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Title: Is Truth Relevant? On the Relevance of Relevance
Authors: Becker, Thomas
Keywords: Truthrelevanceassertionnormvalue
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Thomas Becker, "Is Truth Relevant? On the Relevance of Relevance", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVI (2014) 2, pp. 595-618
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVI (2014) 2
An assertion can be a factual claim or the expression of a value judgment. Since Hume the view that these are two incompatible types of assertions that cannot be connected by argumentation, has often been defended, and, more recently, has also been called into question. In the following paper I attempt to show that the truth both of a descriptive sentence and of a normative sentence is derived from its “practical relevance”. The demand that an assertion must be true and must be based on knowledge of the asserter is derived from the demand that an assertion must be practically relevant to the addressee. On the basis of this claim I will sketch a model of what it me
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2014) XVI/2

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