45/1 - Qualestoria. Rivista di storia contemporanea. Anno XLV, N.ro 1, Giugno 2017

«Qualestoria» è la rivista dell’Irsml FVG, fondata nel 1973 come «Bollettino dell’Istituto regionale per la storia del movimento di liberazione nel Friuli Venezia Giulia». Ospita contributi di autori italiani e stranieri, promuovendo la pubblicazione di numeri monografici e miscellanei. La rivista propone tradizionalmente tematiche legate alla storia contemporanea dell’area alto-adriatica e delle zone di frontiera, rivolgendo particolare attenzione allo studio e alla storiografia dei paesi dell’Europa centro-orientale e balcanica. Le proposte di pubblicazione vanno inviate all’indirizzo e-mail della redazione. Saranno preventivamente valutate da esperti interni ed esterni al comitato di direzione. I saggi pubblicati nella sezione «Studi e ricerche» sono sottoposti in forma anonima a double-blind peer review. «Qualestoria» è attualmente presente nei seguenti indici: Bibliografia storica nazionale, Catalogo italiano dei periodici (Acnp), Essper, Gbv (Gemainsame Bibliotheksverbund), Google Scholar, Res. È inoltre inserita dall’Anvur nella lista delle riviste scientifiche ai fini dell’abilitazione scientifica nazionale. La rivista non si intende impegnata dalle interpretazioni e vedute espresse da articoli e note firmati.

By comparing the consequences of post-war events on the communist world of the Julian March and South Tyrol, the essay illustrates the different perspectives of the communist parties involved in the cross-country region between Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. At the heart of the analysis is the PCI’s strategy towards the two border regions. The Italian party sought to establish and legitimize itself as a political force in two regional scenarios. In the Julian March and Trieste, the obstacles presented to the PCI were manifold. This was due to the very dynamic foreign policy of the Government in Belgrade and its longa manus in the region, the Slovene CP, which intended to incorporate the entire Julian March into Socialist Yugoslavia. The situation in South Tyrol was very different: here, the PCI first chose a policy of strength, especially towards the initial antagonism of the Austrian CP.

The essay provides a detailed analysis of the Communist Party of Austria’s (KPÖ) policy in relation to the events in the Alps-Adriatic region after WWII. The territorial dispute between Austria and Yugoslavia over Carinthia shows the gap between national politics and internationalism at the heart of the strategy pursued by this communist party. In fact, while the KPÖ openly praised the achievements of Yugoslavian socialism and supported its claims on Trieste, it rejected Belgrade’s territorial demands on Austria. The relationship between the two parties, however, developed quite positively until Stalin’s break with Tito. Although part of the party was incredulous with respect to the denunciation that Tito was a traitor to communism, the KPÖ still chose the path of total alignment with Stalin’s dictation. In the case of South Tyrol, however, the Austrian party first demanded the right of self-determination and thereafter, in 1946, sought to install itself as a leading force in the region, referring to the possibility of creating a section of the KPÖ south of the Brenner. However, the PCI proved determined not to leave the rather limited reins of South Tyrolean communism in Austrian hands

The essay examines Belgrade’s view on the conflict between Italian and Yugoslav communism in the stormy years between Stalin and Tito. The dialectics between these two parties, analyzed internationally and on an inter-parties basis, demonstrates how the Yugoslav government had strong doubts about the entire Italian political class, including the PCI. The question of Trieste and the Julian March had raised serious doubts about the correctness of the line brought forward by Italian communism and its leader Palmiro Togliatti. The mistrust between the two parties escalated following the Tito-Stalin split in June 1948. The essay emphasizes that Yugoslavia was always very attentive of developments in the PCI, especially in situations that could have resulted in the creation of opposition currents to the official party line.

The essay examines the passages that depict the historical parable of «adriatic communism » between the end of World War II and the 1948 Tito-Stalin schism. From the picture, re-assembled with extensive use of unpublished sources from national and foreign archives, emerges a Communist movement in which the strategic variants not only intertwined, but often were deeply influenced by the national question. The key figure of the sudden changes of line that «adriatic communism» was forced to meet and, together, the catalyst of the contrasts dividing the communist movement far beyond the regional dimension, was Vittorio Vidali. The essay devotes a great deal of reflection to the policy he followed in the A-zone of Trieste’s free territory and its immediate consequences for the «adriatic communism».

The essay focuses on post-war Stalinist policies towards Austria as a laboratory for strengthening Communist influence in a country on the Cold War border line. In 1945 Moscow instructed the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) to pursue a cautious national- front policy. Indeed, the strong distrust of a large part of the Austrian population towards Communism combined with Soviet post-war crimes in Austria contributed to the KPÖ’s electoral disaster in November 1945. From 1947 on, the KPÖ switched to a more confrontational line as was later pursued by the Kominformburo. While Soviet support for the KPÖ was strong enough to cement the latter’s image as a «Soviet party», it was never strong enough to bring the KPÖ to power.

The present essay analyses the relations between the Communist Party of the Free Territory of Trieste (CP FTT) and the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the beginning of the Cold War. Focusing on the period between 1947 and 1954 the essay shows the asymmetrical relationship between the two parties: if on one side the PC FTT was constantly seeking for recognition and support by ‘fraternal parties’ located beyond the Iron Curtain, on the other side Prague, was more reluctant in supporting this cooperation. However, it would be misleading to think that the Czechoslovak Communist Party has not supported its comrades from Trieste. Czechoslovak communists have contributed widely to the activities of the PC FTT, especially after the split between Stalin and Tito. Even if the Italian and the French Communist Parties remained among the most important Western partners, Prague’s support for the Trieste party remained crucial, constituting one of the most substantial contributions the CCP offered to ‘brother parties’ not in power.