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Tropi
Morganti, Matteo
2012
Abstract
What kind of entity is a property? Should we conceive of properties as Platonic universals, such that, for example, all good men are in some sort of relation with the same entity, 'Goodness' in itself? Moreover, are objects constituted, as Locke suggested, by something over and above their properties - a 'substratum' that supports and unifies those properties? The idea that both universals and substrata exist may seem plausible at first. Trope theorists, however, are antirealists about universals and think that, except in language and thought, every property instance is nothing more than a unique particular. together with the rejection of substrata, this line of thought leads to the radical form of nominalism according to which reality is exclusively constituted by particular property instances. From the foregoing, a series of philosophical questions emerge.
Journal
Subjects
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Matteo Morganti, "Tropi", in "APhEx 5", 2012, pp. 18
Languages
it
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