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Title: Giochi dei beni pubblici: il problema dei beni pubblici nella prospettiva della teoria dei giochi
Authors: Cevolani, Gustavo
Festa, Roberto
Keywords: Public goodsgame theorycooperationprisoner’s dilemmaordered anarchyAnthony de Jasay
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa, "Giochi dei beni pubblici: il problema dei beni pubblici nella prospettiva della teoria dei giochi", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVI (2014) 2, pp. 1063-1101
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVI (2014) 2
The provision of public goods is an important problem in economics and the social sciences. It is often claimed that this problem has the structure of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma so that rational and self-interested individuals would not be able to provide any public good by spontaneous cooperation. In this paper, we argue that this pessimistic view of the possibility spontaneous cooperation is largely unjustified, since the game theoretic analysis of public goods shows how their voluntary provision is indeed feasible in a number of circumstances. We conclude by considering the implications of the game theoretic approach to the problem of public goods for political philosophy and, in particular, for the possibility of "ordered anarchy" as defended in the works of Anthony de Jasay.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2014) XVI/2

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