L’aggregazione di opinioni individuali per formare una decisione collettiva è l’oggetto di studio di Judgment Aggregation, una disciplina che coinvolge logica, economia, filosofia politica ed informatica. Il problema della presa di decisione collettiva a partire da posizioni individuali è comune nella vita di tutti i giorni e, sebbene la procedura da seguire sembri evidente, i risultati possono nascondere paradossi sorprendenti. La formalizzazione del problema dell’aggregazione di giudizi individuali ha permesso di portare un buon numero di risposte, di evidenziare legami con la teoria della scelta sociale e l’aggregazione di credenze, e di aprire la strada a nuove ricerche che permettono di applicare buona parte dei risultati ad altri paradigmi della decisione collettiva. Obiettivo di questo lavoro è di introdurre il problema dell’aggregazione di giudizi, motivare l’interesse per tali questioni, presentando i risultati principali ottenuti e indicando alcune delle piste di ricerca attuali.
Jean Hampton (1954-1996) was an influential voice in the landscape of US Philosophy of the second half of the 20th century. The majority of her writings falls within the sphere of Political Philosophy, although her interests ranged from Ethics to the Philosophy of Law, from the Rational Choice Theory to the History of Modern Philosophy and Feminism. In this context, I will analyse Hampton's contractarianism and her view of Liberal Feminism.
Science and democracy are unanimously considered the cornerstone of Western civilization. For this reason, one may assert that science and democracy are perfectly compatible. However, antiscientific movements are common both in the academic world and in public opinion; the most radical constructivists maintain that the alleged scientific truths are nothing but the outcome of social negotiations and power relations, while many people accuse scientific communities of being at the service of big corporations and established powers. The relationship between science and democracy has consequently become a much-debated issue. In recent years, we have even seen an exponential growth in literature on the subject. Pierluigi Barrotta’s book – Scienza e democrazia. Verità, fatti e valori in una prospettiva pragmatista – takes part in the actual debate, arguing that in a liberal democracy scientists and laypeople should be considered as members of a single community of inquirers whose objective is the truth.
Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), one of the most brilliant and outstanding philosophers among Brentano's pupils, is nowadayswidely discussed in analytic philosophy duetosome (relatively) recent developmentsof his fundamental ideas.In this introductive profile, after some notesabout Meinong's life (§ 1) and conception of philosophy as an inquiry about mental data (§ 2), I shall examine the main branches of his doctrine: the taxonomy of psychic phenomenaand the key-role played by representations (§3); the problem of empty representations, from which the Theory of Objects arises (§ 4); the objective foundation that this theory offers to practical philosophy and the central notion of value (§ 5). Finally, in § 6, I shall briefly present neo-Meinongian theories.
The debate around the perception of temporal properties, or Temporal Perception, is about explaining how it is possible to perceive unfolding events, like motion, change and rest, given that perceptual contents seem to be about single instants. This is indeed the heart of the Paradox of Temporal Experience, whose solutions (the snapshot theories, retentionalism and extensionalism) will be here assessed. Finally, our perceptive acts themselves enjoy temporal properties, and these play a role at solving the Paradox.