This paper treats some of the implications rising from neuroscience outcomes on the philosophical debate about free will. From a physicalist point of view (§1), I will first define the concepts of free will and determinism (§2) and then explain why the latter is a threat for freedom (§3). If we exercise our free will by our brain, then, I think, there are indeed two conflicting hypothesis. On the one side, if determinism is true, then freedom is an illusion. On the other side, if indeterminism is true, then freedom is a mystery (§4). As I will try to show, the first hypothesis seems to be the most plausible (§5). In conclusion, I will examine the theories supporting free will (§6) and also the sceptical critiques to them (§7). If there are not alternatives to physicalism, then the theoretical difficulties of libertarianism and compatibilism, together with neurosciences outcomes, lead us to embrace the sceptical positions about freedom.
The concept of Ereignis (enowning) is apt to be detected as the thread running through the transformative turn (Kehre) that marks the passage between Heidegger’s Being and Time and Contributions (Beiträge zur Philosophie). In the latter work, Ereignis is thought as the “other beginning” whose starting point, i.e. alétheia, was concealed in the “first beginning”. Since the truth of be-ing is thought as enowing, the grounding question develops as such into the relation between enowning, be-ing and being-t/here. This is considered in turn as a rhythmical movement from side to side, a swaying that brings to light the mutual need and turning of being-t/here and be-ing. The enowning is a disposing movement in which what is disposed is also enowned to the Ereignis and established as its own property. The grounding question entails the space-time problems in order to explain this triple relationship, since it shows that only an abysmal Ground, i.e. a groundless ground, is able to establish authentically the self-giving of the truth of be-ing, as it is really suitable for a t/here who knows its being enowned to and by the Ereignis.
The paper examines the problem of translation in Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. He observes an antinomic structure in translation, whose poles are translatability and untranslatability, necessity and impossibility of translation, fidelity and treason, sharing an universal language and exclusivity of the singular idiom. Derrida underlines also an economy of translation, a practical exchange between what is one’s own and the other’s, between words of different languages. But since a perfect equivalence is impossible, translation happens only as a gift, as an unexpected and unconditioned event. Translation is a gift that puts in motion the process of writing and offers the original the possibility to live on. In conclusion the paper suggests a proximity between translation and philosophy or, in a more specific way, between translation and deconstruction.