To what extent are content externalism and epistemic internalism compatible?
The disputes between externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind and epistemology are revealed to be greatly intertwined. In this paper, I would like to defend the compatibility between content externalism and epistemic internalism, and then explore some of its potential consequences. More precisely, I have a twofold goal: first, I shall examine the widespread idea that content externalism is not compatible with epistemic internalism, and argue that, if the two theses are appropriately understood, then there is no real tension between them; second, I shall sketch some interesting effects that may hopefully come from the combination of content externalism and epistemic internalism, as that of accommodating the constitutive link between justification and truth.
vol. 11, n. 2 (2016)
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Cristina Amoretti, "To what extent are content externalism and epistemic internalism compatible?", in: Esercizi Filosofici, vol. 11, n. 2 (2016), pp. 63-77