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Naturalismo e soggettività
Paternoster, Alfredo
2009
Abstract
Metaphysical naturalism (in the philosophy of mind) is the thesis according to which mental
states can be reduced to, and thereby explained by, neurophysiological states. In this paper I
discuss whether this thesis is plausible taking into consideration different kinds of mental
states: propositional attitudes, on the one hand, and phenomenal states, on the other. I shall
argue that, while metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes (beliefs,
desires etc.), it can be defended in the case of low-level phenomenal states, or raw feelings.
As a consequence, since the instantiation of high-order mental states requires the neurophysiological
mechanisms that constitute raw feelings, the notion of self has a biological
basis, and in this sense, we can speak of a “natural self”.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the first paragraph I shall focus
on the naturalization of paradigmatic intentional states (beliefs and desires). In
the second paragraph I move to the discussion of raw feelings and show the consequences
of my view for the notion of self.
Series
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XI (2009) 2
Subjects
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Alfredo Paternoster, "Naturalismo e soggettività", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XI (2009) 2, pp. 142-161.
Languages
en
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