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Paradossi scettici
Sgaravatti, Daniele
2013
Abstract
The aim of this entry is to introduce the reader to the debate on scepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy. I will consider two sorts of sceptical arguments, arguments that aim to show our lack of knowledge. The first kind of argument essentially involved the possibility of sceptical scenarios, scenarios in which our beliefs are false, although the appearances are the same they actually are. The second kind of argument aims to show that there is an internal incoherence in the idea of a sort of justification which falls short of deductive proof. Several replies to the challenge these arguments pose will be considered and discussed; in particular, I will consider an externalist reply, in the form defended by Tim Williamson, a “dogmatist” reply developed by Jim Pryor, and a reply, Wittgensteinean in inspiration, developed by Crispin Wright.
Journal
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Daniele Sgaravatti, "Paradossi scettici", in "APhEx 7", 2013, pp. 30
Languages
it
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