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Title: A Plea for Moral Deference
Authors: Sreenivasan, Gopal
Keywords: Moral deferencemoral expertisemoral virtueethicsvirtue ethics
Issue Date: 25-Feb-2016
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Gopal Sreenivasan, "A Plea for Moral Deference", in: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XVII (2015) 2, pp.41-59
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics
XVII (2015) 2
It seems to be a commonplace of the philosophical literature that there is no such thing as moral expertise. Or perhaps, more narrowly, that there is no such thing as justified deference to moral expertise, when there is moral expertise. On the other hand, a warrant for moral deference seems to have a secure place in everyday moral experience. It is illustrated, for example, by the ubiquitous phenomenon of taking moral advice (this includes a role for exemplars of individual moral virtues, but is not limited to exemplars of virtue). In this paper, I shall defend moral deference against overblown philosophical skepticism. I hope to contribute to rehabilitating the notion for some role in moral theory.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2015) XVII/2

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