Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is an open access philosophical journal, being published only in an electronic format.
The journal aims at promoting research and reflection, both historically and theoretically, in the field of moral and political philosophy, with no cultural preclusion or adhesion to any cultural current.
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1. PUBLICATION AND AUTHORSHIP
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, is the publisher of the peer reviewed international journal Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics.
The publication of an article in a peer-reviewed journal is an essential step of a coherent and respected network of knowledge. It is a direct reflection of the quality of the work of the authors and the institutions that support them. Peer-reviewed articles support and embody the scientific method. It is therefore important to agree upon standards of expected ethical behaviour for all parties involved in the act of publishing: the author, the journal editor, the peer reviewer, the publisher.
Authors need to ensure that the submitted article is the work of the submitting author(s) and is not plagiarized, wholly or in part. They must also make sure that the submitted article is original, is not wholly or in part a re-publication of the author’s earlier work, and contains no fraudulent data.
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Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics is a peer-reviewed journal, and Authors are obliged to participate in our double blind peer review process.
Authors must make sure that all and only the contributors to the article are listed as authors. Authors should also ensure that all authors provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.
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Past issues with download and visitors statistics for each article are provided here: http://www.openstarts.units.it/dspace/handle/10077/4673
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO NAZIONALE / ITALIAN ADVISORY BOARD:
A. Agnelli † (Trieste), A. Allegra (Perugia), G. Alliney (Macerata), S. Amato (Catania), M. Anzalone (Napoli), D. Ardilli (Modena), F. Aronadio (Roma), G. Azzoni (Pavia), F. Bacchini (Sassari), E. Berti (Padova), M. Bettetini (Milano), P. Bettineschi (Venezia), P. Biasetti (Padova), G. Bistagnino (Milano) R. Caporali (Bologna), A.A. Cassi (Bergamo), G. Catapano (Padova), M. Cossutta (Trieste), L. Cova (Trieste), S. Cremaschi (Vercelli), G. Cevolani (Modena), R. Cristin (Trieste), U. Curi (Padova), G. De Anna (Udine), P. Donatelli (Roma), P. Donini (Milano), M. Faraguna (Milano), M. Ferraris (Torino), L. Floridi (Oxford), R. Frega (Bologna), S. Fuselli (Verona), A. Fussi (Pisa), C. Galli (Bologna), R. Giovagnoli (Roma), P. Kobau (Torino), E. Irrera (Bologna), E. Lecaldano (Roma), L.A. Macor (Oxford), E. Manganaro (Trieste), G. Maniaci (Palermo), R. Martinelli (Trieste), F.G. Menga (Tübingen), R. Mordacci (Milano), V. Morfino (Milano), B. de Mori (Padova), M. Pagano (Vercelli), G. Pellegrino (Roma), V. Rasini (Modena-Reggio Emilia), M. Reichlin (Milano), M. Renzo (Stirling), A. Rigobello (Roma), P.A. Rovatti (Trieste), S. Semplici (Roma), A. Schiavello (Palermo), A. Sciumè (Bergamo), M. Sgarbi (Venezia), F. Toto (Roma), F. Trabattoni (Milano), F. Trifirò (London), M.S. Vaccarezza (Genova), C. Vigna (Venezia), P. Vignola (Guayaquil) S. Zeppi † (Trieste).
COMITATO SCIENTIFICO INTERNAZIONALE / INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD:
J. Allan (New Zealand), K. Ballestrem (Germany), T. Bedorf (Germany), G. Betz (Germany), W. Block (USA), M. Byron (USA), S. Chambers (Canada), J. Coleman (UK), C. Cowley (Ireland), W. Edelglass (USA), C.L. Geshekter (USA), A. Kalyvas (USA), J. Kelemen (Hungary), F. Klampfer (Slovenia), M. Knoll (Turkey), C. Illies (Germany), D. Innerarity (Spain), A. Lever (Switzerland), H. Lindahl (Netherlands), J. Marti (Spain), M. Matulovic (Croatia), J. McCormick (USA), N. Miscevic (Croatia), A. Moles (Hungary), L. Paulson (France), A. Przylesbski (Poland), J. Quong (USA) V. Rakic (Serbia), A. Schaap (UK), B. Schultz (USA), N. Tarcov (USA), D. Webb (UK), J.P. Zamora Bonilla (Spain).
REFEREES LIST FOR 2017
B. Accarino (Università di Firenze), A. Altobrando (China University of Politics and Law, Pechino) A. Allegra (Università per Stranieri, Perugia), S. Amato (Università di Catania), P. Bettineschi (Università di Padova), S. Blancu (LUMSA, Roma), M. Ballistreri (Università di Torino), M. Bettetini (IULM, Milano), C. Canullo (Università di Macerata), R. Caporali (Università di Bologna), G. Cevolani (IMT, Lucca), F. Ciaramelli (Università di Napoli, Federico II), A. Cislaghi (Università di Trieste), R. Cristin (Università di Trieste), G. De Anna (Università di Udine), P. Donatelli (Università di Roma, La Sapienza), A. Fabris (Università di Pisa), S. Ferrando (Université de Strasbourg), A. Fussi (Università di Pisa), C. Gerbaz (Università di Rijeka), B. Giovanola (Università di Macerata), G. Grandi (Università di Padova), L. Greco (Università di Oxford), M.L. Lanzillo (Università di Bologna), G. Maniaci (Università di Palermo), R. Martinelli (Università di Trieste), F. Menga (Università di Tubinga), F. Miano (Università di Roma, Tor Vergata), M. Monaldi (Università di Trieste), R. Mordacci (Università San Raffaele, Milano), B. De Mori (Università di Padova), G. Pellegrino (LUISS, Roma), U. Pomarici (Università della Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”), V. Rasini (Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia), C. Rofena (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia), A. Schiavello (Università di Palermo), P. Šustar (Università di Rijeka), M. Trobok (Università di Rijeka), F. Turoldo (Università Ca’ Foscari, Venezia), M. Vaccarezza (Università di Genova), S. Zanardo (Università Europea di Roma).
The first part of the volume addresses the issue of speculative procedure in Hegel's philos-ophy and the role played by mediation and the negative within such a process. The volume proceeds by debating the reach of the influence of Greek thought in Hegel, as well as the legacy of Jusnaturalistic modern thought. In its final part, the volume provides a reflection on the issue of social classes.
I wish to present the reader with some clarifications concerning the essays here pre-sented. They are in a conceptual history perspective and focus on Hegelian texts in order to show that it is possible to find in them an Aufhebung not only of sover-eignty but also of those modern concepts from which it stemmed. Such overcoming clearly shows in the concept of constitution as an articulated and plural totality. The essays also try to clarify the role of philosophy for society, also in relation to social sciences. If the debate may be summarized in the formula “through Hegel, beyond Hegel”, the horizon which thus opens up in the present time may be de-scribed as a new federalism.
The article examines the concept of “truly realized abstraction” in the reflection of Marx on “the scientifically correct method”, on distinction between “simple categories” and “concrete categories”, and on “reproduction”. The author tries to draw attention about “Finelli’s Marxism of abstraction” as a type of “humanism”. He reads the ‘Marxism of abstraction ’ through the analysis (shared by the author of the paper) of "financial capitalism", that today damages labour, industry and personal property.
Sidgwick believed that, when impartial reasons conflict with self-interested reasons, there are no truths about their relative strength. There are such truths, I claim, but these truths are imprecise. Many self-interested reasons are decisively outweighed by conflicting impar-tial moral reasons. But we often have sufficient self-interested reasons to do what would make things go worse, and we sometimes have sufficient self-interested reasons to act wrongly. If we reject Act Consequentialism, we may have to admit that we sometimes have sufficient or even decisive impartial reasons to act wrongly. But these are early days. We may be able to resolve some of these disagreements.
In this response to the essays by Crisp, Parfit, Hooker and Nakano-Okuno on our The Point of View of the Universe, we focus on the following topics: whether egoism is more susceptible to an evolutionary debunking argument than universal benevolence; our defence of impartial rationalism; wide and narrow definitions of “ethics”; the role of moral rules; the extension of ethics to all sentient beings; how best to define and understand pleasure as an intrinsic value; and whether Ross’s ethic of prima facie duties is as defensible as utilitarianism.
The present article addresses the question of the relationship between the Constitution of the State and the freedom of the individual in the light of the recent book by professor Giuseppe Duso Libertà e Costituzione in Hegel, an essay regarding Hegel’s political think-ing and particularly on his Philosophy of Right. By trying to sum up Hegel’s complex ar-gument about sovereignty and government, this article aims to highlight an historical and theoretical problem: with the end of the Jus Publicum Europaeum something has changed in the conceiving of the relation between State and civil society. It seems nowadays very hard to figure out government without sovereignty because of the difficult to imagine a po-litical functioning within the “totality” brought about by the age of globalization and by the crisis of the national States.
I very appreciate the analysis conducted by Roberto Finelli on Marx’s textes, but I have some doubts regarding the total horizon that Finelli promises: the accomplished “abstraction” (as “dematerialisation”) that Marx had prophesied. In this paper I try to explain why I don’t think that Marx was a prophet; I don’t think that the world (and the capitalistic production) has become immaterial; I don’t think that the main problem is a “catastrophe of emotion”…
Modernity is a very complex term, which needs great precision in the definition of its meaning. My point is that Hegel plays a major role in the transformation of modernity in post-Enlightment, but he IS also working with very traditional concepts like Stände, Polizei and so on. This represents an objective limit of his science of government, which cannot be intended as a persistent model for the democratic State-building in the 19th and 20th cen-tury. From a philosophical point of view however his idea of sovereignity and representation could be useful for us today in order to imagine a new idea of political obligation. For doing so, we need an extreme effort to elaborate and achieve a new standard of modernity, perhaps no longer based on the liberal items of individualism, representation and formal constitution. We need to discover a new measure for men and women which can coexist with the growing reality of globalization and human interchange. We can of course call it federalism, as a combination of different measures in private and public life, not only as a rule of law but with the sociological implications put forward for instance by Emile Durkheim and Léon Duguit. An answer could possibly come from a reinterpretation of a political structure that also Hegel had known very well: administration, toward an administrative federalism.
This essay concentrates on the ideal dialogue that Hegel engages with Montesquieu in his Philosophy of Right focusing in particular on the relevance for Hegel of concepts such as the “spirit of a people” and of “manners” and customs discussed in the Esprit des Lois. Ac-cording to Hegel, Montesquieu provided a real philosophical understanding of the history of people's laws and institutions considering them as necessary relationships within a his-torically determined society, that is as the whole set of its objective ways of being.
The paper discusses the philosophical perspective developed by Giuseppe Duso in his latest book, Libertà e costituzione in Hegel. Taking distance from some recent interpretations of Hegel that see in his Philosophy of Law a prefiguration of social theory and sociology, Duso shows the internal need for a dialectical reading of Hegelian thought, as the only condition enabling us to grasp its critical dimension, in particular with regard to the cen-tral concepts and main institutions of modernity, as well as its irreducible nature both to normative political philosophy and to socio-historical empirical sciences. In this framework, the essay focuses on the analysis of the two principal issues in which the Hegelian challenge launched by Duso comes to light: the epistemological primacy of philosophy for an understanding of the reality of human relations and the ontological privilege of a differently conceived State as the level in which the socio-political totality constituted by such relations actually emerges and from which the full achievement of modern autonomy becomes properly thinkable. Addressing the question of democracy, understood as a form of political socie-ty taken in a historical process of self-transformation, the essay then tries to measure the strength and the limits of Hegel's political philosophy, which finally appears as an alternative to the social sciences.
The following text is a part of an article that Vittorio Morfino has dedicated to Marx’s in-terpretations in Italy in the beginning of this century. It focuses on the originality of Fi-nelli’s reading.
This article discusses Roberto Finelli’s latest book ("An accomplished patricide. Marx's fi-nal confrontation with Hegel") by focusing in particular on the theme of individuality. First-ly, it reconstructs the different role played by this theme in the thought of Hegel and Feu-erbach as well as in Marx's early and late writings. Secondly, it highlights an important theoretical tension that, in relation to the question of individuality, potentially jeopardizes Finelli's discourse and its coherence. Is individuality independent from social relation or is it established by the relationship itself? In the former case, how can the abstraction of capi-tal be considered "real"? And in the latter, how is it possible to think the individual's re-sistance to this abstraction?
The author explores the nature and foundation of human rights through the analysis of po-litical conceptions, which focus on the rule playing by human rights on political authority actions, and naturalists (or orthodox) conceptions, which consider human rights those rights that each human has simply in virtue of his humanity.
The intervention discusses Roberto Finelli’s last book, An accomplished patricide. Marx's final confrontation with Hegel, following the structure of the book. I agree with Finelli that the early Marx is somehow compromised with Feuerbach’s Gattung; at the same time, a ‘backward’ reading of Marx reveals that some key notions of the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts reappear in different form in the Grundrisse as well as in Capital. My comment then focuses on the confusions and indeterminacies plaguing Finelli’s refer-ence to Arbeits-kraft, ‘labour-power’. Dealing with abstract labour, I show that Finelli’s in-terpretation is defective because he never considers the dimension of the collective worker, and because his view of abstract labour too often reduces it to simple labour, increasingly devoid of skills. To move beyond Finelli’s limits we need to consider the processual consti-tution of capitalist reality, and to distinguish carefully the eventual validation of private la-bours on the market from the immediate socialisation of collective labour going on within the immediate production process. In my opinion, the failure of Finelli’s dual Parricide is a reminder of the need to move forward towards a re-reading of Marx’s abstract value theory of labour as a macro-monetary theory of capitalist production.
While parties play a fundamental role within democratic systems, from a normative perspective providing a justification of parties and partisanship is all but obvious. According to this anti-partisan approach, parties and partisanship cannot be considered fully legitimate because they polarize political debates, create ideological divisions that cannot be respect-fully composed within democratic decision-making, and aim at defeating their enemies in-stead of striving for the common good. This anti-partisan perspective has been reinforced by the deliberative framework, according to which citizens should ground their claims in publicly justifiable arguments, assess political proposals on their merits, and critically dis-cuss with one another so as to identify what is best for the polity. The ideal political actors, according to this view, are independents, not partisans. In the past few years various scholars challenged this idea by holding that it does not distinguish partisanship from factional-ism. While the latter cannot be considered legitimate, the former ensures that citizens are motivated to exercise their political agency and grants discursive conditions that are necessary to publicly justify collective decisions. In this paper I will consider this defence of party spirits and claim that while it is undeniable that partisanship performs motivational and justificatory functions that are necessary for the proper working of a democratic system, it requires an account of political justification that is not compatible with traditional interpretations of deliberative ideal.
In this essay I discuss one of the objections raised by David Enoch in his recent Against Public Reason. According to Enoch, public-reason theorists misinterpret the role that rea-sons for the action play in the political sphere. Treating the most deeply held beliefs as mere preferences, public-reason theorists end up supporting a paternalistic view that vio-lates people’s freedom and equality. In this essay I try to dismiss this charge, without de-fending the idea of public reason.
The essay is divided into six parts. §1 introduces the problem with an example. §2 lays out the general idea of public reason. §3 illustrates Enoch’s objection. §4 briefly introduces standard responses to the objection and Enoch’s possible counter-arguments. §5, with the help of some formalization, explains how non-public reasons work, addresses Enoch’s ob-jection, and present some doubt on the idea of public reason. §6 concludes.