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RAWLS E ENOCH SU DISACCORDO E RAGIONI
Bocchiola, Michele
2016-05-09
Abstract
In this essay I discuss one of the objections raised by David Enoch in his recent Against Public Reason. According to Enoch, public-reason theorists misinterpret the role that rea-sons for the action play in the political sphere. Treating the most deeply held beliefs as mere preferences, public-reason theorists end up supporting a paternalistic view that vio-lates people’s freedom and equality. In this essay I try to dismiss this charge, without de-fending the idea of public reason.
The essay is divided into six parts. §1 introduces the problem with an example. §2 lays out the general idea of public reason. §3 illustrates Enoch’s objection. §4 briefly introduces standard responses to the objection and Enoch’s possible counter-arguments. §5, with the help of some formalization, explains how non-public reasons work, addresses Enoch’s ob-jection, and present some doubt on the idea of public reason. §6 concludes.
Series
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
(2016) XVIII/1
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Michele Bocchiola, "RAWLS E ENOCH SU DISACCORDO E RAGIONI", in: "Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2016) XVIII/1", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2016, pp. 69-88
Languages
it
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