Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is an open access philosophical journal, being published only in an electronic format.
The journal aims at promoting research and reflection, both historically and theoretically, in the field of moral and political philosophy, with no cultural preclusion or adhesion to any cultural current.
Contributions should be submitted in one of these languages: Italian, English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish.
All essays should include an English abstract of max. 200 words.
The editorial staff especially welcomes interdisciplinary contributions with special attention to the main trends of the world of practice.
The journal has an anonymous double peer review referee system.
Three issues per year are expected.
The copyright of the published articles remain to the authors. We ask that in any future use of them Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics be quoted as a source.
All products on this site are released with a Creative Commons license (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 IT) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/it/
ETICA & POLITICA / ETHICS & POLITICS POSITION ON PUBLISHING ETHICS
The Editors of Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics have taken every possible measure to ensure the quality of the material here published and, in particular, they guarantee that peer review at their journal is fair, unbiased and timely, and that all papers have been reviewed by unprejudiced and qualified reviewers. The publication of an article through a peer-review process is intended as an essential feature of any serious scientific community. The decision to accept or reject a paper for publication is based on the paper’s relevance, originality and clarity, the study’s validity and its relevance to the mission of the journal. In order to guarantee the quality of the published papers, the Editors encourage reviewers to provide detailed comments to motivate their decisions. The comments will help the Editorial Board to decide the outcome of the paper, and will help to justify this decision to the author. If the paper is accepted with the request of revision, the comments should guide the author in making the revisions for the final manuscript. All material submitted to the journal remains confidential while under review.
Once the author receives a positive answer, he/she should send the final version of the article since proofs will not be sent to him/her. E&P will publish the paper within twelve months from the moment of the acceptance, and the author will be informed of the publication.
The journal is committed to such standards as originality in research papers, precise references in discussing other scholars’ positions, avoiding plagiarism. E&P takes these standards extremely seriously, because we think that they embody scientific method and are the mark of real scholarly communication.
Since Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is devoted solely to scientific and academic quality, the journal neither has any submission charges nor any article processing charges.
The following guidelines are based on existing Elsevier policies and COPE’s Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors
1. PUBLICATION AND AUTHORSHIP
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, is the publisher of the peer reviewed international journal Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics.
The publication of an article in a peer-reviewed journal is an essential step of a coherent and respected network of knowledge. It is a direct reflection of the quality of the work of the authors and the institutions that support them. Peer-reviewed articles support and embody the scientific method. It is therefore important to agree upon standards of expected ethical behaviour for all parties involved in the act of publishing: the author, the journal editor, the peer reviewer, the publisher.
Authors need to ensure that the submitted article is the work of the submitting author(s) and is not plagiarized, wholly or in part. They must also make sure that the submitted article is original, is not wholly or in part a re-publication of the author’s earlier work, and contains no fraudulent data.
It is also their responsibility to check that all copyrighted material within the article has permission for publication and that material for which the author does not personally hold copyright is not reproduced without permission.
Finally, authors should ensure that the manuscript submitted is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere.
2. AUTHOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is a peer-reviewed journal, and Authors are obliged to participate in our double blind peer review process.
Authors must make sure that all and only the contributors to the article are listed as authors. Authors should also ensure that all authors provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.
3. PEER REVIEW AND REVIEWERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
Both the Referee and the Author remain anonymous throughout the “double blind” review process. Referees are selected according to their expertise in their particular fields.
Referees have a responsibility to be objective in their judgments; to have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, with respect to the authors and/or with respect to the research funders; to point out relevant published work which is not yet cited by the author(s); and to treat the reviewed articles confidentially.
4. EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Editors hold full authority to reject/accept an article; to accept a paper only when reasonably certain; to promote publication of corrections or retractions when errors are found; to preserve anonymity of reviewers; and to have no conflict of interest with respect to articles they reject/accept. If an Editor feels that there is likely to be a perception of a conflict of interest in relation to their handling of a submission, they will declare it to the other Editors. The other Editors will select referees and make all decisions on the paper.
5. PUBLISHING ETHICS ISSUES
Members of the Editorial Board ensure the monitoring and safeguarding of the publishing ethics. This comprises the strict policy on plagiarism and fraudulent data, the strong commitment to publish corrections, clarifications, retractions and apologies when needed, and the strict preclusion of business needs from compromising intellectual and ethical standards.
Whenever it is recognized that a published paper contains a significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or distorted report, it will be corrected promptly. If, after an appropriate investigation, an item proves to be fraudulent, it will be retracted. The retraction will be clearly identifiable to readers and indexing systems.
PAST ISSUE AND STATISTICS
Past issues with download and visitors statistics for each article are provided here: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/handle/10077/4673
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO NAZIONALE / ITALIAN ADVISORY BOARD:
A. Agnelli † (Trieste), A. Allegra (Perugia), G. Alliney (Macerata), S. Amato (Catania), M. Anzalone (Napoli), D. Ardilli (Modena), F. Aronadio (Roma), G. Azzoni (Pavia), F. Bacchini (Sassari), E. Berti (Padova), M. Bettetini (Milano), P. Bettineschi (Venezia), P. Biasetti (Padova), G. Bistagnino (Milano) R. Caporali (Bologna), A.A. Cassi (Bergamo), G. Catapano (Padova), M. Cossutta (Trieste), L. Cova (Trieste), S. Cremaschi (Vercelli), G. Cevolani (Modena), R. Cristin (Trieste), U. Curi (Padova), G. De Anna (Udine), P. Donatelli (Roma), P. Donini (Milano), M. Faraguna (Milano), M. Ferraris (Torino), L. Floridi (Oxford), R. Frega (Bologna), S. Fuselli (Verona), A. Fussi (Pisa), C. Galli (Bologna), R. Giovagnoli (Roma), P. Kobau (Torino), E. Irrera (Bologna), E. Lecaldano (Roma), L.A. Macor (Oxford), E. Manganaro (Trieste), G. Maniaci (Palermo), R. Martinelli (Trieste), F.G. Menga (Tübingen), R. Mordacci (Milano), V. Morfino (Milano), B. de Mori (Padova), M. Pagano (Vercelli), G. Pellegrino (Roma), V. Rasini (Modena-Reggio Emilia), M. Reichlin (Milano), M. Renzo (Stirling), A. Rigobello (Roma), P.A. Rovatti (Trieste), S. Semplici (Roma), A. Schiavello (Palermo), A. Sciumè (Bergamo), M. Sgarbi (Venezia), F. Toto (Roma), F. Trabattoni (Milano), F. Trifirò (London), M.S. Vaccarezza (Genova), C. Vigna (Venezia), P. Vignola (Guayaquil) S. Zeppi † (Trieste).
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO INTERNAZIONALE / INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD:
J. Allan (New Zealand), K. Ballestrem (Germany), T. Bedorf (Germany), G. Betz (Germany), W. Block (USA), M. Byron (USA), S. Chambers (Canada), J. Coleman (UK), C. Cowley (Ireland), W. Edelglass (USA), C.L. Geshekter (USA), A. Kalyvas (USA), J. Kelemen (Hungary), F. Klampfer (Slovenia), M. Knoll (Turkey), C. Illies (Germany), D. Innerarity (Spain), A. Lever (Switzerland), H. Lindahl (Netherlands), J. Marti (Spain), M. Matulovic (Croatia), J. McCormick (USA), N. Miscevic (Croatia), A. Moles (Hungary), L. Paulson (France), A. Przylesbski (Poland), J. Quong (USA) V. Rakic (Serbia), A. Schaap (UK), B. Schultz (USA), N. Tarcov (USA), D. Webb (UK), J.P. Zamora Bonilla (Spain).
REFEREES LIST FOR 2017
B. Accarino (Università di Firenze), A. Altobrando (China University of Politics and Law, Pechino) A. Allegra (Università per Stranieri, Perugia), S. Amato (Università di Catania), P. Bettineschi (Università di Padova), S. Blancu (LUMSA, Roma), M. Ballistreri (Università di Torino), M. Bettetini (IULM, Milano), C. Canullo (Università di Macerata), R. Caporali (Università di Bologna), G. Cevolani (IMT, Lucca), F. Ciaramelli (Università di Napoli, Federico II), A. Cislaghi (Università di Trieste), R. Cristin (Università di Trieste), G. De Anna (Università di Udine), P. Donatelli (Università di Roma, La Sapienza), A. Fabris (Università di Pisa), S. Ferrando (Université de Strasbourg), A. Fussi (Università di Pisa), C. Gerbaz (Università di Rijeka), B. Giovanola (Università di Macerata), G. Grandi (Università di Padova), L. Greco (Università di Oxford), M.L. Lanzillo (Università di Bologna), G. Maniaci (Università di Palermo), R. Martinelli (Università di Trieste), F. Menga (Università di Tubinga), F. Miano (Università di Roma, Tor Vergata), M. Monaldi (Università di Trieste), R. Mordacci (Università San Raffaele, Milano), B. De Mori (Università di Padova), G. Pellegrino (LUISS, Roma), U. Pomarici (Università della Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”), V. Rasini (Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia), C. Rofena (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia), A. Schiavello (Università di Palermo), P. Šustar (Università di Rijeka), M. Trobok (Università di Rijeka), F. Turoldo (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia), M. Vaccarezza (Università di Genova), S. Zanardo (Università Europea di Roma).
The paper suggests a re-reading of the origins of analytic ethics. A certain notion of moral language—which came to be established through the work of G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross—made it easy to undermine problems of normativity and motivation. But on the other hand recent debate on these problems shows a disappearance of the old notion of moral language. There is another line in analytic ethics explored, among others, by I. Murdoch, J. McDowell and C. Diamond which shows an interest both in the problems of the self (reasons and motivation) and in the language of morality.
In this paper I examine the issue of internal and external reasons as it is presented by Bernard Williams. I argue that Williams’ internalism is a convincing answer to the problem of the nature of reasons in ethics, and that it is immune to various externalist objections made by thinkers belonging to different philosophical perspectives, such as Derek Parfit, Christine Korsgaard, and John McDowell.
The paper assumes as a starting point the observation that the word “happiness” seems to be not really interesting within a critical thought. After a short digression on how different languages translate the word “happiness”, the paper focuses on the notion of “being happy” as equivalent to “choose correctly”. This equivalence seems to bring about a re–evaluation of the Greek concept of “daimon”.
The paper is devoted to the concept of deterrence. After a brief review of the conceptual frame-work of the so–called paradox of deterrence, it focuses on the two concepts of ‘integrity in deliberation’ and ‘emotional assets’ in order to show that they are intrinsic part of the description of an agent as rational and thus not in contradiction with the intention to retaliate.
One of the central questions in recent philosophical debate is whether motivation to act comes from cognitive or non-cognitive mental states. This question clearly is distinct from that of what is the meaning of moral sentences. Nevertheless, I think that an understanding of the nature of motivation is essential to an adequate account of moral language. For although not all motivated (and intentional) actions are susceptible to moral assessment, yet every action which is morally judged must be a motivated (as well as an intentional) one. In what follows I will try to defend ethical non-descriptivism by arguing for the internalist conception of motivation on which it is based.
In this paper I want to suggest a possible reading of the recent debate on the analogy between secondary qualities and values. I maintain that the first important effort in using such analogy has been made by John Mackie. His study has influenced all other different attempts to use this analogy. In particular, I examine the dispositional theory of John McDowell and the projectivist theory of Simon Blackburn. Finally I suggest that, although both succeed in facing the sceptical consequences of Mackie’s error theory, the projectivist line seems to be better positioned to explain the variety of features of our moral experience.
The paper critically examines the metaethical position of J.L. Mackie as regards its influences on the recent debate, starting from the so–called error theory, through his treatment of scepticism and queerness. The aim is to clarify how we can assume an antirealistic position in ethics, believ-ing that there are no objective values and that ‘morality has to be invented’, and to evaluate the force of the arguments of Mackie, by focusing the attention on the important – and often ne-glected – influences on his thought of J. Locke, D. Hume and, particularly, E. Westermarck, with his epistemological and anthropological attitude to ethical enquiry.
At least in the past fifty years, supervenience has been an ubiquitous philosophical concept – employed from metaphysics to ethics. The paper focuses on uses of supervenience in the field of ethics. After a brief survey of the classical debate between realists and anti-realists on supervenience (main participants: Hare, Blackburn, Brink and Railton), an account of the view of language involved in supervenience is presented. Relying on such an account, a turning point is placed in the Nineties, when supervenience was either weakened (in authors like Frank Jackson and Russ Shafer-Landau) or definitely discarded (by J. Dancy and J. Griffin). Both moves lead to a new face taken by normative theory, which ceases to revolve around universal principles – or at least it ceases to build universal principles in the traditional way, by generalizing on similar cases.
The thesis defended is that aesthetic experience plays an important role in moral life and that it can contribute to the perfecting of the moral character. For this reason I argue that an appropriate moral theory should offer an account of the characteristics of aesthetic experience and of the relation between ethics and aesthetics. At the end I defend the thesis that a sentimentalistic perspective is in a better position to give an account of this relation.
The paper examines the problem of the relation between subject and truth in Michel Foucault, with special reference to his 1981-2 course at the Collège de France. Here Foucault argues that the connection between truth and knowledge is relatively recent in the history of the relation between subject and truth and Descartes’ s cogito plays an emblematic role in it. The author then argues against Foucault the importance of the Cartesian stance about truth.
When we evaluate actions from the moral point of view, we can do this in two very different ways. We can consider them as morally right or wrong, but we can also judge them morally good or bad. Even though the distinction between right and good is generally recognized by moral philosophers, there is a tendency in contemporary ethics either to oversimplify it or to blur it altogether. Most philosophers focus on motives when they investigate this problem. I will, however, show that there are also other good–making factors and moreover, I will argue that all of them are traits of the agent’s personality. To this aim, I will in Sections (I) to (III) show that the moral worth of actions depends on more than motivation or the agent’s character, and in (IV) I will argue that no factors other than personality traits determine the moral worth of actions.