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Williams’s Defense of Shame as a Moral Emotion
Fussi, Alessandra
2016-02-25
Abstract
Section 1 examines four reasons most commonly adduced to support the claim that guilt is superior to shame, both psychologically and morally: a) While guilt expresses a concern for others shame is a self-centered and selfish emotion. b) While guilt appeals to autonomy shame is linked to heteronomy. c) Shame is not a reactive attitude, like guilt, indignation, blame, resentment, but an objective attitude, like disdain or disgust. d) While guilt invites us to second-person responses, shame inhibits them. The second part of the paper (sections 2 and 3) addresses Williams’s analysis of the role of shame in ancient Greek literature and philosophy. Section 2 is dedicated to Williams’s response to the objections concerning selfishness and shallowness and to discussing his reply to the charge that since shame belongs to the objective attitudes it tends to inhibit second-person responses. Section 3 concentrates on Williams’s reflections on heteronomy by focusing on the attitude of others in shame and on the role played by the internalized other.
Series
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVII (2015) 2
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Alessandra Fussi, "Williams’s Defense of Shame as a Moral Emotion", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVII (2015) 2, pp.163-179
Languages
en
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