La politica estera italiana e la soluzione della questione di Trieste: gli accordi di Osimo del 1975
After World War II, political and diplomatic relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were characterized by misunderstandings, polemics and hostility, due mainly (though not exclusively) to the Trieste question, which was a long standing territorial dispute that divided the two Adriatic countries for decades. The article, which is based mainly on primary sources (such as Tito’s Archive in Belgrade and Aldo Moro’s Archive in Rome) as well as on relevant literature, argues that Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement, which led to the settlement of the Trieste question in 1975, became possible only due to the crucial domestic changes, which occurred in Italian politics during the Sixties. As the article also argues, it was Aldo Moro, a Christian-Democrat leader, several times Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister between 1963 and 1976, who played the crucial role in getting Italy and Yugoslavia closer. According to Moro, it was necessary to present the agreement with Yugoslavia not as an Italian renounce to zone B, because it was not possible to relinquish something that had not belonged to the country since the end of the War and the Peace Treaty, but to present it as a fi nal acquisition of benefi ts both territorial (zone A with Trieste which the Peace Treaty of 1947 had left outside of the national borders) as well as political and economic, through revival of friendship between Italy and Yugoslavia.
Qualestoria. Rivista di storia contemporanea. Anno XLI, N.ro 2, dicembre 2013
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Massimo Bucarelli, “La politica estera italiana e la soluzione della questione di Trieste: gli accordi di Osimo del 1975” in: “Qualestoria. Rivista di storia contemporanea. Anno XLI, N.ro 2, dicembre 2013”, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste,Trieste, 2013, pp. 33-54
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