Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/2

In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.In this paper, I show the parallelism between the Galenic concept of “complexion” (complexio, in Latin) as it was used in the medieval medical and natural-philosophical texts and the current concept of “personalized medicine”. I this way, I point out to what extent the parallelism between personalized medicine and the medieval notion of “complexion” is nowadays relevant to inquire the proprium of the “human” in a bio-medical framework. For, the medieval notion of “complexion” as “substantial quality” optimally worked as to deal with the problem of reconciling the “case-by-case” approach of medicine with the need of a unified bio-medical account of the “human”. Against the background of this reasoning, I further suggest that a mesoscopic perspective on the living organisms, as the one entailed by the concept of “complexion” and used in current scenarios of Systems Biology, could be advantageous to the bio-medical investigations on “what is human”.

This paper will show how the normalization of the forms of life that governs the political anthropology of Aristotle leads to a naturalization of the social hierarchies typical of the polis of his time. Toward this end, the first part of this paper highlights how in the Politics, the realization of the rational-political nature of Man implies the necessary declension of life (zoe) toward the living well (eu zen) of the polis. Subsequently, the paper will focus on how this living well, which characterizes the political form of life (bios politikos), relates to the condition of autarkeia, conceived by Aristotle not so much in the sense of economic and material or juridical and political selfsufficiency, but rather as the teleological realization of human nature. Finally, we will show that in the Nicomachean Ethics the Stagirite conceives of the nexus between the autarkeia and happiness and the living well as an ontological prerogative exclusive to the good man (spoudaios), thereby justifying his anthropological and moral superiority over other naturally subaltern forms of life.

Within the field of living beings, the human and the non-human coincide and diverge. This is why both hard sciences and philosophy run into issues when they attempt to draw a dividing line between human living beings and non-human living beings. Therefore philosophy should thematize and focus upon the notion of alterity as radical separatedness which could be intended as the essence of living being themselves.Within the field of living beings, the human and the non-human coincide and diverge. This is why both hard sciences and philosophy run into issues when they attempt to draw a dividing line between human living beings and non-human living beings. Therefore philosophy should thematize and focus upon the notion of alterity as radical separatedness which could be intended as the essence of living being themselves.

This contribution explores the concept of Human in Simone Weil, starting from the perspective given by the theme of the Animal. The distinction between Human and Animal initiates a series of reflections. The first one deals with the necessity of leaving the aspect of appropriation, which is proper to the need, and instead having access to the transcendent dimension of the desire. A further detachment from the notion of Animal takes place through the assumption of affliction (malheur). The possibility to consent to malheur is the key not only to the ethical sphere of compassion, but also to the cognitive faculty of attention. These successive passages are summarized, in Weil's last writings, as a movement that goes beyond the person and the community, towards the impersonal (impersonnel), perhaps the most original outcome of Weilian anthropology.This contribution explores the concept of Human in Simone Weil, starting from the perspective given by the theme of the Animal. The distinction between Human and Animal initiates a series of reflections. The first one deals with the necessity of leaving the aspect of appropriation, which is proper to the need, and instead having access to the transcendent dimension of the desire. A further detachment from the notion of Animal takes place through the assumption of affliction (malheur). The possibility to consent to malheur is the key not only to the ethical sphere of compassion, but also to the cognitive faculty of attention. These successive passages are summarized, in Weil's last writings, as a movement that goes beyond the person and the community, towards the impersonal (impersonnel), perhaps the most original outcome of Weilian anthropology.

The aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explainThe aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explain

What to say, what standpoint to take in front of the technical “feasibility” (Machbarkeit) that has human beings as its proper object? We don’t do anything alien to our “nature” both when we are exposed to the action of technology, and when we impose a restriction or a limit (and not only them) on it. If so, what is the task of thought in this age of technical “feasibility”, an age when the possibility to do runs the risk of becoming an injunction to do, an obligation without objection?What to say, what standpoint to take in front of the technical “feasibility” (Machbarkeit) that has human beings as its proper object? We don’t do anything alien to our “nature” both when we are exposed to the action of technology, and when we impose a restriction or a limit (and not only them) on it. If so, what is the task of thought in this age of technical “feasibility”, an age when the possibility to do runs the risk of becoming an injunction to do, an obligation without objection?

The essay inquiries about the notion of law in Montesquieu’s work considered in its relationship with the larger theme of regulation. For the full understanding of the notion of law, connected with the other fundamental concepts of Montesquieu’s political thought (custom, institution, government), we have to start from the problem of regulation in society, taking in consideration the production process of an order and the experience of violation of the rule. In this way, even before being the expression of a legitimate command, the law shows an originally operational character.

In this paper, I reply to the objections and solicitations of the critics who intervened in the symposium on my book L’oggetto buono dell’Io. In this way, I return to discuss some fundamental concepts of the Philosophy of Object Relations, and some theses of its Ethics of Reparation. In doing so, I try to defend and develop some of the most relevant arguments of that complex theory

The question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant andThe question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant andThe question of the relationship between human beings and machines, developed today by transhumanism, is often thought of in terms of an increase. But where does this increase begin? Is there something like a “natural” human being, free from any increase? The path followed in this paper, first through Bergson’s reflection on instinct and intelligence and on tools and organs, then through a reflection on education and human adaptability as a form of increase, with the possible separation of human being from its biological condition, and finally through a reading of La Mettrie’s works about man as a machine, questions the models of the cyborg or the replicant and

In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.In a world tainted by the cult of perfect health and the biomedicalization of identity, the value attributed to individual life appears to come increasingly from individuals’ capacity to maintain— and even enhance—their biological “capital.” The valorization of “life itself” in the bioeconomy fosters a representation of the body as capital. Stemming from the notion of human capital developed by Gary Becker, the conception of the body as capital is dissociable from the bioeconomy, the ultimate stage of globalized capitalism. Not only does the bioeconomy model dictate all neoliberal politics in innovation and research implemented since the early 1980s, it is redefining the very foundations of citizenship. Maintaining and extending health is therefore seen as an investment that increases individuals’ social “value.” This concept of the body as capital is evident in the development of private umbilical cord blood stem cell banks that encourage parents to invest in their children’s biological capital. It also shows up in the phenomenon of medical tourism. This article presents a theoretical analysis of the concept of body capital via two phenomena: the development of private cord blood banks, medical tourism, and translational medicine.

Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.

The article analyses John Rawls’ perspective on interpersonal relationships and on the link between the concepts of the individual, person and community, by the manner in which these topics are presented in his graduation thesis, delivered to the Faculty of Philosophy of Princeton University in 1942. In particular, the work focuses on the transformation from individual to person within the community. The community is essential so that, in the individual, the maturation that leads him to become a person can take place. At the same time, persons are crucial so that the community does not disintegrate, but rather becomes a system of cooperation. The circularity of the connection between individuals, persons and community is, therefore, one of the central elements of this inquiry. In the conclusion of the work, this is put in relation with key concepts of the philosopher’s mature production, such as those of citizen, sense of justice and society. The aim is to demonstrate that an in-depth study of Rawls’ earlier work can provide innovative and stimulating ideas for the interpretation of his later thought.The article analyses John Rawls’ perspective on interpersonal relationships and on the link between the concepts of the individual, person and community, by the manner in which these topics are presented in his graduation thesis, delivered to the Faculty of Philosophy of Princeton University in 1942. In particular, the work focuses on the transformation from individual to person within the community. The community is essential so that, in the individual, the maturation that leads him to become a person can take place. At the same time, persons are crucial so that the community does not disintegrate, but rather becomes a system of cooperation. The circularity of the connection between individuals, persons and community is, therefore, one of the central elements of this inquiry. In the conclusion of the work, this is put in relation with key concepts of the philosopher’s mature production, such as those of citizen, sense of justice and society. The aim is to demonstrate that an in-depth study of Rawls’ earlier work can provide innovative and stimulating ideas for the interpretation of his later thought.

The philosophical and theological research of Ernst Troeltsch largely contributed to focus on the cultural crisis that Europe suffered in the early decades of the twentieth century. On the basis of a large consciousness of the historical evolution of the key-concepts of the European culture, Troeltsch recognised the role of the Christian religious experience in their establishment as well as the consequences of the process of secularisation. Considering the rising and historical evolution of Natural Law, Troeltsch stressed how the progressive separation of this idea from its religious origin is part of the secularisation, that is a major feature of the European religious history in modern period. The consciousness of this situation was the basis for a search of a rethinking of the role of Christianity in the building of a European ethos always considered in terms of relation between the transcendental level of the faith and the contingent social forms that Christianity determines within the historical framework.The philosophical and theological research of Ernst Troeltsch largely contributed to focus on the cultural crisis that Europe suffered in the early decades of the twentieth century. On the basis of a large consciousness of the historical evolution of the key-concepts of the European culture, Troeltsch recognised the role of the Christian religious experience in their establishment as well as the consequences of the process of secularisation. Considering the rising and historical evolution of Natural Law, Troeltsch stressed how the progressive separation of this idea from its religious origin is part of the secularisation, that is a major feature of the European religious history in modern period. The consciousness of this situation was the basis for a search of a rethinking of the role of Christianity in the building of a European ethos always considered in terms of relation between the transcendental level of the faith and the contingent social forms that Christianity determines within the historical framework.

The author proposes a model of pathology in ethics that focuses on domination, a model according to which the ‘capital sin’ in ethics consists in denying the infinity of the human being. Its limits are highlighted and a different but complementary model is proposed: the narcissistic model, whose pathological nucleus consists in denying the finite of the human being.

John Rawls and John Dewey are among the most influential philosophers. Although some aspects of Rawls’s and Dewey’s philosophical positions have been discussed previously by some scholars, those critical studies have compared Dewey’s ideas with the ideas of Rawls while focusing on Rawls’s earlier work, A Theory of Justice. Different from the previous studies, this paper reexamines the two philosophers’ ideas within the limits of political liberalism as framed by Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, while focusing on the two philosophers’ discussions about the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and the person.John Rawls and John Dewey are among the most influential philosophers. Although some aspects of Rawls’s and Dewey’s philosophical positions have been discussed previously by some scholars, those critical studies have compared Dewey’s ideas with the ideas of Rawls while focusing on Rawls’s earlier work, A Theory of Justice. Different from the previous studies, this paper reexamines the two philosophers’ ideas within the limits of political liberalism as framed by Rawls’s later work, Political Liberalism, while focusing on the two philosophers’ discussions about the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and the person.

This essay focuses on Kant’s image and interpretation of decadence in his philosophy of history. Compared to progress, decadence is an older and wider category, with a very insidious metaphysical background. Just because Kant is by definition the philosopher of progress, the topics related to decadence are for him a valuable tool for identifying and criticizing the purposes of conservatism. On the border between philosophy of history, political philosophy and philosophy of religion, what Kant repeatedly argues is that the issue of the inescapable decay of the world is one of the ways in which conservatives oppose the French revolution. Kant’s refutation of this narrative strategy is therefore not an obvious defense of Enlightenment, but a political and moral struggle against paternalistic and despotic power.

Political experiences do not yield a clear-cut notion of the political; rather, they call for a hermeneutical articulation of their political dimension in spaces and orders of dissension which in turn require their revision in terms of contested notions of the political. Every definition of the political will be open to further revisions in political dissent, conflict and strife. In this perspective, a hermeneutic circularity between political experiences, interpretations of the political and political orders turns out as unavoidable. My paper refers to recent discussions on the relations between guilt, owing and debts in the context of violent forms of economization (dept enslavement) in order to demonstrate ways in which this circularity works and may prove to be fertile.

My paper focuses on two topics emerging from the third chapter of Carmine Di Martino’s Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria. The first topic deals with the possibility of a (re)encouter between philosophical anthropology (Paul Alsberg) and philosophy of technology (Ernst Kapp) at their beginning. Such a (re)encounter is conceived of as a countermovement with regard to the current ‘ontic drift’ within these two disciplines. The second topic has to do with the meaning and the function of the culture/technology in a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Between the two alternatives represented by André Leroi-Gourhan and Arnold Gehlen, my paper highlights Gehlen’s institutional approach, that is the idea of the institutions as a balance against the potential risk of a ‘cultural Überentlastung’ (over-relief).My paper focuses on two topics emerging from the third chapter of Carmine Di Martino’s Viventi umani e non umani. Tecnica, linguaggio e memoria. The first topic deals with the possibility of a (re)encouter between philosophical anthropology (Paul Alsberg) and philosophy of technology (Ernst Kapp) at their beginning. Such a (re)encounter is conceived of as a countermovement with regard to the current ‘ontic drift’ within these two disciplines. The second topic has to do with the meaning and the function of the culture/technology in a philosophical-anthropological perspective. Between the two alternatives represented by André Leroi-Gourhan and Arnold Gehlen, my paper highlights Gehlen’s institutional approach, that is the idea of the institutions as a balance against the potential risk of a ‘cultural Überentlastung’ (over-relief).

The essay by Paolo Bettineschi is opposed to a thought that consumes its own presuppositions, and argues for the benefit of the testimony of a truth to which thought tends as the stable end of its fulfillment. My comment praises the emphasis on the emancipatory and non-oppressive force of a vertical truth, excessive and further rather than horizontal and immanent. I article then a Lacanian interpretation of anguish, which is not connected to the absence of an object and therefore to the processes of symbolic work. On the contrary, anguish is read, through Kierkegaardian lenses, as the announcement of a gap in the symbolic enclosure and as the irruption of an exceptional moment in the normal syntax of the law. Along this path, the need for stability of presence is undermined by a new life that arises from the loss of fullness.