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Il paradosso della conoscibilità
Fassio, Davide
2013
Abstract
The Knowability Paradox is a short argument whose conclusion is that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is also known. If one accepts the further plausible assumption that there are truths that as a matter of fact nobody knows, from the conclusion of the argument it is possible to derive that there are truths that it’s impossible to know. The argument has been considered by many as paradoxical insofar it seems to show the existence of necessary epistemic limitations from the mere contingent existence of ignorance. Furthermore, the conclusion of the paradox has been considered problematic for several philosophical theories such as the internal realism of Putnam and the semantic antirealism of Dummett and Wright, according to which every truth is knowable (at least in principle). The present contribution aims to provide an introduction to the paradox and to the philosophical debate about it. I will summarize the historical circumstances in which the paradox was originally formulated and present the various philosophical theories potentially threatened by it. I will then discuss the main reactions to the conclusion of the paradox and I will examine the criticisms addressed to it.
Journal
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Davide Fassio, "Il paradosso della conoscibilità", in "APhEx" 7, 2013, pp. 35
Languages
it
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