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Paradossi dell'intenzionalità
Sbardolini, Giorgio
2018
Abstract
The paradoxes of intensionality differ from the set-theoretic as well as the truth-theoretic paradoxes. They include the paradoxes of Prior, of Kaplan, and of Russell-Myhill: paradoxes which afflict "naïve" theories of propositions and propositional attitudes (just like naive set theory is afflicted by Russell's paradox). The paradoxes of intensionality concern the formal foundations of semantic theory, and the logic of operators like "believe" and "assert". An account of these paradoxes raises questions about the nature of intensionality, the study of (hyper-) intensional logics, and the metaphysics of propositions.
Journal
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Giorgio Sbardolini, "Paradossi dell'intensionalità", in "APhEx 18", 2018, pp. 26
Languages
it
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