Esercizi Filosofici 19 (2024)

This paper proposes a method to infer intention from observation and specific theoretical assumptions. This approach is grounded in counterfactual reasoning, similar to that underlying contemporary causal research. Causation is not directly observable, but empirical evidence—experimental or sometimes purely observational data—can support causal hypotheses. We propose extending this framework to formally represent interventions upon causal systems by identifying their intended effects. To achieve this, we introduce the concepts of final model and want-operator.

This article argues that everyday practices provide meaning to actions through intention. Therefore, it explores the concept of practices, analyzing how they can be identified in Wittgenstein’s philosophy and how their fundamental elements are incorporated by Anscombe in the investigation of intentional actions. The nature of intentional action is discussed, emphasizing that it cannot be reduced to a causal relationship between an intention in the mind and an action in the world, nor can it be defined in isolation from action itself. Drawing on concepts such as Lebensformen, language games, and tacit normativity, the paper examines intentional action, its meaning, and its role in the world. Finally, it is argued that intention operates as a tacit rule of action to be followed within a social context, structuring and adjusting action within the practices.

In this special issue, we present contributions that explore the significant influence of G.E.M. Anscombe’s philosophical insights on both philosophy and social science. Anscombe, a leading 20th-century philosopher, extensively addressed topics from metaphysics to morality, playing a key role in reviving Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, she emphasized language analysis and argued that morality should be grounded in human life and practices, rather than abstract principles. This issue highlights how her work, particularly her account of intentional action and her focus on the “grammar” of practical reasoning, offers valuable conceptual resources for analyzing social phenomena. The papers within this issue aim to bridge conceptual analysis with empirical inquiry, stimulating reflection among both philosophers and social scientists on how Anscombe’s thought can inform concrete research.

Anscombe’s article «The Dignity of the Human Being» raises a question typical of science fiction: what would happen if the stage of gestation in the womb were to disappear? According to her, the fact that procreation is no longer organically anchored would mean that the question « to whom does this human belong?» could then be asked in a meaningful way. This article intends to show that the treatment of the hypothesis is exemplary of Anscombe’s reinterpretation of the Wittgensteinian principle that «essence is expressed in grammar». By shifting the question of dignity onto the terrain of grammar, Anscombe outlines what might be called a «practical turn» for dignity. Dignity is understood not by exhibiting theoretical presuppositions, but by knowing that there is an impossible question about the human, a question we should never be able to ask of each other.

This paper examines Anscombe’s theory of promises, especially the new obligation generated from promises. Firstly, I introduce a possible challenge that there are two seemingly contradictory kinds of necessity in her discussion of promises (Section 1). Then, I analyze these two kinds of necessity: the conventional necessity which indicates that the obligation is based on conventions and not naturally intelligible (Section 2); the Aristotelian necessity without which some good cannot be attained (Section 3). At last, I present Anscombe’s notion of “human linguistic practice” and related practical necessity as her answer to this seeming contradiction (Section 4). My aim is to demonstrate how the notion of “human linguistic practice” can be employed to defend the consistency of Anscombe’s theory of promises.

In this paper we apply Anscombe’s account of human linguistic practices and of intentional action in a novel way—to the acts, by members of the Ngāi Tahu tribe in colonial-era Aotearoa New Zealand, of writing Letters to the Editor of local and regional newspapers. We identify the salient contexts of those acts and then draw on Anscombe’s work to identify intentional and moral actions that otherwise risk going unnoticed. Our analysis exemplifies Anscombe’s and Wittgenstein’s view that we can read off intentional action from behaviour in context and also yields a rich historical and conceptual account of the letter-writers. We argue that this approach has theoretical advantages for Indigenous and Postcolonial Studies.

This paper explores the methodological aspects of Elizabeth Anscombe’s The Reality of the Past (RP), arguing that her discussion exemplifies a thoroughly Wittgensteinian approach to philosophical problems. Through a close reading of Anscombe’s paper, I examine how she exposes the philosophical confusion underlying questions concerning the reality of the past by drawing on a particular language-game and demonstrating how our thinking can thus become entangled in misleading analogies. I argue that understanding her methodological stance sheds light on Anscombe’s conception of the nature of philosophical investigation and clarifies the role of conceptual analysis in addressing seemingly profound problems.

In this paper, I will focus on the notion of relational practices starting from the analysis of some of G.E.M. Anscombe’s contributions. The aim is to provide a broader and clearer framework of the concept of relationality and its grammar, moving from Anscombe’s philosophical approach. The goal is to discuss the notion of relationality, beginning by dialoging with a selection of recent literature on the author. According to the perspective of this study, a reading of the author oriented from a relational point of view provides tools to investigate the theme of relationality and broadens its understanding within the human form of life. This proposal aims to provide an introduction to this subject and is committed to providing a conceptual framework for it to be further discussed. Of particular interest is the introduction, starting from this Anscombean framework, of the notion of shadow-implications linked to that of relationality. I will start by introducing Anscombe’s grammatical method, discussing a selection of recent literature (1 and 1.1), and then I will discuss it concerning Anscombe’s On Brute Facts (2). Next, I will focus on the kind of background that is at stake (2.1), the way we learn a concept (2.2), and the context of our institutions (2.3). Following, I will attempt to examine the notion of relational practices (3) regarding the relationship between the different descriptions of our actions (3.1), the possible answers to the question Why? (3.2), and the risks related to the relational dimension, i.e., its shadow-implications (3.3).

The normative approach to Milgram’s experiment argues that participants do not obey because of submission to authority, but because they are following explicit and previously justified rules. However, this approach remains theoretically ambiguous and empirically imprecise, due to a confused use of the concept of normative necessity. In this article, I draw on Anscombe’s account of practice to clarify this concept and to develop a more precise interpretation of the subjects’ behavior within Milgram’s experimental framework.

Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Aristotle for his failure to account for the person who forms a perfectly clear-headed akratic intention, and yet she agrees with him that the weak-willed do not make what he calls a ‘choice’. She concludes that akratic intentions are not rational, for an intention is rational only when it is conducive to or a part of what one ‘regards as doing well’. Based on the ‘brute facts’ of practice that provide the ‘context of normal procedure’ for human action, akrasia is simply an error in practical reasoning. However, Anscombe also assumes that intentions are analogous to orders, but if they have the same mode of operation then, as I shall try to show, the intention to φ is rational insofar as there is a binding reason to φ and one is trying to get φ, regardless of whether there are more important reasons (or intentions) to ¬φ. Hence, an akratic intention is rational, and a valid feature of everyday practice.