Esercizi Filosofici 14 (2019)

This paper purports to identify the nature of Hegel’s theory of race. Especially, the author will examine whether Hegel’s theory of race in particular, his philosophy of spirit in general, provides the justification of a colonial racism or a cultural racism. While Hegel’s theory undoubtedly contained racist elements, still unanswered is whether racism is inherently at odds with the basic principles of his philosophy of spirit. To be examined critically is the suggestion that racism is fundamentally incompatible with the basic principles of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, notwithstanding its undeniably racist elements. The paper aims to provide clarification in this question by showing that Hegel’s racism is not an accidental or ancillary byproduct of his speculative philosophy of spirit and world history.

In this contribution I deal with a novel theory of trust by accounting for its importance in the improvement of pre-existent institutions. I maintain that it can be useful as a social tool if it increases cooperative firmness and unity. However, I also point out that it can be exploited if the individual member is not in the condition of exerting a critical and autonomous trust towards the institutions. Eventually, I claim that, in order to incentivize critical trust, we necessitate to institutionalize it and to make it able to strengthen the other institutions by fostering what I call practices of trust. Practices of trust are those practices enhancing the critical and aware participation to the social context.

In this paper I show how Frege’s treatment of existence in terms of quantification clashes against the principle of compositionality and I attempt to provide a possible solution to the problem. I expose some of the main innovations introduced by Frege in logic in order to show his good reasons in favor of compositionality and I show how such principle is at odds with the quantificational account of existence. In the final part, I propose a Meinongian solution, namely to abandon the idea that existence is expressed satisfactorily by the particular quantifier and that all terms that succeed to refer, refer to existent objects.

This paper aims to consider the relevance of Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of natural inclinations within the contemporary debate on practical reason. Through a critical analysis of Candace Vogler's Reasonably Vicious (2002) and on the basis of Dario Composta’s analysis of Thomas Aquinas' theory of action (1971), it is intended to show that natural inclinations are metaphysical realities, which define the motivational framework of individual agents, offering them normative constraints regarding what is to be considered good and desirable as an end. The reasons for action that arise from inclinations cannot disregard the point of view of the individual agent, who grasps what pertains to human nature through her own experience.

In this paper I purport to suggest a revision of the phases of Neo-Aristotelian argument. By considering the standard conception of the phases of the argument I will suggest that Neo-aristotelian naturalism has a hard time accounting for its commitment to a non empirical anthropology. On the contrary, by highlighting some Neo-aristotelian features of the argument, i.e. the non empirical access to the human form of life and the teleological structure of human agency, I think it is possible to consider a different sequence of the phases of the argument which is able to make room for an appeal to a non empirical anthropology within the general framework of natural normativity.