The aim of the paper is to offer an analysis of the three following notions: material, immaterial and formal in Nicolai Hartmann’s Ontology. Firstly, I explore the Hartmann’s critique of the merely material and merely formal ontology. The attempt is to offer a definition of the categorial pair composed by matter and form, in the context of the entire categorial system. Furthermore, I try to describe the role of matter in the categorial laws (kategoriale Gesetze), in particular the law of matter (das Gesetz der Materie). The purpose is to show the project of a general formal ontology and the current importance of Hartmann’s ontology in continuity with the Husserl’s third logical investigation. Nonetheless, a pure formal intepretation of ontology presents limits based on the underlying immateriality expressed by the privileged form of the event (Ereignis).

The following issue of Esercizi Filosofici aims to provide some inputs for a re-discussion of philosophical naturalism. In particular, the issue focuses on naturalism as it has been expressed in modernity, from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century. The goal of this re-discussion is to broaden the semantics of naturalism, which to date has been exclusively referred to the sole “physicalist” meaning. Since the semantics of naturalism appears to be irretrievably linked to that of the term “nature”, such a re-discussion seems to open up new vistas in contemporary debate, creating room for thinking.

The question of the alleged involvement of Nicolai Hartmann with National Socialismhas often been circumscribed by critics to the famous “Magdeburg speech” given in October 1933. In this contribution, I would like to attempt to offer abroader overview that also considers the years following 1933. First, I start formemphasizing how the political ambiguity of Hartmann’s attitude can already befound in the 1933 text Das Problem des geistigen Seins. In the second instance, I propose a reading to understand Hartmann’s political behavior from a widerperspective, based on the concept of «necessity» and «destiny», two conceptual keyspervasively present both in his writings and in his unpublished letters.

The paper intends to analyze Nicolai Hartmann's relationship with phenomenology. It has not yet been sufficiently recognized how the detachment from Neo-Kantianism coincided with the adoption of the phenomenological method. In the first instance, we show how Hartmann's original interpretation of phenomenology does not operate any suspension of reality but leads to a phenomenological realism. Secondly, we want to highlight some questions regarding the problem of phenomenological consciousness, with particular reference to the complicated relationship between immanence and transcendence within phenomenology.