The essay first deepens the meaning of the Cartesian Cogito, starting from its performative reading,
with the aim of verifying the plausibility of the interpretation provided by Rocco Ronchi’s
Canone minore, in order to conduct a radical desubjectivization of the experience. Secondly, the
essay raises the question whether this operation, which must lead to an absolute immanentism,
should also mean abandoning the central category of identity, so decisive for the whole western
philosophical tradition. A very brief mention is reserved to the figure that would emerge in the
margins of this extreme exercise of thought.
This work concerns Walter Benjamin’s theory of state of exception in the context of his philosophy
of history, which is expressed above all in two important essays: Über den Begriff der Geschichte
(“On the concept of history”, 1942) and Zur Kritik der Gewalt (“Critique of violence”,
1921). This paper tries to outline the metaphysical meaning of the distinction that Benjamin made
between “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand) as a condition of political and juridical oppression
and the real state of exception (wirklich Ausnahmezustand), which instead Benjamin described
as the revolutionary chance of the oppressed classes that we can think exclusively because
of a Messianic conception of time (Jetztzeit) and history (historical materialism theologically interpreted).
Thanks to this reconstruction of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, the paper attempts to show – also
through a comparison with the theories of Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, Jacob Taubes and
Lenin – whether it is possible to think of a philosophy of law as a philosophy against law.
This paper wants to answer the following questions: 1) Is there a criterion that allows us to objectively
establish the superiority of a human being over an animal of another species?; 2) assuming
that this criterion exist, is its general application valid, that is to the Human being per se over
Animal per se? Or do we have to take the individuals and the contexts in which they are into
account?; 3) assuming that there is an objective and general criterion able of defining us as superior,
do we have the right to dominate over other animals as a consequence?
This paper comments on some passages of the book by Gianfrancesco Zanetti with particular
reference to the notion of vulnerability that it assumes. There are multiple faces of vulnerability.
They deal with the present possibility of injury, harm, discrimination, oppression, marginalization.
Vulnerability is universal and, at the same time, particular. There are “inherent vulnerabilities”,
that are located in the fact that humans are embodied and relational beings; “situational
vulnerabilities”, regarding their context-specific dimension; “pathogenic vulnerabilities”, characterized
as socially created vulnerability-aggravating mechanisms. Vulnerability must be at the
heart of our ideas of social and institutional responsibilities. It may well lead to an update of the
interpretation of the principles of dignity and equality. Law can play an important role in compensating,
lessening and eliminating the situations that produce violations concerning the real-life
The anthropocentric paradigm has been showing for a long time its own fallacies, weaknesses,
limitations. A truly scientific attitude takes note of this crisis and is directed towards broader
perspectives, capable of understanding the deep link between all living beings and the environment.
Innatism, temporality, relationship, measure are some of the main elements of a new and
necessary etho-anthropological paradigm.
The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to redefining the anthropological question
from the perspective of the two paramount members of the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism:
Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband. To this purpose, following the lead of the
outcomes of Windelband’s philosophy of history and of Rickert’s philosophical anthropology,
the paper firstly proposes to identify the essential trait of the human being in its processual and
self-formative nature and, then, to assess the effectiveness and limitations of this thesis within the
current philosophical debate as radically redefined by the phenomena of posthumanism and
transhumanism. In this line of inquiry, the paper dwells principally on the redefinition, in heterological-
processual terms, of the relationship between the natural and cultural spheres of the
human being, as well as on the ethical-practical character that marks the process of human formation,
I will examine in this paper the concept of process proposed by R. Ronchi in his book Canone minore (Feltrinelli 2016). I will retrace a certain relationship between this idea of process and two major languages which historically strived to elaborate an idea of process: the language of classical metaphysics, and the writing of modern and contemporary mathematics. On this basis I will investigate which status and which effects could have Ronchi’s idea of process and the whole speculative itinerary proposed by Canone minore. A first hypothesis is formulated in the direc-tion of what I could call a politics of knowledges and technologies. A second one in the direction of a mystic of knowledges and technologies.
The perspective of the senses constitutes an attractive way of approaching the problems of vulnerability
and discrimination. It makes it possible to underline the relational dimension of vulnerability
and the importance of interpretations and valuations compared to the verification of
Far from establishing as the kingdom of absolute freedom, capitalism (in its neoliberal version)
includes the sujectivity in all its activity and life areas. The rules for consumption increases its
influence in a proportional way to the vagueness it determines our way of life and our expectatives,
producing a paradoxical freedom which turns into an inescapable psychic suffering due to
the compulsory structures inherent to it. The objective of the current article is, in fact, to show
the pathological manifestations of such paradoxical freedom in the formation of a personal identity,
taking into account the new technologies of the Power to impose its dominium and perpetuate
ad infinitum, a modus operandi without any comparison in history.
In this article we will attempt to highlight the dialectic link between transpecific domain relationships and our anthropocentric interpretation of the world. Starting from this hypotesis we asked ouserlves about a possible remit of political philosophy: is it possible to consider and establish non-unidirectional power relationships with non-human animals? We critically picked up on theories by Rawls, Okin, Honneth and Derrida to vouch and give a partial and non-exhaustive answer to the above question.
Rocco Ronchi’s book Il canone minore talks about some lines, operative in Western thought, that are in contrast with the mainly followed theoretical canon, especially by mention to Bergson, Whitehead, Gentile, Deleuze. This essay aims to support this proposal showing how other authors, also in the German area, can be affiliated to the “minor canon”; in particular, I refer to the philosopher Helmuth Plessner, with his “positional theory” and the idea of living subject; and to the scientist Viktor von Weizsäcker, for his idea of Gestaltkreis and the concept of “biological act”.
The following is a reading of Filosofia della vulnerabilità based on the relationship between vulnerability
and human rights. Gianfrancesco Zanetti's reflection allows us to understand how vulnerability
is a common condition to all human beings, but also how in some cases vulnerability
is not universal, but specific, and resulting, at least in part, from social constructions that modulate
even the way in which people are perceived. This perspective links vulnerability and structural
discrimination very closely, but it is not incompatible with insisting that a rights-based approach
must also take into account the individual dimension of vulnerability.
At the base of Ronchi’s The Minor Canon, there are two fundamental theses: i) the experience is not attributable to the consciousness of the subject, but to an impersonal background (the monstrous); ii) the act precedes the potency and is accomplished in itself. I argue that in his theses two risks can be identified: a) once all the experience she has with the impersonal has been identified, the personal singularity becomes something similar to a hologram; b) if we conceive the act as something in itself already fully accomplished, then the concept of creation becomes problematic at least in the sense proposed by Bergson, that is, as a process in which everything is not given at once. The thesis that I argue in this contribution is twofold: 1) the personal singularity is distinct from the self-referential subject; 2) a double overcoming of the self-referential subject is possible: not only in the direction of the “monstrous” (as Ronchi pro-poses in the wake of Schopenhauer), but also in the direction of the level of experience that corresponds to personal singularity.
The article aims at analysing the relevant presence of juridical categories in Levinas’s Philosophy and at reconducting them to their phenomenological premises. The essay is divided in four parts: 1. justice, right and law; 2. the collapse of the law; 3. explanation thanks to the biblical figure of Ritzpa Bath Ajà; 4. conclusions about the levinasian contribution to the studies on vulnerability. For Levinas, vulnerability represents the phenomenological premise to think the collapse of the law, when right is exposed to what it cannot contain, to the significance of the justice.
The article starts from the thesis that the concept of humanity is one of the few capable of providing
an overall orientation in contemporary reality. If this is true, then it is necessary to renew the
humanism. To this aim, a brief reconstruction of modern humanism and its predominant anthropological
model is proposed: a model of human ambiguity and finitude, which includes contradictory
characters and is, therefore, far from triumphant or pacifying. On the basis of this
model, the shortcomings of post-humanist positions are highlighted, which do not fully grasp
human finitude. Finally, related to this finitude, the paper deploys a “methodological conservatism”,
that is, the need to recognize the dark and archaic sides of human nature. It is precisely
thanks to such uncomfortable recognition that the ideals of Enlightenment humanism can be
This essay investigates whether there is the possibility of finding in a passage of modern philoso-phy a Leibnizian perspective, i.e. a Leibnizian “sign” able to connote it. This would be almost a prognostic trace, which could reveal at least part of the path that led to the development of a fundamental text for the narrative of modern-contemporary (political, legal, moral) philosophy, comparable to the Kantian Project for Perpetual Peace.
In his book Il canone minore Rocco Ronchi excludes the perspective of finitude, contingency and transcendence that would manifest themselves in the anthropological figure of desire. Howe-ver, if the field of immanence related to the dimension of transcendence (Other, subject, contin-gency, desire) is cut off, the risk is that of a drift towards a realism. More precisely, it is a realism ending up in a coincidence with a vitalism or a philosophy of nature which denies relief to the ethical dimension.
This article, consisting of four parts, is a philosophical analysis of positive law applied to animals.
After putting the law to the test of philosophical astonishment and drawing up an inventory
of animal conditions made lawful by law, the author questions the links between the "proper
of man" and the rights of animals. These clarifications address the question of who can be a
subject of law from a legal point of view. Finally, in the fourth part, the author wonders about
the fictional status of the law and shows that the obstacles to confer rights on animals are not
technical but ideological.
This paper offers a critical analysis of the current debate in vice theory. Its main aim is to pro-vide the reader with the conceptual and methodological tools to navigate the discussion among reliabilist, responsibilist, and obstructivist approaches to moral and epistemic vices. After a brief exploration of the reasons underlying the recent flourishing of vice theories (§2), the re-sponsibilist account is introduced (§3) and several critical remarks are offered to ensure that this view can accommodate the cases of malevolent and indifferent individuals (§4). The two following sections are devoted to a critical discussion of vice-reliabilism (§5) and Quassim Cas-sam’s obstructivism (§6). The conclusive section (§7) provides reasons to favor vice-responsibilism over vice-reliabilism and Heather Battaly’s pluralist approach, and sheds light on the innovative features of an obstructivist reading.
The social world is permeated by risk exposure, and especially systemic risk, that is, risk we cannot really hedge against or protect ourselves from. Systemic risk is determined by the basic structure of a social system and affects the kind of choices we are able to make in our lives. We argue that when systemic risk is ‘too low’ society becomes stagnant as it does not allow for pro-cesses of creative destruction that, according to a long tradition of economic thinking, are at the core of what allows for growth, and thus progress. In the same way, when levels of systemic risk are too low, the range of option risks that individuals can decide to bear is itself too low and thus hampers their self-respect. At the same time, we will argue that when levels of systemic risk are too high, society runs the risk of marginalizing the potential contributions to innovation and growth of a large part of its members, for when there is too much systemic risk, too much of one’s life is uncertain, and thus investing in one’s future becomes less important. Excessive levels of systemic risk entail a lesser ability to pursue one’s conception of the good.