Options
Virtue and Moral Deference
Driver, Julia
2016-02-25
Abstract
Moral deference has come under attack for undercutting moral understanding, and thus, for undermining virtue. This essay defends the view that moral deference and virtue are not incompatible. Indeed, responsible moral deference is a kind of coping virtue, a trait that has value in counteracting either and agent's own deficiencies, or conditions that undermine the application of moral understanding in a particular practical situation (such as when the agent has insufficient time to deliberate).
Series
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVII (2015) 2
Publisher
EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source
Julia Driver, "Virtue and Moral Deference", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVII (2015) 2, pp.27-40
Languages
en
File(s)