Sensorimotor Enactivism (SE) claims that visual perception is a form of action. The aim of the present article is to offer a careful examination of the implications of this notion of visual perception in relation to the philosophical questions raised by the analysis of the contemporary theories of cognitive, motor and vision neuroscience. I will focus on the the different debates, concerning vision, that have been investigated by SE: the debate on conscious vision/visual consciousness and on its relation with action, the debate on the perception of objects' shape and size, the one about the presence of visual representations, the one about the relationship between vision and the other sensory modalities and about the neural correlates of visual experience. Finally, I will review the problems that the sensorimotor theory of vision proposed by enactivists faces with. Particular attention will be devoted to the experimental results that turn out to be relevant for these philosophical issues.
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Gabriele Ferretti, "Enattivismo sensomotorio", in "APhEx 13", 2016, pp. 56