The aim of this article is to provide a critical introduction to the concept of function in the field of philosophy of biology. Philosophers have been widely discussing this concept during the last years, but the debate is not over yet. In fact, the discussion is very lively and its main characters are the following: the strong etiological theory, the weak etiological theory, the generalized selected effects theory, the causal role theory, and the fitness-contribution theory. This article analyses their features and takes into account what philosophers have objected to them.

This article aims to deal with the problem of function pluralism in biology. The debate on function pluralism involves two conflicting sides: between-discipline pluralism and within-discipline pluralism. The majority of philosophers of biology are between-discipline pluralists. According to them, different theories of biological function – the selected effects theory and the causal role theory – are appropriate to different branches of biology; the selected effects theory is the most appropriate theory for evolutionary biology, while the causal role theory is the most appropriate theory for physiology – e.g., anatomy, neuroscience, and developmental genetics. On the contrary, within-discipline pluralism holds that we should seek out a plurality of functions inside any branch of biology. More precisely, according to within-discipline pluralists, selected effects functions and causal role functions can coexist within the same field. In this paper, I will introduce arguments both in favour and against between-discipline pluralism. Afterwards, I will exhibit how the arguments provided against between-discipline pluralism motivate within-discipline pluralism. Finally, I will develop an argument that may be of help to prove the case of within-discipline pluralism.

Science and democracy are unanimously considered the cornerstone of Western civilization. For this reason, one may assert that science and democracy are perfectly compatible. However, antiscientific movements are common both in the academic world and in public opinion; the most radical constructivists maintain that the alleged scientific truths are nothing but the outcome of social negotiations and power relations, while many people accuse scientific communities of being at the service of big corporations and established powers. The relationship between science and democracy has consequently become a much-debated issue. In recent years, we have even seen an exponential growth in literature on the subject. Pierluigi Barrotta’s book – Scienza e democrazia. Verità, fatti e valori in una prospettiva pragmatista – takes part in the actual debate, arguing that in a liberal democracy scientists and laypeople should be considered as members of a single community of inquirers whose objective is the truth.