Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2019) XXI/2

Supererogatory acts, as moral acts that go beyond duty, problematise the notions of obligation and autonomy within such impartialist ethical accounts such as Kantianism and utilitarianism which opt to reduce and assimilate supererogation as a result. Bernard Williams’s conception of a moral incapacity challenges the claim that cost to the moral agent, and consequently, autonomy, are necessary to conceptualise supererogation. I extend this finding by adapting Craig Taylor’s idea of a primitive moral response as an attitude that can ground supererogation. However, because such a primitive response is too self-regarding, I argue for a reinscription of such an attitude in terms of a Levinasian moral response. Such a response relies on a reconsidered autonomy that is grounded in the alterity of the Other, but which is incessantly corrected by the presence of the third party to the face to face encounter. I argue for an understanding of such an incessant correction in terms of a Levinasian normativity which as a provisional imperative, can also be thought of as an attitude. I claim that Levinasian normativity is supererogatory and that supererogation can also be reconceptualised as the possibility of sacrifice rather than actual sacrifice.

The last book of Carmine Di Martino, Viventi umani e non umani, focuses on some important questions about relations between human being and animals, and it suggests some reflections about philosophy and “anthropological difference”. Furthermore, the reception of recent discoveries in paleontology and physical anthropology gives a special value to darwinian theories and supports the idea of a casual development of man; language, technical ability and culture are not a “special gift” expressly created for human being, but the result of a natural evolution.The last book of Carmine Di Martino, Viventi umani e non umani, focuses on some important questions about relations between human being and animals, and it suggests some reflections about philosophy and “anthropological difference”. Furthermore, the reception of recent discoveries in paleontology and physical anthropology gives a special value to darwinian theories and supports the idea of a casual development of man; language, technical ability and culture are not a “special gift” expressly created for human being, but the result of a natural evolution.

This contribution explores the concept of Human in Simone Weil, starting from the perspective given by the theme of the Animal. The distinction between Human and Animal initiates a series of reflections. The first one deals with the necessity of leaving the aspect of appropriation, which is proper to the need, and instead having access to the transcendent dimension of the desire. A further detachment from the notion of Animal takes place through the assumption of affliction (malheur). The possibility to consent to malheur is the key not only to the ethical sphere of compassion, but also to the cognitive faculty of attention. These successive passages are summarized, in Weil's last writings, as a movement that goes beyond the person and the community, towards the impersonal (impersonnel), perhaps the most original outcome of Weilian anthropology.This contribution explores the concept of Human in Simone Weil, starting from the perspective given by the theme of the Animal. The distinction between Human and Animal initiates a series of reflections. The first one deals with the necessity of leaving the aspect of appropriation, which is proper to the need, and instead having access to the transcendent dimension of the desire. A further detachment from the notion of Animal takes place through the assumption of affliction (malheur). The possibility to consent to malheur is the key not only to the ethical sphere of compassion, but also to the cognitive faculty of attention. These successive passages are summarized, in Weil's last writings, as a movement that goes beyond the person and the community, towards the impersonal (impersonnel), perhaps the most original outcome of Weilian anthropology.

The aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explainThe aim of this paper is to draw the attention of political theorists to the once popular and today too much neglected role of character in fashioning democratic politics. I do this through a discussion of what I consider the two most promising contemporary approaches: the republican theory of civic virtues and the pragmatist theory of democratic habits. My claim is that habits, more than virtues, provide a promising starting point for enriching our understanding of democracy. The paper proceeds as follows. After having clarified the philosophical grammars of virtues and habits and their stakes, I discuss at some length the republican theory of civic virtues, distinguishing its two main branches, the neo-Athenian and the neo-Roman, and showing that both run into significant theoretical troubles. I then proceed to examine the pragmatist account of political habits and show that it proves more successful than republican virtues in explain

This paper will show how the normalization of the forms of life that governs the political anthropology of Aristotle leads to a naturalization of the social hierarchies typical of the polis of his time. Toward this end, the first part of this paper highlights how in the Politics, the realization of the rational-political nature of Man implies the necessary declension of life (zoe) toward the living well (eu zen) of the polis. Subsequently, the paper will focus on how this living well, which characterizes the political form of life (bios politikos), relates to the condition of autarkeia, conceived by Aristotle not so much in the sense of economic and material or juridical and political selfsufficiency, but rather as the teleological realization of human nature. Finally, we will show that in the Nicomachean Ethics the Stagirite conceives of the nexus between the autarkeia and happiness and the living well as an ontological prerogative exclusive to the good man (spoudaios), thereby justifying his anthropological and moral superiority over other naturally subaltern forms of life.

We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.We assume that the sense of being human involves our critical attitude of reasoning, but when we come across the roots of this capability, we get lost in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, neurobiology and ethics. Nowadays, the expression “debunking fake news” is the practice of calling into question or denying false, exaggerated or unscientific statements. In accordance with that definition of debunking, is it possible to debunk fake humanities? And, above all, which are the fake humanities we are referring to? Our proposal aims to discuss this foundation of common reasoning – which relies on the “human measure” - through ancient myths and the idea of Metamorphoses, that the Roman poet Ovid delivered to us in his poem as a kind of predisposition to debunking; then moving forward in the article, we will look through the hermeneutic lens of one of the latest debates between the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the neuroscientist Jean Pierre Changeaux about human being’s identity, which will help us to engage critically the ethical aspects of upcoming metamorphoses such as Robotics.

The paper is focused on the following philosophical issues discussed by Paolo Bettineschi in his book entitled L’oggetto buono dell’io. Etica e filosofia delle relazioni oggettuali: the transcendental structure of thinking and desire; subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the good and the right; hospitality and rejection. It also suggests an analogy between the ethics of restoration and the restorative justice theory.

The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.The essay discusses the genealogy of the human being proposed by Carmine di Martino. This genealogy applies phenomenology to anthropological "autobiography", that is, to the natural history of man written by the sciences. The reference to the autobiographical and evolutionary account of ourselves is red in the essay as a kind of Bildungsroman, the novel of formation or “coming-of-age story” that tells how one becomes a person, overcoming the conflict between the individual and society, nature and freedom. Through this comparison considerations are made on the difference between scientific anthropology and philosophical anthropology regarding how we became ourselves. In this context some critical remarks on Di Martino's genealogy are outlined and in particular on the absolute primacy of language to understand human phenomena.

In this paper, I reply to the objections and solicitations of the critics who intervened in the symposium on my book L’oggetto buono dell’Io. In this way, I return to discuss some fundamental concepts of the Philosophy of Object Relations, and some theses of its Ethics of Reparation. In doing so, I try to defend and develop some of the most relevant arguments of that complex theory

The essay discusses the similarites between first and second humanism (in the 15th and 18th century respectively), analyses the causes of both their differences and the collapse of the whole humanistic tradition in the 20th century, and investigates which philosophical presuppositions a possible resurgence of the humanistic tradition will have to satisfy.

This paper tackles Hegel’s approach to poverty in his philosophy of right. I claim first that Hegel’s account of pauperism diverges from the analysis addressed by the economic school of classic liberalism, which authors as Smith and Kant belong to. Second, I display Hegel’s account of the destructing effects that misery has over the self-esteem of the subject and her links with the political community. Finally, I tackle the ethical mediation that the corporation furnishes as solution of the dilemma that pauperism brings about for completely materializing the ethical idea, highlighting some problems that this claim shows in Hegel’s time as in our time.

Animal welfare is an important concern in modern society. The most common ethical underpinning of animal welfare is the concept of sentience. However, there is no agreement yet on the definition of sentience and on which features are essential for a species to be classified as sentient. Unsurprisingly, hot debates flare up periodically about whether a certain species could be considered as sentient and thus on whether its welfare should be granted. In the present paper, we outline the repetitive tendency of such debates, using fish and arthropods as an example. Up to now, these debates tend to end with the vast majority of researchers either recognising sentience in the target species or advising the use of the precautionary principle and thus tentatively act as if the species is sentient in order to take decisions regarding its welfare status. The debate then usually moves to a species progressively less similar to humans and the cycle of the ‘sliding scale’ begins anew. In view of this tendency, we discuss whether it would be advisable to reject the idea of a sliding scale when welfare relevant decisions are at stake.

The essay inquiries about the notion of law in Montesquieu’s work considered in its relationship with the larger theme of regulation. For the full understanding of the notion of law, connected with the other fundamental concepts of Montesquieu’s political thought (custom, institution, government), we have to start from the problem of regulation in society, taking in consideration the production process of an order and the experience of violation of the rule. In this way, even before being the expression of a legitimate command, the law shows an originally operational character.

The author proposes a model of pathology in ethics that focuses on domination, a model according to which the ‘capital sin’ in ethics consists in denying the infinity of the human being. Its limits are highlighted and a different but complementary model is proposed: the narcissistic model, whose pathological nucleus consists in denying the finite of the human being.

The essay by Paolo Bettineschi is opposed to a thought that consumes its own presuppositions, and argues for the benefit of the testimony of a truth to which thought tends as the stable end of its fulfillment. My comment praises the emphasis on the emancipatory and non-oppressive force of a vertical truth, excessive and further rather than horizontal and immanent. I article then a Lacanian interpretation of anguish, which is not connected to the absence of an object and therefore to the processes of symbolic work. On the contrary, anguish is read, through Kierkegaardian lenses, as the announcement of a gap in the symbolic enclosure and as the irruption of an exceptional moment in the normal syntax of the law. Along this path, the need for stability of presence is undermined by a new life that arises from the loss of fullness.

Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.Which do we conceptualize like Human in opposition to non Human? The institution of “large shares” or “The Great Divide”, in terms of categories between the Human one and the non Human one, is far from to be always established in various times and Human spaces, such as we generally think it. This apparently natural institution, even expresses, appears after examination much less obviates that we thought it traditionally. For this reason, it constitutes an object of intellectual investigations of choice for many traditional knowledge such anthropology, the history, philosophy, theology, but also for the whole of contemporary sciences. Because, this category institution questions the identity even the EC what we indicate like human, and consequently, like nonhuman. Indeed, about what and which precisely speak us when it is question of Human or the Human ones, about humanity in generic term? What do we seek to describe and qualify under the registers of Human and non Human? Which are the non Human, of the binarism category ones presupposed which institute the registers of conceptual dualism Human/humanity/inhumanity? What do we seek to think in the idea of one “beyond the human one”, which the latter institutes a differentialism between the beings or entities or contrary, seeks with the indifférencier as in certain news of anthropology who challenges any anthropocentrée & humanistic design? Most traditional definitions tend to affirm that this we claim to conceptualize & to subsume under the concept of “Human” constitutes something like a certain exception in the order of the alive one. What is it exactly of this alleged “human exception”? What does it recover precisely? In addition, to answer the interrogation: “That are the non Human ones and which is the human ones? ”, does not have anything manifesto apart from this we can crudely observe and who allows us to or not retain, more or less, certain features of appearance and the behavior. We could also answer in a provocative and relativistic way: “With each one its Human and its non Human, its humanity and its nonhumanity”, according to the configurations which we institute to return account of the whole of the interactions that we let us have or not with our multiple, material & immaterial, visible & invisible environments! There thus do not exist standards which would tend in manner more or less final and universal to govern the uses category of Human and of the Human one. For these reasons, the challenge of our short communication will be to expose presupposed and reasons of such an interest category, conceptual and descriptive fundamentally Human for the non Human one which gives an account of the multiple forms of the institution of human the versus the nonhuman one, while founding, in addition, a whole range of beings or of entities going from the one with the other, thus questioning the imaginary and real bases of our multidimensional assignments in category terms, of identity, anybody, cognitive faculties, various heritages, sensitivity, etc.

Paolo Bettineschi’s ‘objects relations philosophy’ has its foundation in the concept of I, understood as an infinite horizon of intentionality, and in that of recognition of the others as ‘I’. This paper shows the limits of a certain understanding of the I and the difficulties raised by the question of intersubjectivity.

Martha Nussbaum’s recent engagement with ecological issues and her project of creating the list of animal capabilities attests to her growing interest in developing a non-anthropocentric philosophy. In her recent article “What Does it mean to be Human – Don’t Ask”, 1 published in NY Times (August 2018), she raises the problematic of anthropocentric thought. According to her, the question itself is a problem and it exposes human being's profound narcissism. She thus calls to cease such questioning. This paper, while recognizing Nussbaum’s contribution in exposing that the way we ask the question about the human being already discloses our understanding of being a human being, attempts at analyzing the problematic in Nussbaum’s call. More specifically, the thesis guiding this article is that the reflection on ecological, social, and political issues cannot exist without the reflection on the human being and his/her place in the world.Martha Nussbaum’s recent engagement with ecological issues and her project of creating the list of animal capabilities attests to her growing interest in developing a non-anthropocentric philosophy. In her recent article “What Does it mean to be Human – Don’t Ask”, 1 published in NY Times (August 2018), she raises the problematic of anthropocentric thought. According to her, the question itself is a problem and it exposes human being's profound narcissism. She thus calls to cease such questioning. This paper, while recognizing Nussbaum’s contribution in exposing that the way we ask the question about the human being already discloses our understanding of being a human being, attempts at analyzing the problematic in Nussbaum’s call. More specifically, the thesis guiding this article is that the reflection on ecological, social, and political issues cannot exist without the reflection on the human being and his/her place in the world.