Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Forgiveness and the limits of duty
Authors: Archer, Alfred
Keywords: Moral philosophylimits of dutyforgivenesssupererogationmoral demandingnessmoral obligation
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Alfred Archer "Forgiveness and the limits of duty" in "Etica & Politica / Ethics and Politics, (2017) XIX/1", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2017, pp. 225-244
Series/Report no.: Etica & Politica / Ethics and Politics
(2017) XIX/1
Can there be a duty to forgive those who have wronged us? According to a popular view amongst philosophers working on forgiveness the answer is no. Forgiveness, it is claimed, is always elective. This view is rejected by Gamlund (2010a; 2010b) who argues that duties to forgive do exist and then provides conditions that are relevant to determining whether for-giveness is obligatory or supererogatory. In this paper I will argue that the conditions that Gamlund provides do not provide a plausible account of the connection between for-giveness and duty. The problems I will raise against Gamlund’s view is a problem that faces any moral view that makes room for supererogation. I will then investigate whether the existing solutions to this problem provide a more plausible account of the connection between forgiveness and obligation. I will argue that the two most prominent solutions, The Favouring Reasons View and The Sacrifice View, produce implausible results when applied to the case of forgiveness. However, an alternative view, The Freedom View, can provide plausible results when applied to the case of forgiveness. This gives us defeasible reason to favour this as a general solution to The Problem of the Good Ought Tie-Up.
Type: Journal Issue
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2017) XIX/1

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
EP_2017_1_20_Archer.pdf187.69 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record

CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

checked on Oct 1, 2022


checked on Oct 1, 2022

Google ScholarTM


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons