The debate about the principles and values that guide consumers' choices in eating animal products has gained considerable interest in food ethics in the last decades. The paper aims to analyse some arguments on using animals for food purposes and the underlying ethical perspectives starting from the discussions of a sample of Italian consumers. The description of the empirical study results is introduced by a brief presentation of the context that has led to the growth of public attention on issues related to animal farming for food and the development of the actual European regulatory framework on animal protection. Moreover, some of the main philosophical perspectives in animal ethics that are involved in this debate are presented. Consumers' main arguments for using animals as food were categorized into four macro areas: animals, the production process, people's health and well-being, and the environment. The results are interpreted in light of the ethical theories and some food ethics issues, such as the right to access information, autonomy in individual choices, and their impact on a global level. Empirical research involving consumers in critical self-reflection on their values and actions can foster the understanding of common sense in the debate on animals becoming food as a starting point for outlining paths of social transformation.

The paper is devoted to a re-examination of the issue of the Human-Animal boundary in the light of the idea that the boundary has been renegotiated every time humans has perceived a challenge to their supremacy in the hierarchy of beings. By making reference to the Darwinian framework and also to the reflections developed by the philosopher and anthropologist Raymond Corbey in his book The Methaphysics of Apes. Negotiating the Animal-Human Boundary, the paper invites to focus the attention to the necessity of reestablishing some balance between humans and animals by doing reference to the quality of life of all living beings.

The Universal declaration of 1948 celebrated the belief in human rights as a great moral value. But what does this belief mean exactly? What are human rights precisely? Admitting the existence of human rights may cause difficulties for the moral theories involved and raise many problems. The problem of justification is particularly relevant: are human rights grounded on nature, that is on something unalterable and absolute, or are they the product of history and social life? Different moral theories of human rights give different answers. This paper, therefore, tries to investigate the controversial question of the justification of human rights by comparing the two main positions forwarded in proof of their existence, naturalization and denaturalization, which are developed inside the main moral theories of human rights. After showing the advantages and disadvantages of these rival arguments, some conclusions are drawn that could throw some light on the question of the justification of a concept, such as that of human rights, on which our present social life appears to be intrinsically based.

The paper critically examines the metaethical position of J.L. Mackie as regards its influences on the recent debate, starting from the so–called error theory, through his treatment of scepticism and queerness. The aim is to clarify how we can assume an antirealistic position in ethics, believ-ing that there are no objective values and that ‘morality has to be invented’, and to evaluate the force of the arguments of Mackie, by focusing the attention on the important – and often ne-glected – influences on his thought of J. Locke, D. Hume and, particularly, E. Westermarck, with his epistemological and anthropological attitude to ethical enquiry.

The United Nations universal declaration of 1948 celebrated the belief in human rights as a great moral value. But what does ‘the belief in human rights’ precisely mean? What exactly are human rights? Admitting that human rights exist may cause difficulties for certain moral thoeries and raise various questions. Some questions concern the problem of the justification of human rights: are these grounded on nature, that is on something unalterable and absolute, or are they the product of history and social life? The various theories of human rights answer these questions differently. This paper, therefore, examines the controversial question of the justification of human rights by comparing the two main forms of argument which are developed by the predominate theories of human rights: naturalization and denaturalization. After showing the advantages and disadvantages of these rival arguments, the author draws some conclusions regarding the issue of justification of concepts, such as the concept of human rights, on which our present social life appears to be intrinsically based.