Esercizi Filosofici 12, 1-2 (2017)

The paper investigates the normative role of human agency in the capability approach of Amartya Sen. It argues for the centrality of the relational dimension of agency freedom with reference (a) to the formation and the critical scrutiny of value judgments, which underlie the choice of functionings and capabilities both individually and collectively, (b) to the process aspect of the formation of personal identity in terms of relational autonomy. According to Sen's emphasis on the importance of the agency freedom for the well-being acquisition, agency poverty understood as relational poverty turns out to be a causal factor in capability deprivation.

The concept of anthropotechnology represents one of the main aspects of the thought of Peter Sloterdijk. The aim of this paper is to examine the development of this concept through the analysis of the concerning texts: Eurotaoismus, Rules for the human zoo, You must change your life. At the same time, is underlined how Nietzsche’s works (especially Thus spoke Zarathustra and On the genealogy of morality) represent a very important source for the elaboration of this concept. Thus, one can fully appreciate its complexity and polyvalence, in its constant swinging between a theory of individual training and a theory of collective domestication.

In Althusser's late philosophy - aleatory materialism - there are two main theses: the contingency of necessity and the necessity of contingency. The paper aims at elucidating and discussing both. First, the relationship between aleatory materialism and Althusser's previous philosophy is clarified. Second, the meaning of aleatory encounter is exposed. Third, the definition of necessity as “the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies” is explained. Finally, the necessity of contingency is discussed through a comparison with Meillassoux’s speculative thought.

This paper analyses whether and, if so, how assertion can be said to be social from a speech-act theoretical point of view. In the first part, I will present a well-know argument put forth by Peter Pagin against standard analyses of assertion as a social act. In the second part, I will argue that, while Pagin’s argument poses serious problems to this kind of analyses, there is an alternative route one can take in characterizing the social nature of assertion. In particular, my aim will be to show that, on the basis of an Austin-inspired conception of illocutionary act, one can provide a specific kind of social approach to assertion and its effects that is immune to Pagin’s argument.