7. Prospettive sulla Politica di Aristotele

This article explores the ethical dimensions of European Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) through the lens of Aristotelian philosophy, emphasizing its significance for European integration. It critiques the European Union's approach to CBC, which traditionally emphasizes economic and political advantages, advocating instead for a deeper incorporation of ethical values. Drawing on Aristotle's concepts of justice, friendship, and the common good, the article argues for a CBC that goes beyond mere economic collaboration, fostering a genuine sense of community and enhancing regional interactions and integration. By embedding these ethical considerations, CBC can profoundly impact the quality and sustainability of inter-regional relationships within the EU.

This contribution aims to outline the physiognomy that economics and chrematistics take on in Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotelian Politics. By carrying out an investigation which from an epistemological level aims to recover, as a founding moment, the ontology of the economic, a clear distinction is made between economics and chrematistics, the latter being auxiliary not only to economics but also to politics. In the Thomasian vision, based on the Aristotelian treatment of the topics in question carried out in Book I of Politics, the economy, being ontologically related to human action and its principles, is qualified as ars oeconomica and as prudentia oeconomica; in this way, on the one hand it manifests a direct connection to the intelligence of the government and a clear orientation towards the achievement of the natural purposes of the family and the community, on the other, it reveals its own specific ethical status. It follows that, from this perspective, as it is a chapter of human action, the economy (art and prudence) is governed by the principle of finality and the criterion of integrity. The acts that pertain to it, if duly ordered, are a good and aim at the good.

This paper deals with the worship of the gods in Aristotle’s Politics. Relevant passages are examined with a focus on interpretative problems, highlighting the interweaving of perspectives and the comparison with other Aristotelian works. The following topics will be discussed: the places and the expenses of worship; the definition of priesthood; whether or not priests belong to the category of magistrates; worship in democracy and monarchy; a medical-religious prescription for pregnant women.

This chapter addresses some relations among Aristotle's views on elections and political stasis, and his claims on the political relevance of music. Aristotle claims that election campaigns are forms of demagoguery and corrupt the political process by promoting candidates who offer voters personal benefits rather than serving the common good. Similarly, Aristotle sees the splitting of a city in political parties as a negative sign of stasis. These judgements challenge our contemporary sensitivities: Aristotle takes politics to aim at happiness and virtue, whereas to the modern mind politics is about creating the material preconditions for happiness, which anyone is then free to interpret as one pleases. This distinction has consequences about the political role of music: Aristotle takes music to be crucial in forming virtues by influencing emotions. By contract, modernity has forgotten the educational and political significance of music. Unchallenged by political considerations, modern Western music has focused on the equal tempered scale and the dominance of the piano, which allowed complex harmonies and continuous innovation. Modern Western music's emphasis on novelty and shocking effects triggers passions and emotions which are not congenial for the search of the common good. Traditional Indian music can offer a telling counterexample of Western music in the contemporary world. Aristotle’s remarks on music's power over emotions suggest ways to maintain balance and virtue in public life.

The aim of the paper is to shed light on the difference between two Aristotelian notions of the just by nature, one is to be found in the Nicomachean Ethics, the other in the Magna Moralia. I shall concentrate on the definitions because they seem to be the core of their divergence. Without any commitment to authorship one has to see that the account in Magna Moralia differs in two important points. First, in general, as a virtue justice contains a non-rational element, a certain kind of impulse (ὁρμή). It is a non-rational force that constitutes natural virtue. In order to become complete virtue such as justice it has to embrace reason and choice as well. Second, natural justice is established by usage. If a custom or habit has become settled it turns into a part of our nature or character and therefore actions based on such intentions can rightly be called actions in accordance with natural justice.