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Title: Virtue and Moral Deference
Authors: Driver, Julia
Keywords: virtuemoral deferencemoral understandingmoral worth
Issue Date: 25-Feb-2016
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Julia Driver, "Virtue and Moral Deference", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVII (2015) 2, pp.27-40
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVII (2015) 2
Abstract: Moral deference has come under attack for undercutting moral understanding, and thus, for undermining virtue. This essay defends the view that moral deference and virtue are not incompatible. Indeed, responsible moral deference is a kind of coping virtue, a trait that has value in counteracting either and agent's own deficiencies, or conditions that undermine the application of moral understanding in a particular practical situation (such as when the agent has insufficient time to deliberate).
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2015) XVII/2

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