Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/2

In this paper, I reply to the objections and solicitations of the critics who intervened in the symposium on my book L’oggetto buono dell’Io. In this way, I return to discuss some fundamental concepts of the Philosophy of Object Relations, and some theses of its Ethics of Reparation. In doing so, I try to defend and develop some of the most relevant arguments of that complex theory

The essay by Paolo Bettineschi is opposed to a thought that consumes its own presuppositions, and argues for the benefit of the testimony of a truth to which thought tends as the stable end of its fulfillment. My comment praises the emphasis on the emancipatory and non-oppressive force of a vertical truth, excessive and further rather than horizontal and immanent. I article then a Lacanian interpretation of anguish, which is not connected to the absence of an object and therefore to the processes of symbolic work. On the contrary, anguish is read, through Kierkegaardian lenses, as the announcement of a gap in the symbolic enclosure and as the irruption of an exceptional moment in the normal syntax of the law. Along this path, the need for stability of presence is undermined by a new life that arises from the loss of fullness.

The last book of Carmine Di Martino, Viventi umani e non umani, focuses on some important questions about relations between human being and animals, and it suggests some reflections about philosophy and “anthropological difference”. Furthermore, the reception of recent discoveries in paleontology and physical anthropology gives a special value to darwinian theories and supports the idea of a casual development of man; language, technical ability and culture are not a “special gift” expressly created for human being, but the result of a natural evolution.The last book of Carmine Di Martino, Viventi umani e non umani, focuses on some important questions about relations between human being and animals, and it suggests some reflections about philosophy and “anthropological difference”. Furthermore, the reception of recent discoveries in paleontology and physical anthropology gives a special value to darwinian theories and supports the idea of a casual development of man; language, technical ability and culture are not a “special gift” expressly created for human being, but the result of a natural evolution.

This paper will show how the normalization of the forms of life that governs the political anthropology of Aristotle leads to a naturalization of the social hierarchies typical of the polis of his time. Toward this end, the first part of this paper highlights how in the Politics, the realization of the rational-political nature of Man implies the necessary declension of life (zoe) toward the living well (eu zen) of the polis. Subsequently, the paper will focus on how this living well, which characterizes the political form of life (bios politikos), relates to the condition of autarkeia, conceived by Aristotle not so much in the sense of economic and material or juridical and political selfsufficiency, but rather as the teleological realization of human nature. Finally, we will show that in the Nicomachean Ethics the Stagirite conceives of the nexus between the autarkeia and happiness and the living well as an ontological prerogative exclusive to the good man (spoudaios), thereby justifying his anthropological and moral superiority over other naturally subaltern forms of life.

The philosophical and theological research of Ernst Troeltsch largely contributed to focus on the cultural crisis that Europe suffered in the early decades of the twentieth century. On the basis of a large consciousness of the historical evolution of the key-concepts of the European culture, Troeltsch recognised the role of the Christian religious experience in their establishment as well as the consequences of the process of secularisation. Considering the rising and historical evolution of Natural Law, Troeltsch stressed how the progressive separation of this idea from its religious origin is part of the secularisation, that is a major feature of the European religious history in modern period. The consciousness of this situation was the basis for a search of a rethinking of the role of Christianity in the building of a European ethos always considered in terms of relation between the transcendental level of the faith and the contingent social forms that Christianity determines within the historical framework.The philosophical and theological research of Ernst Troeltsch largely contributed to focus on the cultural crisis that Europe suffered in the early decades of the twentieth century. On the basis of a large consciousness of the historical evolution of the key-concepts of the European culture, Troeltsch recognised the role of the Christian religious experience in their establishment as well as the consequences of the process of secularisation. Considering the rising and historical evolution of Natural Law, Troeltsch stressed how the progressive separation of this idea from its religious origin is part of the secularisation, that is a major feature of the European religious history in modern period. The consciousness of this situation was the basis for a search of a rethinking of the role of Christianity in the building of a European ethos always considered in terms of relation between the transcendental level of the faith and the contingent social forms that Christianity determines within the historical framework.

The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.

The paper is focused on the following philosophical issues discussed by Paolo Bettineschi in his book entitled L’oggetto buono dell’io. Etica e filosofia delle relazioni oggettuali: the transcendental structure of thinking and desire; subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the good and the right; hospitality and rejection. It also suggests an analogy between the ethics of restoration and the restorative justice theory.

John Rawls and John Dewey are among the most influential philosophers. Although some aspects of Rawls’s and Dewey’s philosophical positions have been discussed previously by some scholars, those critical studies have compared Dewey’s ideas with the ideas of Rawls while focusing on Rawls’s earlier work, A Theory of Justice. Different from the previous studies, this paper reexamines the two philosophers’ ideas within the limits of political liberalism as framed by Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, while focusing on the two philosophers’ discussions about the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and the person.John Rawls and John Dewey are among the most influential philosophers. Although some aspects of Rawls’s and Dewey’s philosophical positions have been discussed previously by some scholars, those critical studies have compared Dewey’s ideas with the ideas of Rawls while focusing on Rawls’s earlier work, A Theory of Justice. Different from the previous studies, this paper reexamines the two philosophers’ ideas within the limits of political liberalism as framed by Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, while focusing on the two philosophers’ discussions about the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and the person.

For the last years Humanism has been called upon by political and religious leaders. Intellectuals and academics of varied stock and diverse sensibilities mourn the loss of humanist values and call in earnest for their hasty reinstitution. When asked how to restore meaning to the term “humanism”, Heidegger answered: “by providing man with a measure other than himself”. Accordingly, if anything akin to humanism should still be justified, this can only be with the question of the human measure not only as a historical legacy, but also a task and future perspective. This paper aims at imagining a post-humanism that – having worked through the grief for lost anthropocentrism: being “post” with regard to traditionally anthropocentric humanism – has discovered that boundaries certainly constitute an obstacle for humans, but they also constitute the symbolic space that allows for the manifestation of a surplus necessary to human life. That would be a new and promising understanding of the human measure.

Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.

At the core of this essay there is the reflection on the subjectivity on which Viktor von Weizsäcker bases his medical reform and his project of a medicine that treat the “whole man”. As it emerges already from his first writings, the comparison with the Max Scheler’s philosophical anthropology is an essential instrument of this reflection. Examining some specific aspects of this comparison between Weizsäcker and Scheler, we will try to bring out the feature of the Weizsäcker’s subjectivity idea that distinguishes his medical anthropology as discipline which makes an epistemological change, focusing primarily on the encounter and the relationship (between subject and object, psyche and body, physician and patient)

Paolo Bettineschi’s ‘objects relations philosophy’ has its foundation in the concept of I, understood as an infinite horizon of intentionality, and in that of recognition of the others as ‘I’. This paper shows the limits of a certain understanding of the I and the difficulties raised by the question of intersubjectivity.

Paul Alsberg’s anthropology could support the reform of Husserlian phenomenology conducted by Carmine Di Martino in his Viventi umani e non umani, not only showing the autopoietic effects of the human technological activity with the principle of body-liberation, but also understanding language as a particular tool. This paper investigates technology and language as crucial factors employed to draw the line between human and non-human living being in a discontinuistic evolutionary perspective.Paul Alsberg’s anthropology could support the reform of Husserlian phenomenology conducted by Carmine Di Martino in his Viventi umani e non umani, not only showing the autopoietic effects of the human technological activity with the principle of body-liberation, but also understanding language as a particular tool. This paper investigates technology and language as crucial factors employed to draw the line between human and non-human living being in a discontinuistic evolutionary perspective.

In this paper I examine some implications of Parfit’s non-metaphysical and cognitivist metaethics, especially his theory that the agents respond in non-causal manner to non-ontological properties, and the criticisms that are carried out from the evolutionary debunking argument. I conclude that a dispositionalist and realistic position in metaethics seems to fit better to our evolutionary history.

Martha Nussbaum’s recent engagement with ecological issues and her project of creating the list of animal capabilities attests to her growing interest in developing a non-anthropocentric philosophy. In her recent article “What Does it mean to be Human – Don’t Ask”, 1 published in NY Times (August 2018), she raises the problematic of anthropocentric thought. According to her, the question itself is a problem and it exposes human being's profound narcissism. She thus calls to cease such questioning. This paper, while recognizing Nussbaum’s contribution in exposing that the way we ask the question about the human being already discloses our understanding of being a human being, attempts at analyzing the problematic in Nussbaum’s call. More specifically, the thesis guiding this article is that the reflection on ecological, social, and political issues cannot exist without the reflection on the human being and his/her place in the world.Martha Nussbaum’s recent engagement with ecological issues and her project of creating the list of animal capabilities attests to her growing interest in developing a non-anthropocentric philosophy. In her recent article “What Does it mean to be Human – Don’t Ask”, 1 published in NY Times (August 2018), she raises the problematic of anthropocentric thought. According to her, the question itself is a problem and it exposes human being's profound narcissism. She thus calls to cease such questioning. This paper, while recognizing Nussbaum’s contribution in exposing that the way we ask the question about the human being already discloses our understanding of being a human being, attempts at analyzing the problematic in Nussbaum’s call. More specifically, the thesis guiding this article is that the reflection on ecological, social, and political issues cannot exist without the reflection on the human being and his/her place in the world.

My paper focuses on two topics emerging from the third chapter of Carmine Di Martino’s Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria. The first topic deals with the possibility of a (re)encouter between philosophical anthropology (Paul Alsberg) and philosophy of technology (Ernst Kapp) at their beginning. Such a (re)encounter is conceived of as a countermovement with regard to the current ‘ontic drift’ within these two disciplines. The second topic has to do with the meaning and the function of the culture/technology in a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Between the two alternatives represented by André Leroi-Gourhan and Arnold Gehlen, my paper highlights Gehlen’s institutional approach, that is the idea of the institutions as a balance against the potential risk of a ‘cultural Überentlastung’ (over-relief).My paper focuses on two topics emerging from the third chapter of Carmine Di Martino’s Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria. The first topic deals with the possibility of a (re)encouter between philosophical anthropology (Paul Alsberg) and philosophy of technology (Ernst Kapp) at their beginning. Such a (re)encounter is conceived of as a countermovement with regard to the current ‘ontic drift’ within these two disciplines. The second topic has to do with the meaning and the function of the culture/technology in a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Between the two alternatives represented by André Leroi-Gourhan and Arnold Gehlen, my paper highlights Gehlen’s institutional approach, that is the idea of the institutions as a balance against the potential risk of a ‘cultural Überentlastung’ (over-relief).

The essay inquiries about the notion of law in Montesquieu’s work considered in its relationship with the larger theme of regulation. For the full understanding of the notion of law, connected with the other fundamental concepts of Montesquieu’s political thought (custom, institution, government), we have to start from the problem of regulation in society, taking in consideration the production process of an order and the experience of violation of the rule. In this way, even before being the expression of a legitimate command, the law shows an originally operational character.

This paper tackles Hegel’s approach to poverty in his philosophy of right. I claim first that Hegel’s account of pauperism diverges from the analysis addressed by the economic school of classic liberalism, which authors as Smith and Kant belong to. Second, I display Hegel’s account of the destructing effects that misery has over the self-esteem of the subject and her links with the political community. Finally, I tackle the ethical mediation that the corporation furnishes as solution of the dilemma that pauperism brings about for completely materializing the ethical idea, highlighting some problems that this claim shows in Hegel’s time as in our time.

We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.

In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.