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Title: Realism and Naturalisation in a Practical Reason Account
Authors: Reichlin, Massimo
Keywords: Moral realismconstructivismobjective reasonsevolutionary debunking
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste
Source: Massimo Reichlin, “Realism and Naturalisation in a Practical Reason Account”, in "Etica & Politica / Ethics and Politics, (2017) XIX/2", Trieste, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2017, pp. 141-157
The paper contends that moral realism entails the mind-independent truth of some moral judgements; but that the mind-independence of "moral facts" is only partly analogous to the mind-independence of physical facts. It is also argued that characteristic moral facts are those relative to the character and dispositions of persons, which supervene on psychologi-cal facts. Along with these evaluative facts there are also deontic facts, concerning the rea-sons for or against embarking on some course of action; these are based on natural facts concerning human beings and the effects of certain actions on their well-being and disposi-tions. These facts about human beings are not immediately moral facts, but necessarily as-sume a moral significance for any rational individual reflecting on them. So, there are ob-jective reasons for action, as contended by moral realism, even though actual obligation presupposes the reflective endorsement of these objective reasons into our subjective sys-tem of intentions. Finally, some standard objections are discussed to this moderate realistic account.
Type: Article
ISSN: 1825-5167
Appears in Collections:Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2017) XIX/2

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