representatives from 70 countries, international organizations, and non-profit groups agreed to create a framework for continued international support for Afghanistan’s economic development from transition at the end of 2014 through the “transformation decade” (2015–2024). At the conference, the international community offered to provide an estimated $16 billion in aid from now through 2015, but with conditions. In return for the assistance, the Afghan government promised to implement political and economic reforms to improve governance, make public institutions more accountable, and tackle pervasive corruption.

The $16 billion does not represent firm pledges by individual countries, but rather a general commitment to maintain current development funding over the next four years. Afghanistan and the
The international community provided an annex to the conference declaration entitled the “Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework” which described priority areas, provided benchmarks for the Afghan government to meet, and clearly stated that “the international community’s ability to sustain support for Afghanistan depends upon the Afghan government delivering on its commitments.

The agreed that international aid will focus on achieving objectives in five major areas:

- Ensuring credible, inclusive, and transparent presidential elections in 2014 and parliamentary elections in 2015;
- Increasing access to justice for all, especially women and combating corruption;
- Improving the integrity of public financial management and the banking sector;
- Improving the Afghan government’s ability to collect revenues and develop and execute budgets;
- Achieving inclusive and sustained growth through a focus on human development, food security and private investment.

This process will build on the existing Joint Monitoring Control Board, which approves major reconstruction initiatives such as increasing the force strength of the ANSF, relying heavily on the World Bank’s latest assessment of the Afghan economy to project Afghanistan’s financial needs and to identify the five priority areas.

5.6.9 Conclusion

Based on the analysis above, Russia is one of the main actor in CA region where divergences between Moscow’s and Beijing’s strategies are less visible. However, both give support to the Central Asian ruling elites, despite the fact that Russian and Chinese experts voice their concerns about the inability of the governments to reform and modernize.

The EU’s point of view, which is that long-term state stability is possible only with a certain level of political diversity and realistic alternatives, is not shared by the two major external actors nor put into practice by Central Asian regimes.

In security thinking the European approach also diverges from that of Russia and China. In contrast to Russia the EU does not give priority to hard security and does not seek to engage the Central Asian states in new strategic alliances besides having organized two security conferences there in 2009 and 2010. The EU has not put forward any proposals for regional security structures that might compete with the CSTO or the SCO and believes this issue should be addressed through NATO and the OSCE. The multilateral and soft-security-based approach of the China-led SCO seems closer to European thinking, although in practice the EU is unable to corroborate the SCO’s
security narrative, which is modeled on the Chinese concept of the “three evils” and which serves to justify the repressive policies conducted in Xinjiang.

Another point of contrast with Russia is the fact that Europe unambiguously emphasizes the relationship between long-term security and development. The US and Europe believes that a commitment to economic development and social well-being is a major element of international peace and of internal stability. Russia does not hold a counter-narrative, but neither does it consider its actions in Central Asia in such terms. Therefore, Europe, in some ways, seems to share more similarities with the Chinese discourse, insofar as it recognizes that inequalities in wealth and a lack of prospects directly fuel political crises.

However, the Chinese definition of development is limited to a socio-economic understanding of the term and the need for political reform is not part of its official preoccupations. In Central Asia, China’s “harmonious society” policy provides unfailing support for corrupt and authoritarian regimes, going against its own development-security narrative.

Now this new center of gravity has its own official organization to represent its interests and this is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO, while the US has the “Axis of Evil” (composed, at one time at least, of Syria, Iran and North Korea), which, by extension, furnishes NATO and the West generally with its collective bogeyman, the loose unity of interests represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia, China, US and the EU therefore have divergences in the prioritization of their interests in Central Asia, as well as in their conceptions of the link between security and development.

Finally, it has to taken into account that lack of a single unified strategy within the EU is the biggest issue in the determination of how to spend funds in Afghanistan. This understanding permeates the literature on reconstruction and development in Afghanistan that it is difficult to understand why effective solutions have not been implemented.

Often problems of donor coordination are leading to a proliferation of disparate projects, with low local impact of funding and creating a poor impression in Afghanistan about donors’ lack of agreement. EU is no stranger to this issue and the key to understanding the lack of coordination in the EU comes with an examination of how the EU institutions interact with each other.

In regard to Afghanistan policy, for instance, the competing institutions in the European Union include the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Although there is not a great deal of literature dealing with internal EU responsibility overlap and conflict in regard to Afghanistan and development, there is a broader history of overlapping functions and conflict among the main EU institutions.
All ecosystems are exposed to gradual changes...Nature is usually assumed to respond to gradual change in a smooth way.

However...smooth change can be interrupted by sudden drastic switches to a contrasting state. Although diverse events can trigger such shifts, recent studies show that a loss of resilience usually paves the way for a switch to an alternative and adverse state.

This suggests that strategies for sustainable management of such ecosystems should focus on building and maintaining resilience....Stability domains typically depend on slowly changing variables...These factors may be predicted, monitored, and modified. In contrast, stochastic events that trigger state shifts are usually difficult to predict or control¹.

6.1 Comparative analysis

The previous Chapter V has introduced the analysis about the gathering of all data under the heading of the EU and NATO commitments and engagement in CA States through their wide and long-term Strategy. It represents as a form of gradual change and development over Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

The research has collected a huge amount of quantitative and qualitative data to support arguments and to measure and evaluate the human advance, through taking in and pooling projects by the European Union, NATO and their Member States on the bases of bilateral agreements too.

However, as mentioned in the pervious Chapter, Russian interest remains an essential variable in every decision made by regional leaders and as far as its power continues to loom large over the region.

Although the EU and NATO influence and engagement made major inroads as a useful counterweight to Russian preponderance, their impact on the political, economical and social spheres remains limited, despite European interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities.

This situation has also been “helped” by NATO’s internal uncertainty as the organization had difficulties in finding adequate motivations and activities for the Central Asian states’ security needs as a whole and security assistance programs as SSR, SFA in particular.

Russia’s success in influencing the CA States, through the strengthening of the CSTO, as well as the SCO, currently comprises Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - a group of undemocratic nations primarily driven by Russia and China- continue keeping the region’s rich energy resources and its renewed interest in Afghanistan at the cost of failures of the European and American strategies in these areas.

Yet, the establishment of the CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces should be viewed as an extension of the Russian influence in Central Asia and by emphasizing the threats coming from Afghanistan and NATO’s problems in managing the situation, Russia again attempts to portray itself as a better security solution for the Central Asian countries\(^2\).

NATO’s activity in the CA States has always been regarded by Moscow rather as a threat than as factors of stability or security cooperation in the region, therefore Russia’s constant objective has been limiting the organization’s activities and success.

Clearly Russia is the main security actor in the region and able to act with military means in its “sphere of influence” for better or worse, indeed, in the case of conflict in Central Asia, it is highly unlikely that the EU, NATO and the US would act, even though the latter two have several military bases in the area focusing on the war effort in Afghanistan. The European Union does however regard itself as a security actor and takes a keen interest in working with Central Asian states on the basis of joint security interests.

One security aspect that is key to the EU and NATO on national and regional security cooperation is the concept of Security Sector Reform³ (SSR), which aims to support reforms of all national security-related agencies and security oversight mechanisms.

Although the EU policy documents concerning Central Asia do not refer to SSR, the EU and NATO activities can be directly related to the holistic concept of SSR and others might contribute indirectly to reform of the security sector, however, one of the main focus on security fro EU is its direct engagement on Border Crossing Points (BCPs) through the BOMCA. Indirect activities such as education, trade and judicial programs that might be beneficial to security and stability in the long term will not be ignored.

The Russian variable also affected the EU and NATO States deeply, with regard the so called Russia-Ukraine gas crisis at the end of 2005, which was a “wake-up call” for the EU, relying on Russia for 25 % of its gas and 30 % of its oil supplies. Some EU members, such as Slovakia and Finland, are totally reliant on Russian gas, while other states (e.g., Poland and Hungary) are heavily dependent on Russian gas, 90 % of which passes through Ukraine on its way to the EU.

Diversification of EU energy supply is seen as the key to greater energy security and is the cornerstone of its energy policy. Besides stepped-up efforts to improve energy efficiency and the expansion of other energy sources to reduce gas consumption, the EU needs to increase imports from other countries and regions. With the oil and natural gas resources in the North Sea in decline, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia regions have become a serious alternative supplier of energy.

According to international analysts the Caspian Sea region’s reserves are crucial for meeting Europe’s demand for oil next future and without them, it is estimated oil exports from the Persian Gulf to Europe would have to increase by 0.5 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) in 2012. However, if the Caspian Sea region fully participates in the export market, oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe will decrease by 1.5 MMbbl/d.

Countries belonging to the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) group called a 2,715 kilometer road corridor through Kazakhstan the most important route within the

³ Security sector reform (SSR) is a relatively recent concept in state transformation, development and post-conflict peace building. Notions of democratizing societies, good governance with transparency and accountability, peaceful transformation of societies, human security and poverty reduction programmers have made inroads in security thinking.
entire Central Asian region, linking Russia, China and Afghanistan, with EU and NATO sharing the burden and providing a loan of 6,361 million euro for an on-going project including road widening, bypasses, highway rehabilitation and related poverty reduction and social service programs.

Other example is the largest project in Tajikistan, begun in 2007 and still underway, with EU 90 million euro aid project for upgrading parts of a highway known as International Trunk Road number 11 and part of the Asian Highway, which will allow the landlocked state easier access for its imports-exports to ocean ports via neighboring Afghanistan.

An equally vital road artery in Kyrgyzstan links the northern capital of Bishkek with the country’s second largest city, Osh, in the south and the construction of a series of bridges has helped providing access for tens of thousands of weekly shoppers from Kyrgyzstan and surrounding countries to the largest market in Central Asia. EU has also modernized several local airports in Uzbekistan and upgraded Manas airport in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek.

An additional reason for EU and NATO to keep an eye on the CA oil resources is the fact that the US and NATO allied troops in Afghanistan are supplied in part via these neighboring states and with the international forces scheduled to leave Afghanistan in 2014, there is widespread concern about a potential destabilizing impact about filling such a void with the creation of a new silk road, integrate Afghanistan and its neighbors.

Therefore, assessing and, where possible measuring the impact of EU and NATO presence in CA region, is imperative for planning reasons to implement effective strategies for strengthening stability in countries where transition is still in place and conflict zones still exist.

**6.2 Impact of EU and NATO efforts on the CA countries: Empirical analysis**

In this paragraph, the research explores the impact of the Efforts on the CA states, analyzing the phenomenon as a tool of assessing the governance, education, economic and security developments in those countries and whether there is correlation before and after the EU and NATO engagement.

It is argued that Good Governance and liberal democracy are not a prerequisite for successful political and economic developments contrary to what some academic environment believe (Held, Goldblat, Perraton, 1999). For instance, taking into account on the one hand the economically successful China and Kazakhstan which have authoritarian regimes, with robust economy and on the other hand the democratic Ukraine with severe economic problems.

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4 Efforts are referred to the joint EU and NATO engagement in the Central Asia region.
The hypothesis states that democratic political regime is an important part of development but not a necessary precondition for it and there are other elements that contribute to development and preliminary conclusions suggest that external factors as EU and NATO engagement do not affect successful political, social and economic developments. During the last decades the world has been affected by an unprecedented rise of globalization and interconnections that are often associated with spread of neo-liberalism and democratization doctrine.

In this respect, the C.A. countries are still trying to find their place in the changed International Environment. According to Huntington, Shin, and Diamond the spread of democratic governance that has been on a rise since the end of the Cold War is contributed to an accelerated globalization that not only brought military and oligopolistic regimes all over the world down but also speeded up economic development in many developing countries (Scholte, 2005).

However, it is obvious that there are certain limitations that affect the results and do not allow being certain about the relationship between governance/democracy and political, social and economic developments. One of them is the use of Democracy Index and Index of Economic Freedom for the Former Soviet Union countries. Despite all claims, the Central Asian countries are still considered to be in the transition from centrally-planned to market economy. That is why some of the variables included in these indexes cannot objectively reflect the current political or economic situation in some Central Asian republics.

Before analyzing the impact on the political, social, economical, education and security spheres, it is needed to define concepts that will be used in this chapter.

Democracy and governance are a very complex phenomenon that is featured by having multiple definitions and conceptions that reflect particular cases. Many of them were developed within comparative politics field. One of the most used definitions of democracy was formulated by Joseph Schumpeter who understood it through perspectives of free election (Fish, 2008).

There is another definition of democracy which was formulated by Stephen Fish who measures political regimes in terms of degrees of openness. According to him regime is democratic if there is an open political participation for everyone, where competition is open and political communication flows openly.

It is very important to mention that the independent variable is democracy/governance which is measured by HDI and its scaling used for a case study is as follow:

- Full democracies - scores of 8-10;

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Flawed democracies - scores of 6 to 7.9;
Hybrid regimes - scores of 4 to 5.9;
Authoritarian regimes - scores below 4.

The education component of the HDI is now measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. Mean years of schooling is estimated based on educational attainment data from censuses and surveys available in the UNESCO Institute for Statistics database and Barro and Lee (2011) methodology\(^8\).

Expected years of schooling estimates are based on enrolment by age at all levels of education and population of official school age for each level of education. Expected years of schooling are capped at 18 years.

The life expectancy at birth component of the HDI is calculated using a minimum value of 20 years and maximum value of 83.4 years. This is the observed maximum value of the indicators from the countries in the time series, 1980-2010. Thus, the longevity component for a country where life expectancy birth is 55 years would be 0.552.

For the wealth component, the goalpost for minimum income is $100 (PPP) and the maximum is $107,721 (PPP), both estimated during the same period, 1980-2010.

The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the four HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean.

The significant numbers of countries have medium HDI and medium democracy index. These results demonstrate that anything can be concluded. Someone can argue that there is a connection between democracy and development or it can be the opposite and someone can conclude that there is no effect of democratic regimes on socio-economic development\(^9\).

The answer is that these states have chosen functional cooperation which is one of the forms of realismism and at certain extent regional integration, especially in areas of economy as a priority for development and maintenance of political and economic stability.

Indeed, with disintegration of the Soviet Union five new Central Asian states were created. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan appeared as a single State. As stated in the Chapter one, Afghanistan is also included as part of the research. Each country has

\(^8\) Source: 

unique features, for instance, Uzbekistan has the largest population of 27 million and is the hub of transit corridors in Central Asia (Swanstrom, 2004), Kazakhstan has the largest land area, highest nominal GDP of $6,791 and largest oil resources among former Soviet Union countries after Russia.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan control more than 90% of water resources in Central Asia (Primbetov, 2006), while Afghanistan has a special strategic importance in the region because it has borders with three Central Asian republics and it is a place of the land routes between Indian subcontinent and resource rich Central Asia.

Having these distinctive features have made leaders of the Central Asian states rethink their positions in the region and on the international arena, choosing between individual pursuing of goals and common efforts in the form of cooperation.

However, weak economic development of Central Asian countries, lack of trust among them and emergence of new outside actors which were interested in gaining political and economic influence in the region have complicated transitional process. Since then, post-Soviet Central Asia has been confronting several major challenges which were coming from regional and global forces. Regional interdependence, illegal drug-trafficking, management of water resources, transnational crime and extremism, immigration as well as growing influence of Russia and China.

One of the biggest local challenges that Central Asian countries have been facing after becoming independent was a lack of institutional mechanism and economic interdependence those states have inherited as a part of Soviet Union legacy and which have been paralyzing an ability of states to pursue their own sovereign policies and to engage in economic activities (Zhalimbetova and Gleason, 2006).

Deep economic, political and social connectedness has driven Central Asian states to a socio-economic decline during the first years of sovereignty. Another problem that has emerged immediately after collapse of the Soviet Union is a management of water resources that used to be regulated by Moscow through mutual cooperation (UNDP, 2005). Independence has empowered each state to pursue own policies toward water distribution which has created a potential danger of conflicts in the region where water plays an important role.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the main suppliers of water to all republics already has reduced its water supply due to technical reasons. Mismanagement of water resources also has created bigger problems such as drying of Aral Sea that has an impact on agricultural sector of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Illicit drug trade, transnational crime and terrorism are other big challenges for the

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10 Source: [www.interpol.int](http://www.interpol.int), accessed in December 2012.
region, with a transit corridor for huge illicit drug flows, primarily from Afghanistan, to the principal hubs of demand in Europe, Russia and China.

Lack of local institutions and cross border cooperation initiatives, as well as high demand, has been exacerbating the situation and supporting flourishing of transnational crime. Central Asia also inherited border disputes with each other as a result of demarcation of territory that was done during the Soviet era. The same demarcation of the territory created zones of potential conflicts, especially in the Fergana Valley that is located at an intersection of three states and comprises three ethnic groups (Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks and Tajiks) and is a safe haven for different militant and religious groups that successfully hide there from Uzbek and Tajik authorities and periodically destabilize situation in those countries.

One of the biggest global challenges for Central Asian countries is an appearance of actors such as Russia, China and the USA\(^{11}\) eager to fulfill an empty niche that has formed after dissolution of the USSR. Each of these states has been interested in strengthening influence in the region, with Russia trying to recovering its influence in the Central Asian region through increasing its military, expanding bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, signing a security pack with Uzbekistan and having joint military exercise as well.

Russia also maintains tight relations with Turkmenistan by retaining control over Turkmen gas supplies (Nygren, 2008\(^{12}\)). China is another important player that has emerged in Central Asia having own agendas for strengthening influence in the region. One of them is the Xingjian autonomous province, the Chinese part of Central Asia which is highly populated by ethnic Turks such as Uyghur, Kazaks and Kyrgyz and reluctant to be incorporated in political and economic structures of China.

Another biggest interest of China in Central Asian is energy reserves that are vital for Chinese economic growth. It already has built one part of a pipe line from Kazakhstan to Xingjian that is designed to carry 10 million tons of oil annually and which will stretch from West China to East Kazakhstan. China was also able to get a deal with Petro Kazakhstan, the Canadian oil company

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\(^{12}\) Bertil Nygren, describes the strategies used by President Putin from 2000 onwards to recreate “Greater Russia”, that is a Russia that controls most of the territory of the former Soviet Union. He shows the subtlety of the means of control, often through creating economic dependencies in the “near abroad”, including exploiting energy dependency, through prolonging other political and military dependencies, and sometimes through traditional “power politics”. He argues that after seven years in power the results of this strategy are beginning to show, providing comprehensive coverage of Russia’s relations to the former Soviet territories of the CIS countries, including Ukraine and Putin’s role in the events surrounding the “Orange Revolution”, Belarus and the attempts to form a union, the Caucasus and Russia’s role in the various conflicts, Moldova, including the Transdniester conflict, and Central Asia.
that was acquired by China National Petroleum Corporation, thus getting access to Kazakh oil (Allouche, 2007).

China also has been interested in hydro power potential of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which control over 90% of region’s water resources and are vital for Western China that is undergoing a massive state-sponsored population migration into this area that depends on agriculture.

The US and NATO are another big player on the Central Asian political arena that has started actively strengthening its influence after the events of September 11 2001, changing the “geopolitical map” of Central Asia and creating new challenges for the Central Asian states (Nygren, 2008).

Immediately, after entering the region under the shade of War on Terror, the US, NATO and EU (with minor military engagement) have started to aggressively implement Western policies toward democratization of the Central Asian states and other former Soviet Union republics. The US was an active supporter of “colored” revolutions that were taking place in different countries of the former Soviet Union.

It also greeted the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan that had to bring a pro-American government into place and what did not come true. It also has started to build its military presence by opening military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and using airspace of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan for the US military and NATO to conduct their operations in Afghanistan. One of the main reasons for the US involvement in the region is a desire to weaken Russian influence in the region and get an access to oil, gas and routes that connect Sub-Indian continent and resource rich Central Asia and represent a potential corridor to Iran and Middle East.

The existing dynamics and conditions of security that are shaped by global and regional forces in the CA region have defined political strategies that can be described as balancing between inside and outside actors. In the light of such balancing the Central Asian states have chosen regional cooperation as a priority of successful development and maintaining stability. They have chosen active engagement with international institutions to solve common challenges and protect own interests.

Today, most of the Central Asian states are active members or observers of such organizations as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization of Security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and many more.

Due to the fact that all Central Asian states have been experiencing common challenges in the face of global and regional political forces, cooperation has become a choice that has defined foreign politics of those countries. Here, it is very important to define what cooperation is and how
it differs from integration, because Central Asian countries mainly involved in functional cooperation which is a form of regionalism, with some attempts of integration primarily in the area of economy.

According to Edward Best and Thomas Christiansen cooperation is one of the dimensions of regionalism, a process that refer to “the growth of societal integration within a region and often involves economic and social interaction”. However, due to the fact that each region and its members have unique nature it produces different forms of interaction “between the various dimensions and dynamics of regionalism”. There are two main forms of regionalism that are well known. It is functional cooperation and regional integration, the functional cooperation represents limited or specific arrangements between states that aim to bring countries together on certain issues such as security or managing nature resources.

Political cooperation refers to commitment of countries in dealing with certain issues such as security and is based on adopting common positions in international organizations such as SCO and sometimes joint actions such as joint military exercises. Functional cooperation implies that states will participate in cooperation arrangements to solve immediate issues, but they do not have long term agendas to create a space that will be subjected to some “distinctive rules” contrary to regional integration which refers to elimination of barriers to create a unified political or economic space such as EU.

According to an Asian Development Bank\textsuperscript{13} report “increased cooperation” among the Central Asian Republics could produce big gains for the people of the region, with benefits from reducing trade cost, more efficient use of water and other natural resources, generating a regional economy twice as large and well off 10 years from now. The price of non-cooperation could also be large from lost economic opportunities, conflict and insecurity.

There are two organizations in which Central Asian states are engaged and which deserve a closer look at. These organizations reflect the needs these countries experience (security and economy) and have unique nature which let them have a special impact on the regional politics. These organizations are Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EEC).

However, the SCO strategic plan for medium term continues to be fixed on two agendas, security and economics. These objectives do not necessarily contradict one another, but they emphasize different priorities according to different member states. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan complain that the SCO is moving away from the purely security objectives that had

been emphasized during its creation. Meanwhile Kazakhstan and Russia are primarily interested in the economic potential of the organization and have cast aside its security role.

Central Asia is a pivotal region that possesses enormous natural, human and strategic potential that has been attracting attention of major global powers for decades. With the disintegration of the USSR and creation of new independent Central Asian republics it has become easier for global forces to enter the region and start spreading their influence. Global and domestic challenges that have emerged after those countries gained independence have forced young and weak Central Asian countries to find a political position that would protect their own interests and satisfy interests of global powers in the face of Russia, China and the Westerns.

6.3 Assessment of the Economic Impact

Labor migration is a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in which independent states have chosen different paths of socio-economic development, coupled with weak political systems as well as economic stagnation of some countries, these have created significant disparities in development among former Soviet Union.

During the last two decades remittances became one of the most important sources of external financial flows in developing countries and for most countries of the Former Soviet Union, remittances are considered to be the second largest financial sources after Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid (Mansoor and Quillin, 2007:41).

Remittances are associated with labor migration that has been on a rise during the last years of accelerated globalization that triggered an unprecedented size of international migratory movements. Data from IMF and World Bank show that financial flows that come from migrant workers constitute a large portion of countries GDP. For instance, remittances in Tajikistan represent 36.2% of GDP, in Kyrgyzstan it is 27.4% and in Uzbekistan 18.3%. For such countries as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where remittances constitute a large portion of GDP, worker’s remittances are not only an external source of finance but also a tool for fixing unemployment which is a serious problem in these countries.

In Kyrgyzstan socio-economic structural changes have been affecting political, social and political spheres of the country, represented by improvements in living standards such as rising income and improving health and educational systems since the EU has engaged in those areas (Jaffe 1998:70).
In theory, start-up capital should be available locally due to remittances from labor migrants, but in reality money is mainly spent on consumption and is seldom invested in revenue-generating activities due to a lack of incentives. The reasons mostly relate to the absence of regulatory framework an abundance of red tape and unclear rules of the game.

Often arbitrary actions of the authorities contribute to the climate of uncertainty and insecurity and prevent business people from taking risks they consider unacceptable.

Administrative restrictions on business prevent the generation of income and tend to generate poverty instead and in Uzbekistan, there are tensions in the regions related to government policies of import substitution, restrictions on entrepreneurial activities and initiatives against the petty retail trade, as well as unfulfilled social promises by the government.

Regional disparities, however, show that energy-rich and economically better off Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are suffering from population decrease, while gender issues emerge as a source of social tensions.

Political systems of the CA region are still in the process of transition from central planning to more efficiently functioning economic systems, explaining the effects of slow economic developments.

However, this is based on a smaller data set, which due to data limitation does not allow having more observations which could increase statistical significance of the results. These results
also show that remittances may not be the main contributors to socio-economic development of CA countries.

Potential for conflict in Central Asia does not derive from absolute poverty, but from the fragility of economic arrangements that, if disrupted, can lead to dire social consequences. Locally, poverty in Central Asia is explained away as originating from the collapse of the USSR, the lack of start-up capital, natural causes such as droughts and in Tajikistan, by the consequences of the civil war. In reality, other factors contribute significantly, such as poor governance and corruption, administrative restrictions and closed borders, extensive cotton cultivation in place of other crops, and gross inequalities in land distribution.

Cotton, for instance, remains the main cash crop in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and is important for Turkmenistan, since much of its labor force is employed in the cotton sector. In Uzbekistan land is owned by the state and farmers in theory lease it, but the conditions of the lease are unclear and in reality the state can take the land back under various pretexts or as a punishment.

In Turkmenistan land is owned by the state and cultivation is done by “leaseholder associations”, where state intervention remains high, so that the state agents can even confiscate harvests, which peasants grow for their own consumption in garden allotments. In Tajikistan land distribution remains a source of grievance, since land was distributed unfairly and to those who had right connections and money.

Hence a shadow economy, smuggling and labor migration have emerged as predominant alternatives for income-generation and legitimate trade is restricted, being monopolized by “business groupings” close to power-holders.

Smuggling is closely related to the shadow economy, since trade restrictions are so severe that regular business has become progressively unviable and extensive smuggling goes on across the Turkmen/Uzbek border mainly from Turkmenistan, involving goods such as petrol, building materials and consumer goods from Iran.

Many poor families in the region survive due to men working abroad and sending remittances to the families and locally, this is generally regarded as positive. There is considerable labor migration from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia and increasingly to Kazakhstan.

Annual seasonal migration is extensive-over 1 million men from Tajikistan to Russia every year and the remittances they send amount to $600 million dollars, exceeding the state budget. This money provides a lifeline for the majority of Tajik households and in some areas of the country 70% of households depend on remittances sent by relatives. It is estimated that 700,000 Kyrgyz and 800,000 Uzbek citizens work in Russia and their remittances is estimated at $500 million in
Kyrgyzstan, roughly twice as much as the amount the whole development community puts into the country.

The same applies to Uzbekistan, with remittances estimated at over $500 million and the states have no ability to levy tax on this money. The social consequences of labor migration are worrying, where many migrants stay in Russia for years, if not forever. At this rate, about one-third of the male population of Tajikistan has gone, leaving mostly boys and older men behind, regions peopled mainly by women are emerging, with obvious impacts on the social structure.

Yet, Central Asian states are vulnerable to fluctuations in Russia’s policies over migration, being aware that remittances are the largest source of income and that an influx of returnees risks social disruption.

However, the five countries of Central Asia have expanded their trade significantly since the beginning of their transition with exports quadrupling to almost $70 billion between 2010 and 2011 but without substantial diversification. These countries achieved this economic performance by promoting private investment, property rights, trade liberalization and transport infrastructure in varying degrees.

In 2011, the proceeds from exports of crude material and mineral fuels reached $49 billion, nearly four times the 2009 level, while exports of food and manufactured products reached $18 billion in 2011. As of 2011 the bulk of exports still came from a narrow range, with more than 80 percent of total export proceeds from just two sectors in Kazakhstan the mineral fuel and metal products, while in Tajikistan cotton and aluminum products.

Only Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan exported 80 percent of their exports from three or more sectors. Diversifying production and exports exposes firms to domestic and international competition, which enhances productivity. Such diversification drives a country’s structural transformation from agriculture to industry to service accompanied by a spatial transformation as leading cities and their hinterlands play a stronger role in trade.

However, the global crisis reduced trade and exports of the three countries in 2009, as it did for the world as a whole, notwithstanding as the world economy recovers, these countries must think strategically about how to diversify and expand their exports in the medium to long term.

Without competitive connections to large markets abroad, investors will not invest in productive capacity in cities even when major cities are competitive producers of goods because such investments will not be profitable.

Policy and investment actions at the urban level are needed to promote more open and competitive environments and foster agglomeration economies.
At city-hinterland level, policy actions must increase mobility of production factors within macro-regions anchored on leading cities. Better connections between leading cities and immediate agricultural hinterlands, such as improved road connections and extension services to farmers would provide a sound basis for intensifying agro-industrial activities within the country.

At regional level, investments and policy actions are needed to reduce transport costs and transport time to key regional markets and in the long-term it is needed to enhance the bedrock of connections between the macro-regions within countries.

6.4 Security and Safety Impact

Repression is often used as the main problem-solving tool, as grimly demonstrated by the Andijan events and the actions of security agents are one of the main sources of citizens’ grievances. This implies emphasis on the security of the ruling regimes, presented as the sole guarantors of stability. The US-led “War on Terror” has served only to strengthen and legitimize this trend in some case. To varying degrees, the Central Asian states tend to base their rule on coercion and at the same time, the legitimacy of the regimes is partially based on their ability to provide security. Rule by coercion is expensive, as it necessitates maintaining large security sector agencies, as the danger is that when the lid is taken off, all the hidden stresses will break loose.

As internal pressure is great, most of the ruling regimes in Central Asia tend to identify state security with their own and make sure that they hang onto power on this basis. This preoccupation with the safety of the regime leads to an emphasis on internal security and the suppression of political opponents.

Increasingly, the state presents itself to its citizens in a police uniform rather than as a provider of goods and services and often the degree of harassment and brutality by the law-enforcement agencies varies from country to country, but the pattern is clear and well-established. The popularity of the police and security forces is universally low: attacks on police in Uzbekistan in 2008 provoked more sympathy for the attackers than for their police victims.

The political standing of agencies within their respective regimes varies depending on their importance for the regime’s survival, typically, the agencies vested with responsibility over internal security-interior and state security ministries-carry more clout, as leaderships have to rely on them for a range of key tasks.

Another “hot potato” is the Border management which is an especially lucrative field. Positions in border and customs agencies in the Ferghana Valley are particularly attractive, as
restrictions on trade and travel in this densely populated area provide excellent extraction opportunities: Prohibited or highly taxed goods are taken across borders by paying bribes.

The tough border regime introduced by Uzbekistan gained a momentum of its own, giving birth to an integrated network of corrupt officials and smugglers from all sides. Appointments in the border areas are prestigious and “job buying” is widespread, provided that a contender already belongs to a patronage network.

There are many stakeholders in these arrangements, such as customs officers, border guards, police, local authorities and populations who live off smuggling. As a result, strong vested interests at the borders need to be serviced by lobbyists at the central level. Even if the leaderships were inclined to relax the border restrictions and facilitate trade, it would be hard to do it in practice, as it would run against powerful interests that have a stake in the preservation of the status quo.

Tajikistan is perhaps the last place in Central Asia likely to slide into violence again in the near future and its experience of civil war conveyed a lesson to the Uzbek leadership that an expansion of political participation and Islamism can create an explosive mixture and propel the country into a civil war.\textsuperscript{14}

Predictions regarding violence are hard to make for two reasons: one is the nature of violence in Central Asia. Unlike in the Caucasus or the Balkans, outbreaks of violence are characterized by having a relatively short run-up to them, an unclear agenda and obscure leadership; violence tends to be extremely brutal and can end as quickly as it started.\textsuperscript{15}

Yet, violence often erupts in a form of sporadic terrorist acts, such as bomb attacks, which are likely to continue, as well as assassination attempts. If and when they can ignite a bigger conflagration, depends on whether large groups can be mobilized for fighting. At present, this seems unlikely, however, there are enough grievances in store and too little means to manage them, thus creating a potential for explosion.

The drug dilemma is one of the major concerns of the CA, where drugs yards are widespread and 40% of GDP is made up of narcotics and in 2011 the drug profits were equivalent to 5 times the annual budget of the Afghan state. The Afghan border is 5,530 kilometers long, including 1,344 km with Tajikistan and 744 km with Turkmenistan.

Drug production has led to a boost in trafficking throughout Central Asia. The EU Situation Report on Drug Production and Trafficking states that significant trafficking takes place along the


Silk Route from Afghanistan to Central Asia and leads via Russia or the Caucasus and Turkey into the EU.

Drug traffickers have shifted part of their activities following enhanced interdiction efforts in Iran focused on its eastern border with Afghanistan. Yet, the EU estimate puts the amount of heroin from Afghanistan going through Tajikistan at roughly 80 to 120 tonnes a year. Hashish from Afghanistan also transits Tajikistan en route to Russian and European markets and for this reason the CA governments, with the exception of Turkmenistan, made efforts to combat drug trafficking and made cultivation of opium nearly impossible.

However, their response to trafficking was to close borders and introduce harsh border regimes, creating a vicious circle: closed borders paralyze the economies and generate poverty, which in its turn makes ordinary people resort to trafficking.

Unlike in Afghanistan, there is little drug-related violence in Central Asia and one explanation may be that because these are functioning states, it is easier to bribe than to fight one’s way through. The main impacts are twofold: Firstly, supply creates a demand and domestic consumption grows; secondly, drug trafficking generates opportunities for crime, corruption a growing merger between crime and politics.

One additional security issue is the presence of a number of separatist and extremist groups have operated on the territories of Central Asia and the Caucasus since the breakup of the Soviet Union. There has not been much terrorist activity in Central Asia in terms of attacks since 2002, but concerns linger about the penetration into the Central Asian territory of militants from South Asia and the Middle East.

The ethnically diverse and volatile Fergana Valley, shared by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, has received particular attention in this respect. Groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, al-Qa’ida, the Islamic Jihad Union and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement is active in the region.

The Russian tactics of border protection consisted of a combination of stationary and mobile patrols and through the International assistance and capacity building of the CA border troops the Russians practiced mostly local recruitment, when only the officers came from Russia and soldiers were from Tajikistan, handpicked by the officers at conscription points. They were paid a considerable salary by the local standards ($40 a month), in addition to provision of uniforms and food rations.

Throughout 2005 Tajikistan’s leadership advocated their withdrawal and an agreement between Russia and Tajikistan was signed in order to transfer the border to the jurisdiction to
Tajikistan and therefore, Russia handed over military installations and equipment to the Tajik side and its experts stayed behind as advisors.

Before the withdrawal of the Russian border troops, Tajikistan ranked fourth in the world for quantity of heroin seizures, but since Tajik soldiers are in place the seizure has dropped considerably: the first six months of 2011 there were seizures of 268,000 kg of heroin and 480,500 kg of opium, according to the UN.\textsuperscript{16}

NATO’ reports note that the Turkmen-Afghan border is poorly guarded and trafficking is rampant, however, Russian law-enforcement circles are not alarmed and view Tajikistan as the main country for trafficking to Russia.

This is confirmed by the nationalities of detained drugs couriers: the UNODC Bi-Annual Report based on government-provided statistics shows that many Tajik but no Turkmen citizens were intercepted as traffickers in Russia. This would imply that drugs from Turkmenistan are likely to go via a southern route to Europe.

The huge problem for the combat against drugs is that corruption remains endemic, with involvement of government officials, including those with direct responsibility for the fight against drugs, in trafficking and money laundering. It is impossible to determine how pervasive drug-related corruption is within government circles.

High-ranking officials of the Drug Control Agency in Tajikistan stated that corruption in law enforcement agencies has become critical and hampers drug control activity and in the international donors’ view, however, Tajikistan is a success story in the implementation of an anti-drug strategy. To this regards, the new Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) opened in February 2006 in Almaty and is staffed by law enforcement officials from the countries in the region, outreaching the Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan and establishing a liaison officers’ network in Afghanistan and in Kazakhstan.

International attention to anti-drug measures is significant and growing, EU and NATO are heavily involved in Central Asia and its drug control portfolio for the region is about $20 million per year. A number of the EU member states, such as the UK, Germany and France, provide substantial bilateral assistance, as well as the European Commission.

Support by the European Commission too, for border management on the Afghan side of the border with Tajikistan was finalized by June 2006, leading to the start of the Border Management in Afghanistan Program (BOMAF).

Apart from drug trafficking, instability in some of CA countries and in Afghanistan in particular can still spill across the border into Central Asia, where the situation is unlikely to change.

for the better anytime soon and challenges from the South would affect Central Asia. The opium economy in Afghanistan is socially embedded and widely seen as a normal economic activity. As Koehler and Zuercher\(^\text{17}\) note, wider state-building in Afghanistan is endangered by the drug economy and by badly designed and poorly executed measures against it.

State capacity in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan remains weak, with warlords presenting a serious challenge to the proper functioning of the state and the interplay between opium cultivation and military patronage has given rise to powerful warlords who are able to challenge the state armed forces.

Although external provision of security is inevitable and will remain so in the long term, the troops committed by the EU countries to NATO are not engaging in drug eradication efforts directly. Afghanistan is experiencing high population growth and it is a matter of time before the Afghans start to become interested in labor opportunities in Central Asia and cross-border migration follows.

It should be stressed that regional cross-border problems impact upon systems of governance that are often too weak to cope with additional challenges, with leaderships potentially in dangers, but as mutual suspicion in interstate relations prevails, it creates political and personal obstacles to cooperation. Thus, the wider security threats tend to upset already strained interstate relations and the authorities tend to aggravate the impact with their own actions and policies.

The only genuine cooperation unfolds among mid-ranking security officials who belong to the old Soviet network and sometimes the response to regional threats has been to erect as many barriers as possible. Although there has been hardly any interstate conflict, mutual hostility and numerous intra-regional disputes have become a characteristic of the post-independence period. The Aga-Khan Development Network\(^\text{18}\) has developed the concept of a Rectangle of Concern, i.e. a politically, economically and socially fragile region that includes Afghanistan, Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan, Western China and Northern Pakistan.

Oil, gas and hydropower are both Central Asia’s greatest assets and its curse, the attention paid to water and energy issues as sources of potential conflict has been considerable. Indeed, disruptions in this sphere have been painfully felt.

With the Soviet system gone, such enforcement and arbitration mechanisms have disappeared and have not been replaced with suitable international legal frameworks, despite many efforts to work them out. Various regional institutions have been set up, but so far have had a limited impact.

\(^{17}\) Source: 

\(^{18}\) Source: 
As a result, stronger states can act largely unchallenged to the considerable disadvantage of the weaker states.

The main hope of the smaller states is that the West or Russia can intervene on their behalf. After almost 20 years later, much of the former economic interdependency and social intermix has disappeared, having been surpassed by political and security considerations. Some leaders view isolationism as a preferred way of preventing a spillover of regional instability.

President Niyazov is by far the leader in this policy of isolationism, followed by President Karimov who closed the borders to an influx of refugees from Tajikistan during the civil war and would surely do it again, if turmoil were to unfold in Kyrgyzstan. More liberal Kazakhstan closed its border with Kyrgyzstan following the March 2005 events. Even Tajikistan grew more cautious about interaction with its northern neighbors, from whom it can expect trouble.

Trans-regional security threats are growing, but political obstacles to genuine security cooperation are too great. Moreover, national capabilities for dealing with the challenges are weak. External powers would have to compensate for this strategic weakness and broker alliances when necessary.

The EU and NATO have to bear in mind that drugs, crime and Islamism are the factors that will shape the future of Central Asia. The countries are likely to combat them in the ways that are habitual for their leaderships, but not appropriate from a European perspective. The EU can play a greater role in helping to create alternative and more humane solutions, but acknowledging the political realities of deep mistrust between the states of the region.

Finally, the EU cannot shy away from its responsibility to help Central Asians, who are the victims of their location to cope with the drug trafficking challenge.

Recently an element of rivalry over Central Asia has entered the relationship between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, although their overall goals towards stability and security are parallel.

The difference with the Great Game of the past is that the Western powers are not looking for a permanent presence in Central Asia. Rather, the significance of the region derives from security concerns elsewhere, such as in Afghanistan. Thus, their long-term commitment cannot be taken for granted. But there are important similarities too, such as support for the local regimes in exchange for loyalty and friendly “orientation” and a spirit of rivalry between the players.

At the beginning, Russian-American cooperation in the Global War on Terror reached unprecedented heights when President Putin gave his blessing to the initially hesitant Central Asian governments to host the Western troops, but has scaled down since. The Western engagement brought an element of competition into an otherwise neglected region.
Although the initial effect was positive, Moscow became more disciplined in fulfilling its commitments, but eventually got involved in competitive behavior, since the matters in Central Asia are central to its own priorities, while less essential to US foreign policy. China has its own reasons to be apprehensive about expansion of the US military presence.

A position shared by Russia, thus, a range of bilateral and multilateral instruments are currently employed to consolidate the presence of the two regional powers.

6.5 The “energy game”

The 2006 and 2009 gas crisis - when gas deliveries from Russia to Ukraine were cut off for two days because of a disagreement over prices - which revealed high levels of non-commercial risk in dealing with Russia, energy assumed a new importance for EU security thinking. Energy issues have gone up the EU on the Central Asia agenda as well, where two states might benefit (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan).

Kazakhstan already enjoys considerable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Europe, while Turkmenistan has proved to be a difficult partner, indeed, Oil from Kazakhstan is interesting for the EU, but is not regarded as crucial. At present, the bulk of oil goes westwards via Russia and tankers ship some oil across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In future, more oil is likely to go eastwards. China-Central Asia routes have large potential and will create a new dynamic in the energy market.

Gas is a more strategic commodity and Gazprom is the Europe’s main supplier, however, Gazprom is making little new investment in gas fields in Russia, meaning that the significance of gas from Central Asia in Gazprom’s deliveries to Europe will grow. With major fields yielding less as they age, Gazprom has chosen to maintain its gas balance by purchasing gas on the side, including in Central Asia, rather than develop Arctic fields.

If Russia and Central Asia combined production declines, a supply gap may follow, meaning that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will be important for future EU energy needs and their political isolation might need to be rebalanced. Politics, such as the events in Andijan, will have to be factored into the EU energy security equation.

In 2010 the search for alternative gas sources intensified and plans for a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan under the Caspian Sea bed, dormant for nearly a decade, were rejuvenated. This is because the EU and others felt the need to reduce their dependency on gas deliveries from Russia by exploring various possibilities for diversifying its energy supplies. There are two schools of thought on the feasibility of this option. According to one, a Trans-Caspian
pipeline is feasible a pipeline through Iran can only be a partial solution, given that Iran is a major gas exporter and is affected by political problems of its own.

A route via Afghanistan to India has still a way to go, however, by 2020 Azerbaijan’s gas reserves may dry up and it will need additional gas to keep the pipeline going. Gazprom’s Blue Stream, an underwater pipeline to deliver gas from Russia to Turkey built in partnership with ENI, demonstrating that such construction can be done quickly and safely. Private investors are interested in financing a Trans-Caspian pipeline.

According to this view, the EU’s role would be to facilitate access and resolution of problems rather than act as an investor, with the EU has already initiated a Caspian-Black Sea Energy dialogue, known as the Baku Process to enable international companies to gain easier access to energy markets and supplies.

The second school of thought is that construction of such a pipeline is unrealistic. Diversification of gas deliveries most likely would go eastwards rather than westwards. China, rather than European investors, will be the driving force, since the country will demand more energy as its economy continues to grow. Earlier attempts by Western companies to strike a deal with Turkmenistan ended in disappointment and no progress at all, while the Chinese investors is able to make deals with a difficult partner.

Thus, the interesting market for the Turkmen gas is China, while the market opportunities in Europe are less obvious, notwithstanding all the efforts and engagements made by EU in the fields of economical and social recovery. Additionally, the relationship between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan is too problematic for pipelines between the two countries to be built. Moreover, it is difficult for EU companies to do business in countries like Turkmenistan because of governance issues on human rights. Indeed, the companies will be constrained by OECD standards and by the Turkmen government’s record in human rights, while Chinese and Russian investors can disregard such considerations.

Neither the possibility of getting a better price from the West may be so attractive. In general, the developments around Turkmen gas are characterized by a high level of complexity and uncertainty. Discussions started with the US and Turkish envoys over a Trans-Caspian pipeline as most of the Turkmen gas currently produced is committed to Russia, only new gas can be supplied through the Trans-Caspian route.

The idea of deliveries to Pakistan and India has been revived and a steering committee for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline took place in February 2006 in Ashgabat and further progresses were made in 2012.
Finally, a pipeline to China may become a reality, where an agreement was signed in 2006 on gas exports. The agreement calls for Turkmenistan to export 30 billion m3 of gas a year to China through a pipeline to be built via Uzbekistan\(^\text{19}\).

Russia controls the transit route from Turkmenistan to Ukraine and Ukraine must arrange deliveries of Turkmen gas through Gazprom. Along the fact that Russia has become active in the energy sector in Central Asia, especially in gas and hydropower. Investment in the pipeline system is planned to rehabilitate and expand the existing capacity in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and to lay new pipelines. Gazprom signed a contract with Uzbekneftegas to invest $1 billion, as a result of which Gazprom would increase gas imports threefold and has reached an agreement to buy 9 billion m3 of gas at $60 in 2006.

In Kyrgyzstan, Gazprom signed a memorandum of intent to form a Kyrgyz-Russian joint venture for energy sector projects, while in Tajikistan gas exploration started in Sarykamysh and Western Shaambary, with Russian Energy Company as RAO UES\(^\text{20}\), plans to develop the Sangtuda hydropower station at Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, in which it will hold a 75% stake. Moreover, RusAl, the Russian aluminum giant, is investing $1.5 billion in Rogun hydropower station and in aluminum production in Tajikistan, expanding its capacity to 100,000 tonnes per year\(^\text{21}\). Two new aluminium production facilities are envisaged, including a new plant with a capacity of 200,000 tonnes, into which RusAl plans to invest $600 million.

In March 2006 construction started on the Sangtuda hydroelectric power complex, in which Iran is the main investor with $180 million\(^\text{22}\). Symptomatically, when Russia disapproved of the performance of the Sangtuda agreement, the decision to change it was announced by the Russian Ambassador, rather than by Tajik officials, proven once again the strong Russian interests and influence upon Tajikistan by Russian Officials.

Although Russia and China may not be global players, they are relevant powers for Central Asia and their role in the political economy is crucial and can be a catalyst for regional cooperation. The cultural influence and the educational facilities Russia offers are here to stay and will continue to produce a political impact, marginalizing EU and NATO role and from the perspective of many Central Asians this is positive, due to the fact that Russia can provide the only alternative to the trend towards Islamisation coming from Pakistan and the Gulf.

The key regional trend is the re-assertion of Russia’s influence, a consolidation of Chinese strategy and the formation of a tactical alliance between them. Both have started to dedicate more


attention to military cooperation and counter-terrorism, which they feel threaten their own stability. By contrast, EU, US and NATO are in “retreat”, reconsidering options and reasons for continuation of engagement, despite the fact that they have made inroads into the military and political sphere in Central Asia. The climate among the main players has been rather competitive, with economic trends, previously dominated by the issues around Western companies’ investment in the oil and gas sector in the CA region.

Kazakhstan is the emerging Central Asian powerhouse, with ready money in search of investment opportunities as its the economic situation has improved, they are more ready than they were ten years ago to engage in projects in their neighborhood.

The other trend is the emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Russia and China promote as a regional organization capable of dealing with a wide range of issues. There is considerable skepticism about regional organizations in Central Asia, whose record so far has been miserable. However, SCO may prove more to have a more effective impact, with same international actors, such as the ADB, have already started making connections with it.

The same goes for EurAsEC, which may be able to make some improvements in economic governance and free trade and transit in Central Asia, leading to a better investment climate. The EU should not dismiss these initiatives out of hand, but consider case-by-case cooperation to give it a chance. EU and NATO relations over Central Asia are largely extremely cooperative, being motivated by a common concern over the stabilization of Afghanistan, where both actors are involved for the long.

NATO has responded with understanding to the European concerns over proliferation of drugs from Afghanistan and become a large contributor to the anti-narcotics efforts, however, policy differences over Central Asia and over global issues exist. At times lack of coordination with regard to the provision of assistance hampered cooperation in the field, especially since the two actors tend to move at a different pace. Moreover, the short-term goal of the current administration to promote its ‘freedom agenda’ may undermine its longer-term goal to enhance stability and security.

The EU needs to be careful not to be tarnished by the same brush by being perceived as echoing the ideological crusade of the US’s interests, with the room for the OSCE to operate in Central Asia is narrowing down and the tendency is for the missions to implement projects in the social and economic sphere rather than for the organization to play the role of a political actor. It would not be effective for the EU to continue to rely heavily on the OSCE as a framework for its

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policies, while it would be more useful to learn from the OSCE experience in order not to fall into the same trap.

Given Russia’s influence, it is imperative establishing a working relationship with Russia as a continuation of the “Great Game” paradigm risks, making external relationships and alliances stable and secure. At present, dialogue between Russia and the EU on Central Asia is not institutionalized, but issues are regularly raised in bilateral meetings.

The EU and Russia are rather ambivalent over engagement with each other on Central Asia and both sides are not against it in principle, but neither feels that it ultimately needs the other and nobody takes the initiative to explore what the common ground might be. This is not to say that Russia’s and the EU’s interests are identical, but their respective stance on civil liberties and human rights is quite different, where Russia prefers to ignore the governance patterns of Central Asian regimes rather than challenge them directly.

On energy and pipeline issues Russia is more in competition with China, rather than with the EU, as the prospects of EU investment in the energy sector in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are very remote, while the Kazakh market is largely divided.

However, given the importance of security concerns to both sides, it is worth making an effort to find a common meeting ground. So far, the lack of clarity over the EU’s interests and reluctance to acknowledge Central Asian realities has somehow obscured its vision. In formulating a new policy, the EU has to agree on a realistic agenda for Central Asia, be mindful of the challenges to achieve and be responsible about how this could be done.

New gas Pipelines in the Caucasus and Central Asia Region began operating at end of 2009, with pipeline starts in Turkmenistan and transits through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and second parallel line opened in 2011, with full capacity reaching 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. The pipeline currently delivers gas from Turkmenistan and 2011 volumes were about 4 bcm. Exports from Uzbekistan will come on stream in 2011 and an extension will link in gas supplies in southwestern Kazakhstan. In addition, a new pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran was opened in early 2010, doubling existing capacity.

When the EU formulates what its interests in the region are, this can replace technical and project-driven approaches which reflect a vague desire to have some kind of ill-defined role in Central Asia. If the aims are sufficiently clear, the EU can be more pragmatic about the choice of means, working closely with multilateral agencies such as the UN agencies on some issues, and with Russia, the US and China on others and employ bilateral and regional approaches as appropriate.
When discussing the future for the EU’s involvement in CA, a degree of political realism has to be borne in mind. The EU is looking at a vast number of engagements and has critical issues, such as Turkey, the Balkans or Iran, to deal with. A case for Central Asia has to reflect its position in respect to other pressing priorities, bearing in mind that the EU’s influence is likely to be secondary to that of the US, Russia and China, so the geopolitical impact that the EU can have should not be overestimated.

The question for the future is how political oversight of technical assistance in the security sphere is to be ensured and by whom. The current paper argues that BOMCA/CADAP can be used as a vehicle and a pilot case for advancement of EU thinking on common security policy, including security sector reform. In conceptual terms, there are different perspectives on the role and meaning of BOMCA, as it has evolved. The first view, coming from certain member states, is an ESDP oriented one. Although BOMCA is a Commission-led activity, the fact that it engages with the security sphere - which is a second pillar for the EU and thus a domain of the member states - allows the latter to become involved in BOMCA. The failure of the European Constitution limits the role of the Commission at this stage. BOMCA should act as a vehicle for pulling together expertise of the member states in security and law enforcement. From this viewpoint, the EU should not subcontract a common security program to an outside agency, but lead on its implementation instead.

When BOMCA acquired a specific rationale that presented interest for the member states, i.e. a focus on the Afghan border, they came with offers of support. For example, at the initiative of the Commission a consultative group of security officials from the embassies was formed to act as a quality control mechanism and to advice on implementation.

Others, mostly within the UNDP and some within the Commission, view BOMCA as primarily being about promoting trade and transit. Such a view tends to brush aside political choices and sensitivities involved and lay emphasis on economic cooperation.

This misses the point that border management reform achieves both improved security and facilitation of movement of goods and people and both are vital to the broad human security agenda. However, neither the Commission nor the Member States presented BOMCA/CADAP as an exercise in SSR, although there are good grounds to regard it as such, i.e. an expansion of civilian control of the security sector.

Arguably, this is a territory where the Council and the Commission can meet and make such a case together, where the idea of SSR is not a new one. The European Security Strategy acknowledges the need for supporting the third countries in the SSR in a broad context of institution building. But, the Political and Security Committee of the Council discussed the Initial elements for
an EU Security Sector Reform Concept, inviting the Council Secretariat and the Commission to develop a draft concept for ESDP support to SSR which resulted in the Commission’s background paper on EC support to Security Sector Reform.

In the case of Central Asia, there is a concrete program upon which an EU task force can focus and the EUSR can take the lead in such an initiative, linking the Council and the Commission together. The second issue to explore is the borderline between security assistance and development aid. The distinction is a fine one, raising the question of where and how the two join. The OECD DAC policy and guidelines could serve as a starting point. This encompasses all civilian aspects of SSR and activities in relation to civilian control of the military parts of SSR. But there is no consensus to broaden ODA eligibility to include expenditure items within the security sector itself, and expenditure on training and equipment supply.

A policy framework for SSR in Central Asia can be developed, strengthening the external dimension of security which is essential to address challenges facing the EU such as terrorism, migration and organized crime. The rationale is that states which enjoy stability, rule of law, good governance and sound institutions will be more effective in preventing domestic threats, which might otherwise spill over and affect the EU.

Lastly, links between security and development can be strengthened. The EC funds both BOMCA/CADAP and a poverty alleviation program which operates in the Ferghana Valley, but they are not interrelated in a security/development nexus. The Commission has chosen the Ferghana Valley for poverty alleviation because of the closed borders and high concentration of population, indeed, in 2005, witnessed violence in the Valley, but the causes were political, rather than derived from poverty.

By the same token, conflict-prevention aspects of BOMCA target local communities, while conflict potential arises out of the policies adopted in the capitals. Thus, a political lead is needed to integrate the security and development aspects. BOMCA/CADAP can be an agent of this, provided that it is reinforced with appropriate mandate and expertise.

The same can be applied to the anti-drugs field. Drug trafficking is often linked to poverty and many people resort to becoming dealers due to basic survival needs. Integrating anti-drug and development assistance in the areas which lie on the main trafficking routes, such as in Khatlon province on the Tajik/Afghan border, is essential. The EC has already allocated assistance to Khatlon, but unrelated to drug prevention. In future, poverty alleviation should be linked to drug prevention much more closely. The Ferghana Valley may not be as important as other areas on the major smuggling routes.

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From CA countries point of view, it has not been easy for inexperienced governments to navigate through multiple funding opportunities, to match the donors together to get larger projects going and to educate donors about the local realities. Fighting against corruption is an essential part of state-building, but outsiders can do little unless there is sufficient political will at the top.

The EC has implemented a project on ‘Fundamental Steps’ in legislation, i.e. measures designed to eliminate some opportunities for corruption. Corruption is a burden for the states, but it becomes a security problem when the rot is in the law-enforcement sphere. It is worth remembering that terrorist attacks in Russia have been facilitated by corruption among security and law-enforcement personnel. Thus, developing a “security consciousness” and anti-corruption measures in the domain of law-enforcement is vitally important.

6.6 Changes?

In general, the citizens of the Central Asian countries believe in the notion of a strong state, but they expect it to rule fairly and to care for the well-being of the population at large. The expectation is that the rulers, without neglecting their own interests and appetites, will nevertheless rule in the interests of all. The focus is on the accountability of politicians rather than their periodic replacement through the ballot box.

An aspiration is that a leader should be a good manager, not excessively corrupt and should not be accompanied into politics by his whole family, whether he is appointed or democratically elected is of secondary importance. In reality, these expectations are regularly frustrated, as the ruling elites are largely interested only in their own grip on the levers of power and in the privatization of their countries’ assets in their favors.

This phenomenon has created a tremendous and widespread sense of injustice, even after overwhelming repression in Andijan, the population is once again beginning to protest over socio-economic hardship.

To sum up, the quality of statehood remains low, often overt repression and brutality is employed to conceal a lack of competence on how to run the affairs of the state and to keep undesirable elements outside the political system. As governments prefer to adopt the strategy of keeping a lid on existing tensions rather than allowing modernization and change to address deep-rooted problems, it is to be expected that the potential for radical and violent protest will persist.

This can disrupt any economic and social advances. It has already resulted in the emergence of a small but growing number of mainly young people who no longer believe that the state can deliver and who seek anti-system solutions. The states of Central Asia, already experiencing serious
internal problems, are affected by security challenges of the “new age”. These are partly of their own making and partly stem from the volatile neighborhood in which they are located. Forces of globalization take their toll by including Central Asia in an international jihad and connecting it to faraway drug markets. The states fight these dangers the way they can, but their response so far has not been promising.

More crises may disrupt an already fragile regional system, security concerns in Central Asia can have an impact on wider international relations in the region, especially on Russia and China, but on the EU as well. Firstly, most of the heroin in the streets of Europe originates from Afghanistan and Central Asia lies on one of the major trafficking routes, secondly, jihadi Islamism constitutes a pressing concern for Europe which still has little understanding of its ideological drivers, recruitment practices, social profiles and international connections.

The EU has an interest in cooperation with Central Asians to make advances on these questions and to support the viability of the moderate Muslim states. Yet, serious upheavals, if they happen, would be impossible to ignore, as they can trigger off refugee flows, disrupt investment and create wider destabilization in the region of the borders of Afghanistan. Lastly, despite external aid, the ability of the states to cope with security challenges remains weak and they may require outside security assistance in the event of an outbreak of acute violence.

6.7 Room for cooperation?

The EU and US’s engagement in the region after September 11 has been a history of rise and fall. The importance of Central Asia for the US derives from its proximity to other places, such as Afghanistan, or to the causes it focuses upon, such as the Freedom Agenda of the current administration. The US’s interests appear to present a combination of different elements, while the importance of each can alternately go up or down the agenda; however, the main reasons for the US involvement in Central Asia are Afghanistan, anti-terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Added to these are efforts to find constructive ways to deal with Islamism, the effort to spread democratization and the energy issue. Although energy from Central Asia does not reach the US domestic market, its companies, such as Chevron, have investments in Kazakhstan.

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25 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment Statement for the Record and U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31 2012.
Tajikistan continues to benefit from US assistance, earmarking $3.2 million in assistance to Tajik border guards in 2011 since drug control, border security and training law enforcement officers have become spheres of success in Tajik-US cooperation.

Providing a counterweight to Russia’s influence and focusing on democratization became more pronounced during the recent years. As a result, the US is left outmaneuvered on a number of fronts where it seemed to hold ground, while the remaining allies appear unreliable. The US will continue to play a role in the regional balance of power (at the expense of EU), but the extent of its long-term involvement will depend on its relationships with Russia and China.

Another player in the region is NATO, with its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deployed in Afghanistan, the Alliance’s most prominent military operation in the region. Currently 26 Allies and 10 non-NATO countries contribute 9,000 personnel to ISAF. Understandably, NATO has to maintain favorable relations with Central Asians, signing a bilateral transit agreement with Tajikistan on support for ISAF.

CSTO, a military-political alliance, intends to transform itself into a multi-level organization capable of engaging with different kinds of threats, including drug trafficking and terrorism. According to the Secretary General of CSTO, cooperation within the organization is proceeding well, because it is easier for the security officials from post-Soviet countries to find common ground. CSTO argues for closer security cooperation between SCO, CSTO and NATO to pull together in the same direction.

Recently, Russia approached NATO with a proposal to cooperate more closely with CSTO in such areas as drug-trafficking, terrorism, and response to natural and man-made disasters, but NATO has been rather reluctant, citing CSTO’s insufficient institutionalization, although some movement has been happening however, such a reaction derives from NATO’s lack of political will to cooperate with CSTO rather than from genuine doubts about the latter’s capacities.

NATO, in its turn, prefers to deal with the countries on a bilateral basis rather than through a Russia-led alliance.

6.8 EU “regional approach” outcome

The EU should be mindful that its ‘regional perspective’ on Central Asia has its limitations. Too often it would like to see Central Asia as a “region” with common values and united by a shared infrastructure, along similar lines to the EU. However, “regionalism” - understood as an active process of change towards increased cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence and identity - has not been an obvious feature of security policy interactions in Central Asia.
It has to be noted that support to “regional cooperation” cost the EC 60 million in 2011-12, while it is unclear whether its goals and values have been advanced considerably. The EU “regional approach” needs refining, making it more imaginative and more pragmatic. A “regional cooperation approach” may be a valid long-term aspiration, but not necessarily a current guide to the practice of the EU, especially since it does not have real leverage to deal with the non-compliance of those actors who are reluctant to play a regional game.

Throughout 2011, adverse security trends developed in Central Asia and the limits of Western influence over domestic politics in the region became increasingly obvious. Still, these setbacks are not a reason for disengagement. On the contrary, new policy approaches are needed to stabilize a potentially risky situation. Afghanistan, Islamism and state fragility make the case for engagement quite real, albeit constrained by the difficult regional environment. The EU has direct security interests in the region, embodied by unconventional dangers such as jihadi terrorism, drugs and criminal networks.26

There is a chance to strengthen moderate Islamic states, which are well disposed towards Europe and to promote harmony between Islam and secularism in these societies. There is also the opportunity to connect European stabilization efforts in Afghanistan to the positive experience of development in Central Asia.

Russia’s influence is not going to just disappear and will be lasting factors in Central Asia politics, economy and security. The EU, in defining its own role, would have to accommodate this basic premise. The political vision for EU engagement in the region has to serve both the interests of the member states and of Central Asia as well. Achieving this may not be easy, given the factors which place limitations on the EU’s engagement, such as the region’s remoteness from Europe, a lack of political leverage, the stubbornness of the Central Asian leaderships and constraints on engagement posed by the EU’s own values of human rights.

A historical chance to work together towards prosperity and security of the region is all but gone. It is in the EU’s interests to ensure that this trend is reversed. Two interrelated goals - stability and security, and prosperity and development - should guide its actions.

The EU has to understand the concrete conditions that pertain specifically to each country, avoid being mechanistic in its approach and see six distinct states with their problems and opportunities. Each Central Asian country in its own right is valid for the EU, in terms of concrete issues, such as energy or drug trafficking, but also with regard to the less tangible, but vitally important, challenges of Islamism or potential state collapse.

The EU needs to develop an analytical perspective on Central Asia in the context of the future of Afghanistan. This means more analysis on how developments in Afghanistan would affect Central Asia, such as population growth, long-term presence of NATO forces, requirements for the supply of troops, development of the Afghan economy and transport infrastructure.

6.9 Conclusion

In the 20-years period since achieving independence, CA countries have had to move away from the Soviet system, where countries became highly specialized in the production of a few commodities and trade and financial flows between the republics. Integration is further complicated by shocks and frictions between countries in the CA region and these hampered intraregional cooperation by disrupting trade and transportation links and hindering development of labor, energy, and capital markets.

On an aggregate level, trade among CA countries appears lower than would be expected on the basis of the size of the economies and their geographical proximity, only about 5 percent of total exports or imports of these countries are destined for or come from other CA countries. Furthermore, this ratio has been on a declining trend, with China and the EU are the main destinations for CA exports, while imports come mainly from China and Russia.

China is growing rapidly in importance not only for Central Asia, but also for the Caucasus. Low aggregate numbers for intra-CCA trade are driven to some extent by the region’s two major exporters - Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

Most of the CA countries rank poorly on indicators of trading across borders, such as the number of documents and days needed for export or import procedures. Costs of exporting or importing are higher than in other transition economies.

Although official data do not capture poverty, inequality, and unemployment adequately in all CA countries, evidence suggests that poverty is still high, especially in Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. Income inequality, unemployment, and underemployment are also matters of concern throughout the region. Because of the Soviet legacy, human development indicators are better than in other countries at a similar income level.

However, they are now deteriorating in some countries, where insufficient funding, weak administrative capacity and corruption limit their effectiveness. Poverty, inequality and inadequate social protection combined with corruption elevate the risk of social disruption. Significant enhancements in governance, transparency, accountability and a boost in investment in human
development should help provide employment opportunities, including to the sizable youth population, which in a few years will enter the job market in large numbers.

The labor-supplying countries of the region have not invested sufficiently in migration infrastructure to enhance benefits in terms of stable employment and thereby social protection. Given that the ongoing migration to Russia, it acts as a safety valve in terms of job opportunities and remittance flows, better skills and language training would benefit the migrating population and with other business environment reforms, eventually lead to better prospects at home.

Although the EU and NATO have been heavily committed to the stabilization and development of Central Asia states and Afghanistan for almost a couple of decades, providing extensive resources and expertise to those countries in a variety of areas, including humanitarian relief and assistance, capacity-building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs and infrastructure projects, progresses appear slow.

While EU, US and NATO have undertaken several attempts to influence the C.A., China is increasing its active role in that region, building pipelines and infrastructure projects, as well as expanding its diplomatic and cultural presence in the region and at the same time.

Analysts studying China’s activity in Central Asia differ on what is the driver, whether the effort to pacify Xinjiang is intended to build that region into a secure platform from which to expand economically into Central Asia, or the opposite Beijing is building up its Central Asia ties in order to more strongly bind Xinjiang to the rest of China.27

The most notable Chinese projects in Central Asia have been pipelines, especially a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. China also is working to improve transportation networks in the region, building new roads and tunnels in Tajikistan. But what China’s goal is with these projects remains opaque, part of the reason is that Central Asia remains a low priority for the government of Beijing and so policy is shaped on an ad hoc basis via deals made by various companies and government organs.28

In some ways, China’s ties with Central Asia resemble those that it is building in Africa and Latin America, with a strong focus on resource extraction, involving a lot of natural resources coming in and a lot of trade going out.

But other analysts argue that, in the case of Central Asia, that energy extraction focus is secondary compared to the need to pacify Xinjiang. The stability of East Turkestan is the most

27 Sean Roberts, a professor at George Washington University and expert on Central Asia.
28 Alexandros Petersen, an analyst and fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center who studies Chinese policy in Central Asia.
significant, both in terms of attracting foreign direct investment or any kind of investment, to the region or providing a safe ground for trade and international economic interactions.\footnote{Kilic Kanat, a political science professor at the University of Pennsylvania at Erie.}

China’s strategy of pacifying Xinjiang and quelling separatist movements there has been rooted in economic development. But it has not worked out as originally envisioned because Uyghurs’ dissatisfaction has to do with cultural and political rights, rather than economic issues.

Nevertheless, China’s strategy towards Central Asia may be a function of its need to pacify Xinjiang, but has to do with security concerns about Xinjiang and only secondly is it about resources and economic development.

In particular, the EU wanted to support the CA countries through a very pragmatic way, putting in place the Strategy for Central Asia for the period 2007-13, allocating an overall financing of €674 million for development assistance in the region. This is fully in line with the European Union’s Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, developed together with the EU Member States since 2007, incorporating a broad range of regional initiatives in areas such as education, rule of law and environment, but once again progresses on the ground and benefit for EU are low.

The seven-year period has been split into two for planning purposes and the first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative Program (2007-10) under the DCI allocated €352.8 million for four years, with €215.8 million provided for bilateral operations, and €137 million for regional programs. In 2009, the assistance strategy was reviewed by the EU in conjunction with national governments, parliaments, civil society and other national stakeholders.

Both strategy and priority areas for cooperation were found to be still relevant. The new Multi-annual Indicative Program (2011-13) provides for €321 million over three years which represents an annual increase of 20% per year. It allocates €216 million for bilateral, and €105 million for regional cooperation.

As a result, the total amount of the EU budget for cooperation, dialogue, education and security with Central Asia has been about 950 billion euro (2005-2011), while NATO budget has been 2 billion euro in the same period.
EU regional and bilateral funding, 2007-13

Here are the figures: Kazakhstan € 74 million, Kyrgyzstan € 106.2 million, Tajikistan € 128 million, Turkmenistan € 53 million, Uzbekistan € 70.6 million, Regional € 242 million.

EU funding by main cooperation sectors, 2007-13

Here are the figures: Security € 23 million, Economy sector € 48.9 million, Governance € 125.8 million, Energy € 106.2 million, Agriculture € 55.2 million, Social protection € 139.5 million, Education € 159.8 million and Other € 15.4 million.

Yet, from 2007 to 2013, € 242 million have been allocated for regional cooperation programs in Central Asia € 137 million under the first Central Asia Multi-annual Indicative program (2007-10) and € 105 million under the second Multi-annual Indicative Program (2011-13).
Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2007-2010

Here are the figures: Security € 13 million, Economy sector € 10.4 million, Governance € 2 million, Energy € 39.2 million, Education € 66.4 million and other € 6 million.

Evolution of funding by sector and planning period 2011-2013

Here are the figures: Economy sector € 5 million, Governance € 2 million, Energy € 46 million, Education € 42 million, Security € 10 million.

It is worth mentioning that EU launched in 2010 the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), with an initial allocation of €20 million, which promotes additional investments and key infrastructure with a priority focus in the first implementation period on energy, environment and social infrastructure. The funding was increased by a further € 45 in the period 2011-2012.\(^{30}\)

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Efforts on the first Border Management program for Central Asia (BOMCA), implemented by the UN Development Program (UNDP), ran from 2003 to 2011 with a budget of over € 26 million.

In the eight years, BOMCA reconstructed, refurbished and equipped 12 border crossing points, 11 border outposts, five training centers for border guards, three dormitories for training centers, three dog training centers and one veterinary unit for dog training centers in all five countries. Over 2,000 border force and customs officers, specialists from the quarantine service, received appropriate training and participated in study visits to the EU where they were acquainted with the latest technologies used in modern border crossing points.

Kyrgyzstan embarked on a major reform program in border security for which BOMCA provided guidance in the drafting of a reform strategy and the development of an action plan.

The region has been experiencing modest growth and asset-stripping has not taken place on a vast scale. Basic security and stability exists, while crime is becoming a big issue as a whole.

Tajikistan recovered from the civil war remarkably quickly and the flares of conflict did not spread, however, concern is that beneath the acquired stability much tension is concealed. The domestic context and developments inside the countries are of primary significance for understanding prospects for the region’s stability.

The central issue stoking the potential for violent conflict is the relationship between the citizens and the state, where lack of understanding of how power functions at a national level is what these states essentially fail.

Personality politics substitutes for an orderly political process and patronage networks take the place of open competition based on merit, while a place in the network guarantees a position in the power hierarchy or in state-controlled businesses, enabling advantages to be secured during the privatization of state assets.

Networks are based on the principle of personal loyalty and most commonly, they are rooted in kinship, but can incorporate other affiliations, such as belonging to a wider region or a shared educational experience. Appointments held by outsiders carry little weight and therefore patronage networks operate on the provincial and local level are dependent on the standing of the patron in the capital.

When a patron falls out of grace, the whole network becomes redundant and is replaced by an alternative one, sometimes local elections are used to legitimize such transfers of power. On the surface, Central Asian institutions resemble their Soviet predecessors, but power arrangements within them are different.
Some institutions are of dual use, Parliaments, for instance, are a way of expanding the power base beyond the ruling group and membership in the parliament is used to reward the loyalty of officials who have to be moved from their executive jobs to give way to new appointments, a kind of “honorary retirement”.

In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan kinship and regionalism is a key factor in networks, where clan loyalties and nepotism became more explicit as the case of Kyrgyzstan President where his brothers got lucrative appointments when the family leader came to power.

In Uzbekistan, although power is highly centralized with a strong presidency on the top, the pyramid on which the power rests is not hollow, but consists of a number of pillars.

Following this line, the policy of border partial closure in the Fergana Valley has been designed to weaken the resource base of the Fergana clans in power struggles in the capital. Yet, power is split between the security and law-enforcement agencies on the one hand and those figures who oversee major assets, such as cotton, energy and gold, on the other hand.

The old elites are those who are in charge of industries inherited from the Soviet era, while the new elites have capitalized on the industries which did not exist before, such as banking, the retail trade, service industry and tourism.

Yet, in Uzbekistan, the new elites are smaller and weaker than the old, but have more energy and connections in the right places, including the presidential family.

In Kazakhstan, in the view of the local analysts, current influence groups are formed along with the principle of personal loyalty and affiliation and each other on the basis of hard, pragmatic interests. The groups can be structured in a hierarchy, with President Nazarbayev’s own group at the top of a pyramid and all groups maintaining links to the president.

Four of the five Central Asian countries have been ruled by the same leaders for nearly two decades, the exception being Kyrgyzstan. These four are authoritarian regimes practicing varying degrees of repression, brutality and state control of the public sphere.

In such circumstances, the danger of turbulent political succession is acute, especially since the leaders are ageing and the post-Soviet experience has provided stark examples of “disorderly” leadership succession, including coups and revolutions. It has also demonstrated orderly succession: Western-style democratic elections, legitimization through the ballot-box of a chosen successor politically loyal to the ancient regime or the establishment of a dynasty by the handing of power to a direct heir. In Central Asia, as the case of Kyrgyzstan has shown, the ruling leaders may not be able to put any of these scenarios of orderly change into practice.

The research found evidence that financial and social support to the CA States have developed a positive impact on attitudes to-wards the Westerns, countries have broadly profited
from financial and educational support by EU and NATO as a whole. Levels of perceived presence of EU and NATO do not influence the levels of threats that people perceive, indicating that EU and NATO influence has little impact on objective security threats.

Moreover, threat perceptions differ between countries and people in Afghanistan who feel more threatened by the Taliban in Afghanistan, while people in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan feel much more threatened by organized crime.

The research also find no evidence that huge amount of economic and financial support has so far increased Afghan state capacities in the perception of respondents. The state is virtually absent as a problem solver and service provider. Most people think that the state has not contributed to the provision of basic services and does not look after the needs of the rural population.

An overwhelming majority in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan think that security has very much increased over the last two years, most people credit foreign forces with this presence and progress their own Armed Forces.

Despite substantial progress in security, many people feel that their physical security is threatened, but the main threat does not stem from Taliban or other armed forces only, but from organized crime and by foreign forces.

International Organization are also widely credited by CA countries people for bringing along positive and widespread changes in basic services for many communities, most notably with regard to drinking water, roads, schooling and IT systems. Progress in other fields seems to be much slower, although CA populations support international presence that are usually associated with Western values. However, despite these positive assessments of foreign involvement, many CA population remain cautious about the presence of foreign troops in general for the so called “collateral damages”.

Yet, the results of this research demonstrate that Central Asian states chose the liberal institutionalism model to build their internal and foreign policies, suggesting that countries would benefit from socio-economic and political integration and cooperation. These states have been relatively successful engaging in different regional organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization or Eurasian Economic Community, Partnership for Peace with NATO framework, which reflect immediate needs those countries have, especially in areas of security and economy.

Central Asian foreign politics shows that they view cooperation as a toll to gain interests, indeed, some CA countries are driven by selfish interest, but they overcome them by being involved in regional organizations and institutions which guarantee them stability and protection of their status quo. There are also evidences that these regional organizations especially SCO and EEC are not only helping member countries to solve common regional challenges but also have far going
political and economic agendas for making the region as an important player on the international arena.

The empirical studies analyses on the comparison of the six CA countries demonstrate that the socio-economic effect of globalization on development of these countries is twofold. On the one hand benefits produced by globalization such as migration and remittances can be useful for economic development in the short run. They take a role of a shock absorber of the challenges that are associated with transition to a free market economy.

The immediate impact of remittances and migration is represented by growth of GDP per capita and increased in private consumption have a small but still positive effect on the growth of services sector. On the other hand, their long term economic impacts can be negative especially in the areas of industry and export. It is consistent with economists predictions about the negative effects of both migration and remittances. According to it, excessive reliance on external financial flows can paralyze the manufacturing sector of the country that will lead to stagnation of the economy in the future.

One of the reasons for not finding positive or negative effect of remittances and migration on development is the data limitations, but most of the data is based on official sources that do not include unofficial statistics and for the same reason data for some countries such as Uzbekistan or Tajikistan is hardly available.
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# INDEX VARIABLES

## ECONOMY SUB-INDEX – 15 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE CALCULATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-Year Rate of Growth</td>
<td>5-year average GDP per capita growth (% annual) 2005-2009.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital per Worker</td>
<td>Average amount of physical capital per worker for the production of goods and services. Logged value.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Financial Institutions</td>
<td>Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence in financial institutions or banks?”</td>
<td>Gallup World Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Savings</td>
<td>Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure. The domestic savings rate is this figure divided by GDP. Logged value.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Annual change in consumer price index. Logged value.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Size</td>
<td>Value of Domestic consumption plus country exports minus country imports in US dollar terms. Logged value.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Standard of Living</td>
<td>question: “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your standard of living, all the things you can buy and do?”</td>
<td>Gallup World Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>Percentage of labour force not employed</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## GOVERNANCE SUB-INDEX – 16 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE CALCULATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business and Government Corruption</td>
<td>Composite variable includes two survey questions: “Is corruption widespread within businesses located in (respondent’s country), or not? Is corruption widespread throughout the government in (respondent’s country), or not?”</td>
<td>Gallup World Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Military</td>
<td>Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence in the military?”</td>
<td>Gallup World Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the Honesty of Elections</td>
<td>Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence in the honesty of elections?”</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the Judicial System</td>
<td>Survey question: “In (respondent’s country), do you have confidence in the judicial system and courts?”</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>Captures the efficiency and quality of bureaucracy, level of government stability and effectiveness with respect to the implementation of policies. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>World Bank Governance Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Ability to participate in political processes such as voting in legitimate elections, joining parties, running for office, etc. This variable captures elements relating to the electoral process, political pluralism and participation as well as the functionality of the government and additional discretionary political rights. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>Freedom House and OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Stability</td>
<td>The number of years since the most recent regime change.</td>
<td>World Bank Governance Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Measures the extent of regulation within society. It captures general regulation with respect to investment and competition. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>World Bank Governance Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>The extent to which individuals within a society respect property rights, the police and the judiciary system, as well the quality of police and legal safeguards. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>World Bank Governance Indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### EDUCATION SUB-INDEX – 9 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE CALCULATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Girls to Boys Enrolment Ratio</td>
<td>This variable is defined as the ratio of the gross enrolment rate of girls to boys in primary and secondary education levels in both public and private schools.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Secondary Enrolment</td>
<td>The ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of secondary education. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Tertiary Enrolment</td>
<td>The ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of tertiary education. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of education at the secondary level.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Primary Enrolment</td>
<td>Net enrolment ratio is the ratio of children of official school age based on the International Standard Classification of Education 1997 who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Educational Quality</td>
<td>Survey question: “In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the educational system or the schools?”</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education per Worker</td>
<td>Average years of secondary education completed amongst the labour force.</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SAFETY & SECURITY SUB-INDEX – 10 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE CALCULATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ability to Express Political Opinion without Fear</strong></td>
<td>Survey question: “In your opinion, how many people in your country, if any, are afraid to openly express their political views?”</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assault</strong></td>
<td>Survey question: “Within the past 12 months, have you been assaulted or mugged?”</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil War</strong></td>
<td>Magnitude score of episode(s) of civil violence, ethnic warfare and ethnic violence involving that state in that year. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>Failed States Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Instability</strong></td>
<td>Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources. The pressure from a population’s settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>Failed States Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Grievances</strong></td>
<td>Grievances based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries. Including atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>Failed States Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</strong></td>
<td>Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries. Ordinal rating.</td>
<td>Failed States Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safe Walking Alone at Night</strong></td>
<td>Survey question: “Do you feel safe walking alone at nights in the city or area where you live?”</td>
<td>Amnesty International &amp; US State Department Political Terror Scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## SOCIAL CAPITAL SUB-INDEX – 7 VARIABLES (USED IN SCORE CALCULATION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>“Have you donated money to a charity in the past month?”</td>
<td>World Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping Strangers</td>
<td>“Have you helped a stranger or someone you didn’t know who needed help in the past month?”</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Volunteering</td>
<td>“Have you volunteered your time to an organization in the past month?”</td>
<td>World Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>“What is your current marital status?” (Single, married, divorced, living with partner, widowed). Percentage of respondents who are married. Binary variable constructed from survey.</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Social Support</td>
<td>“If you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you need them, or not?”</td>
<td>World Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SURVEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MOST RECENT SURVEY DATES FOR DATA USED IN 2011</th>
<th>NO. OF INTERVIEWS</th>
<th>MODE OF INTERVIEWING</th>
<th>NOTES ON REPRESENTATIVENESS OF SAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Jun 3 – Jun 20, 2011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Jul 20 – Aug 4, 2011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Sept 3 – Oct 20, 2011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Nov 2 – Dec 15, 2011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Apr – May 29, 2011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Jun 10 – Jun 26, 2011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 3

**Selected Social and Economical Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (millions km²)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population (% of total)</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate (annual %)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (HDI)/Ranking</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (billions US $)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita (US$)</td>
<td>2260</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth rate (%)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate % (2011)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of goods and services (billions US$)</td>
<td>20.603</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>1.097</td>
<td>4.094</td>
<td>4.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services (billions US$)</td>
<td>13.818</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>1.232</td>
<td>3.524</td>
<td>3.949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary enrolment rate</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to safe water (%)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to improved sanitation (%)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** World Bank website, UN Human Development Report for Central Asia (2011), EU Trade Website.