Several influential recent accounts of moral progress avoid engaging with normative ethical reflection to understand this idea. This allegedly ‘value-neutral’ methodology is based on the belief that we should not ground a theory of progress on abstract, ideal ethical views, and that defining a clear criterion for moral progress would be too epistemically arrogant and disrespectful of ethical pluralism. For these reasons, these accounts mostly provide ‘taxonomic’ views of moral progress, rather than justifying why certain changes should be deemed morally progressive. I argue that it is problematic to address the topic in this way, and that engaging with normative ethics in moral progress theory does not necessarily entail adopting an “ideal” approach. I then defend an agency-based view of moral progress, showing that the value of gains in agency systematizes and justifies paradigmatically progressive historical shifts and extant normative criteria of moral progress. I conclude by replying to concerns of epistemic arrogance and arbitrariness that can be directed against it.