In this essay I respond to the objections that some philosophical and psychoanalyst friends have formulated about the hypothesis developed in my book. In particular I want to clarify what I mean by "pure experience". I then show how such experience does not reduce the dimension of singularity to a "hologram", but rather funds it. Finally, I return to the metaphysics of the process to answer the objection of those who read a masked eleatism and to show the basic congruence of my "megarism" with scientific experience and a possible reformulation of ethics.
Rocco Ronchi’s book Il canone minore talks about some lines, operative in Western thought, that are in contrast with the mainly followed theoretical canon, especially by mention to Bergson, Whitehead, Gentile, Deleuze. This essay aims to support this proposal showing how other authors, also in the German area, can be affiliated to the “minor canon”; in particular, I refer to the philosopher Helmuth Plessner, with his “positional theory” and the idea of living subject; and to the scientist Viktor von Weizsäcker, for his idea of Gestaltkreis and the concept of “biological act”.
This special issue devoted to anti-speciesism collects essays which examine different branches of
modern and contemporary studies on the status of non-human animals and the role that cognitive
progress should play in our ability to abandon the idea that something is uniquely human, analyzing
at the same time the difficult relationship between the inclusion of other animals and the
This paper, starting from Gianfrancesco Zanetti’s conception of situated vulnerability, deals with
the relationship between the symbolic logic of listening and the legal-philosophical problem of
the judgement. In particular, the aim of the paper is to show the role played by a judgement,
based (or not based) on an appropriate listening, in the construction of a wide range of appearances
of the so called “moral stranger”.
Many authors, although they express very different positions on the use of public property in defending common goods, in any case consider juridical rationality to be a fundamental tool in pursuing this aim. Therefore, they undervalue the supremacy that economic rationality is exer-cising today both on juridical rationality and the predominant ways of dwelling in the world. In this regard, it is not simply a question of replacing common goods as things with the common as
a political principle. Indeed, the movements that claim the collective or public ownership of certain “things” also shed light on the crucial crisis of our dwelling relationship with the common world, first of all as a material world.
Main reference authors: Settis, Marella, Ostrom, Dardot, Laval, Arendt, Mattei.
The identification of two different lines of thought is a particularly convincing image in Rocco Ronchi’s book, Il canone minore. In this text a rigorous duality, perhaps unsurpassed, which in-habits thought, is represented. But this dualism does not necessarily have to be fought and over-come. And perhaps it is not even a problem to be solved, but rather it is the movement of philo-sophy itself.
In which conditions does the human species endow itself with a series of obligations aimed at orienting
its relationship with non-human species? In my paper I shall try to answer this question by
formulating two divergent theses. According to the first thesis (§ 1) the conditions of possibility for
these obligations reside in a prescriptive dimension, ie authoritative. This thesis is articulable by distinguishing two kinds of authoritative source, respectively of transcendent (§ 1.1) and immanent
type (§ 1.2). Here the awareness of the proximity between the animal species doesn’t seem to play
an explicit role. The second kind of thesis (§ 2) identifies as a condition of possibility for these obligations a certain cognitive experience: that takes place thanks to the popularization of science's notions (§ 2.1) and that can take place by the virtue of a direct interaction between a man and another
animal (§ 2.2). Here the awareness of the proximity between the animal species plays an explicit
role. In § 3 I will argue why it is adequate to recognize in the perceptual, and therefore bodily, dimension the condition – prior to any prescription and scientific notion – for the emergence of feelings
of obligations inherent to our relationship with other animals.
The essay collects few of the reflections about Rocco Ronchi’s book, Il canone minore. Verso
una filosofia della natura. Having identified some common points, my paper focuses on Ronchi’s
theoretical proposal and it attempts to extend the application of the minor canon to authors not
directly considered by Ronchi in his perspective. The comparison with the text mostly concerns
Ronchi’s references to Husserl’s phenomenology and, going through his criticisms, the article
proposes the hypothesis of a “minor Husserl”, beyond Husserl’s intentions (and Ronchi’s as
The essay first deepens the meaning of the Cartesian Cogito, starting from its performative reading,
with the aim of verifying the plausibility of the interpretation provided by Rocco Ronchi’s
Canone minore, in order to conduct a radical desubjectivization of the experience. Secondly, the
essay raises the question whether this operation, which must lead to an absolute immanentism,
should also mean abandoning the central category of identity, so decisive for the whole western
philosophical tradition. A very brief mention is reserved to the figure that would emerge in the
margins of this extreme exercise of thought.
Far from establishing as the kingdom of absolute freedom, capitalism (in its neoliberal version)
includes the sujectivity in all its activity and life areas. The rules for consumption increases its
influence in a proportional way to the vagueness it determines our way of life and our expectatives,
producing a paradoxical freedom which turns into an inescapable psychic suffering due to
the compulsory structures inherent to it. The objective of the current article is, in fact, to show
the pathological manifestations of such paradoxical freedom in the formation of a personal identity,
taking into account the new technologies of the Power to impose its dominium and perpetuate
ad infinitum, a modus operandi without any comparison in history.
The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to redefining the anthropological question
from the perspective of the two paramount members of the Southwest School of Neo-Kantianism:
Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband. To this purpose, following the lead of the
outcomes of Windelband’s philosophy of history and of Rickert’s philosophical anthropology,
the paper firstly proposes to identify the essential trait of the human being in its processual and
self-formative nature and, then, to assess the effectiveness and limitations of this thesis within the
current philosophical debate as radically redefined by the phenomena of posthumanism and
transhumanism. In this line of inquiry, the paper dwells principally on the redefinition, in heterological-
processual terms, of the relationship between the natural and cultural spheres of the
human being, as well as on the ethical-practical character that marks the process of human formation,
This article, consisting of four parts, is a philosophical analysis of positive law applied to animals.
After putting the law to the test of philosophical astonishment and drawing up an inventory
of animal conditions made lawful by law, the author questions the links between the "proper
of man" and the rights of animals. These clarifications address the question of who can be a
subject of law from a legal point of view. Finally, in the fourth part, the author wonders about
the fictional status of the law and shows that the obstacles to confer rights on animals are not
technical but ideological.
Based on Gianfrancesco Zanetti’s book, this paper presents a reflection on the relationship between law and sensibility. Specifically, the essay is aimed at showing how “legal devices” actively operate in the construction of our five senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch) according to complex mechanisms and strategies. Through several examples, this paper reflects upon the role that the law plays in determining our perceptions.
Personhood is a normative concept applied to beings who are due moral consideration given their
agential and social properties. While the concept is a normative one, knowing how to appropriately
apply the concept is a descriptive project, requiring guidance from scientists who can help to uncover
whether or not a being has the relevant properties. If our current science attributes properties sufficient for personhood to a nonhuman animal, then we can directly conclude that the individual is
morally considerable. However, from the mere fact that an animal is a person, we cannot draw any
specific conclusions about appropriate treatment for captive animals. I will argue that from the premise
that an animal is a person we cannot directly conclude that the animal should be released from
captivity, should not participate in research, should not participate in ecotourist schemes, or engage
in other work; further descriptive premises would be needed. Such premises can only be supplied
by experts who know the animal and the animal’s context. With respect to the descriptive project,
animal ethicists need to defer to folk experts and scientists who are able to make informed judgements
about what is best for a particular animal. This requires a collaborative relationship of trust
between scientists and ethicists in order to best respect animal persons.
This work concerns Walter Benjamin’s theory of state of exception in the context of his philosophy
of history, which is expressed above all in two important essays: Über den Begriff der Geschichte
(“On the concept of history”, 1942) and Zur Kritik der Gewalt (“Critique of violence”,
1921). This paper tries to outline the metaphysical meaning of the distinction that Benjamin made
between “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand) as a condition of political and juridical oppression
and the real state of exception (wirklich Ausnahmezustand), which instead Benjamin described
as the revolutionary chance of the oppressed classes that we can think exclusively because
of a Messianic conception of time (Jetztzeit) and history (historical materialism theologically interpreted).
Thanks to this reconstruction of Benjamin’s philosophy of history, the paper attempts to show – also
through a comparison with the theories of Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, Jacob Taubes and
Lenin – whether it is possible to think of a philosophy of law as a philosophy against law.
The article discusses the relationship between vulnerability, sensory perceptions and law in light of the debates on critical legal studies and identity politics. The epistemological question raised by a philosophy of vulnerability calls for law to ‘stay with the trouble’ of discriminatory social practices rather than to search merely for a resolution.
The article starts from the thesis that the concept of humanity is one of the few capable of providing
an overall orientation in contemporary reality. If this is true, then it is necessary to renew the
humanism. To this aim, a brief reconstruction of modern humanism and its predominant anthropological
model is proposed: a model of human ambiguity and finitude, which includes contradictory
characters and is, therefore, far from triumphant or pacifying. On the basis of this
model, the shortcomings of post-humanist positions are highlighted, which do not fully grasp
human finitude. Finally, related to this finitude, the paper deploys a “methodological conservatism”,
that is, the need to recognize the dark and archaic sides of human nature. It is precisely
thanks to such uncomfortable recognition that the ideals of Enlightenment humanism can be
The moral evaluation of actions that disregard climate change, in individual as well as public ethics, is complex. A clear moral judgment itself is difficult to reach in both contexts, as we are far from paradigm moral cases where specific people provoke harm to easily identifiable others. However, for people to seriously engage in climate change mitigation, it has to be clear why it is wrong not to do so. There is therefore a need to frame moral responsibility for anti-environmen-tal behavior using language and concepts that are understandable to a broad public. This paper will argue that the concept of selfishness, properly construed, is the most appropriate tool for describing and morally evaluating human behavior that disregards climate change. A specific consequentialist definition of selfishness will be provided to this purpose. Some objections to framing the environmental decision in this way will be raised in public as well as individual ethics. In the public sphere, moral deliberations are complicated by the conflict between the rights of the present generation and those of future ones. In individual ethics, the inconsequentiality of individual emissions calls into question the very existence of a moral imperative to act pro-envi-ronmentally. The paper will thus investigate the grounds on which we can hold accountable pol-icy makers who refuse to take action on climate change, focusing on the concept of future dis-counting. With regard to the individual dimension, a proposal will be advanced on the basis of a non-superfluous causal contribution to collective-impact cases. In both contexts, the paper will eventually argue that anti-environmental actions can be defined as selfish according to the defini-tion provided.
The essay discusses the relationship between philosophy of law and legal science in the writings of Arnaldo Volpicelli. According to his thought, the search for an ontological dimension of phi-losophy passes through a critique of Benedetto Croce’s and Giorgio Del Vecchio’s scholarships. The definition of gnoseological function of science, on the other hand, takes place through a comparison with Vittorio Emanuele Orlando’s and Santi Romano’s works.