Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/2

Animal welfare is an important concern in modern society. The most common ethical underpinning of animal welfare is the concept of sentience. However, there is no agreement yet on the definition of sentience and on which features are essential for a species to be classified as sentient. Unsurprisingly, hot debates flare up periodically about whether a certain species could be considered as sentient and thus on whether its welfare should be granted. In the present paper, we outline the repetitive tendency of such debates, using fish and arthropods as an example. Up to now, these debates tend to end with the vast majority of researchers either recognising sentience in the target species or advising the use of the precautionary principle and thus tentatively act as if the species is sentient in order to take decisions regarding its welfare status. The debate then usually moves to a species progressively less similar to humans and the cycle of the ‘sliding scale’ begins anew. In view of this tendency, we discuss whether it would be advisable to reject the idea of a sliding scale when welfare relevant decisions are at stake.

The essay discusses the similarites between first and second humanism (in the 15th and 18th century respectively), analyses the causes of both their differences and the collapse of the whole humanistic tradition in the 20th century, and investigates which philosophical presuppositions a possible resurgence of the humanistic tradition will have to satisfy.

My paper focuses on two topics emerging from the third chapter of Carmine Di Martino’s Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria. The first topic deals with the possibility of a (re)encouter between philosophical anthropology (Paul Alsberg) and philosophy of technology (Ernst Kapp) at their beginning. Such a (re)encounter is conceived of as a countermovement with regard to the current ‘ontic drift’ within these two disciplines. The second topic has to do with the meaning and the function of the culture/technology in a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Between the two alternatives represented by André Leroi-Gourhan and Arnold Gehlen, my paper highlights Gehlen’s institutional approach, that is the idea of the institutions as a balance against the potential risk of a ‘cultural Überentlastung’ (over-relief).My paper focuses on two topics emerging from the third chapter of Carmine Di Martino’s Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria. The first topic deals with the possibility of a (re)encouter between philosophical anthropology (Paul Alsberg) and philosophy of technology (Ernst Kapp) at their beginning. Such a (re)encounter is conceived of as a countermovement with regard to the current ‘ontic drift’ within these two disciplines. The second topic has to do with the meaning and the function of the culture/technology in a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Between the two alternatives represented by André Leroi-Gourhan and Arnold Gehlen, my paper highlights Gehlen’s institutional approach, that is the idea of the institutions as a balance against the potential risk of a ‘cultural Überentlastung’ (over-relief).

In this paper I examine some implications of Parfit’s non-metaphysical and cognitivist metaethics, especially his theory that the agents respond in non-causal manner to non-ontological properties, and the criticisms that are carried out from the evolutionary debunking argument. I conclude that a dispositionalist and realistic position in metaethics seems to fit better to our evolutionary history.

For the last years Humanism has been called upon by political and religious leaders. Intellectuals and academics of varied stock and diverse sensibilities mourn the loss of humanist values and call in earnest for their hasty reinstitution. When asked how to restore meaning to the term “humanism”, Heidegger answered: “by providing man with a measure other than himself”. Accordingly, if anything akin to humanism should still be justified, this can only be with the question of the human measure not only as a historical legacy, but also a task and future perspective. This paper aims at imagining a post-humanism that – having worked through the grief for lost anthropocentrism: being “post” with regard to traditionally anthropocentric humanism – has discovered that boundaries certainly constitute an obstacle for humans, but they also constitute the symbolic space that allows for the manifestation of a surplus necessary to human life. That would be a new and promising understanding of the human measure.

What to say, what standpoint to take in front of the technical “feasibility” (Machbarkeit) that has human beings as its proper object? We don’t do anything alien to our “nature” both when we are exposed to the action of technology, and when we impose a restriction or a limit (and not only them) on it. If so, what is the task of thought in this age of technical “feasibility”, an age when the possibility to do runs the risk of becoming an injunction to do, an obligation without objection?What to say, what standpoint to take in front of the technical “feasibility” (Machbarkeit) that has human beings as its proper object? We don’t do anything alien to our “nature” both when we are exposed to the action of technology, and when we impose a restriction or a limit (and not only them) on it. If so, what is the task of thought in this age of technical “feasibility”, an age when the possibility to do runs the risk of becoming an injunction to do, an obligation without objection?

An ethical approach to migration has to face the complex reality of irregular immigration as a challenge to the protection of the borders by sovereign states. The situation in Europe since 2015 has led to a rise of populism and to a polarization of the political debate in many countries. On the other hand, the presence of asylum seekers has also triggered new expressions of solidarity. The article explores the levels of responsibility of persons and institutions concerned by the need for humanitarian aid and for the administration of applications for asylum according to the rule of law and international commitments. The ideal of hospitality can help to support just and fair procedures without being the answer to all questions. Individual and structural degrees of action have to be distinguished. Religious beliefs play a particular role in the ongoing European debate on strangers, borders and human rights. The ethics of migration urgently needs such inspirational resources in order to close the gap between theoretical argumentation and practical morality.An ethical approach to migration has to face the complex reality of irregular immigration as a challenge to the protection of the borders by sovereign states. The situation in Europe since 2015 has led to a rise of populism and to a polarization of the political debate in many countries. On the other hand, the presence of asylum seekers has also triggered new expressions of solidarity. The article explores the levels of responsibility of persons and institutions concerned by the need for humanitarian aid and for the administration of applications for asylum according to the rule of law and international commitments. The ideal of hospitality can help to support just and fair procedures without being the answer to all questions. Individual and structural degrees of action have to be distinguished. Religious beliefs play a particular role in the ongoing European debate on strangers, borders and human rights. The ethics of migration urgently needs such inspirational resources in order to close the gap between theoretical argumentation and practical morality.

This essay focuses on Kant’s image and interpretation of decadence in his philosophy of history. Compared to progress, decadence is an older and wider category, with a very insidious metaphysical background. Just because Kant is by definition the philosopher of progress, the topics related to decadence are for him a valuable tool for identifying and criticizing the purposes of conservatism. On the border between philosophy of history, political philosophy and philosophy of religion, what Kant repeatedly argues is that the issue of the inescapable decay of the world is one of the ways in which conservatives oppose the French revolution. Kant’s refutation of this narrative strategy is therefore not an obvious defense of Enlightenment, but a political and moral struggle against paternalistic and despotic power.

Paul Alsberg’s anthropology could support the reform of Husserlian phenomenology conducted by Carmine Di Martino in his Viventi umani e non umani, not only showing the autopoietic effects of the human technological activity with the principle of body-liberation, but also understanding language as a particular tool. This paper investigates technology and language as crucial factors employed to draw the line between human and non-human living being in a discontinuistic evolutionary perspective.Paul Alsberg’s anthropology could support the reform of Husserlian phenomenology conducted by Carmine Di Martino in his Viventi umani e non umani, not only showing the autopoietic effects of the human technological activity with the principle of body-liberation, but also understanding language as a particular tool. This paper investigates technology and language as crucial factors employed to draw the line between human and non-human living being in a discontinuistic evolutionary perspective.

The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.

The paper is focused on the following philosophical issues discussed by Paolo Bettineschi in his book entitled L’oggetto buono dell’io. Etica e filosofia delle relazioni oggettuali: the transcendental structure of thinking and desire; subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the good and the right; hospitality and rejection. It also suggests an analogy between the ethics of restoration and the restorative justice theory.

The aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explainThe aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explain

In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.

The question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant andThe question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant andThe question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant and

In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.

In this paper, I reply to the objections and solicitations of the critics who intervened in the symposium on my book L’oggetto buono dell’Io. In this way, I return to discuss some fundamental concepts of the Philosophy of Object Relations, and some theses of its Ethics of Reparation. In doing so, I try to defend and develop some of the most relevant arguments of that complex theory

The article aims at developing some aspects of the fruitful reflections contained in Carmine Di Martino’s book Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria (Milano 2017), especially those concerning the nature and the origin of the human technique and language. The specific purpose of the present paper is to discuss some possible theoretical developments of those topics in connection with the latest discoveries in human evolution field and with the most recent lines of research emerging in the epistemological debates concerning the structure of the standard evolutionary theory. In particular, the article examines the proposal to rethink the human evolution in the light of a multilevel and extended evolutionary synthesis, and of a “tree thinking” and “mosaic” approach. A concluding section addresses a recurring crucial issue in Di Martino’s book, concerning the relationship between philosophy and scientific theories. The possible role of the philosophical practice is analyzed in order to avoid the superstitious attitude that consists of thinking about scientific truths as something absolutely objective and independent from the practical activities, techniques, and theoretical constructions, which constantly put them into being.The article aims at developing some aspects of the fruitful reflections contained in Carmine Di Martino’s book Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria (Milano 2017), especially those concerning the nature and the origin of the human technique and language. The specific purpose of the present paper is to discuss some possible theoretical developments of those topics in connection with the latest discoveries in human evolution field and with the most recent lines of research emerging in the epistemological debates concerning the structure of the standard evolutionary theory. In particular, the article examines the proposal to rethink the human evolution in the light of a multilevel and extended evolutionary synthesis, and of a “tree thinking” and “mosaic” approach. A concluding section addresses a recurring crucial issue in Di Martino’s book, concerning the relationship between philosophy and scientific theories. The possible role of the philosophical practice is analyzed in order to avoid the superstitious attitude that consists of thinking about scientific truths as something absolutely objective and independent from the practical activities, techniques, and theoretical constructions, which constantly put them into being.

The philosophical and theological research of Ernst Troeltsch largely contributed to focus on the cultural crisis that Europe suffered in the early decades of the twentieth century. On the basis of a large consciousness of the historical evolution of the key-concepts of the European culture, Troeltsch recognised the role of the Christian religious experience in their establishment as well as the consequences of the process of secularisation. Considering the rising and historical evolution of Natural Law, Troeltsch stressed how the progressive separation of this idea from its religious origin is part of the secularisation, that is a major feature of the European religious history in modern period. The consciousness of this situation was the basis for a search of a rethinking of the role of Christianity in the building of a European ethos always considered in terms of relation between the transcendental level of the faith and the contingent social forms that Christianity determines within the historical framework.The philosophical and theological research of Ernst Troeltsch largely contributed to focus on the cultural crisis that Europe suffered in the early decades of the twentieth century. On the basis of a large consciousness of the historical evolution of the key-concepts of the European culture, Troeltsch recognised the role of the Christian religious experience in their establishment as well as the consequences of the process of secularisation. Considering the rising and historical evolution of Natural Law, Troeltsch stressed how the progressive separation of this idea from its religious origin is part of the secularisation, that is a major feature of the European religious history in modern period. The consciousness of this situation was the basis for a search of a rethinking of the role of Christianity in the building of a European ethos always considered in terms of relation between the transcendental level of the faith and the contingent social forms that Christianity determines within the historical framework.

We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.