Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/2

Paul Alsberg’s anthropology could support the reform of Husserlian phenomenology conducted by Carmine Di Martino in his Viventi umani e non umani, not only showing the autopoietic effects of the human technological activity with the principle of body-liberation, but also understanding language as a particular tool. This paper investigates technology and language as crucial factors employed to draw the line between human and non-human living being in a discontinuistic evolutionary perspective.Paul Alsberg’s anthropology could support the reform of Husserlian phenomenology conducted by Carmine Di Martino in his Viventi umani e non umani, not only showing the autopoietic effects of the human technological activity with the principle of body-liberation, but also understanding language as a particular tool. This paper investigates technology and language as crucial factors employed to draw the line between human and non-human living being in a discontinuistic evolutionary perspective.

An ethical approach to migration has to face the complex reality of irregular immigration as a challenge to the protection of the borders by sovereign states. The situation in Europe since 2015 has led to a rise of populism and to a polarization of the political debate in many countries. On the other hand, the presence of asylum seekers has also triggered new expressions of solidarity. The article explores the levels of responsibility of persons and institutions concerned by the need for humanitarian aid and for the administration of applications for asylum according to the rule of law and international commitments. The ideal of hospitality can help to support just and fair procedures without being the answer to all questions. Individual and structural degrees of action have to be distinguished. Religious beliefs play a particular role in the ongoing European debate on strangers, borders and human rights. The ethics of migration urgently needs such inspirational resources in order to close the gap between theoretical argumentation and practical morality.An ethical approach to migration has to face the complex reality of irregular immigration as a challenge to the protection of the borders by sovereign states. The situation in Europe since 2015 has led to a rise of populism and to a polarization of the political debate in many countries. On the other hand, the presence of asylum seekers has also triggered new expressions of solidarity. The article explores the levels of responsibility of persons and institutions concerned by the need for humanitarian aid and for the administration of applications for asylum according to the rule of law and international commitments. The ideal of hospitality can help to support just and fair procedures without being the answer to all questions. Individual and structural degrees of action have to be distinguished. Religious beliefs play a particular role in the ongoing European debate on strangers, borders and human rights. The ethics of migration urgently needs such inspirational resources in order to close the gap between theoretical argumentation and practical morality.

This paper will show how the normalization of the forms of life that governs the political anthropology of Aristotle leads to a naturalization of the social hierarchies typical of the polis of his time. Toward this end, the first part of this paper highlights how in the Politics, the realization of the rational-political nature of Man implies the necessary declension of life (zoe) toward the living well (eu zen) of the polis. Subsequently, the paper will focus on how this living well, which characterizes the political form of life (bios politikos), relates to the condition of autarkeia, conceived by Aristotle not so much in the sense of economic and material or juridical and political selfsufficiency, but rather as the teleological realization of human nature. Finally, we will show that in the Nicomachean Ethics the Stagirite conceives of the nexus between the autarkeia and happiness and the living well as an ontological prerogative exclusive to the good man (spoudaios), thereby justifying his anthropological and moral superiority over other naturally subaltern forms of life.

Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.

The aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explainThe aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explain

The last book of Carmine Di Martino, Viventi umani e non umani, focuses on some important questions about relations between human being and animals, and it suggests some reflections about philosophy and “anthropological difference”. Furthermore, the reception of recent discoveries in paleontology and physical anthropology gives a special value to darwinian theories and supports the idea of a casual development of man; language, technical ability and culture are not a “special gift” expressly created for human being, but the result of a natural evolution.The last book of Carmine Di Martino, Viventi umani e non umani, focuses on some important questions about relations between human being and animals, and it suggests some reflections about philosophy and “anthropological difference”. Furthermore, the reception of recent discoveries in paleontology and physical anthropology gives a special value to darwinian theories and supports the idea of a casual development of man; language, technical ability and culture are not a “special gift” expressly created for human being, but the result of a natural evolution.

Supererogatory acts, as moral acts that go beyond duty, problematise the notions of obligation and autonomy within such impartialist ethical accounts such as Kantianism and utilitarianism which opt to reduce and assimilate supererogation as a result. Bernard Williams’s conception of a moral incapacity challenges the claim that cost to the moral agent, and consequently, autonomy, are necessary to conceptualise supererogation. I extend this finding by adapting Craig Taylor’s idea of a primitive moral response as an attitude that can ground supererogation. However, because such a primitive response is too self-regarding, I argue for a reinscription of such an attitude in terms of a Levinasian moral response. Such a response relies on a reconsidered autonomy that is grounded in the alterity of the Other, but which is incessantly corrected by the presence of the third party to the face to face encounter. I argue for an understanding of such an incessant correction in terms of a Levinasian normativity which as a provisional imperative, can also be thought of as an attitude. I claim that Levinasian normativity is supererogatory and that supererogation can also be reconceptualised as the possibility of sacrifice rather than actual sacrifice.

The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.

This paper tackles Hegel’s approach to poverty in his philosophy of right. I claim first that Hegel’s account of pauperism diverges from the analysis addressed by the economic school of classic liberalism, which authors as Smith and Kant belong to. Second, I display Hegel’s account of the destructing effects that misery has over the self-esteem of the subject and her links with the political community. Finally, I tackle the ethical mediation that the corporation furnishes as solution of the dilemma that pauperism brings about for completely materializing the ethical idea, highlighting some problems that this claim shows in Hegel’s time as in our time.

The essay discusses the similarites between first and second humanism (in the 15th and 18th century respectively), analyses the causes of both their differences and the collapse of the whole humanistic tradition in the 20th century, and investigates which philosophical presuppositions a possible resurgence of the humanistic tradition will have to satisfy.

Political experiences do not yield a clear-cut notion of the political; rather, they call for a hermeneutical articulation of their political dimension in spaces and orders of dissension which in turn require their revision in terms of contested notions of the political. Every definition of the political will be open to further revisions in political dissent, conflict and strife. In this perspective, a hermeneutic circularity between political experiences, interpretations of the political and political orders turns out as unavoidable. My paper refers to recent discussions on the relations between guilt, owing and debts in the context of violent forms of economization (dept enslavement) in order to demonstrate ways in which this circularity works and may prove to be fertile.

The question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant andThe question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant andThe question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant and

What to say, what standpoint to take in front of the technical “feasibility” (Machbarkeit) that has human beings as its proper object? We don’t do anything alien to our “nature” both when we are exposed to the action of technology, and when we impose a restriction or a limit (and not only them) on it. If so, what is the task of thought in this age of technical “feasibility”, an age when the possibility to do runs the risk of becoming an injunction to do, an obligation without objection?What to say, what standpoint to take in front of the technical “feasibility” (Machbarkeit) that has human beings as its proper object? We don’t do anything alien to our “nature” both when we are exposed to the action of technology, and when we impose a restriction or a limit (and not only them) on it. If so, what is the task of thought in this age of technical “feasibility”, an age when the possibility to do runs the risk of becoming an injunction to do, an obligation without objection?

John Rawls and John Dewey are among the most influential philosophers. Although some aspects of Rawls’s and Dewey’s philosophical positions have been discussed previously by some scholars, those critical studies have compared Dewey’s ideas with the ideas of Rawls while focusing on Rawls’s earlier work, A Theory of Justice. Different from the previous studies, this paper reexamines the two philosophers’ ideas within the limits of political liberalism as framed by Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, while focusing on the two philosophers’ discussions about the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and the person.John Rawls and John Dewey are among the most influential philosophers. Although some aspects of Rawls’s and Dewey’s philosophical positions have been discussed previously by some scholars, those critical studies have compared Dewey’s ideas with the ideas of Rawls while focusing on Rawls’s earlier work, A Theory of Justice. Different from the previous studies, this paper reexamines the two philosophers’ ideas within the limits of political liberalism as framed by Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, while focusing on the two philosophers’ discussions about the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and the person.

We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.

At the core of this essay there is the reflection on the subjectivity on which Viktor von Weizsäcker bases his medical reform and his project of a medicine that treat the “whole man”. As it emerges already from his first writings, the comparison with the Max Scheler’s philosophical anthropology is an essential instrument of this reflection. Examining some specific aspects of this comparison between Weizsäcker and Scheler, we will try to bring out the feature of the Weizsäcker’s subjectivity idea that distinguishes his medical anthropology as discipline which makes an epistemological change, focusing primarily on the encounter and the relationship (between subject and object, psyche and body, physician and patient)

The article aims at developing some aspects of the fruitful reflections contained in Carmine Di Martino’s book Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria (Milano 2017), especially those concerning the nature and the origin of the human technique and language. The specific purpose of the present paper is to discuss some possible theoretical developments of those topics in connection with the latest discoveries in human evolution field and with the most recent lines of research emerging in the epistemological debates concerning the structure of the standard evolutionary theory. In particular, the article examines the proposal to rethink the human evolution in the light of a multilevel and extended evolutionary synthesis, and of a “tree thinking” and “mosaic” approach. A concluding section addresses a recurring crucial issue in Di Martino’s book, concerning the relationship between philosophy and scientific theories. The possible role of the philosophical practice is analyzed in order to avoid the superstitious attitude that consists of thinking about scientific truths as something absolutely objective and independent from the practical activities, techniques, and theoretical constructions, which constantly put them into being.The article aims at developing some aspects of the fruitful reflections contained in Carmine Di Martino’s book Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria (Milano 2017), especially those concerning the nature and the origin of the human technique and language. The specific purpose of the present paper is to discuss some possible theoretical developments of those topics in connection with the latest discoveries in human evolution field and with the most recent lines of research emerging in the epistemological debates concerning the structure of the standard evolutionary theory. In particular, the article examines the proposal to rethink the human evolution in the light of a multilevel and extended evolutionary synthesis, and of a “tree thinking” and “mosaic” approach. A concluding section addresses a recurring crucial issue in Di Martino’s book, concerning the relationship between philosophy and scientific theories. The possible role of the philosophical practice is analyzed in order to avoid the superstitious attitude that consists of thinking about scientific truths as something absolutely objective and independent from the practical activities, techniques, and theoretical constructions, which constantly put them into being.

The author proposes a model of pathology in ethics that focuses on domination, a model according to which the ‘capital sin’ in ethics consists in denying the infinity of the human being. Its limits are highlighted and a different but complementary model is proposed: the narcissistic model, whose pathological nucleus consists in denying the finite of the human being.

In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.