Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is an open access philosophical journal, being published only in an electronic format.
The journal aims at promoting research and reflection, both historically and theoretically, in the field of moral and political philosophy, with no cultural preclusion or adhesion to any cultural current.
Contributions should be submitted in one of these languages: Italian, English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish.
All essays should include an English abstract of max. 200 words.
The editorial staff especially welcomes interdisciplinary contributions with special attention to the main trends of the world of practice.
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ETICA & POLITICA / ETHICS & POLITICS POSITION ON PUBLISHING ETHICS
The Editors of Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics have taken every possible measure to ensure the quality of the material here published and, in particular, they guarantee that peer review at their journal is fair, unbiased and timely, and that all papers have been reviewed by unprejudiced and qualified reviewers. The publication of an article through a peer-review process is intended as an essential feature of any serious scientific community. The decision to accept or reject a paper for publication is based on the paper’s relevance, originality and clarity, the study’s validity and its relevance to the mission of the journal. In order to guarantee the quality of the published papers, the Editors encourage reviewers to provide detailed comments to motivate their decisions. The comments will help the Editorial Board to decide the outcome of the paper, and will help to justify this decision to the author. If the paper is accepted with the request of revision, the comments should guide the author in making the revisions for the final manuscript. All material submitted to the journal remains confidential while under review.
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1. PUBLICATION AND AUTHORSHIP
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, is the publisher of the peer reviewed international journal Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics.
The publication of an article in a peer-reviewed journal is an essential step of a coherent and respected network of knowledge. It is a direct reflection of the quality of the work of the authors and the institutions that support them. Peer-reviewed articles support and embody the scientific method. It is therefore important to agree upon standards of expected ethical behaviour for all parties involved in the act of publishing: the author, the journal editor, the peer reviewer, the publisher.
Authors need to ensure that the submitted article is the work of the submitting author(s) and is not plagiarized, wholly or in part. They must also make sure that the submitted article is original, is not wholly or in part a re-publication of the author’s earlier work, and contains no fraudulent data.
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2. AUTHOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is a peer-reviewed journal, and Authors are obliged to participate in our double blind peer review process.
Authors must make sure that all and only the contributors to the article are listed as authors. Authors should also ensure that all authors provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.
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Both the Referee and the Author remain anonymous throughout the “double blind” review process. Referees are selected according to their expertise in their particular fields.
Referees have a responsibility to be objective in their judgments; to have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, with respect to the authors and/or with respect to the research funders; to point out relevant published work which is not yet cited by the author(s); and to treat the reviewed articles confidentially.
4. EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Editors hold full authority to reject/accept an article; to accept a paper only when reasonably certain; to promote publication of corrections or retractions when errors are found; to preserve anonymity of reviewers; and to have no conflict of interest with respect to articles they reject/accept. If an Editor feels that there is likely to be a perception of a conflict of interest in relation to their handling of a submission, they will declare it to the other Editors. The other Editors will select referees and make all decisions on the paper.
5. PUBLISHING ETHICS ISSUES
Members of the Editorial Board ensure the monitoring and safeguarding of the publishing ethics. This comprises the strict policy on plagiarism and fraudulent data, the strong commitment to publish corrections, clarifications, retractions and apologies when needed, and the strict preclusion of business needs from compromising intellectual and ethical standards.
Whenever it is recognized that a published paper contains a significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or distorted report, it will be corrected promptly. If, after an appropriate investigation, an item proves to be fraudulent, it will be retracted. The retraction will be clearly identifiable to readers and indexing systems.
PAST ISSUE AND STATISTICS
Past issues with download and visitors statistics for each article are provided here: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/handle/10077/4673
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO NAZIONALE / ITALIAN ADVISORY BOARD:
A. Agnelli † (Trieste), A. Allegra (Perugia), G. Alliney (Macerata), S. Amato (Catania), M. Anzalone (Napoli), D. Ardilli (Modena), F. Aronadio (Roma), G. Azzoni (Pavia), F. Bacchini (Sassari), E. Berti (Padova), M. Bettetini (Milano), P. Bettineschi (Venezia), P. Biasetti (Padova), G. Bistagnino (Milano) R. Caporali (Bologna), A.A. Cassi (Bergamo), G. Catapano (Padova), M. Cossutta (Trieste), L. Cova (Trieste), S. Cremaschi (Vercelli), G. Cevolani (Modena), R. Cristin (Trieste), U. Curi (Padova), G. De Anna (Udine), P. Donatelli (Roma), P. Donini (Milano), M. Faraguna (Milano), M. Ferraris (Torino), L. Floridi (Oxford), R. Frega (Bologna), S. Fuselli (Verona), A. Fussi (Pisa), C. Galli (Bologna), R. Giovagnoli (Roma), P. Kobau (Torino), E. Irrera (Bologna), E. Lecaldano (Roma), L.A. Macor (Oxford), E. Manganaro (Trieste), G. Maniaci (Palermo), R. Martinelli (Trieste), F.G. Menga (Tübingen), R. Mordacci (Milano), V. Morfino (Milano), B. de Mori (Padova), M. Pagano (Vercelli), G. Pellegrino (Roma), V. Rasini (Modena-Reggio Emilia), M. Reichlin (Milano), M. Renzo (Stirling), A. Rigobello (Roma), P.A. Rovatti (Trieste), S. Semplici (Roma), A. Schiavello (Palermo), A. Sciumè (Bergamo), M. Sgarbi (Venezia), F. Toto (Roma), F. Trabattoni (Milano), F. Trifirò (London), M.S. Vaccarezza (Genova), C. Vigna (Venezia), P. Vignola (Guayaquil) S. Zeppi † (Trieste).
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO INTERNAZIONALE / INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD:
J. Allan (New Zealand), K. Ballestrem (Germany), T. Bedorf (Germany), G. Betz (Germany), W. Block (USA), M. Byron (USA), S. Chambers (Canada), J. Coleman (UK), C. Cowley (Ireland), W. Edelglass (USA), C.L. Geshekter (USA), A. Kalyvas (USA), J. Kelemen (Hungary), F. Klampfer (Slovenia), M. Knoll (Turkey), C. Illies (Germany), D. Innerarity (Spain), A. Lever (Switzerland), H. Lindahl (Netherlands), J. Marti (Spain), M. Matulovic (Croatia), J. McCormick (USA), N. Miscevic (Croatia), A. Moles (Hungary), L. Paulson (France), A. Przylesbski (Poland), J. Quong (USA) V. Rakic (Serbia), A. Schaap (UK), B. Schultz (USA), N. Tarcov (USA), D. Webb (UK), J.P. Zamora Bonilla (Spain).
REFEREES LIST FOR 2017
B. Accarino (Università di Firenze), A. Altobrando (China University of Politics and Law, Pechino) A. Allegra (Università per Stranieri, Perugia), S. Amato (Università di Catania), P. Bettineschi (Università di Padova), S. Blancu (LUMSA, Roma), M. Ballistreri (Università di Torino), M. Bettetini (IULM, Milano), C. Canullo (Università di Macerata), R. Caporali (Università di Bologna), G. Cevolani (IMT, Lucca), F. Ciaramelli (Università di Napoli, Federico II), A. Cislaghi (Università di Trieste), R. Cristin (Università di Trieste), G. De Anna (Università di Udine), P. Donatelli (Università di Roma, La Sapienza), A. Fabris (Università di Pisa), S. Ferrando (Université de Strasbourg), A. Fussi (Università di Pisa), C. Gerbaz (Università di Rijeka), B. Giovanola (Università di Macerata), G. Grandi (Università di Padova), L. Greco (Università di Oxford), M.L. Lanzillo (Università di Bologna), G. Maniaci (Università di Palermo), R. Martinelli (Università di Trieste), F. Menga (Università di Tubinga), F. Miano (Università di Roma, Tor Vergata), M. Monaldi (Università di Trieste), R. Mordacci (Università San Raffaele, Milano), B. De Mori (Università di Padova), G. Pellegrino (LUISS, Roma), U. Pomarici (Università della Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”), V. Rasini (Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia), C. Rofena (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia), A. Schiavello (Università di Palermo), P. Šustar (Università di Rijeka), M. Trobok (Università di Rijeka), F. Turoldo (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia), M. Vaccarezza (Università di Genova), S. Zanardo (Università Europea di Roma).
In this paper I discuss some criticism on the relevance of moral principalraised from moral particularism. I conclud that moral principal are relevant both in moral behaviour and in the explication of moral action.
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s wonderful book, The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics, contains a wealth of intriguing arguments and compelling ideas. The present paper focuses on areas of continuing dispute. The paper first attacks Lazari-Radek’s and Singer’s evolutionary debunking arguments against both egoism and parts of common-sense morality. The paper then addresses their discussion of the role of rules in utilitarianism. De Lazari-Radek and Singer concede that rules should constitute our moral decision procedure and our public morality. This paper argues that, if no one should be blamed for complying with the optimal decision procedure and optimal public rules, there are strong reasons to accept that these same rules distinguish what is morally permissible from what is morally wrong.
The last several decades have witnessed a vibrant discussion about the proper political role of religion in pluralistic liberal democracies. An important part of that discussion has been a dispute about the role that religious and secular reasons properly play in the justification of state coercion. As I understand it, the standard view advocated by the members of that pantheon, and by many others as well, includes the following two claims, namely, that reli-gious reasons cannot play a decisive role in justifying state coercion and that citizens and public officials in a liberal polity should not endorse state coercion that requires decisive re-ligious support. I am skeptical about the standard view’s restrictions on religious reasons as a class – restrictions that apply to any and all religious considerations, to religious reasons as such. My main aim in this paper is to motivate skepticism regarding the standard view. I will try to achieve this aim by reflecting on what I take to be the paradigmatic case of state coercion, namely, the use of military violence in war.
Sidgwick believed that, when impartial reasons conflict with self-interested reasons, there are no truths about their relative strength. There are such truths, I claim, but these truths are imprecise. Many self-interested reasons are decisively outweighed by conflicting impar-tial moral reasons. But we often have sufficient self-interested reasons to do what would make things go worse, and we sometimes have sufficient self-interested reasons to act wrongly. If we reject Act Consequentialism, we may have to admit that we sometimes have sufficient or even decisive impartial reasons to act wrongly. But these are early days. We may be able to resolve some of these disagreements.
In this paper I register disagreement with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer on three significant issues. First, Sidgwick does not give utilitarianism the advantage over Ros-sian pluralistic intuitionism. Both views are still very much in the running. Second, his du-alism survives their evolutionary argument. The egoist principle is no more or less vulner-able to debunking than the principle of impartial benevolence. Third, though his view on pleasure is not entirely clear, Sidgwick is best understood to be offering a traditional ‘feel-ing-tone’ account of pleasure, rather than a view which gives a significant role to the ‘ap-prehension’ of the subject.
The core of justificatory liberalism relies on the idea that coercion must be justified to all citizens with reasons they can reasonably be expected to accept. Citizens ought to disci-pline themselves in public discourse because respect triggers a duty requiring them to sup-port only those norms that enjoy public justification. In this article, I question the argu-ments justificatory liberals use to defend the link between respect and public justification, both in their consensus and convergence version. I argue that the idea of respect they em-ploy runs against their own premises in being inevitably authoritarian and that the re-quirements of public justification foster some disrespectful attitudes among disagreeing cit-izens. I contend not only that justificatory liberals lack an argument for the idea that to re-spect one person is to provide her with reasons she can accept, but also that the problem concerns a misunderstanding about justification. Although it is correct to think that there is something morally objectionable to coerce another on the basis of one’s beliefs, there is nothing wrong in coercing another because things are such and such (as one believes). I conclude by drawing a distinction between justificatory liberalism and objectivist liberalism and their different conceptions of respect.
On the basis of what reasons ought the state’s coercive action to be justified? In this article, I discuss the Rawlsian response to this question, which singles out shared and accessible reasons grounded in political values as the only possible bases for public justification. By engaging with Christopher Eberle’s critique of this position, I defend the Rawlsian argu-ment for public reason as capable of resolving epistemic disagreements in a context of per-sistent practical disagreement. I build my defence on a proceduralist interpretation of pub-lic reason. This interpretation rejects the common idea that central to the project of public justification is the restriction of the kinds of reasons that citizens have in support of collec-tive decisions. The project of public justification requires, rather, that the constraints of public reason apply to the establishment of respectful and legitimacy–generating processes capable of giving citizens valid reasons to comply with collective decisions (while the sub-stance of such decisions may remain the object of disagreement).
In this response to the essays by Crisp, Parfit, Hooker and Nakano-Okuno on our The Point of View of the Universe, we focus on the following topics: whether egoism is more susceptible to an evolutionary debunking argument than universal benevolence; our defence of impartial rationalism; wide and narrow definitions of “ethics”; the role of moral rules; the extension of ethics to all sentient beings; how best to define and understand pleasure as an intrinsic value; and whether Ross’s ethic of prima facie duties is as defensible as utilitarianism.
In this essay I discuss one of the objections raised by David Enoch in his recent Against Public Reason. According to Enoch, public-reason theorists misinterpret the role that rea-sons for the action play in the political sphere. Treating the most deeply held beliefs as mere preferences, public-reason theorists end up supporting a paternalistic view that vio-lates people’s freedom and equality. In this essay I try to dismiss this charge, without de-fending the idea of public reason.
The essay is divided into six parts. §1 introduces the problem with an example. §2 lays out the general idea of public reason. §3 illustrates Enoch’s objection. §4 briefly introduces standard responses to the objection and Enoch’s possible counter-arguments. §5, with the help of some formalization, explains how non-public reasons work, addresses Enoch’s ob-jection, and present some doubt on the idea of public reason. §6 concludes.
While parties play a fundamental role within democratic systems, from a normative perspective providing a justification of parties and partisanship is all but obvious. According to this anti-partisan approach, parties and partisanship cannot be considered fully legitimate because they polarize political debates, create ideological divisions that cannot be respect-fully composed within democratic decision-making, and aim at defeating their enemies in-stead of striving for the common good. This anti-partisan perspective has been reinforced by the deliberative framework, according to which citizens should ground their claims in publicly justifiable arguments, assess political proposals on their merits, and critically dis-cuss with one another so as to identify what is best for the polity. The ideal political actors, according to this view, are independents, not partisans. In the past few years various scholars challenged this idea by holding that it does not distinguish partisanship from factional-ism. While the latter cannot be considered legitimate, the former ensures that citizens are motivated to exercise their political agency and grants discursive conditions that are necessary to publicly justify collective decisions. In this paper I will consider this defence of party spirits and claim that while it is undeniable that partisanship performs motivational and justificatory functions that are necessary for the proper working of a democratic system, it requires an account of political justification that is not compatible with traditional interpretations of deliberative ideal.
This paper deals with the question of whether the universalizability of moral judgment, and impartiality in ethics, would require us to expand our scope of moral consideration to cover all sentient beings, human or non-human, as de Lazari-Radek and Singer wish to establish in their new volume on Sidgwick and contemporary ethics. I will argue that the former two concepts, universalizability and impartiality, may not entail the third concept, the expanding circle. De Lazari-Radek and Singer’s arguments may presuppose their moral intuitions that are not entirely self-evident, and the philosophical foundation of ethics Sidgwick presented does not necessarily lead us to their version of utilitarianism.
The aim of this work is to examine a few aspects of Jacques Derrida’s reading of the philosophy of Heidegger and Levinas. Specifically, we intend to show that the criticism Derrida directs towards certain themes in Levinas’s thought at the same time contains a revaluation of Heidegger’s ontology as it was developed during the 1920s, before the so-called Kehre. What this triple hermeneutic comparison puts into play is the relationship between ethics and ontology. In critiquing the relationship between these two concepts in Levinas, Derrida seems to move closer to the way they are described and developed in both Being and Time and in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Finally, we will try to show how this reevaluation of ontology by Derrida determines his approach to the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, whose ethics, differently from Levinas’s, is an ethics of ontology.
This article discusses Roberto Finelli’s latest book ("An accomplished patricide. Marx's fi-nal confrontation with Hegel") by focusing in particular on the theme of individuality. First-ly, it reconstructs the different role played by this theme in the thought of Hegel and Feu-erbach as well as in Marx's early and late writings. Secondly, it highlights an important theoretical tension that, in relation to the question of individuality, potentially jeopardizes Finelli's discourse and its coherence. Is individuality independent from social relation or is it established by the relationship itself? In the former case, how can the abstraction of capi-tal be considered "real"? And in the latter, how is it possible to think the individual's re-sistance to this abstraction?
The intervention discusses Roberto Finelli’s last book, An accomplished patricide. Marx's final confrontation with Hegel, following the structure of the book. I agree with Finelli that the early Marx is somehow compromised with Feuerbach’s Gattung; at the same time, a ‘backward’ reading of Marx reveals that some key notions of the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts reappear in different form in the Grundrisse as well as in Capital. My comment then focuses on the confusions and indeterminacies plaguing Finelli’s refer-ence to Arbeits-kraft, ‘labour-power’. Dealing with abstract labour, I show that Finelli’s in-terpretation is defective because he never considers the dimension of the collective worker, and because his view of abstract labour too often reduces it to simple labour, increasingly devoid of skills. To move beyond Finelli’s limits we need to consider the processual consti-tution of capitalist reality, and to distinguish carefully the eventual validation of private la-bours on the market from the immediate socialisation of collective labour going on within the immediate production process. In my opinion, the failure of Finelli’s dual Parricide is a reminder of the need to move forward towards a re-reading of Marx’s abstract value theory of labour as a macro-monetary theory of capitalist production.
The article examines the concept of “truly realized abstraction” in the reflection of Marx on “the scientifically correct method”, on distinction between “simple categories” and “concrete categories”, and on “reproduction”. The author tries to draw attention about “Finelli’s Marxism of abstraction” as a type of “humanism”. He reads the ‘Marxism of abstraction ’ through the analysis (shared by the author of the paper) of "financial capitalism", that today damages labour, industry and personal property.
The author explores the nature and foundation of human rights through the analysis of po-litical conceptions, which focus on the rule playing by human rights on political authority actions, and naturalists (or orthodox) conceptions, which consider human rights those rights that each human has simply in virtue of his humanity.
The following text is a part of an article that Vittorio Morfino has dedicated to Marx’s in-terpretations in Italy in the beginning of this century. It focuses on the originality of Fi-nelli’s reading.
I wish to present the reader with some clarifications concerning the essays here pre-sented. They are in a conceptual history perspective and focus on Hegelian texts in order to show that it is possible to find in them an Aufhebung not only of sover-eignty but also of those modern concepts from which it stemmed. Such overcoming clearly shows in the concept of constitution as an articulated and plural totality. The essays also try to clarify the role of philosophy for society, also in relation to social sciences. If the debate may be summarized in the formula “through Hegel, beyond Hegel”, the horizon which thus opens up in the present time may be de-scribed as a new federalism.