43/2 - Qualestoria. Rivista di storia contemporanea. Anno XLIII, N.ro 2, Dicembre 2015

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the relationship between the actions of collaborationists forces in Montenegro and the Italian system of occupation during the Second World War. The Fascist State worked on practical measures that ensured an Mediterranean order above all else. Chetniks fought guerrilla actions in which entire villages were involved, their commitment were vital for a successful Italian occupation. In Montenegro the Chetniks forces were composed of three military units (1.500 men each). The forces were represented by separatist general Krsto Popović, Chetnik colonel vojvoda Bajo Stanišić and Chetnik captain vojvoda Pavle Djurišić. This alliance is a central theme of the Italian occupation, given that it refers to the strategies adopted by the Royal Italian Army for the control of the territory. The occupier counted on nationalist committees formed in the district capitals and also in some Italian garrisons. Fascism as an occupying power is a topic which underlies the great issue of Italian self-representation of losers/winners of the world war: this research aims to investigate this historiographic node as well.

The essay examines distortions in the memories of certain individuals who witnessed the Resistance and deportations to the concentration camps, according to the historical context within which the witness record was retold. Alongside variations in the «means of production» of the accounts, there are things which can and cannot be said, and therefore the accounts don’t simply recount past events, but also tell us about the historical and cultural circumstances of the time. It is possible to observe various stages in the evolution of female memory from the time when violence against women was perceived as a result of their own «loose behavior», up to the time when violence against women is roundly condemned both by international courts and by public opinion. The essay goes on to analyze the attitudes of the women of Eastern Friuli towards the use of violence and of firearms and towards their sense of ethnic and national identity, bringing into discussion certain historical stereotypes which would have women seen exclusively as a «homely figure». The story of the partisan Maria Antonietta Moro is emblematic of our need for more refined methods of analysis.

The following discussion focuses on the mass participation of women in the resistance movement during the occupation of Slovenia (1941-1945) and compares it with the women’s position in the anti‑communist and collaborationist political camp in the context of the civil war, which took place in certain areas of Slovenian territory during the occupation. It analyses the aspects of the liberation struggle activities which women took part in. These activities included the activist fieldwork in the context of various organisations (Liberation Front of the Slovenian Nation, Slovenian Anti‑fascist Women’s Association – a special women’s organisation), inclusion of women in the Partisan armed formations, intelligence operations, as well as cultural and educational activities. The discussion underlines the monopoly of the Communist Party, the transmissive role of the resistance organisation in the eyes of the communists, problems with the implementation of the equal position of women in the men’s world, as well as fatalities among women.

The history of the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović is one of the most controversial episodes of the Second World War. Born as a resistance movement after the surrender of the Royal Yugoslav Army to the troops of the Axis, the Chetniks of Mihailović were characterized by a great Serbian nationalism, monarchist positions and strong anti-communism. It was the anti-communism to push the Chetniks to consider Tito’s partisans as the main enemy to be eliminated. After the annihilation of partisans, the Chetniks would have turned their force against the occupier with the help of the Anglo-American Allies. So it was that the Chetnik movement concluded temporary collaborations with the Italian and German occupying armies, to enable them to defeat the followers of Tito. General Draža Mihailović was therefore accused of collaborating, an accusation that he would reject until the process in 1946. Of course, if we can’t talk of a planned and ideological collaboration, for sure we can say that the Chetnik movement made of ambiguity (with the occupiers, the quisling forces, the partisans and the allies) its main strategy.

This essay originates from the author’s recognition that no satisfactory examination of the nature and origins of collaborationism in the European countries occupied by Nazi has been so far provided. In particular, there is no satisfactory account of the cultural and political responsibilities of each European country in promoting the growth movements that were deeply connected with ideology and culture of the occupying Nazi and Fascist powers and that this cultural and ideological atmosphere promoted collaborationism. The essay focuses on the Republica Sociale Italiana (RSI), created by Mussolini after his dismissal (on July 25th 1943). The author examines its institutions and its traces in the memory of the Italian public opinion. The author sketches a comparison of the Italian collaborationism to the collaborationism in other European countries by focusing in particular on the case of France which has important similarities with Italian experience for its attempt to create a New Order, corporative and racist, deeply inspired by Nazi experience.

The starting point of this article is a lecture (Émigration frioulane et Résistance) given by the author in Paris – March 2014 – on behalf of two associations of French people of Italian origin whose ancestors had come to France between the Great Wars from that part of Italy which at present runs alongside Slovenia and Croatia and is included in the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region. The text, duly elaborated and accompanied by foot-notes, focuses on the case of sixty-four individuals who shared that regional origin and all of whom got involved in the French Resistance. Within the limits of the existing literature, and the available evidence, the article brings to light their different destinies taking into account several factors: age, place of origin, residence in France, job, political or military experience (in the Spanish Civil War, for instance), family and village networks as well as their political allegiance, most of which was communist even if the ties with either the French or the Italian Communist Party greatly varied

In the autumn of 1943 the Communist-led Resistance organization ELAS established a monopoly on violence in the German-occupied part of Greek Macedonia. Its most important opponent, the nationalist Resistance organization PAO, was dissolved. Former members of PAO and other «reactionary elements» were persecuted and many of them were executed. But the victory of ELAS against «reaction» was not permanent. From December 1943 – January 1944 on hundreds of villagers took up arms for «protection» against ELAS. They created anti-Partisan units and collaborated with the German military authorities and SD. ELAS and the Secret Police of the Communist Party called OPLA practiced «Red Terror» against «traitors» and other «enemies of the people». This paper will examine the relation between armed collaborationism and the birth of «Red Terror» especially in the last phase of Occupation. The focus will be on the motives and the structure of the collaborationist militia called EES (National Greek Army). On the other hand it will also ask if «Red Terror» was organized centrally as an answer to the anti-Communist action.

The ethnic infighting that took place in Thesprotia between the Greek and Albanian communities during the Axis occupation has been described as a forgotten conflict. Indeed, until recently, the only existing studies were those of local «organic» intellectuals who argued that the Albanian Muslim minority collaborated collectively first with the Italian and then with the German occupiers in the hope that an Axis victory would lead to the eventual creation of a Greater Albanian state. The article will challenge these views and argue that the conflict was shaped by local issues and antagonisms that predated the war and were often unrelated to nationalist agendas. Politics were used by local actors of all nationalities as a means of expressing local differences; however, the root of the conflict must be sought in communal relations. Both the victims and the perpetrators knew each other, shared common cultural codes and often had longstanding grievances. But this was not a parochial conflict waged between pre-modern peasants. Violence became possible solely as a result of the war and the presence of supra-local actors – the Resistance organisations, the Axis militaries and the British Military Mission – who gave peasants the opportunity and means by which to settle their differences. The presence of these groups served to nationalise the ongoing local struggles and led ultimately to an escalation of violence, resulting in the bloody stand-off that took place in the summer of 1944.

This essay analyses the way in which the Italian occupation of Albania was conducted between 1939 and 1943 and the consequent generation of several Resistance groups which made the Italian control of the State more and more unstable, until the tragic conclusion of the 8th September 1943. The union between Italy and Albania was only formally equal, but in fact Albania was subordinate to the Italian political and economical interests of Fascism. This element helped to cool any enthusiasm which eventually aroused when the Royal Army landed in Durres. At the beginning of the Albanian occupation it sufficed to Italy to employ the same means used at home to keep dissent under control (imprisonment, confinement, epuration), but when the Italy- Greece conflict cast a shadow on the Fascist fighting ability and the military fortunes of the Axis turned for the worse, the several Resistance groups which had spread in Albania became stronger, thus forcing the occupant to recur to a massive use of violence. The entire country was ultimately declared zone of military operations. This marked the failure of the Italian attempt to pacifically export Fascism.