Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/10473
Title: “Assoluto e relativo”: una proposta metafisica contemporanea?
Authors: Bertolini, Simona
Keywords: Metaphysicsbeingtranscendentalfinitudeperson
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Simona Bertolini, “Assoluto e relativo”: una proposta metafisica contemporanea?", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVI (2014) 1, pp. 561-570
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVI (2014) 1
Abstract: Francesco Totaro’s book aims at developing a new metaphysical proposal, with the intention of unifying both the concept of absolute Being and the finitude of the human condition. Without ever overcoming the limits of possible experience or returning to old dogmatic metaphysics, the author leads his argumentation keeping the phenomenal point of view in which Being is always given in a relative and partial way: thinking metaphysically does not correspond to reaching an absolute knowledge or getting closer to it, but rather to seeing the phenomenal field and its variety from a comprehensive perspective. Doing so enables us to not give up this variety and at the same time gives us the possibility of finding a guideline thanks to which its fragmentation can be recomposed. Totaro employs this “dialectical” style of thought in several realms of problems, discussing other philosophical models and joining in ethical and anthropological contemporary debates. The solutions he proposes, based on his “phenomenological” metaphysics, always coincide with the attempt to respect the particular differences and to balance them in common horizons of meaning.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/10473
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2014) XVI/1

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