Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/14805
Title: Why should I be moral? The impact of objectivism or non-objectivism on our commonsensical understanding of normative reasons for action
Authors: Songhorian, Sarah
Keywords: Normativityreasons for actionobjectivismnon-objectivismfolk morality
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Sarah Songhorian, “Why should I be moral? The impact of objectivism or non-objectivism on our commonsensical understanding of normative reasons for action”, in "Etica & Politica / Ethics and Politics, (2017) XIX/2", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2017, pp. 39-50
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to see what kind of implications would an objectivist or a non-objectivist response to the research of a foundation for moral normativity have on our commonsensical usage of moral terms and on our ability to justify our moral action trough normative reasons (1.). In order to see the implications of objectivists and non-objectivists perspectives, I will focus on how normative reasons ground and justify moral actions from a first-person perspective (2.).
From an objectivist viewpoint, reasons can be conceived of as referring to what objectively ought to be done. From a non-objectivist viewpoint, on the other hand, if we claim that there are no grounds to justify our moral beliefs that something is right or wrong, then either we believe the normative level is a beneficial illusion that will survive scepticism at the metaethical level, or we take this scepticism to debunk morality entirely (3.).
Type: Article
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10077/14805
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2017) XIX/2

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
EP_04_SONGHORIAN.pdf116.56 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record


CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

221
checked on Sep 27, 2021

Download(s) 10

215
checked on Sep 27, 2021

Google ScholarTM

Check


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons