Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2018) XX/3

The idea of a preliminary commons – a sphere of common property prior to private property – is present in Kant’s philosophy of right where, with his theory of natural law, he first makes a move towards a still underdeveloped kind of ‘objective idealism’. But he cannot transform the idea of a preliminary commons into a theory of right that legitimates social institutions or a sphere of positive law because he soon turns back to the subjective idealism of his previous work in which he takes the world to be a transcendental construction of human subjects. Kant’s anthropocentrism and the highlighting of private property are a direct consequence of this subjective transcendentalism. Kant’s return to subjective idealism also makes it impossible for him to conceive a theory of right based on ‘serviceable stewardship’ and ‘responsibility’ rather than on private property. My claim is that in order to pass from a discourse of possession to one of responsibility it is necessary to emphasize and enlarge his theory of natural law which, I argue, tends towards ‘objective idealism’. Such idealism takes ‘objective reason’ to be manifesting itself in the world in an almost Hegelian way – and it is not confined to the subjective consciousness of humans. Things in the world can then be endowed with intrinsic rights. It is a further claim of this paper that a consequent theory of the commons needs this transcendental complement endowing things with intrinsic rights. Alternative positions like naturalism or subjective idealism place objects in a domain ‘beyond right’ condemning nonhuman beings to become merely potential private property. A remodelling of Kantianism would constitute the main layer of a renewed humanism based on an enlarged idea of community and a corresponding idea of responsibility for Being.

After having introduced some preliminary notions (including “good”, “obligation” etc.), this paper addresses the meaning and the structure of Hume’s Guillotine (GH). It distinguishes between GH1 (the prohibition of translating a normative sentence in a descriptive one) and GH2 (the prohibition of deriving normative conclusions from merely descriptive premises). Then it will investigate GH2 with respect to some formal languages and it will explain the possibility of introducing “bridge-principles” connecting the alethic domain to the deontic one. Moreover, it will call into question some traditional arguments introduced by scholars to overcome the two GH pillars and it will also offer more rigorous arguments for justifying the overcoming of GH. In particular, it will explore the nature of the link between “Ought” and “Is”. For this purpose, it drew attention to Hintikka’s “bridge.principle”, describing the obligation as a kind of necessity. More precisely, the proper necessity of obligation qualifies as the impossibility of providing a counter-example.

In this article I discuss some implications of Gauthier's bargaining theory. I think that the notion of constrained maximization is not only a strategic choice of maximization, but also a moral strategy between individuals from the beginning. I conclude that Rawls’s difference principle seems to respond better to a moral foundation of cooperation between individuals.

The case of Marius, a young giraffe suppressed in the name of species conservation in February 2014 at Copenhagen Zoo as a surplus, created both considerable media outcry and heated debate both in science and ethics. Debate that even today, after almost 5 years still has not subsided. In this contribution, we try to confront with the reiterated question ‘are zoos unethical?’, discussing ‘from the inside’ the presuppositions of specie conservation in zoos today. Following the main questions that have been raised on the web regarding the case of Marius, we suggest that in ethical relevant issues as Marius’ case, a standardized and contextualized ethical analysis on a case-by-case basis can be of help. By clarifying assumptions, considering the values at stake, the scientific aspects and the needs of the stakeholders involved, it is possible to improve the ethical decision-making process. This process can favor the transparency and consistency of the work of the zoos. The request for standardized ethical assessments through ethics committees and the use of tools for analysys has already emerged in different zoological context. If they want to continue to have support from society, it is mandatory for modern zoos to make a commitment to take directly into consideration the difficulties and uncertainties that distinguish the new social ethics for animals.